{"assessments":[],"deployments":[],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"f66fcb49-4b9a-4c70-9aa9-656f5b14d13f","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"34c6245657082065299c7ff58a418ad68c0d86db55383bf7c1fd8b3577dbd833","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_economics","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"2218c98e698f39239287e45ac34ff849eb11b869f4dd7254ff664d0cd9a695db","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_flow","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"c103085c98b84ce6efc1ebbcabc2a8c1ea94a6188d2d4b2684a74c8e600ad9e7","dependsOn":["build_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest","audit_math","audit_permissions","audit_economics","audit_flow"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"3014f1ea5961918ca059453a484bf4c8bcbbfc2248dbe31d94ac7c5cdf8f50bd","skillId":"audit-judge","tools":[]},"key":"audit_judge","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"3014f1ea5961918ca059453a484bf4c8bcbbfc2248dbe31d94ac7c5cdf8f50bd","skillId":"audit-judge","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"ef6e0cdabd446bbe6096134e2c472e7223cca341fda10d2fd7770b8c9473d0d3","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_math","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"117e225b86fe208a790d0e4673c57262817ee057654ee6d8cac2609749f698b9","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_permissions","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"634341499be69166245daa9dc1a54e68b6f2ac676647105d7dd1fb0f53665025","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"b6503de65ad02f845827887c23da4c3b56ccc5df7a459db263bae6e549d92f7f","skillId":"build-contract-project","tools":[]},"key":"build_contract_project","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"b6503de65ad02f845827887c23da4c3b56ccc5df7a459db263bae6e549d92f7f","skillId":"build-contract-project","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"c5ac6022953a8c3d295221be7d0b402a73a8d7aebdecc9a0cdf87b9dc1ccc2c4","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"tools":[]},"key":"manifest","kind":"code","role":"integrate","skillHash":null,"skillId":null,"state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"225a99e29fdda46e79f381006d1ca16c6f153d432bed12284b86511c389768d3","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"73431852439ad3a343f3d2b7db1c43cd363b9f48f9bb51497374a0cf6d50b223","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","tools":[]},"key":"write_foundry_tests","kind":"code","role":"tests","skillHash":"73431852439ad3a343f3d2b7db1c43cd363b9f48f9bb51497374a0cf6d50b223","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"write a smart contract which can receive funds: ETH, USDT, USDC and IMD. (0xD34a99Bc0f67aE1bbd63C660e6d0b0dd03E263B7 on Ethereum mainnet).\n\nDesign the smart contract that it should accept maximum of 10K worth of assets (set the ETH price at fixed 2600 and IMD price 9 dollars)\n\nOnly this address 0x047f606fd5b2baa5f5c6c4ab8958e45cb6b054b7 should withdraw the funds, but he shall be withdraw it any time any amount, full too.\n\nUpgrades and pausing: owner can upgrade and pause","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"712006db1a21611a7418326d88101b6777c85612dc4d96f69d457b440f24ada8","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"f66fcb49-4b9a-4c70-9aa9-656f5b14d13f","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-799-write-smart-contract-can"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"51024","feedbackHash":"f8dba9475983b406f7349475c2f255e0d2a6e50b9dab80cc8f9c6f2337e6a7e3","nodeKey":"audit_economics","submissionHash":"34c6245657082065299c7ff58a418ad68c0d86db55383bf7c1fd8b3577dbd833","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51337","feedbackHash":"571b50934677fd064c5a9b81cd01c35bdd72e759e9f0e4712f81b015d15bc2a9","nodeKey":"audit_flow","submissionHash":"2218c98e698f39239287e45ac34ff849eb11b869f4dd7254ff664d0cd9a695db","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51481","feedbackHash":"4f14a9bb42e71c772a61848e914156fccd9342ac61b785c5a4b3c23bd9b6972e","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"c103085c98b84ce6efc1ebbcabc2a8c1ea94a6188d2d4b2684a74c8e600ad9e7","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51022","feedbackHash":"adda25e5736e01102cc8f3ea3282c858fe35edea16b340a4b15982942a5f33f6","nodeKey":"audit_math","submissionHash":"ef6e0cdabd446bbe6096134e2c472e7223cca341fda10d2fd7770b8c9473d0d3","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51288","feedbackHash":"66a15a8bc0c350b2a445f09cb96d6222b1775c3b698d905274c4f1ed80ff607f","nodeKey":"audit_permissions","submissionHash":"117e225b86fe208a790d0e4673c57262817ee057654ee6d8cac2609749f698b9","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52241","feedbackHash":"0f1be2b241ad77a898f76aa65556f03ead61cb77abd24790834df0b892ce7b45","nodeKey":"build_contract_project","submissionHash":"634341499be69166245daa9dc1a54e68b6f2ac676647105d7dd1fb0f53665025","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52242","feedbackHash":"b2ee77303281a41bf2adeb0cc8446dc8494f1920ad01b41531f205456af9a3fb","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"c5ac6022953a8c3d295221be7d0b402a73a8d7aebdecc9a0cdf87b9dc1ccc2c4","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51475","feedbackHash":"2b6af63fc16f8fe52634a75ab9c2e3af856c8babe4a25eb43d3fcc5397ddf637","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"225a99e29fdda46e79f381006d1ca16c6f153d432bed12284b86511c389768d3","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"78a43980b057410cd5e2066604aeecbd1b09634293f099a1fa92520102e1bd7d","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"1559912e747bbcd4","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Trust Gap seam access x economics. The brief asks that the contract \"accept maximum of 10K worth of assets\". The cap check in _acceptDeposit compares only the vault's present balances (totalValueUsd) against MAX_USD_WAD and the contract keeps no record of cumulative receipts. Each withdrawal by WITHDRAWER (withdrawETH / withdrawToken / withdrawAll, which carry no pause or policy restriction) therefore frees the same capacity again, and the vault will accept another full $10,000. Across the life of the contract the amount accepted is unbounded; only the instantaneous balance is capped. The README documents this as the intended reading (\"Withdrawals restore deposit capacity\"), but the brief's wording is at least as naturally read as a lifetime ceiling. If the requester meant a lifetime cap, a depositor cannot rely on the contract to refuse the 10,001st dollar once the beneficiary has withdrawn. Fix if a lifetime cap is intended: track a monotonically increasing acceptedUsdWad in _acceptDeposit (acceptedUsdWad += valueOfReceipt; revert if it exceeds MAX_USD_WAD) and leave the withdrawal path unchanged. If the holdings-cap reading is confirmed by the requester, this finding needs no code change.","line":153,"path":"src/CappedAssetVault.sol","reproduction":"State: fresh vault, OpenDepositPolicy, Alice holds 20,000 USDC. 1) Alice approve(vault, 10_000e6) then depositToken(USDC, 10_000e6) -> succeeds, totalValueUsd()==10_000e18. 2) Alice depositToken(USDC, 1) -> reverts CapExceeded(10_000e18 + 1e12), as expected. 3) WITHDRAWER (0x047F606fD5b2BaA5f5C6c4aB8958E45CB6B054B7) calls withdrawAll(USDC) -> vault balance 0, remainingCapacityUsd()==10_000e18. 4) Alice approve + depositToken(USDC, 10_000e6) -> succeeds. Expected under a lifetime-cap reading: step 4 reverts because $20,000 has now been accepted. Actual: step 4 succeeds; usdc.balanceOf(WITHDRAWER)+usdc.balanceOf(vault)==20_000e6. Verified by test/scratch/LifetimeCap.t.sol::test_LifetimeReceiptsExceedTenThousandAfterWithdrawal (passes on current code, i.e. demonstrates the behavior).","severity":"low","snippet":"        uint256 value = totalValueUsd();\n        if (value > MAX_USD_WAD) revert CapExceeded(value);","title":"The $10,000 cap bounds current holdings only; beneficiary withdrawals reopen capacity so lifetime acceptance is unbounded"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Access-control scope note, not a permission bypass. upgradeTo only swaps the IDepositPolicy address that is consulted by STATICCALL during deposits. No owner call sequence can alter WITHDRAWER, ETH_PRICE_USD, IMD_PRICE_USD, MAX_USD_WAD, the asset set or the withdrawal logic, and there is no proxy. This is a deliberate narrowing: the launch policy and the protected runtime check forbid DELEGATECALL/CALLCODE/SELFDESTRUCT and proxies, so a UUPS/transparent upgrade is not deployable here, and the README states the tradeoff. The judge should confirm the requester accepts this reading of \"upgrade\"; if a fuller upgrade path was expected it requires a scope decision outside this contract (a new reviewed deployment plus funds moved by the beneficiary). Trust assumptions in this area, recorded for completeness: the owner can pause deposits indefinitely and can install a policy that rejects all or selected depositors; neither power touches withdrawals (verified: withdrawETH/withdrawToken/withdrawAll carry only nonReentrant + onlyWithdrawer and never read depositPolicy or _paused).","line":134,"path":"src/CappedAssetVault.sol","reproduction":"State: deployed vault, owner O. Sequence: O calls pause(); O calls upgradeTo(P2) with any contract whose policyId() returns POLICY_ID; O calls unpause(). After this, vault.WITHDRAWER()==0x047F606fD5b2BaA5f5C6c4aB8958E45CB6B054B7, ETH_PRICE_USD()==2600, IMD_PRICE_USD()==9, MAX_USD_WAD()==10_000e18 and the withdrawal functions are byte-identical in behavior; only depositPolicy() changed. There is no entry point by which the owner can change any of those values (full ABI inventory: acceptOwnership, depositETH, depositToken, pause, receive, transferOwnership, unpause, upgradeTo, withdrawAll, withdrawETH, withdrawToken, renounceOwnership(reverts)). Expected by a proxy-upgrade reading of the brief: owner could replace custody code. Actual: impossible by design.","severity":"info","snippet":"    function upgradeTo(address newPolicy) external nonReentrant onlyOwner whenPaused {\n        _setPolicy(newPolicy);\n    }","title":"\"Owner can upgrade\" is implemented as a replaceable deposit-admission policy only; custody rules, prices, cap and beneficiary cannot be upgraded"}],"hash":"117e225b86fe208a790d0e4673c57262817ee057654ee6d8cac2609749f698b9","nodeId":"ba07160b-6b65-4e13-9fef-682cd44a5f4d","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. `.imd-findings.json` holds two findings and a 15-row coverage record, and no source or configuration file was changed.\n\n**Outcome.** The permission model in `src/CappedAssetVault.sol` holds against the Access Control, Trust Gap and Asymmetry checklists. No permission bypass, escalation path or asymmetric guard was found. Every guarded storage slot has a single writer class, withdrawals never read pause state or the policy, and the beneficiary address is a compile-time constant that no owner call can alter.\n\n**Findings written:**\n\n- **Low, line 153.** The $10K cap is enforced on current holdings only. After the beneficiary withdraws, the vault accepts another full $10,000, so lifetime receipts are unbounded. The README documents this reading, but the brief's wording can be read as a lifetime ceiling. Reproduced with a scratch test that deposits $10K, withdraws all, and deposits $10K again.\n- **Info, line 134.** \"Owner can upgrade\" is implemented as a swappable deposit-admission policy. Custody logic, prices, cap and beneficiary are not upgradeable. This is forced by the platform ban on delegatecall and proxies and is documented, but the requester should confirm it matches their intent.\n\n**Live-chain verification** at mainnet block 26133529 confirmed the configuration assumptions: the IMD address is a verified LayerZero OFT token with 18 decimals and plain ERC20 semantics, USDT and USDC have 6 decimals, and the beneficiary is an EOA that also owns the IMD token.\n\n**Static analysis leads** were all reproduced as non-issues. The slither reentrancy lead on `depositToken` is a balance read with no vault state written and every entry point guarded. The two strict-equality leads are zero-amount checks.\n\n**Coverage.** All 11 ABI entry points have a row. Four reference finding 1 or 2, seven hold. Nothing was left unreached. The scratch test under `test/scratch/` is disposable and passes on current code, since both findings describe behavior rather than a loss of funds.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1135571,"inputTokens":386,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":27987,"runtime":"claude","turns":42,"wallClockMs":505105}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"6ef494db85781eec","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"The brief says the contract 'should accept maximum of 10K worth of assets'. _acceptDeposit() only compares totalValueUsd() (the vault's current holdings at fixed prices) with MAX_USD_WAD. Nothing records how much the vault has already accepted, so every withdrawal by WITHDRAWER reopens the full $10,000 of capacity and the vault will accept $10,000 again, indefinitely. If the requester meant a cumulative acceptance cap (the natural reading of 'accept maximum of 10K', e.g. a raise limit), that guarantee is not enforced at all: the vault accepted $30,000 in the reproduction below. README.md documents the balance-ceiling reading ('Withdrawals restore deposit capacity'), so this is a specification interpretation the author must confirm with the requester; if the balance-ceiling reading is confirmed, no change is needed. Minimal fix that preserves everything else: add `uint256 public totalAcceptedUsdWad;` and, in _acceptDeposit, compute the USD value of `received` for `asset` (same multipliers as totalValueUsd), require `totalAcceptedUsdWad + depositUsd <= MAX_USD_WAD`, then increment it; keep the existing balance check if both limits are wanted.","line":154,"path":"src/CappedAssetVault.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {CappedAssetVault} from \"src/CappedAssetVault.sol\";\nimport {OpenDepositPolicy} from \"src/OpenDepositPolicy.sol\";\nimport {IERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol\";\n\n/// @dev Minimal 6-decimal stablecoin stand-in with standard ERC20 semantics.\ncontract StableMock is IERC20 {\n    mapping(address => uint256) public balanceOf;\n    mapping(address => mapping(address => uint256)) public allowance;\n    uint256 public totalSupply;\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n        totalSupply += amount;\n    }\n\n    function approve(address spender, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[msg.sender][spender] = amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    function transfer(address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        balanceOf[msg.sender] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[from][msg.sender] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[from] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n}\n\n/// @notice Fails on the current code: the vault accepts more than $10,000 of assets over its lifetime\n/// because the cap is checked against the current balance only. Passes once the vault also enforces\n/// a cumulative acceptance cap (or the requester confirms the balance-ceiling reading and the test is dropped).\ncontract LifetimeCapTest is Test {\n    address constant IMD = 0xD34a99Bc0f67aE1bbd63C660e6d0b0dd03E263B7;\n    address constant PAYEE = 0x047F606fD5b2BaA5f5C6c4aB8958E45CB6B054B7;\n    address constant OWNER = address(0xA11CE);\n    address constant ALICE = address(0xB0B);\n\n    CappedAssetVault vault;\n    StableMock usdt;\n    StableMock usdc;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        usdt = new StableMock();\n        usdc = new StableMock();\n        StableMock template = new StableMock();\n        vm.etch(IMD, address(template).code);\n        vault = new CappedAssetVault(OWNER, address(usdt), address(usdc), 18, address(new OpenDepositPolicy()));\n        usdc.mint(ALICE, 1_000_000e6);\n        vm.prank(ALICE);\n        usdc.approve(address(vault), type(uint256).max);\n    }\n\n    function test_VaultAcceptsAtMostTenThousandDollarsOverItsLifetime() public {\n        // Accept exactly $10,000 of USDC: allowed by both readings of the cap.\n        vm.prank(ALICE);\n        vault.depositToken(address(usdc), 10_000e6);\n        assertEq(vault.totalValueUsd(), 10_000e18);\n\n        // The beneficiary withdraws everything; the vault now holds $0.\n        vm.prank(PAYEE);\n        vault.withdrawAll(address(usdc));\n        assertEq(vault.totalValueUsd(), 0);\n\n        // A further deposit would push lifetime acceptance to $10,000.000001 > $10,000.\n        // Expected: the vault refuses it. Actual on current code: it is accepted.\n        vm.prank(ALICE);\n        vm.expectRevert();\n        vault.depositToken(address(usdc), 1);\n\n        assertEq(usdc.balanceOf(PAYEE) + usdc.balanceOf(address(vault)), 10_000e6, \"lifetime acceptance exceeded $10,000\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"State: fresh vault, ALICE holds 1,000,000 USDC and approved the vault. 1) ALICE depositToken(USDC, 10_000e6) -> accepted, totalValueUsd()==10_000e18. 2) WITHDRAWER withdrawAll(USDC) -> vault holds $0. 3) ALICE depositToken(USDC, 10_000e6) -> accepted again (expected under a lifetime cap: revert CapExceeded). 4) WITHDRAWER withdrawAll(USDC); 5) ALICE depositToken(USDC, 10_000e6) -> accepted. Result: WITHDRAWER received 20,000 USDC and the vault holds 10,000 USDC, i.e. $30,000 accepted through the deposit entry points. test/scratch/LifetimeCap.t.sol fails with 'next call did not revert as expected' on step 3.","severity":"medium","snippet":"        if (value > MAX_USD_WAD) revert CapExceeded(value);","title":"Cap is a current-balance ceiling, so lifetime accepted deposits are unbounded once the beneficiary withdraws"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The brief only requires that 0x047f...54b7 be the sole caller allowed to withdraw; the implementation additionally forces every payout to that same address (line 164 for ETH, line 173 for tokens). USDC and USDT can blacklist any address, and both revert transfers to a blacklisted recipient. If the beneficiary is ever blacklisted, every withdrawToken/withdrawAll for that stablecoin reverts forever; the owner has no sweep, no recipient parameter and no way to change WITHDRAWER, so the balance (up to the full $10,000 cap in that asset) is stuck permanently. The same structure makes the vault unrecoverable if the beneficiary's key is lost, which README.md acknowledges. WITHDRAWER was verified on mainnet (block 26133523) to be an active EOA (nonce 2681), so ETH payouts via call{value} work today. Minimal fix that keeps the brief's rule: keep `onlyWithdrawer` but let the withdrawer pass a `to` address (e.g. withdrawETH(uint256 amount, address to)), or add `withdrawTo(asset, amount, to)` alongside the existing functions.","line":173,"path":"src/CappedAssetVault.sol","reproduction":"State: vault holds 5,000 USDC deposited by ALICE; the USDC issuer blacklists WITHDRAWER (mock: transfers to WITHDRAWER revert with 'Blacklistable: account is blacklisted'). Calls: WITHDRAWER withdrawAll(USDC) -> reverts 'Blacklistable: account is blacklisted'; WITHDRAWER withdrawToken(USDC, 1) -> same revert; OWNER withdrawAll(USDC) -> reverts UnauthorizedWithdrawer(OWNER). Expected: some authorised path can move the 5,000 USDC. Actual: usdc.balanceOf(vault) stays 5,000e6 with no function able to release it.","severity":"low","snippet":"        token.safeTransfer(WITHDRAWER, amount);","title":"Payout address is hard-wired to WITHDRAWER, so an issuer blacklist of that address permanently strands USDC/USDT with no recovery path"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The brief asks that the owner 'can upgrade'. Because the launch recipe forbids proxies, DELEGATECALL and SELFDESTRUCT, the author implemented upgradeTo() as a swap of the IDepositPolicy contract that is consulted by STATICCALL during deposits. This is documented in README.md and is a reasonable reading, but the requester should be aware of what it does not cover: ETH_PRICE_USD, IMD_PRICE_USD, MAX_USD_WAD, USDT, USDC, imdDecimals and WITHDRAWER are constants/immutables with no setter. A deployment mistake in a constructor argument (e.g. imdDecimals_ != 18, wrong stablecoin address) or any later change of requirements needs a new deployment and a manual move of funds by the beneficiary. On mainnet (block 26133523) IMD at 0xD34a...63B7 is a non-proxy LayerZero OFT with 18 decimals and plain OpenZeppelin ERC20 transfers, and USDT/USDC at the README addresses report 6 decimals, so the expected constructor values are correct today. No code change is proposed; this records the scope decision for the requester.","line":134,"path":"src/CappedAssetVault.sol","reproduction":"State: vault deployed with imdDecimals_ = 6 by mistake (constructor accepts any value 0..18). Then 1 IMD (1e18 raw) is valued at 1e18 * 9 * 10**12 = $9e12 instead of $9, so depositToken(IMD, 1e18) reverts CapExceeded and no owner function (pause/unpause/upgradeTo/transferOwnership) can correct it; only redeployment can.","severity":"info","snippet":"    function upgradeTo(address newPolicy) external nonReentrant onlyOwner whenPaused {","title":"'Owner can upgrade' is implemented as deposit-policy replacement only; custody rules, prices, cap, token addresses and beneficiary cannot be changed after deployment"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The suite is thorough on cap boundaries, token misbehaviour, pause and policy upgrades, but three paths I traced have no test. (1) withdrawToken(address(0), x) and withdrawToken(<EOA>, x): both revert because balanceOf on a codeless address fails ABI decoding, which is the intended behaviour but is only implied by the address(0)-means-ETH branch of withdrawAll. (2) receive() invoked with the 2,300-gas stipend (Solidity transfer/send) reverts because totalValueUsd() makes three external balanceOf calls plus the policy STATICCALL; README documents it but no test pins it, so a future change that makes receive() cheaper or more expensive would go unnoticed. (3) Because the override rejects transferOwnership(address(0)), the only way to cancel a pending two-step transfer is transferOwnership(currentOwner); this works (pending becomes the owner itself, the old candidate can no longer accept) but is untested and undocumented. All three were verified locally with scratch tests; each behaves as intended today.","line":294,"path":"test/CappedAssetVault.t.sol","reproduction":"Inputs: (1) prank WITHDRAWER, withdrawToken(address(0), 1) -> revert (empty returndata decode); withdrawToken(0xdead, 1) -> revert. (2) After depositETH 1 ether, prank ALICE, address(vault).call{value: 1, gas: 2300}(\"\") -> ok == false. (3) prank OWNER: transferOwnership(ALICE); transferOwnership(OWNER); prank ALICE acceptOwnership() -> revert OwnableUnauthorizedAccount(ALICE); pendingOwner() == OWNER.","severity":"info","snippet":"    function test_ZeroAndExcessWithdrawalsRejected() public {","title":"Untested edges: withdrawToken with address(0)/EOA asset, receive() under the 2300-gas stipend, and the only route to cancel a pending ownership transfer"}],"hash":"2218c98e698f39239287e45ac34ff849eb11b869f4dd7254ff664d0cd9a695db","nodeId":"19e7cd62-e9c3-4444-8337-74cf41df5732","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. The findings file is written and validated: all four quoted snippets match the tree exactly, and the proof test fails on the current code as required.\n\n**Outcome**\n\nThe vault is solid in my area. Every entry point's checks, state changes and failure paths traced as intended, including a mainnet fork simulation of real IMD, USDT and USDC deposits and withdrawals to the fixed payee. Both static-analysis leads were rejected: the reentrancy lead is blocked by the guard on every entry point and the vault grants no approvals, and the strict-equality lead is the `amount == 0` guard.\n\n**Findings written to `.imd-findings.json`**\n\n1. **Medium, with proof.** The $10,000 cap is a current-balance ceiling, not a lifetime acceptance cap. Deposit $10,000, let the beneficiary withdraw it, and the vault accepts another $10,000, indefinitely. The README documents this reading, so the author must confirm with the requester which reading of \"accept maximum of 10K\" was meant. The proof test in `test/scratch/LifetimeCap.t.sol` fails today and passes with a cumulative counter.\n2. **Low.** Payouts are hard-wired to the withdrawer address, not just gated on it. If USDC or USDT blacklists that address, that asset is stranded with no owner recovery path. Letting the withdrawer name a recipient keeps the brief's rule and removes the trap.\n3. **Info.** \"Owner can upgrade\" is implemented as deposit-policy replacement only because the launch recipe forbids proxies. Prices, cap, token addresses, decimals and beneficiary are immutable, so a constructor mistake needs redeployment. Recorded as a scope decision.\n4. **Info.** Three untested edges, each verified to behave correctly today: withdrawing a zero or codeless asset address, ETH sends under the 2,300 gas stipend, and the only route to cancel a pending ownership transfer.\n\n**On-chain facts checked at block 26133523**\n\n- IMD is a non-proxy LayerZero OFT with 18 decimals and plain ERC20 transfers.\n- The withdrawer is an active externally owned account, so ETH payouts via call succeed.\n- USDT and USDC at the README addresses report 6 decimals.\n\nCoverage has a row for all eleven entry points plus three invariant and external-dependency rows. No source files were changed. The only scratch file left is the proof test.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1452074,"inputTokens":450,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":37050,"runtime":"claude","turns":46,"wallClockMs":570879}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"58756a51fd28561c48db9e036c7c8f1bcbb61f27876e9c8f7b0c30372b7ca1e8","device":"4d218e2d11a36af4","findings":[],"hash":"225a99e29fdda46e79f381006d1ca16c6f153d432bed12284b86511c389768d3","nodeId":"50e7e8de-6c73-46e1-8009-bfdc4a77f4cb","outcome":"completed","summary":"Added failure-path, fuzz, and multi-actor invariant tests. All changes are under `test/`.\n\n- `forge build` passed.\n- `forge test`: 63 passed, 0 failed.\n- 6,000 fuzz cases and 40,960 random invariant calls completed.\n\nNo reproducible implementation defects found. Live-mainnet token integration remains unverified.","treeHash":"7d340374f376e5184893dffeeccfc66fddf46232","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1100032,"inputTokens":100505,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":16286,"runtime":"codex","turns":6,"wallClockMs":577794}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"e6de8d4c6cf97551","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"The brief asks for a contract that \"should accept maximum of 10K worth of assets\". _acceptDeposit() enforces the cap only against totalValueUsd(), i.e. the balances the vault holds at that moment (src/CappedAssetVault.sol:153-154). Nothing records how much value the deposit entry points have already accepted, so every withdrawal by WITHDRAWER re-opens capacity and the same vault accepts another full $10,000 through depositETH()/depositToken()/receive(). Over its lifetime the vault therefore accepts an unbounded amount: N withdraw-and-refill cycles accept N x $10,000. README.md states this is intentional (\"Withdrawals restore deposit capacity\"), so this is a specification-interpretation finding rather than an implementation slip: if the requester meant a ceiling on what the vault holds at once, no change is needed; if they meant a ceiling on what it will ever accept (the plainer reading of \"accept maximum of 10K\"), the current code violates it. Economic consequence under the lifetime reading: there is no limit to the funds the fixed beneficiary can collect from depositors through this contract. Minimal design-preserving fix if the lifetime reading is intended: add `uint256 public acceptedUsdWad;`, increment it in _acceptDeposit() by the USD value of the amount actually received (wei*2600, raw*1e12, imdRaw*_imdUsdPerUnit) and revert when `acceptedUsdWad + delta > MAX_USD_WAD`; keep the existing holdings check if unsolicited balances should still count. Untested edge: no existing test deposits again after a full withdrawal and asserts a limit; test_WithdrawalReopensCapacity asserts the opposite.","line":154,"path":"src/CappedAssetVault.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {CappedAssetVault} from \"src/CappedAssetVault.sol\";\nimport {OpenDepositPolicy} from \"src/OpenDepositPolicy.sol\";\nimport {IERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol\";\n\n/// @dev Minimal 6-decimal ERC20 standing in for USDC.\ncontract Stable is IERC20 {\n    uint256 public totalSupply;\n    mapping(address => uint256) public balanceOf;\n    mapping(address => mapping(address => uint256)) public allowance;\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n        totalSupply += amount;\n        emit Transfer(address(0), to, amount);\n    }\n\n    function approve(address spender, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[msg.sender][spender] = amount;\n        emit Approval(msg.sender, spender, amount);\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    function transfer(address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        balanceOf[msg.sender] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n        emit Transfer(msg.sender, to, amount);\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[from][msg.sender] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[from] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n        emit Transfer(from, to, amount);\n        return true;\n    }\n}\n\n/// @notice The vault's \"$10,000 maximum\" is a ceiling on current holdings, not on what it accepts.\n///         After the beneficiary withdraws, the same vault accepts another full $10,000, so the\n///         cumulative value it accepts through its deposit entry points is unbounded.\ncontract CapRecycleTest is Test {\n    address constant OWNER = address(0xA11CE);\n    address constant ALICE = address(0xB0B);\n    address constant PAYEE = 0x047F606fD5b2BaA5f5C6c4aB8958E45CB6B054B7;\n    address constant IMD_ADDRESS = 0xD34a99Bc0f67aE1bbd63C660e6d0b0dd03E263B7;\n\n    CappedAssetVault vault;\n    Stable usdt;\n    Stable usdc;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        usdt = new Stable();\n        usdc = new Stable();\n        Stable template = new Stable();\n        vm.etch(IMD_ADDRESS, address(template).code);\n        OpenDepositPolicy policy = new OpenDepositPolicy();\n        vault = new CappedAssetVault(OWNER, address(usdt), address(usdc), 18, address(policy));\n        usdc.mint(ALICE, 30_000e6);\n    }\n\n    function _deposit(uint256 amount) internal returns (bool ok) {\n        vm.startPrank(ALICE);\n        usdc.approve(address(vault), amount);\n        (ok,) = address(vault).call(abi.encodeCall(vault.depositToken, (address(usdc), amount)));\n        vm.stopPrank();\n    }\n\n    function test_VaultAcceptsMoreThanTenThousandDollarsOverItsLifetime() public {\n        // First $10,000 fills the cap exactly.\n        assertTrue(_deposit(10_000e6), \"first deposit should fill the cap\");\n        assertEq(vault.totalValueUsd(), 10_000e18);\n        assertFalse(_deposit(1), \"one more unit must be rejected at the cap\");\n\n        // Beneficiary withdraws everything, as the brief allows at any time.\n        vm.prank(PAYEE);\n        vault.withdrawAll(address(usdc));\n        assertEq(usdc.balanceOf(PAYEE), 10_000e6);\n        assertEq(vault.totalValueUsd(), 0);\n\n        // Second $10,000 is accepted through the same deposit entry point.\n        bool secondAccepted = _deposit(10_000e6);\n\n        // Cumulative value accepted by the vault is now $20,000 even though the brief\n        // asks for a maximum of $10,000 worth of assets to be accepted.\n        uint256 acceptedLifetime = usdc.balanceOf(PAYEE) + usdc.balanceOf(address(vault));\n        assertFalse(\n            secondAccepted && acceptedLifetime == 20_000e6,\n            \"vault accepted $20,000 of assets over its lifetime; expected acceptance to stop at $10,000\"\n        );\n    }\n}","reproduction":"State: fresh vault, OpenDepositPolicy, Alice holds 20,000 USDC (6 decimals). 1) Alice approves and calls depositToken(USDC, 10_000e6): succeeds, totalValueUsd()==10_000e18. 2) Alice calls depositToken(USDC, 1): reverts CapExceeded, as expected. 3) WITHDRAWER (0x047F606fD5b2BaA5f5C6c4aB8958E45CB6B054B7) calls withdrawAll(USDC): receives 10_000e6, totalValueUsd()==0. 4) Alice approves and calls depositToken(USDC, 10_000e6) again. Actual: step 4 succeeds; WITHDRAWER balance + vault balance == 20_000e6, i.e. the contract has accepted $20,000 of assets. Expected under the brief's lifetime reading: step 4 reverts (CapExceeded) because $10,000 has already been accepted. The scratch test in `proof` fails on the current code with \"vault accepted $20,000 of assets over its lifetime\".","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (value > MAX_USD_WAD) revert CapExceeded(value);","title":"The $10,000 cap bounds current holdings only; the vault accepts unbounded cumulative value once the beneficiary withdraws"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Flow-gap seam (periphery x first principles). Every token withdrawal pays the hard-coded constant WITHDRAWER (src/CappedAssetVault.sol:173; ETH at line 164) and there is no recipient parameter, no owner sweep and no migration. Ethereum USDC (Circle FiatTokenV2) and USDT (TetherToken) both revert any transfer whose `from` or `to` is on the issuer blacklist. The brief's guarantee is that the withdrawer \"shall be withdraw it any time any amount, full too\". If Circle or Tether blacklists 0x047F606fD5b2BaA5f5C6c4aB8958E45CB6B054B7 (an EOA with about 2,700 sent transactions at mainnet block 26133522, so it has a live compliance footprint) or blacklists the vault address itself, every withdrawToken()/withdrawAll() call for that stablecoin reverts inside safeTransfer, forever: WITHDRAWER cannot redirect to a clean address and the owner has no path at all (UnauthorizedWithdrawer). Deposits of that stablecoin keep succeeding meanwhile, so the stranded amount can grow to the full cap. The same single-recipient design also means loss of the payee's key freezes everything, which README.md already documents. Precondition is an action by the token issuer, so severity is kept at low; impact when it occurs is permanent loss of the vault's entire holding of that stablecoin (up to $10,000 at fixed prices). Minimal fix that preserves the brief (only that address may withdraw): let the withdrawer name the recipient, e.g. `withdrawToken(address asset, uint256 amount, address to)` / `withdrawAll(address asset, address to)` with `to != address(0)` and still `onlyWithdrawer`; if paying only WITHDRAWER is a deliberate hardening, record the blacklist-stranding risk as an accepted trust assumption. Untested edge: the suite has no blacklisting token mock; MockToken only models revert-all, false-return, fee and no-movement.","line":173,"path":"src/CappedAssetVault.sol","reproduction":"State: vault configured with a USDC-like token that reverts transfers to/from blacklisted accounts (behaviour of mainnet USDC/USDT). Alice deposits 5_000e6 USDC via depositToken; vault holds 5_000e6. Then the issuer blacklists WITHDRAWER. WITHDRAWER calls withdrawToken(USDC, 1e6): reverts with the token's blacklist reason; withdrawAll(USDC): same revert. OWNER calls withdrawAll(USDC): reverts UnauthorizedWithdrawer(OWNER). Actual: vault USDC balance stays 5_000e6 and no transaction can move it. Expected per brief: the withdrawer can withdraw any amount at any time, which a recipient parameter would restore. Variant: blacklist the vault address instead of the payee; same outcome. Verified with a scratch Foundry test (BlacklistableStable mock with require(!blacklisted[from] && !blacklisted[to])) exercising both withdrawToken and withdrawAll.","severity":"low","snippet":"        token.safeTransfer(WITHDRAWER, amount);","title":"Stablecoin issuer blacklist of the fixed payee (or of the vault) permanently strands USDC/USDT; no recipient override or owner path exists"}],"hash":"34c6245657082065299c7ff58a418ad68c0d86db55383bf7c1fd8b3577dbd833","nodeId":"ac1391c4-085c-40ff-802a-6ff8fe043fe2","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. The findings file is at `.imd-findings.json` and the working tree is otherwise unchanged (build output in `out/` and `cache/` is gitignored, scratch tests removed).\n\n**Result:** no critical or high defects in the Economic Security, Invariant or Flow Gap areas. Two low findings, both reproduced with Foundry tests, plus a 14-row coverage record answering all 11 entry points and three invariants.\n\n**Findings**\n\n- **Cap is a holdings ceiling, not an acceptance ceiling** (`src/CappedAssetVault.sol:154`). After the withdrawer empties the vault, it accepts another full $10,000. The embedded proof test deposits 10,000 USDC, withdraws it, deposits 10,000 again, and fails on the current code. The README says this is intentional, so it is flagged as a specification-reading question for the requester: the brief says the contract \"should accept maximum of 10K\", which reads more naturally as a lifetime limit. A minimal fix is described if that reading is intended.\n- **Stablecoin blacklist strands funds** (`src/CappedAssetVault.sol:173`). Every withdrawal pays the hard-coded payee with no recipient parameter and no owner path. If Circle or Tether blacklists the payee or the vault, that stablecoin is permanently stuck, contradicting \"withdraw any time any amount\". Verified with a blacklisting mock on both withdrawal functions. Kept at low because the trigger is an issuer action. A recipient argument gated by the same withdrawer check would preserve the brief.\n\n**What held** after tracing: cap arithmetic is exact with no division (ETH boundary at 3846153846153846153 wei verified), the balance-delta receipt handles fee, no-return, false-return and over-receipt tokens, all entry points carry the reentrancy guard, the policy is invoked by STATICCALL and cannot move funds or alter the cap, withdrawals are never blocked by pause, policy or another asset's failure, and conservation holds because the vault keeps no internal accounting that could diverge from balances.\n\n**Live checks at mainnet block 26133522:** the pinned IMD address is the Identity.md LayerZero OFT with 18 decimals and standard ERC20 selectors (no fee or blacklist), USDT and USDC report 6 decimals, and the withdrawer is an EOA. Two observations outside my area for the judge: IMD trades near $12.68 against the fixed $9, so the vault undervalues it (per brief, not a defect), and the IMD token contract's owner is the withdrawer address itself.\n\n**Static analysis leads:** the Slither reentrancy-balance line is guarded by the reentrancy modifier and the over-receipt check; the two incorrect-equality lines are `>` comparisons, not strict equality. Neither reproduced.\n\n**Not reached:** no fork test ran against the real IMD bytecode, and the suite's reliance on a mock etched at the IMD address means that path is untested locally.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1456950,"inputTokens":450,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":34655,"runtime":"claude","turns":38,"wallClockMs":550091}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"ef7aa586fdeb70e67544a53e64473323dcf3e75fd38f334053a0fda6ccca5c64","device":"0bd6e7ef3fc9345a","findings":[],"hash":"634341499be69166245daa9dc1a54e68b6f2ac676647105d7dd1fb0f53665025","nodeId":"271dc0e4-8b38-44b3-92b5-d04a704f1d5b","outcome":"completed","summary":"Implemented the vault, vendored dependencies, deployment rehearsal, and tests.\n\n- `forge build` passed with two documented lint warnings.\n- `forge test` passed: 52 tests, including stateful invariants.\n- `forge fmt --check` passed.\n\nUpgrades replace deposit policy logic; custody stays fixed because the protected checks forbid `DELEGATECALL`.\n\nDeployment parameters, forced-transfer limitations, and required live token verification are documented in [README.md](/root/.identitymd-896/work/f66fcb49-4b9a-4c70-9aa9-656f5b14d13f/271dc0e4-8b38-44b3-92b5-d04a704f1d5b/README.md).","treeHash":"fb10e3a147189062c4f124aeb406c51f7cb89675","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1032704,"inputTokens":94900,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":28928,"runtime":"codex","turns":7,"wallClockMs":876368}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"3f91b58cf7cd2d45","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_math (info), audit_flow (medium), audit_permissions (low) and audit_economics (low): same root cause. _acceptDeposit compares only totalValueUsd(), i.e. the balances the vault holds right now at fixed prices, against MAX_USD_WAD. No state records how much value the deposit entry points (depositETH, depositToken, receive) have already admitted. Because WITHDRAWER can withdraw at any time, each withdrawal frees the same $10,000 and the vault admits another $10,000, indefinitely: N refill cycles admit N x $10,000. The brief says the contract 'should accept maximum of 10K worth of assets'. README.md and launch.json notes document the holdings-ceiling reading ('withdrawals restore capacity'), and the existing test test_WithdrawalReopensCapacity asserts it, so this is a specification interpretation the author chose deliberately, not an implementation slip. If the requester confirms the holdings-ceiling reading, no code change is needed. If the requester meant a lifetime ceiling on what the vault ever accepts (a plausible reading of 'accept maximum of 10K'), that guarantee is currently not enforced at all. Severity is set to low because the behaviour is documented and intentional; it would be medium if the lifetime reading is confirmed. Minimal design-preserving fix for the lifetime reading: add `uint256 public acceptedUsdWad;`, compute the USD value of `received` in _acceptDeposit with the same multipliers as totalValueUsd (wei*2600, raw*1e12, imdRaw*_imdUsdPerUnit), revert if acceptedUsdWad + delta > MAX_USD_WAD, then increment; keep the existing holdings check so unsolicited balances still count. Both specialist proofs (.imd/reads/proofs/Proof_5ae97d07fb75.t.sol, Proof_ac2466046664.t.sol) were run and fail on the current code for the stated reason ('next call did not revert as expected' and 'vault accepted $20,000 of assets over its lifetime'). No proof is attached here because the finding is low and attaching one would bind the fix to the lifetime reading before the requester has chosen it.","line":154,"path":"src/CappedAssetVault.sol","reproduction":"State: fresh vault with OpenDepositPolicy; 6-decimal USDC mock; ALICE holds 1,000,000 USDC and approved the vault. 1) ALICE depositToken(USDC, 10_000e6): succeeds, totalValueUsd()==10_000e18. 2) ALICE depositToken(USDC, 1): reverts CapExceeded(10_000e18+1e12), as intended. 3) WITHDRAWER 0x047F606fD5b2BaA5f5C6c4aB8958E45CB6B054B7 calls withdrawAll(USDC): vault balance 0, remainingCapacityUsd()==10_000e18. 4) ALICE depositToken(USDC, 10_000e6): succeeds. Repeating 3-4 twice more leaves usdc.balanceOf(WITHDRAWER)==30_000e6, i.e. $30,000 admitted through depositToken. Expected under a lifetime-cap reading: step 4 reverts CapExceeded. Actual: accepted. Verified in test/scratch/Judge.t.sol::test_LifetimeUnbounded (passes, demonstrating the behaviour) and by running both specialist proofs, which fail on this code.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (value > MAX_USD_WAD) revert CapExceeded(value);","title":"The $10,000 cap bounds current holdings only; lifetime accepted value is unbounded because every withdrawal reopens the full capacity (requester must confirm which reading of the brief is intended)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_flow and audit_economics (same root cause, same line). The brief requires only that 0x047f...54b7 be the sole party allowed to withdraw. The implementation additionally forces every payout to that same constant address (line 164 for ETH, line 173 for tokens) and offers no recipient parameter, no owner sweep and no migration. Mainnet USDC (FiatTokenV2) and USDT (TetherToken) revert transfers whose from or to is on the issuer blacklist. If the beneficiary is blacklisted, every withdrawToken/withdrawAll for that stablecoin reverts inside safeTransfer forever; WITHDRAWER cannot redirect and the owner is rejected by onlyWithdrawer. Deposits of that stablecoin continue to be admitted meanwhile, so the stranded amount can grow to the full $10,000 cap. The same structure means loss of the beneficiary key freezes everything, which README.md documents as accepted. The precondition is an issuer action against a specific address, so severity stays low; the impact when it occurs is permanent loss of the vault's entire holding of that stablecoin. README.md mentions that transfers remain subject to issuer blacklists but does not state that no recovery path exists. Minimal fix that keeps the brief's rule intact: keep onlyWithdrawer and let the caller name the recipient, e.g. withdrawToken(address asset, uint256 amount, address to) and withdrawAll(address asset, address to) with to != address(0); or record blacklist stranding explicitly as an accepted trust assumption. Untested edge: the suite has no blacklisting token mock (MockToken models revert-all, false-return, fee and no-movement only).","line":173,"path":"src/CappedAssetVault.sol","reproduction":"State: vault configured with a USDC-like token whose _transfer does require(!blacklisted[from] && !blacklisted[to]). ALICE deposits 5_000e6 via depositToken; vault holds 5_000e6. Issuer blacklists WITHDRAWER. Calls: WITHDRAWER withdrawAll(USDC) -> reverts 'Blacklistable: account is blacklisted'; WITHDRAWER withdrawToken(USDC, 1e6) -> same revert; OWNER withdrawAll(USDC) -> reverts UnauthorizedWithdrawer(OWNER). ALICE depositToken(USDC, 5_000e6) is still accepted, vault now holds 10_000e6 with no function able to release it. Expected per brief: the withdrawer can withdraw any amount at any time. Actual: the stablecoin balance is unreachable by any caller. Verified in test/scratch/Judge.t.sol::test_BlacklistStrands (passes, demonstrating the stranding).","severity":"low","snippet":"        token.safeTransfer(WITHDRAWER, amount);","title":"Every payout is hard-wired to WITHDRAWER with no recipient parameter, so an issuer blacklist of that address (or of the vault) permanently strands USDC/USDT"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"From audit_math; reproduced. totalValueUsd multiplies both stablecoin balances by the literal 1e12 (assumes 6 decimals) and IMD by 9 * 10**(18 - imdDecimals_), where imdDecimals_ is a constructor argument checked only for <= 18. The constructor (lines 55-58) checks the usdt/usdc arguments for zero, duplicates, IMD and self, but never reads decimals() from any token. A wrong address or wrong decimals argument therefore does not revert: it silently over- or under-values holdings. Over-scaling (an 18-decimal token in a stablecoin slot) makes the asset unusable (only 1e10 raw units fit under the cap); under-scaling (a low-decimal token, or imdDecimals_=6 for the 18-decimal IMD) lets nominal value far above the cap be admitted or blocks IMD deposits entirely. launch.json carries the correct mainnet values (USDT 0xdAC1...1ec7, USDC 0xA0b8...eB48, imdDecimals 18), and README.md requires live verification before deployment, so the current manifest is not misconfigured; the defect is that the contract cannot detect a deviation and no owner action (pause/unpause/upgradeTo) can correct one after deployment. README.md explains the constructor deliberately makes no token calls so the protected deployment rehearsal can run without token code at those addresses. A fix compatible with that constraint: in the constructor, when usdt.code.length > 0 require IERC20Metadata(usdt).decimals() == 6, likewise for usdc, and when IMD.code.length > 0 require IERC20Metadata(IMD).decimals() == imdDecimals_. On mainnet all three have code, so the check is live where it matters.","line":115,"path":"src/CappedAssetVault.sol","reproduction":"Over-scaling: deploy new CappedAssetVault(owner, usdt6, dai18, 18, policy) where dai18 is any 18-decimal ERC20. ALICE approves and calls depositToken(dai18, 1e18) ($1 nominal). Expected: accepted. Actual: reverts CapExceeded(1e30). depositToken(dai18, 1e10) is accepted and totalValueUsd()==10_000e18 while the vault holds $0.00000001 nominal. Under-scaling: deploy with a 2-decimal token as usdt; depositToken(two, 100_000_000e2) ($100,000,000 nominal) is accepted and totalValueUsd()==10_000e18. IMD: deploy with imdDecimals_=6 while IMD has 18 decimals; depositToken(IMD, 1e18) reverts CapExceeded(9e30) (1 IMD valued at $9e12). Verified in test/scratch/Judge.t.sol::test_DecimalsNotValidated (passes, demonstrating all three traces).","severity":"low","snippet":"        return address(this).balance * ETH_PRICE_USD + IERC20(USDT).balanceOf(address(this)) * 1e12\n            + IERC20(USDC).balanceOf(address(this)) * 1e12 + IERC20(IMD).balanceOf(address(this)) * _imdUsdPerUnit;","title":"Stablecoin scale is hardcoded to 6 decimals and IMD decimals are a free parameter; the constructor never validates them against the configured tokens, so a misconfiguration misvalues holdings instead "},{"citation":"resolved","description":"From audit_math; reproduced. remainingCapacityUsd() tells a depositor exactly how much fits, but _acceptDeposit evaluates the cap against the live balance, which anyone can raise with a plain ERC20 transfer or forced ETH without going through the vault. A third party who sees a pending deposit of exactly the remaining capacity can push the total 1e12 WAD (one USDC/USDT unit, $0.000001) over the cap, so the victim's transaction reverts and its gas is wasted. This can be repeated at negligible cost while the beneficiary does not withdraw. No funds are lost and the depositor can retry with a smaller amount, hence low. The existing test test_DirectTokenDonationsCountAndCanExceedCap covers donations counting toward the cap but not this ordering. Mitigations that preserve the design: track admitted balances per asset (incremented in _acceptDeposit, decremented in the withdraw paths) and check the cap against those so donations cannot consume capacity; or document that frontends should leave a small margin below remainingCapacityUsd(). The behaviour is inherent to a balance-based cap, so recording it as accepted is also a valid resolution.","line":153,"path":"src/CappedAssetVault.sol","reproduction":"State: fresh vault, remainingCapacityUsd()==10_000e18. ALICE prepares depositToken(USDC, 10_000e6), which fits exactly. Before it is mined, address 0xBAD executes USDC.transfer(vault, 1). ALICE's transaction then executes with totalValueUsd()==10_000e18 + 1e12 and reverts CapExceeded(10000000000001000000000000). Expected: her deposit, which was within the capacity she read, is accepted. Actual: it reverts. Verified in test/scratch/Judge.t.sol::test_DonationFrontRun (passes, demonstrating the revert with the exact error data).","severity":"low","snippet":"        uint256 value = totalValueUsd();\n        if (value > MAX_USD_WAD) revert CapExceeded(value);","title":"Cap is checked against the live balance including unsolicited transfers, so a 1-unit donation front-run makes a capacity-exact deposit revert (griefing, no fund loss)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_flow and audit_permissions (same observation). Not a permission bypass. upgradeTo swaps only the IDepositPolicy address consulted by STATICCALL during deposits. ETH_PRICE_USD, IMD_PRICE_USD, MAX_USD_WAD, IMD, WITHDRAWER are constants; USDT, USDC and imdDecimals are immutables; there is no proxy and no setter for any of them. This is a deliberate narrowing forced by the launch recipe and protected runtime check, which forbid proxies, DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE and SELFDESTRUCT; README.md and the launch.json notes state the trade-off. Consequences the requester should accept explicitly: a constructor-argument mistake or any later change of requirements needs a new reviewed deployment plus a manual move of funds by the beneficiary. Trust assumptions recorded for completeness: the owner can pause deposits indefinitely and can install a policy that rejects all or selected depositors; neither power touches withdrawals (withdrawETH/withdrawToken/withdrawAll carry only nonReentrant + onlyWithdrawer and never read depositPolicy or the pause flag). No code change proposed.","line":134,"path":"src/CappedAssetVault.sol","reproduction":"State: deployed vault, owner O. Sequence: O pause(); O upgradeTo(P2) where P2 is any contract whose policyId() returns POLICY_ID; O unpause(). After this vault.WITHDRAWER()==0x047F606fD5b2BaA5f5C6c4aB8958E45CB6B054B7, ETH_PRICE_USD()==2600, IMD_PRICE_USD()==9, MAX_USD_WAD()==10_000e18 and withdrawal behaviour is unchanged; only depositPolicy() differs. The full ABI (acceptOwnership, depositETH, depositToken, pause, receive, transferOwnership, unpause, upgradeTo, withdrawAll, withdrawETH, withdrawToken, renounceOwnership which always reverts) contains no entry point that changes any of those values. Expected by a proxy-upgrade reading of the brief: the owner could replace custody code. Actual: impossible by design.","severity":"info","snippet":"    function upgradeTo(address newPolicy) external nonReentrant onlyOwner whenPaused {","title":"'Owner can upgrade' is implemented as deposit-policy replacement only; prices, cap, token set, custody logic and beneficiary are fixed at deployment (scope confirmation for the requester)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"From audit_flow, extended with the blacklist gap from finding 2. The suite covers cap boundaries, token misbehaviour, pause, policy upgrades, two-step ownership and stateful sequences, but four paths have no test: (1) withdrawToken(address(0), x) and withdrawToken(<codeless address>, x) both revert because balanceOf on a codeless address fails ABI decoding; this is intended but only implied by the address(0)-means-ETH branch of withdrawAll. (2) receive() invoked with the 2,300-gas stipend reverts because totalValueUsd makes three external balanceOf calls plus the policy STATICCALL; README.md documents it but no test pins it. (3) Because the override rejects transferOwnership(address(0)), the only way to cancel a pending handover is transferOwnership(currentOwner); this works but is untested and undocumented. (4) No mock models issuer blacklisting of the payee or vault. All four were checked with scratch tests and behave as the README intends today; this records what the suite does not pin.","line":294,"path":"test/CappedAssetVault.t.sol","reproduction":"Inputs (all in test/scratch/Judge.t.sol::test_Edges, passing): prank WITHDRAWER, withdrawToken(address(0), 1) -> call returns false; withdrawToken(0xdead, 1) -> false. After depositETH 1 ether, prank ALICE, address(vault).call{value: 1, gas: 2300}('') -> ok == false, while the same call with full gas succeeds. prank OWNER: transferOwnership(ALICE); transferOwnership(OWNER); prank ALICE acceptOwnership() -> reverts; pendingOwner()==OWNER. Blacklist path is in test_BlacklistStrands. None of these inputs appear in test/*.t.sol.","severity":"info","snippet":"    function test_ZeroAndExcessWithdrawalsRejected() public {","title":"Untested edges: withdrawToken with address(0) or a codeless asset, receive() under the 2300-gas stipend, blacklisting stablecoins, and cancelling a pending ownership transfer"}],"hash":"c103085c98b84ce6efc1ebbcabc2a8c1ea94a6188d2d4b2684a74c8e600ad9e7","nodeId":"ceb608f1-c570-47fe-bed2-556a81a767ca","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is written at the repository root, the scratch tests are removed, and no source or config file was changed.\n\n**Outcome.** The vault is sound on every entry point I traced. No specialist reported a fund-loss or permission-bypass defect, and my own pass found none. All kept findings are low or informational and were reproduced in Foundry against the current code before being recorded.\n\n**What I kept, after merging duplicates across the four specialists:**\n\n- **Holdings cap, not lifetime cap (low).** Four specialists reported this at four different severities. I merged them into one finding and set it to low because the README, the manifest notes, and an existing test all document the holdings-ceiling reading as deliberate. Both attached specialist proofs fail on the current code as claimed. I did not attach a proof, since a proof would bind the fix to the lifetime reading before the requester has confirmed it. This is the one item the requester must settle.\n- **Payout hard-wired to the beneficiary (low).** Two specialists reported this. A blacklist of that address by Circle or Tether strands the stablecoin permanently, with no owner path. Reproduced with a blacklisting mock.\n- **Token decimals never validated (low).** The constructor accepts any token and any IMD decimals up to 18. The current manifest is correct, so this is a fail-closed gap rather than a live misconfiguration. I noted a fix compatible with the protected deployment rehearsal.\n- **Donation front-run griefing (low).** A one-unit transfer makes a capacity-exact deposit revert. No fund loss.\n- **Two informational notes.** The upgrade mechanism replaces only the deposit policy, and four edges have no test coverage.\n\n**Dropped.** Both slither strict-equality leads are zero-amount guards, and the depositToken reentrancy lead is closed by the guard and the fixed token set. Nothing else from the specialists failed to reproduce.\n\n**Coverage.** All 11 entry points are answered, plus four invariant rows. Every snippet was checked byte-for-byte against the tree.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":692143,"inputTokens":290,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":21590,"runtime":"claude","turns":21,"wallClockMs":468778}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"70ccc6d2bace6216a02eb4fe8c1189ac921d823dba76232c21845e58eaf899e1","device":"b29f0968f2df07a0","findings":[],"hash":"c5ac6022953a8c3d295221be7d0b402a73a8d7aebdecc9a0cdf87b9dc1ccc2c4","nodeId":"caac53b8-5d0e-4ed5-bf20-72913e5aec19","outcome":"completed","summary":"Created [launch.json](/home/seat/.identitymd/work/f66fcb49-4b9a-4c70-9aa9-656f5b14d13f/caac53b8-5d0e-4ed5-bf20-72913e5aec19/launch.json) with both accepted contracts in dependency order and matching constructor arguments.\n\nValidation passed: schema and ABI checks, `forge build`, all 52 existing tests, and the protected deployment check. Only `launch.json` is included in the deliverable.","treeHash":"ae89fb741ecad54a233c51c872304a4c848884d2","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":400512,"inputTokens":44003,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":5564,"runtime":"codex","turns":4,"wallClockMs":250086}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"c35be49d2f8f8def","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"totalValueUsd() multiplies both stablecoin balances by the literal 1e12, i.e. it assumes 6 decimals. The constructor (lines 55-58) checks the usdt/usdc addresses for zero, duplicates, IMD and self, but never checks decimals(), and IMD's decimals are a free uint8 parameter checked only for <= 18. A wrong address or wrong decimal argument therefore does not fail closed: it silently misvalues holdings in either direction. Over-scaling (an 18-decimal token in a 6-decimal slot) values 1 raw unit at 1e12 WAD so only 1e10 raw units ($0.00000001 nominal) ever fit under the cap and the asset is effectively unusable; under-scaling (a 2-decimal token, or imdDecimals_=18 for a 9-decimal IMD) lets nominal value 1e4..1e9 times the $10,000 cap be accepted. Mainnet USDT (0xdAC1...1ec7), USDC (0xA0b8...eB48) and IMD (0xD34a...63B7) were read from a public RPC during this review and report 6, 6 and 18 decimals, so the README's expected configuration is correct; the defect is that the contract cannot detect a deviation from it. Minimal fix that preserves the design: in the constructor require IERC20Metadata(usdt).decimals() == 6, IERC20Metadata(usdc).decimals() == 6 and IERC20Metadata(IMD).decimals() == imdDecimals_ (or read IMD decimals instead of taking a parameter). If the author wants deployment rehearsals without token code present, keep the parameter but add the check behind a code.length > 0 condition.","line":115,"path":"src/CappedAssetVault.sol","reproduction":"Over-scaling: deploy new CappedAssetVault(owner, usdt6, dai18, 18, policy) where dai18 is any 18-decimal ERC20. Alice approves and calls depositToken(dai18, 1e18) (1 DAI, $1 nominal). Expected: accepted, totalValueUsd()==1e18. Actual: reverts CapExceeded(1e30) because 1e18*1e12 = 1e30 WAD = $1,000,000,000,000; depositToken(dai18, 1e10) is accepted and totalValueUsd() reads 10_000e18 while the vault holds $0.00000001 nominal. Under-scaling: deploy with a 2-decimal token as usdt; depositToken(two, 100_000_000e2) ($100,000,000 nominal) is accepted and totalValueUsd()==10_000e18. Same arithmetic applies to imdDecimals_: passing 18 for a 9-decimal token undervalues IMD 1e9 times. Both traces were run in test/scratch/MathBoundary.t.sol (test_StablecoinDecimalsNotValidated, test_LowDecimalStableBypassesCap) and pass against the current code.","severity":"low","snippet":"        return address(this).balance * ETH_PRICE_USD + IERC20(USDT).balanceOf(address(this)) * 1e12","title":"Stablecoin scale is hardcoded to 6 decimals (1e12) and never validated against the configured usdt/usdc contracts"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The cap is evaluated against totalValueUsd(), which is the vault's present balance at fixed prices. Because the beneficiary may withdraw at any time, the total value ever accepted through the deposit entry points is unbounded: after each withdrawal the next $10,000 is accepted again. The README documents this interpretation ('Withdrawals restore deposit capacity'), and the brief ('should accept maximum of 10K worth of assets') can be read either way, so this is a design confirmation for the requester rather than a code defect. If the intended guarantee is a lifetime ceiling, the fix is a monotonically increasing accumulator of accepted USD value (incremented by the valued receipt in _acceptDeposit and compared to MAX_USD_WAD) instead of, or in addition to, the balance-based check; withdrawals would then not restore capacity.","line":153,"path":"src/CappedAssetVault.sol","reproduction":"Fresh vault with OpenDepositPolicy. Alice: depositToken(USDC, 10_000e6) -> accepted, totalValueUsd()==10_000e18. WITHDRAWER: withdrawAll(USDC) -> vault balance 0. Alice: depositToken(USDC, 10_000e6) -> accepted again. Vault plus WITHDRAWER now hold 20_000e6 USDC received through depositToken, i.e. $20,000 accepted against a '$10,000 maximum'. Under the lifetime reading the second deposit should revert CapExceeded. Run in test/scratch/MathBoundary.t.sol test_LifetimeReceiptsExceedCap (passes against current code, demonstrating the behaviour).","severity":"info","snippet":"        uint256 value = totalValueUsd();\n        if (value > MAX_USD_WAD) revert CapExceeded(value);","title":"The $10,000 cap bounds current holdings, not lifetime receipts: withdrawals reopen capacity"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Boundary x invariant seam: remainingCapacityUsd() tells a depositor exactly how much fits, but the check in _acceptDeposit is made against the live balance, which anyone can raise by a plain ERC20 transfer or forced ETH without going through the vault. A third party who sees a pending deposit of exactly the remaining capacity can push the total 1e12 WAD (one USDC/USDT unit, $0.000001) over the cap, making the victim's transaction revert and waste its gas; repeated indefinitely at negligible cost while the beneficiary does not withdraw. No funds are lost and the deposit can be retried for a smaller amount, which is why this is low. The README acknowledges unsolicited balances may exceed the cap but does not describe this griefing path. Mitigations that preserve the design: compute the cap against tracked accepted balances (incremented in _acceptDeposit, decremented in the withdraw paths) so donations cannot consume capacity, or have the frontend recommend leaving a small margin below remainingCapacityUsd().","line":154,"path":"src/CappedAssetVault.sol","reproduction":"Fresh vault, remainingCapacityUsd()==10_000e18. Alice prepares depositToken(USDC, 10_000e6) which fits exactly. Before it is mined, address 0xBAD executes USDC.transfer(vault, 1). Alice's transaction now executes with totalValueUsd()==10_000e18 + 1e12 and reverts CapExceeded(10000000000001000000000000) although her own deposit was within the capacity she read. Expected: her deposit is accepted (or capacity reflects only accepted deposits). Run in test/scratch/MathBoundary.t.sol test_DonationFrontRunRevertsExactDeposit (passes against current code, demonstrating the revert).","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (value > MAX_USD_WAD) revert CapExceeded(value);","title":"Cap check includes unsolicited balances, so a 1-unit donation front-run makes a capacity-exact deposit revert"}],"hash":"ef6e0cdabd446bbe6096134e2c472e7223cca341fda10d2fd7770b8c9473d0d3","nodeId":"06383d82-8d5e-44c8-82c0-d25802d9b7e0","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. Findings and coverage are written to `.imd-findings.json`, and all three snippets validate against the source tree.\n\n**Outcome: the valuation math holds.** I traced every multiplication in `totalValueUsd()` and the cap check against the Math Precision, Boundary and Numerical Gap guides, and found no reachable rounding, overflow, truncation or scale-mixing defect. Specifically verified, with scratch tests under test/scratch/ that pass on the current code:\n\n- ETH, USDT, USDC and IMD each value exactly at their smallest unit. There is no division, so no dust can be farmed.\n- The cap is inclusive at exactly $10,000. The largest ETH deposit is the floored wei amount, and one extra wei is rejected.\n- IMD at 0 decimals and 18 decimals both scale correctly. The literal-base exponent evaluates in uint256, so there is no uint8 truncation.\n- Overflow would need more than 1e58 IMD units, and IMD's on-chain supply is about 4.1 million tokens. Any overflow would only block deposits, never withdrawals.\n- The Slither reentrancy and strict-equality leads are benign: all deposit and withdraw paths share one reentrancy guard, and the equality is a zero-amount guard.\n\nI also read mainnet directly: the pinned IMD address is a LayerZero OFT with 18 decimals, and USDT and USDC report 6, so the README's expected configuration is correct.\n\n**Three findings reported, none above low:**\n\n1. **Low.** The stablecoin scale is hardcoded to 6 decimals and the constructor never checks `decimals()` on the configured tokens or IMD. A wrong address or wrong IMD decimal argument silently misvalues holdings in either direction rather than failing closed. Reproduced both ways in scratch tests.\n2. **Info.** The cap bounds current holdings, not lifetime receipts, so each withdrawal reopens $10,000 of capacity. This matches the README but the brief is ambiguous, so the requester should confirm the intended reading.\n3. **Low.** Because the cap check includes unsolicited balances, a one-unit USDC donation front-run makes a capacity-exact deposit revert. No funds are lost, only gas and a retry.\n\nCoverage: all 11 entry points have a row, plus four invariant and static-analysis rows. No proof files were attached because nothing reached high or critical severity. Nothing outside `.imd-findings.json` and test/scratch/ was changed.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1040731,"inputTokens":354,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":24403,"runtime":"claude","turns":24,"wallClockMs":451670}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":2561,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 42 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 2.44s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[missing-events-access-control]: `depositPolicy` is changed without an event but is used for access control\n    ╭▸ src/CappedAssetVault.sol:184:9\n    │\n184 │         depositPolicy = IDepositPolicy(next);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-events-access-control\n\nwarning[reentrancy-eth]: uncapped ETH transfer can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/CappedAssetVault.sol:164:27\n    │\n164 │         (bool success,) = payable(WITHDRAWER).call{value: amount}(\"\");\n    │                           ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-eth\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":8062,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 2 tests for test/Deployment.t.sol:DeploymentTest\n[PASS] test_DeploymentRehearsalTakesExplicitArguments() (gas: 6217805)\n[PASS] test_FactoryStaticConstructorsAndRuntimeRestrictions() (gas: 4773120)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 13.53ms (25.22ms CPU time)\n\nRan 12 tests for test/Administration.t.sol:AdministrationTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_NonOwnerCannotAdminister(address) (runs: 1000, μ: 130713, ~: 130713)\n[PASS] test_ConstructorRejectsInvalidConfiguration() (gas: 10820)\n[PASS] test_InvalidUpgradesLeaveExistingPolicy() (gas: 342404)\n[PASS] test_OnlyOwnerPausesAndUpgrades() (gas: 386115)\n[PASS] test_PolicyCannotBypassCap() (gas: 858782)\n[PASS] test_PolicyRejectionRollsBackTokenTransfer() (gas: 471236)\n[PASS] test_RevertingPolicyCannotBlockWithdrawalsOrReplacement() (gas: 1160853)\n[PASS] test_StaticPolicyCannotWriteAndWithdrawalStillWorks() (gas: 589679)\n[PASS] test_TwoStepOwnershipPreservesWithdrawalAddress() (gas: 268879)\n[PASS] test_UpgradeChangesAdmissionAndPreservesCustodyState() (gas: 819773)\n[PASS] test_UpgradeRequiresPause() (gas: 210312)\n[PASS] test_ZeroSelfAndRenouncedOwnershipRejected() (gas: 74861)\nSuite result: ok. 12 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 135.23ms (138.66ms CPU time)\n\nRan 9 tests for test/AdversarialVault.t.sol:AdversarialVaultTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_FeeReceiptCapAndAtomicRollback(uint256,uint16) (runs: 1000, μ: 386017, ~: 418783)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 2445\n  Bound result 2524\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_IMDDecimalBoundaryAndFullWithdrawal(uint8) (runs: 1000, μ: 1976301, ~: 1976113)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 2\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_MixedCapAcrossSendersAndRefill(uint256,uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 1527918, ~: 1533960)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 9867\n  Bound result 99999966\n  Bound result 19\n  Bound result 19\n\n[PASS] test_AuthorizedTokenCallbackCannotReenterAnyWithdrawalPath() (gas: 1704005)\n[PASS] test_BeneficiaryTransactionOriginDoesNotAuthorizeIntermediary() (gas: 750910)\n[PASS] test_IMDZeroAndEighteenDecimalBoundaries() (gas: 3924177)\n[PASS] test_OverflowingUnsolicitedTokenBalanceFailsClosedButCanBeRecovered() (gas: 370966)\n[PASS] test_PolicyGetsActualReceiptAndCombinedPostTransferValue() (gas: 928715)\n[PASS] test_ReceivePassesActualSenderAndETHContextToPolicy() (gas: 611822)\nSuite result: ok. 9 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 135.31ms (372.58ms CPU time)\n\nRan 37 tests for test/CappedAssetVault.t.sol:CappedAssetVaultTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_ExactValuationAndFullConservation(uint256,uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 880200, ~: 880393)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 208677322516959647\n  Bound result 364111979\n  Bound result 37995201631792176112\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_UnauthorizedWithdrawerAlwaysFails(address) (runs: 1000, μ: 124426, ~: 124426)\n[PASS] test_AllFourAssetsFillOneSharedCap() (gas: 609034)\n[PASS] test_BrokenBalanceReadDoesNotFreezeETHWithdrawal() (gas: 201783)\n[PASS] test_ConfiguredIMDDecimalsAreUsedExactly() (gas: 93644)\n[PASS] test_ConstructorSetsExplicitRolesAndPrices() (gas: 112891)\n[PASS] test_DepositEmitsActualReceivedAndCombinedValue() (gas: 158675)\n[PASS] test_DirectTokenDonationsCountAndCanExceedCap() (gas: 542969)\n[PASS] test_ETHBoundaryOneWeiAboveFails() (gas: 133556)\n[PASS] test_ETHWithdrawalReentrancyBlocked() (gas: 518276)\n[PASS] test_ExcessTokenDepositRollsBackBalancesAndAllowance() (gas: 689816)\n[PASS] test_FailedETHWithdrawalKeepsFundsAndAllowsRetry() (gas: 248672)\n[PASS] test_FalseReturningTokenRollsBackDeposit() (gas: 193239)\n[PASS] test_FalseReturningTokenRollsBackWithdrawal() (gas: 297427)\n[PASS] test_FeeOnTransferValuesActualReceiptAtCap() (gas: 393786)\n[PASS] test_ForcedETHCountsAndRemainsWithdrawableWhilePaused() (gas: 208796)\n[PASS] test_IMDBoundaryAndRepeatedDustCannotEvadeCap() (gas: 564968)\n[PASS] test_MalformedTokenReturnRollsBackDeposit() (gas: 192706)\n[PASS] test_NoAllowanceOrBalanceCannotDeposit() (gas: 178600)\n[PASS] test_OneHundredPercentFeeRejected() (gas: 168791)\n[PASS] test_OnlyBeneficiaryCanRecoverUnsupportedToken() (gas: 989410)\n[PASS] test_OwnerCannotWithdraw() (gas: 875931)\n[PASS] test_PartialAndFullWithdrawalsForEveryAssetWhilePaused() (gas: 1076881)\n[PASS] test_PausedDepositsFailAndOwnerCanResume() (gas: 283747)\n[PASS] test_ReceiveUsesCapAndPauseChecks() (gas: 248176)\n[PASS] test_StablecoinSixDecimalsAndIMDEighteenDecimals() (gas: 539364)\n[PASS] test_TokenDepositReentrancyBlocked() (gas: 301142)\n[PASS] test_TokenFailureDoesNotFreezeOtherWithdrawals() (gas: 882925)\n[PASS] test_TokenReturningSuccessWithoutMovementRejected() (gas: 153804)\n[PASS] test_TokenTransferRevertRollsBackDeposit() (gas: 172851)\n[PASS] test_USDTWithoutReturnDataDepositsAndWithdraws() (gas: 264016)\n[PASS] test_UnexpectedBalanceIncreaseRejected() (gas: 322168)\n[PASS] test_UnknownSelectorRejectsETH() (gas: 36729)\n[PASS] test_UnsupportedAssetRejected() (gas: 879567)\n[PASS] test_WithdrawalReopensCapacity() (gas: 317161)\n[PASS] test_ZeroAndExcessWithdrawalsRejected() (gas: 375519)\n[PASS] test_ZeroDepositsRejected() (gas: 98484)\nSuite result: ok. 37 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 135.36ms (273.43ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/VaultInvariant.t.sol:VaultInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nVaultInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_AcceptedDepositsStayWithinSharedCap\n[PASS] invariant_ConservationAndFixedCustody\n VaultInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭--------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract     | Selector    | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=========================================================+\n| VaultHandler | deposit     | 4193  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| VaultHandler | togglePause | 4053  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| VaultHandler | upgrade     | 4053  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| VaultHandler | withdraw    | 4085  | 0       | 0        |\n╰--------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 623\n  Bound result 3373\n  Bound result 863\n  Bound result 4559\n  Bound result 1584\n  Bound result 1419\n  Bound result 779\n  Bound result 1313373041\n  Bound result 239\n  Bound result 6175\n  Bound result 2218330523995133971\n  Bound result 669\n  Bound result 6695\n  Bound result 449974641474896298220\n  Bound result 53\n  Bound result 80446665\n  Bound result 9192067031560892903\n  Bound result 7049129\n  Bound result 10395410\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 2.34s (2.34s CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/VaultStateMachine.t.sol:VaultStateMachineTest\n[PASS]\nVaultStateMachineTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_AllFundsAccountedAndOnlyBeneficiaryPaid\n[PASS] invariant_PausePolicyAndOwnershipMatchAuthorizedTransitions\n VaultStateMachineTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 24576, reverts: 0)\n\n╭--------------------------+------------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract                 | Selector               | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+================================================================================+\n| VaultStateMachineHandler | administer             | 4897  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------------+------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| VaultStateMachineHandler | deposit                | 4944  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------------+------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| VaultStateMachineHandler | donate                 | 4932  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------------+------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| VaultStateMachineHandler | unauthorizedWithdrawal | 4890  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------------+------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| VaultStateMachineHandler | withdraw               | 4913  | 0       | 0        |\n╰--------------------------+------------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2600\n  Bound result 3000000\n  Bound result 12995\n  Bound result 6901818924185159713\n  Bound result 30100000000001\n  Bound result 2609\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 5376\n  Bound result 2270270286\n  Bound result 9628\n  Bound result 10959\n  Bound result 33179802\n  Bound result 19\n  Bound result 20000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 805462699\n\n[PASS] test_HandlerExercisesRejectionHandoverPolicyAndRecovery() (gas: 6500115)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 20000000000\n\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 7.97s (7.98s CPU time)\n\nRan 6 test suites in 7.98s (10.73s CPU time): 63 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (63 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":38,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"CappedAssetVault.acceptOwnership()\",\"CappedAssetVault.depositETH()\",\"CappedAssetVault.depositToken(address,uint256)\",\"CappedAssetVault.pause()\",\"CappedAssetVault.receive()\",\"CappedAssetVault.transferOwnership(address)\",\"CappedAssetVault.unpause()\",\"CappedAssetVault.upgradeTo(address)\",\"CappedAssetVault.withdrawAll(address)\",\"CappedAssetVault.withdrawETH(uint256)\",\"CappedAssetVault.withdrawToken(address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":3,\"DEPENDENCIES.md\":14,\"README.md\":182,\"foundry.toml\":20,\"remappings.txt\":2,\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":17,\"src/CappedAssetVault.sol\":187,\"src/OpenDepositPolicy.sol\":15,\"src/interfaces/IDepositPolicy.sol\":15,\"test/Administration.t.sol\":206,\"test/AdversarialVault.t.sol\":265,\"test/CappedAssetVault.t.sol\":450,\"test/Deployment.t.sol\":58,\"test/README.md\":49,\"test/VaultBase.sol\":61,\"test/VaultInvariant.t.sol\":116,\"test/VaultStateMachine.t.sol\":333,\"test/mocks/MockToken.sol\":99,\"test/mocks/Policies.sol\":50,\"test/mocks/Receivers.sol\":24},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"225a99e29fdda46e79f381006d1ca16c6f153d432bed12284b86511c389768d3","verifiedTreeHash":"7d340374f376e5184893dffeeccfc66fddf46232","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+e6140b7a"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":1985,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 40 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 1.83s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[missing-events-access-control]: `depositPolicy` is changed without an event but is used for access control\n    ╭▸ src/CappedAssetVault.sol:184:9\n    │\n184 │         depositPolicy = IDepositPolicy(next);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-events-access-control\n\nwarning[reentrancy-eth]: uncapped ETH transfer can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/CappedAssetVault.sol:164:27\n    │\n164 │         (bool success,) = payable(WITHDRAWER).call{value: amount}(\"\");\n    │                           ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-eth\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":1552,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 2 tests for test/Deployment.t.sol:DeploymentTest\n[PASS] test_DeploymentRehearsalTakesExplicitArguments() (gas: 6217805)\n[PASS] test_FactoryStaticConstructorsAndRuntimeRestrictions() (gas: 4773120)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 12.75ms (20.50ms CPU time)\n\nRan 12 tests for test/Administration.t.sol:AdministrationTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_NonOwnerCannotAdminister(address) (runs: 256, μ: 131066, ~: 131066)\n[PASS] test_ConstructorRejectsInvalidConfiguration() (gas: 10820)\n[PASS] test_InvalidUpgradesLeaveExistingPolicy() (gas: 342404)\n[PASS] test_OnlyOwnerPausesAndUpgrades() (gas: 386115)\n[PASS] test_PolicyCannotBypassCap() (gas: 858782)\n[PASS] test_PolicyRejectionRollsBackTokenTransfer() (gas: 471236)\n[PASS] test_RevertingPolicyCannotBlockWithdrawalsOrReplacement() (gas: 1160853)\n[PASS] test_StaticPolicyCannotWriteAndWithdrawalStillWorks() (gas: 589679)\n[PASS] test_TwoStepOwnershipPreservesWithdrawalAddress() (gas: 268879)\n[PASS] test_UpgradeChangesAdmissionAndPreservesCustodyState() (gas: 819773)\n[PASS] test_UpgradeRequiresPause() (gas: 210312)\n[PASS] test_ZeroSelfAndRenouncedOwnershipRejected() (gas: 74861)\nSuite result: ok. 12 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 29.24ms (14.15ms CPU time)\n\nRan 37 tests for test/CappedAssetVault.t.sol:CappedAssetVaultTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_ExactValuationAndFullConservation(uint64,uint64,uint64) (runs: 256, μ: 879432, ~: 879226)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 74714240001059\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 162374877593697076\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_UnauthorizedWithdrawerAlwaysFails(address) (runs: 256, μ: 124811, ~: 124811)\n[PASS] test_AllFourAssetsFillOneSharedCap() (gas: 609034)\n[PASS] test_BrokenBalanceReadDoesNotFreezeETHWithdrawal() (gas: 201783)\n[PASS] test_ConfiguredIMDDecimalsAreUsedExactly() (gas: 93644)\n[PASS] test_ConstructorSetsExplicitRolesAndPrices() (gas: 112891)\n[PASS] test_DepositEmitsActualReceivedAndCombinedValue() (gas: 158675)\n[PASS] test_DirectTokenDonationsCountAndCanExceedCap() (gas: 542969)\n[PASS] test_ETHBoundaryOneWeiAboveFails() (gas: 133556)\n[PASS] test_ETHWithdrawalReentrancyBlocked() (gas: 518276)\n[PASS] test_ExcessTokenDepositRollsBackBalancesAndAllowance() (gas: 689816)\n[PASS] test_FailedETHWithdrawalKeepsFundsAndAllowsRetry() (gas: 248672)\n[PASS] test_FalseReturningTokenRollsBackDeposit() (gas: 193239)\n[PASS] test_FalseReturningTokenRollsBackWithdrawal() (gas: 297427)\n[PASS] test_FeeOnTransferValuesActualReceiptAtCap() (gas: 393786)\n[PASS] test_ForcedETHCountsAndRemainsWithdrawableWhilePaused() (gas: 208796)\n[PASS] test_IMDBoundaryAndRepeatedDustCannotEvadeCap() (gas: 564968)\n[PASS] test_MalformedTokenReturnRollsBackDeposit() (gas: 192706)\n[PASS] test_NoAllowanceOrBalanceCannotDeposit() (gas: 178600)\n[PASS] test_OneHundredPercentFeeRejected() (gas: 168791)\n[PASS] test_OnlyBeneficiaryCanRecoverUnsupportedToken() (gas: 989410)\n[PASS] test_OwnerCannotWithdraw() (gas: 875931)\n[PASS] test_PartialAndFullWithdrawalsForEveryAssetWhilePaused() (gas: 1076881)\n[PASS] test_PausedDepositsFailAndOwnerCanResume() (gas: 283747)\n[PASS] test_ReceiveUsesCapAndPauseChecks() (gas: 248176)\n[PASS] test_StablecoinSixDecimalsAndIMDEighteenDecimals() (gas: 539364)\n[PASS] test_TokenDepositReentrancyBlocked() (gas: 301142)\n[PASS] test_TokenFailureDoesNotFreezeOtherWithdrawals() (gas: 882925)\n[PASS] test_TokenReturningSuccessWithoutMovementRejected() (gas: 153804)\n[PASS] test_TokenTransferRevertRollsBackDeposit() (gas: 172851)\n[PASS] test_USDTWithoutReturnDataDepositsAndWithdraws() (gas: 264126)\n[PASS] test_UnexpectedBalanceIncreaseRejected() (gas: 322168)\n[PASS] test_UnknownSelectorRejectsETH() (gas: 36729)\n[PASS] test_UnsupportedAssetRejected() (gas: 879567)\n[PASS] test_WithdrawalReopensCapacity() (gas: 317161)\n[PASS] test_ZeroAndExcessWithdrawalsRejected() (gas: 375519)\n[PASS] test_ZeroDepositsRejected() (gas: 98484)\nSuite result: ok. 37 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 42.32ms (62.58ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/VaultInvariant.t.sol:VaultInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nVaultInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_AcceptedDepositsStayWithinSharedCap\n[PASS] invariant_ConservationAndFixedCustody\n VaultInvariantTest invariants (runs: 128, calls: 8192, reverts: 0)\n\n╭--------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract     | Selector    | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=========================================================+\n| VaultHandler | deposit     | 2095  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| VaultHandler | togglePause | 2024  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| VaultHandler | upgrade     | 2010  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| VaultHandler | withdraw    | 2063  | 0       | 0        |\n╰--------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 6915\n  Bound result 2303\n  Bound result 1197\n  Bound result 995\n  Bound result 9876652851\n  Bound result 2247\n  Bound result 388\n  Bound result 4427\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.43s (1.42s CPU time)\n\nRan 4 test suites in 1.44s (1.52s CPU time): 52 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (52 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":58,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"CappedAssetVault.acceptOwnership()\",\"CappedAssetVault.depositETH()\",\"CappedAssetVault.depositToken(address,uint256)\",\"CappedAssetVault.pause()\",\"CappedAssetVault.receive()\",\"CappedAssetVault.transferOwnership(address)\",\"CappedAssetVault.unpause()\",\"CappedAssetVault.upgradeTo(address)\",\"CappedAssetVault.withdrawAll(address)\",\"CappedAssetVault.withdrawETH(uint256)\",\"CappedAssetVault.withdrawToken(address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":3,\"DEPENDENCIES.md\":14,\"README.md\":182,\"foundry.toml\":20,\"remappings.txt\":2,\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":17,\"src/CappedAssetVault.sol\":187,\"src/OpenDepositPolicy.sol\":15,\"src/interfaces/IDepositPolicy.sol\":15,\"test/Administration.t.sol\":205,\"test/CappedAssetVault.t.sol\":448,\"test/Deployment.t.sol\":58,\"test/VaultBase.sol\":61,\"test/VaultInvariant.t.sol\":113,\"test/mocks/MockToken.sol\":99,\"test/mocks/Policies.sol\":50,\"test/mocks/Receivers.sol\":24},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":688,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[high/medium] reentrancy-balance at src/CappedAssetVault.sol:82: Reentrancy in CappedAssetVault.depositToken(address,uint256) (src/CappedAssetVault.sol#82-91):\n[medium/high] incorrect-equality at src/CappedAssetVault.sol:168: CappedAssetVault._withdrawToken(address,uint256) (src/CappedAssetVault.sol#168-174) uses a dangerous strict equality:\n[medium/high] incorrect-equality at src/CappedAssetVault.sol:159: CappedAssetVault._withdrawETH(uint256) (src/CappedAssetVault.sol#159-166) uses a dangerous strict equality:","passed":true},{"durationMs":282,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[low] centralization-risk at src/CappedAssetVault.sol:14: Centralization Risk (6 places)\n[low] literal-instead-of-constant at src/CappedAssetVault.sol:57: Literal Instead of Constant (4 places)","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"634341499be69166245daa9dc1a54e68b6f2ac676647105d7dd1fb0f53665025","verifiedTreeHash":"fb10e3a147189062c4f124aeb406c51f7cb89675","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+e6140b7a"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":1789,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 40 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 1.68s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[missing-events-access-control]: `depositPolicy` is changed without an event but is used for access control\n    ╭▸ src/CappedAssetVault.sol:184:9\n    │\n184 │         depositPolicy = IDepositPolicy(next);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-events-access-control\n\nwarning[reentrancy-eth]: uncapped ETH transfer can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/CappedAssetVault.sol:164:27\n    │\n164 │         (bool success,) = payable(WITHDRAWER).call{value: amount}(\"\");\n    │                           ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-eth\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":1426,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 12 tests for test/Administration.t.sol:AdministrationTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_NonOwnerCannotAdminister(address) (runs: 256, μ: 131066, ~: 131066)\n[PASS] test_ConstructorRejectsInvalidConfiguration() (gas: 10820)\n[PASS] test_InvalidUpgradesLeaveExistingPolicy() (gas: 342404)\n[PASS] test_OnlyOwnerPausesAndUpgrades() (gas: 386115)\n[PASS] test_PolicyCannotBypassCap() (gas: 858782)\n[PASS] test_PolicyRejectionRollsBackTokenTransfer() (gas: 471236)\n[PASS] test_RevertingPolicyCannotBlockWithdrawalsOrReplacement() (gas: 1160853)\n[PASS] test_StaticPolicyCannotWriteAndWithdrawalStillWorks() (gas: 589679)\n[PASS] test_TwoStepOwnershipPreservesWithdrawalAddress() (gas: 268879)\n[PASS] test_UpgradeChangesAdmissionAndPreservesCustodyState() (gas: 819773)\n[PASS] test_UpgradeRequiresPause() (gas: 210312)\n[PASS] test_ZeroSelfAndRenouncedOwnershipRejected() (gas: 74861)\nSuite result: ok. 12 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 7.33ms (8.84ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/Deployment.t.sol:DeploymentTest\n[PASS] test_DeploymentRehearsalTakesExplicitArguments() (gas: 6217805)\n[PASS] test_FactoryStaticConstructorsAndRuntimeRestrictions() (gas: 4773120)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 7.42ms (12.49ms CPU time)\n\nRan 37 tests for test/CappedAssetVault.t.sol:CappedAssetVaultTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_ExactValuationAndFullConservation(uint64,uint64,uint64) (runs: 256, μ: 879517, ~: 879603)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 425973026\n  Bound result 492348564\n  Bound result 1\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_UnauthorizedWithdrawerAlwaysFails(address) (runs: 256, μ: 124811, ~: 124811)\n[PASS] test_AllFourAssetsFillOneSharedCap() (gas: 609034)\n[PASS] test_BrokenBalanceReadDoesNotFreezeETHWithdrawal() (gas: 201783)\n[PASS] test_ConfiguredIMDDecimalsAreUsedExactly() (gas: 93644)\n[PASS] test_ConstructorSetsExplicitRolesAndPrices() (gas: 112891)\n[PASS] test_DepositEmitsActualReceivedAndCombinedValue() (gas: 158675)\n[PASS] test_DirectTokenDonationsCountAndCanExceedCap() (gas: 542969)\n[PASS] test_ETHBoundaryOneWeiAboveFails() (gas: 133556)\n[PASS] test_ETHWithdrawalReentrancyBlocked() (gas: 518276)\n[PASS] test_ExcessTokenDepositRollsBackBalancesAndAllowance() (gas: 689816)\n[PASS] test_FailedETHWithdrawalKeepsFundsAndAllowsRetry() (gas: 248672)\n[PASS] test_FalseReturningTokenRollsBackDeposit() (gas: 193239)\n[PASS] test_FalseReturningTokenRollsBackWithdrawal() (gas: 297427)\n[PASS] test_FeeOnTransferValuesActualReceiptAtCap() (gas: 393786)\n[PASS] test_ForcedETHCountsAndRemainsWithdrawableWhilePaused() (gas: 208796)\n[PASS] test_IMDBoundaryAndRepeatedDustCannotEvadeCap() (gas: 564968)\n[PASS] test_MalformedTokenReturnRollsBackDeposit() (gas: 192706)\n[PASS] test_NoAllowanceOrBalanceCannotDeposit() (gas: 178600)\n[PASS] test_OneHundredPercentFeeRejected() (gas: 168791)\n[PASS] test_OnlyBeneficiaryCanRecoverUnsupportedToken() (gas: 989410)\n[PASS] test_OwnerCannotWithdraw() (gas: 875931)\n[PASS] test_PartialAndFullWithdrawalsForEveryAssetWhilePaused() (gas: 1076881)\n[PASS] test_PausedDepositsFailAndOwnerCanResume() (gas: 283747)\n[PASS] test_ReceiveUsesCapAndPauseChecks() (gas: 248176)\n[PASS] test_StablecoinSixDecimalsAndIMDEighteenDecimals() (gas: 539364)\n[PASS] test_TokenDepositReentrancyBlocked() (gas: 301142)\n[PASS] test_TokenFailureDoesNotFreezeOtherWithdrawals() (gas: 882925)\n[PASS] test_TokenReturningSuccessWithoutMovementRejected() (gas: 153804)\n[PASS] test_TokenTransferRevertRollsBackDeposit() (gas: 172851)\n[PASS] test_USDTWithoutReturnDataDepositsAndWithdraws() (gas: 264126)\n[PASS] test_UnexpectedBalanceIncreaseRejected() (gas: 322168)\n[PASS] test_UnknownSelectorRejectsETH() (gas: 36729)\n[PASS] test_UnsupportedAssetRejected() (gas: 879567)\n[PASS] test_WithdrawalReopensCapacity() (gas: 317161)\n[PASS] test_ZeroAndExcessWithdrawalsRejected() (gas: 375519)\n[PASS] test_ZeroDepositsRejected() (gas: 98484)\nSuite result: ok. 37 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 27.00ms (44.40ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/VaultInvariant.t.sol:VaultInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nVaultInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_AcceptedDepositsStayWithinSharedCap\n[PASS] invariant_ConservationAndFixedCustody\n VaultInvariantTest invariants (runs: 128, calls: 8192, reverts: 0)\n\n╭--------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract     | Selector    | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=========================================================+\n| VaultHandler | deposit     | 2066  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| VaultHandler | togglePause | 2117  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| VaultHandler | upgrade     | 1999  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| VaultHandler | withdraw    | 2010  | 0       | 0        |\n╰--------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 2131\n  Bound result 315\n  Bound result 455927795\n  Bound result 4511\n  Bound result 2969\n  Bound result 6127\n  Bound result 6153\n  Bound result 4310\n  Bound result 96872935\n  Bound result 5533\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.34s (1.34s CPU time)\n\nRan 4 test suites in 1.34s (1.38s CPU time): 52 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (52 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":42,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"CappedAssetVault.acceptOwnership()\",\"CappedAssetVault.depositETH()\",\"CappedAssetVault.depositToken(address,uint256)\",\"CappedAssetVault.pause()\",\"CappedAssetVault.receive()\",\"CappedAssetVault.transferOwnership(address)\",\"CappedAssetVault.unpause()\",\"CappedAssetVault.upgradeTo(address)\",\"CappedAssetVault.withdrawAll(address)\",\"CappedAssetVault.withdrawETH(uint256)\",\"CappedAssetVault.withdrawToken(address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":3,\"DEPENDENCIES.md\":14,\"README.md\":182,\"foundry.toml\":20,\"launch.json\":20,\"remappings.txt\":2,\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":17,\"src/CappedAssetVault.sol\":187,\"src/OpenDepositPolicy.sol\":15,\"src/interfaces/IDepositPolicy.sol\":15,\"test/Administration.t.sol\":205,\"test/CappedAssetVault.t.sol\":448,\"test/Deployment.t.sol\":58,\"test/VaultBase.sol\":61,\"test/VaultInvariant.t.sol\":113,\"test/mocks/MockToken.sol\":99,\"test/mocks/Policies.sol\":50,\"test/mocks/Receivers.sol\":24},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"c5ac6022953a8c3d295221be7d0b402a73a8d7aebdecc9a0cdf87b9dc1ccc2c4","verifiedTreeHash":"ae89fb741ecad54a233c51c872304a4c848884d2","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+e6140b7a"}]}