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fee that sends 5% of every swap to the pool creators wallet 0x1EE3ffadfE138415A2ddaedeEBe5F46616fA413d\n\nToken name: Democratizing Collectable Acquisions\nToken symbol: 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runs inside afterSwap of every launch-pool swap. It burns ALL accumulated FWA claims (line 254: oldClaims = min(balanceOf(hook, FWA), MAX_DELTA - fee)) and sells fee + oldClaims exact-input on the owner-configured ETH/FWA market with sqrtPriceLimit = min(spot * sqrt(1 + maxPriceMoveBps/1e4), maxConversionSqrtPriceX96), where spot is read with getSlot0 in the same transaction (line 261). Three facts combine: (a) the relative bound is anchored to whatever the market price is at that moment, so the same-block caller controls it; (b) the sale is triggered by any launch swap, including one that pays no fee (a 1 wei DCA sell gives pairDelta 0, fee 0, passes _validateSwap and still sells the entire backlog because budget = 0 + oldClaims != 0); (c) a backlog is the normal state because conversion defers whenever spot >= the static ceiling (README: 'If spot is already at/above the ceiling ... FWA remains as claims'), and the owner must leave slack above spot or nothing ever converts (the project's own fixture and README examples use a 4x ceiling). An unprivileged actor therefore (1) sells FWA on the market to push the price just under the ceiling, (2) sells 1 wei DCA on the launch pool, which makes the hook dump the whole backlog into that price, (3) buys the FWA back. The creator's ETH is transferred to the sandwicher. Without any manipulation, repeated dust swaps in one block re-anchor the relative bound each time, so the '10% per conversion' bound does not bound one block's movement at all: 8 fee-free swaps sold a ~39,000 FWA backlog moving the market sqrt price from Q96 to 1.4058*Q96 (price x1.976). Merged from audit_economics (high) and audit_permissions (medium): same root cause (lines 254-270). Severity high: unprivileged, profitable, loss of the recipient's funds bounded only by the ceiling slack the owner must leave. Fix preserving the design: anchor the relative bound to a reference the same-block caller cannot set (e.g. the market sqrt price recorded at the previous block or at the last successful conversion, kept in storage; defer to claims when current spot deviates by more than maxPriceMoveBps), do not sell the backlog on a swap whose fee is 0, and cap the backlog sold per swap (e.g. a multiple of the new fee).","line":261,"path":"src/DCAHook.sol","reproduction":"test/scratch/ConversionSandwichProof.t.sol (source in proof). Fixture: fresh PoolManager; DCAToken; DCAHook(manager, token, factory=test, owner=0x1EE3...413d) at a mined address; launch pool DCA/FWA fee 12500 spacing 60 at sqrtPrice 2^96 with 1,000,000e18 liquidity over [-60000, 60000]; hookless ETH/FWA market fee 3000 spacing 60 at 2^96 with 100,000e18 liquidity over the same range. test_attackerCannotProfitFromSandwichingTheFeeConversion: (1) owner setConversionPool(market, 1000, 2^96): spot == ceiling so the fee is deferred; victim buys DCA with exact input 100,000e18 FWA -> manager.balanceOf(hook, uint160(FWA)) == 5,000e18. (2) owner setConversionPool(market, 1000, 2*2^96). (3) attacker, one block, holding 1,000,000e18 FWA and 1,000e18 DCA: market swap SwapParams(false, -500,000e18, 1.8*2^96) (sells FWA until sqrt price 1.8*2^96, receives ~44k ETH); launch swap exact-input sell of 1 wei DCA (fee 0) -> hook burns and sells all 5,000e18 FWA with limit min(1.8*2^96*1.0488, 2*2^96); market swap SwapParams(true, -ethGained, MIN_SQRT_PRICE+1). Expected: attacker FWA after <= before (no profit), creator receives ~5,000 ETH worth of value at the pre-attack 1 FWA/ETH spot. Actual: attacker FWA 1,000,000e18 -> 1,003,086.80e18 (+3,086.80 FWA for 1 wei DCA), creator received 1,497.12 ETH for 5,000 FWA; assertion 'attacker must not profit from sandwiching the fee conversion: 1003086801768205879562441 > 1000000000000000000000000'. test_oneBlockOfConversionsCannotMoveTheMarketPastTheRelativeBound: ceiling at spot, 4 round trips of buy/sell 100,000e18 leave > 30,000e18 FWA claims; owner raises the ceiling to 2*2^96; 8 exact-input sells of 1 wei DCA. Expected: the market sqrt price moves at most sqrt(1.1) above the block's starting spot (83095209898423065647147237008). Actual: 111379297925602961594143051351 (x1.4058 sqrt, x1.976 price).","severity":"high","snippet":" (uint160 price,,,) = poolManager.getSlot0(market.toId());","title":"Fee conversion sells at a same-transaction spot-relative bound and any fee-free swap sells the whole FWA backlog, so an unprivileged trader sandwiches the creator's fee and chains conversions past the"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"_validateSwap, called by both beforeSwap and afterSwap, reverts ConversionNotConfigured while conversionConfigured is false. The factory deploys the hook, initializes the pool and seeds 88% of supply in one transaction (initialization and liquidity do not run _validateSwap, so the launch itself deploys), but nothing in that flow or in the constructor configures a conversion market, so from the launch block until the immutable owner 0x1EE3...413d hand-builds and sends a native-ETH/FWA PoolKey with a bps bound and a sqrtPrice ceiling, every buy and sell on the launch pool is refused; if that key is lost, the pool is permanently untradeable while holding the launch liquidity. The same inline, mandatory conversion couples trading liveness to the route afterwards: _convertAndPay calls poolManager.swap(market) without a fallback, so a market whose hook reverts (on mainnet the only liquid ETH/FWA pool is FWA's own, hooked by FWATokenHook; a hookless pool the owner could point at cannot receive FWA liquidity because FWA refuses transfers to the PoolManager outside its own hook) or that the owner repoints at an unusable pool (setConversionPool checks only key shape, hook code presence and slot0 != 0) halts every launch swap until the owner reconfigures. The brief asks for a fee on every swap, not for trading gated on an owner action; the hook already knows how to keep unsold FWA as ERC-6909 claims (line 278) and retry later, so the guarantee is broken without need. Merged from audit_flow (medium), audit_economics (medium) and audit_permissions (low). The owner-halt power is a trust assumption, reported here with its preconditions, not a permission bypass. Fix preserving the design: remove the conversionConfigured check from _validateSwap; in _convertAndPay skip the market sale when !conversionConfigured (mint the whole budget as FWA claims), and wrap the market swap in a try/catch that falls back to claims, so the fee is always charged and trading never depends on the route.","line":227,"path":"src/DCAHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {IUnlockCallback} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/callback/IUnlockCallback.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {BalanceDelta} from \"v4-core/src/types/BalanceDelta.sol\";\nimport {ModifyLiquidityParams, SwapParams} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\nimport {TickMath} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/TickMath.sol\";\nimport {TransientStateLibrary} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/TransientStateLibrary.sol\";\nimport {IERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol\";\nimport {ERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\";\nimport {DCAToken} from \"src/DCAToken.sol\";\nimport {DCAHook} from \"src/DCAHook.sol\";\nimport {HookFlags} from \"src/HookFlags.sol\";\n\ncontract PairMock is ERC20 {\n constructor() ERC20(\"FWA\", \"FWA\") {}\n function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {\n _mint(to, amount);\n }\n}\n\n/// @dev Minimal router: pulls caller funds before unlock, settles from its own balance.\ncontract Router is IUnlockCallback {\n using TransientStateLibrary for IPoolManager;\n\n IPoolManager immutable manager;\n\n constructor(IPoolManager m) {\n manager = m;\n }\n\n receive() external payable {}\n\n function addLiquidity(PoolKey memory key, ModifyLiquidityParams memory p, uint256 max0, uint256 max1)\n external\n {\n IERC20(Currency.unwrap(key.currency0)).transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), max0);\n IERC20(Currency.unwrap(key.currency1)).transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), max1);\n manager.unlock(abi.encode(true, key, p, SwapParams(false, 0, 0)));\n _refund(key.currency0);\n _refund(key.currency1);\n }\n\n function swap(PoolKey memory key, SwapParams memory p, uint256 maxIn) external returns (BalanceDelta d) {\n IERC20(Currency.unwrap(p.zeroForOne ? key.currency0 : key.currency1)).transferFrom(\n msg.sender, address(this), maxIn\n );\n d = abi.decode(manager.unlock(abi.encode(false, key, ModifyLiquidityParams(0, 0, 0, 0), p)), (BalanceDelta));\n _refund(key.currency0);\n _refund(key.currency1);\n }\n\n function unlockCallback(bytes calldata data) external returns (bytes memory) {\n require(msg.sender == address(manager));\n (bool liq, PoolKey memory key, ModifyLiquidityParams memory lp, SwapParams memory sp) =\n abi.decode(data, (bool, PoolKey, ModifyLiquidityParams, SwapParams));\n BalanceDelta d;\n if (liq) (d,) = manager.modifyLiquidity(key, lp, \"\");\n else d = manager.swap(key, sp, \"\");\n _settle(key.currency0);\n _settle(key.currency1);\n return abi.encode(d);\n }\n\n function _settle(Currency c) private {\n int256 delta = manager.currencyDelta(address(this), c);\n if (delta > 0) manager.take(c, address(this), uint256(delta));\n else if (delta < 0) {\n manager.sync(c);\n IERC20(Currency.unwrap(c)).transfer(address(manager), uint256(-delta));\n manager.settle();\n }\n }\n\n function _refund(Currency c) private {\n uint256 b = IERC20(Currency.unwrap(c)).balanceOf(address(this));\n if (b != 0) IERC20(Currency.unwrap(c)).transfer(msg.sender, b);\n }\n}\n\n/// @notice The launch pool must be tradeable from the moment the factory opens and seeds it.\n/// Today every swap reverts with ConversionNotConfigured until the owner sends a separate\n/// transaction; fees could instead be held as FWA claims until a conversion market is set.\ncontract UnconfiguredTradingTest is Test {\n address constant FWA = 0xa0Df17B5aC76ABaBA36E1450E2cbCd18A620C845;\n address constant CREATOR = 0x1EE3ffadfE138415A2ddaedeEBe5F46616fA413d;\n uint160 constant Q96 = 79228162514264337593543950336;\n\n IPoolManager manager;\n DCAToken token;\n PairMock pair;\n DCAHook hook;\n Router router;\n PoolKey key;\n\n function setUp() public {\n manager = IPoolManager(address(new PoolManager(address(this))));\n token = new DCAToken();\n vm.etch(FWA, address(new PairMock()).code);\n pair = PairMock(FWA);\n pair.mint(address(this), 1_000_000_000 ether);\n\n bytes memory initCode = abi.encodePacked(\n type(DCAHook).creationCode, abi.encode(manager, address(token), address(this), CREATOR)\n );\n bytes32 hash = keccak256(initCode);\n address predicted;\n bytes32 salt;\n for (uint256 i; i < 200_000; ++i) {\n salt = bytes32(i);\n predicted = address(uint160(uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0xff), address(this), salt, hash)))));\n if (HookFlags.matches(predicted, HookFlags.DCA)) break;\n }\n address deployed;\n assembly {\n deployed := create2(0, add(initCode, 32), mload(initCode), salt)\n }\n require(deployed == predicted, \"deploy\");\n hook = DCAHook(deployed);\n\n bool tokenFirst = address(token) < FWA;\n key = PoolKey({\n currency0: Currency.wrap(tokenFirst ? address(token) : FWA),\n currency1: Currency.wrap(tokenFirst ? FWA : address(token)),\n fee: 12_500,\n tickSpacing: 60,\n hooks: IHooks(address(hook))\n });\n // The factory: initialize and seed in the launch transaction.\n manager.initialize(key, Q96);\n router = new Router(manager);\n token.approve(address(router), type(uint256).max);\n pair.approve(address(router), type(uint256).max);\n router.addLiquidity(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(-60_000, 60_000, 1_000_000 ether, 0), 1_000_000 ether, 1_000_000 ether);\n }\n\n /// @dev Fails today: the first buyer after launch is refused until the owner acts.\n function test_buyRightAfterLaunchSucceedsBeforeOwnerConfiguresConversion() public {\n assertFalse(hook.conversionConfigured());\n bool zeroForOne = Currency.unwrap(key.currency0) == FWA;\n SwapParams memory p = SwapParams(\n zeroForOne, -int256(100 ether), zeroForOne ? TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1 : TickMath.MAX_SQRT_PRICE - 1\n );\n uint256 tokenBefore = token.balanceOf(address(this));\n router.swap(key, p, 100 ether);\n assertGt(token.balanceOf(address(this)), tokenBefore, \"buyer received DCA\");\n // The 5% fee is retained for the creator as FWA claims until a market is configured.\n assertEq(manager.balanceOf(address(hook), uint160(FWA)), 5 ether, \"fee held as FWA claims\");\n }\n}","reproduction":"test/scratch/Proof_3a7bcf3a38aa.t.sol (the audit_flow proof, re-run here, source in proof). State: fresh PoolManager; DCAToken; DCAHook(manager, token, factory=test, owner=0x1EE3...413d); factory calls manager.initialize(key{DCA/FWA, 12500, 60, hook}, 2^96) and adds 1,000,000e18 liquidity over [-60000, 60000]. No setConversionPool call (hook.conversionConfigured() == false). Input: router exact-input buy SwapParams(zeroForOne = FWA is currency0, amountSpecified = -100e18, sqrtPriceLimit = MIN+1 or MAX-1). Expected: the buyer receives DCA and 5e18 FWA is retained for the creator (as claims until a market exists). Actual: PoolManager.swap reverts WrappedError(hook, 0x575e24b4 beforeSwap.selector, 0xe44cc672 ConversionNotConfigured(), 0xa9e35b2f HookCallFailed()); the project's own test test/SwapFee.t.sol test_swapWithoutConfiguredMarketRevertsAtomically asserts the same revert. Owner-halt variant: vm.prank(owner); hook.setConversionPool(keyOf an initialized ETH/FWA pool whose hook reverts in beforeSwap, 100, 2*2^96) is accepted; afterwards every launch swap reverts inside afterSwap -> poolManager.swap(market) (test/ConversionSecurity.t.sol test_negativeNativeConversionOutputRevertsAtomically shows the atomic revert path with a misbehaving market hook).","severity":"medium","snippet":" if (!conversionConfigured) revert ConversionNotConfigured();","title":"Launch pool opens untradeable: every swap reverts until the owner sends setConversionPool, and trading stays coupled to the conversion route for the life of the pool"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The paired currency is hardcoded as 0xa0Df17B5aC76ABaBA36E1450E2cbCd18A620C845. On Ethereum mainnet that is FWAToken ('Fake World Assets', source verified on Sourcify, read for this review). Its _afterTokenTransfer allows a transfer only when (a) it is a mint/burn, (b) isDistributor[from] || isDistributor[to], (c) from/to is FWA's owner, or (d) from/to is the v4 PoolManager AND a transient allowance in slot 0 is >= amount (then decremented); every other transfer reverts InvalidTransfer(). Only FWA's immutable hook 0x2c67eba8a50af0db5fba55f725247a75cbda6444 (FWATokenHook, also verified) may call increaseTransferAllowance, and it does so only in its own afterSwap/afterAddLiquidity, i.e. only for FWA's own ETH/FWA pool. The DCA/FWA launch pool is hooked by DCAHook, so no bump ever happens for it. Consequence: a buy of DCA must move FWA into the PoolManager (Universal Router SETTLE pays the manager from the user via Permit2: from = user, to = PoolManager, allowance 0 -> InvalidTransfer; a router that pulls to itself first fails earlier because user -> router is not an allowed edge at all), and a sell of DCA pays FWA out with take(FWA, user, amount) (from = PoolManager -> InvalidTransfer). Live state read on 2026-10-12 (block 0x18f75cc): isDistributor(UniversalRouter 0x66a9893cc07d91d95644aedd05d03f95e1dba8af) = false, isDistributor(FWATokenHook) = false, FWA.launched() = true, FWATokenHook.externalBuysEnabled() = true. The hook's own fee path is unaffected (claims only, and FWATokenHook's afterSwap allows sells by any sender with a 1% ETH fee, so the conversion through FWA's canonical pool works), but 'a fee on every swap' presupposes swaps: only an FWA distributor/owner, or a bespoke router that keeps the FWA leg entirely as ERC-6909 claims (buy FWA claims on FWA's pool, spend them on the launch pool in the same unlock, take sell proceeds as claims), can trade the launch pool. The repository models FWA as refusing transfers only to the hook (test/helpers/HookFixture.sol lines 93-94, README 'a FWA mock that refuses transfers to the hook' and 'Both token orderings work'), so every integration test passes on a path mainnet refuses. Not a defect in the hook's logic and not fixable in this code; reported because the launch's economic premise rests on an undocumented platform property. Needed before launch: evidence that the launch's router/front-end is isDistributor on FWA or settles the FWA leg via claims; the README should state this dependency and the fixture should model the real guard.","line":31,"path":"src/DCAHook.sol","reproduction":"Scratch test (not attached as proof because no change to this code can make it pass): a mock etched at the FWA address implementing the verified guard verbatim (mint/burn, distributor, owner exempt; PoolManager edge gated by tload(0); else revert InvalidTransfer), launch pool and ETH/FWA market seeded by FWA's owner (exempt), conversion configured (market, 1000, 2*2^96); an ordinary holder alice (1,000e18 FWA and DCA received from the owner) trades through a router that settles from the user directly to the PoolManager and takes output straight to the user. Buy: router.swap(key, SwapParams(zeroForOne = FWA is currency0, -100e18, MIN+1/MAX-1)) from alice reverts InvalidTransfer() at FWA.transferFrom(alice, PoolManager, 100e18). Sell: router.swap(key, SwapParams(zeroForOne = DCA is currency0, -100e18, ...)) reverts inside PoolManager.take(FWA, alice) with WrappedError(0xa0Df...C845, 0xa9059cbb transfer, 0x2f352531 InvalidTransfer(), 0xf27f64e4 ERC20TransferFailed). Expected per README: 'Both token orderings work', every swap taxed; actual: neither direction completes for a non-exempt router. The same mock with the router marked distributor and taking to itself completes both swaps and pays the creator, showing the hook itself is fine.","severity":"medium","snippet":" address public constant PAIRED_TOKEN = 0xa0Df17B5aC76ABaBA36E1450E2cbCd18A620C845;","title":"The real FWA token refuses ERC-20 transfers to and from the PoolManager on the launch pool, so no ordinary router can buy or sell DCA; the fixture and README model the wrong restriction"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Every unsold fee is minted back to the hook as an ERC-6909 claim for currency id uint160(FWA). The only code that burns those claims is _convertAndPay, which runs only inside a launch-pool swap and only sells into the owner-configured market under the price bounds. No function, owner or permissionless, can take or transfer the claims to RECIPIENT, even though poolManager.take(FWA, RECIPIENT, amount) never touches the hook's own balance (the stated reason for never taking FWA). ETH has redeemEth(); FWA has no equivalent. If the configured market has no liquidity within the bounds, spot stays at or above any ceiling the owner is willing to set, or the owner key is lost, every swap keeps adding 5% of its FWA side to a balance nobody can move: traders pay the fee, the creator never receives it. Merged from audit_flow (low) and audit_permissions (low). Minimal fix: a permissionless redeemPair() mirroring redeemEth() that unlocks the manager, burns the hook's FWA claims and calls poolManager.take(FWA, RECIPIENT, amount) (reverting harmlessly, claims preserved, if FWA rejects the recipient), or an owner-triggered equivalent.","line":278,"path":"src/DCAHook.sol","reproduction":"State: the project's fixture HookFixture._deploy(false, true, true): launch pool funded, ETH/FWA market initialized with zero liquidity, owner configured it (setConversionPool accepts it because only slot0 != 0 is checked). Input: router exact-input buy of 100e18 FWA. Actual: FeeCharged(gross 100e18, fee 5e18), FeeConverted(spent 0, ethReceived 0, pending 5e18); manager.balanceOf(hook, uint160(FWA)) == 5e18 (the project's test test/SwapFee.t.sol test_noConversionLiquidityRetainsFeeClaims asserts exactly this). Then enumerate the hook's ABI: afterSwap, beforeInitialize, beforeSwap, redeemEth, setConversionPool, unlockCallback. None reduces the FWA claim balance except afterSwap via _convertAndPay, which needs a later launch-pool swap and a live market with spot below the ceiling; redeemEth/unlockCallback only touch currency id 0; setConversionPool cannot move claims. Expected: the creator (or anyone on the creator's behalf) can always collect a fee that was charged.","severity":"low","snippet":" if (budget > spent) poolManager.mint(address(this), pair.toId(), budget - spent);","title":"Collected FWA fee claims have no exit except an in-swap conversion; an unusable ETH/FWA route strands the creator's fee indefinitely"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Every launch swap performs an exact-input sale of the fee FWA on the configured market up to a limit of spot * sqrt(1 + maxPriceMoveBps/1e4), at most 10% above spot. Nothing bounds the initialized ticks the PoolManager must cross on the way: no cap on the FWA sold per swap, no gas stipend, no try/catch. If the owner selects a tickSpacing-1 market (the fee-100 tier) whose liquidity above spot is thin, anyone can seed one-tick dust positions across the band; every launch swap then crosses all of them. Measured with the audit_math proof: 372,322 gas for a 100 FWA buy on a deep market, 28,315,972 gas once 900 positions of liquidity 1e12 sit on ticks 0..899 (the band limit is tick ~953). Preconditions: owner picks a spacing-1 (or 10: ~95 ticks, ~3M gas) market, thin band above spot, attacker spends ~150M gas once. The README trusts the owner to pick a sound market but a third party can degrade it afterwards. Low: no loss, trading on the launch pool becomes very expensive until the owner lowers maxPriceMoveBps or repoints the market. Fix: bound the work per swap, e.g. cap the FWA sold per swap, or run the market swap with a fixed gas stipend in a try/catch that falls back to claims.","line":270,"path":"src/DCAHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {IUnlockCallback} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/callback/IUnlockCallback.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {BalanceDelta} from \"v4-core/src/types/BalanceDelta.sol\";\nimport {ModifyLiquidityParams, SwapParams} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\nimport {TickMath} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/TickMath.sol\";\nimport {TransientStateLibrary} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/TransientStateLibrary.sol\";\nimport {ERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\";\nimport {DCAToken} from \"src/DCAToken.sol\";\nimport {DCAHook} from \"src/DCAHook.sol\";\nimport {HookFlags} from \"src/HookFlags.sol\";\n\ncontract PairMock is ERC20 {\n constructor() ERC20(\"FWA\", \"FWA\") {}\n function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {\n _mint(to, amount);\n }\n}\n\n/// @dev Minimal router: pulls from this test, settles from its own balance.\ncontract Router is IUnlockCallback {\n using TransientStateLibrary for IPoolManager;\n\n IPoolManager immutable manager;\n constructor(IPoolManager m) {\n manager = m;\n }\n receive() external payable {}\n\n function addLiquidity(PoolKey memory key, ModifyLiquidityParams memory p) external payable {\n manager.unlock(abi.encode(true, key, p, SwapParams(false, 0, 0)));\n }\n\n function swap(PoolKey memory key, SwapParams memory s) external {\n manager.unlock(abi.encode(false, key, ModifyLiquidityParams(0, 0, 0, 0), s));\n }\n\n function unlockCallback(bytes calldata data) external returns (bytes memory) {\n require(msg.sender == address(manager));\n (bool liq, PoolKey memory key, ModifyLiquidityParams memory p, SwapParams memory s) =\n abi.decode(data, (bool, PoolKey, ModifyLiquidityParams, SwapParams));\n if (liq) manager.modifyLiquidity(key, p, \"\");\n else manager.swap(key, s, \"\");\n _settle(key.currency0);\n _settle(key.currency1);\n return \"\";\n }\n\n function _settle(Currency c) private {\n int256 d = manager.currencyDelta(address(this), c);\n if (d > 0) {\n manager.take(c, address(this), uint256(d));\n } else if (d < 0) {\n manager.sync(c);\n if (c.isAddressZero()) {\n manager.settle{value: uint256(-d)}();\n } else {\n ERC20(Currency.unwrap(c)).transfer(address(manager), uint256(-d));\n manager.settle();\n }\n }\n }\n}\n\n/// @notice A tickSpacing-1 conversion market seeded with dust positions inside the hook's 10% price\n/// band makes every launch-pool swap walk all of them. Fails now (about 28M gas per swap); passes\n/// once the conversion step bounds the work it does per swap.\ncontract DenseMarketGasTest is Test {\n address constant FWA = 0xa0Df17B5aC76ABaBA36E1450E2cbCd18A620C845;\n address constant CREATOR = 0x1EE3ffadfE138415A2ddaedeEBe5F46616fA413d;\n uint160 constant Q96 = 79228162514264337593543950336;\n\n IPoolManager manager;\n DCAToken token;\n PairMock pair;\n DCAHook hook;\n Router router;\n PoolKey key;\n PoolKey dense;\n\n function setUp() public {\n vm.deal(address(this), 1_000_000 ether);\n manager = IPoolManager(address(new PoolManager(address(this))));\n token = new DCAToken();\n vm.etch(FWA, address(new PairMock()).code);\n pair = PairMock(FWA);\n pair.mint(address(this), 1_000_000_000 ether);\n\n bytes memory initCode = abi.encodePacked(\n type(DCAHook).creationCode, abi.encode(manager, address(token), address(this), CREATOR)\n );\n bytes32 salt;\n address predicted;\n for (uint256 i; i < 500_000; ++i) {\n salt = bytes32(i);\n predicted = address(\n uint160(uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0xff), address(this), salt, keccak256(initCode)))))\n );\n if (HookFlags.matches(predicted, HookFlags.DCA)) break;\n }\n address deployed;\n assembly (\"memory-safe\") {\n deployed := create2(0, add(initCode, 32), mload(initCode), salt)\n }\n require(deployed == predicted, \"hook\");\n hook = DCAHook(deployed);\n router = new Router(manager);\n token.transfer(address(router), 500_000_000 ether);\n pair.transfer(address(router), 500_000_000 ether);\n (bool ok,) = address(router).call{value: 100_000 ether}(\"\");\n require(ok);\n\n bool tokenIs0 = address(token) < FWA;\n key = PoolKey(\n Currency.wrap(tokenIs0 ? address(token) : FWA),\n Currency.wrap(tokenIs0 ? FWA : address(token)),\n 12_500,\n 60,\n IHooks(address(hook))\n );\n manager.initialize(key, Q96);\n router.addLiquidity(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(-60_000, 60_000, 1_000_000 ether, 0));\n\n // The owner points conversion at a canonical fee-100 / spacing-1 ETH-FWA pool.\n dense = PoolKey(Currency.wrap(address(0)), Currency.wrap(FWA), 100, 1, IHooks(address(0)));\n manager.initialize(dense, Q96);\n // Real depth sits below spot (ETH side); above spot, inside the hook's sale band, it is thin.\n router.addLiquidity(dense, ModifyLiquidityParams(-10_000, 0, 1_000 ether, 0));\n vm.prank(CREATOR);\n hook.setConversionPool(dense, 1000, Q96 * 2);\n }\n\n function test_swapGasBoundedWhenConversionMarketHasManyTicks() public {\n // Anyone: 900 one-tick dust positions between spot and spot * 1.1 (ticks 0..953).\n for (int24 i; i < 900; ++i) {\n router.addLiquidity(dense, ModifyLiquidityParams(i, i + 1, 1e12, 0));\n }\n bool tokenIs0 = address(token) < FWA;\n SwapParams memory buy = SwapParams(\n !tokenIs0, -int256(100 ether), !tokenIs0 ? TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1 : TickMath.MAX_SQRT_PRICE - 1\n );\n uint256 before = gasleft();\n router.swap(key, buy);\n uint256 used = before - gasleft();\n emit log_named_uint(\"launch swap gas with 900 dust ticks in band\", used);\n assertLt(used, 5_000_000, \"one launch swap must not cost more than 5M gas\");\n }\n}","reproduction":"test/scratch/Proof_fd6879f532eb.t.sol (the audit_math proof, re-run here, source in proof). 1. Fresh PoolManager, DCAToken, DCAHook(owner 0x1EE3...413d); launch pool DCA/FWA fee 12500 spacing 60 at 2^96 with 1,000,000e18 liquidity over [-60000, 60000]. 2. ETH/FWA pool fee 100, tickSpacing 1 at 2^96; 1,000e18 liquidity on [-10000, 0]; owner setConversionPool(thatKey, 1000, 2*2^96). 3. Anyone adds 900 positions ModifyLiquidityParams(i, i+1, 1e12, 0) for i in 0..899. 4. Exact-input buy of 100e18 FWA. Expected: a swap costing on the order of a few hundred thousand gas (372,322 measured without the dust). Actual: 28,315,972 gas; assertion 'one launch swap must not cost more than 5M gas: 28315972 >= 5000000'.","severity":"low","snippet":" poolManager.swap(market, SwapParams(false, -budget.toInt256(), limit), \"\");","title":"The conversion walks every initialized tick in its price band: a tickSpacing-1 market seeded with dust positions makes each launch swap cost ~28M gas"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"For an exact-input buy or an exact-output sell (FWA is the specified currency) beforeSwap already charged the fee as a specified delta, and afterSwap compares the pool's actual FWA delta with the full fee-adjusted amount and reverts PartialFillNotSupported on any difference. In core v4, and in this pool for DCA-specified swaps, a swap that reaches the caller's sqrtPriceLimitX96 fills partially and succeeds; here it hard-fails, so a trader or aggregator that protects an FWA-specified order with a price limit rather than MIN/MAX plus a min-output check is refused once the pool moves past that limit. The README documents the limitation; it remains an asymmetry between the four swap modes that integrators will not expect from a plain fee hook. No loss (the revert is atomic). Within the design there is no v4 way to refund a specified-side fee from afterSwap; the practical mitigation is to document to routers that FWA-specified orders must use MIN/MAX price limits with min-output/max-input checks.","line":195,"path":"src/DCAHook.sol","reproduction":"State: the project's fixture (deep launch liquidity, market configured). Input: exact-input buy SwapParams(zeroForOne = FWA is currency0, amountSpecified = -1000e18, sqrtPriceLimitX96 = current sqrt price moved one small step in the swap's direction) so the fill stops at the limit. Expected (core v4 semantics): the swap fills up to the limit, the trader pays only the consumed FWA, the fee is charged on what was consumed. Actual: afterSwap sees pairDelta != -(1000e18 - 50e18) and reverts WrappedError(hook, afterSwap.selector, PartialFillNotSupported(), HookCallFailed()); the same order with DCA specified succeeds and is charged on the actual FWA. The project's tests test/SwapFee.t.sol test_partialPairSpecifiedSwapsRevertWithoutFee and test_partialDcaSpecifiedTradeChargesOnlyActualFwa show both behaviours.","severity":"low","snippet":" if (int256(pairDelta) != expected) revert PartialFillNotSupported();","title":"FWA-specified swaps that stop at the trader's sqrtPriceLimitX96 revert instead of partially filling"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The assignment names the token 'Democratizing Collectable Acquisions'. The contract publishes 'Democratizing Collectable Acquisitions', and README and launch.json token.name repeat the corrected spelling. The brief's spelling is probably a typo that the contributor corrected, but the requester never confirmed that; manifest token.name must match the on-chain name() and the requester's intent. Merged from audit_math, audit_economics and audit_permissions (all low). Symbol DCA, 18 decimals and the 10^27 fixed supply match. Fix is a requester decision: keep the corrected spelling and record it, or change the string literal.","line":8,"path":"src/DCAToken.sol","reproduction":"Deploy DCAToken and call name(). Actual: 'Democratizing Collectable Acquisitions'. Brief: 'Democratizing Collectable Acquisions'. launch.json token.name: 'Democratizing Collectable Acquisitions' (matches the contract, not the brief).","severity":"low","snippet":" constructor() ERC20(\"Democratizing Collectable Acquisitions\", \"DCA\") {","title":"Token name differs from the commissioned name"}],"hash":"14b0c60cd1ea5f6598c7f238bdf72b99106da139c5c07580c934fbee8936a357","nodeId":"f251437d-475e-4895-bb83-b873d722506c","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is written at `.imd-findings.json` and nothing else in the tree changed (git status is clean apart from the ignored report).\n\n**What I did**\n\nI rebuilt the project, ran its 77 tests (all pass), re-ran both specialist proofs (both fail as claimed), fetched the verified source of the real FWA token and its hook from Sourcify, read live chain state, and wrote my own proof for the top finding. The thirteen specialist findings reduced to seven after merging duplicates and reproducing each one.\n\n**Findings kept, by severity**\n\n1. **High. Fee conversion is sandwichable and the relative bound is meaningless within a block.** The hook anchors its 10% price bound to the market's spot in the same transaction and sells the entire FWA backlog on any swap, including a 1 wei DCA sell that pays no fee. My proof shows an attacker gaining about 3,087 FWA for 1 wei of DCA while the creator receives 1,497 ETH for 5,000 FWA, and eight dust swaps moving the market price by 98% under a \"10%\" bound. Merged from economics and permissions.\n2. **Medium. The pool opens untradeable.** Every swap reverts until the owner sends a separate configuration transaction, and trading remains coupled to the conversion route afterwards. The audit_flow proof is attached. Merged from three specialists.\n3. **Medium. The real FWA token blocks ordinary routers.** Verified from the mainnet source: FWA refuses ERC-20 transfers to or from the PoolManager unless its own hook bumped a transient allowance, which only happens on FWA's own pool. The Universal Router is not a distributor on-chain. A buy or sell of DCA through a normal router reverts in both directions. The hook's own fee path is unaffected, but the launch needs evidence of a distributor or claims-based router. No proof attached since no change to this code can fix it.\n4. **Low.** FWA fee claims have no exit other than an in-swap conversion.\n5. **Low.** A tick-spacing-1 conversion market seeded with dust positions pushes each launch swap to about 28M gas. The audit_math proof is attached.\n6. **Low.** FWA-specified swaps revert at a price limit instead of partially filling.\n7. **Low.** Token name spelling differs from the brief. Merged from three specialists.\n\n**Coverage**\n\nAll nine entry points are answered, plus three invariant rows. The static-analysis leads did not reproduce as defects and are recorded as holding with the reason.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1645107,"inputTokens":386,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":48146,"runtime":"claude","turns":31,"wallClockMs":664547}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"a62eee8ba84d49e92a325e94a577dc2bc262212e3e2b9483e56d7fafab6b63cb","device":"f20ec62b0213db3f","findings":[],"hash":"18e2e7f4cd08884a727b11102622e6d44b45056fdd56f8c2a56c3c77923b0130","nodeId":"a9fe2db0-6f20-43bd-9c95-1cbf9ee387ab","outcome":"completed","summary":"All findings are answered, the code is revised, and every check passes.\n\n**Checks**\n\n| Check | Result |\n| --- | --- |\n| `forge build` | pass |\n| `forge test` | 59 passed, 0 failed (includes the reviewer's proof copied under `test/scratch/`) |\n| `forge fmt --check` | pass |\n| clean offline copy, empty environment | 58 passed, 0 failed |\n\n**What changed in the hook** (`src/DCAHook.sol`)\n\n- **Sandwich / backlog dumping (high): fixed.** The relative price bound is now measured from an anchor price observed in an earlier block, using the lower of anchor and spot, so a same-block spike defers the sale. A swap whose fee is zero sells nothing. Old claims sold beside a new fee are capped at four times that fee, so draining the backlog costs the trader a real fee paid to the creator. Configuring the market resets the anchor, so sales resume the next block.\n- **Pool untradeable before configuration (medium): fixed.** Swaps no longer require a configured market. Without one, the fee is held as FWA claims. The market sale runs in try/catch with a 2,000,000 gas stipend, so a reverting, uninitialized or gas-burning market defers to claims instead of blocking trading. The supplied proof now passes.\n- **FWA claims had no exit (low): fixed** with owner-only `redeemPair()`, which takes FWA from the manager straight to the fixed recipient and preserves claims if FWA refuses the transfer.\n- **Dust-tick gas griefing (low): fixed** by the same stipend and backlog cap.\n- **Token name (low): fixed.** `DCAToken` now returns the brief's exact spelling, \"Democratizing Collectable Acquisions\".\n\n**FWA transfer restriction (medium)** cannot be fixed in this code. The FWA mock now implements the real guard, the fixture runs every integration test on it, a new test shows a non-distributor router failing both directions, and the README states that the launch needs a distributor router or a claims-based router before anyone can trade. The partial-fill asymmetry is answered as disputed, since v4 cannot refund a specified-side fee, with the router guidance the reviewer proposed added to the README.\n\n**Tests** live in the new `test/ConversionBounds.t.sol` (sandwich scenario, same-block deferral, fee-free dust swaps, backlog cap, one-block bound, next-block promotion, reverting and gas-burning markets, `redeemPair`, FWA guard) and two rewritten tests in `test/SwapFee.t.sol`. README, `docs/SECURITY.md` and `docs/VALIDATION.md` describe the new bounds, the no-configuration behaviour, the FWA dependency and the updated counts. `.imd-responses.json` holds the seven verdicts.\n\nOperator items that remain open: obtain evidence of an FWA-distributor or claims-based router before launch, and set the conversion market after launch. Nothing was committed; the working tree holds the revision.","treeHash":"6dcb06ed0b0d6be2a0080a84388d96d20d9af1f1","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1598406,"inputTokens":418,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":49502,"runtime":"claude","turns":49,"wallClockMs":695752}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"f1196c5b61cf5a36584e75a13d25e7cba16f3500a8335ff78e949803a8892f5c","device":"410d15d57eeec440","findings":[],"hash":"265fb1168ea9824850d36783b3421fcfb7a2a8d9578d596b5e1b2e07cce9d7f5","nodeId":"c73cb404-3829-4d36-ad73-0c8907edeb35","outcome":"completed","summary":"Created [launch.json](launch.json) with matching contracts, constructor arguments, permissions, and required pool settings. Notes document the owner’s required conversion configuration.\n\nOnly `launch.json` changed. Build succeeded with existing lint warnings; all 48 tests passed.","treeHash":"432d0832f9e4bd793f8ea69f21309f4ca0c3fdc5","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":303616,"inputTokens":42514,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":3447,"runtime":"codex","turns":4,"wallClockMs":92005}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"5835e48821d8827d","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Settles the round-2 finding e68c2cbaa4ce (one-block anchor jump): FIXED. _referencePrice now promotes observedSqrtPriceX96 into anchorSqrtPriceX96 by at most one sqrt(1 + maxPriceMoveBps/10000) step per promotion (line 350-352), lowers at once, and the configuration block records no observation. The round-2 reproduction re-run on this code (test/scratch/Round3Anchor.t.sol test_A) gives anchor 83095197855742363478967922789 (2^96 * sqrt(1.1)), 6,250e18 + 1 wei FWA claims unsold, creator ETH 0, attacker FWA 998,851.407e21 after vs 998,854.774e21 before (a loss). The author's test_anchorHeldAcrossABlockBoundaryRisesByAtMostOneStep covers the same steps.\n\nResidual (merges the tester's ec23e65b and d8ec9de1, same root cause: a 1 wei fee is enough to record an observation and to promote): every sale attempt with fee != 0 records spot (lines 355-358) and the first attempt of each later block promotes the anchor one step toward it. A 20 wei exact-input buy pays a 1 wei fee, so an attacker who sells FWA on the market to 1.8x the sqrt price (under the fixture's 2x ceiling) and holds it walks the anchor from 2^96 to 140357522538684953799425769653 in 13 blocks for 13 wei of fees; in the 13th block the bound from the anchor clears the spike and a 25,000e18 buy sells its 1,250e18 fee plus the 5,000e18 backlog (6,250e18 FWA) into the spike for 1,858.87 ETH (pre-spike value ~6,250 ETH); the attacker buys the FWA back and ends +965.56 FWA with ETH unchanged. This is exactly the round-2 numbers delayed by twelve blocks, which is the limit the ratchet was designed to impose. It is NOT a broken guarantee: the README's 'at most maxPriceMoveBps per block' sentence now holds and is tested. What does not hold is the cost claim in README.md line 54, 'lifting the reference 80% takes about twelve such blocks at the maximum setting, and each of those swaps pays its own 5% fee': the fee on a 20 wei promotion swap is 1 wei, so the only real costs are the held market position's exposure to arbitrage for ~13 blocks and the round-trip LP fees, and the only bound on the loss is the owner's absolute ceiling. With the ceiling kept one step above spot (1.1 * 2^96 sqrt, 21% price slack; test_B2) the same walk takes 2 blocks and the attacker ends 3,031.92 FWA down, so the README's 'keep the absolute ceiling close to it' guidance is the defence that matters. The mirror image (tester's d8ec9de1) is the same dust-recorded observation of a held dip pinning the anchor low: seven deferred blocks for a 0.7x dip, no loss, griefer pays two market swaps; the author tests it (test_dipHeldAcrossABlockDefersBoundedlyThenRecovers) but the README does not mention it.\n\nNo cheap code change removes the residual: ignoring deferred observations lets the attacker instead walk the price one step per block with 5 wei sales, and a minimum fee for a promotion only raises the cost linearly. Minimal fix, documentation: in README.md line 54 and docs/SECURITY.md, replace the fee-cost claim with the real cost (a market position held across N blocks, exposed to arbitrage, promoted by any fee-bearing swap of 20 minor units or more) and state that the absolute ceiling is the binding bound and should be set within one or two steps of a checked spot and refreshed; mention the dip-pin deferral as a liveness limit. Optional hardening, if wanted: require a minimum gross (for example 1e18 FWA) for an attempt to record observedSqrtPriceX96, which makes each promotion cost a real fee as the README already claims, without changing the ratchet.","line":355,"path":"src/DCAHook.sol","reproduction":"test/scratch/Round3Anchor.t.sol test_B_thirteenBlockDustWalk (fixture: test/helpers/HookFixture.sol _deploy(true, true, true): fresh PoolManager, DCAToken below FWA, FWA mock with the real guard, DCAHook(manager, token, factory=test, owner=0x1EE3...413d), launch pool DCA/FWA 12500/60 at 2^96 with 1,000,000e18 liquidity over [-60000, 60000], hookless ETH/FWA market 3000/60 at 2^96 with 100,000e18 liquidity). Steps: (1) owner setConversionPool(market, 1000, 2^96), roll, exact-input buy 100,000e18 FWA -> 5,000e18 FWA claims; owner setConversionPool(market, 1000, 2*2^96), roll. (2) attacker market swap SwapParams(false, -500,000e18, 1.8*2^96). (3) one exact-input buy of 20 wei FWA per block, rolling one block each time, until oneStep(anchor) > 1.8*2^96: 13 blocks, 13 wei of fees, anchor == 140357522538684953799425769653, every attempt but the last defers (spent 0). (4) same block: exact-input buy 25,000e18 FWA. Actual: FeeConverted spent 6,250e18, ethReceived 1,858,874,681,642,074,332,613 wei; CREATOR.balance 1,858,874,681,642,074,332,614 wei. (5) attacker swaps the ETH from step 2 back for FWA and sells the DCA from step 4: attacker FWA 998,855,739,551,866,015,258,036,860 after vs 998,854,773,990,139,377,985,858,356 before (+965,561,726,637,272,178,504 wei), ETH unchanged. Expected per README line 54: each promotion costs the attacker a meaningful 5% fee; actual: 1 wei per block. Counter-check test_B2_tightCeilingWalk with ceiling 1.1*2^96: 2 blocks, creator receives 82.72 ETH for 100.30 FWA at the 1.099x spot, attacker ends -3,031.92 FWA.","severity":"low","snippet":" if (anchor != 0) {\n observedSqrtPriceX96 = price;\n observedBlock = uint64(block.number);\n }","title":"Anchor observations and one-step promotions are driven by 20 wei (1 wei fee) swaps, so the README's stated cost of a cross-block manipulation ('each of those swaps pays its own 5% fee') is 13 wei in p"}],"hash":"2b4a20b4aa743144b68ea28a53fcc3bfa7dfc382b52690e985572d2e7b92dd23","nodeId":"f251437d-475e-4895-bb83-b873d722506c","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. The findings file is written and validated.\n\n**Round-2 finding (one-block anchor jump, e68c2cbaa4ce): fixed.** I re-ran the round-2 steps on the revised code. The anchor now rises by at most one `sqrt(1.1)` step per promotion, nothing is sold into the held spike, the creator's ETH is untouched and the attacker ends with less FWA than they started with. The author's own test covers the same scenario.\n\n**Specialist findings from the prior panel, settled against this code:**\n- Trading gated on `setConversionPool` (three reports): fixed. Unconfigured swaps now mint the fee as claims. The attached proof passes.\n- No FWA exit for stranded claims (two reports): fixed by owner-only `redeemPair()`, which pays only the fixed recipient.\n- Dense-tick gas griefing: fixed by the 2,000,000 gas stipend in try/catch. The attached proof passes at 210,804 gas.\n- Same-block sandwich and fee-free backlog dump: fixed by the fee-free skip, the 4x backlog cap and the earlier-block anchor.\n- Token name: the contract and manifest now carry the brief's spelling.\n- FWA-specified partial fills and the real FWA transfer guard: design limits outside the hook's control, now documented. Dropped as defects.\n\n**One new finding, low.** The tester's 13-block dust walk reproduces exactly as described. One 20 wei buy per block, paying 1 wei of fee, promotes the anchor one step per block, so a spike held for 13 blocks under a 4x ceiling is eventually sold into. The attacker's gain matches my round-2 numbers delayed by twelve blocks, which is the limit the ratchet was designed to impose. The documented guarantee holds. What does not hold is the README's cost claim that each promotion swap pays a meaningful 5% fee. With the ceiling set one step above spot, as the README advises, the same walk loses the attacker about 3,031 FWA, so the absolute ceiling is the binding defence. The fix is documentation, with an optional minimum-gross threshold for recording an observation. I merged the tester's dip-pin griefing report into it as the same root cause.\n\nCoverage answers all ten entry points plus six checked invariants. The full suite passes (100 tests). No repository files were changed; scratch tests live only under the ignored test/scratch directory.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":928692,"inputTokens":258,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":24550,"runtime":"claude","turns":22,"wallClockMs":349848}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"4face87342e53c586f1b2e4d79b74a309b6e9bdfdac30e43045d846dfd5fe916","device":"2dc755dfe7bd177c","findings":[],"hash":"44e6b4ffa0a7bf732ba83e1d1aa4a9ba9450f48064de3e466af398fdf5e1b694","nodeId":"c73cb404-3829-4d36-ad73-0c8907edeb35","outcome":"completed","summary":"Revised `launch.json` and verified it. Only that file changed; the scratch test lives under the ignored test/scratch directory.\n\n**What was wrong in the previous manifest**\n\n- The token name read \"Acquisitions\", but the brief and the accepted DCAToken contract both spell it \"Acquisions\". The manifest now matches the contract.\n- The notes described an older hook. They said the owner must call setConversionPool before swaps can execute and that an unusable route can block swaps. The accepted hook never gates trading: every swap pays its 5% from the launch block, unsold FWA waits as ERC-6909 claims, and the market sale runs in try/catch with a gas stipend. The notes also omitted the owner-only redeemPair exit and the FWA transfer-guard router dependency.\n\n**What the manifest now states**\n\n- Hook contract DCAHook with constructor arguments `$poolManager`, `$token`, `$factory`, `$owner` in declaration order.\n- Permissions beforeInitialize, beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta, afterSwapReturnDelta, exactly what getHookPermissions returns.\n- Token DCAToken, name \"Democratizing Collectable Acquisions\", symbol DCA, 18 decimals.\n- Pool paired with FWA at the required lowercase address, fee 12500, tick spacing 60, initial price \"79228162514264337593543950336\".\n- Notes of 3274 characters describing the fee path, conversion bounds, ETH payout and claim fallback, the fixed recipient, the immutable owner powers, caller restrictions, and the FWA router dependency.\n\n**Checks run**\n\n- `forge build` passes and `forge test` reports 58 passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped.\n- A scratch test parsed the manifest, deployed the real DCAHook at a flag-matching address, and confirmed the permission list, constructor placeholder order, token name and symbol and decimals from the real DCAToken, the pool fields, and the notes length. It passed.\n- `git status` shows launch.json as the only modified tracked file.","treeHash":"1564d328714541862679e4a0b13dbe6ce023f977","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":498525,"inputTokens":226,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":9759,"runtime":"claude","turns":15,"wallClockMs":127367}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"96307f8ebc1adef0c3fea6b4b67387e6a91ecd8cf1abe97edabef8a121035f56","device":"fa2b7fcb5f53535a","findings":[],"hash":"516634b53797c6d8a0c6c4ecbdde9d41dbd47479e47b3381112bffb961792904","nodeId":"a9fe2db0-6f20-43bd-9c95-1cbf9ee387ab","outcome":"completed","summary":"The finding reproduced exactly and is fixed. The revision touches the anchor promotion in the hook, adds four regression tests, and corrects the documentation.\n\n**Reproduction.** I rebuilt the reviewer's scenario in test/scratch against the accepted code. The anchor was promoted wholesale to 1.8×Q96 after a one-block hold, the whole 5,000 FWA backlog plus the 1,250 FWA trigger fee was sold into the spike, the creator received about 1,859 ETH for 6,250 FWA, and the attacker netted about 965 FWA. These match the reported numbers.\n\n**Fix in `src/DCAHook.sol`.** The promotion of the observed price into the anchor is now ratcheted. When the observation is above the previous anchor, the anchor rises by at most one `sqrt(1 + maxPriceMoveBps/10000)` step. A lower observation is still adopted in full, since a lower reference only tightens the sale. The step factor is shared with the sale bound through a new internal helper. I also closed the adjacent window the suggested patch left open: sale attempts in the configuration block, when the anchor is still zero, no longer record spot, so a trade back-running the owner's setter in the same block cannot seed the first anchor. With the fix, the same proof ends with the anchor at 1.0488×Q96, all 6,250 FWA still held as claims, no ETH paid cheaply, and the attacker down about 3,366 FWA.\n\n**Tests added to `test/ConversionBounds.t.sol`:**\n- the cross-block hold scenario from the finding, asserting the one-step anchor, no sale, and attacker loss\n- a genuine 1.3× sqrt-price rise followed in five one-step promotions before conversion resumes\n- a genuine fall adopted at once, never ratcheted\n- a back-run of the configuration setter that cannot seed the first anchor\n\n**Documentation.** The README now describes the ratchet, the catch-up rate for genuine moves, and the remaining caveat that a trade front-running the setter in the same block still sets the configured price. SECURITY.md and VALIDATION.md were updated to match. The response for the reviewer is in `.imd-responses.json` with verdict fixed.\n\n**Checks run:**\n\n| Check | Result |\n| --- | --- |\n| forge build | pass, no link references, hook runtime 12,986 bytes |\n| forge test | 62 passed, 0 failed, including the 64×32 invariant campaign |\n| forge fmt --check | pass |\n| clean offline copy, empty environment | 62 passed, 0 failed |\n\nThe protected verifier tests were read but not executed here, as before. The forge lint notes on the hook are the same guarded-callback patterns already reviewed in SECURITY.md. Nothing was committed, matching the previous rounds where the harness recorded the commit.","treeHash":"d0a5ac2aaff03f1b27997c7c829280492137c929","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2052221,"inputTokens":674,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":29107,"runtime":"claude","turns":45,"wallClockMs":515766}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"523b06a3dd921f5d","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Every launch-pool swap runs _convertAndPay inside afterSwap, which performs an exact-input sale of the fee FWA on the owner-chosen ETH/FWA market up to a price limit of spot * sqrt(1 + maxPriceMoveBps/10000), at most 10% above spot. Nothing bounds the number of initialized ticks the PoolManager has to cross on the way to that limit. If the market has tickSpacing 1 (the fee-100 tier) and its liquidity above spot is thin relative to the fee flow, anyone can seed one-tick dust positions across the band (ticks 0..953 for a 10% band). The hook's sale then crosses all of them on every launch swap. Measured: a buy of 100 FWA costs 372,322 gas on the deep test market and 28,315,972 gas once 900 dust positions of liquidity 1e12 sit between spot and spot*1.1. That is close to the Ethereum block gas limit and makes every DCA trade cost a large multiple of a normal swap until the owner lowers maxPriceMoveBps or repoints the market. Preconditions: owner selects a tickSpacing-1 (or 10, which gives ~95 ticks and ~3M gas) market; the band above spot is thin enough for the sale to reach the limit; attacker spends roughly 150M gas once to open the positions and in return buys the hook's FWA up to 10% below spot. The hook has no cap on ticks crossed, gas spent, or FWA sold per swap. The README states the owner is trusted to pick a sound market, but a third party can degrade a sound market after the fact. Minimal fix that preserves the design: bound the work per swap, e.g. wrap the market swap in try/catch with a fixed gas stipend (a reverted inner swap leaves no delta, and the unsold FWA is already minted back as claims), or cap the per-swap conversion amount so the sale cannot sweep the whole band.","line":269,"path":"src/DCAHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {IUnlockCallback} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/callback/IUnlockCallback.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {BalanceDelta} from \"v4-core/src/types/BalanceDelta.sol\";\nimport {ModifyLiquidityParams, SwapParams} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\nimport {TickMath} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/TickMath.sol\";\nimport {TransientStateLibrary} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/TransientStateLibrary.sol\";\nimport {ERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\";\nimport {DCAToken} from \"src/DCAToken.sol\";\nimport {DCAHook} from \"src/DCAHook.sol\";\nimport {HookFlags} from \"src/HookFlags.sol\";\n\ncontract PairMock is ERC20 {\n constructor() ERC20(\"FWA\", \"FWA\") {}\n function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {\n _mint(to, amount);\n }\n}\n\n/// @dev Minimal router: pulls from this test, settles from its own balance.\ncontract Router is IUnlockCallback {\n using TransientStateLibrary for IPoolManager;\n\n IPoolManager immutable manager;\n constructor(IPoolManager m) {\n manager = m;\n }\n receive() external payable {}\n\n function addLiquidity(PoolKey memory key, ModifyLiquidityParams memory p) external payable {\n manager.unlock(abi.encode(true, key, p, SwapParams(false, 0, 0)));\n }\n\n function swap(PoolKey memory key, SwapParams memory s) external {\n manager.unlock(abi.encode(false, key, ModifyLiquidityParams(0, 0, 0, 0), s));\n }\n\n function unlockCallback(bytes calldata data) external returns (bytes memory) {\n require(msg.sender == address(manager));\n (bool liq, PoolKey memory key, ModifyLiquidityParams memory p, SwapParams memory s) =\n abi.decode(data, (bool, PoolKey, ModifyLiquidityParams, SwapParams));\n if (liq) manager.modifyLiquidity(key, p, \"\");\n else manager.swap(key, s, \"\");\n _settle(key.currency0);\n _settle(key.currency1);\n return \"\";\n }\n\n function _settle(Currency c) private {\n int256 d = manager.currencyDelta(address(this), c);\n if (d > 0) {\n manager.take(c, address(this), uint256(d));\n } else if (d < 0) {\n manager.sync(c);\n if (c.isAddressZero()) {\n manager.settle{value: uint256(-d)}();\n } else {\n ERC20(Currency.unwrap(c)).transfer(address(manager), uint256(-d));\n manager.settle();\n }\n }\n }\n}\n\n/// @notice A tickSpacing-1 conversion market seeded with dust positions inside the hook's 10% price\n/// band makes every launch-pool swap walk all of them. Fails now (about 28M gas per swap); passes\n/// once the conversion step bounds the work it does per swap.\ncontract DenseMarketGasTest is Test {\n address constant FWA = 0xa0Df17B5aC76ABaBA36E1450E2cbCd18A620C845;\n address constant CREATOR = 0x1EE3ffadfE138415A2ddaedeEBe5F46616fA413d;\n uint160 constant Q96 = 79228162514264337593543950336;\n\n IPoolManager manager;\n DCAToken token;\n PairMock pair;\n DCAHook hook;\n Router router;\n PoolKey key;\n PoolKey dense;\n\n function setUp() public {\n vm.deal(address(this), 1_000_000 ether);\n manager = IPoolManager(address(new PoolManager(address(this))));\n token = new DCAToken();\n vm.etch(FWA, address(new PairMock()).code);\n pair = PairMock(FWA);\n pair.mint(address(this), 1_000_000_000 ether);\n\n bytes memory initCode = abi.encodePacked(\n type(DCAHook).creationCode, abi.encode(manager, address(token), address(this), CREATOR)\n );\n bytes32 salt;\n address predicted;\n for (uint256 i; i < 500_000; ++i) {\n salt = bytes32(i);\n predicted = address(\n uint160(uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0xff), address(this), salt, keccak256(initCode)))))\n );\n if (HookFlags.matches(predicted, HookFlags.DCA)) break;\n }\n address deployed;\n assembly (\"memory-safe\") {\n deployed := create2(0, add(initCode, 32), mload(initCode), salt)\n }\n require(deployed == predicted, \"hook\");\n hook = DCAHook(deployed);\n router = new Router(manager);\n token.transfer(address(router), 500_000_000 ether);\n pair.transfer(address(router), 500_000_000 ether);\n (bool ok,) = address(router).call{value: 100_000 ether}(\"\");\n require(ok);\n\n bool tokenIs0 = address(token) < FWA;\n key = PoolKey(\n Currency.wrap(tokenIs0 ? address(token) : FWA),\n Currency.wrap(tokenIs0 ? FWA : address(token)),\n 12_500,\n 60,\n IHooks(address(hook))\n );\n manager.initialize(key, Q96);\n router.addLiquidity(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(-60_000, 60_000, 1_000_000 ether, 0));\n\n // The owner points conversion at a canonical fee-100 / spacing-1 ETH-FWA pool.\n dense = PoolKey(Currency.wrap(address(0)), Currency.wrap(FWA), 100, 1, IHooks(address(0)));\n manager.initialize(dense, Q96);\n // Real depth sits below spot (ETH side); above spot, inside the hook's sale band, it is thin.\n router.addLiquidity(dense, ModifyLiquidityParams(-10_000, 0, 1_000 ether, 0));\n vm.prank(CREATOR);\n hook.setConversionPool(dense, 1000, Q96 * 2);\n }\n\n function test_swapGasBoundedWhenConversionMarketHasManyTicks() public {\n // Anyone: 900 one-tick dust positions between spot and spot * 1.1 (ticks 0..953).\n for (int24 i; i < 900; ++i) {\n router.addLiquidity(dense, ModifyLiquidityParams(i, i + 1, 1e12, 0));\n }\n bool tokenIs0 = address(token) < FWA;\n SwapParams memory buy = SwapParams(\n !tokenIs0, -int256(100 ether), !tokenIs0 ? TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1 : TickMath.MAX_SQRT_PRICE - 1\n );\n uint256 before = gasleft();\n router.swap(key, buy);\n uint256 used = before - gasleft();\n emit log_named_uint(\"launch swap gas with 900 dust ticks in band\", used);\n assertLt(used, 5_000_000, \"one launch swap must not cost more than 5M gas\");\n }\n}","reproduction":"1. Deploy PoolManager, DCAToken, DCAHook (owner = 0x1EE3...413d); initialize the launch pool DCA/FWA fee 12500 spacing 60 at sqrtPrice 2^96 and add 1,000,000e18 liquidity over ticks [-60000, 60000]. 2. Initialize an ETH/FWA pool with fee 100, tickSpacing 1 at 2^96; add 1000e18 liquidity on [-10000, 0] (depth below spot only). Owner calls setConversionPool(thatKey, 1000, 2*2^96). 3. Anyone adds 900 positions ModifyLiquidityParams(i, i+1, 1e12, 0) for i in 0..899. 4. Buy DCA with exact input 100e18 FWA. Expected: a swap that costs on the order of a few hundred thousand gas (372,322 measured without the dust). Actual: 28,315,972 gas, the sale crosses ticks 0..953 and ends at the band limit having sold 46,030,110,427 wei FWA; 4.99999995e18 FWA is minted back as claims. The attached test asserts the swap costs under 5M gas and fails on the current code.","severity":"low","snippet":" BalanceDelta converted =\n poolManager.swap(market, SwapParams(false, -budget.toInt256(), limit), \"\");","title":"Conversion step walks every initialized tick in the price band: a tickSpacing-1 market seeded with dust positions makes each launch swap cost ~28M gas"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The assignment names the token \"Democratizing Collectable Acquisions\". The contract publishes \"Democratizing Collectable Acquisitions\" and the README repeats that spelling. The brief's spelling is probably a typo that the contributor corrected, but the requester never confirmed that, and the manifest step must write token.name to match whichever is intended. Outside the math area; reported because it is a concrete deviation from the stated requirement. Symbol DCA, 18 decimals and the 10^27 fixed supply match.","line":8,"path":"src/DCAToken.sol","reproduction":"Deploy DCAToken and call name(). Actual: \"Democratizing Collectable Acquisitions\". Brief: \"Democratizing Collectable Acquisions\". Fix is a requester decision: keep the corrected spelling and record it in the manifest, or change the string literal to the brief's spelling.","severity":"low","snippet":" constructor() ERC20(\"Democratizing Collectable Acquisitions\", \"DCA\") {","title":"Token name differs from the commissioned name"}],"hash":"63a2f6d1b0ba058455944bf15ee3449ccfea628f00bc22633998310f8b52bdf0","nodeId":"4d932ed2-9568-450d-9d80-c13fa32dca3a","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is written and valid, no tracked files were changed, and the scratch tests live under the ignored test/scratch directory.\n\n**Outcome:** the fee math holds in every path I could reach. Two low findings are recorded in `.imd-findings.json`, one with a failing proof test.\n\n**What I verified in the math area**\n\n- **Fee formula.** All four swap modes in both currency orderings yield fee = floor(gross FWA / 20). The exact-output gross-up N/19 is algebraically equivalent, so the trader is never overcharged. Rounding favours the trader by at most 1 wei and gross below 20 wei pays nothing, which the README documents and which is dust with 18 decimals. I confirmed on mainnet that the paired token is Fake World Assets with 18 decimals.\n- **Delta accounting.** The hook's FWA and native deltas net to zero on every branch of the conversion and payout, including a rejected ETH transfer, a manager with no ETH, and claim balances above 2^127, which are processed in chunks as the README says.\n- **Boundaries.** Specified amounts at the int128 limit revert cleanly, the conversion price limit always sits strictly between spot and the owner's ceiling, the uint160 cast cannot overflow near the maximum price, and partial fills of FWA-specified swaps revert before any fee moves.\n\n**Findings**\n\n1. **Low, with proof.** The conversion sale inside every launch swap has no bound on ticks crossed, gas, or amount. On a tick-spacing-1 market that is thin above spot, anyone can seed one-tick dust positions across the 10% band. Measured gas per launch swap rose from about 372k to about 28.3M with 900 dust positions. The owner can mitigate by lowering the relative bound, and the likely production market has spacing 60, so I rated it low. The attached test fails on the current code.\n2. **Low, outside my area.** The token's on-chain name is \"Democratizing Collectable Acquisitions\" while the brief says \"Acquisions\". Probably a corrected typo, but the requester must confirm so the manifest matches.\n\n**Coverage.** All nine listed entry points have rows: eight hold, and afterSwap points at finding 1. Six extra rows record the invariants and boundaries I checked. One row is marked unreached: production market depth and the sandwich economics of the relative price bound, which belong to the economic specialist and need fork state.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2235738,"inputTokens":514,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":60086,"runtime":"claude","turns":41,"wallClockMs":833454}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"e57a8e639cccfbab","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Trust gap (access x economics x asymmetry). afterSwap -> _convertAndPay reads the conversion market's spot sqrt price inside the same transaction as the launch swap, derives the relative limit from that spot (price * sqrt(1+maxPriceMoveBps)) and sells the fee FWA exact-input up to min(relative limit, owner ceiling). The only reference that is not under the swapper's control is the owner's absolute ceiling maxConversionSqrtPriceX96, which is static and must leave slack for ordinary market movement (the project's own tests and README examples use 2*Q96, i.e. 4x the opening FWA/ETH price). An unprivileged trader therefore picks the moment of the sale: in one bundle they (1) sell FWA into the ETH/FWA market to push sqrt price to just under the ceiling, (2) perform the launch-pool swap whose afterSwap sells the 5% fee into that moved price, and (3) buy the FWA back. The creator's ETH is transferred to the sandwicher; the creator (owner) can only limit the loss by keeping the ceiling within a few percent of fair value at all times, which the code does not help with. Asymmetry amplifier: _convertAndPay(fee) is called for every swap and processes oldClaims regardless of fee, and a 1 wei DCA sell produces pairDelta 0, fee 0 and still passes _validateSwap, so anyone can trigger the sale of the entire accumulated FWA claim backlog (deferred earlier because spot was at/above the ceiling) at a moment and price of their choosing, right after the owner widens the ceiling. The relative bound (<=10%) only limits the hook's own additional impact on top of the attacker's pre-positioned price; it is not a protection against this. Suggested fix preserving the design: bound the sale against a reference the same-block caller cannot set, e.g. record the market sqrt price observed in a previous block (or the price at the last successful conversion) and skip conversion (keep claims) when current spot deviates from it by more than maxPriceMoveBps; additionally cap the FWA sold per swap to the new fee plus a bounded share of the backlog, and do not run conversion at all when fee == 0 unless called from a dedicated owner/anyone function.","line":261,"path":"src/DCAHook.sol","reproduction":"Setup (test/scratch/ConversionSandwich.t.sol, fresh PoolManager, launch pool DCA/FWA at 1:1 with 1,000,000e18 liquidity over [-60000,60000], ETH/FWA market fee 3000 at 1:1 with 100,000e18 liquidity, owner config setConversionPool(market, 1000, 2*Q96) as in the project's own fixture). Baseline: router buys DCA with exact input 100,000 FWA -> fee 5,000 FWA -> creator receives 4,653.74 ETH. Attack from the same unprivileged trader: (1) swap on market zeroForOne=false, amountSpecified=-500,000e18, sqrtPriceLimitX96=1.8*Q96 (sells ~80k FWA, receives ~44k ETH, spot now 3.24 FWA/ETH, still below ceiling 4.0); (2) the same 100,000 FWA buy on the launch pool: afterSwap sells 5,000 FWA at ~3.24 FWA/ETH -> creator receives 1,497.12 ETH (-68%), 0 FWA left pending; (3) swap on market zeroForOne=true with all ETH from step 1. Attacker FWA balance after - before = +3,086.80 FWA (net of 0.3% LP fees on both legs); creator lost 3,156.62 ETH-equivalent. Expected: the hook should not sell at a price the swapper set in the same block (defer to claims) or the attacker should not profit. Actual: the attacker profits; `assertLe(attackerFwaAfter, attackerFwaBefore)` fails with 998957860791907583865420797 > 998954773990139377985858356. Dust variant: owner sets ceiling = Q96 (spot == ceiling -> swaps defer), victim buy leaves 5,000e18 FWA claims; owner then sets ceiling 2*Q96; attacker front-runs to 1.8*Q96, sells 1 wei DCA on the launch pool (fee 0): hook burns and sells all 5,000 FWA for 1,497.12 ETH; attacker back-runs for +3,086.80 FWA. Run: forge test --match-path test/scratch/ConversionSandwich.t.sol -vv (both tests fail on current code).","severity":"medium","snippet":" (uint160 price,,,) = poolManager.getSlot0(market.toId());\n if (price < maxConversionSqrtPriceX96) {","title":"Fee conversion sells at attacker-chosen spot up to the static ceiling; any trader can sandwich it, and a zero-fee dust swap dumps the whole FWA backlog"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Access control / trust assumption. _validateSwap is run in both beforeSwap and afterSwap and reverts every launch-pool swap while conversionConfigured is false. The factory deploys the hook and initializes/seeds the pool in one transaction, so the pool goes live with every swap reverting until the immutable owner ($owner, 0x1EE3...413d) crafts and submits an exact native-ETH/FWA PoolKey via setConversionPool. The same immutable, non-transferable owner can at any later time call setConversionPool with an initialized ETH/FWA pool whose hook reverts in beforeSwap (the setter only checks currency order, fee/tickSpacing validity, hook address flags, code presence and slot0 price != 0), after which every swap in the launch pool reverts inside _convertAndPay; the owner can also lose the key, freezing the current configuration forever. Trading availability is thus coupled to an owner action although the fee could simply be kept as FWA claims until a route exists (the code already supports claims and later conversion). This is the owner's documented power, reported as a trust assumption with its preconditions; it is not a permission bypass. Minimal fix that preserves the design: when !conversionConfigured (or when the route reverts) keep the fee as ERC-6909 FWA claims instead of reverting the swap, i.e. move the conversionConfigured check inside _convertAndPay and wrap the nested swap in a try/catch that mints claims on failure.","line":227,"path":"src/DCAHook.sol","reproduction":"State: hook deployed with ($poolManager, $token, $factory, $owner), factory initialized the pool and added liquidity, owner has not called setConversionPool. Input: any router swap on the launch pool, e.g. SwapParams(zeroForOne = (currency0 == FWA), amountSpecified = -100e18, sqrtPriceLimitX96 = MIN_SQRT_PRICE+1). Expected: a 5% fee is collected (as claims if no route). Actual: PoolManager.swap reverts with WrappedError(hook, beforeSwap.selector, ConversionNotConfigured(), HookCallFailed()); the project's own test test_swapWithoutConfiguredMarketRevertsAtomically shows this. Owner halt: vm.prank(owner); hook.setConversionPool(keyOf(ETH/FWA pool whose hook reverts in beforeSwap), 100, 2*Q96) is accepted; afterwards the same swap reverts inside afterSwap -> poolManager.swap(market) for every trader until the owner reconfigures (test/ConversionSecurity.t.sol test_negativeNativeConversionOutputRevertsAtomically shows the atomic revert path with a misbehaving market hook).","severity":"low","snippet":" if (!conversionConfigured) revert ConversionNotConfigured();","title":"Launch pool is untradeable until a separate owner transaction, and the owner can halt all trading at any time by pointing the conversion route at an unusable pool"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Asymmetry between the two fee assets: ETH owed to the creator has a permissionless redeemEth() path that takes it straight from the PoolManager to RECIPIENT, but FWA owed to the creator can only leave the PoolManager through the nested market sale in afterSwap. There is no function (owner or permissionless) that does poolManager.take(FWA, RECIPIENT, claims), even though such a take never touches the hook's own balance and so is unaffected by FWA refusing transfers to the hook (the reason the code gives for never taking FWA). Consequently, whenever the configured ETH/FWA pool has no liquidity within the owner's price bounds, spot is above the ceiling for a long period, or the owner key is lost (owner is immutable), every 5% fee collected is minted as FWA claims owned by the hook and nobody, including the creator, can move them. Minimal fix: add a permissionless redeemPair() mirroring redeemEth() that burns the hook's FWA claims and takes FWA to RECIPIENT (reverting harmlessly if FWA rejects RECIPIENT), or let the owner opt into paying the creator in FWA when conversion is unavailable.","line":278,"path":"src/DCAHook.sol","reproduction":"State: deployment as in test/SwapFee.t.sol _deploy(false, true, true): launch pool funded, ETH/FWA market initialized but with zero liquidity, owner configured it (setConversionPool accepts it because only slot0 price != 0 is checked). Input: buy with exact input 100e18 FWA. Actual: FeeCharged(fee = 5e18), FeeConverted(spent 0, ethReceived 0, pending 5e18); manager.balanceOf(hook, uint160(FWA)) == 5e18 (the project's test test_noConversionLiquidityRetainsFeeClaims asserts exactly this). There is no selector on DCAHook that transfers those claims to RECIPIENT; redeemEth() only handles currency id 0; setConversionPool cannot move them. Expected: the creator (or anyone on the creator's behalf) can receive the 5e18 FWA, or at least the owner can, when no conversion route exists.","severity":"low","snippet":" if (budget > spent) poolManager.mint(address(this), pair.toId(), budget - spent);","title":"Collected FWA fees have no delivery path to the creator other than a successful ETH conversion; with no usable ETH/FWA route they are stranded as hook-owned claims"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The assignment names the token \"Democratizing Collectable Acquisions\" (sic); the deployed ERC-20 reports name() == \"Democratizing Collectable Acquisitions\". The README also uses the corrected spelling. If the manifest step copies the brief's string into token.name, the manifest and the on-chain name() disagree; if it copies the contract's, the launch does not match what the requester asked for. Outside my assigned area; reported because it is concrete and cheap to decide. Fix: confirm the intended spelling with the requester and make the constructor string, README and manifest agree.","line":8,"path":"src/DCAToken.sol","reproduction":"Call: new DCAToken().name(). Expected (per the request): \"Democratizing Collectable Acquisions\". Actual: \"Democratizing Collectable Acquisitions\".","severity":"low","snippet":" constructor() ERC20(\"Democratizing Collectable Acquisitions\", \"DCA\") {","title":"Token name differs from the name the request specified"}],"hash":"68c30c0313581a69cfffd82b3509a44ac260e5d94662781cd8d7c08e6240c159","nodeId":"b1f2bd73-b316-4050-8d2d-2b72d352990a","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. The findings file is at `.imd-findings.json`, with the proof test under `test/scratch/`. No tracked file was changed.\n\n**Outcome.** One substantive defect in the assigned area, three low findings, and coverage rows for all nine entry points plus three invariants.\n\n- **Medium, sandwichable fee conversion (DCAHook.sol:261).** The hook sells the 5% FWA fee for ETH at the conversion market's spot price inside the same transaction as the launch swap. The only bound not under the swapper's control is the owner's static ceiling, which must leave slack. Any trader can push the ETH/FWA market toward the ceiling, trade on the launch pool so the hook sells into the moved price, and buy back. In the scratch test the creator receives 1,497 ETH instead of 4,654 ETH for the same 5,000 FWA fee, and the attacker nets about 3,087 FWA after LP fees. A 1 wei swap pays no fee but still sells the entire accumulated FWA claims backlog, so a deferred backlog can be dumped at a moment of the attacker's choosing right after the owner widens the ceiling. The proof file fails both of its tests on the current code and would pass under a fix that defers conversion when spot deviates from a reference set outside the caller's block.\n- **Low, owner-gated trading (DCAHook.sol:227).** Every swap reverts until the immutable owner submits a conversion route, and the owner can halt trading later by pointing at an unusable route. Reported as a trust assumption with preconditions, not a bypass.\n- **Low, no FWA delivery path (DCAHook.sol:278).** ETH owed to the creator has a permissionless redemption path, but FWA fee claims can only leave through a successful market sale. With no usable route or a lost owner key they are stranded.\n- **Low, token name (DCAToken.sol:8).** The contract says \"Acquisitions\" while the request says \"Acquisions\". Outside my area, included because it is concrete.\n\n**Coverage.** Access control holds everywhere I traced it: callbacks are manager-only, initialization is factory-only and one-shot, the setter is owner-only and rejects the launch pool as a route, redemption pays only the fixed recipient, and the unlock callback is reachable only from the hook's own redemption. Delta conservation across burn, nested swap, mint and take matches v4-core's accounting, including the failed-take path. The token is unmodified OpenZeppelin ERC-20. I did not run the project's full fuzz and invariant suites myself. Scratch files in `/tmp` were removed.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1692764,"inputTokens":386,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":52208,"runtime":"claude","turns":31,"wallClockMs":724079}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"9207acfd5cf9712ff032d82473fb6248013e5d94b038bf85d9817d597b79a72a","device":"56e50117311155be","findings":[],"hash":"695dcc9c13855b5d20f08eea2438084aee89b065c2354ffeac73aca7c60e1876","nodeId":"c73cb404-3829-4d36-ad73-0c8907edeb35","outcome":"completed","summary":"The manifest is updated and verified. Only launch.json changed.\n\n**What I found.** The previous round's launch.json already matched the accepted tree in every structural field: contract names DCAHook and DCAToken, constructor order `$poolManager`, `$token`, `$factory`, `$owner`, the five permissions, the FWA pair address in lowercase, fee 12500, tick spacing 60 and the one-to-one initial price. The only hook change since the manifest was written is the latest contributor commit, which ratchets the conversion anchor so it rises by at most one bound step per block. The notes still described the older anchor.\n\n**What I changed.** One clause in the notes now describes the ratcheted anchor: it is observed in an earlier block, rises by at most one bound step per block, falls at once, and a spike held across blocks still defers the sale to claims. Nothing else in the manifest moved. Notes are 3385 characters, under the 4000 cap.\n\n**Verification.**\n- `forge build` passes.\n- The full suite passes with 62 tests, plus one scratch test I added under test/scratch that deploys DCAHook at a mined address and asserts its getHookPermissions equals the manifest's permission list and that every manifest field matches the brief. That scratch file is not submitted.\n- A JSON check confirmed the first key is `\"kind\": \"univ4_hook\"`, only schema keys are present, fee, tickSpacing and decimals are numbers, initialPrice is a decimal string below 2^256, all addresses are lowercase, and no stand-in address appears.\n\nNo placeholder gaps remain. The hook needs no address beyond `$poolManager`, `$token`, `$factory` and `$owner`, and the fee recipient is the wallet the brief names, hardcoded in the hook.","treeHash":"0470e78b7e648181b2d846d62b752e9b8d093dba","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":899859,"inputTokens":418,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":8701,"runtime":"claude","turns":20,"wallClockMs":134240}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"3bddbe291a4b07798942f2bd4537c808d2addfbb2390a9562e5189170d95ca82","device":"fc87c05048aca47d","findings":[{"description":"_referencePrice promotes the anchor by one bound step on the first sale attempt of a new block, and a sale attempt happens for any swap whose fee is nonzero (_convertAndPay: fee == 0 skips, fee != 0 calls _sellPair). A 20 wei exact-input buy on the launch pool pays a 1 wei fee, which is enough to run _sellPair and promote the anchor. An attacker who pushes sqrt(FWA/ETH) up to 1.8x (under the owner's 2x ceiling) and holds it can therefore walk the anchor from Q96 to within one step of the spike with one 20 wei buy per block: 13 blocks at maxPriceMoveBps = 1000, paying 13 wei of fees in total. In the thirteenth block a 25,000 FWA buy (fee 1,250 FWA) makes the hook sell its fee plus four times it (about 5,820 FWA) into the spike for about 1,735 ETH, where that FWA was worth about 5,820 ETH at the pre-spike price. The attacker buys the FWA back with the ETH from the spike, sells the DCA back, and ends about 666 FWA ahead after paying the 1,250 FWA fee. This is the independent reviewer's round-2 cross-block attack (finding e68c2cbaa4ce) delayed by twelve blocks, not prevented. The README states that lifting the reference 80% takes about twelve blocks and that 'each of those swaps pays its own 5% fee'; the fee each of those swaps pays is 1 wei. The accepted ceiling (maxConversionSqrtPriceX96) is the only bound that holds, and the README's cost claim encourages setting it loosely. Possible fixes: require a minimum fee or gross amount for a sale attempt to record an observation or promote the anchor (so a promotion costs a real fee, as the README already claims); or ratchet by elapsed blocks since the last promotion rather than per block with any fee-bearing swap, so the step rate cannot be bought; or do not promote the anchor from an attempt that deferred because spot was already beyond the bound (a deferred attempt records the spike as the observation that the next block promotes towards). The existing single-block sandwich test's criterion (attacker ends with no more FWA than before) is what the proof asserts.","line":348,"path":"src/DCAHook.sol","reproduction":"Fresh PoolManager, DCAToken below FWA, ETH/FWA market with 100,000 liquidity at sqrt price Q96 over ticks [-60000, 60000], launch pool with 1,000,000 liquidity. 1. setConversionPool(market, 1000, Q96), roll one block, buy 100,000 FWA of DCA: 5,000 FWA of claims (ceiling at spot defers). 2. setConversionPool(market, 1000, 2*Q96), roll one block. 3. Sell 500,000 FWA on the market with sqrtPriceLimit 1.8*Q96 (spot becomes 1.8*Q96, attacker receives about 44,000 ETH). 4. In each of 13 consecutive blocks make one exact-input buy of 20 wei FWA on the launch pool. Expected: a promotion requires a meaningful fee, or the anchor does not follow a spike it just refused to sell into. Actual: anchorSqrtPriceX96 goes Q96, Q96*1.048808848, ... (one step each block), total fees paid 13 wei; after the 13th buy anchor = 140357522538684953799425769653 and oneStep(anchor) > 1.8*Q96. 5. Same block: exact-input buy of 25,000 FWA. Expected: no sale into a 1.8x spike the owner never approved. Actual: FeeConverted(5,820.35 FWA spent, 1,735.08 ETH received); creator receives 1,735.08 ETH for FWA worth 5,820 ETH at the pre-spike price. 6. Attacker swaps the 44,000 ETH back for FWA on the market and sells the acquired DCA back on the launch pool: FWA balance ends +665.91 FWA above the start, ETH unchanged. The proof asserts pair.balanceOf(attacker) <= starting balance and fails with 998855439904797029815570548 > 998854773990139377985858356.","severity":"medium","title":"Anchor ratchet promotions are triggered by 20 wei dust swaps, so a held spike is adopted for a few wei per block and the backlog is then sold into it"},{"description":"The ratchet caps upward promotions but adopts a lower observation in full (observed <= anchor ? observed). A griefer buys FWA with ETH to push sqrt(FWA/ETH) down (0.7x), records the dip with a 20 wei fee-bearing buy (1 wei fee), rolls one block, and sells the FWA back so spot is restored. The next trade adopts the dip as the anchor; spot is now more than one step above it, so the sale defers, and the anchor climbs one step per block with a fee-bearing swap until the bound clears spot: seven blocks for a 0.7x dip at maxPriceMoveBps = 1000. No fee is lost (claims are kept and sold later, or exit through redeemPair) and the griefer loses two market swaps' worth of fees and slippage, so this is a liveness limit. It is tested, with the deferral count asserted, in test/AnchorAndPairExit.t.sol (test_dipHeldAcrossABlockDefersBoundedlyThenRecovers) so a change in the ratchet is visible, and noted here because the README describes the unbounded downward adoption only as a genuine-fall case.","line":350,"path":"src/DCAHook.sol","reproduction":"Same fixture as above with the market configured at (1000, 2*Q96) and one trade done so anchor = Q96. 1. Buy FWA with 100,000 ETH on the market with sqrtPriceLimit 0.7*Q96. 2. Exact-input buy of 20 wei FWA on the launch pool: observedSqrtPriceX96 = 0.7*Q96 (fee 1 wei). 3. Roll one block; sell the FWA from step 1 back: spot about 0.999*Q96. 4. Make a 100 FWA buy on the launch pool each block. Expected: a restored market converts at once. Actual: anchor = 0.7*Q96 after the first buy, then one step per block; FeeConverted reports 0 spent for seven consecutive blocks and the sale resumes in the eighth.","severity":"low","title":"A dip held across a block boundary pins the anchor low and defers conversion for several blocks (griefing, no loss)"}],"hash":"71e93d08695ddcc1e7048b12f6794bd2a9365eed24db4d92206b94d0a1514ca4","nodeId":"cf230703-7459-4117-ab75-e319e414f175","outcome":"completed","summary":"The findings file is in place at the repository root and is excluded from git by the harness's own rule, as intended. Work is complete.\n\n## Summary\n\n**The implementation changed under my tests.** The other contributor replaced the wholesale anchor promotion with a ratchet (at most one `sqrt(1 + bps/10000)` step upward per promotion, unbounded downward). One of my accepted tests encoded the old behaviour and failed. This revision changes only what that required and adds coverage of the new logic.\n\n**Changes in `test/`:**\n- `AnchorAndPairExit.t.sol`: the stale test now expects one capped step per block for a held 12% move (two deferrals, then sale, then exact catch-up). The 400-case fuzz property additionally asserts the first anchor is the configured price and no promotion exceeds one step. A new test counts the deferral a held dip causes (seven blocks for a 0.7x dip) and checks recovery with no lost fees.\n- `helpers/ClaimLifecycleHandler.sol` and `ClaimLifecycleInvariant.t.sol`: a ghost model of the ratchet checked after every trade and as a new invariant: anchor changes only inside a trade or configuration, first value equals the configured price, at most one step up per promotion, at most one change per block. The deterministic sequence was retuned to a move that is over one step but under two.\n- `CONTRIBUTOR_TESTS.md` updated.\n\n**Result:** `forge build` clean, `forge test` 100 passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped across 14 suites (256 invariant runs × 64 depth, fail-on-revert, 0 reverts).\n\n**Defect reported, not tested around** (`.imd-findings.json`, with a self-contained proof that fails now):\n- **Medium.** A promotion happens on any fee-bearing swap, and a 20-wei buy pays a 1-wei fee. An attacker holding a 1.8x spike walks the anchor up in 13 blocks for 13 wei total, then a 25,000 FWA buy makes the hook sell 5,820 FWA into the spike for 1,735 ETH. The attacker nets +666 FWA. This is the reviewer's round-2 attack delayed, not prevented; the README's claim that each step costs a 5% fee describes 1 wei. The owner's absolute ceiling is the only bound that holds.\n- **Low.** A dip held across a block is adopted in full, letting a griefer defer conversion for several blocks at their own cost. Tested with the count asserted and noted as a liveness limit.","treeHash":"14eb69b90b04fc08726938efea4dec635e5ef916","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2464444,"inputTokens":674,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":47814,"runtime":"claude","turns":49,"wallClockMs":723625}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"e764f15311426447","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"The only protection the fee conversion has against selling FWA cheaply is `maxPriceMoveBps` relative to the market's *current* spot (line 261-267) and an owner-set absolute ceiling. Three properties combine into an extractable loss for the fixed recipient 0x1EE3ffadfE138415A2ddaedeEBe5F46616fA413d: (a) `_convertAndPay` burns and sells *all* accumulated FWA claims on every launch swap (line 254-258 `oldClaims = min(balanceOf(hook, FWA), MAX_DELTA - fee)`), not just the new fee; (b) the trigger is permissionless and free: a 19-wei buy pays fee 0 (`19*500/10000 = 0`) yet `budget = fee + oldClaims != 0` so the sale runs; (c) the relative limit is computed from `getSlot0` at that moment, so each trigger re-anchors to the price the previous trigger's own sale already pushed down. Backlogs are the normal state: the README says conversion silently defers whenever spot >= ceiling or liquidity is thin, and FWA (Fake World Assets, $0.013, microcap) will cross a static ceiling routinely. The claim balance is public (`manager.balanceOf(hook, uint160(FWA))`). An attacker therefore waits for a backlog, then in one transaction repeats dust swaps until the backlog is gone, each slice sold another 10% lower (with the maximum `maxPriceMoveBps = 1000`), down to the absolute ceiling, and buys the dip. The same mechanism works with a smaller `maxPriceMoveBps`: the attacker just needs more dust swaps, since nothing limits cumulative movement per block. The absolute ceiling bounds the loss only to whatever slack the owner leaves, and slack is unavoidable because a ceiling at spot stops conversion entirely. A second variant with the same root cause: the attacker first sells FWA on the market to push spot just below the ceiling, then triggers; the relative bound then allows selling up to the ceiling price regardless of fair value. Economic Security guide: 'Sandwich every price-dependent operation', 'cheapest griefing vector'; Invariant guide: 'use stale/re-anchored state after coupled mutation'. Fix (preserving the design): anchor the relative bound per block (store the first observed sqrtPrice of the block in transient storage and compute `limit` from that anchor for later conversions in the same block), and/or cap the backlog sold per swap to a multiple of the new fee so a zero-fee swap converts nothing, and/or refuse conversion when `fee == 0`. Severity high: unprivileged actor, profitable, loss of the recipient's funds with no cap other than owner slack.","line":261,"path":"src/DCAHook.sol","reproduction":"Fixture: real PoolManager; launch pool DCA/FWA with 1,000,000e18 liquidity over ticks [-60000,60000] at price 1; ETH/FWA market (hookless, fee 3000, spacing 60) with 100,000e18 liquidity same range at price 1 (1 FWA per ETH). Steps: (1) owner calls setConversionPool(market, 1000, Q96) so spot == ceiling and every fee is deferred; (2) 20 round trips of buy 10,000e18 FWA exact-in and sell 10,000e18 DCA exact-in leave 19,865.56e18 FWA as hook claims (`manager.balanceOf(hook, uint160(FWA))`); (3) owner calls setConversionPool(market, 1000, 2*Q96) (10% per conversion, ceiling 4x spot); (4) attacker holding 1,000e18 FWA calls, in one block, router.swap(key, SwapParams(false, -19, MAX_SQRT_PRICE-1)) repeatedly: each pays hook fee 0, each sells the next slice of backlog with limit = spot*sqrt(1.1). Observed: 4 dust swaps sell the entire 19,865.56 FWA; CREATOR receives 16,531.70 ETH; value at pre-attack spot was 19,865.56 ETH; shortfall 3,333.86 ETH (16.8%); market price moved from 1.000 to 1.435 FWA/ETH (43.5%, well past the 10% bound). Attacker then buys FWA with the 16,531.70 ETH and receives 19,756.35 FWA, restoring spot to 1.001: attacker nets ~3,225 FWA-equivalent minus 0.3% LP fees for 4 swaps of 19 wei. Expected: one block's conversions cannot move the market more than the configured 10%, so the recipient keeps at least ~90% of spot value. Proof test test/scratch/BacklogDumpProof.t.sol fails on current code with `creator lost more than the configured 10% bound in one block: 16531703587415956804211 < 17879007694517561704484`.","severity":"high","snippet":" (uint160 price,,,) = poolManager.getSlot0(market.toId());\n if (price < maxConversionSqrtPriceX96) {\n // price is FWA/ETH. Selling FWA increases sqrt(price). sqrt(1 + bps/10000)\n // is evaluated with 1e9 precision and rounded down, tightening the bound.\n uint256 factor = Math.sqrt((BPS + maxPriceMoveBps) * 1e18 / BPS);\n uint160 limit =\n Math.min(FullMath.mulDiv(price, factor, 1e9), maxConversionSqrtPriceX96).toUint160();","title":"Conversion price bound re-anchors to spot on every swap and any fee-free dust swap sells the whole FWA claim backlog, so one transaction walks the market far past the configured bound and the fee reci"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The paired currency is hardcoded as FWA 0xa0Df17B5aC76ABaBA36E1450E2cbCd18A620C845 (src/DCAHook.sol:31). On mainnet that is 'Fake World Assets' (verified source, Sourcify): its `_afterTokenTransfer` allows a transfer only if (a) mint/burn, (b) `isDistributor[from] || isDistributor[to]`, (c) from/to is the FWA owner, or (d) from/to is the v4 PoolManager AND a transient allowance (`tload(0)`) >= amount, which is decremented; every other transfer reverts `InvalidTransfer()`. The allowance can only be bumped by `increaseTransferAllowance`, restricted to FWA's immutable hook 0x2c67eba8a50af0db5fba55f725247a75cbda6444 (FWATokenHook), which bumps it only inside its own afterSwap / afterAddLiquidity on FWA's own ETH/FWA pool. The DCA/FWA launch pool uses DCAHook, so no bump ever happens for it. Consequences for 'a fee on every swap': a buy of DCA requires the trader (or router) to transfer FWA into the PoolManager: `transferFrom(user, router)` reverts outright (neither side exempt) and `transfer(router -> PoolManager)` reverts for allowance 0; a sell of DCA pays FWA out with `take(FWA, user)`, which reverts for the same reason. Verified on-chain: Uniswap Universal Router 0x66a9893cc07d91d95644aedd05d03f95e1dba8af is not a distributor; FWA's hook itself is not a distributor; `launching()` is false so FWATokenHook.afterAddLiquidity now reverts NotLaunching for everyone. Only an FWA distributor/owner, or a bespoke router that keeps the FWA leg entirely as ERC-6909 claims (buy FWA claims on FWA's pool and spend them in the same unlock; take sell proceeds as claims), can trade the launch pool. The hook's own fee path is unaffected (it uses claims only), but the launch's economic premise (public trading, 5% to the creator) depends on an undocumented platform property. The repository's model of FWA (HookFixture line 93-94, README 'FWA mock that refuses transfers to the hook') blocks the wrong edge and so every integration test passes on a path mainnet refuses. Needed evidence before launch: that the launch's router/front-end is `isDistributor` on FWA or settles FWA via claims; otherwise this is launch-blocking. Fix in scope: correct the README's stated dependency (FWA transfers to/from the PoolManager need a distributor or claims-based router), and model the real guard in the fixture. Flow Gap guide seam 2: periphery x first principles.","line":93,"path":"test/helpers/HookFixture.sol","reproduction":"Scratch test test/scratch/FwaGuard.t.sol (passes, demonstrating the behaviour): a mock at the FWA address implementing the verified guard verbatim (owner/distributor exempt, PoolManager gated by tload(0) allowance, else revert InvalidTransfer); launch pool and market seeded through a router temporarily marked distributor; then the router is un-marked and an ordinary holder alice (1,000e18 FWA and 1,000e18 DCA received from the owner) trades through the project's own PoolTestRouter. test_ordinaryBuyOfDcaWithFwaReverts: router.swap(key, SwapParams(false, -100e18, MAX_SQRT_PRICE-1)) reverts InvalidTransfer() at `safeTransferFrom(alice, router)`. test_ordinarySellOfDcaForFwaReverts: router.swap(key, SwapParams(true, -100e18, MIN_SQRT_PRICE+1)) reverts inside `take(FWA, router)`; alice's FWA balance unchanged. test_distributorRouterCanTrade: with the router marked distributor both swaps succeed and CREATOR.balance > 0, showing the hook itself is fine. Expected per README: 'Both token orderings work', every swap taxed; actual: no non-exempt router can complete either direction. Mainnet facts used: FWA.hook() = 0x2c67eba8a50af0db5fba55f725247a75cbda6444, FWA.owner() = 0x019817ad02a31b990433542097be29d97613e8cb, FWA.poolManager() = 0x000000000004444c5dc75cb358380d2e3de08a90, FWA.launching() = false, isDistributor(UniversalRouter) = false. Mock guard used:\n\ncontract GuardedFWA is ERC20 {\n error InvalidTransfer();\n\n address public immutable owner;\n address public poolManager;\n mapping(address => bool) public isDistributor;\n\n constructor() ERC20(\"Fake World Assets\", \"FWA\") {\n owner = msg.sender;\n }\n\n function setPoolManager(address pm) external {\n poolManager = pm;\n }\n\n function setDistributor(address a, bool ok) external {\n isDistributor[a] = ok;\n }\n\n function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {\n _mint(to, amount);\n }\n\n function getTransferAllowance() public view returns (uint256 a) {\n assembly {\n a := tload(0)\n }\n }\n\n function _update(address from, address to, uint256 amount) internal override {\n super._update(from, to, amount);\n if (from == address(0) || to == address(0)) return;\n if (isDistributor[from] || isDistributor[to]) return;\n if (from == owner || to == owner) return;\n address pm = poolManager;\n if (from == pm || to == pm) {\n uint256 allowance = getTransferAllowance();\n if (allowance < amount) revert InvalidTransfer();\n assembly {\n tstore(0, sub(allowance, amount))\n }\n return;\n }\n revert InvalidTransfer();\n }\n}\n\n","severity":"medium","snippet":" // Model FWA's restriction: any attempt to withdraw fee FWA to the hook fails.\n pair.setBlockedRecipient(address(hook));","title":"The real FWA token locks ERC-20 transfers to/from the PoolManager behind a transient allowance only FWA's own hook bumps, so an ordinary router cannot settle a buy or take a sell on the launch pool; t"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"`_validateSwap` (called by both beforeSwap and afterSwap) reverts `ConversionNotConfigured` whenever the owner has not configured an ETH/FWA conversion market. The factory deploys the hook, initializes the pool and seeds 88% of the DCA supply in one transaction; from that moment until 0x1EE3ffadfE138415A2ddaedeEBe5F46616fA413d (the owner, an EOA, no transfer or fallback) sends a correctly-formed PoolKey plus two price parameters, no trade is possible, and the deployer's launch simulation cannot show a working swap. The same gate ties trading liveness to the conversion route permanently: a conversion market whose hook starts reverting (e.g. FWATokenHook reverts `ExternalBuysDisabled`/`NotLaunching` branches or its owner changes behaviour) makes every launch swap revert until the owner reconfigures, because `_convertAndPay` is inline in afterSwap with no fallback. The guide's intended behaviour for this launch family is 'the unsold rest kept as a claim for the next swap': conversion failing should defer the fee, not block the trade. The owner's `setConversionPool` also does nothing to validate that the market has liquidity or that `maxConversionSqrtPriceX96` is above spot, so a mis-set value silently defers all fees (documented) while a missing call blocks all trading (not a documented trade-off, only a 'must'). Fix: when `conversionConfigured` is false, charge the fee and mint it as FWA claims without converting (the claims are sold once a market is configured); keep the strict config checks in setConversionPool. Optionally wrap the conversion swap in a try/catch that defers the fee as claims on failure.","line":227,"path":"src/DCAHook.sol","reproduction":"Existing test test/SwapFee.t.sol test_swapWithoutConfiguredMarketRevertsAtomically shows it: _deploy(true, false, true) (pool initialized and seeded, conversion not configured) then router.swap(key, _params(true, true, 100e18), 100e18, 0) reverts (ConversionNotConfigured wrapped in HookCallFailed); trader balance unchanged, no fee claims. Expected for a launch pool: the buy executes and 5e18 FWA is held as hook claims (as test_noConversionLiquidityRetainsFeeClaims shows the hook can already do when a configured market has no liquidity). State on mainnet at launch: `conversionConfigured == false` for every block until the owner acts; any swap from any router in that window reverts.","severity":"medium","snippet":" if (!conversionConfigured) revert ConversionNotConfigured();","title":"Every swap on the launch pool reverts until the owner EOA calls setConversionPool, so the launch opens dead and stays dead if that key is lost or the chosen market later becomes unusable"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The requester's token name is 'Democratizing Collectable Acquisions' (sic). The contract hardcodes 'Democratizing Collectable Acquisitions'. If the brief's spelling is what the launch request, manifest `token.name` and front-end carry, `name()` will not match them; if the brief contains a typo the README should say the name was corrected deliberately. Either way the manifest's `token.name` must equal the on-chain string.","line":8,"path":"src/DCAToken.sol","reproduction":"Call DCAToken.name() after deployment: returns 'Democratizing Collectable Acquisitions'; the assignment text reads 'Democratizing Collectable Acquisions'. A manifest with token.name copied from the brief disagrees with the deployed contract.","severity":"low","snippet":" constructor() ERC20(\"Democratizing Collectable Acquisitions\", \"DCA\") {","title":"Token name differs from the brief: contract says 'Democratizing Collectable Acquisitions', the assignment says 'Democratizing Collectable Acquisions'"}],"hash":"8a4e02a75f7a4e96ad10d2a876c5fbc630868af9c07ca7df97f1b833419665a4","nodeId":"357f7876-1f2f-4b88-8ec0-918ba4993816","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is written and verified, and nothing else in the tree changed (git status shows only the ignored findings file and scratch tests).\n\n**Outcome:** `.imd-findings.json` holds 4 findings and 14 coverage rows, one for each of the 9 listed entry points plus 5 invariant and economics rows. All cited snippets were checked against the tree. The existing 48-test suite passes unchanged.\n\n**Findings, most severe first:**\n\n- **High, src/DCAHook.sol:261.** The conversion's price limit is recomputed from the market's spot on every swap, and any swap re-sells the entire accumulated FWA claim backlog, including a 19-wei swap that pays zero fee. An attacker waits for a backlog (deferral is the normal state whenever spot sits above the owner's ceiling), then repeats dust swaps in one block. In the fixture, 4 free triggers sold a 19,865 FWA backlog while walking the market 43% past the configured 10% bound. The creator received 16,532 ETH-equivalent instead of 19,866, and the attacker bought the dip back for the difference. The proof test under test/scratch fails on current code with that shortfall. Suggested fix: anchor the bound per block and skip backlog sales when the triggering fee is zero.\n- **Medium, test/helpers/HookFixture.sol:93.** The real FWA token on mainnet (\"Fake World Assets\") locks all transfers except owner, distributors, and PoolManager transfers covered by a transient allowance that only FWA's own hook bumps on its own pool. An ordinary router can neither pay FWA into the launch pool nor take FWA out of it. The repository models the wrong restriction (blocking transfers to the hook only), so every integration test passes on a path mainnet refuses. The hook's own claims-based fee path is unaffected. Verified on chain: the Universal Router is not a distributor. Needed evidence: the launch router is an FWA distributor or settles FWA as ERC-6909 claims.\n- **Medium, src/DCAHook.sol:227.** Every swap reverts until the owner EOA configures a conversion pool, so the launch opens dead and trading liveness stays tied to that key and the chosen market. The guide's intended behavior is deferring the fee as claims, not blocking trades.\n- **Low, src/DCAToken.sol:8.** The contract name is \"Acquisitions\" while the brief says \"Acquisions\"; the manifest's token name must match the deployed string either way.\n\n**Coverage notes:** The fee arithmetic, hook-delta credit timing, FWA and ETH delta conservation, claim mint/burn branches, redemption re-entry guards and the unlock callback all traced clean. The static-analysis leads (unused getSlot0 return, redeemEth reentrancy) are benign and were not promoted. Not reached: a mainnet fork rehearsal against FWA's hooked pool, which the network restrictions of the verifier would not allow anyway.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2975257,"inputTokens":610,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":71937,"runtime":"claude","turns":54,"wallClockMs":1088387}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"a622edefa9b79d7b7fe5787add3f41be096f9ea7051ca5416e306bb542974127","device":"b0ab61c6f4146d8d","findings":[],"hash":"99b164b01ecb2c8493aedc2718d9198d1597a1bfc178d83709d00366f96f240c","nodeId":"a9fe2db0-6f20-43bd-9c95-1cbf9ee387ab","outcome":"completed","summary":"Implemented the DCA token and 5% swap-fee hook, with ETH conversion and claim fallback for the specified creator wallet.\n\nVerified: `forge build`, 48 passing tests, and `forge fmt --check`, including offline parallel checks.\n\nBefore trading, the owner must configure the ETH/FWA conversion pool and price limits. Deployment and operating instructions are in [README.md](/root/.identitymd/work/9a7c8a8b-11cd-4d06-9b8e-0ee784be8ff3/a9fe2db0-6f20-43bd-9c95-1cbf9ee387ab/README.md).","treeHash":"c965dcafaf60cc22d731e4bf156415398782979f","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2007296,"inputTokens":118610,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":50364,"runtime":"codex","turns":9,"wallClockMs":1351774}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"764cd99b4c628a47","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Round-2 residual of the sandwich finding (id 626c2497...): the same-block attack is fixed (fee-free swaps sell nothing, backlog capped at BACKLOG_MULTIPLE x fee, bound measured from an earlier block), and the author's test_attackerCannotProfitFromSandwichingTheFeeConversion passes. But _referencePrice (line 337) promotes observedSqrtPriceX96 into anchorSqrtPriceX96 without any bound relative to the previous anchor. observedSqrtPriceX96 is simply the market spot at the last sale attempt (line 338), and a sale attempt is any fee-bearing launch swap (20 wei of FWA gross gives a 1 wei fee), so an unprivileged trader sets next block's reference price: in block N they push the ETH/FWA market up to just under the owner's ceiling, make a 20 wei buy (deferred, but observed = manipulated price), hold the position one block, and in block N+1 the anchor equals the manipulated price in full; a fee-bearing swap of size S then sells fee(S) + 4 x fee(S) of backlog within [anchor, anchor*sqrt(1.1)], i.e. at the attacker's price, and the attacker buys the FWA back. The README (line 54) states 'a manipulation held across two blocks ... can still shift the anchor by at most maxPriceMoveBps per block'; the code does not implement that: the anchor moved from Q96 to 1.8*Q96 (sqrt, price x3.24) across one block boundary. Preconditions: a backlog (the normal state, per README), owner ceiling slack above spot (the project's fixtures and README use 4x), and holding a market position across one block boundary (exposed to arbitrage for an ordinary trader; risk-free for a builder/proposer with two consecutive slots). Cost to the attacker: the 5% fee on the trigger swap (which is itself sold cheaply) plus round-trip LP fees; measured net gain +965.56 FWA on a 5,000 FWA backlog while the creator received 1,858.87 ETH for 6,250 FWA whose pre-attack value was ~6,250 ETH (-70%). Medium: unprivileged loss of the recipient's funds under specific conditions (cross-block hold, ceiling slack, 5x the trigger fee per swap), and a stated guarantee that does not hold. Fix preserving the design: ratchet the promotion so the anchor can rise by at most the bound per block, e.g. in _referencePrice when observedBlock < block.number: `uint160 prev = anchorSqrtPriceX96; uint256 cap = prev == 0 ? type(uint256).max : FullMath.mulDiv(prev, factor, 1e9); anchorSqrtPriceX96 = uint160(Math.min(observedSqrtPriceX96, cap));` (lowering stays unbounded because a lower base only tightens the sale), and correct or keep the README sentence accordingly. A legitimately falling FWA price then catches up at maxPriceMoveBps per block with a sale attempt; a manipulation must be held for ~12 blocks to lift the reference 80%. Verified on a patched copy with exactly that change: the attached proof passes, anchor == 1.0488*Q96, 6,250e18 + 1 wei of FWA claims remain unsold, the creator's ETH is untouched and the attacker ends 3,366.50 FWA down.","line":337,"path":"src/DCAHook.sol","reproduction":"test/scratch/Proof_AnchorJump.t.sol (source in proof; run with forge test --match-path test/scratch/Proof_AnchorJump.t.sol -vv). Fixture: fresh PoolManager; DCAToken; plain FWA ERC-20 mock etched at 0xa0Df...C845 (the guard is irrelevant: the hook's path is claims-only); DCAHook(manager, token, factory=test, owner=0x1EE3...413d) at a mined address; launch pool DCA/FWA fee 12500 spacing 60 at 2^96 with 1,000,000e18 liquidity over [-60000, 60000]; hookless ETH/FWA market fee 3000 spacing 60 at 2^96 with 100,000e18 liquidity over the same range. Steps: (1) owner setConversionPool(market, 1000, 2^96), roll one block, exact-input buy of 100,000e18 FWA -> manager.balanceOf(hook, uint160(FWA)) == 5,000e18 (ceiling == spot defers); owner setConversionPool(market, 1000, 2*2^96), roll one block. (2) Block N, attacker: market swap SwapParams(false, -500,000e18, 1.8*2^96) (sells FWA until sqrt price 1.8*2^96), then exact-input buy of 20 wei FWA on the launch pool (fee 1 wei; sale deferred; hook.observedSqrtPriceX96() == 1.8*2^96). (3) vm.roll(+1); attacker exact-input buy of 25,000e18 FWA (fee 1,250e18). (4) attacker market swap SwapParams(true, -ethGainedInStep2, MIN_SQRT_PRICE+1), then sells the DCA bought in step 3 back on the launch pool. Expected: hook.anchorSqrtPriceX96() <= 2^96 * sqrt(1.1) (83095197855742363478967922789), so spot 1.8*2^96 is beyond the bound, nothing is sold into the spike, the 5,000e18 backlog stays, and the attacker's FWA after <= before. Actual: anchorSqrtPriceX96 == 142610692525675807668379110604 (1.8*2^96); FWA claims left after block N+1 == 1 wei (the whole 5,000e18 backlog plus the 1,250e18 fee, 6,250e18 FWA, was sold into the spike; on fixed code 6,250e18 + 1 wei remain); creator received 1,858,874,681,642,074,332,613 wei ETH (~1,858.87 ETH) for 6,250 FWA; attacker FWA net +965,561,726,637,272,178,758 wei (+965.56 FWA) with ETH net 0. Assertion: 'anchor moved more than maxPriceMoveBps in one block: 142610692525675807668379110604 > 83095197855742363478967922789'.","severity":"medium","snippet":" if (observedBlock < block.number) anchorSqrtPriceX96 = observedSqrtPriceX96;","title":"Prior-block anchor is promoted wholesale from the previous block's observed price, so a one-block manipulation hold still sells the creator's fee plus 4x backlog at the attacker's price (README claims"}],"hash":"ce8a6cf7113965aed59c156905440f6d0a6ad366e0b78125a9b4ae94bec23f28","nodeId":"f251437d-475e-4895-bb83-b873d722506c","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. The findings file is written and validated.\n\n**Earlier findings, settled against the revised code**\n\n- **Same-block sandwich and backlog dump (high)**: fixed as reported. Fee-free swaps sell nothing, the backlog sold per swap is capped at four times the new fee, and the bound is measured from an earlier block. The author's tests pass. A residual two-block variant remains, reported below.\n- **Pool untradeable until setConversionPool (medium)**: fixed. The gate is gone from `_validateSwap`, the fee is minted as claims without a market, and the sale runs in try/catch. My attached proof now passes.\n- **Real FWA guard (medium)**: addressed as asked. The mock now implements the verified guard, the fixture runs on it, and the README documents the distributor or claims-router dependency.\n- **No FWA exit (low)**: fixed by owner-only `redeemPair`, which takes straight to the recipient and keeps claims on a refused transfer.\n- **Gas griefing (low)**: fixed by the 2,000,000 gas stipend in try/catch. The earlier proof now passes.\n- **Partial fill (low)**: dispute accepted and dropped. The mitigation is in the README.\n- **Token name (low)**: fixed to the brief's spelling. The manifest matches.\n\nThe full suite passes with 95 tests, and the hook is well under the size limits.\n\n**One new finding (medium)**, with a self-contained proof at `test/scratch/Proof_AnchorJump.t.sol`. The anchor is promoted wholesale from the previous block's observed spot, with no bound relative to the prior anchor. A trader who pushes the market up in block N, records it with a 20 wei buy, and holds one block gets that price as the full reference in block N+1. On a 5,000 FWA backlog the hook sold 6,250 FWA for about 1,859 ETH worth, and the attacker netted about 965 FWA. The README's claim that the anchor shifts at most the configured bps per block is not what the code does. I verified on a patched copy that ratcheting the promotion by the bound makes the proof pass and leaves the attacker at a loss.\n\nCoverage answers all ten entry points, nine holding and `afterSwap` carrying the finding, plus rows for the settled findings, the manifest, and the static-analysis leads, none of which reproduced as defects.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2520772,"inputTokens":642,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":35308,"runtime":"claude","turns":30,"wallClockMs":622283}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"8d0f6461585275b2960cb9e4f20f3c0bd13e57228f0e69ac967e963a9b3fd9e1","device":"3beb94a990617d46","findings":[],"hash":"d355b216ab61c9210be3fe4a6a057b05b59b3af7b55eabe3c52f29d4572aa02c","nodeId":"cf230703-7459-4117-ab75-e319e414f175","outcome":"completed","summary":"The revision is complete. The suite passes with 95 tests across 14 suites, zero failures, and only paths under `test/` changed.\n\n**What this round covered.** The implementation was revised after my previous tests: it gained an owner-only FWA exit, a per-block price anchor for the conversion bound, a backlog cap, and gas-bounded market sales. My earlier tests still passed against it, so I left them alone and added coverage for the new mechanics only.\n\n- **New file `test/AnchorAndPairExit.t.sol`** (7 tests). A market move made in an earlier block defers exactly one attempt and is then promoted as the anchor. A lowered spot tightens the bound to the spot rather than the stale anchor. Reconfiguration resets the anchor and restarts observation. A 400-case property shows no sale ever passes the owner's relative bound or absolute ceiling under same-block or earlier-block manipulation in either direction. The owner's FWA exit is tested with a separate owner and recipient (recipient cannot configure, owner receives nothing on either side), chunks above the signed-delta limit, moves only FWA while the ETH exit moves only ETH, and is refused from inside a foreign unlock without leaving a pending authorization.\n- **Extended lifecycle invariant handler.** Three new random actions: direct market manipulation in both directions, block advances, and the owner's FWA exit with and without the token guard allowing the recipient. Every hook sale is now read from the market's own Swap event and checked against the bound from the promoted anchor and the ceiling. Conservation now includes FWA paid out by the owner's exit. The end-of-campaign liveness check drains the backlog at the capped pace across fresh blocks and requires anything left to clear through the owner's exit.\n\n**Results.** The lifecycle campaign ran 256 sequences of 64 calls with zero unexpected reverts on the default seed and two extra seeds. Coverage of the hook is 99.40% lines and 92.68% branches.\n\n**No defect found.** I wrote no findings file. Two things I examined are design limits already stated in the README rather than defects: the one-block anchor defers conversion when a market is held above the bound across a block boundary, and an owner-chosen conversion market with its own hook is trusted by the owner, who per the README is the same wallet as the recipient. I recorded both in `test/CONTRIBUTOR_TESTS.md` along with the updated pass and coverage figures.","treeHash":"a5c1dfbb4493eda79fbf12a780e7e992acd79770","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2915470,"inputTokens":706,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":59561,"runtime":"claude","turns":54,"wallClockMs":969295}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"e8816d4386532a66","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"_validateSwap runs in both beforeSwap and afterSwap and reverts with ConversionNotConfigured whenever conversionConfigured is false. The factory deploys the hook, initializes the pool and seeds 88% of supply in one transaction, but nothing in that flow (or in the constructor) configures a conversion market. From the moment of launch every buy and sell on the pool is refused until the owner wallet 0x1EE3ffadfE138415A2ddaedeEBe5F46616fA413d hand-builds and sends a setConversionPool call with a full native-ETH/FWA PoolKey, a bps bound and a sqrtPriceX96 ceiling. If the launch factory performs any swap in the launch transaction the launch itself reverts; if the owner never acts (lost key, unfamiliar with v4 PoolKey encoding) the pool is permanently untradeable even though it holds the launch liquidity. The brief asks for a fee on every swap, not for trading to be gated on an owner action. The fee can be retained without a market: _convertAndPay already knows how to hold unsold FWA as ERC-6909 claims (line 278). Minimal fix that preserves the design: drop the conversionConfigured check from _validateSwap and, in _convertAndPay, skip the conversion when !conversionConfigured so the whole budget is minted as FWA claims and sold later once the owner configures a market (the existing claim-rollover path then pays the creator). The attached test fails on the current code with WrappedError(hook, beforeSwap 0x575e24b4, ConversionNotConfigured 0xe44cc672, HookCallFailed) and passes with that change (verified against a patched copy).","line":227,"path":"src/DCAHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {IUnlockCallback} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/callback/IUnlockCallback.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {BalanceDelta} from \"v4-core/src/types/BalanceDelta.sol\";\nimport {ModifyLiquidityParams, SwapParams} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\nimport {TickMath} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/TickMath.sol\";\nimport {TransientStateLibrary} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/TransientStateLibrary.sol\";\nimport {IERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol\";\nimport {ERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\";\nimport {DCAToken} from \"src/DCAToken.sol\";\nimport {DCAHook} from \"src/DCAHook.sol\";\nimport {HookFlags} from \"src/HookFlags.sol\";\n\ncontract PairMock is ERC20 {\n constructor() ERC20(\"FWA\", \"FWA\") {}\n function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {\n _mint(to, amount);\n }\n}\n\n/// @dev Minimal router: pulls caller funds before unlock, settles from its own balance.\ncontract Router is IUnlockCallback {\n using TransientStateLibrary for IPoolManager;\n\n IPoolManager immutable manager;\n\n constructor(IPoolManager m) {\n manager = m;\n }\n\n receive() external payable {}\n\n function addLiquidity(PoolKey memory key, ModifyLiquidityParams memory p, uint256 max0, uint256 max1)\n external\n {\n IERC20(Currency.unwrap(key.currency0)).transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), max0);\n IERC20(Currency.unwrap(key.currency1)).transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), max1);\n manager.unlock(abi.encode(true, key, p, SwapParams(false, 0, 0)));\n _refund(key.currency0);\n _refund(key.currency1);\n }\n\n function swap(PoolKey memory key, SwapParams memory p, uint256 maxIn) external returns (BalanceDelta d) {\n IERC20(Currency.unwrap(p.zeroForOne ? key.currency0 : key.currency1)).transferFrom(\n msg.sender, address(this), maxIn\n );\n d = abi.decode(manager.unlock(abi.encode(false, key, ModifyLiquidityParams(0, 0, 0, 0), p)), (BalanceDelta));\n _refund(key.currency0);\n _refund(key.currency1);\n }\n\n function unlockCallback(bytes calldata data) external returns (bytes memory) {\n require(msg.sender == address(manager));\n (bool liq, PoolKey memory key, ModifyLiquidityParams memory lp, SwapParams memory sp) =\n abi.decode(data, (bool, PoolKey, ModifyLiquidityParams, SwapParams));\n BalanceDelta d;\n if (liq) (d,) = manager.modifyLiquidity(key, lp, \"\");\n else d = manager.swap(key, sp, \"\");\n _settle(key.currency0);\n _settle(key.currency1);\n return abi.encode(d);\n }\n\n function _settle(Currency c) private {\n int256 delta = manager.currencyDelta(address(this), c);\n if (delta > 0) manager.take(c, address(this), uint256(delta));\n else if (delta < 0) {\n manager.sync(c);\n IERC20(Currency.unwrap(c)).transfer(address(manager), uint256(-delta));\n manager.settle();\n }\n }\n\n function _refund(Currency c) private {\n uint256 b = IERC20(Currency.unwrap(c)).balanceOf(address(this));\n if (b != 0) IERC20(Currency.unwrap(c)).transfer(msg.sender, b);\n }\n}\n\n/// @notice The launch pool must be tradeable from the moment the factory opens and seeds it.\n/// Today every swap reverts with ConversionNotConfigured until the owner sends a separate\n/// transaction; fees could instead be held as FWA claims until a conversion market is set.\ncontract UnconfiguredTradingTest is Test {\n address constant FWA = 0xa0Df17B5aC76ABaBA36E1450E2cbCd18A620C845;\n address constant CREATOR = 0x1EE3ffadfE138415A2ddaedeEBe5F46616fA413d;\n uint160 constant Q96 = 79228162514264337593543950336;\n\n IPoolManager manager;\n DCAToken token;\n PairMock pair;\n DCAHook hook;\n Router router;\n PoolKey key;\n\n function setUp() public {\n manager = IPoolManager(address(new PoolManager(address(this))));\n token = new DCAToken();\n vm.etch(FWA, address(new PairMock()).code);\n pair = PairMock(FWA);\n pair.mint(address(this), 1_000_000_000 ether);\n\n bytes memory initCode = abi.encodePacked(\n type(DCAHook).creationCode, abi.encode(manager, address(token), address(this), CREATOR)\n );\n bytes32 hash = keccak256(initCode);\n address predicted;\n bytes32 salt;\n for (uint256 i; i < 200_000; ++i) {\n salt = bytes32(i);\n predicted = address(uint160(uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0xff), address(this), salt, hash)))));\n if (HookFlags.matches(predicted, HookFlags.DCA)) break;\n }\n address deployed;\n assembly {\n deployed := create2(0, add(initCode, 32), mload(initCode), salt)\n }\n require(deployed == predicted, \"deploy\");\n hook = DCAHook(deployed);\n\n bool tokenFirst = address(token) < FWA;\n key = PoolKey({\n currency0: Currency.wrap(tokenFirst ? address(token) : FWA),\n currency1: Currency.wrap(tokenFirst ? FWA : address(token)),\n fee: 12_500,\n tickSpacing: 60,\n hooks: IHooks(address(hook))\n });\n // The factory: initialize and seed in the launch transaction.\n manager.initialize(key, Q96);\n router = new Router(manager);\n token.approve(address(router), type(uint256).max);\n pair.approve(address(router), type(uint256).max);\n router.addLiquidity(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(-60_000, 60_000, 1_000_000 ether, 0), 1_000_000 ether, 1_000_000 ether);\n }\n\n /// @dev Fails today: the first buyer after launch is refused until the owner acts.\n function test_buyRightAfterLaunchSucceedsBeforeOwnerConfiguresConversion() public {\n assertFalse(hook.conversionConfigured());\n bool zeroForOne = Currency.unwrap(key.currency0) == FWA;\n SwapParams memory p = SwapParams(\n zeroForOne, -int256(100 ether), zeroForOne ? TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1 : TickMath.MAX_SQRT_PRICE - 1\n );\n uint256 tokenBefore = token.balanceOf(address(this));\n router.swap(key, p, 100 ether);\n assertGt(token.balanceOf(address(this)), tokenBefore, \"buyer received DCA\");\n // The 5% fee is retained for the creator as FWA claims until a market is configured.\n assertEq(manager.balanceOf(address(hook), uint160(FWA)), 5 ether, \"fee held as FWA claims\");\n }\n}","reproduction":"State: fresh PoolManager; DCAToken; DCAHook deployed with (manager, token, factory, 0x1EE3...); factory calls manager.initialize(key{token/FWA, 12500, 60, hook}, 2^96) and adds liquidity ticks [-60000, 60000], 1e24 liquidity. No setConversionPool call. Input: any router swap, e.g. exact-input buy SwapParams(zeroForOne = FWA is currency0, amountSpecified = -100e18, limit = MIN+1/MAX-1). Expected: the buyer receives DCA and 5e18 FWA (5%) is retained for the creator. Actual: PoolManager.swap reverts with WrappedError(hook, 0x575e24b4 beforeSwap, 0xe44cc672 ConversionNotConfigured, 0xa9e35b2f HookCallFailed); the pool has zero volume until the owner acts, forever if the owner does not.","severity":"medium","snippet":" if (!conversionConfigured) revert ConversionNotConfigured();","title":"Launch pool cannot trade at all until the owner sends a separate setConversionPool transaction"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Every unsold fee is minted back to the hook as an ERC-6909 claim for currency uint160(FWA). The only code that ever burns that claim is _convertAndPay, which runs only inside a launch-pool swap and only sells into the owner-configured native-ETH/FWA pool under the price bounds. No function (owner or permissionless) can take or transfer those claims to the fixed RECIPIENT, and the owner cannot change the recipient or the fee. If the ETH/FWA v4 market loses its liquidity, is drained, or its price stays at or above any ceiling the owner is willing to set, every swap keeps adding 5% of its FWA side to a balance nobody can ever withdraw: the traders pay the fee, the creator never receives it, and the FWA is locked in the PoolManager. The ETH side has redeemEth(); the FWA side has no equivalent. Suggested minimal fix: add a permissionless redeemPair() mirroring redeemEth() that unlocks the manager, burns the hook's FWA claims and calls poolManager.take(FWA, RECIPIENT, amount) directly to the creator wallet (never to the hook, so FWA's transfer restriction on the hook does not matter), or at least an owner-triggered equivalent, so a dead conversion route cannot strand the fee.","line":278,"path":"src/DCAHook.sol","reproduction":"State: the existing fixture with the conversion market initialized but holding no liquidity (HookFixture._deploy(false, true, true)). Input: router.swap exact-input buy of 100e18 FWA. Result: FeeCharged(gross 100e18, fee 5e18), FeeConverted(spent 0, eth 0, pending 5e18); manager.balanceOf(hook, uint160(FWA)) == 5e18 (test_noConversionLiquidityRetainsFeeClaims shows this). Then enumerate the hook ABI: afterSwap, beforeInitialize, beforeSwap, redeemEth, setConversionPool, unlockCallback. None of them reduces the FWA claim balance except afterSwap via _convertAndPay, which requires a later launch-pool swap AND a live ETH/FWA market with spot below the ceiling. With the market never funded (or drained after launch), the 5e18 FWA (and every later fee) stays in the manager indefinitely; expected: the creator can always collect the fee that was charged.","severity":"low","snippet":" // Never take FWA out of the manager; FWA can reject transfers to this hook.\n if (budget > spent) poolManager.mint(address(this), pair.toId(), budget - spent);","title":"Collected FWA fee claims have no exit except an in-swap conversion; an unusable ETH/FWA market strands the creator's fee permanently"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"For an exact-input buy or exact-output sell where FWA is the specified currency, afterSwap compares the pool's actual FWA delta against the full fee-adjusted amount and reverts with PartialFillNotSupported on any difference. In core v4 (and in this pool for DCA-specified swaps) a swap that reaches the caller's sqrtPriceLimitX96 fills partially and succeeds; here it hard-fails, so a trader or aggregator that protects a buy with a price limit (rather than a min-output check) is refused entirely once the pool moves past that limit. The README documents the limitation, but it remains an asymmetry between the four swap modes that integrators will not expect from a plain fee hook. A fix within the design: compute the fee in afterSwap from the actual specified delta and return the difference between the beforeSwap charge and the actual fee on the unspecified side is not possible in v4, so the practical alternative is to charge FWA-specified swaps entirely in afterSwap as an unspecified-side charge where v4 permits it, or to document to routers that price-limited FWA-specified orders must use MIN/MAX limits plus min-output.","line":195,"path":"src/DCAHook.sol","reproduction":"State: the standard fixture (deep launch liquidity, market configured). Input: exact-input buy SwapParams(zeroForOne = FWA is currency0, amountSpecified = -1000e18, sqrtPriceLimitX96 = currentSqrtPrice - 1 (or + 1 for the other ordering)). Expected (core v4 semantics): the swap fills up to the limit, the trader pays only the consumed FWA, and the fee is charged on what was consumed. Actual: afterSwap sees pairDelta != -(1000e18 - 50e18) and reverts with WrappedError(hook, afterSwap, PartialFillNotSupported, HookCallFailed); the same order with DCA specified succeeds and is charged on the actual FWA (test_partialPairSpecifiedSwapsRevertWithoutFee vs test_partialDcaSpecifiedTradeChargesOnlyActualFwa).","severity":"low","snippet":" if (int256(pairDelta) != expected) revert PartialFillNotSupported();","title":"FWA-specified swaps that hit the trader's sqrtPriceLimitX96 revert instead of partially filling"}],"hash":"e776d1b710f4a3210973634d0c9c47018cabed75941dc88fc7b8acd8dde9c704","nodeId":"5f779d17-dd6d-409e-b8f1-75b33ff2efb5","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. No tracked file was changed; the findings are in `.imd-findings.json` at the repository root, with the proof test under `test/scratch/`.\n\n**What I found**\n\nThe fee accounting itself holds. I traced all four swap modes in both currency orderings through v4's `beforeSwap`/`afterSwap` delta handling, the nested conversion swap, the claim burn/mint rollover, and the ETH `take` with its catch path. The hook's FWA and ETH deltas net to zero on every branch and the fee is 5% of gross FWA. Access control, reentrancy guards, the one-shot factory-only initialization, and the token are all sound. The 48 existing tests pass.\n\nThree defects are reported, one with a Foundry proof:\n\n1. **Medium: the launch pool cannot trade until the owner sends a separate configuration transaction.** Every swap reverts with `ConversionNotConfigured` from the moment the factory opens and seeds the pool. If the owner wallet never sends a correctly encoded `setConversionPool` call, the pool holding the launch liquidity is permanently untradeable. The proof test deploys a real PoolManager, initializes and seeds the pool as the factory would, and attempts a buy. It fails today and passes with the minimal fix: skip the conversion and hold the fee as FWA claims when no market is configured. I verified the pass against a patched copy that was then deleted.\n2. **Low: collected FWA fee claims have no exit except an in-swap conversion.** If the ETH/FWA market is illiquid, drained, or stuck above the ceiling, the fee accumulates in the PoolManager with no function able to deliver it to the creator. A permissionless redemption that takes FWA straight to the fixed recipient would close this.\n3. **Low: FWA-specified swaps that reach the trader's price limit revert** rather than partially filling, unlike DCA-specified swaps on the same pool. Documented by the author, but an asymmetry integrators will not expect.\n\n**Coverage**\n\nAll nine listed entry points have a row, plus three invariant rows. The static-analysis leads (unused returns, reentrancy-events, state change after unlock) were each traced and found benign. Not reached: a mainnet fork rehearsal against the real FWA token and its live ETH/FWA pool, which the author also lists as outstanding. The paired token resolves to Fake World Assets, which does have an ETH pool, so the owner can configure a market, but that does not remove finding 1.\n\nSources: [Fake World Assets on CoinGecko](https://www.coingecko.com/en/coins/fake-world-assets), [ETH / FWA pool](https://dexpaprika.com/ethereum/pool/0xcc36bffe1ef4b823cca59dc00a6f228cd2a3c6e610adf4842aed3a60ec4a2abe), [FWA deployments](https://www.fwa.fun/docs/deployments)","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1404162,"inputTokens":322,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":46465,"runtime":"claude","turns":26,"wallClockMs":655511}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"0b4a88309424978fc3e6002d70d4b1d44833b0b8b4cc41a70a66d8e343fc2107","device":"87645bda72145989","findings":[],"hash":"e867c97be6097b1a244aea3f4c9776472902b9bbcd42e5ef4ae7b22305322f5d","nodeId":"cf230703-7459-4117-ab75-e319e414f175","outcome":"completed","summary":"Added fee boundary, failure-path, redemption, reentrancy, and randomized accounting invariant tests under `test/`.\n\nVerified offline: build passes; **77 tests pass**, with zero failures or skips. No implementation defects were reproduced.","treeHash":"213f369f734cee59aba256c9097e67662f196242","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":3458688,"inputTokens":185244,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":30371,"runtime":"codex","turns":10,"wallClockMs":811522}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":4454,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 97 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 4.23s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:172:25\n │\n172 │ observedBlock = uint64(block.number);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n │ \n │ // casting to 'uint64' is safe because [explain why]\n │ // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n │ \n │ \n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:232:9\n │\n232 │ poolManager.unlock(\"\");\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:232:9\n │\n232 │ poolManager.unlock(\"\");\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:241:9\n │\n241 │ poolManager.unlock(\"\");\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:241:9\n │\n241 │ poolManager.unlock(\"\");\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:287:13\n │\n287 │ emit ConversionSkipped(poolManager.balanceOf(address(this), pair.toId()));\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:301:13\n │\n301 │ emit FeeConverted(spent, ethReceived, poolManager.balanceOf(address(this), pair.toId()));\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:358:13\n │\n358 │ emit EthDeferred(newCredit - pay);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:366:17\n │\n366 │ emit EthPaid(RECIPIENT, pay);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:369:17\n │\n369 │ emit EthDeferred(pay);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:339:25\n │\n339 │ observedBlock = uint64(block.number);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n │ \n │ // casting to 'uint64' is safe because [explain why]\n │ // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n │ \n │ \n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:350:9\n │\n350 │ emit PairPaid(RECIPIENT, amount);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[environment-read-across-mutation]: `block.number` may be reused across `vm.roll`\n ╭▸ test/helpers/HookFixture.sol:110:17\n │\n110 │ vm.roll(block.number + 1);\n │ ────────━━━━━━━━━━━━───── `vm.roll` changes this environment here\n │\n ├ help: capture it with `vm.getBlockNumber()` instead\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/environment-read-across-mutation\n\nwarning[environment-read-across-mutation]: `block.number` may be reused across `vm.roll`\n ╭▸ test/ConversionBounds.t.sol:207:17\n │\n207 │ vm.roll(block.number + 1);\n │ ────────━━━━━━━━━━━━───── `vm.roll` changes this environment here\n │\n ├ help: capture it with `vm.getBlockNumber()` instead\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/environment-read-across-mutation\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":854,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 8 tests for test/Token.t.sol:TokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupplyAndChargesNoFee(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 135584, ~: 135447)\nLogs:\n Bound result 10000000000000000000000000\n\n[PASS] test_approvedTransferAndAllowance() (gas: 136349)\n[PASS] test_insufficientAllowanceRevertsWithoutMovingFunds() (gas: 55589)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceAndZeroRecipientRevert() (gas: 61757)\n[PASS] test_metadataAndPolicySupply() (gas: 56959)\n[PASS] test_mintsToFactoryRatherThanTransactionOrigin() (gas: 24204)\n[PASS] test_noMintPauseFeeOrUpgradeEntryPointEvenForDeployer() (gas: 393315)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 779982)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 5.61ms (9.94ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/Deployment.t.sol:DeploymentTest\n[PASS] test_saltFinderDeploysActualCreationCodeAndFactoryInitializes() (gas: 27408879)\n[PASS] test_saltFinderRejectsInvalidSearchRatherThanGuessingAddresses() (gas: 3356604)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 29.57ms (29.78ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/ConversionSecurity.t.sol:ConversionSecurityTest\n[PASS] test_externalConversionHookCannotReenterLaunchSwapOrRedeem() (gas: 1440081)\n[PASS] test_negativeNativeConversionOutputRevertsAtomically() (gas: 1092496)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 88.58ms (2.18ms CPU time)\n\nRan 20 tests for test/SwapFee.t.sol:SwapFeeTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_feeAndConservation(bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 532299, ~: 530544)\nLogs:\n Bound result 2522187153593536027518\n\n[PASS] test_absoluteCeilingDefersFeeThenOwnerCanRestoreConversion() (gas: 997828)\n[PASS] test_bothDirectionsAndExactnessWithFwaAsCurrency0() (gas: 67209958)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 525790)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput() (gas: 525441)\n[PASS] test_conversionHitsRelativeBoundAndNextSwapSellsRemainder() (gas: 1678437)\n[PASS] test_conversionStopsAtAbsoluteBoundWithinRelativeBound() (gas: 458142)\n[PASS] test_freshManagerSeededWithTokensOnlyUsesEthClaims() (gas: 10892811)\n[PASS] test_laterSwapAutomaticallyPaysEarlierEthClaims() (gas: 678428)\n[PASS] test_liquidityCanBeRemovedBeforeConversionIsConfiguredAndPaysNoHookFee() (gas: 10224173)\n[PASS] test_nativeClaimsOnAllSwapModesWhenNativeIsTemporarilyUnavailable() (gas: 1693585)\n[PASS] test_noConversionLiquidityRetainsFeeClaims() (gas: 10512176)\n[PASS] test_partialDcaSpecifiedTradeChargesOnlyActualFwa() (gas: 461732)\n[PASS] test_partialNativeBalancePaysAvailableAndClaimsRest() (gas: 577076)\n[PASS] test_partialPairSpecifiedSwapsRevertWithoutFee() (gas: 562746)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 530861)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput() (gas: 530779)\n[PASS] test_swapsBeforeOwnerConfiguresMarketChargeFeeAsClaims() (gas: 12349167)\n[PASS] test_tinySwapRoundsFeeDown() (gas: 346797)\n[PASS] test_userSlippageFailureRollsBackFeeAndPoolState() (gas: 458725)\nSuite result: ok. 20 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 125.92ms (132.47ms CPU time)\n\nRan 10 tests for test/ConversionBounds.t.sol:ConversionBoundsTest\n[PASS] test_attackerCannotProfitFromSandwichingTheFeeConversion() (gas: 1288423)\n[PASS] test_backlogSoldPerSwapIsCappedToMultipleOfNewFee() (gas: 2569254)\n[PASS] test_configurationInTheSameBlockDefersUntilTheNextBlock() (gas: 682324)\n[PASS] test_feeFreeSwapSellsNoBacklog() (gas: 3492470)\n[PASS] test_gasExhaustingMarketIsBoundedAndDefersToClaims() (gas: 2991351)\n[PASS] test_oneBlockOfConversionsStaysWithinTheBoundFromTheAnchor() (gas: 4447712)\n[PASS] test_redeemPairIsOwnerOnlyAndKeepsClaimsWhenFwaRefusesTheRecipient() (gas: 762061)\n[PASS] test_revertingMarketDefersToClaimsInsteadOfBlockingTrading() (gas: 1410739)\n[PASS] test_routerThatIsNotAnFwaDistributorCannotTradeTheLaunchPool() (gas: 3224776)\n[PASS] test_sameBlockPriceMoveAboveTheBoundDefersConversion() (gas: 2646452)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 126.16ms (36.19ms CPU time)\n\nRan 15 tests for test/HookSecurity.t.sol:HookSecurityTest\n[PASS] test_beforeSwapRejectsWrongPoolZeroAndOversizedAmounts() (gas: 208491)\n[PASS] test_configurationIsOwnerOnlyIncludingAgainstFactory() (gas: 139898)\n[PASS] test_configurationRejectsWrongCurrencyHookUninitializedMarketAndLimits() (gas: 337280)\n[PASS] test_constructorNeedsNoExternalCodeAtAnyDependency() (gas: 165077299)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsWrongAddressFlags() (gas: 25347)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroArgumentsAndPairAsLaunchToken() (gas: 8845)\n[PASS] test_disabledCallbacksFailClosed() (gas: 393987)\n[PASS] test_donatedClaimsCannotRedirectFeesAndAreRecoverableToCreator() (gas: 645562)\n[PASS] test_enabledCallbacksAndUnlockRejectUnauthorizedCallers() (gas: 167919)\n[PASS] test_initializationRequiresFactoryAndCorrectPool() (gas: 5020357)\n[PASS] test_ownerCanReplaceMarketWhileKeepingOldFeeClaims() (gas: 1124015)\n[PASS] test_permissionsExactlyMatchMinedAddress() (gas: 65979)\n[PASS] test_recipientCannotReenterFeePaymentOrClaimRedemption() (gas: 1026427)\n[PASS] test_rejectingRecipientDefersWithoutBlockingAndCanRecover() (gas: 692180)\n[PASS] test_runtimeWithinSizeLimitAndNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 5137683)\nSuite result: ok. 15 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 197.38ms (123.33ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/HookInvariant.t.sol:HookInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nHookInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_allEthIsPaidToCreatorOrHeldAsEthClaims\n[PASS] invariant_allFeesAreSoldOrHeldAsPairClaims\n[PASS] invariant_noOpenDeltasAndFixedTokenSupply\n HookInvariantTest invariants (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+===============================================================+\n| HookInvariantTest | actLimits | 545 | 0 | 0 |\n|-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookInvariantTest | actRecipient | 497 | 0 | 0 |\n|-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookInvariantTest | actRedeem | 455 | 0 | 0 |\n|-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookInvariantTest | actTrade | 551 | 0 | 0 |\n╰-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n Bound result 499999999000000011526\n Bound result 499999999000000015622\n Bound result 499999999000000008768\n Bound result 499999999000000015685\n Bound result 499999999000000000440\n Bound result 499999999000000006476\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 712.45ms (611.04ms CPU time)\n\nRan 7 test suites in 714.17ms (1.29s CPU time): 58 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (58 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":75,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"DCAHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"DCAHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"DCAHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"DCAHook.redeemEth()\",\"DCAHook.redeemPair()\",\"DCAHook.setConversionPool((address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint16,uint160)\",\"DCAHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\",\"DCAToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"DCAToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"DCAToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"DEPENDENCIES.md\":12,\"LICENSE\":23,\"README.md\":97,\"docs/SECURITY.md\":59,\"docs/VALIDATION.md\":22,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/MineHook.s.sol\":49,\"src/DCAHook.sol\":373,\"src/DCAToken.sol\":12,\"src/HookBase.sol\":94,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":31,\"test/ConversionBounds.t.sol\":214,\"test/ConversionSecurity.t.sol\":71,\"test/Deployment.t.sol\":61,\"test/HookInvariant.t.sol\":84,\"test/HookSecurity.t.sol\":328,\"test/SwapFee.t.sol\":267,\"test/Token.t.sol\":102,\"test/helpers/HookDeployer.sol\":27,\"test/helpers/HookFixture.sol\":183,\"test/helpers/PoolTestRouter.sol\":190,\"test/mocks/ConversionHooks.sol\":86,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":59},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":2886,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[medium/medium] unused-return at src/DCAHook.sol:239: DCAHook.redeemPair() (src/DCAHook.sol#239-243) ignores return value by poolManager.unlock() (src/DCAHook.sol#241)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/DCAHook.sol:308: DCAHook._sellPair(uint256) (src/DCAHook.sol#308-332) ignores return value by (price,None,None,None) = poolManager.getSlot0(market.toId()) (src/DCAHook.sol#310)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/DCAHook.sol:230: DCAHook.redeemEth() (src/DCAHook.sol#230-234) ignores return value by poolManager.unlock() (src/DCAHook.sol#232)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/DCAHook.sol:147: DCAHook.setConversionPool(PoolKey,uint16,uint160) (src/DCAHook.sol#147-176) ignores return value by (price,None,None,None) = poolManager.getSlot0(key.toId()) (src/DCAHook.sol#164)\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/DCAHook.sol:239: Reentrancy in DCAHook.redeemPair() (src/DCAHook.sol#239-243):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/DCAHook.sol:230: Reentrancy in DCAHook.redeemEth() (src/DCAHook.sol#230-234):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/DCAHook.sol:280: Reentrancy in DCAHook._convertAndPay(uint256) (src/DCAHook.sol#280-304):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/DCAHook.sol:280: Reentrancy in DCAHook._convertAndPay(uint256) (src/DCAHook.sol#280-304):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/DCAHook.sol:353: Reentrancy in DCAHook._payEth(uint256) (src/DCAHook.sol#353-372):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/DCAHook.sol:344: Reentrancy in DCAHook._payPair() (src/DCAHook.sol#344-351):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/DCAHook.sol:353: Reentrancy in DCAHook._payEth(uint256) (src/DCAHook.sol#353-372):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/DCAHook.sol:353: Reentrancy in DCAHook._payEth(uint256) (src/DCAHook.sol#353-372):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/DCAHook.sol:280: Reentrancy in DCAHook._convertAndPay(uint256) (src/DCAHook.sol#280-304):","passed":true},{"durationMs":669,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[high] reentrancy-state-change at src/DCAHook.sol:232: Reentrancy: State change after external call (2 places)\n[low] centralization-risk at src/DCAHook.sol:150: Centralization Risk (2 places)\n[low] internal-function-used-once at src/HookFlags.sol:24: Internal Function Used Only Once\n[low] large-numeric-literal at src/DCAHook.sol:33: Large Numeric Literal (4 places)\n[low] state-change-without-event at src/DCAHook.sol:178: State Change Without Event (3 places)\n[low] unchecked-return at src/DCAHook.sol:232: Unchecked Return (2 places)","passed":true},{"durationMs":2700,"exitCode":0,"name":"proof dfa2af182d0a","output":"Compiling 90 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 1.98s\nCompiler run successful!\n\nRan 1 test for test/imd-proof-8495bdea/Proof_dfa2af182d0a.t.sol:UnconfiguredTradingTest\n[PASS] test_buyRightAfterLaunchSucceedsBeforeOwnerConfiguresConversion() (gas: 253683)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 50.52ms (446.20µs CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test suite in 51.23ms (50.52ms CPU time): 1 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (1 total tests)\n","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"18e2e7f4cd08884a727b11102622e6d44b45056fdd56f8c2a56c3c77923b0130","verifiedTreeHash":"6dcb06ed0b0d6be2a0080a84388d96d20d9af1f1","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+1f97cecf"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":9481,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 96 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 8.88s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:213:9\n │\n213 │ poolManager.unlock(\"\");\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:213:9\n │\n213 │ poolManager.unlock(\"\");\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:279:13\n │\n279 │ emit FeeConverted(spent, ethReceived, poolManager.balanceOf(address(this), pair.toId()));\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:289:13\n │\n289 │ emit EthDeferred(newCredit - pay);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:297:17\n │\n297 │ emit EthPaid(RECIPIENT, pay);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:300:17\n │\n300 │ emit EthDeferred(pay);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":1573,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 8 tests for test/Token.t.sol:TokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupplyAndChargesNoFee(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 135427, ~: 135447)\nLogs:\n Bound result 536470091807302952667423618\n\n[PASS] test_approvedTransferAndAllowance() (gas: 136349)\n[PASS] test_insufficientAllowanceRevertsWithoutMovingFunds() (gas: 55589)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceAndZeroRecipientRevert() (gas: 61757)\n[PASS] test_metadataAndPolicySupply() (gas: 56959)\n[PASS] test_mintsToFactoryRatherThanTransactionOrigin() (gas: 24204)\n[PASS] test_noMintPauseFeeOrUpgradeEntryPointEvenForDeployer() (gas: 393315)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 779982)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 22.14ms (27.85ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/Deployment.t.sol:DeploymentTest\n[PASS] test_saltFinderDeploysActualCreationCodeAndFactoryInitializes() (gas: 28419991)\n[PASS] test_saltFinderRejectsInvalidSearchRatherThanGuessingAddresses() (gas: 2985045)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 68.46ms (69.86ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/ConversionSecurity.t.sol:ConversionSecurityTest\n[PASS] test_externalConversionHookCannotReenterLaunchSwapOrRedeem() (gas: 1398201)\n[PASS] test_negativeNativeConversionOutputRevertsAtomically() (gas: 1051175)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 117.11ms (4.00ms CPU time)\n\nRan 15 tests for test/HookSecurity.t.sol:HookSecurityTest\n[PASS] test_beforeSwapRejectsWrongPoolZeroAndOversizedAmounts() (gas: 216363)\n[PASS] test_configurationIsOwnerOnlyIncludingAgainstFactory() (gas: 132113)\n[PASS] test_configurationRejectsWrongCurrencyHookUninitializedMarketAndLimits() (gas: 337488)\n[PASS] test_constructorNeedsNoExternalCodeAtAnyDependency() (gas: 4744165)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsWrongAddressFlags() (gas: 23244)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroArgumentsAndPairAsLaunchToken() (gas: 8845)\n[PASS] test_disabledCallbacksFailClosed() (gas: 393741)\n[PASS] test_donatedClaimsCannotRedirectFeesAndAreRecoverableToCreator() (gas: 611649)\n[PASS] test_enabledCallbacksAndUnlockRejectUnauthorizedCallers() (gas: 167446)\n[PASS] test_initializationRequiresFactoryAndCorrectPool() (gas: 7846664)\n[PASS] test_ownerCanReplaceMarketWhileKeepingOldFeeClaims() (gas: 1048523)\n[PASS] test_permissionsExactlyMatchMinedAddress() (gas: 65979)\n[PASS] test_recipientCannotReenterFeePaymentOrClaimRedemption() (gas: 984809)\n[PASS] test_rejectingRecipientDefersWithoutBlockingAndCanRecover() (gas: 660803)\n[PASS] test_runtimeWithinSizeLimitAndNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 4485150)\nSuite result: ok. 15 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 166.09ms (101.09ms CPU time)\n\nRan 20 tests for test/SwapFee.t.sol:SwapFeeTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_feeAndConservation(bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 501164, ~: 499312)\nLogs:\n Bound result 9999999999000000000103\n\n[PASS] test_absoluteCeilingDefersFeeThenOwnerCanRestoreConversion() (gas: 925065)\n[PASS] test_bothDirectionsAndExactnessWithFwaAsCurrency0() (gas: 18610231)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 494558)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput() (gas: 494209)\n[PASS] test_conversionHitsRelativeBoundAndNextSwapSellsRemainder() (gas: 989485)\n[PASS] test_conversionStopsAtAbsoluteBoundWithinRelativeBound() (gas: 419349)\n[PASS] test_freshManagerSeededWithTokensOnlyUsesEthClaims() (gas: 10736050)\n[PASS] test_laterSwapAutomaticallyPaysEarlierEthClaims() (gas: 637093)\n[PASS] test_liquidityCanBeRemovedBeforeConversionIsConfiguredAndPaysNoHookFee() (gas: 10120447)\n[PASS] test_nativeClaimsOnAllSwapModesWhenNativeIsTemporarilyUnavailable() (gas: 1630719)\n[PASS] test_noConversionLiquidityRetainsFeeClaims() (gas: 10355043)\n[PASS] test_partialDcaSpecifiedTradeChargesOnlyActualFwa() (gas: 430922)\n[PASS] test_partialNativeBalancePaysAvailableAndClaimsRest() (gas: 545959)\n[PASS] test_partialPairSpecifiedSwapsRevertWithoutFee() (gas: 564208)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 499917)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput() (gas: 499835)\n[PASS] test_swapWithoutConfiguredMarketRevertsAtomically() (gas: 10923392)\n[PASS] test_tinySwapRoundsFeeDown() (gas: 343206)\n[PASS] test_userSlippageFailureRollsBackFeeAndPoolState() (gas: 427781)\nSuite result: ok. 20 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 232.51ms (244.18ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/HookInvariant.t.sol:HookInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nHookInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_allEthIsPaidToCreatorOrHeldAsEthClaims\n[PASS] invariant_allFeesAreSoldOrHeldAsPairClaims\n[PASS] invariant_noOpenDeltasAndFixedTokenSupply\n HookInvariantTest invariants (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+===============================================================+\n| HookInvariantTest | actLimits | 498 | 0 | 0 |\n|-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookInvariantTest | actRecipient | 480 | 0 | 0 |\n|-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookInvariantTest | actRedeem | 551 | 0 | 0 |\n|-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookInvariantTest | actTrade | 519 | 0 | 0 |\n╰-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n Bound result 499999999000000009334\n Bound result 499999999000000000480\n Bound result 499999999000000008047\n Bound result 499999999000000001540\n Bound result 499999999001909354811\n Bound result 499999999000000009603\n Bound result 499999999000000015932\n Bound result 499999999000000015548\n Bound result 499999999000630829812\n Bound result 414882503491095069426\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.29s (1.16s CPU time)\n\nRan 6 test suites in 1.29s (1.90s CPU time): 48 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (48 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":158,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"DCAHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"DCAHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"DCAHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"DCAHook.redeemEth()\",\"DCAHook.setConversionPool((address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint16,uint160)\",\"DCAHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\",\"DCAToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"DCAToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"DCAToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"DEPENDENCIES.md\":12,\"LICENSE\":23,\"README.md\":89,\"docs/SECURITY.md\":57,\"docs/VALIDATION.md\":22,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"launch.json\":32,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/MineHook.s.sol\":49,\"src/DCAHook.sol\":304,\"src/DCAToken.sol\":11,\"src/HookBase.sol\":94,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":31,\"test/ConversionSecurity.t.sol\":70,\"test/Deployment.t.sol\":61,\"test/HookInvariant.t.sol\":84,\"test/HookSecurity.t.sol\":327,\"test/SwapFee.t.sol\":248,\"test/Token.t.sol\":102,\"test/helpers/HookDeployer.sol\":27,\"test/helpers/HookFixture.sol\":178,\"test/helpers/PoolTestRouter.sol\":190,\"test/mocks/ConversionHooks.sol\":60,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":26},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"265fb1168ea9824850d36783b3421fcfb7a2a8d9578d596b5e1b2e07cce9d7f5","verifiedTreeHash":"432d0832f9e4bd793f8ea69f21309f4ca0c3fdc5","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+788bb33f"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":4278,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 97 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 4.07s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:172:25\n │\n172 │ observedBlock = uint64(block.number);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n │ \n │ // casting to 'uint64' is safe because [explain why]\n │ // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n │ \n │ \n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:232:9\n │\n232 │ poolManager.unlock(\"\");\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:232:9\n │\n232 │ poolManager.unlock(\"\");\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:241:9\n │\n241 │ poolManager.unlock(\"\");\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:241:9\n │\n241 │ poolManager.unlock(\"\");\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:287:13\n │\n287 │ emit ConversionSkipped(poolManager.balanceOf(address(this), pair.toId()));\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:301:13\n │\n301 │ emit FeeConverted(spent, ethReceived, poolManager.balanceOf(address(this), pair.toId()));\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:358:13\n │\n358 │ emit EthDeferred(newCredit - pay);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:366:17\n │\n366 │ emit EthPaid(RECIPIENT, pay);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:369:17\n │\n369 │ emit EthDeferred(pay);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:339:25\n │\n339 │ observedBlock = uint64(block.number);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n │ \n │ // casting to 'uint64' is safe because [explain why]\n │ // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n │ \n │ \n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:350:9\n │\n350 │ emit PairPaid(RECIPIENT, amount);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[environment-read-across-mutation]: `block.number` may be reused across `vm.roll`\n ╭▸ test/helpers/HookFixture.sol:110:17\n │\n110 │ vm.roll(block.number + 1);\n │ ────────━━━━━━━━━━━━───── `vm.roll` changes this environment here\n │\n ├ help: capture it with `vm.getBlockNumber()` instead\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/environment-read-across-mutation\n\nwarning[environment-read-across-mutation]: `block.number` may be reused across `vm.roll`\n ╭▸ test/ConversionBounds.t.sol:207:17\n │\n207 │ vm.roll(block.number + 1);\n │ ────────━━━━━━━━━━━━───── `vm.roll` changes this environment here\n │\n ├ help: capture it with `vm.getBlockNumber()` instead\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/environment-read-across-mutation\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":797,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 8 tests for test/Token.t.sol:TokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupplyAndChargesNoFee(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 135506, ~: 135399)\nLogs:\n Bound result 12538035\n\n[PASS] test_approvedTransferAndAllowance() (gas: 136349)\n[PASS] test_insufficientAllowanceRevertsWithoutMovingFunds() (gas: 55589)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceAndZeroRecipientRevert() (gas: 61757)\n[PASS] test_metadataAndPolicySupply() (gas: 56959)\n[PASS] test_mintsToFactoryRatherThanTransactionOrigin() (gas: 24204)\n[PASS] test_noMintPauseFeeOrUpgradeEntryPointEvenForDeployer() (gas: 393315)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 779982)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 5.55ms (8.30ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/Deployment.t.sol:DeploymentTest\n[PASS] test_saltFinderDeploysActualCreationCodeAndFactoryInitializes() (gas: 27408879)\n[PASS] test_saltFinderRejectsInvalidSearchRatherThanGuessingAddresses() (gas: 3356604)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 50.76ms (50.82ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/ConversionSecurity.t.sol:ConversionSecurityTest\n[PASS] test_externalConversionHookCannotReenterLaunchSwapOrRedeem() (gas: 1440081)\n[PASS] test_negativeNativeConversionOutputRevertsAtomically() (gas: 1092496)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 55.82ms (1.78ms CPU time)\n\nRan 20 tests for test/SwapFee.t.sol:SwapFeeTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_feeAndConservation(bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 532621, ~: 534072)\nLogs:\n Bound result 9999999999051287078730\n\n[PASS] test_absoluteCeilingDefersFeeThenOwnerCanRestoreConversion() (gas: 997828)\n[PASS] test_bothDirectionsAndExactnessWithFwaAsCurrency0() (gas: 67209958)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 525790)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput() (gas: 525441)\n[PASS] test_conversionHitsRelativeBoundAndNextSwapSellsRemainder() (gas: 1678437)\n[PASS] test_conversionStopsAtAbsoluteBoundWithinRelativeBound() (gas: 458142)\n[PASS] test_freshManagerSeededWithTokensOnlyUsesEthClaims() (gas: 10892811)\n[PASS] test_laterSwapAutomaticallyPaysEarlierEthClaims() (gas: 678428)\n[PASS] test_liquidityCanBeRemovedBeforeConversionIsConfiguredAndPaysNoHookFee() (gas: 10224173)\n[PASS] test_nativeClaimsOnAllSwapModesWhenNativeIsTemporarilyUnavailable() (gas: 1693585)\n[PASS] test_noConversionLiquidityRetainsFeeClaims() (gas: 10512176)\n[PASS] test_partialDcaSpecifiedTradeChargesOnlyActualFwa() (gas: 461732)\n[PASS] test_partialNativeBalancePaysAvailableAndClaimsRest() (gas: 577076)\n[PASS] test_partialPairSpecifiedSwapsRevertWithoutFee() (gas: 562746)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 530861)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput() (gas: 530779)\n[PASS] test_swapsBeforeOwnerConfiguresMarketChargeFeeAsClaims() (gas: 12349167)\n[PASS] test_tinySwapRoundsFeeDown() (gas: 346797)\n[PASS] test_userSlippageFailureRollsBackFeeAndPoolState() (gas: 458725)\nSuite result: ok. 20 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 115.99ms (119.98ms CPU time)\n\nRan 10 tests for test/ConversionBounds.t.sol:ConversionBoundsTest\n[PASS] test_attackerCannotProfitFromSandwichingTheFeeConversion() (gas: 1288423)\n[PASS] test_backlogSoldPerSwapIsCappedToMultipleOfNewFee() (gas: 2569254)\n[PASS] test_configurationInTheSameBlockDefersUntilTheNextBlock() (gas: 682324)\n[PASS] test_feeFreeSwapSellsNoBacklog() (gas: 3492470)\n[PASS] test_gasExhaustingMarketIsBoundedAndDefersToClaims() (gas: 2991351)\n[PASS] test_oneBlockOfConversionsStaysWithinTheBoundFromTheAnchor() (gas: 4447712)\n[PASS] test_redeemPairIsOwnerOnlyAndKeepsClaimsWhenFwaRefusesTheRecipient() (gas: 762061)\n[PASS] test_revertingMarketDefersToClaimsInsteadOfBlockingTrading() (gas: 1410739)\n[PASS] test_routerThatIsNotAnFwaDistributorCannotTradeTheLaunchPool() (gas: 3224776)\n[PASS] test_sameBlockPriceMoveAboveTheBoundDefersConversion() (gas: 2646452)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 156.41ms (36.03ms CPU time)\n\nRan 15 tests for test/HookSecurity.t.sol:HookSecurityTest\n[PASS] test_beforeSwapRejectsWrongPoolZeroAndOversizedAmounts() (gas: 208491)\n[PASS] test_configurationIsOwnerOnlyIncludingAgainstFactory() (gas: 139898)\n[PASS] test_configurationRejectsWrongCurrencyHookUninitializedMarketAndLimits() (gas: 337280)\n[PASS] test_constructorNeedsNoExternalCodeAtAnyDependency() (gas: 165077299)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsWrongAddressFlags() (gas: 25347)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroArgumentsAndPairAsLaunchToken() (gas: 8845)\n[PASS] test_disabledCallbacksFailClosed() (gas: 393987)\n[PASS] test_donatedClaimsCannotRedirectFeesAndAreRecoverableToCreator() (gas: 645562)\n[PASS] test_enabledCallbacksAndUnlockRejectUnauthorizedCallers() (gas: 167919)\n[PASS] test_initializationRequiresFactoryAndCorrectPool() (gas: 5020357)\n[PASS] test_ownerCanReplaceMarketWhileKeepingOldFeeClaims() (gas: 1124015)\n[PASS] test_permissionsExactlyMatchMinedAddress() (gas: 65979)\n[PASS] test_recipientCannotReenterFeePaymentOrClaimRedemption() (gas: 1026427)\n[PASS] test_rejectingRecipientDefersWithoutBlockingAndCanRecover() (gas: 692180)\n[PASS] test_runtimeWithinSizeLimitAndNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 5137683)\nSuite result: ok. 15 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 156.39ms (109.45ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/HookInvariant.t.sol:HookInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nHookInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_allEthIsPaidToCreatorOrHeldAsEthClaims\n[PASS] invariant_allFeesAreSoldOrHeldAsPairClaims\n[PASS] invariant_noOpenDeltasAndFixedTokenSupply\n HookInvariantTest invariants (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+===============================================================+\n| HookInvariantTest | actLimits | 529 | 0 | 0 |\n|-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookInvariantTest | actRecipient | 515 | 0 | 0 |\n|-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookInvariantTest | actRedeem | 486 | 0 | 0 |\n|-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookInvariantTest | actTrade | 518 | 0 | 0 |\n╰-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n Bound result 499999999000000001273\n Bound result 499999999004113140428\n Bound result 702954302825159580\n Bound result 499999999000000014428\n Bound result 499999999000000000676\n Bound result 127549650958721498082\n Bound result 499999999000047690816\n Bound result 499999999000000009014\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 671.56ms (600.77ms CPU time)\n\nRan 7 test suites in 673.60ms (1.21s CPU time): 58 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (58 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":71,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"DCAHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"DCAHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"DCAHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"DCAHook.redeemEth()\",\"DCAHook.redeemPair()\",\"DCAHook.setConversionPool((address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint16,uint160)\",\"DCAHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\",\"DCAToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"DCAToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"DCAToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"DEPENDENCIES.md\":12,\"LICENSE\":23,\"README.md\":97,\"docs/SECURITY.md\":59,\"docs/VALIDATION.md\":22,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"launch.json\":32,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/MineHook.s.sol\":49,\"src/DCAHook.sol\":373,\"src/DCAToken.sol\":12,\"src/HookBase.sol\":94,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":31,\"test/ConversionBounds.t.sol\":214,\"test/ConversionSecurity.t.sol\":71,\"test/Deployment.t.sol\":61,\"test/HookInvariant.t.sol\":84,\"test/HookSecurity.t.sol\":328,\"test/SwapFee.t.sol\":267,\"test/Token.t.sol\":102,\"test/helpers/HookDeployer.sol\":27,\"test/helpers/HookFixture.sol\":183,\"test/helpers/PoolTestRouter.sol\":190,\"test/mocks/ConversionHooks.sol\":86,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":59},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"44e6b4ffa0a7bf732ba83e1d1aa4a9ba9450f48064de3e466af398fdf5e1b694","verifiedTreeHash":"1564d328714541862679e4a0b13dbe6ce023f977","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+1f97cecf"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":6363,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 97 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 6.05s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:173:25\n │\n173 │ observedBlock = uint64(block.number);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n │ \n │ // casting to 'uint64' is safe because [explain why]\n │ // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n │ \n │ \n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:233:9\n │\n233 │ poolManager.unlock(\"\");\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:233:9\n │\n233 │ poolManager.unlock(\"\");\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:242:9\n │\n242 │ poolManager.unlock(\"\");\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:242:9\n │\n242 │ poolManager.unlock(\"\");\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:288:13\n │\n288 │ emit ConversionSkipped(poolManager.balanceOf(address(this), pair.toId()));\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:302:13\n │\n302 │ emit FeeConverted(spent, ethReceived, poolManager.balanceOf(address(this), pair.toId()));\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:376:13\n │\n376 │ emit EthDeferred(newCredit - pay);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:384:17\n │\n384 │ emit EthPaid(RECIPIENT, pay);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:387:17\n │\n387 │ emit EthDeferred(pay);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:357:29\n │\n357 │ observedBlock = uint64(block.number);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n │ \n │ // casting to 'uint64' is safe because [explain why]\n │ // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n │ \n │ \n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:368:9\n │\n368 │ emit PairPaid(RECIPIENT, amount);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[environment-read-across-mutation]: `block.number` may be reused across `vm.roll`\n ╭▸ test/helpers/HookFixture.sol:110:17\n │\n110 │ vm.roll(block.number + 1);\n │ ────────━━━━━━━━━━━━───── `vm.roll` changes this environment here\n │\n ├ help: capture it with `vm.getBlockNumber()` instead\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/environment-read-across-mutation\n\nwarning[environment-read-across-mutation]: `block.number` may be reused across `vm.roll`\n ╭▸ test/ConversionBounds.t.sol:320:17\n │\n320 │ vm.roll(block.number + 1);\n │ ────────━━━━━━━━━━━━───── `vm.roll` changes this environment here\n │\n ├ help: capture it with `vm.getBlockNumber()` instead\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/environment-read-across-mutation\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":967,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 8 tests for test/Token.t.sol:TokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupplyAndChargesNoFee(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 135450, ~: 135471)\nLogs:\n Bound result 624705425072451965986921933\n\n[PASS] test_approvedTransferAndAllowance() (gas: 136349)\n[PASS] test_insufficientAllowanceRevertsWithoutMovingFunds() (gas: 55589)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceAndZeroRecipientRevert() (gas: 61757)\n[PASS] test_metadataAndPolicySupply() (gas: 56959)\n[PASS] test_mintsToFactoryRatherThanTransactionOrigin() (gas: 24204)\n[PASS] test_noMintPauseFeeOrUpgradeEntryPointEvenForDeployer() (gas: 393315)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 779982)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 15.91ms (19.17ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/Deployment.t.sol:DeploymentTest\n[PASS] test_saltFinderDeploysActualCreationCodeAndFactoryInitializes() (gas: 22664462)\n[PASS] test_saltFinderRejectsInvalidSearchRatherThanGuessingAddresses() (gas: 3383015)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 29.39ms (29.37ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/ConversionSecurity.t.sol:ConversionSecurityTest\n[PASS] test_externalConversionHookCannotReenterLaunchSwapOrRedeem() (gas: 1440257)\n[PASS] test_negativeNativeConversionOutputRevertsAtomically() (gas: 1092674)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 46.43ms (2.50ms CPU time)\n\nRan 20 tests for test/SwapFee.t.sol:SwapFeeTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_feeAndConservation(bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 532932, ~: 534492)\nLogs:\n Bound result 9999999999000000006566\n\n[PASS] test_absoluteCeilingDefersFeeThenOwnerCanRestoreConversion() (gas: 998147)\n[PASS] test_bothDirectionsAndExactnessWithFwaAsCurrency0() (gas: 36175620)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 525966)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput() (gas: 525617)\n[PASS] test_conversionHitsRelativeBoundAndNextSwapSellsRemainder() (gas: 1679009)\n[PASS] test_conversionStopsAtAbsoluteBoundWithinRelativeBound() (gas: 458318)\n[PASS] test_freshManagerSeededWithTokensOnlyUsesEthClaims() (gas: 15282477)\n[PASS] test_laterSwapAutomaticallyPaysEarlierEthClaims() (gas: 678714)\n[PASS] test_liquidityCanBeRemovedBeforeConversionIsConfiguredAndPaysNoHookFee() (gas: 14599739)\n[PASS] test_nativeClaimsOnAllSwapModesWhenNativeIsTemporarilyUnavailable() (gas: 1694091)\n[PASS] test_noConversionLiquidityRetainsFeeClaims() (gas: 14894995)\n[PASS] test_partialDcaSpecifiedTradeChargesOnlyActualFwa() (gas: 461908)\n[PASS] test_partialNativeBalancePaysAvailableAndClaimsRest() (gas: 577252)\n[PASS] test_partialPairSpecifiedSwapsRevertWithoutFee() (gas: 562746)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 531037)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput() (gas: 530955)\n[PASS] test_swapsBeforeOwnerConfiguresMarketChargeFeeAsClaims() (gas: 16826385)\n[PASS] test_tinySwapRoundsFeeDown() (gas: 346797)\n[PASS] test_userSlippageFailureRollsBackFeeAndPoolState() (gas: 458901)\nSuite result: ok. 20 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 105.56ms (262.03ms CPU time)\n\nRan 14 tests for test/ConversionBounds.t.sol:ConversionBoundsTest\n[PASS] test_anchorFollowsAFallingMarketAtOnce() (gas: 3302114)\n[PASS] test_anchorFollowsAGenuineRiseOneStepPerBlockAndThenSellsAgain() (gas: 4628413)\n[PASS] test_anchorHeldAcrossABlockBoundaryRisesByAtMostOneStep() (gas: 1725748)\n[PASS] test_attackerCannotProfitFromSandwichingTheFeeConversion() (gas: 1288905)\n[PASS] test_backRunOfConfigurationCannotSeedTheFirstAnchor() (gas: 1198434)\n[PASS] test_backlogSoldPerSwapIsCappedToMultipleOfNewFee() (gas: 2570164)\n[PASS] test_configurationInTheSameBlockDefersUntilTheNextBlock() (gas: 682312)\n[PASS] test_feeFreeSwapSellsNoBacklog() (gas: 3493182)\n[PASS] test_gasExhaustingMarketIsBoundedAndDefersToClaims() (gas: 2991570)\n[PASS] test_oneBlockOfConversionsStaysWithinTheBoundFromTheAnchor() (gas: 4451081)\n[PASS] test_redeemPairIsOwnerOnlyAndKeepsClaimsWhenFwaRefusesTheRecipient() (gas: 762397)\n[PASS] test_revertingMarketDefersToClaimsInsteadOfBlockingTrading() (gas: 1411219)\n[PASS] test_routerThatIsNotAnFwaDistributorCannotTradeTheLaunchPool() (gas: 3225481)\n[PASS] test_sameBlockPriceMoveAboveTheBoundDefersConversion() (gas: 2647472)\nSuite result: ok. 14 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 113.03ms (126.02ms CPU time)\n\nRan 15 tests for test/HookSecurity.t.sol:HookSecurityTest\n[PASS] test_beforeSwapRejectsWrongPoolZeroAndOversizedAmounts() (gas: 208491)\n[PASS] test_configurationIsOwnerOnlyIncludingAgainstFactory() (gas: 139898)\n[PASS] test_configurationRejectsWrongCurrencyHookUninitializedMarketAndLimits() (gas: 337280)\n[PASS] test_constructorNeedsNoExternalCodeAtAnyDependency() (gas: 5947903)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsWrongAddressFlags() (gas: 25507)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroArgumentsAndPairAsLaunchToken() (gas: 8845)\n[PASS] test_disabledCallbacksFailClosed() (gas: 393987)\n[PASS] test_donatedClaimsCannotRedirectFeesAndAreRecoverableToCreator() (gas: 645738)\n[PASS] test_enabledCallbacksAndUnlockRejectUnauthorizedCallers() (gas: 167919)\n[PASS] test_initializationRequiresFactoryAndCorrectPool() (gas: 35972718)\n[PASS] test_ownerCanReplaceMarketWhileKeepingOldFeeClaims() (gas: 1124334)\n[PASS] test_permissionsExactlyMatchMinedAddress() (gas: 65979)\n[PASS] test_recipientCannotReenterFeePaymentOrClaimRedemption() (gas: 1026713)\n[PASS] test_rejectingRecipientDefersWithoutBlockingAndCanRecover() (gas: 692356)\n[PASS] test_runtimeWithinSizeLimitAndNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 5184179)\nSuite result: ok. 15 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 113.00ms (104.88ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/HookInvariant.t.sol:HookInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nHookInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_allEthIsPaidToCreatorOrHeldAsEthClaims\n[PASS] invariant_allFeesAreSoldOrHeldAsPairClaims\n[PASS] invariant_noOpenDeltasAndFixedTokenSupply\n HookInvariantTest invariants (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+===============================================================+\n| HookInvariantTest | actLimits | 499 | 0 | 0 |\n|-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookInvariantTest | actRecipient | 550 | 0 | 0 |\n|-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookInvariantTest | actRedeem | 522 | 0 | 0 |\n|-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookInvariantTest | actTrade | 477 | 0 | 0 |\n╰-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n Bound result 499999999000000011943\n Bound result 499999999000000011020\n Bound result 499999999000000001567\n Bound result 172720662593385494008\n Bound result 499999999003196814599\n Bound result 212100747070479113073\n Bound result 172720662593385494009\n Bound result 499999999000000007463\n Bound result 499999999361671629661\n Bound result 129637340857309698022\n Bound result 72906614350956429539\n Bound result 499999999001532254334\n Bound result 499999999000000000722\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 787.98ms (735.16ms CPU time)\n\nRan 7 test suites in 799.82ms (1.21s CPU time): 62 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (62 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":107,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"DCAHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"DCAHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"DCAHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"DCAHook.redeemEth()\",\"DCAHook.redeemPair()\",\"DCAHook.setConversionPool((address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint16,uint160)\",\"DCAHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\",\"DCAToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"DCAToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"DCAToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"DEPENDENCIES.md\":12,\"LICENSE\":23,\"README.md\":97,\"docs/SECURITY.md\":59,\"docs/VALIDATION.md\":22,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/MineHook.s.sol\":49,\"src/DCAHook.sol\":391,\"src/DCAToken.sol\":12,\"src/HookBase.sol\":94,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":31,\"test/ConversionBounds.t.sol\":327,\"test/ConversionSecurity.t.sol\":71,\"test/Deployment.t.sol\":61,\"test/HookInvariant.t.sol\":84,\"test/HookSecurity.t.sol\":328,\"test/SwapFee.t.sol\":267,\"test/Token.t.sol\":102,\"test/helpers/HookDeployer.sol\":27,\"test/helpers/HookFixture.sol\":183,\"test/helpers/PoolTestRouter.sol\":190,\"test/mocks/ConversionHooks.sol\":86,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":59},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":3815,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[medium/medium] unused-return at src/DCAHook.sol:148: DCAHook.setConversionPool(PoolKey,uint16,uint160) (src/DCAHook.sol#148-177) ignores return value by (price,None,None,None) = poolManager.getSlot0(key.toId()) (src/DCAHook.sol#165)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/DCAHook.sol:309: DCAHook._sellPair(uint256) (src/DCAHook.sol#309-331) ignores return value by (price,None,None,None) = poolManager.getSlot0(market.toId()) (src/DCAHook.sol#311)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/DCAHook.sol:231: DCAHook.redeemEth() (src/DCAHook.sol#231-235) ignores return value by poolManager.unlock() (src/DCAHook.sol#233)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/DCAHook.sol:240: DCAHook.redeemPair() (src/DCAHook.sol#240-244) ignores return value by poolManager.unlock() (src/DCAHook.sol#242)\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/DCAHook.sol:231: Reentrancy in DCAHook.redeemEth() (src/DCAHook.sol#231-235):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/DCAHook.sol:240: Reentrancy in DCAHook.redeemPair() (src/DCAHook.sol#240-244):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/DCAHook.sol:362: Reentrancy in DCAHook._payPair() (src/DCAHook.sol#362-369):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/DCAHook.sol:281: Reentrancy in DCAHook._convertAndPay(uint256) (src/DCAHook.sol#281-305):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/DCAHook.sol:281: Reentrancy in DCAHook._convertAndPay(uint256) (src/DCAHook.sol#281-305):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/DCAHook.sol:281: Reentrancy in DCAHook._convertAndPay(uint256) (src/DCAHook.sol#281-305):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/DCAHook.sol:371: Reentrancy in DCAHook._payEth(uint256) (src/DCAHook.sol#371-390):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/DCAHook.sol:371: Reentrancy in DCAHook._payEth(uint256) (src/DCAHook.sol#371-390):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/DCAHook.sol:371: Reentrancy in DCAHook._payEth(uint256) (src/DCAHook.sol#371-390):","passed":true},{"durationMs":1236,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[high] reentrancy-state-change at src/DCAHook.sol:233: Reentrancy: State change after external call (2 places)\n[low] centralization-risk at src/DCAHook.sol:151: Centralization Risk (2 places)\n[low] internal-function-used-once at src/HookFlags.sol:24: Internal Function Used Only Once\n[low] large-numeric-literal at src/DCAHook.sol:33: Large Numeric Literal (4 places)\n[low] state-change-without-event at src/DCAHook.sol:179: State Change Without Event (3 places)\n[low] unchecked-return at src/DCAHook.sol:233: Unchecked Return (2 places)","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"516634b53797c6d8a0c6c4ecbdde9d41dbd47479e47b3381112bffb961792904","verifiedTreeHash":"d0a5ac2aaff03f1b27997c7c829280492137c929","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+f0753cb7"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":4204,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 97 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 3.99s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:173:25\n │\n173 │ observedBlock = uint64(block.number);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n │ \n │ // casting to 'uint64' is safe because [explain why]\n │ // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n │ \n │ \n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:233:9\n │\n233 │ poolManager.unlock(\"\");\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:233:9\n │\n233 │ poolManager.unlock(\"\");\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:242:9\n │\n242 │ poolManager.unlock(\"\");\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:242:9\n │\n242 │ poolManager.unlock(\"\");\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:288:13\n │\n288 │ emit ConversionSkipped(poolManager.balanceOf(address(this), pair.toId()));\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:302:13\n │\n302 │ emit FeeConverted(spent, ethReceived, poolManager.balanceOf(address(this), pair.toId()));\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:376:13\n │\n376 │ emit EthDeferred(newCredit - pay);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:384:17\n │\n384 │ emit EthPaid(RECIPIENT, pay);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:387:17\n │\n387 │ emit EthDeferred(pay);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:357:29\n │\n357 │ observedBlock = uint64(block.number);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n │ \n │ // casting to 'uint64' is safe because [explain why]\n │ // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n │ \n │ \n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:368:9\n │\n368 │ emit PairPaid(RECIPIENT, amount);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[environment-read-across-mutation]: `block.number` may be reused across `vm.roll`\n ╭▸ test/helpers/HookFixture.sol:110:17\n │\n110 │ vm.roll(block.number + 1);\n │ ────────━━━━━━━━━━━━───── `vm.roll` changes this environment here\n │\n ├ help: capture it with `vm.getBlockNumber()` instead\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/environment-read-across-mutation\n\nwarning[environment-read-across-mutation]: `block.number` may be reused across `vm.roll`\n ╭▸ test/ConversionBounds.t.sol:320:17\n │\n320 │ vm.roll(block.number + 1);\n │ ────────━━━━━━━━━━━━───── `vm.roll` changes this environment here\n │\n ├ help: capture it with `vm.getBlockNumber()` instead\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/environment-read-across-mutation\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":771,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 8 tests for test/Token.t.sol:TokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupplyAndChargesNoFee(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 135600, ~: 135423)\nLogs:\n Bound result 9947\n\n[PASS] test_approvedTransferAndAllowance() (gas: 136349)\n[PASS] test_insufficientAllowanceRevertsWithoutMovingFunds() (gas: 55589)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceAndZeroRecipientRevert() (gas: 61757)\n[PASS] test_metadataAndPolicySupply() (gas: 56959)\n[PASS] test_mintsToFactoryRatherThanTransactionOrigin() (gas: 24204)\n[PASS] test_noMintPauseFeeOrUpgradeEntryPointEvenForDeployer() (gas: 393315)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 779982)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 7.90ms (15.94ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/ConversionSecurity.t.sol:ConversionSecurityTest\n[PASS] test_externalConversionHookCannotReenterLaunchSwapOrRedeem() (gas: 1440257)\n[PASS] test_negativeNativeConversionOutputRevertsAtomically() (gas: 1092674)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 26.34ms (2.24ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/Deployment.t.sol:DeploymentTest\n[PASS] test_saltFinderDeploysActualCreationCodeAndFactoryInitializes() (gas: 22664462)\n[PASS] test_saltFinderRejectsInvalidSearchRatherThanGuessingAddresses() (gas: 3383015)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 31.00ms (32.85ms CPU time)\n\nRan 14 tests for test/ConversionBounds.t.sol:ConversionBoundsTest\n[PASS] test_anchorFollowsAFallingMarketAtOnce() (gas: 3302114)\n[PASS] test_anchorFollowsAGenuineRiseOneStepPerBlockAndThenSellsAgain() (gas: 4628413)\n[PASS] test_anchorHeldAcrossABlockBoundaryRisesByAtMostOneStep() (gas: 1725748)\n[PASS] test_attackerCannotProfitFromSandwichingTheFeeConversion() (gas: 1288905)\n[PASS] test_backRunOfConfigurationCannotSeedTheFirstAnchor() (gas: 1198434)\n[PASS] test_backlogSoldPerSwapIsCappedToMultipleOfNewFee() (gas: 2570164)\n[PASS] test_configurationInTheSameBlockDefersUntilTheNextBlock() (gas: 682312)\n[PASS] test_feeFreeSwapSellsNoBacklog() (gas: 3493182)\n[PASS] test_gasExhaustingMarketIsBoundedAndDefersToClaims() (gas: 2991570)\n[PASS] test_oneBlockOfConversionsStaysWithinTheBoundFromTheAnchor() (gas: 4451081)\n[PASS] test_redeemPairIsOwnerOnlyAndKeepsClaimsWhenFwaRefusesTheRecipient() (gas: 762397)\n[PASS] test_revertingMarketDefersToClaimsInsteadOfBlockingTrading() (gas: 1411219)\n[PASS] test_routerThatIsNotAnFwaDistributorCannotTradeTheLaunchPool() (gas: 3225481)\n[PASS] test_sameBlockPriceMoveAboveTheBoundDefersConversion() (gas: 2647472)\nSuite result: ok. 14 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 45.92ms (53.03ms CPU time)\n\nRan 15 tests for test/HookSecurity.t.sol:HookSecurityTest\n[PASS] test_beforeSwapRejectsWrongPoolZeroAndOversizedAmounts() (gas: 208491)\n[PASS] test_configurationIsOwnerOnlyIncludingAgainstFactory() (gas: 139898)\n[PASS] test_configurationRejectsWrongCurrencyHookUninitializedMarketAndLimits() (gas: 337280)\n[PASS] test_constructorNeedsNoExternalCodeAtAnyDependency() (gas: 5947903)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsWrongAddressFlags() (gas: 25507)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroArgumentsAndPairAsLaunchToken() (gas: 8845)\n[PASS] test_disabledCallbacksFailClosed() (gas: 393987)\n[PASS] test_donatedClaimsCannotRedirectFeesAndAreRecoverableToCreator() (gas: 645738)\n[PASS] test_enabledCallbacksAndUnlockRejectUnauthorizedCallers() (gas: 167919)\n[PASS] test_initializationRequiresFactoryAndCorrectPool() (gas: 35972718)\n[PASS] test_ownerCanReplaceMarketWhileKeepingOldFeeClaims() (gas: 1124334)\n[PASS] test_permissionsExactlyMatchMinedAddress() (gas: 65979)\n[PASS] test_recipientCannotReenterFeePaymentOrClaimRedemption() (gas: 1026713)\n[PASS] test_rejectingRecipientDefersWithoutBlockingAndCanRecover() (gas: 692356)\n[PASS] test_runtimeWithinSizeLimitAndNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 5184179)\nSuite result: ok. 15 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 68.64ms (68.71ms CPU time)\n\nRan 20 tests for test/SwapFee.t.sol:SwapFeeTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_feeAndConservation(bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 532604, ~: 530720)\nLogs:\n Bound result 9999999999000000008486\n\n[PASS] test_absoluteCeilingDefersFeeThenOwnerCanRestoreConversion() (gas: 998147)\n[PASS] test_bothDirectionsAndExactnessWithFwaAsCurrency0() (gas: 36175620)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 525966)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput() (gas: 525617)\n[PASS] test_conversionHitsRelativeBoundAndNextSwapSellsRemainder() (gas: 1679009)\n[PASS] test_conversionStopsAtAbsoluteBoundWithinRelativeBound() (gas: 458318)\n[PASS] test_freshManagerSeededWithTokensOnlyUsesEthClaims() (gas: 15282477)\n[PASS] test_laterSwapAutomaticallyPaysEarlierEthClaims() (gas: 678714)\n[PASS] test_liquidityCanBeRemovedBeforeConversionIsConfiguredAndPaysNoHookFee() (gas: 14599739)\n[PASS] test_nativeClaimsOnAllSwapModesWhenNativeIsTemporarilyUnavailable() (gas: 1694091)\n[PASS] test_noConversionLiquidityRetainsFeeClaims() (gas: 14894995)\n[PASS] test_partialDcaSpecifiedTradeChargesOnlyActualFwa() (gas: 461908)\n[PASS] test_partialNativeBalancePaysAvailableAndClaimsRest() (gas: 577252)\n[PASS] test_partialPairSpecifiedSwapsRevertWithoutFee() (gas: 562746)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 531037)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput() (gas: 530955)\n[PASS] test_swapsBeforeOwnerConfiguresMarketChargeFeeAsClaims() (gas: 16826385)\n[PASS] test_tinySwapRoundsFeeDown() (gas: 346797)\n[PASS] test_userSlippageFailureRollsBackFeeAndPoolState() (gas: 458901)\nSuite result: ok. 20 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 70.33ms (159.92ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/HookInvariant.t.sol:HookInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nHookInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_allEthIsPaidToCreatorOrHeldAsEthClaims\n[PASS] invariant_allFeesAreSoldOrHeldAsPairClaims\n[PASS] invariant_noOpenDeltasAndFixedTokenSupply\n HookInvariantTest invariants (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+===============================================================+\n| HookInvariantTest | actLimits | 535 | 0 | 0 |\n|-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookInvariantTest | actRecipient | 503 | 0 | 0 |\n|-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookInvariantTest | actRedeem | 492 | 0 | 0 |\n|-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookInvariantTest | actTrade | 518 | 0 | 0 |\n╰-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n Bound result 19999999999980000\n Bound result 499999999000000000574\n Bound result 499999999000000000373\n Bound result 499999999000000015095\n Bound result 499999999000000014594\n Bound result 43702804466072165285\n Bound result 499999999000000004152\n Bound result 499999999000000001026\n Bound result 499999999000000014427\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 640.59ms (604.58ms CPU time)\n\nRan 7 test suites in 643.41ms (890.73ms CPU time): 62 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (62 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":72,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"DCAHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"DCAHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"DCAHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"DCAHook.redeemEth()\",\"DCAHook.redeemPair()\",\"DCAHook.setConversionPool((address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint16,uint160)\",\"DCAHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\",\"DCAToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"DCAToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"DCAToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"DEPENDENCIES.md\":12,\"LICENSE\":23,\"README.md\":97,\"docs/SECURITY.md\":59,\"docs/VALIDATION.md\":22,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"launch.json\":32,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/MineHook.s.sol\":49,\"src/DCAHook.sol\":391,\"src/DCAToken.sol\":12,\"src/HookBase.sol\":94,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":31,\"test/ConversionBounds.t.sol\":327,\"test/ConversionSecurity.t.sol\":71,\"test/Deployment.t.sol\":61,\"test/HookInvariant.t.sol\":84,\"test/HookSecurity.t.sol\":328,\"test/SwapFee.t.sol\":267,\"test/Token.t.sol\":102,\"test/helpers/HookDeployer.sol\":27,\"test/helpers/HookFixture.sol\":183,\"test/helpers/PoolTestRouter.sol\":190,\"test/mocks/ConversionHooks.sol\":86,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":59},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"695dcc9c13855b5d20f08eea2438084aee89b065c2354ffeac73aca7c60e1876","verifiedTreeHash":"0470e78b7e648181b2d846d62b752e9b8d093dba","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+f0753cb7"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":11770,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 104 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 11.15s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:173:25\n │\n173 │ observedBlock = uint64(block.number);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n │ \n │ // casting to 'uint64' is safe because [explain why]\n │ // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n │ \n │ \n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:233:9\n │\n233 │ poolManager.unlock(\"\");\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:233:9\n │\n233 │ poolManager.unlock(\"\");\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:242:9\n │\n242 │ poolManager.unlock(\"\");\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:242:9\n │\n242 │ poolManager.unlock(\"\");\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:288:13\n │\n288 │ emit ConversionSkipped(poolManager.balanceOf(address(this), pair.toId()));\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:302:13\n │\n302 │ emit FeeConverted(spent, ethReceived, poolManager.balanceOf(address(this), pair.toId()));\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:376:13\n │\n376 │ emit EthDeferred(newCredit - pay);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:384:17\n │\n384 │ emit EthPaid(RECIPIENT, pay);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:387:17\n │\n387 │ emit EthDeferred(pay);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:357:29\n │\n357 │ observedBlock = uint64(block.number);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n │ \n │ // casting to 'uint64' is safe because [explain why]\n │ // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n │ \n │ \n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:368:9\n │\n368 │ emit PairPaid(RECIPIENT, amount);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[environment-read-across-mutation]: `block.number` may be reused across `vm.roll`\n ╭▸ test/helpers/HookFixture.sol:110:17\n │\n110 │ vm.roll(block.number + 1);\n │ ────────━━━━━━━━━━━━───── `vm.roll` changes this environment here\n │\n ├ help: capture it with `vm.getBlockNumber()` instead\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/environment-read-across-mutation\n\nwarning[environment-read-across-mutation]: `block.number` may be reused across `vm.roll`\n ╭▸ test/ConversionBounds.t.sol:320:17\n │\n320 │ vm.roll(block.number + 1);\n │ ────────━━━━━━━━━━━━───── `vm.roll` changes this environment here\n │\n ├ help: capture it with `vm.getBlockNumber()` instead\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/environment-read-across-mutation\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":7074,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 8 tests for test/Token.t.sol:TokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupplyAndChargesNoFee(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 135552, ~: 135447)\nLogs:\n Bound result 7222011895267276295306252\n\n[PASS] test_approvedTransferAndAllowance() (gas: 136349)\n[PASS] test_insufficientAllowanceRevertsWithoutMovingFunds() (gas: 55589)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceAndZeroRecipientRevert() (gas: 61757)\n[PASS] test_metadataAndPolicySupply() (gas: 56959)\n[PASS] test_mintsToFactoryRatherThanTransactionOrigin() (gas: 24204)\n[PASS] test_noMintPauseFeeOrUpgradeEntryPointEvenForDeployer() (gas: 393315)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 779982)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 41.33ms (59.23ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/ConversionSecurity.t.sol:ConversionSecurityTest\n[PASS] test_externalConversionHookCannotReenterLaunchSwapOrRedeem() (gas: 1440257)\n[PASS] test_negativeNativeConversionOutputRevertsAtomically() (gas: 1092674)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 71.16ms (17.14ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/Deployment.t.sol:DeploymentTest\n[PASS] test_saltFinderDeploysActualCreationCodeAndFactoryInitializes() (gas: 22664462)\n[PASS] test_saltFinderRejectsInvalidSearchRatherThanGuessingAddresses() (gas: 3383015)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 94.53ms (109.76ms CPU time)\n\nRan 8 tests for test/HookFailurePaths.t.sol:HookFailurePathsTest\n[PASS] test_afterSwapRejectsReversedPairDeltasAndOverflowingGross() (gas: 182723)\n[PASS] test_bothSwapCallbacksAuthenticateEveryPoolKeyField() (gas: 458668)\n[PASS] test_bothSwapCallbacksRejectUninitializedHook() (gas: 33439191)\n[PASS] test_bothSwapCallbacksRejectZeroAndSignedRangeNeighbors() (gas: 411377)\n[PASS] test_configurationRejectsMalformedHooksFeesAndSpacingWithoutLosingClaims() (gas: 1894625)\n[PASS] test_inputSettlementFailureRollsBackConversionAndCreatorPayment() (gas: 1378161)\n[PASS] test_lateSlippageRevertRestoresClaimsBothPoolsAndPayout() (gas: 1380237)\n[PASS] test_partialSpecifiedFillReturnsExactErrorAndPreservesOldClaims() (gas: 1296541)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 163.05ms (67.03ms CPU time)\n\nRan 14 tests for test/ConversionBounds.t.sol:ConversionBoundsTest\n[PASS] test_anchorFollowsAFallingMarketAtOnce() (gas: 3302114)\n[PASS] test_anchorFollowsAGenuineRiseOneStepPerBlockAndThenSellsAgain() (gas: 4628413)\n[PASS] test_anchorHeldAcrossABlockBoundaryRisesByAtMostOneStep() (gas: 1725748)\n[PASS] test_attackerCannotProfitFromSandwichingTheFeeConversion() (gas: 1288905)\n[PASS] test_backRunOfConfigurationCannotSeedTheFirstAnchor() (gas: 1198434)\n[PASS] test_backlogSoldPerSwapIsCappedToMultipleOfNewFee() (gas: 2570164)\n[PASS] test_configurationInTheSameBlockDefersUntilTheNextBlock() (gas: 682312)\n[PASS] test_feeFreeSwapSellsNoBacklog() (gas: 3493182)\n[PASS] test_gasExhaustingMarketIsBoundedAndDefersToClaims() (gas: 2991570)\n[PASS] test_oneBlockOfConversionsStaysWithinTheBoundFromTheAnchor() (gas: 4451081)\n[PASS] test_redeemPairIsOwnerOnlyAndKeepsClaimsWhenFwaRefusesTheRecipient() (gas: 762397)\n[PASS] test_revertingMarketDefersToClaimsInsteadOfBlockingTrading() (gas: 1411219)\n[PASS] test_routerThatIsNotAnFwaDistributorCannotTradeTheLaunchPool() (gas: 3225481)\n[PASS] test_sameBlockPriceMoveAboveTheBoundDefersConversion() (gas: 2647472)\nSuite result: ok. 14 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 175.20ms (79.83ms CPU time)\n\nRan 5 tests for test/FeeBoundaries.t.sol:FeeBoundariesToken0Test\n[PASS] testFuzz_beforeSwapCannotConsumeTheWholeInput(uint128) (runs: 1000, μ: 59364, ~: 59342)\nLogs:\n Bound result 999\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_walletFeeIsFivePercentOfActualGross(bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 583387, ~: 592551)\nLogs:\n Bound result 2899295888279040438576\n\n[PASS] test_allSwapModesAtWeiRoundingBoundaries() (gas: 23220970)\n[PASS] test_dcaSpecifiedDoesNotChangeRequestedAmountAtSignedBoundary() (gas: 89364)\n[PASS] test_largestGrossedUpExactOutputAndFirstInvalidNeighbor() (gas: 138970)\nSuite result: ok. 5 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 356.43ms (463.03ms CPU time)\n\nRan 15 tests for test/HookSecurity.t.sol:HookSecurityTest\n[PASS] test_beforeSwapRejectsWrongPoolZeroAndOversizedAmounts() (gas: 208491)\n[PASS] test_configurationIsOwnerOnlyIncludingAgainstFactory() (gas: 139898)\n[PASS] test_configurationRejectsWrongCurrencyHookUninitializedMarketAndLimits() (gas: 337280)\n[PASS] test_constructorNeedsNoExternalCodeAtAnyDependency() (gas: 5947903)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsWrongAddressFlags() (gas: 25507)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroArgumentsAndPairAsLaunchToken() (gas: 8845)\n[PASS] test_disabledCallbacksFailClosed() (gas: 393987)\n[PASS] test_donatedClaimsCannotRedirectFeesAndAreRecoverableToCreator() (gas: 645738)\n[PASS] test_enabledCallbacksAndUnlockRejectUnauthorizedCallers() (gas: 167919)\n[PASS] test_initializationRequiresFactoryAndCorrectPool() (gas: 35972718)\n[PASS] test_ownerCanReplaceMarketWhileKeepingOldFeeClaims() (gas: 1124334)\n[PASS] test_permissionsExactlyMatchMinedAddress() (gas: 65979)\n[PASS] test_recipientCannotReenterFeePaymentOrClaimRedemption() (gas: 1026713)\n[PASS] test_rejectingRecipientDefersWithoutBlockingAndCanRecover() (gas: 692356)\n[PASS] test_runtimeWithinSizeLimitAndNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 5184179)\nSuite result: ok. 15 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 416.21ms (343.99ms CPU time)\n\nRan 20 tests for test/SwapFee.t.sol:SwapFeeTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_feeAndConservation(bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 532874, ~: 534248)\nLogs:\n Bound result 2892750061598841441024\n\n[PASS] test_absoluteCeilingDefersFeeThenOwnerCanRestoreConversion() (gas: 998147)\n[PASS] test_bothDirectionsAndExactnessWithFwaAsCurrency0() (gas: 36175620)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 525966)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput() (gas: 525617)\n[PASS] test_conversionHitsRelativeBoundAndNextSwapSellsRemainder() (gas: 1679009)\n[PASS] test_conversionStopsAtAbsoluteBoundWithinRelativeBound() (gas: 458318)\n[PASS] test_freshManagerSeededWithTokensOnlyUsesEthClaims() (gas: 15282477)\n[PASS] test_laterSwapAutomaticallyPaysEarlierEthClaims() (gas: 678714)\n[PASS] test_liquidityCanBeRemovedBeforeConversionIsConfiguredAndPaysNoHookFee() (gas: 14599739)\n[PASS] test_nativeClaimsOnAllSwapModesWhenNativeIsTemporarilyUnavailable() (gas: 1694091)\n[PASS] test_noConversionLiquidityRetainsFeeClaims() (gas: 14894995)\n[PASS] test_partialDcaSpecifiedTradeChargesOnlyActualFwa() (gas: 461908)\n[PASS] test_partialNativeBalancePaysAvailableAndClaimsRest() (gas: 577252)\n[PASS] test_partialPairSpecifiedSwapsRevertWithoutFee() (gas: 562746)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 531037)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput() (gas: 530955)\n[PASS] test_swapsBeforeOwnerConfiguresMarketChargeFeeAsClaims() (gas: 16826385)\n[PASS] test_tinySwapRoundsFeeDown() (gas: 346797)\n[PASS] test_userSlippageFailureRollsBackFeeAndPoolState() (gas: 458901)\nSuite result: ok. 20 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 461.15ms (576.48ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/ClaimRedemption.t.sol:ClaimRedemptionTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_oldClaimsAndNewFeeConservedWithLimitedCash(bool,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 742967, ~: 692396)\nLogs:\n Bound result 18618248198119005885\n\n[PASS] test_ownerRecipientCannotChangeRouteInsideSwapOrRedemptionPayout() (gas: 1090052)\n[PASS] test_redemptionChunksAboveInt128AndCannotBeReplayed() (gas: 722816)\n[PASS] test_redemptionDuringExistingUnlockCannotLeavePendingAuthorization() (gas: 771345)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 461.99ms (401.96ms CPU time)\n\nRan 5 tests for test/FeeBoundaries.t.sol:FeeBoundariesPair0Test\n[PASS] testFuzz_beforeSwapCannotConsumeTheWholeInput(uint128) (runs: 1000, μ: 59174, ~: 59151)\nLogs:\n Bound result 999\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_walletFeeIsFivePercentOfActualGross(bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 583307, ~: 591392)\nLogs:\n Bound result 2\n\n[PASS] test_allSwapModesAtWeiRoundingBoundaries() (gas: 23225358)\n[PASS] test_dcaSpecifiedDoesNotChangeRequestedAmountAtSignedBoundary() (gas: 89364)\n[PASS] test_largestGrossedUpExactOutputAndFirstInvalidNeighbor() (gas: 139341)\nSuite result: ok. 5 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 479.84ms (777.70ms CPU time)\n\nRan 8 tests for test/AnchorAndPairExit.t.sol:AnchorAndPairExitTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_saleNeverPassesTheBoundFromTheAnchor(uint16,uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 400, μ: 2301897, ~: 2328842)\nLogs:\n Bound result 657\n Bound result 59999000000000201787480\n\n[PASS] test_dipHeldAcrossABlockDefersBoundedlyThenRecovers() (gas: 3434672)\n[PASS] test_loweredSpotTightensTheBoundToSpot() (gas: 1044906)\n[PASS] test_moveInAnEarlierBlockDefersThenRatchetsTheAnchorOneStepPerBlock() (gas: 1824375)\n[PASS] test_pairAndEthExitsAreIsolatedAndNestedExitIsRefused() (gas: 1021468)\n[PASS] test_pairExitChunksAboveInt128AndStopsWhenEmpty() (gas: 909615)\n[PASS] test_pairExitPaysTheRecipientNotTheOwner() (gas: 8622444)\n[PASS] test_reconfigurationResetsTheAnchorAndRestartsObservation() (gas: 1139797)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 591.00ms (687.01ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/HookInvariant.t.sol:HookInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nHookInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_allEthIsPaidToCreatorOrHeldAsEthClaims\n[PASS] invariant_allFeesAreSoldOrHeldAsPairClaims\n[PASS] invariant_noOpenDeltasAndFixedTokenSupply\n HookInvariantTest invariants (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+===============================================================+\n| HookInvariantTest | actLimits | 519 | 0 | 0 |\n|-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookInvariantTest | actRecipient | 510 | 0 | 0 |\n|-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookInvariantTest | actRedeem | 508 | 0 | 0 |\n|-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookInvariantTest | actTrade | 511 | 0 | 0 |\n╰-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n Bound result 80053295396472539101\n Bound result 499999999000000009470\n Bound result 499999999000000000804\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.17s (1.09s CPU time)\n\nRan 5 tests for test/TokenStateful.t.sol:TokenStatefulTest\n[PASS]\nTokenStatefulTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_balancesMatchRequestedTransfersAndFixedSupply\n[PASS] invariant_onlyApprovalAndSuccessfulDelegatedTransfersChangeAllowances\n TokenStatefulTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-----------------+--------------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=========================================================================+\n| DCATokenHandler | approve | 2726 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------+--------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| DCATokenHandler | rejectAllowanceOverspend | 2761 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------+--------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| DCATokenHandler | rejectInvalidTransfer | 2648 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------+--------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| DCATokenHandler | transfer | 2717 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------+--------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| DCATokenHandler | transferEntireBalance | 2763 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------+--------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| DCATokenHandler | transferFrom | 2769 | 0 | 0 |\n╰-----------------+--------------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 469231731687303545742922267\n Bound result 850\n Bound result 256\n Bound result 6501\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 8255\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 217\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 7506\n Bound result 147708726258153168654584006\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 6319\n Bound result 354\n Bound result 859308272567249033047863201\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 395707337898848578808967280\n Bound result 2293517444\n Bound result 42000000000000000000\n Bound result 788920497483539327956237682\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 240000000000000000000\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 2\n Bound result 0\n\n[PASS] test_failedTransferFromRestoresAllowanceAfterBalanceCheck() (gas: 264660)\n[PASS] test_failedTransferFromToZeroRestoresAllowance() (gas: 253768)\n[PASS] test_sequenceExhaustRevokeReapproveAndSelfTransfer() (gas: 1252351)\nLogs:\n Bound result 100\n Bound result 100\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 100\n\n[PASS] test_zeroSpenderApprovalIsRejected() (gas: 193255)\nSuite result: ok. 5 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 6.27s (6.26s CPU time)\n\nRan 3 tests for test/ClaimLifecycleInvariant.t.sol:ClaimLifecycleInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nClaimLifecycleInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_allCreatorFeesAndDonationsAreAccountedFor\n[PASS] invariant_anchorFollowsTheRatchetModel\n[PASS] invariant_fixedSupplyNoCustodyLeakAndNoUnsettledDelta\n ClaimLifecycleInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-----------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+======================================================================================+\n| ClaimLifecycleHandler | configure | 1726 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ClaimLifecycleHandler | donateClaims | 1670 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ClaimLifecycleHandler | moveMarket | 1589 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ClaimLifecycleHandler | recipientAcceptsEth | 1570 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ClaimLifecycleHandler | redeem | 1695 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ClaimLifecycleHandler | redeemPair | 1568 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ClaimLifecycleHandler | rejectUnauthorizedConfiguration | 1670 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ClaimLifecycleHandler | resizeConversionLiquidity | 1572 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ClaimLifecycleHandler | roll | 1600 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ClaimLifecycleHandler | trade | 1724 | 0 | 0 |\n╰-----------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n Bound result 2\n Bound result 9999000000000000006057\n Bound result 282\n Bound result 19463\n Bound result 10\n Bound result 10059\n Bound result 21183\n Bound result 9999000000000000001631\n Bound result 2228906401740\n Bound result 128\n Bound result 75\n Bound result 9999000000000000018629\n Bound result 1785\n Bound result 3041954472\n Bound result 9999000000000000007721\n Bound result 100000000000000000000\n Bound result 369\n Bound result 329359\n Bound result 3\n Bound result 862\n Bound result 2800\n Bound result 849\n Bound result 3\n Bound result 5000\n Bound result 4\n Bound result 15416\n Bound result 28695485\n Bound result 4\n Bound result 1992540917543495012\n\n[PASS] test_sequenceEmptyMarketSwitchRejectedPayoutAndRecovery() (gas: 2750153)\nLogs:\n Bound result 100000000000000000000\n Bound result 2000000000000000000\n Bound result 1\n Bound result 100000000000000000000\n Bound result 1000000000000000000\n\n[PASS] test_sequenceMultiBlockManipulationDefersThenRecoversAndOwnerExits() (gas: 3530891)\nLogs:\n Bound result 100000000000000000000\n Bound result 6000000000000000000000\n Bound result 1\n Bound result 100000000000000000000\n Bound result 1\n Bound result 100000000000000000000\n Bound result 5000000000000000000\n Bound result 100000000000000000000\n Bound result 1\n Bound result 100000000000000000000\n\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 6.82s (6.75s CPU time)\n\nRan 14 test suites in 6.84s (17.57s CPU time): 100 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (100 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":162,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"DCAHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"DCAHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"DCAHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"DCAHook.redeemEth()\",\"DCAHook.redeemPair()\",\"DCAHook.setConversionPool((address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint16,uint160)\",\"DCAHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\",\"DCAToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"DCAToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"DCAToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"DEPENDENCIES.md\":12,\"LICENSE\":23,\"README.md\":97,\"docs/SECURITY.md\":59,\"docs/VALIDATION.md\":22,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/MineHook.s.sol\":49,\"src/DCAHook.sol\":391,\"src/DCAToken.sol\":12,\"src/HookBase.sol\":94,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":31,\"test/AnchorAndPairExit.t.sol\":353,\"test/CONTRIBUTOR_TESTS.md\":82,\"test/ClaimLifecycleInvariant.t.sol\":101,\"test/ClaimRedemption.t.sol\":149,\"test/ConversionBounds.t.sol\":327,\"test/ConversionSecurity.t.sol\":71,\"test/Deployment.t.sol\":61,\"test/FeeBoundaries.t.sol\":172,\"test/HookFailurePaths.t.sol\":234,\"test/HookInvariant.t.sol\":84,\"test/HookSecurity.t.sol\":328,\"test/SwapFee.t.sol\":267,\"test/Token.t.sol\":102,\"test/TokenStateful.t.sol\":199,\"test/helpers/ClaimLifecycleHandler.sol\":395,\"test/helpers/HookDeployer.sol\":27,\"test/helpers/HookFixture.sol\":183,\"test/helpers/PoolTestRouter.sol\":190,\"test/mocks/ConversionHooks.sol\":86,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":59},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"71e93d08695ddcc1e7048b12f6794bd2a9365eed24db4d92206b94d0a1514ca4","verifiedTreeHash":"14eb69b90b04fc08726938efea4dec635e5ef916","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+f0753cb7"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":3155,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 96 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 3.00s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:213:9\n │\n213 │ poolManager.unlock(\"\");\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:213:9\n │\n213 │ poolManager.unlock(\"\");\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:279:13\n │\n279 │ emit FeeConverted(spent, ethReceived, poolManager.balanceOf(address(this), pair.toId()));\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:289:13\n │\n289 │ emit EthDeferred(newCredit - pay);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:297:17\n │\n297 │ emit EthPaid(RECIPIENT, pay);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:300:17\n │\n300 │ emit EthDeferred(pay);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":685,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 8 tests for test/Token.t.sol:TokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupplyAndChargesNoFee(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 134852, ~: 135423)\nLogs:\n Bound result 0\n\n[PASS] test_approvedTransferAndAllowance() (gas: 136349)\n[PASS] test_insufficientAllowanceRevertsWithoutMovingFunds() (gas: 55589)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceAndZeroRecipientRevert() (gas: 61757)\n[PASS] test_metadataAndPolicySupply() (gas: 56959)\n[PASS] test_mintsToFactoryRatherThanTransactionOrigin() (gas: 24204)\n[PASS] test_noMintPauseFeeOrUpgradeEntryPointEvenForDeployer() (gas: 393315)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 779982)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 8.41ms (11.69ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/Deployment.t.sol:DeploymentTest\n[PASS] test_saltFinderDeploysActualCreationCodeAndFactoryInitializes() (gas: 28419991)\n[PASS] test_saltFinderRejectsInvalidSearchRatherThanGuessingAddresses() (gas: 2985045)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 34.36ms (33.71ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/ConversionSecurity.t.sol:ConversionSecurityTest\n[PASS] test_externalConversionHookCannotReenterLaunchSwapOrRedeem() (gas: 1398201)\n[PASS] test_negativeNativeConversionOutputRevertsAtomically() (gas: 1051175)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 42.99ms (1.86ms CPU time)\n\nRan 15 tests for test/HookSecurity.t.sol:HookSecurityTest\n[PASS] test_beforeSwapRejectsWrongPoolZeroAndOversizedAmounts() (gas: 216363)\n[PASS] test_configurationIsOwnerOnlyIncludingAgainstFactory() (gas: 132113)\n[PASS] test_configurationRejectsWrongCurrencyHookUninitializedMarketAndLimits() (gas: 337488)\n[PASS] test_constructorNeedsNoExternalCodeAtAnyDependency() (gas: 4744165)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsWrongAddressFlags() (gas: 23244)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroArgumentsAndPairAsLaunchToken() (gas: 8845)\n[PASS] test_disabledCallbacksFailClosed() (gas: 393741)\n[PASS] test_donatedClaimsCannotRedirectFeesAndAreRecoverableToCreator() (gas: 611649)\n[PASS] test_enabledCallbacksAndUnlockRejectUnauthorizedCallers() (gas: 167446)\n[PASS] test_initializationRequiresFactoryAndCorrectPool() (gas: 7846664)\n[PASS] test_ownerCanReplaceMarketWhileKeepingOldFeeClaims() (gas: 1048523)\n[PASS] test_permissionsExactlyMatchMinedAddress() (gas: 65979)\n[PASS] test_recipientCannotReenterFeePaymentOrClaimRedemption() (gas: 984809)\n[PASS] test_rejectingRecipientDefersWithoutBlockingAndCanRecover() (gas: 660803)\n[PASS] test_runtimeWithinSizeLimitAndNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 4485150)\nSuite result: ok. 15 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 58.04ms (28.80ms CPU time)\n\nRan 20 tests for test/SwapFee.t.sol:SwapFeeTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_feeAndConservation(bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 501355, ~: 499312)\nLogs:\n Bound result 9999999999000762778507\n\n[PASS] test_absoluteCeilingDefersFeeThenOwnerCanRestoreConversion() (gas: 925065)\n[PASS] test_bothDirectionsAndExactnessWithFwaAsCurrency0() (gas: 18610231)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 494558)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput() (gas: 494209)\n[PASS] test_conversionHitsRelativeBoundAndNextSwapSellsRemainder() (gas: 989485)\n[PASS] test_conversionStopsAtAbsoluteBoundWithinRelativeBound() (gas: 419349)\n[PASS] test_freshManagerSeededWithTokensOnlyUsesEthClaims() (gas: 10736050)\n[PASS] test_laterSwapAutomaticallyPaysEarlierEthClaims() (gas: 637093)\n[PASS] test_liquidityCanBeRemovedBeforeConversionIsConfiguredAndPaysNoHookFee() (gas: 10120447)\n[PASS] test_nativeClaimsOnAllSwapModesWhenNativeIsTemporarilyUnavailable() (gas: 1630719)\n[PASS] test_noConversionLiquidityRetainsFeeClaims() (gas: 10355043)\n[PASS] test_partialDcaSpecifiedTradeChargesOnlyActualFwa() (gas: 430922)\n[PASS] test_partialNativeBalancePaysAvailableAndClaimsRest() (gas: 545959)\n[PASS] test_partialPairSpecifiedSwapsRevertWithoutFee() (gas: 564208)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 499917)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput() (gas: 499835)\n[PASS] test_swapWithoutConfiguredMarketRevertsAtomically() (gas: 10923392)\n[PASS] test_tinySwapRoundsFeeDown() (gas: 343206)\n[PASS] test_userSlippageFailureRollsBackFeeAndPoolState() (gas: 427781)\nSuite result: ok. 20 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 76.08ms (77.13ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/HookInvariant.t.sol:HookInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nHookInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_allEthIsPaidToCreatorOrHeldAsEthClaims\n[PASS] invariant_allFeesAreSoldOrHeldAsPairClaims\n[PASS] invariant_noOpenDeltasAndFixedTokenSupply\n HookInvariantTest invariants (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+===============================================================+\n| HookInvariantTest | actLimits | 513 | 0 | 0 |\n|-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookInvariantTest | actRecipient | 524 | 0 | 0 |\n|-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookInvariantTest | actRedeem | 519 | 0 | 0 |\n|-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookInvariantTest | actTrade | 492 | 0 | 0 |\n╰-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n Bound result 499999999000000000232\n Bound result 499999999000000000111\n Bound result 34544132518673743616\n Bound result 499999999000000012762\n Bound result 499999999007147624437\n Bound result 499999999000000018884\n Bound result 499999999000000002831\n Bound result 499999999000000000709\n Bound result 499999999000000016560\n Bound result 499999999000000015477\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 589.39ms (521.34ms CPU time)\n\nRan 6 test suites in 592.02ms (809.26ms CPU time): 48 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (48 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":64,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"DCAHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"DCAHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"DCAHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"DCAHook.redeemEth()\",\"DCAHook.setConversionPool((address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint16,uint160)\",\"DCAHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\",\"DCAToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"DCAToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"DCAToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"DEPENDENCIES.md\":12,\"LICENSE\":23,\"README.md\":89,\"docs/SECURITY.md\":57,\"docs/VALIDATION.md\":22,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/MineHook.s.sol\":49,\"src/DCAHook.sol\":304,\"src/DCAToken.sol\":11,\"src/HookBase.sol\":94,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":31,\"test/ConversionSecurity.t.sol\":70,\"test/Deployment.t.sol\":61,\"test/HookInvariant.t.sol\":84,\"test/HookSecurity.t.sol\":327,\"test/SwapFee.t.sol\":248,\"test/Token.t.sol\":102,\"test/helpers/HookDeployer.sol\":27,\"test/helpers/HookFixture.sol\":178,\"test/helpers/PoolTestRouter.sol\":190,\"test/mocks/ConversionHooks.sol\":60,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":26},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":2194,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[medium/medium] unused-return at src/DCAHook.sol:131: DCAHook.setConversionPool(PoolKey,uint16,uint160) (src/DCAHook.sol#131-157) ignores return value by (price,None,None,None) = poolManager.getSlot0(key.toId()) (src/DCAHook.sol#148)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/DCAHook.sol:251: DCAHook._convertAndPay(uint256) (src/DCAHook.sol#251-282) ignores return value by (price,None,None,None) = poolManager.getSlot0(market.toId()) (src/DCAHook.sol#261)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/DCAHook.sol:211: DCAHook.redeemEth() (src/DCAHook.sol#211-215) ignores return value by poolManager.unlock() (src/DCAHook.sol#213)\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/DCAHook.sol:211: Reentrancy in DCAHook.redeemEth() (src/DCAHook.sol#211-215):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/DCAHook.sol:284: Reentrancy in DCAHook._payEth(uint256) (src/DCAHook.sol#284-303):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/DCAHook.sol:284: Reentrancy in DCAHook._payEth(uint256) (src/DCAHook.sol#284-303):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/DCAHook.sol:284: Reentrancy in DCAHook._payEth(uint256) (src/DCAHook.sol#284-303):","passed":true},{"durationMs":541,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[high] reentrancy-state-change at src/DCAHook.sol:213: Reentrancy: State change after external call\n[low] centralization-risk at src/DCAHook.sol:134: Centralization Risk\n[low] internal-function-used-once at src/HookFlags.sol:24: Internal Function Used Only Once\n[low] large-numeric-literal at src/DCAHook.sol:33: Large Numeric Literal (3 places)\n[low] modifier-used-only-once at src/DCAHook.sol:94: Modifier Invoked Only Once\n[low] state-change-without-event at src/DCAHook.sol:159: State Change Without Event (2 places)\n[low] unchecked-return at src/DCAHook.sol:213: Unchecked Return","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"99b164b01ecb2c8493aedc2718d9198d1597a1bfc178d83709d00366f96f240c","verifiedTreeHash":"c965dcafaf60cc22d731e4bf156415398782979f","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+788bb33f"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":8163,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 104 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 7.86s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:172:25\n │\n172 │ observedBlock = uint64(block.number);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n │ \n │ // casting to 'uint64' is safe because [explain why]\n │ // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n │ \n │ \n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:232:9\n │\n232 │ poolManager.unlock(\"\");\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:232:9\n │\n232 │ poolManager.unlock(\"\");\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:241:9\n │\n241 │ poolManager.unlock(\"\");\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:241:9\n │\n241 │ poolManager.unlock(\"\");\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:287:13\n │\n287 │ emit ConversionSkipped(poolManager.balanceOf(address(this), pair.toId()));\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:301:13\n │\n301 │ emit FeeConverted(spent, ethReceived, poolManager.balanceOf(address(this), pair.toId()));\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:358:13\n │\n358 │ emit EthDeferred(newCredit - pay);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:366:17\n │\n366 │ emit EthPaid(RECIPIENT, pay);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:369:17\n │\n369 │ emit EthDeferred(pay);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:339:25\n │\n339 │ observedBlock = uint64(block.number);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n │ \n │ // casting to 'uint64' is safe because [explain why]\n │ // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n │ \n │ \n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:350:9\n │\n350 │ emit PairPaid(RECIPIENT, amount);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[environment-read-across-mutation]: `block.number` may be reused across `vm.roll`\n ╭▸ test/helpers/HookFixture.sol:110:17\n │\n110 │ vm.roll(block.number + 1);\n │ ────────━━━━━━━━━━━━───── `vm.roll` changes this environment here\n │\n ├ help: capture it with `vm.getBlockNumber()` instead\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/environment-read-across-mutation\n\nwarning[environment-read-across-mutation]: `block.number` may be reused across `vm.roll`\n ╭▸ test/ConversionBounds.t.sol:207:17\n │\n207 │ vm.roll(block.number + 1);\n │ ────────━━━━━━━━━━━━───── `vm.roll` changes this environment here\n │\n ├ help: capture it with `vm.getBlockNumber()` instead\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/environment-read-across-mutation\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":4835,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 8 tests for test/Token.t.sol:TokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupplyAndChargesNoFee(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 135774, ~: 135447)\nLogs:\n Bound result 121\n\n[PASS] test_approvedTransferAndAllowance() (gas: 136349)\n[PASS] test_insufficientAllowanceRevertsWithoutMovingFunds() (gas: 55589)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceAndZeroRecipientRevert() (gas: 61757)\n[PASS] test_metadataAndPolicySupply() (gas: 56959)\n[PASS] test_mintsToFactoryRatherThanTransactionOrigin() (gas: 24204)\n[PASS] test_noMintPauseFeeOrUpgradeEntryPointEvenForDeployer() (gas: 393315)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 779982)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 17.49ms (20.41ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/Deployment.t.sol:DeploymentTest\n[PASS] test_saltFinderDeploysActualCreationCodeAndFactoryInitializes() (gas: 27408879)\n[PASS] test_saltFinderRejectsInvalidSearchRatherThanGuessingAddresses() (gas: 3356604)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 32.91ms (40.49ms CPU time)\n\nRan 8 tests for test/HookFailurePaths.t.sol:HookFailurePathsTest\n[PASS] test_afterSwapRejectsReversedPairDeltasAndOverflowingGross() (gas: 182723)\n[PASS] test_bothSwapCallbacksAuthenticateEveryPoolKeyField() (gas: 458668)\n[PASS] test_bothSwapCallbacksRejectUninitializedHook() (gas: 4471473)\n[PASS] test_bothSwapCallbacksRejectZeroAndSignedRangeNeighbors() (gas: 411377)\n[PASS] test_configurationRejectsMalformedHooksFeesAndSpacingWithoutLosingClaims() (gas: 1894625)\n[PASS] test_inputSettlementFailureRollsBackConversionAndCreatorPayment() (gas: 1377809)\n[PASS] test_lateSlippageRevertRestoresClaimsBothPoolsAndPayout() (gas: 1379885)\n[PASS] test_partialSpecifiedFillReturnsExactErrorAndPreservesOldClaims() (gas: 1296541)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 104.85ms (12.24ms CPU time)\n\nRan 20 tests for test/SwapFee.t.sol:SwapFeeTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_feeAndConservation(bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 532542, ~: 534054)\nLogs:\n Bound result 2522187153593536027516\n\n[PASS] test_absoluteCeilingDefersFeeThenOwnerCanRestoreConversion() (gas: 997828)\n[PASS] test_bothDirectionsAndExactnessWithFwaAsCurrency0() (gas: 67209958)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 525790)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput() (gas: 525441)\n[PASS] test_conversionHitsRelativeBoundAndNextSwapSellsRemainder() (gas: 1678437)\n[PASS] test_conversionStopsAtAbsoluteBoundWithinRelativeBound() (gas: 458142)\n[PASS] test_freshManagerSeededWithTokensOnlyUsesEthClaims() (gas: 10892811)\n[PASS] test_laterSwapAutomaticallyPaysEarlierEthClaims() (gas: 678428)\n[PASS] test_liquidityCanBeRemovedBeforeConversionIsConfiguredAndPaysNoHookFee() (gas: 10224173)\n[PASS] test_nativeClaimsOnAllSwapModesWhenNativeIsTemporarilyUnavailable() (gas: 1693585)\n[PASS] test_noConversionLiquidityRetainsFeeClaims() (gas: 10512176)\n[PASS] test_partialDcaSpecifiedTradeChargesOnlyActualFwa() (gas: 461732)\n[PASS] test_partialNativeBalancePaysAvailableAndClaimsRest() (gas: 577076)\n[PASS] test_partialPairSpecifiedSwapsRevertWithoutFee() (gas: 562746)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 530861)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput() (gas: 530779)\n[PASS] test_swapsBeforeOwnerConfiguresMarketChargeFeeAsClaims() (gas: 12349167)\n[PASS] test_tinySwapRoundsFeeDown() (gas: 346797)\n[PASS] test_userSlippageFailureRollsBackFeeAndPoolState() (gas: 458725)\nSuite result: ok. 20 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 197.14ms (207.22ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/ClaimRedemption.t.sol:ClaimRedemptionTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_oldClaimsAndNewFeeConservedWithLimitedCash(bool,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 745186, ~: 692904)\nLogs:\n Bound result 1896\n\n[PASS] test_ownerRecipientCannotChangeRouteInsideSwapOrRedemptionPayout() (gas: 1089876)\n[PASS] test_redemptionChunksAboveInt128AndCannotBeReplayed() (gas: 722816)\n[PASS] test_redemptionDuringExistingUnlockCannotLeavePendingAuthorization() (gas: 771345)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 215.45ms (142.85ms CPU time)\n\nRan 10 tests for test/ConversionBounds.t.sol:ConversionBoundsTest\n[PASS] test_attackerCannotProfitFromSandwichingTheFeeConversion() (gas: 1288423)\n[PASS] test_backlogSoldPerSwapIsCappedToMultipleOfNewFee() (gas: 2569254)\n[PASS] test_configurationInTheSameBlockDefersUntilTheNextBlock() (gas: 682324)\n[PASS] test_feeFreeSwapSellsNoBacklog() (gas: 3492470)\n[PASS] test_gasExhaustingMarketIsBoundedAndDefersToClaims() (gas: 2991351)\n[PASS] test_oneBlockOfConversionsStaysWithinTheBoundFromTheAnchor() (gas: 4447712)\n[PASS] test_redeemPairIsOwnerOnlyAndKeepsClaimsWhenFwaRefusesTheRecipient() (gas: 762061)\n[PASS] test_revertingMarketDefersToClaimsInsteadOfBlockingTrading() (gas: 1410739)\n[PASS] test_routerThatIsNotAnFwaDistributorCannotTradeTheLaunchPool() (gas: 3224776)\n[PASS] test_sameBlockPriceMoveAboveTheBoundDefersConversion() (gas: 2646452)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 282.27ms (34.58ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/ConversionSecurity.t.sol:ConversionSecurityTest\n[PASS] test_externalConversionHookCannotReenterLaunchSwapOrRedeem() (gas: 1440081)\n[PASS] test_negativeNativeConversionOutputRevertsAtomically() (gas: 1092496)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 284.73ms (2.11ms CPU time)\n\nRan 15 tests for test/HookSecurity.t.sol:HookSecurityTest\n[PASS] test_beforeSwapRejectsWrongPoolZeroAndOversizedAmounts() (gas: 208491)\n[PASS] test_configurationIsOwnerOnlyIncludingAgainstFactory() (gas: 139898)\n[PASS] test_configurationRejectsWrongCurrencyHookUninitializedMarketAndLimits() (gas: 337280)\n[PASS] test_constructorNeedsNoExternalCodeAtAnyDependency() (gas: 165077299)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsWrongAddressFlags() (gas: 25347)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroArgumentsAndPairAsLaunchToken() (gas: 8845)\n[PASS] test_disabledCallbacksFailClosed() (gas: 393987)\n[PASS] test_donatedClaimsCannotRedirectFeesAndAreRecoverableToCreator() (gas: 645562)\n[PASS] test_enabledCallbacksAndUnlockRejectUnauthorizedCallers() (gas: 167919)\n[PASS] test_initializationRequiresFactoryAndCorrectPool() (gas: 5020357)\n[PASS] test_ownerCanReplaceMarketWhileKeepingOldFeeClaims() (gas: 1124015)\n[PASS] test_permissionsExactlyMatchMinedAddress() (gas: 65979)\n[PASS] test_recipientCannotReenterFeePaymentOrClaimRedemption() (gas: 1026427)\n[PASS] test_rejectingRecipientDefersWithoutBlockingAndCanRecover() (gas: 692180)\n[PASS] test_runtimeWithinSizeLimitAndNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 5137683)\nSuite result: ok. 15 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 346.50ms (137.63ms CPU time)\n\nRan 5 tests for test/FeeBoundaries.t.sol:FeeBoundariesToken0Test\n[PASS] testFuzz_beforeSwapCannotConsumeTheWholeInput(uint128) (runs: 1000, μ: 59361, ~: 59342)\nLogs:\n Bound result 5000000000000000000\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_walletFeeIsFivePercentOfActualGross(bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 584956, ~: 592118)\nLogs:\n Bound result 10641\n\n[PASS] test_allSwapModesAtWeiRoundingBoundaries() (gas: 23217274)\n[PASS] test_dcaSpecifiedDoesNotChangeRequestedAmountAtSignedBoundary() (gas: 89364)\n[PASS] test_largestGrossedUpExactOutputAndFirstInvalidNeighbor() (gas: 138970)\nSuite result: ok. 5 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 346.52ms (370.92ms CPU time)\n\nRan 7 tests for test/AnchorAndPairExit.t.sol:AnchorAndPairExitTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_saleNeverPassesTheBoundFromTheAnchor(uint16,uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 400, μ: 2247269, ~: 2287175)\nLogs:\n Bound result 40\n Bound result 29990000000000000500\n\n[PASS] test_loweredSpotTightensTheBoundToSpot() (gas: 1044620)\n[PASS] test_moveInAnEarlierBlockDefersOnceThenPromotesTheObservedPrice() (gas: 1211003)\n[PASS] test_pairAndEthExitsAreIsolatedAndNestedExitIsRefused() (gas: 1021325)\n[PASS] test_pairExitChunksAboveInt128AndStopsWhenEmpty() (gas: 909593)\n[PASS] test_pairExitPaysTheRecipientNotTheOwner() (gas: 19748207)\n[PASS] test_reconfigurationResetsTheAnchorAndRestartsObservation() (gas: 1139665)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 346.68ms (298.86ms CPU time)\n\nRan 5 tests for test/FeeBoundaries.t.sol:FeeBoundariesPair0Test\n[PASS] testFuzz_beforeSwapCannotConsumeTheWholeInput(uint128) (runs: 1000, μ: 59173, ~: 59151)\nLogs:\n Bound result 16143682\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_walletFeeIsFivePercentOfActualGross(bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 584753, ~: 592309)\nLogs:\n Bound result 5911\n\n[PASS] test_allSwapModesAtWeiRoundingBoundaries() (gas: 23221662)\n[PASS] test_dcaSpecifiedDoesNotChangeRequestedAmountAtSignedBoundary() (gas: 89364)\n[PASS] test_largestGrossedUpExactOutputAndFirstInvalidNeighbor() (gas: 139341)\nSuite result: ok. 5 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 346.72ms (521.09ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/HookInvariant.t.sol:HookInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nHookInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_allEthIsPaidToCreatorOrHeldAsEthClaims\n[PASS] invariant_allFeesAreSoldOrHeldAsPairClaims\n[PASS] invariant_noOpenDeltasAndFixedTokenSupply\n HookInvariantTest invariants (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+===============================================================+\n| HookInvariantTest | actLimits | 552 | 0 | 0 |\n|-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookInvariantTest | actRecipient | 513 | 0 | 0 |\n|-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookInvariantTest | actRedeem | 514 | 0 | 0 |\n|-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookInvariantTest | actTrade | 469 | 0 | 0 |\n╰-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n Bound result 499999999000000002825\n Bound result 499999999000000012684\n Bound result 499999999000000003462\n Bound result 499999999000000003834\n Bound result 499999999000000001672\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 697.15ms (598.36ms CPU time)\n\nRan 5 tests for test/TokenStateful.t.sol:TokenStatefulTest\n[PASS]\nTokenStatefulTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_balancesMatchRequestedTransfersAndFixedSupply\n[PASS] invariant_onlyApprovalAndSuccessfulDelegatedTransfersChangeAllowances\n TokenStatefulTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-----------------+--------------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=========================================================================+\n| DCATokenHandler | approve | 2698 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------+--------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| DCATokenHandler | rejectAllowanceOverspend | 2673 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------+--------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| DCATokenHandler | rejectInvalidTransfer | 2787 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------+--------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| DCATokenHandler | transfer | 2698 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------+--------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| DCATokenHandler | transferEntireBalance | 2786 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------+--------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| DCATokenHandler | transferFrom | 2742 | 0 | 0 |\n╰-----------------+--------------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n Bound result 999\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 425\n Bound result 60000000000000000000000\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 50000000000000000000\n Bound result 50000000000000000000000\n Bound result 482473\n Bound result 3000\n Bound result 30000000000000000000\n Bound result 54553048156536840824708759\n Bound result 4637\n Bound result 1761649581\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 521\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 493\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 2\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 4549\n Bound result 4549\n Bound result 71\n Bound result 42000000000000000000\n Bound result 467500684253196101836098939\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 30000000000000000000\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 7489\n Bound result 770174916\n Bound result 30000000000000000000\n\n[PASS] test_failedTransferFromRestoresAllowanceAfterBalanceCheck() (gas: 264660)\n[PASS] test_failedTransferFromToZeroRestoresAllowance() (gas: 253768)\n[PASS] test_sequenceExhaustRevokeReapproveAndSelfTransfer() (gas: 1252351)\nLogs:\n Bound result 100\n Bound result 100\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 100\n\n[PASS] test_zeroSpenderApprovalIsRejected() (gas: 193255)\nSuite result: ok. 5 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 4.64s (4.64s CPU time)\n\nRan 3 tests for test/ClaimLifecycleInvariant.t.sol:ClaimLifecycleInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nClaimLifecycleInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_allCreatorFeesAndDonationsAreAccountedFor\n[PASS] invariant_fixedSupplyNoCustodyLeakAndNoUnsettledDelta\n ClaimLifecycleInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-----------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+======================================================================================+\n| ClaimLifecycleHandler | configure | 1686 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ClaimLifecycleHandler | donateClaims | 1663 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ClaimLifecycleHandler | moveMarket | 1564 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ClaimLifecycleHandler | recipientAcceptsEth | 1602 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ClaimLifecycleHandler | redeem | 1626 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ClaimLifecycleHandler | redeemPair | 1677 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ClaimLifecycleHandler | rejectUnauthorizedConfiguration | 1662 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ClaimLifecycleHandler | resizeConversionLiquidity | 1626 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ClaimLifecycleHandler | roll | 1663 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ClaimLifecycleHandler | trade | 1615 | 0 | 0 |\n╰-----------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n Bound result 3770\n Bound result 1\n Bound result 1488517853\n Bound result 2\n Bound result 16\n Bound result 8724\n Bound result 9999000000000000022015\n Bound result 3545\n Bound result 10269\n Bound result 3\n Bound result 9990000000000001180\n Bound result 2\n Bound result 1321223797248079664\n Bound result 9999000000000000008034\n Bound result 512\n Bound result 472\n Bound result 1552046665358961491\n Bound result 128\n Bound result 863\n Bound result 63896322314881230949\n Bound result 3714247997\n Bound result 9713\n Bound result 9999000000000000009324\n Bound result 17189\n Bound result 1792965046\n Bound result 1\n Bound result 45\n Bound result 2\n Bound result 3619\n Bound result 5677\n Bound result 19255\n Bound result 96\n Bound result 28201\n\n[PASS] test_sequenceEmptyMarketSwitchRejectedPayoutAndRecovery() (gas: 2588298)\nLogs:\n Bound result 100000000000000000000\n Bound result 2000000000000000000\n Bound result 1\n Bound result 100000000000000000000\n Bound result 1000000000000000000\n\n[PASS] test_sequenceMultiBlockManipulationDefersThenRecoversAndOwnerExits() (gas: 3318602)\nLogs:\n Bound result 100000000000000000000\n Bound result 10000000000000000000000\n Bound result 1\n Bound result 100000000000000000000\n Bound result 1\n Bound result 100000000000000000000\n Bound result 5000000000000000000\n Bound result 100000000000000000000\n Bound result 1\n Bound result 100000000000000000000\n\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 4.69s (4.67s CPU time)\n\nRan 14 test suites in 4.70s (12.56s CPU time): 95 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (95 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":94,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"DCAHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"DCAHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"DCAHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"DCAHook.redeemEth()\",\"DCAHook.redeemPair()\",\"DCAHook.setConversionPool((address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint16,uint160)\",\"DCAHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\",\"DCAToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"DCAToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"DCAToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"DEPENDENCIES.md\":12,\"LICENSE\":23,\"README.md\":97,\"docs/SECURITY.md\":59,\"docs/VALIDATION.md\":22,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/MineHook.s.sol\":49,\"src/DCAHook.sol\":373,\"src/DCAToken.sol\":12,\"src/HookBase.sol\":94,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":31,\"test/AnchorAndPairExit.t.sol\":275,\"test/CONTRIBUTOR_TESTS.md\":69,\"test/ClaimLifecycleInvariant.t.sol\":87,\"test/ClaimRedemption.t.sol\":149,\"test/ConversionBounds.t.sol\":214,\"test/ConversionSecurity.t.sol\":71,\"test/Deployment.t.sol\":61,\"test/FeeBoundaries.t.sol\":172,\"test/HookFailurePaths.t.sol\":234,\"test/HookInvariant.t.sol\":84,\"test/HookSecurity.t.sol\":328,\"test/SwapFee.t.sol\":267,\"test/Token.t.sol\":102,\"test/TokenStateful.t.sol\":199,\"test/helpers/ClaimLifecycleHandler.sol\":351,\"test/helpers/HookDeployer.sol\":27,\"test/helpers/HookFixture.sol\":183,\"test/helpers/PoolTestRouter.sol\":190,\"test/mocks/ConversionHooks.sol\":86,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":59},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"d355b216ab61c9210be3fe4a6a057b05b59b3af7b55eabe3c52f29d4572aa02c","verifiedTreeHash":"a5c1dfbb4493eda79fbf12a780e7e992acd79770","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+1f97cecf"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":6117,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 102 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 5.92s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:213:9\n │\n213 │ poolManager.unlock(\"\");\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:213:9\n │\n213 │ poolManager.unlock(\"\");\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:279:13\n │\n279 │ emit FeeConverted(spent, ethReceived, poolManager.balanceOf(address(this), pair.toId()));\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:289:13\n │\n289 │ emit EthDeferred(newCredit - pay);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:297:17\n │\n297 │ emit EthPaid(RECIPIENT, pay);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n ╭▸ src/DCAHook.sol:300:17\n │\n300 │ emit EthDeferred(pay);\n │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n │\n ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":4689,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 8 tests for test/Token.t.sol:TokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupplyAndChargesNoFee(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 135663, ~: 135399)\nLogs:\n Bound result 902\n\n[PASS] test_approvedTransferAndAllowance() (gas: 136349)\n[PASS] test_insufficientAllowanceRevertsWithoutMovingFunds() (gas: 55589)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceAndZeroRecipientRevert() (gas: 61757)\n[PASS] test_metadataAndPolicySupply() (gas: 56959)\n[PASS] test_mintsToFactoryRatherThanTransactionOrigin() (gas: 24204)\n[PASS] test_noMintPauseFeeOrUpgradeEntryPointEvenForDeployer() (gas: 393315)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 779982)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 6.29ms (9.89ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/Deployment.t.sol:DeploymentTest\n[PASS] test_saltFinderDeploysActualCreationCodeAndFactoryInitializes() (gas: 28419991)\n[PASS] test_saltFinderRejectsInvalidSearchRatherThanGuessingAddresses() (gas: 2985045)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 41.05ms (41.20ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/ConversionSecurity.t.sol:ConversionSecurityTest\n[PASS] test_externalConversionHookCannotReenterLaunchSwapOrRedeem() (gas: 1398201)\n[PASS] test_negativeNativeConversionOutputRevertsAtomically() (gas: 1051175)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 82.88ms (1.66ms CPU time)\n\nRan 15 tests for test/HookSecurity.t.sol:HookSecurityTest\n[PASS] test_beforeSwapRejectsWrongPoolZeroAndOversizedAmounts() (gas: 216363)\n[PASS] test_configurationIsOwnerOnlyIncludingAgainstFactory() (gas: 132113)\n[PASS] test_configurationRejectsWrongCurrencyHookUninitializedMarketAndLimits() (gas: 337488)\n[PASS] test_constructorNeedsNoExternalCodeAtAnyDependency() (gas: 4744165)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsWrongAddressFlags() (gas: 23244)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroArgumentsAndPairAsLaunchToken() (gas: 8845)\n[PASS] test_disabledCallbacksFailClosed() (gas: 393741)\n[PASS] test_donatedClaimsCannotRedirectFeesAndAreRecoverableToCreator() (gas: 611649)\n[PASS] test_enabledCallbacksAndUnlockRejectUnauthorizedCallers() (gas: 167446)\n[PASS] test_initializationRequiresFactoryAndCorrectPool() (gas: 7846664)\n[PASS] test_ownerCanReplaceMarketWhileKeepingOldFeeClaims() (gas: 1048523)\n[PASS] test_permissionsExactlyMatchMinedAddress() (gas: 65979)\n[PASS] test_recipientCannotReenterFeePaymentOrClaimRedemption() (gas: 984809)\n[PASS] test_rejectingRecipientDefersWithoutBlockingAndCanRecover() (gas: 660803)\n[PASS] test_runtimeWithinSizeLimitAndNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 4485150)\nSuite result: ok. 15 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 100.53ms (45.86ms CPU time)\n\nRan 8 tests for test/HookFailurePaths.t.sol:HookFailurePathsTest\n[PASS] test_afterSwapRejectsReversedPairDeltasAndOverflowingGross() (gas: 188849)\n[PASS] test_bothSwapCallbacksAuthenticateEveryPoolKeyField() (gas: 457643)\n[PASS] test_bothSwapCallbacksRejectUninitializedHook() (gas: 6965562)\n[PASS] test_bothSwapCallbacksRejectZeroAndSignedRangeNeighbors() (gas: 431582)\n[PASS] test_configurationRejectsMalformedHooksFeesAndSpacingWithoutLosingClaims() (gas: 1890795)\n[PASS] test_inputSettlementFailureRollsBackConversionAndCreatorPayment() (gas: 1305095)\n[PASS] test_lateSlippageRevertRestoresClaimsBothPoolsAndPayout() (gas: 1307104)\n[PASS] test_partialSpecifiedFillReturnsExactErrorAndPreservesOldClaims() (gas: 1294756)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 103.48ms (17.53ms CPU time)\n\nRan 20 tests for test/SwapFee.t.sol:SwapFeeTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_feeAndConservation(bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 501219, ~: 499312)\nLogs:\n Bound result 9999999999000000006102\n\n[PASS] test_absoluteCeilingDefersFeeThenOwnerCanRestoreConversion() (gas: 925065)\n[PASS] test_bothDirectionsAndExactnessWithFwaAsCurrency0() (gas: 18610231)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 494558)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput() (gas: 494209)\n[PASS] test_conversionHitsRelativeBoundAndNextSwapSellsRemainder() (gas: 989485)\n[PASS] test_conversionStopsAtAbsoluteBoundWithinRelativeBound() (gas: 419349)\n[PASS] test_freshManagerSeededWithTokensOnlyUsesEthClaims() (gas: 10736050)\n[PASS] test_laterSwapAutomaticallyPaysEarlierEthClaims() (gas: 637093)\n[PASS] test_liquidityCanBeRemovedBeforeConversionIsConfiguredAndPaysNoHookFee() (gas: 10120447)\n[PASS] test_nativeClaimsOnAllSwapModesWhenNativeIsTemporarilyUnavailable() (gas: 1630719)\n[PASS] test_noConversionLiquidityRetainsFeeClaims() (gas: 10355043)\n[PASS] test_partialDcaSpecifiedTradeChargesOnlyActualFwa() (gas: 430922)\n[PASS] test_partialNativeBalancePaysAvailableAndClaimsRest() (gas: 545959)\n[PASS] test_partialPairSpecifiedSwapsRevertWithoutFee() (gas: 564208)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 499917)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput() (gas: 499835)\n[PASS] test_swapWithoutConfiguredMarketRevertsAtomically() (gas: 10923392)\n[PASS] test_tinySwapRoundsFeeDown() (gas: 343206)\n[PASS] test_userSlippageFailureRollsBackFeeAndPoolState() (gas: 427781)\nSuite result: ok. 20 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 155.04ms (150.65ms CPU time)\n\nRan 5 tests for test/FeeBoundaries.t.sol:FeeBoundariesPair0Test\n[PASS] testFuzz_beforeSwapCannotConsumeTheWholeInput(uint128) (runs: 1000, μ: 61172, ~: 61150)\nLogs:\n Bound result 1\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_walletFeeIsFivePercentOfActualGross(bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 556234, ~: 561241)\nLogs:\n Bound result 5607666236711\n\n[PASS] test_allSwapModesAtWeiRoundingBoundaries() (gas: 22822768)\n[PASS] test_dcaSpecifiedDoesNotChangeRequestedAmountAtSignedBoundary() (gas: 93362)\n[PASS] test_largestGrossedUpExactOutputAndFirstInvalidNeighbor() (gas: 143339)\nSuite result: ok. 5 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 184.37ms (218.88ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/ClaimRedemption.t.sol:ClaimRedemptionTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_oldClaimsAndNewFeeConservedWithLimitedCash(bool,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 713323, ~: 661681)\nLogs:\n Bound result 8732\n\n[PASS] test_ownerRecipientCannotChangeRouteInsideSwapOrRedemptionPayout() (gas: 1050843)\n[PASS] test_redemptionChunksAboveInt128AndCannotBeReplayed() (gas: 722124)\n[PASS] test_redemptionDuringExistingUnlockCannotLeavePendingAuthorization() (gas: 770965)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 184.48ms (116.37ms CPU time)\n\nRan 5 tests for test/FeeBoundaries.t.sol:FeeBoundariesToken0Test\n[PASS] testFuzz_beforeSwapCannotConsumeTheWholeInput(uint128) (runs: 1000, μ: 61366, ~: 61341)\nLogs:\n Bound result 1\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_walletFeeIsFivePercentOfActualGross(bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 555794, ~: 560744)\nLogs:\n Bound result 1\n\n[PASS] test_allSwapModesAtWeiRoundingBoundaries() (gas: 22818382)\n[PASS] test_dcaSpecifiedDoesNotChangeRequestedAmountAtSignedBoundary() (gas: 93362)\n[PASS] test_largestGrossedUpExactOutputAndFirstInvalidNeighbor() (gas: 142968)\nSuite result: ok. 5 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 184.50ms (279.31ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/HookInvariant.t.sol:HookInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nHookInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_allEthIsPaidToCreatorOrHeldAsEthClaims\n[PASS] invariant_allFeesAreSoldOrHeldAsPairClaims\n[PASS] invariant_noOpenDeltasAndFixedTokenSupply\n HookInvariantTest invariants (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+===============================================================+\n| HookInvariantTest | actLimits | 473 | 0 | 0 |\n|-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookInvariantTest | actRecipient | 534 | 0 | 0 |\n|-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookInvariantTest | actRedeem | 510 | 0 | 0 |\n|-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookInvariantTest | actTrade | 531 | 0 | 0 |\n╰-------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n Bound result 499999999000051118261\n Bound result 499999999000012568867\n Bound result 499999999000000000234\n Bound result 499999999000000017052\n Bound result 144115188075855871\n Bound result 499999999000000004306\n Bound result 499999999000000005288\n Bound result 499999999000000011801\n Bound result 499999999000000003098\n Bound result 473055573118364866574\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 729.72ms (654.05ms CPU time)\n\nRan 5 tests for test/TokenStateful.t.sol:TokenStatefulTest\n[PASS]\nTokenStatefulTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_balancesMatchRequestedTransfersAndFixedSupply\n[PASS] invariant_onlyApprovalAndSuccessfulDelegatedTransfersChangeAllowances\n TokenStatefulTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-----------------+--------------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=========================================================================+\n| DCATokenHandler | approve | 2767 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------+--------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| DCATokenHandler | rejectAllowanceOverspend | 2678 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------+--------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| DCATokenHandler | rejectInvalidTransfer | 2702 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------+--------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| DCATokenHandler | transfer | 2781 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------+--------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| DCATokenHandler | transferEntireBalance | 2714 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------+--------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| DCATokenHandler | transferFrom | 2742 | 0 | 0 |\n╰-----------------+--------------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n Bound result 9801\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 5000000000000000000\n Bound result 8247\n Bound result 18\n Bound result 33\n Bound result 68\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 2048\n Bound result 4288775754\n Bound result 219231731687315285484581024\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 5955\n Bound result 10000000000000000000000000\n Bound result 1521727669821228503\n Bound result 6\n Bound result 500\n Bound result 24576\n Bound result 3\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 5184428054272375\n Bound result 2726\n Bound result 1000001\n Bound result 13\n Bound result 12500\n Bound result 10426\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 8234\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 198\n\n[PASS] test_failedTransferFromRestoresAllowanceAfterBalanceCheck() (gas: 264660)\n[PASS] test_failedTransferFromToZeroRestoresAllowance() (gas: 253768)\n[PASS] test_sequenceExhaustRevokeReapproveAndSelfTransfer() (gas: 1252351)\nLogs:\n Bound result 100\n Bound result 100\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 100\n\n[PASS] test_zeroSpenderApprovalIsRejected() (gas: 193255)\nSuite result: ok. 5 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 4.55s (4.55s CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/ClaimLifecycleInvariant.t.sol:ClaimLifecycleInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nClaimLifecycleInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_allCreatorFeesAndDonationsAreAccountedFor\n[PASS] invariant_fixedSupplyNoCustodyLeakAndNoUnsettledDelta\n ClaimLifecycleInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-----------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+======================================================================================+\n| ClaimLifecycleHandler | configure | 2377 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ClaimLifecycleHandler | donateClaims | 2405 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ClaimLifecycleHandler | recipientAcceptsEth | 2332 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ClaimLifecycleHandler | redeem | 2287 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ClaimLifecycleHandler | rejectUnauthorizedConfiguration | 2362 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ClaimLifecycleHandler | resizeConversionLiquidity | 2309 | 0 | 0 |\n|-----------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ClaimLifecycleHandler | trade | 2312 | 0 | 0 |\n╰-----------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n Bound result 19986\n Bound result 6636\n Bound result 5500\n Bound result 18174\n Bound result 324\n Bound result 18939\n Bound result 3851\n Bound result 5194\n Bound result 151\n Bound result 10967\n Bound result 18792\n Bound result 6584\n Bound result 9936259696746313\n Bound result 8583\n Bound result 8452\n Bound result 20922\n Bound result 6934\n Bound result 36292972364529831343\n Bound result 2067\n Bound result 889\n Bound result 892642768184016897\n Bound result 960\n Bound result 3753\n Bound result 713\n Bound result 7276275615895120192\n Bound result 3608392\n Bound result 1989\n Bound result 163\n\n[PASS] test_sequenceEmptyMarketSwitchRejectedPayoutAndRecovery() (gas: 2417582)\nLogs:\n Bound result 100000000000000000000\n Bound result 2000000000000000000\n Bound result 1\n Bound result 100000000000000000000\n Bound result 1000000000000000000\n\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 4.56s (4.54s CPU time)\n\nRan 12 test suites in 4.57s (10.89s CPU time): 77 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (77 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":80,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"DCAHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"DCAHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"DCAHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"DCAHook.redeemEth()\",\"DCAHook.setConversionPool((address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint16,uint160)\",\"DCAHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\",\"DCAToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"DCAToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"DCAToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"DEPENDENCIES.md\":12,\"LICENSE\":23,\"README.md\":89,\"docs/SECURITY.md\":57,\"docs/VALIDATION.md\":22,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/MineHook.s.sol\":49,\"src/DCAHook.sol\":304,\"src/DCAToken.sol\":11,\"src/HookBase.sol\":94,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":31,\"test/CONTRIBUTOR_TESTS.md\":52,\"test/ClaimLifecycleInvariant.t.sol\":57,\"test/ClaimRedemption.t.sol\":149,\"test/ConversionSecurity.t.sol\":70,\"test/Deployment.t.sol\":61,\"test/FeeBoundaries.t.sol\":172,\"test/HookFailurePaths.t.sol\":234,\"test/HookInvariant.t.sol\":84,\"test/HookSecurity.t.sol\":327,\"test/SwapFee.t.sol\":248,\"test/Token.t.sol\":102,\"test/TokenStateful.t.sol\":199,\"test/helpers/ClaimLifecycleHandler.sol\":250,\"test/helpers/HookDeployer.sol\":27,\"test/helpers/HookFixture.sol\":178,\"test/helpers/PoolTestRouter.sol\":190,\"test/mocks/ConversionHooks.sol\":60,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":26},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"e867c97be6097b1a244aea3f4c9776472902b9bbcd42e5ef4ae7b22305322f5d","verifiedTreeHash":"213f369f734cee59aba256c9097e67662f196242","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+ea80570d"}]}