{"assessments":[],"deployments":[],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent 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custom token: Prediction Markets Run by AI Agents (VERDICT).\nToken name: Prediction Markets Run by AI Agents\nToken symbol: VERDICT\nToken supply: 1,000,000,000 with 18 decimals, all minted once to the deployer in the constructor.","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"bad43b4c57ebc4fe12ae79e5c5c9b29e1daa84c9dc8f91ff2c3c2f1b76620a9d","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"b2a646bb-5c85-4eab-8b7a-3cb4905203dd","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-1352-prediction-markets-run-by-ai-agents"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"51304","feedbackHash":"fc7dcb1dbd18e6a19bb041c640f1eed8ec234984b77e7701081f7ed694ca8991","nodeKey":"audit_economics","submissionHash":"2f431f4df8c360a2c8694613d01acc633c06a3760c27dce58da78e35670e6c76","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51040","feedbackHash":"5178a3dbd21b619ae122515f34aa0121c005087224c8b8e5b2c14c9fe7ee166c","nodeKey":"audit_flow","submissionHash":"915b32ce50999c94c8bc3b575697e1c40ae868657bdc0cb21c9c5218e009617e","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52396","feedbackHash":"771ab294d8c1061891e12a56c73674bc81302e91e7c141d4fb62e29d4a587c9e","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"356523ac6476f4b29aa590df2ad5b8edba15eb671c3f19c6a8fce90f2cd3b7da","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52150","feedbackHash":"e355e5de05a933ad884cb3c0174cfbc33439c6787fa6a1a1113bcbe57f2ee943","nodeKey":"audit_math","submissionHash":"4e4e0c14e1cbb60b84edf91bc53bc1b999a3df40f8d7e623557424c303e8b2b3","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52169","feedbackHash":"046821fb835d349b7131de110a85bb52063382bf63ee40acd2bb6710a6200baf","nodeKey":"audit_permissions","submissionHash":"ddf9feda716d806799d6c9a990875e1ee133e9ab5108a880dd4c0ad56c31cdea","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52641","feedbackHash":"9d6b3a74d064d1de568d60d6b4befdb59d4b955cea0538a6d4335ab10d959d8a","nodeKey":"build_contract_project","submissionHash":"bb3e3e0206a0a0137e544139ef5f2ee90b18276c471df1a1a6b3189dd710b7e2","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52644","feedbackHash":"4991dc7adc8db8abfd971c40bbea4218defb6a4af03db3ca0721ca0bea991c5e","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"08656514e830d7770c8438f60ff3818e55917a316d9617075d6047c2255f61f9","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52647","feedbackHash":"b838c966b50236841324d8e9e2b37cb8396db2e19767fd667c674b5d81aa5cd8","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"ae082ff57412975471c429d24f4b896d0a8a84d17a67a143e5368ac51157eb73","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"7cd544bf2346f5ca2af4b6e3478726a1b2aee89b08103ef0b819eda255a7a84d","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"e084cf528c7283d5e4c0ef90244b4a162e6581637d5793b32fd6977684bb133b","device":"fd858f647b25d72d","findings":[],"hash":"08656514e830d7770c8438f60ff3818e55917a316d9617075d6047c2255f61f9","nodeId":"52b1825e-4d1e-4a88-99ee-e03859e54d58","outcome":"completed","summary":"Created [launch.json](/home/seat/.identitymd/work/b2a646bb-5c85-4eab-8b7a-3cb4905203dd/52b1825e-4d1e-4a88-99ee-e03859e54d58/launch.json) matching `VerdictToken`, its constructor supply, and the exact pool and economics values.\n\nVerified manifest fields and constructor ABI. `forge build` succeeded; `forge test` passed all 46 tests. Only `launch.json` is changed for submission.","treeHash":"60510442bc9acbd93fed65f5e8bc58e6f8d9d18f","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":183552,"inputTokens":31566,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":1927,"runtime":"codex","turns":3,"wallClockMs":54633}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"4be5e039e1c77ce3","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"transferFrom never checks that `from` is a real sender. Because `_allowances[address(0)][anyone]` is 0 and `_balances[address(0)]` is 0, an amount of 0 passes both the allowance check (0 < 0 is false) and the balance check, so `_transfer(address(0), to, 0)` runs and emits `Transfer(address(0), to, 0)`. The project's own interface (src/interfaces/IERC20.sol line 7: 'A mint has `from == address(0)`') and README state that the constructor is the only mint, yet any unprivileged caller can produce an event with the mint signature after deployment. No balance or supply changes (conservation holds: sum of balances stays 1e27), so this is a reporting/indexing nuisance, not a loss: explorers and indexers that classify Transfer-from-zero as mints will record phantom zero-value mints attributed to arbitrary recipients. OpenZeppelin v5 rejects this input with ERC20InvalidSender. Suggested minimal fix: `if (from == address(0)) revert ERC20InvalidSender(address(0));` in _transfer (or in transferFrom), which preserves every intended behaviour.","line":104,"path":"src/VerdictToken.sol","reproduction":"State: fresh VerdictToken deployed by D (D holds 1e27). Call from any address A (no allowance, no balance): token.transferFrom(address(0), address(0xCAFE), 0). Expected (per the interface's 'from == address(0) is a mint' and the fixed-supply design): revert. Actual: returns true and emits Transfer(from=0x0, to=0xCAFE, value=0); totalSupply stays 1e27 and balanceOf(0xCAFE) stays 0. Verified with a scratch Foundry test using vm.prank(A) and vm.expectEmit on Transfer(address(0), 0xCAFE, 0).","severity":"info","snippet":"    function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        uint256 current = _allowances[from][msg.sender];\n        if (current != type(uint256).max) {","title":"transferFrom accepts from == address(0) and lets anyone emit a zero-value mint-shaped Transfer event"}],"hash":"2f431f4df8c360a2c8694613d01acc633c06a3760c27dce58da78e35670e6c76","nodeId":"952fe0e3-72eb-42a3-aeb8-ff64c40a70b1","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and `.imd-findings.json` is written in the repository root. The tree is otherwise unchanged.\n\n**Outcome.** The VERDICT token is a minimal fixed-supply ERC-20 with no owner, minter, fee, burn, pause or blacklist. Against the Economic Security, Invariant and Flow Gap guides I found no defect that costs anyone funds. One info-level deviation is reported with a reproduction.\n\n**What I checked**\n- Conservation: sum of balances equals the constant 1e27 supply. The constructor is the only crediting-only write, and the internal transfer debits and credits the same amount. The existing invariant and fuzz suites pass, plus my own probes for self-transfer, zero-amount, max-allowance and exact-allowance paths.\n- Launch flows: no fee, tax, reflection, burn or exemption list, so the factory-to-distributor, factory-to-pool, claim and PoolManager settle paths move exactly the stated amounts. The v4 protected test could not be run here because v4-core is not vendored in this tree, so that row rests on the source trace and the LaunchFlow tests.\n- Privileged surface: no admin selector exists, unknown selectors revert, and the runtime holds no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT. The constructor takes no arguments and mints to msg.sender, which is the factory.\n- The manifest does not exist yet. The README's declared values match the source.\n\n**The one finding (info).** `transferFrom` never checks that `from` is a real sender. Any unprivileged caller can run `transferFrom(address(0), X, 0)` with no allowance and emit a `Transfer(0x0, X, 0)` event, which carries the mint signature the project's own interface documents. No balance or supply changes, so it is an indexing nuisance rather than a loss. The suggested fix is a single `from == address(0)` revert, matching OpenZeppelin v5.\n\n**Coverage.** All three listed entry points have rows: approve holds, transfer holds, transferFrom points to finding 1. Four extra rows record the invariants and flow checks above.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":618480,"inputTokens":290,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":9052,"runtime":"claude","turns":10,"wallClockMs":188774}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"f9a9196633a6ffa8","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_flow, audit_math, audit_permissions and audit_economics (same root cause, one finding). `_transfer` (src/VerdictToken.sol:122-133) rejects a zero `to` but never a zero `from`, and `transferFrom` (line 104) passes `from` through unchecked. The zero address can never call `approve`, so `_allowances[address(0)][msg.sender]` is 0, and it never holds tokens, so `_balances[address(0)]` is 0. With `amount == 0` both guards clear: line 107 `current < amount` is `0 < 0` (false), line 125 `fromBalance < amount` is `0 < 0` (false). The function then performs two no-op writes and emits `Transfer(address(0), to, 0)`. The project's own interface documents that shape as a mint (src/interfaces/IERC20.sol:7 'A mint has `from == address(0)`') and the README states the constructor is the only mint, yet any unprivileged account can log a zero-value 'mint' to an arbitrary address after deployment. No balance, allowance or totalSupply changes, so there is no loss of funds and no launch-flow impact (no launch flow calls transferFrom with a zero `from`); the impact is on off-chain consumers (explorers, indexers, mint/holder analytics, event-driven monitors) that classify transfers by `from == address(0)`, plus address-poisoning spam. OpenZeppelin ERC20 reverts on this path with ERC20InvalidSender(address(0)). Reproduced: both specialist proofs (Proof_5b3115bc9368.t.sol, Proof_e14246bd4afe.t.sol) fail on the current code for exactly this reason ('next call did not revert as expected' / 'transferFrom(address(0), victim, 0) succeeded'). Minimal fix preserving intended behaviour: add `error ERC20InvalidSender(address sender);` and `if (from == address(0)) revert ERC20InvalidSender(address(0));` at the top of `_transfer`. Severity low: a concrete, anyone-can-trigger deviation from the documented event semantics, but with no on-chain effect on funds or supply.","line":123,"path":"src/VerdictToken.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {VerdictToken} from \"src/VerdictToken.sol\";\n\n/// @notice Fails on the current code: transferFrom with a zero `from` and zero amount succeeds and emits\n///         Transfer(address(0), attacker, 0). Passes once _transfer (or transferFrom) rejects from == address(0).\ncontract ZeroSenderEventTest is Test {\n    VerdictToken token;\n    address attacker = makeAddr(\"attacker\");\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        token = new VerdictToken();\n    }\n\n    function test_transferFromZeroSenderReverts() public {\n        vm.prank(attacker);\n        vm.expectRevert();\n        token.transferFrom(address(0), attacker, 0);\n        assertEq(token.totalSupply(), 1_000_000_000e18);\n        assertEq(token.balanceOf(attacker), 0);\n    }\n}","reproduction":"State: freshly deployed VerdictToken (deployer holds 1e27). Caller: any address A (e.g. 0xA77A) with no balance and no allowance. Call from A: token.transferFrom(address(0), 0xBEEF, 0). Expected (per IERC20.sol:7 'a mint has from == address(0)', the fixed-supply design, and OpenZeppelin semantics): revert. Actual: returns true and emits Transfer(from=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000, to=0xBEEF, value=0); totalSupply() stays 1000000000000000000000000000, balanceOf(0xBEEF) stays 0. Control: token.transferFrom(address(0), 0xBEEF, 1) from A reverts with ERC20InsufficientAllowance(A, 0, 1). Verified by running the two attached specialist proofs under test/scratch/: `forge test --match-path 'test/scratch/Proof_*'` reports 2 failing tests on the current code, both because the call succeeded.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (to == address(0)) revert ERC20InvalidReceiver(address(0));\n        uint256 fromBalance = _balances[from];\n        if (fromBalance < amount) revert ERC20InsufficientBalance(from, fromBalance, amount);","title":"transferFrom accepts from == address(0) with amount 0, so any caller can emit a mint-shaped Transfer(address(0), x, 0) event"}],"hash":"356523ac6476f4b29aa590df2ad5b8edba15eb671c3f19c6a8fce90f2cd3b7da","nodeId":"9a87b1c4-a357-45b5-bd30-686b1d667335","outcome":"completed","summary":"The findings file is in place and the tree is otherwise untouched. The review is complete.\n\n**Outcome.** One finding, low severity, written to `.imd-findings.json` with a coverage record for all three entry points plus the constructor and manifest.\n\n**The finding.** All four specialists reported the same root cause, and I merged them into one. The `_transfer` helper rejects a zero receiver but never a zero sender. Because the zero address holds nothing and can never approve anyone, a zero amount clears both the allowance and balance guards. Any unprivileged caller can therefore make the token emit a zero-value Transfer from the zero address, which the project's own interface defines as a mint. I reproduced it by running both specialists' attached proofs against the tree. Both failed because the call succeeded instead of reverting. No balance, allowance or supply changes, so I kept it at low rather than promoting it.\n\n**What else I checked and found sound.**\n- `approve` rejects a zero spender and only writes the caller's own row.\n- `transfer` cannot hit the zero-sender path because the sender is always the caller. Self-transfers preserve the balance.\n- `transferFrom` handles unlimited allowance correctly and restores the allowance when the balance check reverts.\n- The constructor is argument-free and mints the constant supply to the deployer, so it deploys unchanged under the factory's CREATE2 flow. Runtime and creation code are far under the size limits.\n- The manifest matches the code: empty constructor arguments, supply equal to one billion times ten to the eighteenth, decimals 18, lowercase addresses.\n\nThe Aderyn large-numeric-literal lead is the constant supply expression and is not a defect. Scratch tests were removed after use.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":482545,"inputTokens":258,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":9050,"runtime":"claude","turns":21,"wallClockMs":186069}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"e764f15311426447","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Boundary (sentinel-address) check from the assigned area. _transfer rejects the zero address as receiver but never as sender, and transferFrom lets any caller name address(0) as `from`. With amount 0 every guard passes: allowance of address(0) to the caller is 0 and `0 < 0` is false, the balance of address(0) is 0 and `0 < 0` is false, so the function succeeds and emits Transfer(address(0), to, 0). Indexers and explorers that classify a Transfer whose `from` is the zero address as a mint record a phantom zero-value mint for an arbitrary `to`, attributed to a token whose supply is documented as fixed. No balance, allowance or supply changes: with any amount > 0 the call reverts with ERC20InsufficientAllowance(caller, 0, amount) before reaching the balance check, so funds are never at risk. EIP-20 does not forbid this, but OpenZeppelin's ERC20 reverts with ERC20InvalidSender(address(0)) on this path, which is the minimal fix if the author wants event streams free of spoofed mints: add `if (from == address(0)) revert ERC20InvalidSender(address(0));` at the top of _transfer (or reject it in transferFrom). Reported at info because the impact is limited to off-chain event interpretation.","line":123,"path":"src/VerdictToken.sol","reproduction":"State: freshly deployed VerdictToken, any caller `alice` with no balance and no allowance. Call: vm.prank(alice); token.transferFrom(address(0), bob, 0). Expected (per the contract's own \"a mint has from == address(0)\" documentation in IERC20.sol and OpenZeppelin semantics): revert as an invalid sender. Actual: returns true and emits Transfer(from=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000, to=bob, value=0); totalSupply() stays 1000000000000000000000000000 and balanceOf(bob) stays 0. Control: vm.prank(alice); token.transferFrom(address(0), bob, 1) reverts with ERC20InsufficientAllowance(alice, 0, 1). Verified with a scratch Foundry test using vm.expectEmit(true,true,true,true) on Transfer(address(0), bob, 0).","severity":"info","snippet":"        if (to == address(0)) revert ERC20InvalidReceiver(address(0));\n        uint256 fromBalance = _balances[from];\n        if (fromBalance < amount) revert ERC20InsufficientBalance(from, fromBalance, amount);","title":"transferFrom accepts from == address(0) with amount 0 and emits a mint-shaped Transfer(0, to, 0) event"}],"hash":"4e4e0c14e1cbb60b84edf91bc53bc1b999a3df40f8d7e623557424c303e8b2b3","nodeId":"11d54b35-07d3-4dc9-9ec9-73b334660639","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and the findings file is written. The working tree shows no tracked changes, since the findings file is ignored by git and the scratch directory is removed.\n\n**Result: no math, boundary or numerical-gap defect found in VerdictToken; one informational note recorded.**\n\nThe token at `src/VerdictToken.sol` is a 135-line fixed-supply ERC-20 with no division, no multiplication by user input, no narrowing casts, no external calls, no payable paths and no bytes decoding. Almost every failure mode in the three assigned guides has nothing to attach to. What remained was checked concretely:\n\n- **Unchecked arithmetic** in `_transfer` and `transferFrom` is guarded by the preceding balance and allowance checks, and the unchecked add cannot overflow because balances always sum to the 1e27 constant. Self-transfer of a whole balance, zero amounts, max-uint amounts, allowance of max minus one, and allowance above balance all behave as intended.\n- **Supply literal** flagged by aderyn evaluates to exactly 1e27 at compile time. Not a defect.\n- **Conservation invariant** holds under the repository's invariant suite and an additional 256-run fuzz over all three entry points.\n- **Informational finding**: `transferFrom(address(0), to, 0)` succeeds from any caller and emits a mint-shaped zero-value Transfer event. No balance, allowance or supply changes, and any positive amount reverts on allowance. OpenZeppelin rejects this sender; the fix is a one-line zero-sender check. Reported at info only.\n\nCoverage rows answer all three listed entry points plus four invariant and boundary rows. Build and the full suite of 46 tests pass with Foundry 1.8.5 and solc 0.8.26.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":569471,"inputTokens":226,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":10456,"runtime":"claude","turns":22,"wallClockMs":141152}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"df74f6c887684f20","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"_transfer validates `to` but never `from`. The zero address can never call approve (msg.sender is never address(0) on chain) so its allowance to everyone is 0, and it holds 0 tokens. With amount == 0 both guards clear: in transferFrom line 107 `current < amount` is `0 < 0` (false), in _transfer line 125 `fromBalance < amount` is `0 < 0` (false). The function then writes 0 and emits `Transfer(address(0), to, 0)`, which is the ERC-20 shape of a mint, from an arbitrary unprivileged caller against an arbitrary recipient. No balance or supply changes, so there is no loss of funds and no launch-flow impact; the effect is a spoofable mint event for indexers, explorers and address-poisoning spam, which OpenZeppelin ERC20 rejects with ERC20InvalidSender. Reported at info since it is cosmetic on-chain; minimal fix preserving intended behaviour: add `error ERC20InvalidSender(address sender);` and `if (from == address(0)) revert ERC20InvalidSender(address(0));` at the top of _transfer (verified: the attached proof then passes and the existing 46 tests are unaffected by the rule since no test transfers from the zero address).","line":122,"path":"src/VerdictToken.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {VerdictToken} from \"src/VerdictToken.sol\";\n\n/// @notice Anyone can make the token emit `Transfer(address(0), victim, 0)` — the shape of a mint —\n///         by calling `transferFrom(address(0), victim, 0)`. `approve` can never be called by the zero\n///         address, so its allowance is 0, and 0 >= 0 clears the allowance check; the zero address holds\n///         0, and 0 >= 0 clears the balance check; `_transfer` only rejects a zero `to`, never a zero\n///         `from`. Fails on the current code (the call succeeds); passes once `_transfer` rejects\n///         `from == address(0)`.\ncontract ZeroSenderScratch is Test {\n    VerdictToken token;\n    address attacker = address(0xA77A);\n    address victim = address(0xBEEF);\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        token = new VerdictToken();\n    }\n\n    function test_transferFromZeroAddressIsRejected() public {\n        vm.prank(attacker);\n        (bool ok,) = address(token).call(abi.encodeCall(VerdictToken.transferFrom, (address(0), victim, 0)));\n        assertFalse(ok, \"transferFrom(address(0), victim, 0) succeeded: anyone can emit a mint-shaped Transfer event\");\n        assertEq(token.totalSupply(), 1_000_000_000e18);\n        assertEq(token.balanceOf(victim), 0);\n    }\n}","reproduction":"State: fresh VerdictToken, any caller A (e.g. 0xA77A) with no balance and no allowance. Call from A: token.transferFrom(address(0), 0xBEEF, 0). Expected (OpenZeppelin semantics and the contract's own NatSpec that a `from == address(0)` Transfer denotes a mint): revert. Actual: returns true and emits Transfer(from=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000, to=0xBEEF, value=0); totalSupply and all balances unchanged. With amount >= 1 the call correctly reverts with ERC20InsufficientAllowance(A, 0, amount).","severity":"info","snippet":"    function _transfer(address from, address to, uint256 amount) private {\n        if (to == address(0)) revert ERC20InvalidReceiver(address(0));\n        uint256 fromBalance = _balances[from];\n        if (fromBalance < amount) revert ERC20InsufficientBalance(from, fromBalance, amount);","title":"transferFrom accepts from == address(0) with amount 0: anyone can emit a mint-shaped Transfer(address(0), victim, 0) event"}],"hash":"915b32ce50999c94c8bc3b575697e1c40ae868657bdc0cb21c9c5218e009617e","nodeId":"ac4b10d1-276d-4610-ab81-13909876d29e","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. The findings file is written at `.imd-findings.json` with one substantiated finding and a full coverage record. No repository files were changed; the only writes are the findings file and scratch tests under `test/scratch/`.\n\n**What I covered**\n\nI applied the Senior Auditor's Mindset and the three assigned guides to `src/VerdictToken.sol`, its interface, the deploy script and the vendored forge-std. I traced every entry point from call to final state, checked the launch flows against the protected floor test, and ran the existing suite, which passes all 46 tests. I also checked the compiled ABI, formatting and runtime size.\n\n**Finding (info)**\n\n`transferFrom(address(0), victim, 0)` succeeds from any caller. The zero address can never approve anyone, so its allowance is zero, and it holds nothing. With a zero amount both guards clear, and `_transfer` only rejects a zero recipient, never a zero sender. The result is a `Transfer` event from the zero address, which is the ERC-20 shape of a mint, emitted at will against any recipient. No balance or supply changes, so I rated it info. OpenZeppelin rejects this case with `ERC20InvalidSender`. I attached a proof test that fails on the current code and verified it passes against a scratch copy carrying the one-line fix. No existing test transfers from the zero address, so the fix would not disturb the suite.\n\n**What holds**\n\n- `approve` rejects a zero spender, overwrites rather than adds, and only touches the caller's own allowances.\n- `transfer` and `transferFrom` deliver exactly the stated amount, revert on insufficient balance or allowance, handle self-transfer correctly, and the unchecked math is bounded by the constant supply.\n- The constructor takes no arguments, calls nothing, and mints exactly one billion tokens with 18 decimals to the deployer, which is the factory under CREATE2.\n- There is no owner, mint, pause, blacklist, burn, receive, fallback, DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT, so the launch floor's refusals do not apply.\n- Launch flows arrive whole, so the swarm share, pool seed, swaps and remainder need no exemptions, and empty constructor arguments in the manifest are correct.\n\n**Static analysis leads**\n\nSlither reported nothing. Aderyn's large-numeric-literal note at line 30 is the intended supply constant and is not a defect.\n\n**Not reached**\n\nNothing in the assigned area was left unreached. I did not run long fuzz campaigns beyond the project's configured 256 fuzz runs and 64 invariant runs.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":588074,"inputTokens":290,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":14290,"runtime":"claude","turns":25,"wallClockMs":230882}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"2c8505cf3f362ec6c96425d7437a4718a030ba34e250e6145ce137e18e13502c","device":"db7554a772b3fbf3","findings":[],"hash":"ae082ff57412975471c429d24f4b896d0a8a84d17a67a143e5368ac51157eb73","nodeId":"5b3fe6cc-eddf-430b-975c-0a3bb3cf4c34","outcome":"completed","summary":"Added 24 edge-case and failure-path tests, plus stronger balance and allowance invariants covering 16,384 random calls.\n\n`forge build` and the full `forge test` pass: **70 passed, 0 failed**.\n\nOnly `test/` changed. No implementation defects found.","treeHash":"dbc02a1d8336766b791f93e7430168fd93a9740b","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1010176,"inputTokens":82864,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":15038,"runtime":"codex","turns":6,"wallClockMs":411138}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"6ce5a8b9051c2bcb3f13007b2d8251e2257ed0e93d6882f1d1aa9419d9c26aa0","device":"803eeae3d8b63de3","findings":[],"hash":"bb3e3e0206a0a0137e544139ef5f2ee90b18276c471df1a1a6b3189dd710b7e2","nodeId":"75de64b0-f243-448b-863c-9f6bba802950","outcome":"completed","summary":"The deliverable is complete and committed on `main` as commit `e2dc8e9`. Build, tests and format check all pass from a fresh clone with no network and an empty environment.\n\n**What was built**\n\n- `src/VerdictToken.sol` is a plain fixed-supply ERC-20. Its name is \"Prediction Markets Run by AI Agents\", symbol VERDICT, 18 decimals. The constructor takes no arguments and mints the whole supply to the deployer once. The supply is a compile-time constant, so no code path can change it.\n- The token has no owner, mint, pause, blacklist, freeze, fee, burn, receive or fallback. Only a holder or an approved spender can move a balance, which satisfies the protected launch floor.\n- `script/DeployVerdictToken.s.sol` exposes a plain function the tests call directly, with a broadcasting wrapper for manual rehearsals.\n- `README.md` documents assumptions, the manifest values, the expected supply split, operational responsibilities, and that nothing needs setting after launch.\n\n**Tests** (46 passing across four suites)\n\n- ERC-20 behaviour with success and failure paths for transfer, approve and transferFrom, plus fuzzed conservation checks.\n- Safety: the ten admin and twelve privileged selectors from the protected test all revert for a stranger and for the deployer, the runtime has no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT, and it fits EIP-170.\n- Launch flow: CREATE2 deployment from a factory stand-in, the 10/80/10 payout arriving whole, and pool buys and sells returning exactly what they say.\n- Invariants: sum of balances always equals the supply under random transfers and allowance pulls.\n\n**Dependency note**\n\nGitHub and jsDelivr were blocked by the proxy, so forge-std 1.9.7 was taken from the npm package `@layerzerolabs/toolbox-foundry`, which ships a verbatim copy. It is committed under `lib/forge-std` as plain files, not a submodule, and only tests and the script use it.\n\n**Open items for the launch's deployer**\n\n- Explorer verification after deployment with the pinned settings in `foundry.toml`.\n- No static analyser was available here, so none ran.","treeHash":"73a799fe6302fb08b24a896908be762c15c5702b","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1033381,"inputTokens":546,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":32470,"runtime":"claude","turns":35,"wallClockMs":408928}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"e8816d4386532a66","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Asymmetry (approve <-> transferFrom, and _transfer's receiver check <-> its missing sender check). `approve` rejects a zero spender (line 96) and `_transfer` rejects a zero receiver (line 123), but neither `transferFrom` nor `_transfer` rejects a zero `from`. The zero address never holds a balance and never grants an allowance, so `_allowances[address(0)][msg.sender]` is 0 and `_balances[address(0)]` is 0; with `amount == 0` both guards (`current < amount`, `fromBalance < amount`) pass and `_transfer` emits `Transfer(address(0), to, 0)`. The project's own interface documents a Transfer from the zero address as a mint (src/interfaces/IERC20.sol:7), and the constructor is meant to be the only emitter of such an event. Any unprivileged account can therefore make the token log a zero-value 'mint' to an arbitrary address. Balances and totalSupply are unaffected, so there is no loss of funds; the impact is limited to off-chain consumers (explorers, indexers, mint/holder analytics, event-driven monitors) that classify transfers by `from == address(0)`. OpenZeppelin's ERC20 reverts here with ERC20InvalidSender(address(0)). Minimal fix that preserves intended behaviour: add `if (from == address(0)) revert ERC20InvalidSender(address(0));` at the top of `_transfer` (a new error, mirroring ERC20InvalidReceiver). This cannot affect any launch flow because no launch flow ever calls transferFrom with a zero `from`.","line":104,"path":"src/VerdictToken.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {VerdictToken} from \"src/VerdictToken.sol\";\n\n/// @notice Fails on the current code: transferFrom with a zero `from` and zero amount succeeds and emits\n///         Transfer(address(0), attacker, 0). Passes once _transfer (or transferFrom) rejects from == address(0).\ncontract ZeroSenderEventTest is Test {\n    VerdictToken token;\n    address attacker = makeAddr(\"attacker\");\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        token = new VerdictToken();\n    }\n\n    function test_transferFromZeroSenderReverts() public {\n        vm.prank(attacker);\n        vm.expectRevert();\n        token.transferFrom(address(0), attacker, 0);\n    }\n}","reproduction":"State: freshly deployed VerdictToken, attacker = any EOA with no balance and no allowance. Call, from attacker: token.transferFrom(address(0), attacker, 0). Expected (per the interface's 'a mint has from == address(0)' and the symmetry with approve's zero-spender and _transfer's zero-receiver checks): revert. Actual: returns true and emits Transfer(from=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000, to=attacker, value=0); totalSupply stays 1e27 and balanceOf(attacker) stays 0. Verified with test/scratch/ZeroSenderEvent.t.sol: test_transferFromZeroSenderReverts fails with 'next call did not revert as expected'; test_currentBehaviour_emitsMintShapedEvent passes with vm.expectEmit on Transfer(address(0), attacker, 0).","severity":"low","snippet":"    function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        uint256 current = _allowances[from][msg.sender];\n        if (current != type(uint256).max) {\n            if (current < amount) revert ERC20InsufficientAllowance(msg.sender, current, amount);","title":"transferFrom accepts the zero address as `from`, so any caller can emit a mint-shaped Transfer(address(0), x, 0) event"}],"hash":"ddf9feda716d806799d6c9a990875e1ee133e9ab5108a880dd4c0ad56c31cdea","nodeId":"73033281-c959-45b7-aca2-174fefd7e6b6","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and the findings file is in place at the repository root.\n\n**Outcome.** The VERDICT token is a minimal fixed-supply ERC-20 with no owner, no roles, no initializer, no proxy, and no fallback. Its state-changing surface is exactly the three ERC-20 actions, and the access-control and trust-gap guides find nothing privileged to abuse. One asymmetry defect was substantiated and reported.\n\n**Finding 1 (low).** `transferFrom` has no zero-sender guard. `approve` rejects a zero spender and `_transfer` rejects a zero receiver, but nothing rejects `from == address(0)`. Since the zero address holds no balance and grants no allowance, both guards pass for a zero amount, and any unprivileged caller can emit `Transfer(address(0), x, 0)`. The project's own interface documents a Transfer from the zero address as a mint, so this spoofs a mint-shaped event for indexers and monitors. Balances and supply are untouched, so no funds are at risk. The proof test in the findings file fails on the current code and passes against a patched copy that reverts on a zero sender.\n\n**Coverage.** All three listed entry points have rows: `approve` holds, `transfer` holds, `transferFrom` carries finding 1. Extra rows cover the constructor's mint and role handout, the absence of any role, modifier, proxy, receive or fallback, the trust-gap seams, and the launch floor (exact transfers for factory, PoolManager and distributor, constant supply, privileged calls all reverting). The protected launch test itself could not be run here because Uniswap v4 core is not vendored, so that row rests on tracing rather than execution.\n\n**Leads not promoted.** The approve race is standard ERC-20 and documented in the README. The aderyn large-literal lead is the correct constant 1e27. No source files were changed; scratch tests live only under the ignored `test/scratch/` directory.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":561250,"inputTokens":258,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":13123,"runtime":"claude","turns":26,"wallClockMs":229225}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":1311,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 27 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 1.22s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":253,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 8 tests for test/VerdictTokenSafety.t.sol:VerdictTokenSafetyTest\n[PASS] test_creationCodeHasNoConstructorArguments() (gas: 413824)\n[PASS] test_deployerHasNoSpecialPowersAfterSpendingItsBalance() (gas: 96492)\n[PASS] test_noCommonAdminCallIncreasesSupply() (gas: 726903)\n[PASS] test_noPrivilegedHandMovesOrFreezesAHolder() (gas: 474530)\n[PASS] test_noReceiveOrFallbackSoEtherCannotBeStranded() (gas: 39651)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeFitsEip170() (gas: 8166)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoDelegatecallCallcodeOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 1699361)\n[PASS] test_unknownSelectorsRevert() (gas: 51488)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 3.72ms (4.33ms CPU time)\n\nRan 8 tests for test/LaunchFlow.t.sol:LaunchFlowTest\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_factoryMovesMoreThanTheSupply() (gas: 38888)\n[PASS] test_create2AddressIsPredictable() (gas: 9361)\n[PASS] test_create2DeploymentMintsWholeSupplyToTheFactory() (gas: 31405)\n[PASS] test_deployScriptMintsToItsCaller() (gas: 885814)\n[PASS] test_fullPayoutSplitsExactlyAndSumsToSupply() (gas: 218306)\n[PASS] test_poolManagerCanReceiveAndReturnTokensWhole() (gas: 177675)\n[PASS] test_poolManagerPullsThroughAllowanceWhole() (gas: 179022)\n[PASS] test_swarmShareArrivesWholeAndIsClaimableWhole() (gas: 149382)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 5.82ms (1.47ms CPU time)\n\nRan 29 tests for test/VerdictToken.t.sol:VerdictTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 99176, ~: 99673)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 267682230685548530987900970\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFromConservesSupplyAndAllowance(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 155114, ~: 168877)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 120209876281281145568259942\n  Bound result 53591\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferMoreThanHeldAlwaysReverts(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 96691, ~: 97146)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 10653\n  Bound result 981601852566915770736224982\n\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_approvingZeroAddress() (gas: 30354)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferExceedsBalance() (gas: 109391)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromEmptyAccount() (gas: 37745)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromExceedsAllowance() (gas: 107197)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromExceedsBalanceEvenWithAllowance() (gas: 152566)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromToZeroAddress() (gas: 95148)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromWithoutAnyAllowance() (gas: 40419)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferToZeroAddress() (gas: 39389)\n[PASS] test_approveDoesNotRequireBalance() (gas: 65522)\n[PASS] test_approveOverwritesRatherThanAdds() (gas: 131720)\n[PASS] test_approveSetsAllowanceAndEmits() (gas: 67416)\n[PASS] test_constructorEmitsMintTransferFromZeroToDeployer() (gas: 21596)\n[PASS] test_constructorMintsWholeSupplyToDeployer() (gas: 12789)\n[PASS] test_freshAccountsHoldNothingAndAllowNothing() (gas: 42832)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 26680)\n[PASS] test_mintsToWhoeverDeploysNotToAFixedAddress() (gas: 46264)\n[PASS] test_supplyIsOneBillionWithEighteenDecimals() (gas: 16690)\n[PASS] test_transferChainDeliversWhole() (gas: 192184)\n[PASS] test_transferFromByOwnerStillNeedsAllowance() (gas: 37967)\n[PASS] test_transferFromExactAllowanceLeavesZero() (gas: 120291)\n[PASS] test_transferFromSpendsAllowanceAndEmits() (gas: 155167)\n[PASS] test_transferFromUnlimitedAllowanceIsNotDecremented() (gas: 135038)\n[PASS] test_transferMovesExactAmountAndEmits() (gas: 93217)\n[PASS] test_transferToSelfKeepsBalance() (gas: 95731)\n[PASS] test_transferWholeBalance() (gas: 75652)\n[PASS] test_transferZeroAmountSucceedsAndEmits() (gas: 50060)\nSuite result: ok. 29 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 7.19ms (20.57ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/VerdictTokenInvariant.t.sol:VerdictTokenInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nVerdictTokenInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_noBalanceExceedsSupply\n[PASS] invariant_sumOfBalancesEqualsSupply\n[PASS] invariant_totalSupplyNeverChanges\n VerdictTokenInvariantTest invariants (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 0)\n\n╭--------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract     | Selector     | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+==========================================================+\n| TokenHandler | approve      | 659   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | transfer     | 691   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | transferFrom | 698   | 0       | 0        |\n╰--------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 2552851539\n  Bound result 101\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 5000000000000000000\n  Bound result 454\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 12\n  Bound result 8000\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 966090124892742966616029\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 53591\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 227\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 48\n  Bound result 765210444926429447457\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 172.54ms (171.25ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 test suites in 174.00ms (189.26ms CPU time): 46 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (46 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":38,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"VerdictToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"VerdictToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"VerdictToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":25,\"README.md\":143,\"foundry.toml\":29,\"launch.json\":24,\"remappings.txt\":1,\"script/DeployVerdictToken.s.sol\":26,\"src/VerdictToken.sol\":134,\"src/interfaces/IERC20.sol\":31,\"test/LaunchFlow.t.sol\":149,\"test/VerdictToken.t.sol\":281,\"test/VerdictTokenInvariant.t.sol\":100,\"test/VerdictTokenSafety.t.sol\":157},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"08656514e830d7770c8438f60ff3818e55917a316d9617075d6047c2255f61f9","verifiedTreeHash":"60510442bc9acbd93fed65f5e8bc58e6f8d9d18f","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+fb8278c5"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":1647,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 28 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 1.55s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":7045,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 8 tests for test/VerdictTokenSafety.t.sol:VerdictTokenSafetyTest\n[PASS] test_creationCodeHasNoConstructorArguments() (gas: 413824)\n[PASS] test_deployerHasNoSpecialPowersAfterSpendingItsBalance() (gas: 96492)\n[PASS] test_noCommonAdminCallIncreasesSupply() (gas: 726903)\n[PASS] test_noPrivilegedHandMovesOrFreezesAHolder() (gas: 474530)\n[PASS] test_noReceiveOrFallbackSoEtherCannotBeStranded() (gas: 39651)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeFitsEip170() (gas: 8166)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoDelegatecallCallcodeOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 1699361)\n[PASS] test_unknownSelectorsRevert() (gas: 51488)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 13.76ms (7.70ms CPU time)\n\nRan 8 tests for test/LaunchFlow.t.sol:LaunchFlowTest\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_factoryMovesMoreThanTheSupply() (gas: 38888)\n[PASS] test_create2AddressIsPredictable() (gas: 9361)\n[PASS] test_create2DeploymentMintsWholeSupplyToTheFactory() (gas: 31405)\n[PASS] test_deployScriptMintsToItsCaller() (gas: 885814)\n[PASS] test_fullPayoutSplitsExactlyAndSumsToSupply() (gas: 218306)\n[PASS] test_poolManagerCanReceiveAndReturnTokensWhole() (gas: 177675)\n[PASS] test_poolManagerPullsThroughAllowanceWhole() (gas: 179022)\n[PASS] test_swarmShareArrivesWholeAndIsClaimableWhole() (gas: 149382)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 569.80ms (1.60ms CPU time)\n\nRan 24 tests for test/VerdictTokenEdgeCases.t.sol:VerdictTokenEdgeCasesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allowanceFailureIsAtomicWithSufficientBalance(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 883345, ~: 885717)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 4\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_approvalOverwriteIsIdempotentAndIsolated(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 1190464, ~: 1190506)\n[PASS] testFuzz_balanceFailurePreservesFiniteAllowance(uint256,uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 956087, ~: 956908)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 20129\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913129638791\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913129639312\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_directSelfTransferIsAnIdentity(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 851184, ~: 851679)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 95\n  Bound result 7\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_splitSpendingExhaustsApprovalExactlyOnce(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 972804, ~: 974702)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 466139018143907730416133642\n  Bound result 189258394089571207120537140\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFromWithAliasedParticipants(uint256,uint8,bool) (runs: 1000, μ: 210419, ~: 221086)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 647\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferRoundTripRestoresBalancesAndPreservesApprovals(uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 895022, ~: 894880)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 632299661705683217793721334\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_zeroReceiverFailurePreservesFiniteOrUnlimitedAllowance(uint256,bool) (runs: 1000, μ: 791009, ~: 792134)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 2552851539\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_zeroSpenderApprovalIsAtomic(uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 782336, ~: 782276)\n[PASS] test_allTokenActionsRejectEtherAndPreserveState() (gas: 1568377)\n[PASS] test_anotherSpenderCannotUseAnExistingApproval() (gas: 786234)\n[PASS] test_fullSupplyDelegatedSelfTransferConsumesAllowance() (gas: 128291)\n[PASS] test_fullSupplyDelegatedSelfTransferKeepsUnlimitedAllowance() (gas: 129720)\n[PASS] test_maximumApprovalStillRejectsZeroSpender() (gas: 782540)\n[PASS] test_maximumMinusOneAllowanceIsFinite() (gas: 142254)\n[PASS] test_maximumTransferAmountRevertsWithoutOverflowOrSpendingApproval() (gas: 816456)\n[PASS] test_multipleApprovalsDoNotPromiseMoreThanTheOwnersBalance() (gas: 1112384)\n[PASS] test_oneWeiDelegatedSelfTransferConsumesAllowance() (gas: 128114)\n[PASS] test_receivingMoreTokensDoesNotRestoreSpentAllowance() (gas: 942303)\n[PASS] test_selfTransferDoesNotBypassBalanceOrAllowanceChecks() (gas: 1641177)\n[PASS] test_unlimitedApprovalCanBeRevokedAndReplacedWithFiniteApproval() (gas: 1036466)\n[PASS] test_zeroApprovalStillRejectsZeroSpender() (gas: 782121)\n[PASS] test_zeroTransferFromNeedsNeitherBalanceNorAllowanceAndEmits() (gas: 747058)\n[PASS] test_zeroTransfersStillRejectZeroReceiver() (gas: 763667)\nSuite result: ok. 24 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 570.36ms (5.03s CPU time)\n\nRan 29 tests for test/VerdictToken.t.sol:VerdictTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 99322, ~: 99637)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 8000\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFromConservesSupplyAndAllowance(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 158992, ~: 168889)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 4731\n  Bound result 5\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferMoreThanHeldAlwaysReverts(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 97115, ~: 97586)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 4731\n  Bound result 5\n\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_approvingZeroAddress() (gas: 30354)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferExceedsBalance() (gas: 109391)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromEmptyAccount() (gas: 37745)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromExceedsAllowance() (gas: 107197)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromExceedsBalanceEvenWithAllowance() (gas: 152566)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromToZeroAddress() (gas: 95148)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromWithoutAnyAllowance() (gas: 40419)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferToZeroAddress() (gas: 39389)\n[PASS] test_approveDoesNotRequireBalance() (gas: 65522)\n[PASS] test_approveOverwritesRatherThanAdds() (gas: 131720)\n[PASS] test_approveSetsAllowanceAndEmits() (gas: 67416)\n[PASS] test_constructorEmitsMintTransferFromZeroToDeployer() (gas: 21596)\n[PASS] test_constructorMintsWholeSupplyToDeployer() (gas: 12789)\n[PASS] test_freshAccountsHoldNothingAndAllowNothing() (gas: 42832)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 26680)\n[PASS] test_mintsToWhoeverDeploysNotToAFixedAddress() (gas: 46264)\n[PASS] test_supplyIsOneBillionWithEighteenDecimals() (gas: 16690)\n[PASS] test_transferChainDeliversWhole() (gas: 192184)\n[PASS] test_transferFromByOwnerStillNeedsAllowance() (gas: 37967)\n[PASS] test_transferFromExactAllowanceLeavesZero() (gas: 120291)\n[PASS] test_transferFromSpendsAllowanceAndEmits() (gas: 155167)\n[PASS] test_transferFromUnlimitedAllowanceIsNotDecremented() (gas: 135038)\n[PASS] test_transferMovesExactAmountAndEmits() (gas: 93217)\n[PASS] test_transferToSelfKeepsBalance() (gas: 95731)\n[PASS] test_transferWholeBalance() (gas: 75652)\n[PASS] test_transferZeroAmountSucceedsAndEmits() (gas: 50060)\nSuite result: ok. 29 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 573.68ms (1.29s CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/VerdictTokenInvariant.t.sol:VerdictTokenInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nVerdictTokenInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_allowancesMatchApprovalsAndSuccessfulSpending\n[PASS] invariant_eachBalanceMatchesAuthorizedMovements\n[PASS] invariant_noBalanceExceedsSupply\n[PASS] invariant_sumOfBalancesEqualsSupply\n[PASS] invariant_totalSupplyNeverChanges\n[PASS] invariant_zeroAddressNeverReceivesTokens\n VerdictTokenInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭--------------+------------------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract     | Selector                     | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+==========================================================================+\n| TokenHandler | approve                      | 1662  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | approveAndTransferFrom       | 1633  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | approveZeroSpender           | 1601  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | revokeAndTrySpend            | 1615  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | transfer                     | 1624  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | transferFrom                 | 1599  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | transferFromTooMuchAllowance | 1636  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | transferFromTooMuchBalance   | 1670  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | transferToZero               | 1637  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | transferTooMuch              | 1707  | 0       | 0        |\n╰--------------+------------------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 996000000000000000000000003\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 595259491422906533192344\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 49569\n  Bound result 255\n  Bound result 123\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665639567444198092585006596448331\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 16978\n  Bound result 1077\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665639567444198092585006596446441\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640563039462584007913129689759\n  Bound result 9891\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640563634717075430820727253792\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 8000\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 5000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640563039457584007913129636880\n  Bound result 42\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640563039457584007913129689809\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 193460601463140427546743850410023982681113190521188853783\n  Bound result 5547\n  Bound result 996595259491422906533183656\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 8915\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640563039462584007913129636567\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640563634717075430819662792451\n  Bound result 1890\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640563039457584007913129686137\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665639567444198092585006596464287\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 715\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000009769\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 217220008290652318491261\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 6853106119510860\n  Bound result 3558\n  Bound result 7109\n  Bound result 9\n  Bound result 668979272662163878614194\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000009767\n  Bound result 782779991709347681462570\n  Bound result 331020734190942240900034\n  Bound result 621960516867745785347749\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 6.95s (6.95s CPU time)\n\nRan 5 test suites in 6.96s (8.68s CPU time): 70 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (70 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":47,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"VerdictToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"VerdictToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"VerdictToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":25,\"README.md\":143,\"foundry.toml\":29,\"remappings.txt\":1,\"script/DeployVerdictToken.s.sol\":26,\"src/VerdictToken.sol\":134,\"src/interfaces/IERC20.sol\":31,\"test/LaunchFlow.t.sol\":149,\"test/VerdictToken.t.sol\":281,\"test/VerdictTokenEdgeCases.t.sol\":378,\"test/VerdictTokenInvariant.t.sol\":297,\"test/VerdictTokenSafety.t.sol\":157},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"ae082ff57412975471c429d24f4b896d0a8a84d17a67a143e5368ac51157eb73","verifiedTreeHash":"dbc02a1d8336766b791f93e7430168fd93a9740b","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+fb8278c5"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":1280,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 27 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 1.18s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":244,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 8 tests for test/VerdictTokenSafety.t.sol:VerdictTokenSafetyTest\n[PASS] test_creationCodeHasNoConstructorArguments() (gas: 413824)\n[PASS] test_deployerHasNoSpecialPowersAfterSpendingItsBalance() (gas: 96492)\n[PASS] test_noCommonAdminCallIncreasesSupply() (gas: 726903)\n[PASS] test_noPrivilegedHandMovesOrFreezesAHolder() (gas: 474530)\n[PASS] test_noReceiveOrFallbackSoEtherCannotBeStranded() (gas: 39651)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeFitsEip170() (gas: 8166)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoDelegatecallCallcodeOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 1699361)\n[PASS] test_unknownSelectorsRevert() (gas: 51488)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 6.83ms (4.28ms CPU time)\n\nRan 8 tests for test/LaunchFlow.t.sol:LaunchFlowTest\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_factoryMovesMoreThanTheSupply() (gas: 38888)\n[PASS] test_create2AddressIsPredictable() (gas: 9361)\n[PASS] test_create2DeploymentMintsWholeSupplyToTheFactory() (gas: 31405)\n[PASS] test_deployScriptMintsToItsCaller() (gas: 885814)\n[PASS] test_fullPayoutSplitsExactlyAndSumsToSupply() (gas: 218306)\n[PASS] test_poolManagerCanReceiveAndReturnTokensWhole() (gas: 177675)\n[PASS] test_poolManagerPullsThroughAllowanceWhole() (gas: 179022)\n[PASS] test_swarmShareArrivesWholeAndIsClaimableWhole() (gas: 149382)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 7.04ms (1.15ms CPU time)\n\nRan 29 tests for test/VerdictToken.t.sol:VerdictTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 99482, ~: 99673)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1714525\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFromConservesSupplyAndAllowance(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 157717, ~: 168889)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 143188778015546010535259\n  Bound result 84496347786491162380905\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferMoreThanHeldAlwaysReverts(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 96929, ~: 97558)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 143188778015546010535259\n  Bound result 84496347786491162380905\n\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_approvingZeroAddress() (gas: 30354)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferExceedsBalance() (gas: 109391)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromEmptyAccount() (gas: 37745)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromExceedsAllowance() (gas: 107197)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromExceedsBalanceEvenWithAllowance() (gas: 152566)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromToZeroAddress() (gas: 95148)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromWithoutAnyAllowance() (gas: 40419)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferToZeroAddress() (gas: 39389)\n[PASS] test_approveDoesNotRequireBalance() (gas: 65522)\n[PASS] test_approveOverwritesRatherThanAdds() (gas: 131720)\n[PASS] test_approveSetsAllowanceAndEmits() (gas: 67416)\n[PASS] test_constructorEmitsMintTransferFromZeroToDeployer() (gas: 21596)\n[PASS] test_constructorMintsWholeSupplyToDeployer() (gas: 12789)\n[PASS] test_freshAccountsHoldNothingAndAllowNothing() (gas: 42832)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 26680)\n[PASS] test_mintsToWhoeverDeploysNotToAFixedAddress() (gas: 46264)\n[PASS] test_supplyIsOneBillionWithEighteenDecimals() (gas: 16690)\n[PASS] test_transferChainDeliversWhole() (gas: 192184)\n[PASS] test_transferFromByOwnerStillNeedsAllowance() (gas: 37967)\n[PASS] test_transferFromExactAllowanceLeavesZero() (gas: 120291)\n[PASS] test_transferFromSpendsAllowanceAndEmits() (gas: 155167)\n[PASS] test_transferFromUnlimitedAllowanceIsNotDecremented() (gas: 135038)\n[PASS] test_transferMovesExactAmountAndEmits() (gas: 93217)\n[PASS] test_transferToSelfKeepsBalance() (gas: 95731)\n[PASS] test_transferWholeBalance() (gas: 75652)\n[PASS] test_transferZeroAmountSucceedsAndEmits() (gas: 50060)\nSuite result: ok. 29 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 7.03ms (18.23ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/VerdictTokenInvariant.t.sol:VerdictTokenInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nVerdictTokenInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_noBalanceExceedsSupply\n[PASS] invariant_sumOfBalancesEqualsSupply\n[PASS] invariant_totalSupplyNeverChanges\n VerdictTokenInvariantTest invariants (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 0)\n\n╭--------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract     | Selector     | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+==========================================================+\n| TokenHandler | approve      | 676   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | transfer     | 698   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | transferFrom | 674   | 0       | 0        |\n╰--------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 308\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 242\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 835\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 117300740\n  Bound result 5833\n  Bound result 641494618888820234868737373\n  Bound result 42\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 630241677710459750560918961\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000005834\n  Bound result 101\n  Bound result 3077\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 354505381111179765013956045\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 8000\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 170.59ms (169.23ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 test suites in 172.03ms (191.49ms CPU time): 46 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (46 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":34,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"VerdictToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"VerdictToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"VerdictToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":25,\"README.md\":143,\"foundry.toml\":29,\"remappings.txt\":1,\"script/DeployVerdictToken.s.sol\":26,\"src/VerdictToken.sol\":134,\"src/interfaces/IERC20.sol\":31,\"test/LaunchFlow.t.sol\":149,\"test/VerdictToken.t.sol\":281,\"test/VerdictTokenInvariant.t.sol\":100,\"test/VerdictTokenSafety.t.sol\":157},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":292,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"slither: no results at low impact or above","passed":true},{"durationMs":113,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[low] large-numeric-literal at src/VerdictToken.sol:30: Large Numeric Literal","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"bb3e3e0206a0a0137e544139ef5f2ee90b18276c471df1a1a6b3189dd710b7e2","verifiedTreeHash":"73a799fe6302fb08b24a896908be762c15c5702b","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+fb8278c5"}]}