{"assessments":[],"deployments":[],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent 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custom token: Pegzeus (ZEUS).\nToken name: Pegzeus\nToken symbol: ZEUS\nToken supply: 1,000,000,000 with 18 decimals, all minted once to the deployer in the constructor.","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"c3547c7f4ada09c4f6280d4880a0321e198524e416b56ea38cc2ae72b71b0066","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"4e300578-17f2-41e2-9620-ea7d2e0283ef","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-1145-pegzeus"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"52179","feedbackHash":"2c8073ef9491db2feae73542cb0d7f8addc5ba4f37020be2ead9c43868a8f6cb","nodeKey":"audit_economics","submissionHash":"09fb2e2862216745331e47232673715591d8268d3015115d3da0fa8738a0778e","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52287","feedbackHash":"38d2438ef276038a247654e9c5dc03357c0b0a11cd5b5a49be06e0b8776b8155","nodeKey":"audit_flow","submissionHash":"fd614dfe5438482be8f2068e01fe730bfe978db5932d25c89437721eae16ea00","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52188","feedbackHash":"2109553f7d0598bc9914aba4e6776ecee0412b452594cd39134eb4898d644445","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"38fed53396bc7514f965f4525a5e3eb7b09ec6aeb7a066838d7520e4dbb078ae","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51367","feedbackHash":"64b61d76ec6c7c2c853b087b3ccaa21b28835b21726423f4263c3f205e97f1b9","nodeKey":"audit_math","submissionHash":"dfe5d8aed11e090760eec1f60ce5680002fb2810445656938c63e29492b4d904","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51512","feedbackHash":"a15ed2e7a525d64ca652e1f610f132cec9ba4b08de6ebb5cca8cf8791d6d9066","nodeKey":"audit_permissions","submissionHash":"52ac6f2c48228de56a58f3c9321814aa311de5d029711c5c1953092afe0cdd85","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51375","feedbackHash":"2b71042d8754d9ea192d1ee45010935644a7f7a8218dd58a3a1ba3eb7abd729c","nodeKey":"build_contract_project","submissionHash":"b87602ee749dfbcbc21f8a30899a45809a82f245e57ad9d2dacbda92adfcde9c","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51487","feedbackHash":"29f03582a11194c0aa9f934070f1e7c196886c31b0bbba7d30a4b93e1053b9c8","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"0c07415a26533d26ad1020353e45ed637ef77830324f6d5de3d61b5cccea3b45","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52518","feedbackHash":"333a70cea93d55979c15ed08ed5ae9cfc0b17d17660d33ae1955f41c6dd94e60","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"259b4085a357533b6718e95cdbdef4e537d6b89b8bd6b6640f8d4217c5aad19a","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"cf9832407f73ad2496e7c0bf2e798ee16df27eeb274354ce0901b711c995837a","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"02f22d6f13810ca8","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"_transfer rejects only `to == address(0)`; it never rejects `from == address(0)`. _spendAllowance (line 139-146) passes whenever `value == 0` because the check is `current < value` and 0 < 0 is false, and _transfer passes because the zero address's balance (0) is not below 0. So an unprivileged caller can execute transferFrom(address(0), anyone, 0) and the token emits `Transfer(address(0), anyone, 0)` plus `Approval(address(0), caller, 0)`. By the EIP-20 convention a Transfer whose `from` is 0x0 is a mint; the contract's own constructor uses that exact shape for its one real mint (line 64), and the NatSpec says the supply is minted 'exactly once'. Event-driven indexers, explorers and supply dashboards that reconstruct mint history from Transfer(0x0, ...) logs will record additional mint rows for this token after launch. No balance, allowance or totalSupply changes (value is always 0, and a non-zero value reverts with InsufficientAllowance), so this is an event-integrity defect, not a loss of funds. Zero-value transferFrom from a real holder is standard EIP-20 behaviour and is not the defect; only the zero-address sender is. OpenZeppelin's ERC20 refuses this path with ERC20InvalidSender. Minimal fix: in _transfer add `if (from == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();` (or revert in transferFrom when from is the zero address).","line":120,"path":"src/ZeusToken.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test, Vm} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {ZeusToken} from \"src/ZeusToken.sol\";\n\n/// @notice Fails on the current code: any unprivileged caller can make the token emit a\n///         mint-shaped `Transfer(address(0), to, 0)` event through `transferFrom(address(0), to, 0)`,\n///         because `_spendAllowance` passes when `value == 0` and `_transfer` never rejects\n///         `from == address(0)`. Passes once `_transfer` (or `transferFrom`) refuses the zero\n///         address as sender.\ncontract ZeroSenderMintEventTest is Test {\n    address internal constant DEPLOYER = address(0xDE91);\n    address internal constant ATTACKER = address(0xBAD);\n\n    ZeusToken internal token;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        vm.prank(DEPLOYER);\n        token = new ZeusToken();\n    }\n\n    function test_transferFromZeroSenderIsRefused() public {\n        vm.prank(ATTACKER);\n        (bool ok,) = address(token).call(abi.encodeCall(ZeusToken.transferFrom, (address(0), ATTACKER, 0)));\n        assertFalse(ok, \"transferFrom(address(0), to, 0) succeeded and emitted a mint-shaped Transfer event\");\n    }\n\n    function test_transferFromZeroSenderEmitsNoMintEvent() public {\n        vm.recordLogs();\n        vm.prank(ATTACKER);\n        address(token).call(abi.encodeCall(ZeusToken.transferFrom, (address(0), ATTACKER, 0)));\n        Vm.Log[] memory logs = vm.getRecordedLogs();\n        bytes32 transferSig = keccak256(\"Transfer(address,address,uint256)\");\n        for (uint256 i; i < logs.length; ++i) {\n            if (logs[i].topics[0] == transferSig) {\n                assertTrue(\n                    logs[i].topics[1] != bytes32(0), \"a Transfer event with from == address(0) was emitted after deployment\"\n                );\n            }\n        }\n    }\n}","reproduction":"State: token deployed by any address (e.g. vm.prank(0xDE91); new ZeusToken()). Call, from any unprivileged address 0xBAD: token.transferFrom(address(0), 0xBAD, 0). Expected: revert (the zero address cannot be a sender; no mint-shaped event after the constructor). Actual: returns true and emits Transfer(from=0x0, to=0xBAD, value=0) and Approval(owner=0x0, spender=0xBAD, value=0). Balances and totalSupply are unchanged. With value 1 instead of 0 the call reverts with InsufficientAllowance(0x0, 0xBAD, 0, 1), so no tokens can be created. Proof test: test/scratch/ZeroSenderMintEvent.t.sol fails on the current code (both tests) and passes once _transfer rejects from == address(0).","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (to == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();\n        uint256 fromBalance = _balances[from];\n        if (fromBalance < value) revert InsufficientBalance(from, fromBalance, value);","title":"transferFrom accepts address(0) as sender for zero value, letting anyone emit a mint-shaped Transfer(address(0), to, 0) event after deployment"}],"hash":"09fb2e2862216745331e47232673715591d8268d3015115d3da0fa8738a0778e","nodeId":"cd223b19-7a07-4550-8e35-6ebeb3e2140e","outcome":"completed","summary":"The proof test fails on the current code and passes with the one-line fix. The source is restored and the working tree is clean apart from the findings file and my scratch tests, which are gitignored.\n\n**Outcome.** The review of Pegzeus (ZEUS) against the Economic Security, Invariant and Flow Gap guides found one low-severity defect and no loss-of-funds or launch-breaking issue. Findings and coverage are written to `.imd-findings.json`.\n\n**The finding (low).** The internal transfer path rejects the zero address only as receiver, never as sender. Combined with a zero-amount allowance check that passes when nothing is spent, any unprivileged caller can call `transferFrom(address(0), anyone, 0)` and the token emits a mint-shaped `Transfer(0x0, anyone, 0)` event after deployment. No balance, allowance or supply changes, and a non-zero amount reverts, so the impact is limited to event integrity for indexers and explorers that treat a zero-sender Transfer as a mint. The attached proof test fails on the current code and passes with a one-line guard on the sender.\n\n**What holds in my area.**\n- Conservation: sum of balances always equals the constant supply of 1e27. Verified by reading the only two writers and by a stateful invariant run over random transfers, approvals and transferFroms.\n- Allowance accounting: the view and the spend path read the same slot, unlimited allowances are never decremented, and every other allowance is reduced by exactly the amount moved.\n- Launch flows: transfers move exact amounts with no fee, burn or exemption logic, so the swarm share, distributor claims, the Uniswap v4 seed and swaps in both directions all arrive whole.\n- Economic dependencies: the token makes no external calls, has no oracle, price-dependent operation, shared cap or privileged role, and contains no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT.\n\n**Not reached.** There is no launch manifest in this tree, so constructor arguments and the manifest supply could only be compared against the constructor itself, which mints the brief's supply to the factory. Slither and Mythril were not run beyond the supplied static output, which raised nothing above a benign large-literal note.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":809031,"inputTokens":354,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":14434,"runtime":"claude","turns":22,"wallClockMs":245361}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"47cf7439b1f1686b30f794ebb9ed379e6f696b07e50af7fe5a0d1ae15f89b50d","device":"9e51ef2afd7c2af8","findings":[],"hash":"0c07415a26533d26ad1020353e45ed637ef77830324f6d5de3d61b5cccea3b45","nodeId":"e6216151-f1e1-4ef5-8c50-290f57de2a95","outcome":"completed","summary":"Done. I wrote `launch.json` as the only new file, and the working tree is otherwise unchanged.\n\n**What the manifest says**\n- Kind `custom_token`, token contract `ZeusToken`, name Pegzeus, symbol ZEUS, 18 decimals.\n- Constructor arguments are an empty list. The accepted constructor takes no parameters, confirmed against the compiled ABI.\n- Total supply is 1,000,000,000 × 10^18 in minor units, which is exactly the constant the constructor mints to msg.sender.\n- Contracts list is empty. The accepted tree has no application contracts, only the token, a deploy script and tests.\n- Pool and economics are copied from the launch terms verbatim: IMD pair at the given address, fee 12500, tick spacing 60, one-to-one initialPrice, and the requester's economics object.\n- Notes describe the token's actual behavior from the source, at 1617 characters.\n\n**Checks**\n- `forge build` compiles cleanly with solc 0.8.26.\n- `forge test` passes all 31 tests in the existing suite.\n- A script check confirmed the ABI constructor has zero inputs, the supply string equals 10^27, and the economics object matches the job's byte for byte.\n- `git status` shows only the untracked `launch.json`.\n\nNothing is outstanding. The protected test depends on environment variables the admission service supplies, so it was read rather than run here.","treeHash":"b6d7f7f934d2940d1b09c3d191c0c949d2d7b13a","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":163512,"inputTokens":130,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":2870,"runtime":"claude","turns":8,"wallClockMs":65345}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"4267b34484b1f8174e6652e9aba0f1f51331b0d6d79de05eb48b16d48d708a3d","device":"9e122b922ce3ac83","findings":[{"description":"transferFrom(from, to, value) does not reject from == address(0). With value == 0 both checks pass trivially (the zero address has allowance 0 >= 0 and balance 0 >= 0), so the call succeeds, moves nothing, and emits Approval(address(0), msg.sender, 0) followed by Transfer(address(0), to, 0). The constructor's Transfer(address(0), deployer, TOTAL_SUPPLY) is meant to be the only Transfer from the zero address this fixed-supply token ever emits; explorers and indexers that classify Transfer-from-zero as a mint will show spurious zero-value mints for any address a caller names. No balance, allowance or supply changes, so there is no loss of funds; this is an event-hygiene issue only. The same pattern applies to transfer(to, 0) from an empty account, but that one is required by EIP-20 (zero-value transfers must emit). A fix is to revert in _transfer (or transferFrom) when from == address(0), as OpenZeppelin's ERC20 does with ERC20InvalidSender.","line":109,"path":"src/ZeusToken.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test, Vm} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {ZeusToken} from \"src/ZeusToken.sol\";\n\n/// Shows that any caller can make the token emit Transfer(address(0), anyone, 0) after deployment.\ncontract MintShapedEventTest is Test {\n    function test_anyoneCanEmitAMintShapedTransferEvent() public {\n        vm.prank(address(0xDE91));\n        ZeusToken token = new ZeusToken();\n\n        vm.recordLogs();\n        vm.prank(address(0xA11CE));\n        (bool ok,) = address(token).call(abi.encodeCall(ZeusToken.transferFrom, (address(0), address(0xB0B), 0)));\n        ok;\n        Vm.Log[] memory logs = vm.getRecordedLogs();\n\n        // Expected for a fixed-supply token: no Transfer from address(0) after the constructor.\n        bool mintShaped;\n        for (uint256 i; i < logs.length; ++i) {\n            if (logs[i].topics[0] == keccak256(\"Transfer(address,address,uint256)\") && logs[i].topics[1] == bytes32(0)) {\n                mintShaped = true;\n            }\n        }\n        assertFalse(mintShaped, \"a mint-shaped Transfer event was emitted after deployment\");\n        assertEq(token.totalSupply(), 1_000_000_000 ether);\n        assertEq(token.balanceOf(address(0xB0B)), 0);\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Deploy ZeusToken from 0xDE91. From any account (0xA11CE) call token.transferFrom(address(0), 0xB0B, 0). Expected: revert (no Transfer from the zero address after construction). Actual: returns true and emits Approval(0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000, 0x00000000000000000000000000000000000A11cE, 0) and Transfer(0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000, 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000B0b, 0). Balances and totalSupply are unchanged. transferFrom(address(0), to, 1) correctly reverts with InsufficientAllowance(address(0), caller, 0, 1).","severity":"info","title":"Anyone can emit a mint-shaped Transfer(address(0), to, 0) event after deployment"}],"hash":"259b4085a357533b6718e95cdbdef4e537d6b89b8bd6b6640f8d4217c5aad19a","nodeId":"73d1a713-7350-4620-8452-3f41d8a3e9f9","outcome":"completed","summary":"Work is complete and verified. Summary:\n\n**What I added** (only `test/` paths were touched; the implementation and config are untouched):\n\n- `test/ZeusToken.invariants.t.sol`: a handler-driven invariant suite. The handler drives six actors plus fuzzer-chosen stranger recipients through twenty clamped entry points, covering successful transfers, whole-balance and one-wei moves, self-transfers, every revert path with the exact custom error asserted in place, the unlimited-allowance sentinel, arbitrary selectors and ether sends. Ghost variables track what each holder and each allowance should be. Eight invariants are checked after every call: fixed supply, tracked balances summing to the supply, balances and allowances matching ghosts, zero address holding nothing, no implicit recipients or fee leakage, immutable metadata, and no holder above the supply. An end-of-campaign hook rejects a vacuous run. Run counts are set with inline config so foundry.toml stays untouched.\n- `test/ZeusToken.edges.t.sol`: 41 edge and failure-path tests the existing suite did not pin. These include the allowance sentinel boundary at max minus one, failed calls consuming no allowance and emitting nothing, exact event counts and ordering, one-word return data, truncated and dirty-high-bit calldata, value sent to non-payable functions, independent deployments, factory-style deployment, and ten bound-based fuzz properties with no discarded inputs.\n\n**Verification.** `forge build` and `forge test` pass with 73 tests across three suites, with the invariant campaign taking about one minute. I also ran the invariant suite in scratch against two deliberately broken token mutants, one with a fee on transfer and one that never decrements allowances. Both were caught by the handler postconditions, and the end-of-campaign hook was confirmed to execute.\n\n**One finding reported** in `.imd-findings.json`, severity info. Any caller can invoke `transferFrom(address(0), to, 0)`, which succeeds and emits a mint-shaped `Transfer` event from the zero address along with a spurious `Approval`. No value, balance or supply changes, so it is event hygiene only. The attached proof test fails on the current code as written. I did not write a test asserting this behaviour is correct.\n\nNo defects of higher severity were found. The token's supply, transfer accounting and allowance handling held under every sequence the fuzzer produced.","treeHash":"9f9bed2e9fc02de8b4f80483cc2b116eef40f9a2","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1580651,"inputTokens":546,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":41779,"runtime":"claude","turns":33,"wallClockMs":721809}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"d4b53d656a3fbe07","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_permissions, audit_economics, audit_flow and write_foundry_tests, which all report the same root cause. `_transfer` (line 119-130) rejects only `to == address(0)` and never rejects `from == address(0)`; `_spendAllowance` (line 138-146) passes whenever `value == 0` because `current < value` is `0 < 0 == false`, and `_transfer` passes because the zero address's balance (0) is not below 0. So any unprivileged caller can execute `transferFrom(address(0), anyone, 0)`: the call returns true and emits `Approval(address(0), caller, 0)` then `Transfer(address(0), anyone, 0)`. EIP-20 reserves a Transfer whose `from` is 0x0 for token creation and the constructor (line 64) uses exactly that shape for the one real mint, while the README and NatSpec state the supply is minted exactly once. Indexers, explorers and supply dashboards that build mint history from Transfer-from-zero logs will record extra zero-value mint rows for this token after launch. No balance, allowance or totalSupply changes: a non-zero value reverts with InsufficientAllowance(address(0), caller, 0, value) because nobody can approve as the zero address, so there is no loss of funds and the launch flows are unaffected. Related, same mechanism: `transferFrom(holder, attacker, 0)` with no allowance also succeeds and emits `Approval(holder, attacker, 0)` and `Transfer(holder, attacker, 0)` naming a holder who did nothing; zero-value transfers are standard EIP-20 behaviour, but the Approval emitted from `_spendAllowance` (line 145) is not something OpenZeppelin emits on spend. OpenZeppelin's ERC20 refuses the zero-address sender with ERC20InvalidSender. Minimal fix preserving intended behaviour: add `if (from == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();` at the top of `_transfer` next to the existing `to` check (optionally also drop the Approval emit in `_spendAllowance`). I verified all three specialist proofs fail on the current tree for exactly this reason (4 tests, 4 failures: 'next call did not revert as expected', 'a Transfer event with from == address(0) was emitted after deployment', 'a mint-shaped Transfer event was emitted after deployment').","line":120,"path":"src/ZeusToken.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {ZeusToken} from \"src/ZeusToken.sol\";\n\ncontract ZeroSenderTest is Test {\n    event Transfer(address indexed from, address indexed to, uint256 value);\n    event Approval(address indexed owner, address indexed spender, uint256 value);\n\n    ZeusToken token;\n    address constant DEPLOYER = address(0xDE91);\n    address constant ALICE = address(0xA11CE);\n    address constant ATTACKER = address(0xBAD);\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        vm.prank(DEPLOYER);\n        token = new ZeusToken();\n    }\n\n    /// Fails on the current code: the call succeeds and emits a mint-shaped event. Passes once\n    /// `_transfer` rejects `from == address(0)`.\n    function test_transferFromZeroSenderIsRefused() public {\n        vm.expectRevert(ZeusToken.ZeroAddress.selector);\n        vm.prank(ATTACKER);\n        token.transferFrom(address(0), ALICE, 0);\n    }\n}","reproduction":"State: fresh ZeusToken deployed by DEPLOYER (0xDE91), which holds 1e27. ATTACKER (0xBAD) holds nothing and has no allowance from anyone. Call: vm.prank(ATTACKER); token.transferFrom(address(0), 0xA11CE, 0). Expected: revert ZeroAddress() (the zero address cannot be a sender; no Transfer from 0x0 after the constructor). Actual: returns true and emits Approval(0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000, 0xBAD, 0) followed by Transfer(0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000, 0xA11CE, 0); balanceOf(0xA11CE) == 0 and totalSupply() == 1e27 unchanged. Control: vm.prank(ATTACKER); token.transferFrom(address(0), 0xA11CE, 1) reverts with InsufficientAllowance(0x0, 0xBAD, 0, 1), and vm.prank(DEPLOYER); token.transfer(address(0), 0) reverts with ZeroAddress(). Second shape: vm.prank(ATTACKER); token.transferFrom(DEPLOYER, ATTACKER, 0) returns true and emits Approval(0xDE91, 0xBAD, 0) and Transfer(0xDE91, 0xBAD, 0) with no allowance ever granted; balances and allowance unchanged. Proof below (copied from the audit_permissions proof, run under test/scratch) fails on the current code with 'next call did not revert as expected' and passes once _transfer rejects from == address(0).","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (to == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();","title":"transferFrom accepts address(0) as sender for zero value, so anyone can emit a mint-shaped Transfer(address(0), to, 0) and a spurious Approval(address(0), caller, 0) after deployment"}],"hash":"38fed53396bc7514f965f4525a5e3eb7b09ec6aeb7a066838d7520e4dbb078ae","nodeId":"bc036126-e6a2-4553-aae4-505dbd631545","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and written to `.imd-findings.json`. The working tree is otherwise unchanged, with the scratch directory removed.\n\n**Outcome.** The four specialist reports all describe one root cause, and it reproduces. I merged them into a single low-severity finding. My own pass over the token, the manifest and the compiled bytecode found nothing further.\n\n**The kept finding.** In `src/ZeusToken.sol`, the internal transfer only rejects a zero receiver, never a zero sender. With a zero value, the allowance check and the balance check both pass trivially. So any caller can run a transferFrom from the zero address and make the token emit a mint-shaped Transfer event plus a spurious Approval event. Nothing moves and the supply is untouched, so this is event hygiene, not loss of funds. All three attached specialist proofs failed on the current code for exactly the reason they state. I attached one of them to the finding.\n\n**Dropped or merged.** Nothing was dropped. The audit_flow note about zero-value transferFrom from a real holder with no allowance is the same mechanism and is folded into the one finding as a related shape.\n\n**My own checks, all holding:**\n- Supply is a constant equal to the manifest's totalSupply, minted once to msg.sender, which is the factory.\n- The ABI exposes only approve, transfer, transferFrom and views. No owner, mint, burn, pause, fallback or receive.\n- Runtime bytecode contains no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE, SELFDESTRUCT or any call or create opcode. Sizes are far below the limits.\n- Constructor takes no arguments and matches the empty constructorArgs in the manifest. The manifest uses only schema keys, lowercase addresses, a 9-character contract name and notes under the limit.\n- The project's 73 existing tests pass.\n\n**Coverage.** All three entry points are answered, plus three invariant rows. The protected launch harness could not be run here because it imports v4-core and launch contracts not in this tree, so I verified the flows it checks by trace instead.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":523746,"inputTokens":290,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":8167,"runtime":"claude","turns":10,"wallClockMs":186748}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"8c9c4986ca881107","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Asymmetry guide, branch/pair diff of transfer vs transferFrom and receiver vs sender validation. `_transfer` refuses `to == address(0)` (line 120) but never checks `from`, and `_spendAllowance` has no owner check either. `transferFrom` therefore accepts `from = address(0)`. For a non-zero `value` the call is stopped by the allowance check (`_allowances[0][spender]` is 0 and nobody can call `approve` as the zero address), so no balance can move. For `value == 0` nothing stops it: `_spendAllowance(0, caller, 0)` passes `0 < 0`, writes the (unchanged) allowance and emits `Approval(address(0), caller, 0)`; `_transfer(0, to, 0)` passes `0 < 0` and emits `Transfer(address(0), to, 0)`. EIP-20 reserves a Transfer with `_from == 0x0` for token creation, and the constructor at line 64 uses exactly that shape for the real mint, so an unprivileged caller can forge zero-value \"mint\" events to any address and zero-value Approval events from the zero address. OpenZeppelin's ERC20 reverts this path (`ERC20InvalidSender(address(0))`). Impact is limited to off-chain consumers: explorers, indexers or alerting that treat any `Transfer` from the zero address as a mint will record spurious mints of 0; balances, supply and allowances are unaffected. Minimal fix that preserves behaviour: add `if (from == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();` at the top of `_transfer` (and optionally an owner check in `_approve`/`_spendAllowance`).","line":119,"path":"src/ZeusToken.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {ZeusToken} from \"src/ZeusToken.sol\";\n\ncontract ZeroSenderTest is Test {\n    event Transfer(address indexed from, address indexed to, uint256 value);\n    event Approval(address indexed owner, address indexed spender, uint256 value);\n\n    ZeusToken token;\n    address constant DEPLOYER = address(0xDE91);\n    address constant ALICE = address(0xA11CE);\n    address constant ATTACKER = address(0xBAD);\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        vm.prank(DEPLOYER);\n        token = new ZeusToken();\n    }\n\n    /// Fails on the current code: the call succeeds and emits a mint-shaped event. Passes once\n    /// `_transfer` rejects `from == address(0)`.\n    function test_transferFromZeroSenderIsRefused() public {\n        vm.expectRevert(ZeusToken.ZeroAddress.selector);\n        vm.prank(ATTACKER);\n        token.transferFrom(address(0), ALICE, 0);\n    }\n}","reproduction":"State: fresh ZeusToken deployed by DEPLOYER (0xDE91). Call from ATTACKER (0xBAD, holds nothing, has no allowance): `token.transferFrom(address(0), ALICE, 0)`. Expected (per the contract's own zero-address policy and EIP-20 mint semantics): revert ZeroAddress. Actual: returns true and emits `Approval(0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000, 0xBAD, 0)` followed by `Transfer(0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000, ALICE, 0)`; balances and totalSupply unchanged. Control: `token.transferFrom(address(0), ALICE, 1)` from ATTACKER reverts with `InsufficientAllowance(0x0, 0xBAD, 0, 1)`, and `token.transfer(address(0), 0)` from DEPLOYER reverts with `ZeroAddress()`. Verified with a Foundry test under test/scratch (vm.expectEmit on both events, assertTrue on the return value) against the current tree.","severity":"low","snippet":"    function _transfer(address from, address to, uint256 value) private {\n        if (to == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();","title":"transferFrom accepts the zero address as sender and emits a mint-shaped Transfer(0x0, to, 0) event anyone can trigger"}],"hash":"52ac6f2c48228de56a58f3c9321814aa311de5d029711c5c1953092afe0cdd85","nodeId":"d9fa9081-9212-480d-8fb5-8ed806da5ab9","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. Only the findings file was written. No source, test, or configuration file changed, and the scratch tests were removed.\n\n**Outcome.** The Pegzeus token in `src/ZeusToken.sol` has no owner, role, initializer, proxy, fallback, or external call, so the Access Control and Trust Gap guides came back clean. The Asymmetry pass found one low-severity defect, recorded in `.imd-findings.json` with a reproduction and a failing Foundry proof.\n\n**Finding 1, low.** The internal transfer path refuses a zero-address receiver but never checks the sender. Any caller can run the following and it succeeds:\n\n```\ntransferFrom(address(0), anyone, 0)\n```\n\nThe token then emits a mint-shaped event, `Transfer(0x0, anyone, 0)`, plus `Approval(0x0, caller, 0)`. The same shape is what the constructor emits for the real mint, so indexers that treat any transfer from the zero address as a mint will record spurious zero-value mints. Non-zero amounts from the zero sender are stopped by the allowance check, so balances and supply cannot be affected. OpenZeppelin's ERC-20 rejects this path. The minimal fix is a `from == address(0)` revert at the top of the internal transfer. The proof test fails on the current code with \"next call did not revert as expected\" and will pass once that check exists.\n\n**What was checked and holds.**\n- All three listed entry points were traced for guards, state writes and failure paths. Approve and transfer hold. TransferFrom carries the finding above.\n- Constructor mints exactly one billion tokens with 18 decimals to the deployer, once, with no arguments, matching the brief and the protected launch test's expectations.\n- No privileged surface exists. Supply is a pure constant and cannot grow. The existing selector sweep and fuzz tests pass.\n- Runtime bytecode has no delegatecall, callcode or selfdestruct. Sending ether reverts.\n- No fee, tax or exemption list, so factory, distributor, pool seed and swap flows move exact amounts.\n- Static-analysis lead from aderyn about the large numeric literal is a style note only. Slither reported nothing.\n\n**Coverage record.** Eight rows were written: the three entry points, the constructor, and four invariant rows covering privileged surface, bytecode properties, launch flows, and the absent manifest. Nothing was left unreached.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":642286,"inputTokens":258,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":14285,"runtime":"claude","turns":28,"wallClockMs":312181}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"d50752329f3bece0f5afc47539aadb3201f54ac3f259a0c456ce053ff8737502","device":"93c37f17670e4d98","findings":[],"hash":"b87602ee749dfbcbc21f8a30899a45809a82f245e57ad9d2dacbda92adfcde9c","nodeId":"9ab97e4b-92de-4357-8058-247cb40cd694","outcome":"completed","summary":"Done. The Pegzeus (ZEUS) token is implemented, tested, documented and committed on main.\n\n**What was delivered**\n\n- `src/ZeusToken.sol`: a self-contained fixed-supply ERC-20. The constructor takes no arguments and mints the whole supply of one billion ZEUS at 18 decimals to the deployer once. It has no owner, mint, burn, pause, blocklist, fee or upgrade path, imports no library, and makes no external calls. Transfers to the zero address and zero-address spenders revert with custom errors. An unlimited allowance is not decremented.\n- `script/DeployZeusToken.s.sol`: a deploy script whose `deploy()` is called directly by the tests. It reads no environment variables.\n- `test/ZeusToken.t.sol`: 31 tests covering metadata, the one-time mint to whichever address deploys, exact transfer accounting, allowance success and failure paths, revert reasons, event emission, rejection of every common admin selector from both a stranger and the deployer, rejection of ether, absence of DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE and SELFDESTRUCT in the runtime, deployability of the raw creation code, and fuzzed supply conservation.\n- `foundry.toml` pins solc 0.8.26 with `bytecode_hash = \"none\"` and cbor metadata off. The compiled artifact has no metadata trailer and no link references.\n- `lib/forge-std` is forge-std v1.9.7 vendored as plain files with no nested git metadata.\n- `README.md` documents behaviour, assumptions, the launch parameters decided by the policy, manual deployment, operational responsibilities and the security checklist as applied.\n\n**Verification results**\n\n| Check | Result |\n| --- | --- |\n| forge build | passes |\n| forge test | 31 passed, 0 failed |\n| forge fmt --check | passes |\n| Clean copy, offline build and test | passes |\n\n**Notes for the reviewer**\n\n- Because transfers are untaxed, the token needs no factory, pool manager or distributor exemptions, so the constructor has zero arguments. That matches the protected harness, which appends the manifest's constructor arguments to the creation code.\n- Slither and Mythril were not available here and were not run. The README says so.\n- No launch.json was written, per the brief.","treeHash":"18b2134451472aa2ed82eb85d00175ab03600f3d","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":671825,"inputTokens":354,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":21441,"runtime":"claude","turns":24,"wallClockMs":392563}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"ddfb1efa72fe9a94","findings":[],"hash":"dfe5d8aed11e090760eec1f60ce5680002fb2810445656938c63e29492b4d904","nodeId":"2c45ed77-4fc6-41cc-994f-a1209cab1981","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is written and the working tree has no changes beyond it.\n\n**Result: no defects in the Math Precision, Boundary or Numerical Gap area.** The file `.imd-findings.json` holds an empty findings list and six coverage rows, all `holds`.\n\n**What I checked against the three guides**\n\n- **Math Precision.** The only arithmetic is the constant supply expression, one unchecked subtraction and addition in the transfer internals, and one unchecked allowance decrement. Each unchecked subtraction is preceded by the matching strict less-than guard. The addition cannot overflow because no mint or burn path exists and the sum of balances is pinned at 1e27. There is no division, no downcast, no decimals mixing and no rounding anywhere. The aderyn large-literal lead is the supply constant, which evaluates to exactly one billion times ten to the eighteenth.\n- **Boundary.** The contract has no external call, no payable, receive or fallback, no bytes decoding and no address-typed parameters that reach a call. The two sentinel branches (zero receiver, zero spender) revert on every path. Max-uint amounts revert with the custom error rather than wrapping. An allowance of max minus one is decremented normally, so only the exact sentinel is unlimited. A transferFrom that fails on balance leaves the allowance unchanged.\n- **Numerical Gap.** With no division and no early-return fast path except the unlimited-allowance return, there is no seam. The constant totalSupply cannot drift from the live sum of balances because transfers to the zero address are refused.\n\n**Evidence.** Beyond the project's 31 passing tests, I ran a scratch invariant suite under test/scratch and then deleted it. It held the sum-of-balances invariant across 256 runs of 500 handler calls, and checked exact accounting on every successful or reverted transfer, transferFrom and approve, plus unit tests for self-transfer through allowance, from-equals-zero, max-value inputs and the near-unlimited allowance edge. All passed.\n\n**Outside my area, noted but not reported.** A transferFrom of zero value emits an Approval event with value zero for an owner who never approved anything. The emitted value matches true state and matches OpenZeppelin 4.x behaviour, so I did not list it as a defect.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":414602,"inputTokens":194,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":11149,"runtime":"claude","turns":16,"wallClockMs":171176}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"99c6d0bcc495ad61","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Execution trace of transferFrom(from, to, value): _spendAllowance reads _allowances[from][msg.sender]; with value == 0 the check `current < value` (line 141) is 0 < 0 == false, so the call proceeds with no allowance at all and emits Approval(from, msg.sender, 0). _transfer (line 119) then checks only `to == address(0)` and `fromBalance < value` (0 < 0 == false), so it passes for any `from`, including address(0), and emits Transfer(from, to, 0). The result is that an unprivileged caller can, at will, emit (a) Transfer(address(0), anyAddress, 0), which indexers and explorers classify as a mint event, on a token whose documentation states nothing can ever mint, and (b) Transfer(victim, attacker, 0) plus Approval(victim, attacker, 0) naming any holder as sender/owner without the holder's participation. No balance, allowance or supply changes, so there is no on-chain loss; the impact is limited to event-stream spoofing (fake mint rows, fake approval rows, spurious holder entries at zero balance). EIP-20 permits zero-value Transfer events, but reference implementations (OpenZeppelin ERC20._transfer) reject from == address(0) with ERC20InvalidSender precisely to keep Transfer-from-zero reserved for real mints. Minimal fix preserving intended behaviour: in _transfer add `if (from == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();` next to the existing `to` check. Optionally also skip the Approval emit in _spendAllowance when current == value == 0, though that is purely cosmetic.","line":120,"path":"src/ZeusToken.sol","reproduction":"State: freshly deployed ZeusToken (deployer D holds 1e27). Attacker A = 0xBAD has no balance and no allowance from anyone.\n1. vm.prank(A); token.transferFrom(address(0), A, 0)\n   Expected (per README 'no function can mint' and OpenZeppelin semantics): revert.\n   Actual: returns true; emits Approval(address(0), A, 0) and Transfer(address(0), A, 0). totalSupply() and all balances unchanged.\n2. vm.prank(A); token.transferFrom(D, A, 0)\n   Expected: revert InsufficientAllowance or at least no event naming D as approver.\n   Actual: returns true; emits Approval(D, A, 0) and Transfer(D, A, 0). D's balance and allowance to A unchanged (both still 1e27 / 0).\nVerified with a forge test using vm.expectEmit on both events (test/scratch/Probe.t.sol, tests test_zeroValueTransferFromZeroAddressEmitsMintLikeEvent and test_zeroValueTransferFromAnyoneWithoutAllowance, both pass against the current code, i.e. the events are emitted).","severity":"info","snippet":"        if (to == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();","title":"transferFrom accepts from == address(0) and zero-value spends with no allowance, letting anyone emit mint-shaped Transfer(address(0), x, 0) and Approval(victim, attacker, 0) events"}],"hash":"fd614dfe5438482be8f2068e01fe730bfe978db5932d25c89437721eae16ea00","nodeId":"cef80720-8348-4897-be4e-bcbf96e25139","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and `.imd-findings.json` is written. The working tree is otherwise untouched: git status shows no modified tracked files, and `test/scratch/` is gitignored.\n\n**Outcome.** The token holds up under the Execution Trace, Periphery and First Principles guides. I found no defect that moves value, changes supply, or breaks a launch flow. One informational deviation is reported with a reproduction.\n\n**What I traced**\n\n- `transfer`: zero-receiver and insufficient-balance guards, the unchecked arithmetic (safe because the balance sum is pinned at 1e27), self-transfer conservation, and the max-value boundary. It moves exactly the requested amount, so the factory, distributor, seed and swap flows in the protected floor arrive whole.\n- `transferFrom`: allowance spend before transfer, unlimited-allowance skip, atomic revert when balance is short, self-transferFrom semantics.\n- `approve`: zero-spender guard and unconditional overwrite. The approval race is documented and is standard behaviour, not a defect.\n- Invariants: supply conservation under fuzzing, single mint in the constructor to the creator, no privileged selectors in the compiled ABI, no receive or fallback, no delegatecall, callcode or selfdestruct.\n- Periphery: the deploy script and the build settings the launch requires. There are no libraries or helpers in this project.\n\n**The one finding (info).** Any account can call `transferFrom(address(0), x, 0)` or `transferFrom(victim, attacker, 0)` with no allowance. Both succeed and emit a zero-value Transfer and Approval. The first is a mint-shaped event on a token documented as unmintable. Nothing on chain changes, so this is event-stream spoofing only. The fix is one extra guard rejecting a zero sender in the internal transfer, mirroring OpenZeppelin. Coverage rows are filed for all three listed entry points plus four invariant and periphery rows.\n\n**Not reached.** Nothing in my assigned area was left unverified. I did not run Slither or Mythril, since the task supplied their output; the aderyn large-literal note is stylistic and was not promoted.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":926079,"inputTokens":450,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":14651,"runtime":"claude","turns":22,"wallClockMs":194619}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":773,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 23 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 652.29ms\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":88,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 31 tests for test/ZeusToken.t.sol:ZeusTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_randomSelectorsNeverChangeSupply(bytes4,bytes32,bytes32) (runs: 256, μ: 45617, ~: 45799)\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferAboveBalanceReverts(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 92972, ~: 93154)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 5253\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 109138, ~: 109682)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 584001654212672156260821900\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFromDecrementsAllowanceExactly(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 146012, ~: 147171)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 5253\n\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_approveZeroAddressSpender() (gas: 30381)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_sendingEther() (gas: 36864)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferExceedsBalance() (gas: 85364)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromEmptyAccount() (gas: 33176)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromExceedsAllowance() (gas: 80566)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromExceedsOwnerBalanceDespiteAllowance() (gas: 135314)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromToZeroAddress() (gas: 85110)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromWithoutAnyAllowance() (gas: 33487)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferToZeroAddress() (gas: 30380)\n[PASS] test_approveOverwritesPreviousAllowance() (gas: 90333)\n[PASS] test_approveSetsAllowanceAndEmits() (gas: 63063)\n[PASS] test_approveZeroClearsAllowance() (gas: 85470)\n[PASS] test_constructorMintsWholeSupplyToDeployerOnce() (gas: 27084)\n[PASS] test_creationCodeTakesNoConstructorArguments() (gas: 505896)\n[PASS] test_deployScriptMintsToTheBroadcaster() (gas: 1127942)\n[PASS] test_deployerCannotMoveAnotherHoldersBalance() (gas: 92556)\n[PASS] test_deployerIsWhoeverCreatesTheContract() (gas: 17846)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 26874)\n[PASS] test_noAdminSelectorExists() (gas: 1137437)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoDelegatecallCallcodeOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 2245566)\n[PASS] test_supplyIsOneBillionWithEighteenDecimals() (gas: 26137)\n[PASS] test_transferFromSpendsAllowanceAndEmits() (gas: 157012)\n[PASS] test_transferFromWithUnlimitedAllowanceDoesNotDecrement() (gas: 125948)\n[PASS] test_transferMovesExactAmountAndEmits() (gas: 87942)\n[PASS] test_transferOfZeroSucceeds() (gas: 42966)\n[PASS] test_transferToSelfKeepsBalance() (gas: 93201)\n[PASS] test_transferWholeBalanceLeavesZero() (gas: 71460)\nSuite result: ok. 31 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 9.18ms (39.77ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test suite in 9.86ms (9.18ms CPU time): 31 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (31 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":37,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"ZeusToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"ZeusToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"ZeusToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":6,\"README.md\":123,\"foundry.toml\":27,\"launch.json\":24,\"remappings.txt\":1,\"script/DeployZeusToken.s.sol\":26,\"src/ZeusToken.sol\":147,\"test/ZeusToken.t.sol\":385},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"0c07415a26533d26ad1020353e45ed637ef77830324f6d5de3d61b5cccea3b45","verifiedTreeHash":"b6d7f7f934d2940d1b09c3d191c0c949d2d7b13a","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+c4d32abc"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":1569,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 25 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 1.47s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":17891,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 31 tests for test/ZeusToken.t.sol:ZeusTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_randomSelectorsNeverChangeSupply(bytes4,bytes32,bytes32) (runs: 256, μ: 45606, ~: 45799)\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferAboveBalanceReverts(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 91907, ~: 93060)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 827905\n  Bound result 5000000000000000000\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 109215, ~: 109676)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 0\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFromDecrementsAllowanceExactly(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 144234, ~: 147079)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 827905\n  Bound result 312688\n\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_approveZeroAddressSpender() (gas: 30381)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_sendingEther() (gas: 36864)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferExceedsBalance() (gas: 85364)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromEmptyAccount() (gas: 33176)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromExceedsAllowance() (gas: 80566)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromExceedsOwnerBalanceDespiteAllowance() (gas: 135314)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromToZeroAddress() (gas: 85110)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromWithoutAnyAllowance() (gas: 33487)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferToZeroAddress() (gas: 30380)\n[PASS] test_approveOverwritesPreviousAllowance() (gas: 90333)\n[PASS] test_approveSetsAllowanceAndEmits() (gas: 63063)\n[PASS] test_approveZeroClearsAllowance() (gas: 85470)\n[PASS] test_constructorMintsWholeSupplyToDeployerOnce() (gas: 27084)\n[PASS] test_creationCodeTakesNoConstructorArguments() (gas: 505896)\n[PASS] test_deployScriptMintsToTheBroadcaster() (gas: 1127942)\n[PASS] test_deployerCannotMoveAnotherHoldersBalance() (gas: 92556)\n[PASS] test_deployerIsWhoeverCreatesTheContract() (gas: 17846)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 26874)\n[PASS] test_noAdminSelectorExists() (gas: 1137437)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoDelegatecallCallcodeOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 2245566)\n[PASS] test_supplyIsOneBillionWithEighteenDecimals() (gas: 26137)\n[PASS] test_transferFromSpendsAllowanceAndEmits() (gas: 157012)\n[PASS] test_transferFromWithUnlimitedAllowanceDoesNotDecrement() (gas: 125948)\n[PASS] test_transferMovesExactAmountAndEmits() (gas: 87942)\n[PASS] test_transferOfZeroSucceeds() (gas: 42966)\n[PASS] test_transferToSelfKeepsBalance() (gas: 93201)\n[PASS] test_transferWholeBalanceLeavesZero() (gas: 71460)\nSuite result: ok. 31 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 75.07ms (143.58ms CPU time)\n\nRan 41 tests for test/ZeusToken.edges.t.sol:ZeusTokenEdgeTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_approveOverwritesNotAccumulates(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 90548, ~: 90639)\n[PASS] testFuzz_approveSetsExactly(address,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 86046, ~: 86903)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 316526743418344945414720175197996926630344588322\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_randomCalldataNeverChangesBalancesOrAllowances(bytes,address) (runs: 1000, μ: 106480, ~: 106326)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 48879\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_roundTripReturnsExactly(uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 109625, ~: 109752)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 5\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_splitThenMergeEqualsSingleTransfer(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 117704, ~: 118691)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 163800763333737017805915621\n  Bound result 534642395531\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_strangerCanNeverMoveAnything(address,address,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 68423, ~: 68506)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 642719433865697547594508438862032943730304639195\n  Bound result 433413959319203619768981859350196892310862550380\n  Bound result 24198281633875724574732266346305205519856071310009578462604147677007673145342\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferChainConservesSupply(uint256,uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 208462, ~: 210691)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 310517459572099892058546941\n  Bound result 289717739028933928386589716\n  Bound result 75158102874524826265741096\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFromAboveBalanceWithEnoughAllowanceReverts(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 175287, ~: 175979)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1731\n  Bound result 902\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFromAboveFiniteAllowanceReverts(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 105307, ~: 105621)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 37167076537645809183163800800500813555451724804\n  Bound result 534642395531\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferToAnyNonZeroAddressDeliversWhole(address,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 89800, ~: 91247)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1047962496382886055419428810272547581813593034840\n  Bound result 1456794876111\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_unlimitedAllowanceNeverDecrements(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 201985, ~: 202965)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 127\n  Bound result 96357860\n\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_addressArgumentHasDirtyHighBits() (gas: 36692)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_approveZeroToZeroAddressSpender() (gas: 30368)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_emptyCalldata() (gas: 29645)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_ownerPullsOwnBalanceWithoutSelfApproval() (gas: 33632)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferCalldataIsTruncated() (gas: 53748)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferCalledWithValue() (gas: 48719)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromMaxUintWithUnlimitedAllowance() (gas: 83433)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromZeroAddressOfOneWei() (gas: 33639)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferMaxUint() (gas: 33484)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferZeroToZeroAddress() (gas: 30390)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_unlimitedAllowanceButOwnerIsEmpty() (gas: 90271)\n[PASS] test_allowanceIsIsolatedPerPair() (gas: 113017)\n[PASS] test_allowanceOneBelowMaxIsNotUnlimited() (gas: 120991)\n[PASS] test_approveEmitsExactlyOneEvent() (gas: 57818)\n[PASS] test_constructorEmitsExactlyOneMintEvent() (gas: 9554)\n[PASS] test_creationCodeIgnoresAppendedBytes() (gas: 515534)\n[PASS] test_factoryStyleDeploymentMintsToTheFactory() (gas: 280355)\n[PASS] test_failedTransferEmitsNothing() (gas: 34940)\n[PASS] test_failedTransferFromDoesNotConsumeAllowance() (gas: 168354)\n[PASS] test_mutatorsReturnExactlyOneTrueWord() (gas: 165545)\n[PASS] test_selfApprovalThenSelfTransferFromSpendsAllowance() (gas: 131148)\n[PASS] test_spendingExactAllowanceLeavesZeroThenRefusesMore() (gas: 148821)\n[PASS] test_transferEmitsExactlyOneEvent() (gas: 63755)\n[PASS] test_transferFromWithFiniteAllowanceEmitsApprovalThenTransfer() (gas: 120839)\n[PASS] test_transferFromWithUnlimitedAllowanceEmitsOnlyTransfer() (gas: 112910)\n[PASS] test_transferFromZeroAddressOfZeroMovesNothing() (gas: 77177)\n[PASS] test_transferToTokenContractIsAcceptedAndStranded() (gas: 76772)\n[PASS] test_twoDeploymentsAreIndependent() (gas: 100311)\n[PASS] test_unlimitedAllowanceSurvivesDrainingTheOwner() (gas: 207481)\n[PASS] test_viewsReturnOneWordEach() (gas: 29809)\nSuite result: ok. 41 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 75.99ms (803.19ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/ZeusToken.invariants.t.sol:ZeusTokenInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nZeusTokenInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_allowancesMatchGhosts\n[PASS] invariant_balancesMatchGhosts\n[PASS] invariant_metadataIsImmutable\n[PASS] invariant_noHolderExceedsSupply\n[PASS] invariant_noImplicitRecipients\n[PASS] invariant_totalSupplyIsFixed\n[PASS] invariant_trackedBalancesSumToSupply\n[PASS] invariant_zeroAddressHoldsNothing\n ZeusTokenInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 25600, reverts: 0)\n\n╭------------------+--------------------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract         | Selector                       | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+================================================================================+\n| ZeusTokenHandler | approve                        | 1313  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+--------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ZeusTokenHandler | approveUnlimited               | 1362  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+--------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ZeusTokenHandler | approveZero                    | 1352  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+--------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ZeusTokenHandler | approveZeroAddressSpender      | 1342  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+--------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ZeusTokenHandler | callArbitrarySelector          | 1351  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+--------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ZeusTokenHandler | sendEther                      | 1326  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+--------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ZeusTokenHandler | transfer                       | 1329  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+--------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ZeusTokenHandler | transferExceedingBalance       | 1344  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+--------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ZeusTokenHandler | transferFrom                   | 1337  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+--------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ZeusTokenHandler | transferFromExceedingAllowance | 1372  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+--------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ZeusTokenHandler | transferFromExceedingBalance   | 1396  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+--------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ZeusTokenHandler | transferFromToZeroAddress      | 1314  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+--------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ZeusTokenHandler | transferFromWholeAllowance     | 1319  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+--------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ZeusTokenHandler | transferFromWithoutAllowance   | 1386  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+--------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ZeusTokenHandler | transferFullBalance            | 1332  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+--------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ZeusTokenHandler | transferOneWei                 | 1320  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+--------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ZeusTokenHandler | transferToSelf                 | 1396  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+--------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ZeusTokenHandler | transferToStranger             | 1365  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+--------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ZeusTokenHandler | transferToZeroAddress          | 1344  | 0       | 0        |\n╰------------------+--------------------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 3474162266\n  Bound result 16970\n  Bound result 39999999999999999998\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 938463463374607772050586613\n  Bound result 4136\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 48879\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 4294967296\n  Bound result 610808921463514891005198006323093375251782249537\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 14764\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 1529\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 2546\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 41\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 1449\n  Bound result 18044\n  Bound result 1467\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 3745337211\n  Bound result 32\n  Bound result 938463463374607772050586613\n  Bound result 1096\n  Bound result 60000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000\n  Bound result 293611165476118310981938536\n  Bound result 19515\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 823848004754476769463186600158309260623708342053\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 6201\n  Bound result 142656200131271923454646\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 192\n  Bound result 1825694312\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 3029184283\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 14410\n  Bound result 12400886871000901\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 4136\n  Bound result 14783\n  Bound result 12976\n  Bound result 14170862331528793133481465744128209718630301243639276836814985056955045532494\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 17.81s (17.80s CPU time)\n\nRan 3 test suites in 17.81s (17.96s CPU time): 73 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (73 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":38,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"ZeusToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"ZeusToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"ZeusToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":6,\"README.md\":123,\"foundry.toml\":27,\"remappings.txt\":1,\"script/DeployZeusToken.s.sol\":26,\"src/ZeusToken.sol\":147,\"test/ZeusToken.edges.t.sol\":591,\"test/ZeusToken.invariants.t.sol\":531,\"test/ZeusToken.t.sol\":385},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"259b4085a357533b6718e95cdbdef4e537d6b89b8bd6b6640f8d4217c5aad19a","verifiedTreeHash":"9f9bed2e9fc02de8b4f80483cc2b116eef40f9a2","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+c4d32abc"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":742,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 23 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 653.83ms\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":83,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 31 tests for test/ZeusToken.t.sol:ZeusTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_randomSelectorsNeverChangeSupply(bytes4,bytes32,bytes32) (runs: 256, μ: 45604, ~: 45809)\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferAboveBalanceReverts(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 92837, ~: 93118)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 5536214174965128101223\n  Bound result 116188289717544337287056622\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 109042, ~: 109670)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 700678757648301037347385422\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFromDecrementsAllowanceExactly(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 145559, ~: 147147)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2\n\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_approveZeroAddressSpender() (gas: 30381)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_sendingEther() (gas: 36864)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferExceedsBalance() (gas: 85364)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromEmptyAccount() (gas: 33176)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromExceedsAllowance() (gas: 80566)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromExceedsOwnerBalanceDespiteAllowance() (gas: 135314)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromToZeroAddress() (gas: 85110)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromWithoutAnyAllowance() (gas: 33487)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferToZeroAddress() (gas: 30380)\n[PASS] test_approveOverwritesPreviousAllowance() (gas: 90333)\n[PASS] test_approveSetsAllowanceAndEmits() (gas: 63063)\n[PASS] test_approveZeroClearsAllowance() (gas: 85470)\n[PASS] test_constructorMintsWholeSupplyToDeployerOnce() (gas: 27084)\n[PASS] test_creationCodeTakesNoConstructorArguments() (gas: 505896)\n[PASS] test_deployScriptMintsToTheBroadcaster() (gas: 1127942)\n[PASS] test_deployerCannotMoveAnotherHoldersBalance() (gas: 92556)\n[PASS] test_deployerIsWhoeverCreatesTheContract() (gas: 17846)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 26874)\n[PASS] test_noAdminSelectorExists() (gas: 1137437)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoDelegatecallCallcodeOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 2245566)\n[PASS] test_supplyIsOneBillionWithEighteenDecimals() (gas: 26137)\n[PASS] test_transferFromSpendsAllowanceAndEmits() (gas: 157012)\n[PASS] test_transferFromWithUnlimitedAllowanceDoesNotDecrement() (gas: 125948)\n[PASS] test_transferMovesExactAmountAndEmits() (gas: 87942)\n[PASS] test_transferOfZeroSucceeds() (gas: 42966)\n[PASS] test_transferToSelfKeepsBalance() (gas: 93201)\n[PASS] test_transferWholeBalanceLeavesZero() (gas: 71460)\nSuite result: ok. 31 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 9.75ms (40.58ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test suite in 10.53ms (9.75ms CPU time): 31 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (31 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":34,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"ZeusToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"ZeusToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"ZeusToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":6,\"README.md\":123,\"foundry.toml\":27,\"remappings.txt\":1,\"script/DeployZeusToken.s.sol\":26,\"src/ZeusToken.sol\":147,\"test/ZeusToken.t.sol\":385},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":310,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"slither: no results at low impact or above","passed":true},{"durationMs":234,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[low] large-numeric-literal at src/ZeusToken.sol:27: Large Numeric Literal","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"b87602ee749dfbcbc21f8a30899a45809a82f245e57ad9d2dacbda92adfcde9c","verifiedTreeHash":"18b2134451472aa2ed82eb85d00175ab03600f3d","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+c4d32abc"}]}