{"assessments":[],"deployments":[],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"8b487389-0db6-4655-b316-cb65af54259a","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"6eee58863c4e6f9dcc5d39f068a2717a88e8a77bf3fd2ec66c51345ca6cfc98d","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_economics","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"0cb9ce17dc8a6862f6d445596ce782d0206bb7973d069e9cfb85e22dd171bc10","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_flow","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"a721be9eba9b2e1b4f82e8622d0dd505bd821df2e50e25771a6a921ac8301ffa","dependsOn":["build_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest","audit_math","audit_permissions","audit_economics","audit_flow"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"af3aa01159bbf354f621cafa5c0006f6169e0938a8b015be508b7377dbf165bc","skillId":"audit-judge","tools":[]},"key":"audit_judge","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"af3aa01159bbf354f621cafa5c0006f6169e0938a8b015be508b7377dbf165bc","skillId":"audit-judge","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"f5d4b9fc07e5d65bd3dc72202196a25c5f6b026a54a3956e18a15df08475bbd1","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_math","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"fd1236970ab26bb244ef935c9c7b245ef99721c4a51c0bc9019aa693b5275d66","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_permissions","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"c3903671a396e6fcdc7bc5555402f89076d9008385aba65799403cbe6c0bdcbe","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"6b8d2c2ebd3301cff2be8edb1e1cc6ba65c858c02fe7247be81722b969842265","skillId":"build-contract-project","tools":[]},"key":"build_contract_project","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"6b8d2c2ebd3301cff2be8edb1e1cc6ba65c858c02fe7247be81722b969842265","skillId":"build-contract-project","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"f6d6754eecfca80bb52a23fa9d9ac926e467e01af6bad3f8c18dae48c9998ff4","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"tools":[]},"key":"manifest","kind":"code","role":"integrate","skillHash":null,"skillId":null,"state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"cebc933835c954e5ae5278a3ca7940de315abace9c54fa378f507dfbc96242e4","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"73431852439ad3a343f3d2b7db1c43cd363b9f48f9bb51497374a0cf6d50b223","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","tools":[]},"key":"write_foundry_tests","kind":"code","role":"tests","skillHash":"73431852439ad3a343f3d2b7db1c43cd363b9f48f9bb51497374a0cf6d50b223","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"A custom token: VerdictIMD (VERDICT).\nToken name: VerdictIMD\nToken symbol: VERDICT\nToken supply: 1,000,000,000 with 18 decimals, all minted once to the deployer in the constructor.","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"e795b41aa47cd2c5d03cd80c73698f28c36c060ba35cbc331d6be51293e51899","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"8b487389-0db6-4655-b316-cb65af54259a","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-1462-verdictimd"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"51482","feedbackHash":"b09ebbdef91c35eac38676a93468ec0c9a884f7d84c2075591b14fceb3f5c5fd","nodeKey":"audit_economics","submissionHash":"6eee58863c4e6f9dcc5d39f068a2717a88e8a77bf3fd2ec66c51345ca6cfc98d","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51468","feedbackHash":"43a05792bc0c6947e5db8d6044b03b536e0790a7175d32ad7a32bcc0173fce4a","nodeKey":"audit_flow","submissionHash":"0cb9ce17dc8a6862f6d445596ce782d0206bb7973d069e9cfb85e22dd171bc10","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51139","feedbackHash":"f97e9f425ca7c1a380edccb95f915841e3a0bd5766e90cf93fed5c0360179798","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"a721be9eba9b2e1b4f82e8622d0dd505bd821df2e50e25771a6a921ac8301ffa","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51484","feedbackHash":"9ccc3aacc543a1997561ce078af641314610c510a1f3a54e7375ad1d926ffb0b","nodeKey":"audit_math","submissionHash":"f5d4b9fc07e5d65bd3dc72202196a25c5f6b026a54a3956e18a15df08475bbd1","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51508","feedbackHash":"c3bb078895b0d063b7101a6da1df61af67b6506f39acdc9addc77d4c035a7f4f","nodeKey":"audit_permissions","submissionHash":"fd1236970ab26bb244ef935c9c7b245ef99721c4a51c0bc9019aa693b5275d66","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51410","feedbackHash":"c6251c91b0f956c0189f1661937d9c5dd4cce398bad1a804b8437d29ffc29c5c","nodeKey":"build_contract_project","submissionHash":"c3903671a396e6fcdc7bc5555402f89076d9008385aba65799403cbe6c0bdcbe","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51252","feedbackHash":"a09e0c1220cff466605b41e9263a2d4af940e3aa2dfb00835e6c3ce085711767","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"f6d6754eecfca80bb52a23fa9d9ac926e467e01af6bad3f8c18dae48c9998ff4","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51437","feedbackHash":"7cb0f848cf123da7d11d86cd57268dc8c61de32b65a6a7697ded4f433a489d55","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"cebc933835c954e5ae5278a3ca7940de315abace9c54fa378f507dfbc96242e4","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"590e9256679447e0454ea264c0e5a6d78a4bf868620938adbac26c04208e152f","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"ea62f3bebece9304","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"The dependency manifest says lib/openzeppelin-contracts is OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 and pins each vendored file by sha256. Two of the files in the tree have been reformatted (line wrapping, probably by forge fmt even though foundry.toml has [fmt] ignore = [\"lib/**\"]), so their hashes no longer match. lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol:284-287 wraps `function _approve(address owner, address spender, uint256 value, bool emitEvent) internal virtual {` over four lines, and lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/interfaces/draft-IERC6093.sol:121-123 wraps the `ERC1155InsufficientBalance` error. A diff against upstream v5.0.2 shows only whitespace changes, so the compiled behaviour of VerdictIMD is the same (32/32 project tests pass). The impact is on provenance: anyone, or any admission check, that confirms the vendored dependency against DEPENDENCIES.json gets a mismatch on both files and cannot tell the code is unmodified without diffing it by hand. Both bytecode metadata and source verification also include the reformatted source text instead of upstream's. Fix: restore the two files byte-for-byte from the v5.0.2 archive, or update the recorded hashes and say the files were reformatted.","line":11,"path":"lib/DEPENDENCIES.json","reproduction":"From the repo root: `sha256sum lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/interfaces/draft-IERC6093.sol` returns 4a1db79b7b76a41b1d228242ad369c24fb293be6a62cd00b7e286333e965df59 and 94e5638bf0e43993e72ed07612547554e9265b335ab69ad8e74b8d41d90368bd. DEPENDENCIES.json expects 2d874da1c1478ed22a2d30dcf1a6ec0d09a13f897ca680d55fb49fbcc0e0c5b1 and 4aea87243e6de38804bf8737bf86f750443d3b5e63dd0fd0b7ad92f77cdbd3e3, which are the sha256 of the upstream v5.0.2 files (fetched from raw.githubusercontent.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/v5.0.2/...). Expected: the hashes match. Actual: they don't, and `diff` shows only line-wrapping changes at ERC20.sol:284 and draft-IERC6093.sol:121. The other four pinned files (LICENSE, IERC20.sol, IERC20Metadata.sol, Context.sol) match.","severity":"low","snippet":"      \"contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\": \"2d874da1c1478ed22a2d30dcf1a6ec0d09a13f897ca680d55fb49fbcc0e0c5b1\",","title":"Vendored OpenZeppelin files do not match the sha256 recorded in lib/DEPENDENCIES.json (reformatted, semantically identical)"}],"hash":"0cb9ce17dc8a6862f6d445596ce782d0206bb7973d069e9cfb85e22dd171bc10","nodeId":"a6a33763-5cc1-46ca-bf40-09643e96fc77","outcome":"completed","summary":"I found no defects in VerdictIMD's own code. The one finding is low severity and about how its dependency was recorded, not how the token behaves. The findings and coverage are in `.imd-findings.json`. It parses as valid JSON, and no tracked files were changed.\n\n**What the code is:** `src/VerdictIMD.sol` is a plain OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 ERC20. Its constructor takes no arguments and mints 1,000,000,000 × 10^18 tokens to `msg.sender` (the factory) once. It changes nothing in the inherited transfer logic, and has no owner, mint, burn, pause, upgrade, `delegatecall` or `selfdestruct`.\n\n**Coverage, checked against the Execution Trace, Periphery and First Principles guides:**\n\n| Entry point | Verdict | Why |\n|---|---|---|\n| `approve` | holds | OpenZeppelin code as published: rejects a zero owner or spender, overwrites the allowance, emits `Approval`. |\n| `transfer` | holds | Delivers the exact amount and reverts on low balance or a zero recipient. So every launch transfer moves exactly what it says: factory to distributor, distributor to claimant, the pool seed and trades. |\n| `transferFrom` | holds | The allowance is checked and spent before the transfer, a revert undoes both, an unlimited allowance is never reduced, and no address can skip the allowance check. |\n\nI also checked two invariants. The supply is fixed at exactly 10^27 base units and nothing can increase it. `decimals()` returns 18 and the constructor takes no arguments. The static-analysis lead (aderyn's \"large numeric literal\") is harmless: the constant evaluates to exactly 10^27. All 32 existing project tests pass.\n\n**Finding 1 (low): two vendored OpenZeppelin files don't match their recorded hashes.** `lib/DEPENDENCIES.json` pins each vendored file by sha256, but `ERC20.sol` and `draft-IERC6093.sol` have been reformatted. I fetched both files from upstream v5.0.2: their hashes match the recorded ones, and the only differences from the tree are line wrapping at `ERC20.sol:284` and `draft-IERC6093.sol:121`. The token compiles and behaves the same. The cost is provenance: anything that checks the dependency against its recorded hashes gets a mismatch on both files. The fix is to restore the two files byte-for-byte from v5.0.2, or to update the hashes and note the reformatting.\n\nNone of the findings is critical or high, so I wrote no Foundry proof test.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":396203,"inputTokens":18,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":5456,"runtime":"claude","turns":9,"wallClockMs":62454}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"dedd4428da8fa41e","findings":[],"hash":"6eee58863c4e6f9dcc5d39f068a2717a88e8a77bf3fd2ec66c51345ca6cfc98d","nodeId":"02436f23-033c-44d4-96c1-040e0ab477e4","outcome":"completed","summary":"I found no defects in VerdictIMD, so `.imd-findings.json` holds an empty findings list plus a coverage record. No contract or test files were changed. I didn't run the existing Foundry tests, because there was nothing that needed a reproduction.\n\n`src/VerdictIMD.sol` is a plain OpenZeppelin ERC20. Its constructor mints the full 1e27 (one billion × 10^18) to `msg.sender`, which is the factory during a launch. It overrides nothing and has no owner, mint, burn, fee or pause functions. I checked it against the Economic Security, Invariant and Flow Gap guides:\n\n- **Supply invariant:** holds. The supply is fixed at 1e27 and nothing can mint or burn after deployment.\n- **Launch flows:** hold. Every transfer moves exactly the amount stated, with no fee or burn. The factory's transfers to the distributor and the requester, the pool seeding, and the distributor's claim payouts all arrive in full.\n- **Privileged powers:** none. Nothing can freeze, seize or move a holder's balance.\n- **Decimals:** 18, which matches the manifest.\n\nThe coverage record has one row per entry point, all \"holds\":\n- **`approve`:** standard OpenZeppelin behaviour, with no fee or hook. The usual approve front-running issue is part of the ERC-20 standard, not an economic defect here.\n- **`transfer`:** moves the exact amount.\n- **`transferFrom`:** spends the allowance, then moves the exact amount. An unlimited allowance is not reduced.\n\nI also added rows for the two supply invariants.\n\nThe one static-analysis lead was aderyn's \"large numeric literal\" on the `INITIAL_SUPPLY` line (line 12). It's just a style note: the constant equals exactly 1e27, as the manifest requires.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":92328,"inputTokens":6,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":1338,"runtime":"claude","turns":3,"wallClockMs":16513}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"8d26cb1a4eaeb75a","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_flow and audit_permissions (same root cause). lib/DEPENDENCIES.json records a sha256 for every vendored file and README.md line 65 states 'Upstream files are unmodified and excluded from local formatting'. Two of the six OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 files in the tree do not hash to the recorded values: contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol (recorded 2d874da1..., actual 4a1db79b...) and contracts/interfaces/draft-IERC6093.sol (recorded 4aea8724..., actual 94e5638b...). I fetched both files from the v5.0.2 tag; the upstream copies hash exactly to the recorded values, and `diff` against the vendored copies shows only line re-wrapping: the four-argument `_approve(...) internal virtual {` signature split over ERC20.sol lines 284-287, and the `ERC1155InsufficientBalance` error declaration split over draft-IERC6093.sol lines 121-123. `diff -w` is empty, so the change is whitespace only and the compiled VerdictIMD bytecode is unaffected (the full suite of 48 tests passes and bytecode_hash is 'none'). The defect is in provenance: the trust anchor the project publishes for the file that implements transfer/approve/transferFrom does not verify, so anyone who checks the recorded hashes (admission, a later revision author, a user auditing published source) gets a mismatch and must redo the upstream comparison by hand to rule out a semantic change. The other four recorded OpenZeppelin hashes (LICENSE, IERC20.sol, IERC20Metadata.sol, Context.sol) match. Fix: restore the two files byte-for-byte from the v5.0.2 archive so the recorded hashes become true, or recompute the two entries from the committed files and amend the README sentence so it no longer claims the files are unmodified upstream bytes.","line":11,"path":"lib/DEPENDENCIES.json","reproduction":"From the repository root run: sha256sum lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/interfaces/draft-IERC6093.sol. Expected (lib/DEPENDENCIES.json lines 11 and 10): 2d874da1c1478ed22a2d30dcf1a6ec0d09a13f897ca680d55fb49fbcc0e0c5b1 and 4aea87243e6de38804bf8737bf86f750443d3b5e63dd0fd0b7ad92f77cdbd3e3. Actual: 4a1db79b7b76a41b1d228242ad369c24fb293be6a62cd00b7e286333e965df59 and 94e5638bf0e43993e72ed07612547554e9265b335ab69ad8e74b8d41d90368bd. Fetching https://raw.githubusercontent.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/v5.0.2/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol and .../contracts/interfaces/draft-IERC6093.sol yields files that hash to the recorded values; `diff upstream vendored` reports only '284c284,287' (the `_approve` signature re-wrapped) for ERC20.sol and '121c121,123' (the `ERC1155InsufficientBalance` error re-wrapped) for draft-IERC6093.sol, and `diff -w -B` reports no difference for either.","severity":"low","snippet":"      \"contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\": \"2d874da1c1478ed22a2d30dcf1a6ec0d09a13f897ca680d55fb49fbcc0e0c5b1\",","title":"Vendored OpenZeppelin ERC20.sol and draft-IERC6093.sol do not hash to the values recorded in lib/DEPENDENCIES.json (whitespace-only reformatting; README claims upstream files are unmodified)"}],"hash":"a721be9eba9b2e1b4f82e8622d0dd505bd821df2e50e25771a6a921ac8301ffa","nodeId":"10e7d5ea-c8c2-4644-a25a-1c15b7c2a8ab","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is valid JSON, the working tree is clean apart from the required output, and the scratch directory is removed.\n\n**Outcome:** one low finding kept, zero critical or high, all three entry points hold.\n\n**What I did**\n\n- Reproduced the two specialist findings from audit_flow and audit_permissions. Both describe the same root cause, so they are merged into one finding on `lib/DEPENDENCIES.json`.\n- Confirmed the mismatch directly. The vendored ERC20.sol and draft-IERC6093.sol hash differently from the recorded values, while the four other OpenZeppelin files match.\n- Fetched both files from the OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 tag. The upstream copies hash exactly to the recorded values, and the diff is whitespace only: two declarations re-wrapped across lines. A whitespace-insensitive diff is empty.\n- Kept it at low severity. The token's bytecode and behaviour are unaffected. The defect is that the README's claim of unmodified upstream files and the published hashes do not verify, so anyone checking provenance has to redo the comparison by hand.\n\n**What I checked myself beyond the specialists**\n\n- The token adds only a constant and one constructor mint on top of unmodified OpenZeppelin v5.0.2. The ABI has no mint, burn, owner, pause, or upgrade entry point.\n- The full project suite passes, with 48 tests including the invariant run.\n- Disassembly of creation and runtime bytecode shows no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE, SELFDESTRUCT, or any external call. Sizes are far below the protocol limits.\n- The manifest uses only schema keys, correct types, lowercase addresses, an empty constructor argument list matching the no-argument constructor, and a supply equal to what the constructor mints.\n- The aderyn large-numeric-literal lead is the correct supply constant and is not a defect.\n- The protected harness test could not run here because it imports the network's own v4-core and platform sources, which are not in this tree. Its checks are mirrored by the project's launch compatibility test, which passes.\n\n**Coverage record:** approve, transfer, and transferFrom are all marked holds, with three extra rows for the fixed-supply invariant, CREATE2 deployability, and manifest shape.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":656298,"inputTokens":386,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":10076,"runtime":"claude","turns":13,"wallClockMs":167977}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"0c3cc4da63a00aafffd1ea7388dcdc159929a99a78976aa23bd59bad00bd457c","device":"19542bcd32391419","findings":[],"hash":"c3903671a396e6fcdc7bc5555402f89076d9008385aba65799403cbe6c0bdcbe","nodeId":"2f5791e4-d115-4119-91ea-19c9e4ea1775","outcome":"completed","summary":"Implemented VerdictIMD (VERDICT) with 18 decimals and exactly 1,000,000,000 tokens minted once to the deployer.\n\nIncluded vendored dependencies, success/failure tests, fuzz and invariant tests, and deployment/operations documentation.\n\nPassed with Solidity 0.8.26:\n\n- `forge build`\n- `forge test`\n- `forge fmt --check`\n\nAlso passed from a clean copy offline with parallel tests and no deployment environment variables. No transactions were broadcast.","treeHash":"efc58cd32edf3807f49f7f792979ff80050249dc","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":490880,"inputTokens":66341,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":15491,"runtime":"codex","turns":5,"wallClockMs":398309}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"7bf208790abe9fea8173d2d97c71f5df323afd22553db019c3a585da6e82a461","device":"810692103659803b","findings":[],"hash":"cebc933835c954e5ae5278a3ca7940de315abace9c54fa378f507dfbc96242e4","nodeId":"d60f83bb-62f7-4033-bd2c-837c90d7d536","outcome":"completed","summary":"Added 16 boundary and fuzz tests covering authorization failures, allowance limits, revocation, and rollback. Expanded invariants to 13 randomized actions checking balances, allowances, supply conservation, and transfer liveness.\n\nClean offline `forge build` and `forge test` pass: 48 tests, including 32,768 invariant handler calls.\n\nOnly `test/` changed. No contract defects found.","treeHash":"09e54496300cf8fa1734a7805d7d05b4d650bd96","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":704256,"inputTokens":86934,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":14893,"runtime":"codex","turns":6,"wallClockMs":450272}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"6ed09c2eb1ff6aec","findings":[],"hash":"f5d4b9fc07e5d65bd3dc72202196a25c5f6b026a54a3956e18a15df08475bbd1","nodeId":"4816ffee-9872-4391-a052-0758975ea437","outcome":"completed","summary":"I found no math defects in VerdictIMD, so `.imd-findings.json` has an empty findings list and a coverage record. I read the code but did not run any Foundry tests.\n\n`src/VerdictIMD.sol` is a standard OpenZeppelin ERC20 with nothing changed. Its only addition is a constructor that mints `INITIAL_SUPPLY = 1_000_000_000 * 10 ** 18` (10^27) once to `msg.sender`. Against the precision, boundary and numerical-gap checklists:\n\n- **Supply:** the constant is worked out at compile time to exactly 10^27, and the contract has no way to mint or burn after deployment, so the total supply can never change.\n- **Transfers:** a transfer checks the sender's balance before subtracting. The one addition OpenZeppelin skips the overflow check on can't overflow, because no balance can exceed the fixed supply. There are no fees, divisions, rounding or type-narrowing casts.\n- **Allowances:** spending an allowance checks it before reducing it, and an allowance of the maximum `uint256` is treated as unlimited, which is OpenZeppelin's documented behaviour.\n- **Edge cases:** zero-amount transfers, transfers to yourself and transfers of a full balance all move exactly the stated amount. Sending to or from the zero address reverts.\n- **Static-analysis lead:** Aderyn's \"large numeric literal\" note on line 12 is about readability only; the value is correct.\n\nThe coverage record marks `approve`, `transfer` and `transferFrom` as **holds**, plus a row for the fixed-supply invariant.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":94514,"inputTokens":6,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":1259,"runtime":"claude","turns":3,"wallClockMs":15371}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"68db55320b6c4583c77a0cc4c9bc72fad93813e9da0b26f5dbd38a626f624fe4","device":"8cb9deeead5ce571","findings":[],"hash":"f6d6754eecfca80bb52a23fa9d9ac926e467e01af6bad3f8c18dae48c9998ff4","nodeId":"083c9f00-1af8-4c1e-85ee-d788f2da1feb","outcome":"completed","summary":"Created [launch.json](/root/.identitymd/work/8b487389-0db6-4655-b316-cb65af54259a/083c9f00-1af8-4c1e-85ee-d788f2da1feb/launch.json) matching VerdictIMD’s constructor, supply, and the exact pool and economics values.\n\nValidation passed: manifest checks, `forge build`, and `forge test` (32 passed). Only `launch.json` is changed for submission.","treeHash":"9e15a9363feafa4225fb91b3d66ed63e46d257fe","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":161792,"inputTokens":34031,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":2299,"runtime":"codex","turns":3,"wallClockMs":71233}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"3516474d8a268bd8","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"lib/DEPENDENCIES.json is the project's provenance record: it claims to hold the SHA-256 of every vendored file, and README.md line 65 states that 'Upstream files are unmodified and excluded from local formatting'. Two of the six OpenZeppelin files do not hash to the recorded values. Diffing against the files fetched from the OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 tag shows the only difference is line wrapping (the four-argument `_approve` signature in ERC20.sol lines 284-287, and the `ERC1155InsufficientBalance` error declaration in draft-IERC6093.sol lines 121-123), i.e. `forge fmt` was run on lib/ before the `ignore = [\"lib/**\"]` setting was in place. The token's semantics are therefore unaffected and the compiled bytecode is identical in meaning. The defect is that the trust anchor the project offers for its vendored dependencies does not verify: anyone who re-checks the recorded hashes (the admission reviewer, the author of a later revision, or a user auditing the published source) gets a mismatch on the very file that implements transfer/approve/transferFrom and must redo the upstream comparison by hand to rule out a semantic change. This is an access/trust-gap observation about the supply chain of the token's logic, not a bug in the logic. Fix (author's choice, both touch lib/ which the worker rules forbid for workers): either restore the two files byte-for-byte from the v5.0.2 archive so the recorded hashes become true, or recompute the two SHA-256 entries from the committed files and amend the README sentence so it no longer claims the files are unmodified upstream bytes.","line":11,"path":"lib/DEPENDENCIES.json","reproduction":"From the repository root run: sha256sum lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/interfaces/draft-IERC6093.sol. Expected (per lib/DEPENDENCIES.json lines 9-10): 2d874da1c1478ed22a2d30dcf1a6ec0d09a13f897ca680d55fb49fbcc0e0c5b1 and 4aea87243e6de38804bf8737bf86f750443d3b5e63dd0fd0b7ad92f77cdbd3e3. Actual: 4a1db79b7b76a41b1d228242ad369c24fb293be6a62cd00b7e286333e965df59 and 94e5638bf0e43993e72ed07612547554e9265b335ab69ad8e74b8d41d90368bd. The other four recorded OpenZeppelin hashes (LICENSE, IERC20.sol, IERC20Metadata.sol, Context.sol) match. Fetching https://raw.githubusercontent.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/v5.0.2/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol hashes to the recorded 2d874da1..., and `diff` against the vendored copy shows only the single-line `function _approve(address owner, address spender, uint256 value, bool emitEvent) internal virtual {` re-wrapped onto four lines (vendored lines 284-287); likewise draft-IERC6093.sol differs only at the error declaration re-wrapped onto lines 121-123.","severity":"low","snippet":"      \"contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\": \"2d874da1c1478ed22a2d30dcf1a6ec0d09a13f897ca680d55fb49fbcc0e0c5b1\",","title":"Vendored dependency provenance record does not match the committed files: ERC20.sol and draft-IERC6093.sol hashes in lib/DEPENDENCIES.json are those of upstream v5.0.2, but the committed copies were r"}],"hash":"fd1236970ab26bb244ef935c9c7b245ef99721c4a51c0bc9019aa693b5275d66","nodeId":"f4bc73b6-7e45-4329-8114-40d84fb69ab1","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and `.imd-findings.json` is written at the repository root. No files in the tree were changed.\n\n**Result: the token's permission model has no defects.** `src/VerdictIMD.sol` is the unmodified OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 ERC20 plus a constant and a single constructor mint of 10^27 units to msg.sender. The compiled ABI exposes only the ten ERC-20 selectors and `INITIAL_SUPPLY()`. There is no owner, initializer, proxy, pause, blacklist, mint or burn path, and the runtime contains no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT. The existing 32 tests pass on this tree.\n\n**Coverage, all three entry points hold:**\n- `approve` writes only the caller's own allowance and rejects a zero spender.\n- `transfer` debits only msg.sender with a checked balance and no fee, hook or exemption.\n- `transferFrom` checks the allowance before the balance move and leaves infinite allowances untouched.\n- Three extra rows cover the constructor mint invariant, the absence of privileged roles, and the trust-gap and asymmetry seams, which have no privileged actor to act through.\n\n**One low finding, outside the token logic.** The provenance record in `lib/DEPENDENCIES.json` lists SHA-256 hashes for the vendored OpenZeppelin files, and the README states they are unmodified upstream bytes. Two of the six files do not hash to the recorded values: ERC20.sol and draft-IERC6093.sol. A diff against the files fetched from the v5.0.2 tag shows the only change is line wrapping from a formatter run, so semantics and bytecode are unaffected. The reproduction is a `sha256sum` of the two files with expected and actual values recorded. The fix touches lib/ or the dependency record, so it is the author's call: restore the upstream bytes or recompute the two hashes and amend the README claim.\n\nStatic-analysis leads were checked. Slither reported nothing, and aderyn's large-literal lead resolves to exactly 10^27, matching the brief. No critical or high finding exists, so no proof test was written.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":684665,"inputTokens":354,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":9736,"runtime":"claude","turns":17,"wallClockMs":205364}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":1248,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 28 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 1.14s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":2520,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 3 tests for test/LaunchCompatibility.t.sol:LaunchCompatibilityTest\n[PASS] test_Create2FactoryReceivesEntireSupplyWithoutConstructorConfiguration() (gas: 291964)\n[PASS] test_LaunchAllocationClaimAndPoolTransfersArriveWhole() (gas: 646392)\n[PASS] test_TransferToContractDoesNotInvokeReceiver() (gas: 182444)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 11.46ms (2.95ms CPU time)\n\nRan 28 tests for test/VerdictIMD.t.sol:VerdictIMDTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_DelegatedTransferUsesOnlyApprovedAmount(uint256,uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 162846, ~: 164892)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 852052582043472250767295115\n  Bound result 470242532547346750356647635\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_OverdrawRevertsWithoutMovingTokens(uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 69043, ~: 69383)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 15389113887766298178034600471629643600509540021333554036282227\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_TransferConservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 92958, ~: 93142)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 989489090536425779712209296\n\n[PASS] test_ApproveEmitsEventAndReplacesAllowance() (gas: 134484)\n[PASS] test_ConstructorEmitsSingleMintToImmediateDeployer() (gas: 38939)\n[PASS] test_DeployerCannotSpendHolderBalanceWithoutApproval() (gas: 97192)\n[PASS] test_EntireSupplyCanMoveAndMoveBack() (gas: 149165)\n[PASS] test_InfiniteAllowanceStaysInfinite() (gas: 214748)\n[PASS] test_MetadataAndFullSupplyBelongToDeployer() (gas: 107692)\n[PASS] test_NoMintBurnAdminOrUpgradeEntrypointsForDeployerOrStranger() (gas: 1463916)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenApproveZeroSpender() (gas: 37594)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenEmptyAccountTransfers() (gas: 44601)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenSelfTransferExceedsBalance() (gas: 33363)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenSpentAllowanceIsReused() (gas: 146369)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenTransferExceedsBalance() (gas: 54950)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenTransferFromExceedsAllowance() (gas: 115680)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenTransferFromExceedsBalanceRestoresAllowance() (gas: 126176)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenTransferFromToZeroAddressRestoresAllowance() (gas: 114245)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenTransferToZeroAddressIncludingZeroAmount() (gas: 82440)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenUnapprovedSpenderAttemptsTransferFrom() (gas: 117758)\n[PASS] test_RevocationPreventsFurtherSpending() (gas: 120367)\n[PASS] test_RuntimeFitsSizeLimitAndHasNoForbiddenOpcodes() (gas: 2259500)\n[PASS] test_SelfTransferPreservesBalance() (gas: 51506)\n[PASS] test_TransferDeliversExactAmountAndEmitsEvent() (gas: 93461)\n[PASS] test_TransferFromDeliversExactAmountAndConsumesAllowance() (gas: 244044)\n[PASS] test_TransferFromToOwnerConsumesAllowanceWithoutChangingBalance() (gas: 103311)\n[PASS] test_ZeroTransferFromEmptyAccountSucceedsAndEmitsEvent() (gas: 73353)\n[PASS] test_ZeroTransferFromWithoutAllowanceSucceedsAndEmitsEvent() (gas: 68861)\nSuite result: ok. 28 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 13.35ms (51.30ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/VerdictIMD.invariant.t.sol:VerdictIMDInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nVerdictIMDInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_BalancesAndAllowancesMatchIndependentModel\n[PASS] invariant_SupplyIsFixedAndEveryUnitIsAccountedFor\n VerdictIMDInvariantTest invariants (runs: 128, calls: 8192, reverts: 0)\n\n╭--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract     | Selector         | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+==============================================================+\n| TokenHandler | approve          | 2076  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | rejectedOverdraw | 2005  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | transfer         | 2046  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | transferFrom     | 2065  | 0       | 0        |\n╰--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 10399741253477432206960347\n  Bound result 2842\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 1467\n  Bound result 24\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 3461\n  Bound result 4303\n  Bound result 6821\n  Bound result 239600258746522567793042513\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 10089544942129071917918934\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 403092504628227239611548994\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 4767\n  Bound result 40000000000000000000\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2233625728\n  Bound result 718\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 1668\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 2.43s (2.43s CPU time)\n\nRan 3 test suites in 2.43s (2.46s CPU time): 32 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (32 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":42,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"VerdictIMD.approve(address,uint256)\",\"VerdictIMD.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"VerdictIMD.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"README.md\":140,\"foundry.toml\":24,\"remappings.txt\":2,\"src/VerdictIMD.sol\":17,\"test/LaunchCompatibility.t.sol\":97,\"test/VerdictIMD.invariant.t.sol\":47,\"test/VerdictIMD.t.sol\":380,\"test/helpers/TokenHandler.sol\":70},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":561,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"slither: no results at low impact or above","passed":true},{"durationMs":284,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[low] large-numeric-literal at src/VerdictIMD.sol:12: Large Numeric Literal","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"c3903671a396e6fcdc7bc5555402f89076d9008385aba65799403cbe6c0bdcbe","verifiedTreeHash":"efc58cd32edf3807f49f7f792979ff80050249dc","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+7ff5db2c"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":1646,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 29 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 1.53s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":9889,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 3 tests for test/LaunchCompatibility.t.sol:LaunchCompatibilityTest\n[PASS] test_Create2FactoryReceivesEntireSupplyWithoutConstructorConfiguration() (gas: 291964)\n[PASS] test_LaunchAllocationClaimAndPoolTransfersArriveWhole() (gas: 646392)\n[PASS] test_TransferToContractDoesNotInvokeReceiver() (gas: 182444)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 929.98µs (981.05µs CPU time)\n\nRan 16 tests for test/VerdictIMD.boundaries.t.sol:VerdictIMDBoundariesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_AllowanceOverdrawRevertsDespiteSufficientBalance(uint256,uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 216823, ~: 218770)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1000000000\n  Bound result 127\n  Bound result 207\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_DelegatedSelfTransferChangesOnlyFiniteAllowance(uint256,uint256,uint256,bool,bool) (runs: 1000, μ: 205015, ~: 204538)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 367610368378382710127734696\n  Bound result 307418111328382852\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_ExhaustedApprovalDoesNotReviveWhenBalanceReturns(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 427811, ~: 428652)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 310234873628872357694734148\n  Bound result 92188755255640224959047763\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_InsufficientBalancePreservesApprovalForRetry(uint256,uint256,bool) (runs: 1000, μ: 347488, ~: 347848)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 5218\n  Bound result 999999999999999999999998756\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_ReplacingApprovalIsIdempotentAndIsolated(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 327720, ~: 327809)\n[PASS] test_ApprovalDoesNotApplyToADifferentOwner() (gas: 339591)\n[PASS] test_ApprovalsCannotBeDelegatedTransitively() (gas: 256339)\n[PASS] test_DelegatedSelfOverdrawRestoresAllowanceAndAllowsValidRetry() (gas: 175704)\n[PASS] test_InfiniteApprovalCanBeLoweredAndRevokedAfterUse() (gas: 300400)\n[PASS] test_MaxMinusOneAllowanceIsFinite() (gas: 158231)\n[PASS] test_MaxUintTransferCannotWrapBalancesEvenWithInfiniteApproval() (gas: 156791)\n[PASS] test_OneBaseUnitCanMoveAndReturnThroughAnApproval() (gas: 213369)\n[PASS] test_OwnerTransferFromRequiresSelfApproval() (gas: 253106)\n[PASS] test_ZeroDelegatedTransferPreservesFiniteAndInfiniteAllowance() (gas: 259804)\n[PASS] test_ZeroDelegatedTransferToZeroStillReverts() (gas: 262810)\n[PASS] test_ZeroSpenderIsRejectedForZeroAndMaximumApproval() (gas: 83377)\nSuite result: ok. 16 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 78.97ms (385.87ms CPU time)\n\nRan 28 tests for test/VerdictIMD.t.sol:VerdictIMDTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_DelegatedTransferUsesOnlyApprovedAmount(uint256,uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 163230, ~: 164858)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 26899970823592132983228893\n  Bound result 21321365523781517307607966\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_OverdrawRevertsWithoutMovingTokens(uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 69053, ~: 69383)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 699670788207874532001401660289204438247130356611912389686\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_TransferConservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 92908, ~: 93142)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 15\n\n[PASS] test_ApproveEmitsEventAndReplacesAllowance() (gas: 134484)\n[PASS] test_ConstructorEmitsSingleMintToImmediateDeployer() (gas: 38939)\n[PASS] test_DeployerCannotSpendHolderBalanceWithoutApproval() (gas: 97192)\n[PASS] test_EntireSupplyCanMoveAndMoveBack() (gas: 149165)\n[PASS] test_InfiniteAllowanceStaysInfinite() (gas: 214748)\n[PASS] test_MetadataAndFullSupplyBelongToDeployer() (gas: 107692)\n[PASS] test_NoMintBurnAdminOrUpgradeEntrypointsForDeployerOrStranger() (gas: 1463916)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenApproveZeroSpender() (gas: 37594)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenEmptyAccountTransfers() (gas: 44601)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenSelfTransferExceedsBalance() (gas: 33363)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenSpentAllowanceIsReused() (gas: 146369)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenTransferExceedsBalance() (gas: 54950)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenTransferFromExceedsAllowance() (gas: 115680)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenTransferFromExceedsBalanceRestoresAllowance() (gas: 126176)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenTransferFromToZeroAddressRestoresAllowance() (gas: 114245)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenTransferToZeroAddressIncludingZeroAmount() (gas: 82440)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenUnapprovedSpenderAttemptsTransferFrom() (gas: 117758)\n[PASS] test_RevocationPreventsFurtherSpending() (gas: 120367)\n[PASS] test_RuntimeFitsSizeLimitAndHasNoForbiddenOpcodes() (gas: 2259500)\n[PASS] test_SelfTransferPreservesBalance() (gas: 51506)\n[PASS] test_TransferDeliversExactAmountAndEmitsEvent() (gas: 93461)\n[PASS] test_TransferFromDeliversExactAmountAndConsumesAllowance() (gas: 244044)\n[PASS] test_TransferFromToOwnerConsumesAllowanceWithoutChangingBalance() (gas: 103311)\n[PASS] test_ZeroTransferFromEmptyAccountSucceedsAndEmitsEvent() (gas: 73353)\n[PASS] test_ZeroTransferFromWithoutAllowanceSucceedsAndEmitsEvent() (gas: 68861)\nSuite result: ok. 28 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 79.03ms (243.92ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/VerdictIMD.invariant.t.sol:VerdictIMDInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nVerdictIMDInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_BalancesAndAllowancesMatchIndependentModel\n[PASS] invariant_SupplyIsFixedAndEveryUnitIsAccountedFor\n VerdictIMDInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 32768, reverts: 0)\n\n╭--------------+---------------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract     | Selector                  | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=======================================================================+\n| TokenHandler | approve                   | 2500  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+---------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | approveBoundary           | 2441  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+---------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | rejectedAllowanceOverdraw | 2549  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+---------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | rejectedBalanceOverdraw   | 2562  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+---------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | rejectedOverdraw          | 2468  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+---------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | rejectedZeroReceiver      | 2537  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+---------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | rejectedZeroSpender       | 2573  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+---------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | revokeAndReject           | 2570  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+---------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | roundTrip                 | 2519  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+---------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | spendThenRejectReuse      | 2569  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+---------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | transfer                  | 2459  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+---------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | transferAll               | 2576  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+---------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | transferFrom              | 2445  | 0       | 0        |\n╰--------------+---------------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 107101817271047939197267892\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 357101817271047939197267890\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 246990440624255814438602794\n  Bound result 6653\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 6000000000000000000\n  Bound result 144146220017400966016720353\n  Bound result 395907742104696246364129314\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913129639933\n  Bound result 395907742104696246364129313\n  Bound result 116182643323655115690044321\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 12743233\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 420533640895743176460474440794190458265571429686948719429411218271\n  Bound result 303\n  Bound result 6131840\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 937\n  Bound result 4108\n  Bound result 14\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 395907742104696246364129616\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 12\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 3415\n  Bound result 265\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 0\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 9.79s (9.79s CPU time)\n\nRan 4 test suites in 9.80s (9.95s CPU time): 48 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (48 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":54,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"VerdictIMD.approve(address,uint256)\",\"VerdictIMD.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"VerdictIMD.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"README.md\":140,\"foundry.toml\":24,\"remappings.txt\":2,\"src/VerdictIMD.sol\":17,\"test/LaunchCompatibility.t.sol\":97,\"test/VerdictIMD.boundaries.t.sol\":364,\"test/VerdictIMD.invariant.t.sol\":72,\"test/VerdictIMD.t.sol\":380,\"test/helpers/TokenHandler.sol\":229},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"cebc933835c954e5ae5278a3ca7940de315abace9c54fa378f507dfbc96242e4","verifiedTreeHash":"09e54496300cf8fa1734a7805d7d05b4d650bd96","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+7ff5db2c"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":1358,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 28 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 1.23s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":2678,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 3 tests for test/LaunchCompatibility.t.sol:LaunchCompatibilityTest\n[PASS] test_Create2FactoryReceivesEntireSupplyWithoutConstructorConfiguration() (gas: 291964)\n[PASS] test_LaunchAllocationClaimAndPoolTransfersArriveWhole() (gas: 646392)\n[PASS] test_TransferToContractDoesNotInvokeReceiver() (gas: 182444)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 14.34ms (7.22ms CPU time)\n\nRan 28 tests for test/VerdictIMD.t.sol:VerdictIMDTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_DelegatedTransferUsesOnlyApprovedAmount(uint256,uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 162601, ~: 164870)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 530608791860517564521788208\n  Bound result 254051198146773259183682263\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_OverdrawRevertsWithoutMovingTokens(uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 69029, ~: 69383)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665639564039457584007913129639945\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_TransferConservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 92854, ~: 93142)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 114043225543735115558825815\n\n[PASS] test_ApproveEmitsEventAndReplacesAllowance() (gas: 134484)\n[PASS] test_ConstructorEmitsSingleMintToImmediateDeployer() (gas: 38939)\n[PASS] test_DeployerCannotSpendHolderBalanceWithoutApproval() (gas: 97192)\n[PASS] test_EntireSupplyCanMoveAndMoveBack() (gas: 149165)\n[PASS] test_InfiniteAllowanceStaysInfinite() (gas: 214748)\n[PASS] test_MetadataAndFullSupplyBelongToDeployer() (gas: 107692)\n[PASS] test_NoMintBurnAdminOrUpgradeEntrypointsForDeployerOrStranger() (gas: 1463916)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenApproveZeroSpender() (gas: 37594)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenEmptyAccountTransfers() (gas: 44601)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenSelfTransferExceedsBalance() (gas: 33363)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenSpentAllowanceIsReused() (gas: 146369)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenTransferExceedsBalance() (gas: 54950)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenTransferFromExceedsAllowance() (gas: 115680)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenTransferFromExceedsBalanceRestoresAllowance() (gas: 126176)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenTransferFromToZeroAddressRestoresAllowance() (gas: 114245)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenTransferToZeroAddressIncludingZeroAmount() (gas: 82440)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenUnapprovedSpenderAttemptsTransferFrom() (gas: 117758)\n[PASS] test_RevocationPreventsFurtherSpending() (gas: 120367)\n[PASS] test_RuntimeFitsSizeLimitAndHasNoForbiddenOpcodes() (gas: 2259500)\n[PASS] test_SelfTransferPreservesBalance() (gas: 51506)\n[PASS] test_TransferDeliversExactAmountAndEmitsEvent() (gas: 93461)\n[PASS] test_TransferFromDeliversExactAmountAndConsumesAllowance() (gas: 244044)\n[PASS] test_TransferFromToOwnerConsumesAllowanceWithoutChangingBalance() (gas: 103311)\n[PASS] test_ZeroTransferFromEmptyAccountSucceedsAndEmitsEvent() (gas: 73353)\n[PASS] test_ZeroTransferFromWithoutAllowanceSucceedsAndEmitsEvent() (gas: 68861)\nSuite result: ok. 28 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 16.24ms (80.97ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/VerdictIMD.invariant.t.sol:VerdictIMDInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nVerdictIMDInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_BalancesAndAllowancesMatchIndependentModel\n[PASS] invariant_SupplyIsFixedAndEveryUnitIsAccountedFor\n VerdictIMDInvariantTest invariants (runs: 128, calls: 8192, reverts: 0)\n\n╭--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract     | Selector         | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+==============================================================+\n| TokenHandler | approve          | 2046  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | rejectedOverdraw | 2109  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | transfer         | 2026  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | transferFrom     | 2011  | 0       | 0        |\n╰--------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 16\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 93046374323832551895791898\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 64727960808048456583809605\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 250000000\n  Bound result 242\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 2472\n  Bound result 2647771738\n  Bound result 1097\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 33\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 3889236926554421\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 1541\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 200000000000000000000\n  Bound result 65583961010167667464218219\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 1000000000\n  Bound result 0\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 2.56s (2.56s CPU time)\n\nRan 3 test suites in 2.56s (2.59s CPU time): 32 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (32 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":44,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"VerdictIMD.approve(address,uint256)\",\"VerdictIMD.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"VerdictIMD.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"README.md\":140,\"foundry.toml\":24,\"launch.json\":24,\"remappings.txt\":2,\"src/VerdictIMD.sol\":17,\"test/LaunchCompatibility.t.sol\":97,\"test/VerdictIMD.invariant.t.sol\":47,\"test/VerdictIMD.t.sol\":380,\"test/helpers/TokenHandler.sol\":70},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"f6d6754eecfca80bb52a23fa9d9ac926e467e01af6bad3f8c18dae48c9998ff4","verifiedTreeHash":"9e15a9363feafa4225fb91b3d66ed63e46d257fe","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+7ff5db2c"}]}