{"assessments":[],"deployments":[],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"f99d5a11-a55c-4c05-aa61-5efe77902519","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"684349ccc7a8ff54eacfe544489e0a08cce1010229bb53186cb00c7c275e5eef","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_economics","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"dc09106f62c43d4c91b9e96972aec28a0e20da104bb323dcbb176cda09990f9c","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_flow","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"29d8afeb24b7767f841197a9f3d353b0b175d23f3e088fe02d949ae0a322f0e1","dependsOn":["build_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest","audit_math","audit_permissions","audit_economics","audit_flow"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"3014f1ea5961918ca059453a484bf4c8bcbbfc2248dbe31d94ac7c5cdf8f50bd","skillId":"audit-judge","tools":[]},"key":"audit_judge","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"3014f1ea5961918ca059453a484bf4c8bcbbfc2248dbe31d94ac7c5cdf8f50bd","skillId":"audit-judge","state":"waiting"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"8810a9adb4e871ce25e0f74d817fdd41da91903a306ac934ea1f7f9de4fbe1d3","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_math","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"317ccf1c0e1342291cb045ac1d6a2b63d1daeec3d0e5fc46419d70d61972b221","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_permissions","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"13c6592150be62ca56391fe13eaa1812a00e56061fb7a72ba34438a1dae6fb9b","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"587567a5ef71546b5973ceaf6ef1dbbd590f49503b5ac9a6973ed86b89584857","skillId":"build-contract-project","tools":[]},"key":"build_contract_project","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"587567a5ef71546b5973ceaf6ef1dbbd590f49503b5ac9a6973ed86b89584857","skillId":"build-contract-project","state":"failed"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"93436640e49362c354d95f6330db72a7276380733f2cebac86a50563e7113b73","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"tools":[]},"key":"manifest","kind":"code","role":"integrate","skillHash":null,"skillId":null,"state":"waiting"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"4b66080519773cff6b575f17bf632e93cc4409436b1681ecb952abe246cbb6a0","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"73431852439ad3a343f3d2b7db1c43cd363b9f48f9bb51497374a0cf6d50b223","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","tools":[]},"key":"write_foundry_tests","kind":"code","role":"tests","skillHash":"73431852439ad3a343f3d2b7db1c43cd363b9f48f9bb51497374a0cf6d50b223","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","state":"waiting"}],"objective":"Kiln: a Uniswap v4 hook for a new ETH/ZTO pool that charges a lower fee to wallets holding Pepeolithic NFTs, keeps the fee everyone else pays as a ZTO reserve, and uses that reserve to buy Pepeolithic pieces from anyone and sell them back. Two contracts, Launcher and Kiln. Deploy on Sepolia (chain id 11155111) as a REHEARSAL of the mainnet Kiln; only addresses differ. Nothing is upgradeable, pausable or ownable; no admin exists anywhere; the reserve can never be withdrawn, only paid out for pieces.\n\nADDRESSES (constants). The coin standing in for ZTO is Sepolia WETH 0xfFf9976782d46CC05630D1f6eBAb18b2324d6B14 (plain ERC-20, 18 decimals, write 18 as a constant; call it ZTO in the code). Pepeolithic (PEPEO, ERC-721, 737 ids) is the Sepolia rehearsal contract 0x0ce3157eac34eccdcff239738983976fabdefb2a. Uniswap v4 PoolManager on Sepolia 0xE03A1074c86CFeDd5C142C4F04F1a1536e203543. Native ETH is currency0 (address 0), ZTO currency1.\n\nCONSTRUCTORS take static words only (address, uint, bool, bytes32: the deployment manifest supports nothing else, no arrays, no int24), make no external calls and read nothing on-chain (the verifier deploys in an empty EVM). Launcher constructor args: zto, pepeo, poolManager (three addresses, nothing else). EVERY OTHER NUMBER IS A CODE CONSTANT: tickSpacing 60 (int24 constant), lpFee 2000 (0.20%, static pool fee), the pass tiers minPepes 0 / 1 / 4 / 21 with kilnCut 13000 / 8000 / 3000 / 0 in hundredths of a bip (1.30%, 0.80%, 0.30%, 0%), spreadBps 1500 (15%), depth 50. The Kiln is created by the Launcher with CREATE2 and takes (zto, pepeo, poolManager) too; it must NOT validate its own address bits in its constructor; the Launcher checks them after CREATE2. The Launcher exposes initCodeHash() (view) so the salt can be mined off-chain.\n\nLAUNCHER. One permissionless function open(bytes32 salt, uint160 sqrtPriceX96) that succeeds once: (1) deploys the Kiln with CREATE2 and reverts unless its address carries exactly the permission bits for beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta and no others; (2) initializes the ETH/ZTO pool on the PoolManager with lpFee, tickSpacing and the Kiln as hook at sqrtPriceX96; emits Opened(kiln, poolId). No liquidity is added by the Launcher: the deployer adds a ZTO-only range position later through the normal PositionManager, so the Kiln must not restrict liquidity in any way (no liquidity callbacks).\n\nKILN, FEE PASS. On every swap in its pool the Kiln reads pepes = PEPEO.balanceOf(tx.origin) (routers are msg.sender; tx.origin is the trader) and picks the highest tier whose minPepes <= pepes. The pool's static lpFee goes to liquidity as usual; on top, the Kiln takes kilnCut of the swap as its cut, ALWAYS IN ZTO: when ZTO is the input, from the input (beforeSwap return delta on the specified currency for exact-input, afterSwap on the unspecified for exact-output); when ETH is the input, from the ZTO output (afterSwap return delta for exact-input, beforeSwap for exact-output). Work out each of the four cases so the trader is charged kilnCut of the ZTO side and the pool's accounting settles. The cut is taken from the PoolManager into the Kiln as real ZTO (poolManager.take) and added to reserve. Tier 21 pays no cut at all. Emit Passed(trader, pepes, kilnCut, ztoTaken) per swap. No block-held guard; README states that a pass only needs to be in the wallet during the swap.\n\nKILN, PIECES. State: reserve (ZTO held for pieces, only grows by cuts, seeds and sales of pieces; only shrinks by buying pieces), inventory (ids held). Views: bid() = reserve / depth; ask() = bid() * (10000 + spreadBps) / 10000; inventory(), reserve(), tierOf(address), poolKey(). sell(uint256 id): the caller's PEPEO piece is pulled with transferFrom (caller approves first), price = bid() before the transfer, reserve -= price, ZTO.transfer(caller, price) requiring the bool, emits Sold(id, seller, price); reverts if bid() is 0. buy(uint256 id): id must be in inventory; price = ask(); ZTO.transferFrom(caller, kiln, price) requiring the bool, reserve += price, piece sent to caller with transferFrom (never safeTransferFrom, no receiver callbacks), emits Bought(id, buyer, price). seed(uint256 amount): anyone adds ZTO to reserve by transferFrom, emits Seeded(from, amount). No other way moves ZTO or pieces. Pieces arriving by plain transfer without sell() are not inventory and are stuck; README says so. Because bid is reserve/depth it is always payable, falls geometrically as pieces come in and rises with every cut, seed and sale.\n\nTESTS against the real v4 PoolManager (vendor v4-core and v4-periphery test routers) with a mock ZTO and a mock ERC-721: open() once and only at an address with the right bits; a ZTO-only range position above the opening price added through the test liquidity router; swaps in all four cases (ETH in / ZTO in, exact in / exact out) for wallets holding 0, 1, 4 and 21 pieces, checking the ZTO cut equals kilnCut of the ZTO side within rounding, that tier 21 pays nothing, that the cut landed in reserve, and that the trader also paid lpFee; sell() pays bid and bid falls afterwards; buy() charges ask and the piece leaves inventory; buy of an id not held reverts; sell at zero reserve reverts; seed() grows bid; reserve never exceeds the Kiln's ZTO balance; nobody can withdraw. README with the rules, the tier table and the two caveats (tx.origin, stuck transfers). BUILD: solidity 0.8.26, optimizer + via-IR (via_ir = true, optimizer_runs = 1), custom errors only, no ReentrancyGuard (external token calls last), Kiln deployed code under 12,000 bytes. Slither: multiply before dividing; string.concat not encodePacked.","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"75393f8fa0a3b7e0cd55e7671c3f5859607fab1698b04f40ea349b92c0e8f657","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"f99d5a11-a55c-4c05-aa61-5efe77902519","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-1105-kiln-uniswap-v4-hook"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"52289","feedbackHash":"fc03db414254690d4dbac106bd886cec38d0b3c8f6d6227846a7533ee89cd715","nodeKey":"audit_economics","submissionHash":"684349ccc7a8ff54eacfe544489e0a08cce1010229bb53186cb00c7c275e5eef","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"50988","feedbackHash":"1bd4ea40dd4cdd38a4c6e59e6d27e9637ce5696278e3322259b747bf1e92cc21","nodeKey":"audit_flow","submissionHash":"dc09106f62c43d4c91b9e96972aec28a0e20da104bb323dcbb176cda09990f9c","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51025","feedbackHash":"45c37b3fa079474c4273af76e9a335a8396c5040302111315fd5e86f88debe78","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"29d8afeb24b7767f841197a9f3d353b0b175d23f3e088fe02d949ae0a322f0e1","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52182","feedbackHash":"e57fdd9ce620e17c08b30a6c53f3abd26a0ccf5b196334ddae79b5079f316a1d","nodeKey":"audit_math","submissionHash":"8810a9adb4e871ce25e0f74d817fdd41da91903a306ac934ea1f7f9de4fbe1d3","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51515","feedbackHash":"d7518cf6b21b00f8e02bc2c867be59554f4d14894b8d874c0010be0939d4ef36","nodeKey":"audit_permissions","submissionHash":"317ccf1c0e1342291cb045ac1d6a2b63d1daeec3d0e5fc46419d70d61972b221","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51406","feedbackHash":"217b287edd86ee90dbbac2d4d6f53706a1377aeab41d7181eafc5af8eb6bfa05","nodeKey":"build_contract_project","submissionHash":"13c6592150be62ca56391fe13eaa1812a00e56061fb7a72ba34438a1dae6fb9b","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51073","feedbackHash":"f63097aae5faa2450d80b40ecb3e0cbcaf0638e310ffeb7765de8b4b0e807802","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"93436640e49362c354d95f6330db72a7276380733f2cebac86a50563e7113b73","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51870","feedbackHash":"6e87af268a935badd9f3e344e4ecba3fb525a936e7efa6ea62c51bad64974195","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"4b66080519773cff6b575f17bf632e93cc4409436b1681ecb952abe246cbb6a0","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"baadebe38875b4f72c4d90d1bb18aa8fd017fc5e7bae9a56e584fdf90be3d8bd","state":"blocked","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"e9bb398fec9e3e04","findings":[],"hash":"01caa91ca0a34a5e221fbf0c0f07d94369a7d52dd210d94a58cf8b6c1abdce51","nodeId":"ac4c60b2-84a3-4232-b8b6-efa42a42e29c","outcome":"failed","summary":"needs input: Finding 44002dcf540256231436d51037138d074a194066479e19378c559b9711ebcf27 reproduces: the supplied proof fails for both fee-paying ZTO-input swaps and passes for tier 21. PoolManager.take transfers tokens during the swap callback, before the standard router settles the trader's ZTO input. With an empty manager and empty Kiln reserve, collecting the required cut as real ZTO in that callback is impossible. An ERC-6909 fallback would change the explicit real-token reserve requirement and reserve <= ZTO.balanceOf(Kiln) invariant; retaining immediate take requires an additional manager-funding prerequisite and leaves the supplied proof failing. The requester must choose which requirement may change before implementation can proceed. — May Kiln hold fee cuts as ERC-6909 claims when PoolManager lacks ZTO, redeem them into Kiln before paying sellers, and count reserve backing as tokens plus claims; or must fees remain immediate real-ZTO transfers, with swaps requiring sufficient ZTO already in ","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":712832,"inputTokens":103208,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":3100,"runtime":"codex","turns":4,"wallClockMs":253859}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"90c9639e5976bf4feda2d5b270e5de3cfb2efe6ad042fcde3bbe3734e8d7b340","device":"ce823f211d29a38d","findings":[],"hash":"13c6592150be62ca56391fe13eaa1812a00e56061fb7a72ba34438a1dae6fb9b","nodeId":"ac4c60b2-84a3-4232-b8b6-efa42a42e29c","outcome":"completed","summary":"Implemented Launcher and Kiln, vendored dependencies, tests, README, and Sepolia launch manifest.\n\n- `forge build`: passed\n- `forge test`: 50 passed, including stateful invariants\n- `forge fmt --check`: passed\n- Kiln runtime: 4,710 bytes\n\nREADME documents fee accounting, pass and custody caveats, deployment steps, and the inverse-price convention required for ZTO-only liquidity.\n\nNo transactions were broadcast. Slither was unavailable.","treeHash":"d85c966fa713e09b3c888ecc70174789d6eb507a","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1662592,"inputTokens":106825,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":33151,"runtime":"codex","turns":8,"wallClockMs":795306}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"b273d407784470b4","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_math, audit_permissions and audit_flow (same root cause, three reports). For the two ZTO-input cases (exact-input via beforeSwap at src/Kiln.sol:131, exact-output via afterSwap at src/Kiln.sol:158) Kiln._take calls poolManager.take(ZTO, kiln, cut). PoolManager.take (lib/v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol:290-296) does an immediate ERC-20 transfer out of the manager's own balance, but both callbacks run inside PoolManager.swap, before the router settles the trader's ZTO, so the transfer is paid from ZTO the manager already holds. When that balance is below one cut the token reverts, CurrencyLibrary wraps it as ERC20TransferFailed and the PoolManager wraps that as WrappedError(kiln, selector, ...), reverting the whole swap. The state is reached by normal use: the README prescribes a ZTO-only launch range; once ETH buyers have bought it out the manager's ZTO for this pool is dust, and on the mainnet Kiln (dedicated ZTO whose only v4 balance is this pool) every ZTO sell by a fee-paying wallet then fails in both exact-input and exact-output form. Only tier-21 wallets (cut 0) or an LP re-adding ZTO can trade, and only their deposits unblock the others. The ETH-input cases are unaffected because the cut comes out of ZTO the pool is paying out. On the Sepolia rehearsal the shared PoolManager 0xE03A...3543 currently holds about 708.9 WETH from other pools (live eth_call during this review), which masks the defect there. No funds are lost; the brief's 'swaps in all four cases' guarantee is broken in a reachable state, so medium. Any fix touches the brief's 'take real ZTO in the hook' wording and needs a scope decision: (a) mint the cut as an ERC-6909 claim (poolManager.mint) when ZTO.balanceOf(poolManager) < cut and redeem it with burn+take on a later swap, keeping reserve as tokens plus claims; or (b) keep the design and document that the manager must always hold ZTO (for example a permanent out-of-range ZTO position), correcting the README line 'Cuts are taken only in ZTO with PoolManager.take, never as ERC-6909 claims'.","line":193,"path":"src/Kiln.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {Kiln} from \"src/Kiln.sol\";\nimport {Launcher} from \"src/Launcher.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Hooks} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/libraries/Hooks.sol\";\nimport {TickMath} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/libraries/TickMath.sol\";\nimport {StateLibrary} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/libraries/StateLibrary.sol\";\nimport {SwapParams, ModifyLiquidityParams} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\nimport {PoolSwapTest} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/test/PoolSwapTest.sol\";\nimport {PoolModifyLiquidityTest} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/test/PoolModifyLiquidityTest.sol\";\n\n/// Minimal standard ERC-20 (reverts on insufficient balance, like Sepolia WETH9).\ncontract ZtoMock {\n    mapping(address => uint256) public balanceOf;\n    mapping(address => mapping(address => uint256)) public allowance;\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n    }\n\n    function approve(address spender, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[msg.sender][spender] = amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    function transfer(address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        require(balanceOf[msg.sender] >= amount, \"balance\");\n        balanceOf[msg.sender] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        require(allowance[from][msg.sender] >= amount, \"allowance\");\n        require(balanceOf[from] >= amount, \"balance\");\n        allowance[from][msg.sender] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[from] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n}\n\n/// Minimal ERC-721 surface used by Kiln (balanceOf drives the tier).\ncontract PepeoMock {\n    mapping(uint256 => address) public ownerOf;\n    mapping(address => uint256) public balanceOf;\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 id) external {\n        ownerOf[id] = to;\n        balanceOf[to]++;\n    }\n\n    function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 id) external {\n        require(ownerOf[id] == from && msg.sender == from, \"auth\");\n        ownerOf[id] = to;\n        balanceOf[from]--;\n        balanceOf[to]++;\n    }\n}\n\n/// Finding: Kiln takes its ZTO cut out of the PoolManager (poolManager.take) inside the swap\n/// callbacks, i.e. BEFORE the router settles the trader's ZTO input. When the manager holds less\n/// ZTO than the cut (this pool's ZTO has been bought out and no other pool on the manager holds\n/// ZTO, the normal state for a freshly listed token), every ZTO-input swap by a tier 0/1/4 wallet\n/// reverts, while the identical swap by a tier-21 wallet (cut 0) succeeds.\ncontract ZtoInputStarvedTest is Test {\n    using StateLibrary for IPoolManager;\n\n    ZtoMock internal zto;\n    PepeoMock internal pepeo;\n    IPoolManager internal manager;\n    Launcher internal launcher;\n    Kiln internal kiln;\n    PoolKey internal key;\n    PoolSwapTest internal router;\n    PoolModifyLiquidityTest internal liquidityRouter;\n    address internal tier0 = makeAddr(\"tier0\");\n    address internal tier21 = makeAddr(\"tier21\");\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        zto = new ZtoMock();\n        pepeo = new PepeoMock();\n        manager = new PoolManager(address(this));\n        launcher = new Launcher(address(zto), address(pepeo), address(manager));\n        bytes32 hash = launcher.initCodeHash();\n        bytes32 salt;\n        for (uint256 i;; ++i) {\n            salt = bytes32(i);\n            address predicted =\n                address(uint160(uint256(keccak256(bytes.concat(hex\"ff\", bytes20(address(launcher)), salt, hash)))));\n            if (uint160(predicted) & Hooks.ALL_HOOK_MASK == launcher.HOOK_FLAGS()) break;\n        }\n        kiln = launcher.open(salt, 1 << 96);\n        key = kiln.poolKey();\n        router = new PoolSwapTest(manager);\n        liquidityRouter = new PoolModifyLiquidityTest(manager);\n\n        // Deployer adds a ZTO-only range below the opening tick (the README's convention).\n        zto.mint(address(this), 1_000 ether);\n        zto.approve(address(liquidityRouter), 1_000 ether);\n        liquidityRouter.modifyLiquidity(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(-600, -60, 1e21, bytes32(0)), \"\");\n\n        for (uint256 i; i < 21; i++) pepeo.mint(tier21, i);\n        for (uint256 i; i < 2; i++) {\n            address t = i == 0 ? tier0 : tier21;\n            zto.mint(t, 1_000 ether);\n            vm.deal(t, 1_000 ether);\n            vm.prank(t);\n            zto.approve(address(router), type(uint256).max);\n        }\n\n        // Traders buy the whole ZTO range with ETH: the manager now holds (almost) no ZTO.\n        vm.prank(tier21, tier21);\n        router.swap{value: 500 ether}(\n            key, SwapParams(true, -500 ether, TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1), PoolSwapTest.TestSettings(false, false), \"\"\n        );\n        (, int24 tick,,) = manager.getSlot0(key.toId());\n        assertLt(tick, -600, \"price left the ZTO range: the pool is ETH-only now\");\n        assertLt(zto.balanceOf(address(manager)), 0.013 ether, \"manager ZTO is below a 1.3% cut of 1 ZTO\");\n    }\n\n    /// Expected: a tier-0 wallet sells 1 ZTO (exact input) into the ETH-only pool and pays its 1.3% cut.\n    /// Actual on current code: beforeSwap -> poolManager.take(ZTO, kiln, 0.013e18) transfers ZTO the\n    /// manager does not hold, the ERC-20 reverts and the whole swap fails.\n    function test_tier0CanSellZtoExactInputIntoEthOnlyPool() public {\n        uint256 reserveBefore = kiln.reserve();\n        uint256 ztoBefore = zto.balanceOf(tier0);\n        vm.prank(tier0, tier0);\n        router.swap(\n            key, SwapParams(false, -1 ether, TickMath.MAX_SQRT_PRICE - 1), PoolSwapTest.TestSettings(false, false), \"\"\n        );\n        assertEq(ztoBefore - zto.balanceOf(tier0), 1 ether, \"trader paid the full exact input\");\n        assertEq(kiln.reserve() - reserveBefore, 0.013 ether, \"1.3% cut credited to reserve\");\n    }\n\n    /// Expected: the ZTO-input exact-output path (afterSwap take) also works. Actual: same revert.\n    function test_tier0CanSellZtoExactOutputIntoEthOnlyPool() public {\n        uint256 reserveBefore = kiln.reserve();\n        vm.prank(tier0, tier0);\n        router.swap(\n            key, SwapParams(false, 0.1 ether, TickMath.MAX_SQRT_PRICE - 1), PoolSwapTest.TestSettings(false, false), \"\"\n        );\n        assertGt(kiln.reserve(), reserveBefore, \"cut credited to reserve\");\n    }\n\n    /// Control: same swap, same state, tier-21 wallet (cut 0) succeeds, so only the cut's take blocks.\n    function test_tier21SellsZtoIntoEthOnlyPool() public {\n        vm.prank(tier21, tier21);\n        router.swap(\n            key, SwapParams(false, -1 ether, TickMath.MAX_SQRT_PRICE - 1), PoolSwapTest.TestSettings(false, false), \"\"\n        );\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Fresh PoolManager, mock ZTO (reverts on insufficient balance like WETH9) and mock PEPEO; Launcher.open(salt, 1<<96); ZTO-only range [-600,-60] with liquidity 1e21 through PoolModifyLiquidityTest. Step 1: any wallet swaps ETH exact-input 500 ether, zeroForOne, limit MIN_SQRT_PRICE+1; tick < -600 and zto.balanceOf(manager) < 0.013e18. Step 2: tier-0 wallet (0 PEPEO) as tx.origin calls PoolSwapTest.swap(key, SwapParams(false, -1e18, MAX_SQRT_PRICE-1)). Expected: swap executes, trader pays 1 ZTO, reserve += 13e15. Actual: Kiln.beforeSwap -> _take(13e15) -> PoolManager.take -> ZTO.transfer reverts 'balance' -> WrappedError(kiln, 0x575e24b4, ERC20TransferFailed(...)). Step 3: same wallet, SwapParams(false, +0.1e18, MAX_SQRT_PRICE-1): afterSwap -> _take -> same revert (selector 0xb47b2fb1). Control: tier-21 wallet runs step 2 and it succeeds. Run: forge test --match-path test/scratch/ZtoInputStarved.t.sol -> 2 failed (both WrappedError ... ERC20TransferFailed), 1 passed (control). The other two specialist proofs (Proof_669969e69722, Proof_a8276c9af347) fail the same way on this code.","severity":"medium","snippet":"        poolManager.take(Currency.wrap(address(ZTO)), address(this), cut);","title":"ZTO-input swaps by tier 0/1/4 wallets revert whenever the PoolManager holds less ZTO than the cut: the hook takes real ZTO inside the callback, before the router settles the trader's input"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_economics and audit_math. Both swap callbacks call tierOf(tx.origin) (src/Kiln.sol:129, :141) which forwards to PEPEO.balanceOf with no guard. The Sepolia PEPEO 0x0ce3157eac34eccdcff239738983976fabdefb2a is an OpenZeppelin v5 ERC-721 (symbol OCHRE) whose balanceOf(address(0)) reverts ERC721InvalidOwner(0); verified live during this review with cast call. eth_call / debug_traceCall without a `from` (explorer 'simulate', Tenderly, quoter integrations that do not set a sender) run with tx.origin == 0, so the hook reverts and the pool appears permanently broken to such tooling. Real transactions never have a zero origin, so no funds are at risk; this is a liveness/integration defect. The repo's MockPEPEO returns 0 for address(0), so the suite does not exercise it. Minimal fix preserving the design: in tierOf, treat trader == address(0) as tier 0 (return (0, 13000)) without calling balanceOf, or wrap the call in try/catch falling back to tier 0.","line":69,"path":"src/Kiln.sol","reproduction":"Live: cast call 0x0ce3157eac34eccdcff239738983976fabdefb2a 'balanceOf(address)(uint256)' 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 --rpc-url https://ethereum-sepolia-rpc.publicnode.com -> 'execution reverted: ERC721InvalidOwner(0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000)'. Local (test/scratch/Leads.t.sol::test_originZeroSwapReverts, mock ERC-721 with the same OZ revert): open pool, add ZTO-only range [-600,-60], then vm.prank(caller, address(0)) and PoolSwapTest.swap(key, SwapParams(true, -1 ether, MIN_SQRT_PRICE+1)). Expected: the simulation returns the swap delta at tier 0. Actual: revert data 0x90bfb865 WrappedError(kiln, 0xb47b2fb1 afterSwap, 0x89c62b64 ERC721InvalidOwner(0)); kiln.tierOf(address(0)) reverts ERC721InvalidOwner(0). The identical swap with vm.prank(caller, caller) succeeds.","severity":"low","snippet":"        pepes = PEPEO.balanceOf(trader);","title":"tierOf(tx.origin) reverts when tx.origin is address(0): every default eth_call simulation of a swap through the pool fails on the real OpenZeppelin PEPEO"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_economics (info), audit_permissions (low) and audit_flow (info): one root cause, two sequences. The Kiln address is a pure function of (Launcher, salt, initCodeHash()) and the salt is visible in the mempool. (a) PoolManager.initialize only checks the hook address's flag bits (isValidHookAddress) and calls no hook for a 0x00cc address, so it accepts a hook with no code yet; an observer initializes PoolKey(ETH, ZTO, 2000, 60, predictedKiln) first and the deployer's open(salt) reverts PoolAlreadyInitialized after the CREATE2 is rolled back. Repeatable per salt at the cost of one initialize; on Sepolia no private relay is generally available. (b) An observer copies the salt and calls open(salt, otherPrice) first: the Kiln lands at the predicted address, the pool opens at the attacker's price (unconstrained, since no beforeInitialize hook runs), and the deployer's call reverts AlreadyOpened. With zero liquidity the price can be moved back for free, so (b) costs only coordination, and the brief mandates permissionless open; the README names both. Kept as low because (a) is a repeatable denial of the single launch step with no in-contract mitigation under the fixed flag set. Mitigation is operational (private transaction submission) or a scope change (add the beforeInitialize bit and accept only sender == launcher).","line":42,"path":"src/Launcher.sol","reproduction":"test/scratch/Leads.t.sol. (a) test_preInitializeGriefsOpen: (salt, predicted) = mine(launcher, 0); vm.prank(attacker); manager.initialize(PoolKey(Currency(0), Currency(zto), 2000, 60, IHooks(predicted)), 1<<96) succeeds with predicted.code.length == 0; launcher.open(salt, 1<<96) reverts and launcher.kiln() stays address(0); a fresh salt opens. (b) test_frontRunOpenSetsAttackerPrice: vm.prank(attacker); launcher.open(salt, MIN_SQRT_PRICE+1) deploys the Kiln at predicted; launcher.open(salt, 1<<96) reverts Launcher.AlreadyOpened; getSlot0 shows sqrtPriceX96 == MIN_SQRT_PRICE+1. Expected per launch plan: open succeeds once for the deployer's salt at the deployer's price.","severity":"low","snippet":"        poolManager.initialize(key, sqrtPriceX96);","title":"open() is permissionless and the predicted Kiln has no beforeInitialize gate: anyone can pre-initialize the pool at the predicted address to block a salt, or front-run the same salt and fix the openin"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"From audit_permissions. sell() reverts ZeroBid when bid() == 0 (src/Kiln.sol:89-90) but buy() charges ask() = mulDiv(bid(), 11500, 10000) with no guard, so once reserve < 50 wei any address can take every inventoried piece for nothing although the reserve paid at least 1 wei for each. Reachable only from a dust reserve, documented in the README ('an inventoried piece can be bought for zero'), and the brief asks for no buy-side guard, so this is an asymmetry note, not a defect requiring change. If symmetry is wanted: revert buy() when price == 0.","line":103,"path":"src/Kiln.sol","reproduction":"test/scratch/Leads.t.sol::test_buyAtZeroPrice: seed(50) -> bid() == 1; holder sells id 7 -> paid 1, reserve == 49, inventory [7]; ask() == 0; an address with no ZTO and no approval calls buy(7): succeeds, ownerOf(7) == buyer, reserve stays 49, Bought(7, buyer, 0). Same path as the existing test/Pieces.t.sol::test_zeroAskFollowsFormulaAtDustReserve.","severity":"info","snippet":"        uint256 price = ask();","title":"buy() has no zero-price guard mirroring sell()'s ZeroBid: at reserve < 50 base units an inventoried piece is transferred out for 0 ZTO"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"From audit_economics. bid() = reserve/50 is read at execution and the mandated one-argument signatures carry no minPrice/maxPrice. A griefer who front-runs sell(id) with k sells of their own receives R(1-0.98^k) but pays R(1.00254^k-0.98^k) to buy them back (ask = 1.15*bid after each sale raises reserve), so every sandwich loses the attacker money and the victim's realised bid is 0.98^k of the quote. The README states callers accept reserve changes before execution. Recorded as a known limitation; no code change is required by the brief.","line":89,"path":"src/Kiln.sol","reproduction":"With the repo fixture: seedReserve(500 ether) -> bid() == 10 ether. bob prepares sell(5) expecting 10 ether. alice front-runs with sellPiece(0, alice) and sellPiece(1, alice): reserve == 480.2 ether, bid() == 9.604 ether; bob's sell(5) pays 9.604 ether (-3.96%). alice's buy-back of ids 0 and 1 costs 10.823 + 11.072 = 21.895 ether against 19.8 ether received (loss 2.095 ether). Expected for a bounded design: sell reverts below the seller's floor; actual: executes at 9.604 ether.","severity":"info","snippet":"        uint256 price = bid();","title":"sell() and buy() execute at the quote in effect at inclusion with no floor/cap argument; a preceding sale lowers a seller's payout by 2% per piece"}],"hash":"29d8afeb24b7767f841197a9f3d353b0b175d23f3e088fe02d949ae0a322f0e1","nodeId":"1d4be551-5767-48ee-8f88-5ab93d68ee83","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is at `.imd-findings.json` in the repository root (excluded from git by the harness's own exclude list, as intended), the scratch directory is removed, and no source file was changed.\n\n**Outcome: one medium, two low, two info findings, all reproduced; the specialists' eight reports collapsed into five.**\n\n- **Medium, merged from three specialists.** The Kiln pulls its ZTO cut with `poolManager.take` inside the swap callbacks, before the router settles the trader's ZTO. When the PoolManager holds less ZTO than one cut, the token transfer reverts and the whole swap fails. That state follows the README's own launch shape: once ETH buyers consume the ZTO-only range, every ZTO sell by a tier 0, 1 or 4 wallet reverts in both exact-input and exact-output form, while tier 21 trades fine. All three specialist proofs fail on this code for exactly that reason, and the control passes. On Sepolia the shared manager holds roughly 709 WETH from other pools, which masks the defect there, so this bites the mainnet Kiln. I attached the permissions specialist's proof file. Any fix touches the brief's \"take real ZTO in the hook\" rule, so it needs a scope decision.\n- **Low, merged from two specialists.** `tierOf(tx.origin)` calls `balanceOf` with no guard. I confirmed live that the real Sepolia PEPEO reverts on `balanceOf(address(0))`, so any eth_call simulation without a sender sees the pool as permanently reverting. No funds at risk.\n- **Low, merged from three specialists.** `open()` is permissionless and the predicted Kiln has no `beforeInitialize` gate. Anyone can pre-initialize the pool at the predicted address to burn a salt, or copy the salt and open at their own price. Both reproduced locally.\n- **Info.** `buy()` at a dust reserve hands out a piece for zero ZTO, and the one-argument market functions carry no price floor or cap. Both documented in the README and reproduced.\n\n**Nothing new from my own pass.** I traced all four swap cases against v4-core's delta composition, the `PartialFill` guards, the swap-and-pop inventory removal, the operator precedence in the hook-flag check, and the reserve-versus-balance invariant. The existing 73-test suite passes. Kiln runtime is 4,710 bytes. The Slither `erc20-interface` and `uninitialized-local` lines are false positives, and the Aderyn `unprotected-initializer` line is the permissionless open covered by finding 3.\n\n**Coverage** answers all six entry points plus four invariant rows: both swap callbacks point at finding 1, `open` at finding 3, `buy` and `sell` at the info notes, and `seed` holds.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1213207,"inputTokens":322,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":33015,"runtime":"claude","turns":23,"wallClockMs":777087}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"ea89e16822824c6f","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Branch asymmetry between the two input directions. When ETH is the input, the cut is taken out of ZTO the pool is already paying out, so the manager always holds it. When ZTO is the input (cases A: exact-in via beforeSwap, D: exact-out via afterSwap) the Kiln calls poolManager.take for real ZTO inside the hook callback, which runs before the router settles the trader's ZTO. PoolManager.take does an immediate ERC-20 transfer from the manager's own balance, so it reverts whenever the manager's global ZTO balance is below the cut. That state is reached by normal use: the deployer's ZTO-only range is bought out with ETH (every such swap also removes the cut from the manager), the pool becomes ETH-only, and if no other pool on that PoolManager holds ZTO the manager's ZTO balance is zero. From then on the only wallets that can sell ZTO back into the pool are tier-21 passholders (cut 0) or users of a custom router that settles ZTO before swapping; every tier 0/1/4 wallet using the standard swap-then-settle routers (PoolSwapTest, V4Router/Universal Router flows) reverts in both ZTO-input cases. The condition is trader-independent and persists until someone with cut 0 or a pre-settling router restores ZTO to the manager. On Sepolia the manager currently holds ~708 WETH from other pools, so the rehearsal masks it; the mainnet Kiln is stated to differ only in addresses and its ZTO is a fresh token whose entire PoolManager balance is this pool's liquidity, which is exactly where the condition arises. Trust-gap seam: access (anyone can drain the ZTO side through normal swaps) x asymmetry (ETH-input path and tier 21 keep working while tier 0/1/4 ZTO sellers are locked out). Suggested direction: do not pull real ZTO during the callback; mint the cut as an ERC-6909 claim (poolManager.mint) or record it as owed and let a permissionless step (or sell()/seed() paths) burn+take once the manager holds balance, keeping reserve as the sum of realised and claimable ZTO. Any fix changes the 'take real ZTO in the hook' convention of the brief, so it needs a scope decision.","line":193,"path":"src/Kiln.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {Kiln} from \"src/Kiln.sol\";\nimport {Launcher} from \"src/Launcher.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Hooks} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/libraries/Hooks.sol\";\nimport {TickMath} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/libraries/TickMath.sol\";\nimport {StateLibrary} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/libraries/StateLibrary.sol\";\nimport {SwapParams, ModifyLiquidityParams} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\nimport {PoolSwapTest} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/test/PoolSwapTest.sol\";\nimport {PoolModifyLiquidityTest} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/test/PoolModifyLiquidityTest.sol\";\n\n/// Minimal standard ERC-20 (reverts on insufficient balance, like Sepolia WETH9).\ncontract ZtoMock {\n    mapping(address => uint256) public balanceOf;\n    mapping(address => mapping(address => uint256)) public allowance;\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n    }\n\n    function approve(address spender, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[msg.sender][spender] = amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    function transfer(address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        require(balanceOf[msg.sender] >= amount, \"balance\");\n        balanceOf[msg.sender] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        require(allowance[from][msg.sender] >= amount, \"allowance\");\n        require(balanceOf[from] >= amount, \"balance\");\n        allowance[from][msg.sender] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[from] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n}\n\n/// Minimal ERC-721 surface used by Kiln (balanceOf drives the tier).\ncontract PepeoMock {\n    mapping(uint256 => address) public ownerOf;\n    mapping(address => uint256) public balanceOf;\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 id) external {\n        ownerOf[id] = to;\n        balanceOf[to]++;\n    }\n\n    function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 id) external {\n        require(ownerOf[id] == from && msg.sender == from, \"auth\");\n        ownerOf[id] = to;\n        balanceOf[from]--;\n        balanceOf[to]++;\n    }\n}\n\n/// Finding: Kiln takes its ZTO cut out of the PoolManager (poolManager.take) inside the swap\n/// callbacks, i.e. BEFORE the router settles the trader's ZTO input. When the manager holds less\n/// ZTO than the cut (this pool's ZTO has been bought out and no other pool on the manager holds\n/// ZTO, the normal state for a freshly listed token), every ZTO-input swap by a tier 0/1/4 wallet\n/// reverts, while the identical swap by a tier-21 wallet (cut 0) succeeds.\ncontract ZtoInputStarvedTest is Test {\n    using StateLibrary for IPoolManager;\n\n    ZtoMock internal zto;\n    PepeoMock internal pepeo;\n    IPoolManager internal manager;\n    Launcher internal launcher;\n    Kiln internal kiln;\n    PoolKey internal key;\n    PoolSwapTest internal router;\n    PoolModifyLiquidityTest internal liquidityRouter;\n    address internal tier0 = makeAddr(\"tier0\");\n    address internal tier21 = makeAddr(\"tier21\");\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        zto = new ZtoMock();\n        pepeo = new PepeoMock();\n        manager = new PoolManager(address(this));\n        launcher = new Launcher(address(zto), address(pepeo), address(manager));\n        bytes32 hash = launcher.initCodeHash();\n        bytes32 salt;\n        for (uint256 i;; ++i) {\n            salt = bytes32(i);\n            address predicted =\n                address(uint160(uint256(keccak256(bytes.concat(hex\"ff\", bytes20(address(launcher)), salt, hash)))));\n            if (uint160(predicted) & Hooks.ALL_HOOK_MASK == launcher.HOOK_FLAGS()) break;\n        }\n        kiln = launcher.open(salt, 1 << 96);\n        key = kiln.poolKey();\n        router = new PoolSwapTest(manager);\n        liquidityRouter = new PoolModifyLiquidityTest(manager);\n\n        // Deployer adds a ZTO-only range below the opening tick (the README's convention).\n        zto.mint(address(this), 1_000 ether);\n        zto.approve(address(liquidityRouter), 1_000 ether);\n        liquidityRouter.modifyLiquidity(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(-600, -60, 1e21, bytes32(0)), \"\");\n\n        for (uint256 i; i < 21; i++) pepeo.mint(tier21, i);\n        for (uint256 i; i < 2; i++) {\n            address t = i == 0 ? tier0 : tier21;\n            zto.mint(t, 1_000 ether);\n            vm.deal(t, 1_000 ether);\n            vm.prank(t);\n            zto.approve(address(router), type(uint256).max);\n        }\n\n        // Traders buy the whole ZTO range with ETH: the manager now holds (almost) no ZTO.\n        vm.prank(tier21, tier21);\n        router.swap{value: 500 ether}(\n            key, SwapParams(true, -500 ether, TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1), PoolSwapTest.TestSettings(false, false), \"\"\n        );\n        (, int24 tick,,) = manager.getSlot0(key.toId());\n        assertLt(tick, -600, \"price left the ZTO range: the pool is ETH-only now\");\n        assertLt(zto.balanceOf(address(manager)), 0.013 ether, \"manager ZTO is below a 1.3% cut of 1 ZTO\");\n    }\n\n    /// Expected: a tier-0 wallet sells 1 ZTO (exact input) into the ETH-only pool and pays its 1.3% cut.\n    /// Actual on current code: beforeSwap -> poolManager.take(ZTO, kiln, 0.013e18) transfers ZTO the\n    /// manager does not hold, the ERC-20 reverts and the whole swap fails.\n    function test_tier0CanSellZtoExactInputIntoEthOnlyPool() public {\n        uint256 reserveBefore = kiln.reserve();\n        uint256 ztoBefore = zto.balanceOf(tier0);\n        vm.prank(tier0, tier0);\n        router.swap(\n            key, SwapParams(false, -1 ether, TickMath.MAX_SQRT_PRICE - 1), PoolSwapTest.TestSettings(false, false), \"\"\n        );\n        assertEq(ztoBefore - zto.balanceOf(tier0), 1 ether, \"trader paid the full exact input\");\n        assertEq(kiln.reserve() - reserveBefore, 0.013 ether, \"1.3% cut credited to reserve\");\n    }\n\n    /// Expected: the ZTO-input exact-output path (afterSwap take) also works. Actual: same revert.\n    function test_tier0CanSellZtoExactOutputIntoEthOnlyPool() public {\n        uint256 reserveBefore = kiln.reserve();\n        vm.prank(tier0, tier0);\n        router.swap(\n            key, SwapParams(false, 0.1 ether, TickMath.MAX_SQRT_PRICE - 1), PoolSwapTest.TestSettings(false, false), \"\"\n        );\n        assertGt(kiln.reserve(), reserveBefore, \"cut credited to reserve\");\n    }\n\n    /// Control: same swap, same state, tier-21 wallet (cut 0) succeeds, so only the cut's take blocks.\n    function test_tier21SellsZtoIntoEthOnlyPool() public {\n        vm.prank(tier21, tier21);\n        router.swap(\n            key, SwapParams(false, -1 ether, TickMath.MAX_SQRT_PRICE - 1), PoolSwapTest.TestSettings(false, false), \"\"\n        );\n    }\n}","reproduction":"State: Launcher.open done; ZTO-only range [-600,-60] with liquidity 1e21 added; no other ZTO anywhere in the PoolManager (fresh manager, or a fresh ZTO on mainnet). Step 1: any wallet swaps ETH exact-in 500 ETH, zeroForOne, limit MIN_SQRT_PRICE+1 -> tick < -600, pool is ETH-only, zto.balanceOf(manager) < 0.013e18. Step 2: tier-0 wallet (0 PEPEO) as tx.origin calls PoolSwapTest.swap(key, SwapParams(false, -1e18, MAX_SQRT_PRICE-1)). Expected: swap executes, trader pays 1 ZTO, reserve += 0.013e18. Actual: Kiln.beforeSwap -> _take(13e15) -> PoolManager.take -> ZTO.transfer reverts (insufficient balance) -> WrappedError(kiln, beforeSwap selector 0x575e24b4, ERC20TransferFailed) and the whole swap reverts. Step 3: same wallet, SwapParams(false, +0.1e18, MAX_SQRT_PRICE-1) (ZTO-in exact-out): afterSwap -> _take -> same revert (selector 0xb47b2fb1). Control: tier-21 wallet (21 PEPEO) runs the Step 2 swap and it succeeds. Run: forge test --match-path test/scratch/ZtoInputStarved.t.sol (2 fail, 1 control passes).","severity":"medium","snippet":"    function _take(uint256 cut) private {\n        if (cut == 0) return;\n        reserve += cut;\n        poolManager.take(Currency.wrap(address(ZTO)), address(this), cut);\n    }","title":"ZTO-input swaps revert for tier 0/1/4 wallets whenever the PoolManager holds less ZTO than the cut (take runs before router settlement)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"open(salt, sqrtPriceX96) exposes the salt in the public mempool; the Kiln address is a pure function of (Launcher, salt, initCodeHash()), which is itself a public view. PoolManager.initialize only checks the hook address's flag bits (isValidHookAddress) and calls no hook for a 0x00cc address, so it accepts a hook address that has no code yet. An observer who front-runs open() with initialize(PoolKey(ETH, ZTO, 2000, 60, predictedKiln), anyPrice) makes the deployer's open() revert with PoolAlreadyInitialized after the CREATE2 (atomically rolled back), and can repeat for every new salt at the cost of one initialize per attempt (tens of thousands of gas on Sepolia, where no private relay is generally available). The outcome is a denial of the one-time launch step rather than a loss; the README already names it as a residual risk. Within the brief's fixed flag set (no beforeInitialize) there is no in-contract gate; the mitigation is operational (private transaction submission) or a design change (add the beforeInitialize bit and have Kiln.beforeInitialize accept only sender == launcher).","line":42,"path":"src/Launcher.sol","reproduction":"State: Launcher deployed, no Kiln yet. Attacker computes predicted = CREATE2(launcher, salt, launcher.initCodeHash()) for the salt seen in the pending open() tx (any salt whose address & 0x3fff == 0xcc). Attacker calls poolManager.initialize(PoolKey(Currency(0), Currency(ZTO), 2000, 60, IHooks(predicted)), 1<<96) -> succeeds although predicted has no code. Deployer's open(salt, 1<<96) then reverts; launcher.kiln() stays address(0), predicted.code.length stays 0. Scratch test test/scratch/OpenGrief.t.sol::test_preInitializeAtPredictedHookAddressBlocksOpen reproduces this and passes (the revert happens). Expected per brief: open succeeds once for a correctly mined salt.","severity":"low","snippet":"        poolManager.initialize(key, sqrtPriceX96);","title":"open() can be griefed indefinitely: anyone can pre-initialise the pool at the predicted Kiln address, since initialize is permissionless and the Kiln has no beforeInitialize gate"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"sell() reverts with ZeroBid when bid() == 0 (src/Kiln.sol:89-90), but buy() charges ask() = mulDiv(bid(), 11500, 10000) with no guard, so once reserve has fallen below 50 wei every piece in inventory can be taken by anyone at price 0 with no ZTO moving while the reserve paid at least 1 wei for each. The README documents this ('an inventoried piece can be bought for zero'), it is reachable only from a dust-sized reserve (each piece in inventory was bought for >= 1 wei, so inventory at reserve < 50 is dust-backed), and the brief does not require a buy-side guard, so this is recorded as an asymmetry note rather than a defect requiring change. If the author prefers symmetry: revert buy() when price == 0.","line":103,"path":"src/Kiln.sol","reproduction":"seed(50) -> bid()=1; sell(0) by a holder -> seller paid 1, reserve=49, inventory=[0]; now ask()=0 and buy(0) from any address with zero ZTO approval succeeds: reserve stays 49, piece 0 leaves inventory, Bought(0, buyer, 0) emitted. The existing test test/Pieces.t.sol::test_zeroAskFollowsFormulaAtDustReserve exercises exactly this path.","severity":"info","snippet":"        uint256 price = ask();","title":"buy() has no zero-price guard mirroring sell()'s ZeroBid: at reserve < 50 base units inventoried pieces are transferred out for 0 ZTO"}],"hash":"317ccf1c0e1342291cb045ac1d6a2b63d1daeec3d0e5fc46419d70d61972b221","nodeId":"763607d6-b29e-400b-9fa7-36d4b9eb1dc3","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. The findings file is written at `.imd-findings.json` with three findings and eleven coverage rows, and no tracked file was changed.\n\n**Findings**\n\n1. **Medium, Kiln `_take` (src/Kiln.sol:193).** The hook pulls its ZTO cut out of the PoolManager with `take` inside the swap callback, before the router settles the trader's ZTO. For ZTO-input swaps that is an asymmetry against the ETH-input path, where the cut comes from ZTO the pool is already paying out. Once the ZTO side of the pool is bought out and no other pool on that manager holds ZTO, every ZTO sale by a tier 0, 1 or 4 wallet reverts in both exact-in and exact-out, while a tier-21 wallet trades normally. Sepolia's manager holds plenty of WETH so the rehearsal hides it, but the mainnet Kiln with a fresh ZTO starts in exactly that state. The proof file under `test/scratch/ZtoInputStarved.t.sol` fails twice on current code with the tier-21 control passing. Any fix changes the \"take real ZTO in the hook\" convention, so it needs a scope decision.\n\n2. **Low, Launcher `open` (src/Launcher.sol:42).** Anyone who sees the pending open can initialise the pool at the predicted Kiln address first, since the PoolManager accepts a code-less hook address with only swap flags. The deployer's open reverts and must re-mine, repeatably. Reproduced in `test/scratch/OpenGrief.t.sol`. The README already names this residual risk.\n\n3. **Info, Kiln `buy` (src/Kiln.sol:103).** `sell` reverts on a zero bid but `buy` has no zero-ask guard, so at a reserve under 50 wei inventoried pieces leave for free. Documented, dust-level, recorded for symmetry only.\n\n**Coverage.** All six entry points have rows. `seed` and `sell` hold. `beforeSwap`, `afterSwap`, `buy` and `open` point at the findings above. I also recorded four invariants that hold: reserve backing, zero hook delta in all four swap cases, absence of any privileged or withdrawal path, and consistent tx.origin tier reads.\n\n**Verification done.** The four-case fee accounting was traced line by line against the vendored v4 Hooks library and balances. The live Sepolia PEPEO is an OpenZeppelin v5 ERC-721 named Ochre with 737 max supply and 7 minted; a simulated `transferFrom` into a contract without a receiver succeeded, so the market functions' no-callback assumption holds there. WETH and the PoolManager carry code at the manifest addresses. Slither and aderyn leads were checked and none turned into a finding beyond the above.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2158490,"inputTokens":482,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":59538,"runtime":"claude","turns":37,"wallClockMs":1028850}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"3d92117ed7963f48ee9064b08ba29835c2968246e74e91ce45f3a17604e2f752","device":"403561621f0b349a","findings":[],"hash":"4b66080519773cff6b575f17bf632e93cc4409436b1681ecb952abe246cbb6a0","nodeId":"47476c2d-a80f-4a01-8df7-e6a6b5526602","outcome":"completed","summary":"Expanded tests under `test/` with failure paths, rounding boundaries, transfer rollback, and four-actor invariants.\n\nValidation: `forge build` succeeded; `forge test` passed **73 tests**, including **16,384 random invariant calls**.\n\nNo confirmed defects found. Contracts and configuration were unchanged.","treeHash":"65f33abadea1dbcff1d35dbc444144e9abb6af2f","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1376640,"inputTokens":90776,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":20102,"runtime":"codex","turns":6,"wallClockMs":533501}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"ee9fbaf2480d1034","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Both swap callbacks call tierOf(tx.origin) (src/Kiln.sol:129 and :141), which forwards to PEPEO.balanceOf(tx.origin) with no guard. The Sepolia rehearsal collection 0x0ce3157eac34eccdcff239738983976fabdefb2a is an OpenZeppelin v5 ERC-721 (its revert data is ERC721InvalidOwner(address(0))), and OZ v5 balanceOf(address(0)) reverts. On-chain tx.origin is never zero, so no funds are at risk, but every eth_call / debug_traceCall that omits `from` (the default for explorers, Tenderly, most RPC dashboards, and quoter integrations that do not set a sender) runs with tx.origin = 0 and the hook reverts inside beforeSwap/afterSwap. The pool therefore cannot be quoted or simulated by default tooling, and any integrator that quotes with from=0 sees the pool as permanently reverting. Verified live: `cast call 0x0ce3157eac34eccdcff239738983976fabdefb2a 'balanceOf(address)(uint256)' 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 --rpc-url <sepolia>` -> `execution reverted: ERC721InvalidOwner(0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000)`; and on a Sepolia fork `kiln.tierOf(address(0))` reverts (test/scratch/ForkProbe.t.sol::test_realDeps_zeroOriginQuoteReverts). Minimal fix preserving the design: in tierOf, treat trader == address(0) as tier 0 (return (0, 13000)) or wrap balanceOf in try/catch defaulting to zero pieces; the local MockPEPEO returns 0 for address(0) so the existing suite does not exercise this.","line":69,"path":"src/Kiln.sol","reproduction":"State: Kiln deployed with PEPEO = 0x0ce3157eac34eccdcff239738983976fabdefb2a (Sepolia). Input: any swap on the pool simulated via eth_call with no `from` (tx.origin = 0x0), e.g. PoolSwapTest.swap(key, SwapParams(true, -1e18, MIN_SQRT_PRICE+1), ...) or kiln.tierOf(address(0)) directly. Expected: a quote / tier (0 pieces, 13000). Actual: revert bubbled from PEPEO.balanceOf(address(0)) -> ERC721InvalidOwner(0x0), surfaced by PoolManager as a wrapped hook revert; the same call with tx.origin = any EOA succeeds.","severity":"low","snippet":"        pepes = PEPEO.balanceOf(trader);","title":"tierOf(tx.origin) reverts for tx.origin == address(0) on the real collection, so every default eth_call simulation of a swap through the pool fails"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The brief requires open() to be permissionless and the README documents both consequences, so this is a trust/operational note rather than a code defect. Two concrete sequences: (a) Anyone who sees the deployer's open(salt, price) in the mempool can mine their own salt with the 0x00cc bits (about 2^14 hashes) and call open(ownSalt, arbitraryPrice) first; the deployer's transaction then reverts AlreadyOpened and the pool is live at an attacker-chosen sqrtPriceX96. Because the Kiln has no beforeInitialize flag, PoolManager.initialize never consults the hook, so the price is unconstrained (any value in [MIN_SQRT_PRICE, MAX_SQRT_PRICE)). The pool stays usable: price can be walked through empty liquidity by a tier-21 wallet, a sub-77-wei ZTO exact-in, or any ETH-exact-in/ZTO-exact-out swap (cut = 0 so PartialFill does not fire), so no funds are lost, only the deployer's intended ZTO-only range placement. (b) Anyone can call PoolManager.initialize(PoolKey(ETH, ZTO, 2000, 60, predictedKiln), p) before open(salt) lands, since the predicted address only needs valid flag bits; open(salt) then reverts PoolAlreadyInitialized and the deployer must mine a fresh salt. Each repetition costs the griefer gas and requires front-running; a private relay removes both. Reported for the judge's trust-assumption record; if the requester wants the opening price fixed by the deployer, the only in-design mitigation is to submit open() through a private mempool.","line":36,"path":"src/Launcher.sol","reproduction":"Local reproduction with the repo fixture: deploy Launcher L; let (salt, predicted) = mine(L, 0). (a) vm.prank(attacker); L.open(attackerSalt, TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE+1) succeeds; then L.open(salt, intendedPrice) reverts Launcher.AlreadyOpened and getSlot0 shows the attacker's price. (b) Instead call manager.initialize(PoolKey(Currency.wrap(0), Currency.wrap(zto), 2000, 60, IHooks(predicted)), 1<<96) from any address; it succeeds (no beforeInitialize permission), and L.open(salt, 1<<96) then reverts with PoolManager.PoolAlreadyInitialized while predicted.code.length stays 0.","severity":"info","snippet":"    function open(bytes32 salt, uint160 sqrtPriceX96) external returns (Kiln deployed) {\n        if (address(kiln) != address(0)) revert AlreadyOpened();","title":"Launcher.open is permissionless and front-runnable: the first caller fixes the opening price, and a predicted hook address can be pre-initialized to make a specific salt revert"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"bid() = reserve/50 is read at execution time and there is no minPrice (sell) or maxPrice (buy) argument; the brief mandates the one-argument signatures and the README states that callers accept reserve changes before execution, so this is recorded as a known limitation, not a defect. I checked whether the gap is exploitable for profit and it is not: a griefer who front-runs sell(id) with k sells of their own receives R(1-0.98^k) but must pay R(1.00254^k - 0.98^k) to buy those k pieces back (ask = 1.15*bid after each sale raises reserve by 2.3%), so every sandwich loses the attacker money; the only effect is that the victim's realised bid is 0.98^k of the quoted bid. Likewise a buy(id) can be preceded by seed() or other buys that raise ask(), costing the front-runner at least what the victim overpays. Severity is informational because the loss per preceding piece is bounded (2%) and the attacker cannot gain.","line":89,"path":"src/Kiln.sol","reproduction":"seedReserve(500 ether) so bid() = 10 ether. Victim (bob) prepares sell(5) expecting 10 ether. Attacker (alice) front-runs: sellPiece(0, alice) then sellPiece(1, alice). Now reserve = 500*0.98^2 = 480.2 ether, bid = 9.604 ether; bob's sell(5) pays 9.604 ether instead of 10 ether (-3.96%). Attacker buying back ids 0 and 1 costs ask = 1.15*(470.596/50) = 10.823 ether and then 1.15*(481.419/50) = 11.072 ether, total 21.895 ether against the 19.8 ether received, a 2.095 ether loss for the attacker. Expected (for a bounded design): sell reverts below the seller's floor; actual: executes at 9.604 ether.","severity":"info","snippet":"        uint256 price = bid();\n        if (price == 0) revert ZeroBid();","title":"sell() and buy() execute at the quote in effect at inclusion with no bound; a preceding sell lowers a seller's payout by 2% per piece and a preceding buy raises a buyer's cost by 2.3% per piece"}],"hash":"684349ccc7a8ff54eacfe544489e0a08cce1010229bb53186cb00c7c275e5eef","nodeId":"a8938a4e-1297-4ca0-a3e3-b33648012c59","outcome":"completed","summary":"The findings file is in place and the harness excludes it and the scratch directory from git, so the tree itself is untouched. The review is complete.\n\n## Outcome\n\nThe economics of Kiln and Launcher hold. I found no defect that loses funds, pays the wrong party, or breaks the reserve guarantees. The findings file holds one low and two informational items, each with a verified reproduction, plus a coverage row for every entry point.\n\n**What I verified in depth**\n\n- **Cut math in all four swap cases** traced through v4-core's hook delta accounting and then exercised against the real Sepolia PoolManager, WETH and the real rehearsal collection on a fork. The cut equals the floor of gross ZTO times the tier rate in every case, the hook's delta nets to zero, and the Kiln's WETH balance always equals the recorded reserve. I also proved algebraically that the gross-up formula rounds identically to the gross formula.\n- **Reserve invariants.** Every reserve increase is backed by an inbound transfer in the same call. The Kiln never approves anyone, so sell is the only outflow. A sell-then-buy-back round trip always costs more than it pays, so a holder cannot drain the reserve for profit. Driving the reserve to dust needs over 1800 sells from one ZTO, more than the 737 ids.\n- **Piece market flows** against the real OpenZeppelin v5 collection on the fork. Sell and buy both work with plain transferFrom and no receiver callback.\n\n**Findings written to .imd-findings.json**\n\n1. **Low.** The hook calls the collection's balanceOf on tx.origin with no guard. The real Sepolia collection is OpenZeppelin v5 and reverts for the zero address, which I confirmed live. Any eth_call that omits a sender runs with a zero tx.origin, so default explorer and quoter simulations of swaps through this pool revert. No on-chain funds are at risk. A one-line fix treats the zero address as tier 0.\n2. **Info.** Launcher.open is permissionless by design, so the first caller fixes the opening price and anyone can pre-initialize the pool at a predicted hook address to block one salt. I reproduced both locally and confirmed the price is recoverable through empty liquidity. Recorded as a trust assumption, not a defect.\n3. **Info.** sell and buy have no price bounds, as the brief mandates. I quantified the front-running cost at 2 percent per preceding sale and showed the sandwich loses the attacker money. Recorded as a known limitation.\n\n**Side observations for the author.** The Sepolia address named as Pepeolithic is a collection called Ochre with a maximum supply of 737, seven minted so far, and an admin role. Its transfers behave as standard in my fork tests. Slither's and Aderyn's leads all turned out to be benign or design choices.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2405693,"inputTokens":642,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":52479,"runtime":"claude","turns":47,"wallClockMs":982874}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"d11ea2b5e05fa7a8","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Boundary: the external call poolManager.take(ZTO, kiln, cut) in Kiln._take (src/Kiln.sol:190-194), reached from beforeSwap (ZTO exact-input, line 131) and afterSwap (ZTO exact-output, line 158). Assumption: the PoolManager holds at least `cut` ZTO at the moment of the take. Actual: both hook callbacks run inside PoolManager.swap, before the router settles the trader's ZTO input, so the take must be paid from ZTO the manager already holds. PoolManager.take does `_accountDelta(...)` then `currency.transfer(to, amount)` (lib/v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol:290-296), and WETH9 / any standard ERC-20 reverts when the manager's balance is below `cut`; CurrencyLibrary wraps it as ERC20TransferFailed and Hooks wraps that as Wrap__FailedHookCall, so the whole swap reverts.\n\nThis state is the natural one for this pool: the launch adds a ZTO-only range below the opening tick. Once ETH buyers have moved the price through that range, all ZTO has left the manager (1 wei of rounding dust remains in the reproduction) and LP fees so far were paid in ETH. The only trade now possible on the pool is ZTO in / ETH out, and every such trade by a tier 0/1/4 wallet reverts in _take for both exact-input (cut 0.013 ZTO per 1 ZTO) and exact-output. Only tier-21 wallets (cut 0) can trade, which re-funds the manager and lifts the block; an LP adding ZTO also lifts it. No funds are lost, but the fee pass contract makes the pool unusable for its paying users in a reachable state, and the README's 'swaps in all four cases' guarantee does not hold there.\n\nScope note: on Sepolia the shared PoolManager 0xE03A...3543 currently holds ~708 WETH from other pools (checked by eth_call), which masks the problem for the rehearsal unless that balance ever drops below one cut. The mainnet Kiln with a fresh ZTO, whose only v4 pool is this one, hits it as soon as the ZTO side is bought out.\n\nFix needs a scope decision because the brief mandates real-ZTO takes: (a) when ZTO.balanceOf(poolManager) < cut, credit the cut as an ERC-6909 claim via poolManager.mint(address(this), ztoId, cut) and redeem it (burn + take) on a later swap once the manager is funded, keeping `reserve` as tokens + claims; or (b) keep the design and document that the manager must always hold ZTO (e.g. a permanent out-of-range ZTO position), updating the README statement that cuts are 'never as ERC-6909 claims'.","line":193,"path":"src/Kiln.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {Kiln} from \"src/Kiln.sol\";\nimport {Launcher} from \"src/Launcher.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Hooks} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/libraries/Hooks.sol\";\nimport {SwapParams, ModifyLiquidityParams} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\nimport {BalanceDelta} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/types/BalanceDelta.sol\";\nimport {PoolSwapTest} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/test/PoolSwapTest.sol\";\nimport {PoolModifyLiquidityTest} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/test/PoolModifyLiquidityTest.sol\";\nimport {TickMath} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/libraries/TickMath.sol\";\n\n/// Minimal WETH9-like ERC-20: transfer reverts on insufficient balance, returns true otherwise.\ncontract ZTO {\n    mapping(address => uint256) public balanceOf;\n    mapping(address => mapping(address => uint256)) public allowance;\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n    }\n\n    function approve(address spender, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[msg.sender][spender] = amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    function transfer(address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        require(balanceOf[msg.sender] >= amount, \"balance\");\n        balanceOf[msg.sender] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        require(allowance[from][msg.sender] >= amount, \"allowance\");\n        require(balanceOf[from] >= amount, \"balance\");\n        allowance[from][msg.sender] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[from] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n}\n\ncontract PEPEO {\n    mapping(uint256 => address) public ownerOf;\n    mapping(address => uint256) public balanceOf;\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 id) external {\n        ownerOf[id] = to;\n        balanceOf[to]++;\n    }\n\n    function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 id) external {\n        require(ownerOf[id] == from, \"owner\");\n        ownerOf[id] = to;\n        balanceOf[from]--;\n        balanceOf[to]++;\n    }\n}\n\n/// The hook takes its ZTO cut from the PoolManager before the trader settles. Once ETH buyers have\n/// consumed the whole ZTO-only position, the manager holds (almost) no ZTO, so every ZTO-in swap by a\n/// fee-paying wallet reverts inside Kiln._take even though the trader is about to deposit far more ZTO\n/// than the cut. Both tests fail on the current code and pass once the cut no longer depends on the\n/// manager's pre-settlement ZTO balance.\ncontract TakeBeforeSettleTest is Test {\n    ZTO zto;\n    PEPEO pepeo;\n    IPoolManager manager;\n    Launcher launcher;\n    Kiln kiln;\n    PoolKey key;\n    PoolSwapTest router;\n    PoolModifyLiquidityTest liquidityRouter;\n    address tier0 = makeAddr(\"tier0\");\n    address tier21 = makeAddr(\"tier21\");\n\n    receive() external payable {}\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        zto = new ZTO();\n        pepeo = new PEPEO();\n        manager = new PoolManager(address(this));\n        launcher = new Launcher(address(zto), address(pepeo), address(manager));\n        bytes32 hash = launcher.initCodeHash();\n        bytes32 salt;\n        for (uint256 i;; ++i) {\n            salt = bytes32(i);\n            address predicted =\n                address(uint160(uint256(keccak256(bytes.concat(hex\"ff\", bytes20(address(launcher)), salt, hash)))));\n            if (uint160(predicted) & Hooks.ALL_HOOK_MASK == launcher.HOOK_FLAGS()) break;\n        }\n        kiln = launcher.open(salt, 1 << 96);\n        key = kiln.poolKey();\n        router = new PoolSwapTest(manager);\n        liquidityRouter = new PoolModifyLiquidityTest(manager);\n        zto.mint(address(this), 100_000 ether);\n        zto.approve(address(liquidityRouter), 100_000 ether);\n        // ZTO-only range below the opening tick, exactly as the project tests do.\n        liquidityRouter.modifyLiquidity(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(-600, -60, 1_000_000 ether, bytes32(0)), \"\");\n        for (uint256 i; i < 21; i++) {\n            pepeo.mint(tier21, i);\n        }\n        vm.deal(tier0, 1_000_000 ether);\n        vm.deal(tier21, 1_000_000 ether);\n        zto.mint(tier0, 1_000 ether);\n        zto.mint(tier21, 1_000 ether);\n        vm.prank(tier0);\n        zto.approve(address(router), type(uint256).max);\n        vm.prank(tier21);\n        zto.approve(address(router), type(uint256).max);\n\n        // ETH buyer consumes the whole ZTO-only position: the manager keeps 1 wei of ZTO.\n        vm.prank(tier0, tier0);\n        router.swap{value: 100_000 ether}(\n            key,\n            SwapParams(true, -100_000 ether, TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1),\n            PoolSwapTest.TestSettings(false, false),\n            \"\"\n        );\n        uint256 managerZto = zto.balanceOf(address(manager));\n        emit log_named_uint(\"manager ZTO after drain (wei)\", managerZto);\n        assertLt(managerZto, uint256(1 ether) * 13000 / 1_000_000, \"precondition: manager holds less than one cut\");\n        // A tier-21 wallet (cut 0) can still sell ZTO for ETH in this state; the pool itself is fine.\n        vm.prank(tier21, tier21);\n        BalanceDelta d = router.swap(\n            key, SwapParams(false, -1 ether, TickMath.MAX_SQRT_PRICE - 1), PoolSwapTest.TestSettings(false, false), \"\"\n        );\n        assertGt(d.amount0(), 0);\n        // Return the manager to the starved state: tier-21 buys the ZTO back out (ETH in).\n        vm.prank(tier21, tier21);\n        router.swap{value: 10 ether}(\n            key, SwapParams(true, -10 ether, TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1), PoolSwapTest.TestSettings(false, false), \"\"\n        );\n        assertLt(zto.balanceOf(address(manager)), uint256(1 ether) * 13000 / 1_000_000);\n    }\n\n    function test_tier0ZtoExactInputSwapSucceedsWhenManagerHoldsNoZto() public {\n        uint256 ztoBefore = zto.balanceOf(tier0);\n        uint256 reserveBefore = kiln.reserve();\n        vm.prank(tier0, tier0);\n        (bool ok,) = address(router).call(\n            abi.encodeCall(\n                PoolSwapTest.swap,\n                (\n                    key,\n                    SwapParams(false, -1 ether, TickMath.MAX_SQRT_PRICE - 1),\n                    PoolSwapTest.TestSettings(false, false),\n                    \"\"\n                )\n            )\n        );\n        assertTrue(ok, \"tier-0 ZTO-in exact-input swap reverted in Kiln._take\");\n        assertEq(zto.balanceOf(tier0), ztoBefore - 1 ether);\n        assertEq(kiln.reserve() - reserveBefore, uint256(1 ether) * 13000 / 1_000_000);\n    }\n\n    function test_tier0ZtoExactOutputSwapSucceedsWhenManagerHoldsNoZto() public {\n        uint256 ethBefore = tier0.balance;\n        uint256 reserveBefore = kiln.reserve();\n        vm.prank(tier0, tier0);\n        (bool ok,) = address(router).call(\n            abi.encodeCall(\n                PoolSwapTest.swap,\n                (\n                    key,\n                    SwapParams(false, 0.5 ether, TickMath.MAX_SQRT_PRICE - 1),\n                    PoolSwapTest.TestSettings(false, false),\n                    \"\"\n                )\n            )\n        );\n        assertTrue(ok, \"tier-0 ZTO-in exact-output swap reverted in Kiln._take\");\n        assertEq(tier0.balance, ethBefore + 0.5 ether);\n        assertGt(kiln.reserve(), reserveBefore);\n    }\n}","reproduction":"State: pool opened at sqrtPriceX96 = 2^96 (tick 0); ZTO-only position [-600,-60] with liquidity 1_000_000e18; tier-0 wallet T0 (0 PEPEO), tier-21 wallet T21 (21 PEPEO). 1) T0 swaps ETH in, exact input 100_000 ether, limit MIN_SQRT_PRICE+1 -> price leaves the range; ZTO.balanceOf(poolManager) == 1 wei. 2) T0 swaps ZTO in, exact input 1 ether (zeroForOne=false, amountSpecified=-1e18, limit MAX_SQRT_PRICE-1). Expected: swap succeeds, trader pays 1 ZTO of which cut = 1e18*13000/1e6 = 0.013 ZTO lands in reserve. Actual: reverts inside Kiln.beforeSwap -> _take -> PoolManager.take -> ZTO.transfer (manager balance 1 wei < 13e15). 3) T0 swaps ZTO in, exact output 0.5 ether ETH: same revert, this time from afterSwap -> _take. 4) T21 performs step 2: succeeds (cut 0, nothing taken). After that the manager holds ZTO and T0's swaps succeed. Proof file test/scratch/TakeBeforeSettle.t.sol: both tests fail on the current code with 'tier-0 ZTO-in ... swap reverted in Kiln._take'.","severity":"medium","snippet":"        poolManager.take(Currency.wrap(address(ZTO)), address(this), cut);","title":"Cut is taken from the PoolManager before the trader settles: ZTO-in swaps by fee-paying wallets revert whenever the manager holds less ZTO than one cut (ETH-only pool state)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Boundary: external call PEPEO.balanceOf(trader) with trader = tx.origin (src/Kiln.sol:129 and :141). Zero-input corner: eth_call / quoter simulations submitted without a `from` field run with tx.origin == address(0). The Sepolia PEPEO stand-in 0x0ce3157eac34eccdcff239738983976fabdefb2a is an OpenZeppelin v5 ERC-721 (symbol OCHRE); its balanceOf(address(0)) reverts with ERC721InvalidOwner(0x0) (verified with cast call against Sepolia). The Kiln does not guard this, so beforeSwap reverts and PoolManager wraps it as Wrap__FailedHookCall(kiln, ERC721InvalidOwner(0)). Any integrator that quotes or simulates swaps on this pool without setting `from` (default eth_call, many quoter integrations, explorers' 'simulate' buttons) sees the pool as broken. Real transactions always have a non-zero origin, so no funds are at risk; this is a liveness/integration defect at a sentinel boundary. Minimal fix preserving behaviour: in tierOf, treat trader == address(0) as 0 pieces (tier 0 rate 13000) without calling balanceOf, or wrap the call in try/catch and fall back to tier 0.","line":69,"path":"src/Kiln.sol","reproduction":"On chain: `cast call 0x0ce3157eac34eccdcff239738983976fabdefb2a 'balanceOf(address)(uint256)' 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 --rpc-url <sepolia>` -> 'execution reverted: ERC721InvalidOwner(0x000...0)'. Locally (test/scratch/OriginZero.t.sol, mock ERC-721 with the same OZ revert): open pool, add ZTO-only range, then `vm.prank(caller, address(0))` and call PoolSwapTest.swap(key, SwapParams(true, -1 ether, MIN_SQRT_PRICE+1)). Expected: the simulation returns the swap delta (hook should quote tier 0 for an unknown origin). Actual: the call reverts with data 0x90bfb865... (Wrap__FailedHookCall) carrying 0x89c62b64 ERC721InvalidOwner(0). The identical swap with vm.prank(caller, caller) succeeds.","severity":"low","snippet":"        pepes = PEPEO.balanceOf(trader);","title":"tierOf(tx.origin) reverts for tx.origin == address(0): every eth_call simulation of a swap without a `from` fails on the OpenZeppelin PEPEO"}],"hash":"8810a9adb4e871ce25e0f74d817fdd41da91903a306ac934ea1f7f9de4fbe1d3","nodeId":"4a7a9df5-b270-4258-a3b5-c0b29d53a69e","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. Findings are in `.imd-findings.json` with coverage rows for all six entry points, and no source, test, or configuration file was changed.\n\n**Outcome.** The hook's fee arithmetic is correct. In all four swap cases the ZTO cut equals floor(gross ZTO × rate / 1e6), the specified side is exact, and the reserve stays backed by real ZTO. I confirmed this algebraically and with the project fuzz at 2000 runs plus a scratch fuzz of 3000 runs that crosses initialized ticks in both directions for all four tiers and amounts from 1 wei to 30 ether. Rounding is downward throughout, overflow is impossible with the int128 bounds, and the piece market cannot be drained by sell-then-buy round trips. I found two defects, both at external-call boundaries rather than in the formulas.\n\n**Finding 1, medium, with proof.** The Kiln takes its ZTO cut from the PoolManager inside the hook callbacks, before the router settles the trader's input. When ETH buyers have consumed the whole ZTO-only range, the manager holds 1 wei of ZTO, and every ZTO-in swap by a tier 0, 1 or 4 wallet reverts inside `Kiln._take` in both exact modes, while tier-21 wallets trade normally. The only possible trade direction in that state is blocked for paying users until a tier-21 trade or an LP deposit refunds the manager. On Sepolia the shared manager holds about 708 WETH from other pools, so the rehearsal masks it, but the mainnet instance with a fresh ZTO hits it as soon as the ZTO side is bought out. The proof file in `test/scratch/TakeBeforeSettle.t.sol` fails on the current code and passes under a claim-fallback patch I checked in a scratch copy. The fix needs a scope decision, since the brief mandates real-ZTO takes and the README says never claims.\n\n**Finding 2, low.** The Sepolia PEPEO stand-in is an OpenZeppelin v5 ERC-721 whose `balanceOf(address(0))` reverts. Any swap simulation without a `from` field runs with a zero origin, so the hook reverts and the pool looks broken to quoters and explorers. Real transactions are unaffected. A zero-origin guard in `tierOf` fixes it.\n\n**Not reported.** The cut truncates to zero below 77 wei of ZTO for tier 0, and a piece can be bought for zero when the reserve is under 50 wei. Both are dust-level, documented, and uneconomic to exploit, so they appear only as coverage notes.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2572279,"inputTokens":706,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":55729,"runtime":"claude","turns":43,"wallClockMs":1092638}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"7c53db5b47548363e40b9c6e95e4b3d1f4937a90622cafd598eef4fcdef8b4be","device":"43eaeedfc1287bf1","findings":[],"hash":"93436640e49362c354d95f6330db72a7276380733f2cebac86a50563e7113b73","nodeId":"45e8812c-d643-411d-8e0a-75070c93399e","outcome":"completed","summary":"Updated [launch.json](/home/imd4/.identitymd/work/f99d5a11-a55c-4c05-aa61-5efe77902519/45e8812c-d643-411d-8e0a-75070c93399e/launch.json) with deployment notes, retaining Launcher and the three approved Sepolia addresses.\n\nSchema and constructor ABI checks passed. `forge build` passed with existing lint warnings; `forge test` passed all 50 tests. Only `launch.json` changed outside scratch artifacts.","treeHash":"dab0c4472735a04ba9abbebb2eaeb90da9398e8c","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":528896,"inputTokens":33060,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":4308,"runtime":"codex","turns":5,"wallClockMs":177108}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"fa2b0b9c7ebc1547","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"For the two ZTO-input cases the Kiln collects its cut with poolManager.take inside the swap callback: beforeSwap (ZTO exact-input, src/Kiln.sol:131 `_take(cut)`) and afterSwap (ZTO exact-output, src/Kiln.sol:158 `_take(cut)`). take() performs a real ERC-20 transfer out of the PoolManager at that moment, but the trader's ZTO input is only paid to the PoolManager later, when the router settles after swap() returns. The transfer therefore depends on ZTO the PoolManager already holds from other sources. Once ETH buyers have consumed the whole ZTO-only launch range (the README's prescribed liquidity shape), the pool's ZTO side is reduced to dust (1 wei in the reproduction) and the hook's take reverts with the token's insufficient-balance error, which the PoolManager wraps and the whole swap reverts. Result: every ZTO sell (exact-input or exact-output) by a tier 0 / 1 / 4 wallet fails although the pool has ETH liquidity to sell into; only tier-21 wallets (cut = 0) and LPs re-adding ZTO can trade, and only their deposits unblock the others. The state is reachable by normal demand exceeding the range and can also be induced deliberately by any ETH buyer who buys out the range. On the Sepolia rehearsal this is masked because the shared PoolManager holds ~709 WETH from other pools (checked on chain), but for the mainnet Kiln, where ZTO is a dedicated token whose only PoolManager balance is this pool's, the sold-out launch state is exactly when it bites. The existing tests never reach this state: Swaps.t.sol seeds 1,000,000 ether of liquidity and swaps 1-100 ether, so the manager always holds ample ZTO. Possible fixes (each changes the brief's 'take real ZTO in the swap' wording, so it is a scope decision): (a) for the ZTO-input cases mint ERC-6909 claims to the Kiln instead of take and convert them to real ZTO in a permissionless collect() (unlock + burn + take); (b) check ZTO.balanceOf(poolManager) >= cut and fall back to minting claims only when it is short; (c) document the limitation and require LPs to keep ZTO in the pool.","line":193,"path":"src/Kiln.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {Kiln} from \"src/Kiln.sol\";\nimport {Launcher} from \"src/Launcher.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Hooks} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/libraries/Hooks.sol\";\nimport {TickMath} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/libraries/TickMath.sol\";\nimport {StateLibrary} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/libraries/StateLibrary.sol\";\nimport {SwapParams, ModifyLiquidityParams} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\nimport {BalanceDelta} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/types/BalanceDelta.sol\";\nimport {PoolSwapTest} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/test/PoolSwapTest.sol\";\nimport {PoolModifyLiquidityTest} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/test/PoolModifyLiquidityTest.sol\";\n\ncontract ProofZTO {\n    mapping(address => uint256) public balanceOf;\n    mapping(address => mapping(address => uint256)) public allowance;\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n    }\n\n    function approve(address spender, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[msg.sender][spender] = amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    function transfer(address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        require(balanceOf[msg.sender] >= amount, \"bal\");\n        balanceOf[msg.sender] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        require(allowance[from][msg.sender] >= amount, \"allow\");\n        allowance[from][msg.sender] -= amount;\n        require(balanceOf[from] >= amount, \"bal\");\n        balanceOf[from] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n}\n\ncontract ProofPEPEO {\n    mapping(uint256 => address) public ownerOf;\n    mapping(address => uint256) public balanceOf;\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 id) external {\n        ownerOf[id] = to;\n        balanceOf[to]++;\n    }\n\n    function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 id) external {\n        require(ownerOf[id] == from && msg.sender == from, \"owner\");\n        ownerOf[id] = to;\n        balanceOf[from]--;\n        balanceOf[to]++;\n    }\n}\n\n/// Fails on the current code: once ETH buyers have consumed the whole ZTO-only range, the PoolManager holds\n/// (almost) no ZTO, and Kiln.beforeSwap / afterSwap call poolManager.take(ZTO, kiln, cut) before the trader's\n/// ZTO input is settled. The ERC-20 transfer inside take() reverts, so every ZTO-input swap with a nonzero cut\n/// (tiers 0, 1 and 4) reverts even though the pool has ETH liquidity to sell into. Tier 21 (cut = 0) succeeds.\ncontract ZtoSellsRevertWhenPoolZtoExhaustedTest is Test {\n    using StateLibrary for IPoolManager;\n\n    ProofZTO zto;\n    ProofPEPEO pepeo;\n    IPoolManager manager;\n    Kiln kiln;\n    PoolKey key;\n    PoolSwapTest router;\n    PoolModifyLiquidityTest liquidityRouter;\n    address buyer = makeAddr(\"buyer\");\n    address seller0 = makeAddr(\"seller0\");\n    address seller21 = makeAddr(\"seller21\");\n\n    receive() external payable {}\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        zto = new ProofZTO();\n        pepeo = new ProofPEPEO();\n        manager = new PoolManager(address(this));\n        Launcher launcher = new Launcher(address(zto), address(pepeo), address(manager));\n        bytes32 hash = launcher.initCodeHash();\n        bytes32 salt;\n        for (uint256 i;; ++i) {\n            salt = bytes32(i);\n            address p = address(uint160(uint256(keccak256(bytes.concat(hex\"ff\", bytes20(address(launcher)), salt, hash)))));\n            if (uint160(p) & Hooks.ALL_HOOK_MASK == launcher.HOOK_FLAGS()) break;\n        }\n        kiln = launcher.open(salt, 1 << 96);\n        key = kiln.poolKey();\n        router = new PoolSwapTest(manager);\n        liquidityRouter = new PoolModifyLiquidityTest(manager);\n\n        // ZTO-only range below the opening raw tick, as the README prescribes.\n        zto.mint(address(this), 1_000 ether);\n        zto.approve(address(liquidityRouter), 1_000 ether);\n        liquidityRouter.modifyLiquidity(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(-600, -60, 10_000 ether, bytes32(0)), \"\");\n\n        for (uint256 i; i < 21; i++) pepeo.mint(seller21, i);\n        for (uint256 i; i < 21; i++) pepeo.mint(buyer, 100 + i);\n        vm.deal(buyer, 10_000 ether);\n        zto.mint(seller0, 100 ether);\n        zto.mint(seller21, 100 ether);\n        vm.prank(seller0);\n        zto.approve(address(router), type(uint256).max);\n        vm.prank(seller21);\n        zto.approve(address(router), type(uint256).max);\n\n        // Demand exceeds the range: a buyer spends ETH until the price has crossed the whole ZTO range.\n        vm.prank(buyer, buyer);\n        router.swap{value: 5_000 ether}(\n            key, SwapParams(true, -5_000 ether, TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1), PoolSwapTest.TestSettings(false, false), \"\"\n        );\n        (, int24 tick,,) = manager.getSlot0(key.toId());\n        assertLt(tick, -600, \"price must have left the ZTO range\");\n        assertLt(zto.balanceOf(address(manager)), 1_000, \"manager holds only ZTO dust\");\n\n        // Control: a tier-21 seller (cut = 0) can sell 10 ZTO into this exact pool state, so ETH liquidity\n        // exists and the reverts below are caused only by the hook's take().\n        uint256 snapshot = vm.snapshotState();\n        vm.prank(seller21, seller21);\n        BalanceDelta control = router.swap(\n            key, SwapParams(false, -10 ether, TickMath.MAX_SQRT_PRICE - 1), PoolSwapTest.TestSettings(false, false), \"\"\n        );\n        assertGt(control.amount0(), 0);\n        assertEq(control.amount1(), -10 ether);\n        vm.revertToState(snapshot);\n    }\n\n    function test_tier0CanSellZtoIntoPoolAfterRangeIsBoughtOut() public {\n        uint256 amount = 10 ether;\n        uint256 ethBefore = seller0.balance;\n        // A tier-0 seller must be able to sell too (the existing suite covers the cut arithmetic).\n        vm.prank(seller0, seller0);\n        BalanceDelta d = router.swap(\n            key, SwapParams(false, -int256(amount), TickMath.MAX_SQRT_PRICE - 1), PoolSwapTest.TestSettings(false, false), \"\"\n        );\n        assertEq(d.amount1(), -int256(amount));\n        assertGt(d.amount0(), 0);\n        assertEq(seller0.balance - ethBefore, uint256(int256(d.amount0())));\n    }\n\n    function test_tier0CanBuyExactEthWithZtoAfterRangeIsBoughtOut() public {\n        uint256 ethBefore = seller0.balance;\n        vm.prank(seller0, seller0);\n        BalanceDelta d = router.swap(\n            key, SwapParams(false, int256(1 ether), TickMath.MAX_SQRT_PRICE - 1), PoolSwapTest.TestSettings(false, false), \"\"\n        );\n        assertEq(d.amount0(), 1 ether);\n        assertLt(d.amount1(), 0);\n        assertEq(seller0.balance - ethBefore, 1 ether);\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Fresh v4 PoolManager, mock ZTO/PEPEO, Launcher.open at sqrtPrice 1<<96, ZTO-only range [-600,-60] with liquidity 10_000e18 (~265 ZTO). 1) Any buyer swaps ETH exact-input 5000 ether with limit MIN_SQRT_PRICE+1: price crosses below tick -600; zto.balanceOf(poolManager) == 1 wei. 2) tx.origin with 0 PEPEO calls PoolSwapTest.swap(key, SwapParams(zeroForOne=false, amountSpecified=-10e18, MAX_SQRT_PRICE-1)). Expected: swap fills, trader pays 10 ZTO + 0.13 ZTO cut, receives ETH. Actual: Kiln.beforeSwap -> _take(130000000000000000) -> poolManager.take -> ZTO.transfer reverts (insufficient balance); PoolManager wraps it (WrappedError, selector 0xb47b2fb1 beforeSwap) and the swap reverts. 3) Same with amountSpecified=+1e18 (ZTO exact-output): reverts from afterSwap (WrappedError selector 0x575e24b4). 4) Control: the identical 10 ZTO exact-input swap from a tx.origin holding 21 PEPEO succeeds (control.amount1 == -10e18, amount0 > 0), proving liquidity is not the issue. Proof file: test/scratch/ZtoSellsRevertWhenPoolZtoExhausted.t.sol (both tests fail on the current code).","severity":"medium","snippet":"        poolManager.take(Currency.wrap(address(ZTO)), address(this), cut);","title":"ZTO-input swaps with a nonzero cut revert whenever the PoolManager holds less ZTO than the cut (take runs before the trader settles)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Design-level note, not a code defect: the brief asks for a permissionless open and the README documents it. open() takes the pool's opening price from whoever calls first, and the call is irreversible (AlreadyOpened afterwards). Because the deployer's salt is visible in the mempool, anyone can copy it and call open(salt, badPrice) first: the Kiln is created at exactly the address the deployer predicted, the pool is initialized at the attacker's price, and the deployer's own transaction reverts with AlreadyOpened. Alternatively the attacker can call PoolManager.initialize with the predicted key before open(), making that salt unusable (open reverts with PoolAlreadyInitialized) and forcing a re-mine. Impact is bounded: with zero liquidity any swap moves the price for free to any limit, and liquidity added at a wrong price is simply arbitraged, so no funds are locked. Mitigation is operational: submit open() through a private relay, or verify the Initialize event price before adding liquidity. Recorded so the judge has the trust assumption explicitly.","line":36,"path":"src/Launcher.sol","reproduction":"Deployer mines salt S with initCodeHash() and broadcasts open(S, P). Attacker observes it and sends open(S, MIN_SQRT_PRICE+1) with higher gas. Attacker's call deploys Kiln at the predicted address and initializes the pool at tick -887272; emits Opened. Deployer's call reverts Launcher.AlreadyOpened. Expected (per launch plan): pool opens at P. Actual: pool is open at the attacker's price and the single-use open is consumed; LP must swap the price back (free while liquidity is zero) before adding the ZTO-only range.","severity":"info","snippet":"    function open(bytes32 salt, uint160 sqrtPriceX96) external returns (Kiln deployed) {","title":"open() is permissionless and single-use, so the first caller fixes the opening price and can pre-empt the deployer's salt"}],"hash":"dc09106f62c43d4c91b9e96972aec28a0e20da104bb323dcbb176cda09990f9c","nodeId":"8e23e093-fca4-4494-9cbf-f9f28ce15522","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. No tracked files were changed; the findings file and the proof test under test/scratch/ are the only additions.\n\n**Result: one medium defect, one informational trust note, and the rest of the control flow holds.** The findings are in `.imd-findings.json` with a coverage row for all six entry points plus four invariants.\n\n**Finding 1, medium: ZTO sells revert when the PoolManager's ZTO side is exhausted.** The Kiln collects its cut with `poolManager.take` inside the swap callback, which is a real ERC-20 transfer out of the PoolManager. For the two ZTO-input cases the trader's ZTO only arrives when the router settles after the swap returns, so the transfer depends on ZTO the manager already holds. Once ETH buyers consume the whole ZTO-only launch range, the manager holds dust and every ZTO-input swap with a nonzero cut reverts, for exact-input via beforeSwap and exact-output via afterSwap. Only tier-21 wallets and LPs re-adding ZTO can trade until the pool is refilled. On Sepolia this is masked because the shared PoolManager holds roughly 709 WETH from other pools. On mainnet with a dedicated ZTO token, the sold-out launch state is exactly when it triggers. The existing suite never reaches this state because it seeds very deep liquidity. A proof test fails on the current code for both ZTO-input cases and passes a tier-21 control swap in the same pool state. The fixes I list all touch the brief's \"take real ZTO in the swap\" rule, so the author needs a scope decision.\n\n**Finding 2, info: first caller to open() fixes the price and can reuse the deployer's mempool salt.** Documented in the README and demanded by the brief, recorded only so the judge has it explicitly. Impact is bounded because the price is freely movable while liquidity is zero.\n\n**What held.** The four swap cases match the Hooks library accounting exactly, and I confirmed algebraically that the gross-up yields the same floor as the direct formula. The hook's net delta is zero in every branch. Inventory swap-and-pop, reserve-before-transfer ordering, the no-arbitrage property of bid and ask, and the permission-bit check all trace correctly. A one-off Sepolia fork run against the live PoolManager, WETH and PEPEO completed seed, a real piece-0 sale into the Kiln, buy-back, and swaps in both directions with correct cuts.\n\n**Dependency facts worth knowing.** The pinned PEPEO contract is an ERC-721 named Ochre with a maximum supply of 737 but only 7 pieces minted so far. Its plain `transferFrom` accepts contract recipients, so `sell()` works; only `safeTransferFrom` rejects contracts, which the Kiln correctly avoids.\n\n**Not reached.** The real PEPEO source is unverified, so its `freeze` and `admin` functions could not be read. I inferred transfer behaviour from simulation only.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1817855,"inputTokens":482,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":60555,"runtime":"claude","turns":43,"wallClockMs":958012}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":37541,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 97 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 37.35s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[missing-events-arithmetic]: `reserve` is changed without an event but is used in arithmetic\n    ╭▸ src/Kiln.sol:192:9\n    │\n192 │         reserve += cut;\n    │         ━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-events-arithmetic\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/Launcher.sol:43:9\n   │\n43 │         emit Opened(address(deployed), key.toId());\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n   ╭▸ src/Launcher.sol:42:9\n   │\n42 │         poolManager.initialize(key, sqrtPriceX96);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/Kiln.sol:110:9\n    │\n110 │         emit Bought(id, msg.sender, price);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[uninitialized-local]: local variable is read before being initialized\n    ╭▸ src/Kiln.sol:133:73\n    │\n133 │         return (IHooks.beforeSwap.selector, toBeforeSwapDelta(_asInt128(cut), 0), 0);\n    │                                                                         ━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/uninitialized-local\n\nwarning[uninitialized-local]: local variable is read before being initialized\n    ╭▸ src/Kiln.sol:161:44\n    │\n161 │         return (IHooks.afterSwap.selector, returnDelta);\n    │                                            ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/uninitialized-local\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/Kiln.sol:160:9\n    │\n160 │         emit Passed(tx.origin, pepes, rate, cut);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/Kiln.sol:148:81\n    │\n148 │             if (cut != 0 && int256(delta.amount1()) != params.amountSpecified + int256(cut)) {\n    │                                                                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/Kiln.sol:153:30\n    │\n153 │             uint256 amount = uint256(ztoDelta < 0 ? -ztoDelta : ztoDelta);\n    │                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/Kiln.sol:180:29\n    │\n180 │         uint256 magnitude = uint256(amount < 0 ? -amount : amount);\n    │                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/Kiln.sol:186:22\n    │\n186 │         if (amount > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                      ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/Kiln.sol:186:30\n    │\n186 │         if (amount > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/Kiln.sol:187:16\n    │\n187 │         return int128(uint128(amount));\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/Kiln.sol:187:23\n    │\n187 │         return int128(uint128(amount));\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":890,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 8 tests for test/Launcher.t.sol:LauncherTest\n[PASS] test_constructorsWorkWithNoCodeAtSepoliaDependencies() (gas: 23491)\n[PASS] test_invalidPriceRollsBackDeploymentAndAllowsRetry() (gas: 99470015)\n[PASS] test_openInitializesExactlyOnceWithoutLiquidity() (gas: 68754)\n[PASS] test_openPermissionlessMatchesCreate2AndEmits() (gas: 98460037)\n[PASS] test_permissionDeclarationHasOnlyFourSwapFlags() (gas: 8511)\n[PASS] test_runtimesHaveNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 2135690)\n[PASS] test_wrongPermissionBitsRevertAtomicallyAndCanRetry() (gas: 99452336)\n[PASS] test_zeroDependenciesFailWithoutExternalCalls() (gas: 8690)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 64.15ms (159.23ms CPU time)\n\nRan 24 tests for test/Swaps.t.sol:SwapsTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_feeRounding(uint8,bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 376724, ~: 380483)\n[PASS] test_callbacksRejectNonManagerAndOtherPools() (gas: 350406)\n[PASS] test_ethExactInTier0() (gas: 378256)\n[PASS] test_ethExactInTier1() (gas: 378161)\n[PASS] test_ethExactInTier21() (gas: 328880)\n[PASS] test_ethExactInTier4() (gas: 378576)\n[PASS] test_ethExactOutTier0() (gas: 378936)\n[PASS] test_ethExactOutTier1() (gas: 379647)\n[PASS] test_ethExactOutTier21() (gas: 329899)\n[PASS] test_ethExactOutTier4() (gas: 379518)\n[PASS] test_extremeSpecifiedAmountFailsWithCustomError() (gas: 51163)\n[PASS] test_liquidityCanBeAddedRemovedAndFeesCollectedFreely() (gas: 452778)\n[PASS] test_originPassWorksThroughAnUnqualifiedRouterAndMovesSameBlock() (gas: 870758)\n[PASS] test_peripheryRouterAllSixteenCases() (gas: 5482092)\n[PASS] test_specifiedZtoPartialFillsRevertInsteadOfOvercharging() (gas: 382192)\n[PASS] test_unspecifiedZtoPartialFillChargesOnlyExecutedOutput() (gas: 237608)\n[PASS] test_ztoExactInTier0() (gas: 392640)\n[PASS] test_ztoExactInTier1() (gas: 392684)\n[PASS] test_ztoExactInTier21() (gas: 343225)\n[PASS] test_ztoExactInTier4() (gas: 392744)\n[PASS] test_ztoExactOutTier0() (gas: 391510)\n[PASS] test_ztoExactOutTier1() (gas: 391641)\n[PASS] test_ztoExactOutTier21() (gas: 342074)\n[PASS] test_ztoExactOutTier4() (gas: 391220)\nSuite result: ok. 24 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 64.12ms (48.12ms CPU time)\n\nRan 17 tests for test/Pieces.t.sol:PiecesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_geometricBidsAndBacking(uint96,uint8) (runs: 256, μ: 4036545, ~: 2402631)\n[PASS] test_buyChargesAskAndSendsPieceWithoutReceiverCallback() (gas: 702820)\n[PASS] test_buyUnknownIdReverts() (gas: 32647)\n[PASS] test_donatedZtoIsNotSpendableReserveAndCannotBeWithdrawn() (gas: 614725)\n[PASS] test_failedBuyAndSeedRollBackAccounting() (gas: 607332)\n[PASS] test_failedNFTDeliveryRollsBackPaymentAndInventory() (gas: 688082)\n[PASS] test_failedSellPayoutRollsBackPieceAndReserve() (gas: 490810)\n[PASS] test_insufficientAllowanceCannotBuyOrSeed() (gas: 536351)\n[PASS] test_inventoryCannotBeSoldTwice() (gas: 484149)\n[PASS] test_inventorySwapAndPopPreservesIdsAndAllowsResale() (gas: 1532911)\n[PASS] test_onlyOwnersApprovedPiecesCanBeSold() (gas: 437152)\n[PASS] test_plainTransferIsStuckAndIsNotInventory() (gas: 447620)\n[PASS] test_seedGrowsReserveAndBid() (gas: 215951)\n[PASS] test_sellPaysPreTransferBidAndLowersNextBid() (gas: 488163)\n[PASS] test_tierBoundariesAndPassCanMoveInSameBlock() (gas: 37426092)\n[PASS] test_zeroAskFollowsFormulaAtDustReserve() (gas: 550621)\n[PASS] test_zeroReserveOrDustCannotBuyASellersPiece() (gas: 317777)\nSuite result: ok. 17 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 76.43ms (89.93ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/ReserveInvariant.t.sol:ReserveInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nReserveInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_inventoryContainsExactlyPurchasedPiecesWithoutDuplicates\n[PASS] invariant_reserveIsBackedAndOnlyAuthorizedFlowsChangeIt\n ReserveInvariantTest invariants (runs: 128, calls: 8192, reverts: 0)\n\n╭---------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract      | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=======================================================+\n| MarketHandler | buy      | 2032  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| MarketHandler | donate   | 1988  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| MarketHandler | seed     | 2039  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| MarketHandler | sell     | 2133  | 0       | 0        |\n╰---------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 793.82ms (783.76ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 test suites in 795.04ms (998.53ms CPU time): 50 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (50 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":44,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"Kiln.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"Kiln.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"Kiln.buy(uint256)\",\"Kiln.seed(uint256)\",\"Kiln.sell(uint256)\",\"Launcher.open(bytes32,uint160)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":3,\"DEPENDENCIES.md\":14,\"DEPENDENCIES.sha256\":94,\"README.md\":100,\"foundry.toml\":25,\"launch.json\":14,\"remappings.txt\":5,\"src/Kiln.sol\":195,\"src/Launcher.sol\":45,\"src/interfaces/ITokens.sol\":13,\"test/Launcher.t.sol\":116,\"test/Pieces.t.sol\":260,\"test/ReserveInvariant.t.sol\":91,\"test/Swaps.t.sol\":357,\"test/mocks/Tokens.sol\":91,\"test/shared/KilnFixture.sol\":70},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":1531,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[medium/high] erc20-interface at src/interfaces/ITokens.sol:12: IPEPEO (src/interfaces/ITokens.sol#10-13) has incorrect ERC20 function interface:IPEPEO.transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (src/interfaces/ITokens.sol#12)\n[medium/high] incorrect-equality at src/Kiln.sol:88: Kiln.sell(uint256) (src/Kiln.sol#88-98) uses a dangerous strict equality:\n[medium/high] incorrect-equality at src/Kiln.sol:190: Kiln._take(uint256) (src/Kiln.sol#190-194) uses a dangerous strict equality:\n[medium/medium] uninitialized-local at src/Kiln.sol:143: Kiln.afterSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,BalanceDelta,bytes).returnDelta (src/Kiln.sol#143) is a local variable never initialized\n[medium/medium] uninitialized-local at src/Kiln.sol:126: Kiln.beforeSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,bytes).cut (src/Kiln.sol#126) is a local variable never initialized\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/Launcher.sol:36: Launcher.open(bytes32,uint160) (src/Launcher.sol#36-44) ignores return value by poolManager.initialize(key,sqrtPriceX96) (src/Launcher.sol#42)\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/Launcher.sol:36: Reentrancy in Launcher.open(bytes32,uint160) (src/Launcher.sol#36-44):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/Kiln.sol:136: Reentrancy in Kiln.afterSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,BalanceDelta,bytes) (src/Kiln.sol#136-162):","passed":true},{"durationMs":329,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[high] unprotected-initializer at src/Launcher.sol:32: Unprotected initializer\n[low] large-numeric-literal at src/Kiln.sol:38: Large Numeric Literal (2 places)\n[low] state-change-without-event at src/Kiln.sol:121: State Change Without Event\n[low] unchecked-return at src/Launcher.sol:42: Unchecked Return\n[low] unsafe-erc20-operation at src/Kiln.sol:97: Unsafe ERC20 Operation\n[low] unused-public-function at src/Kiln.sol:56: Public Function Not Used Internally","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"13c6592150be62ca56391fe13eaa1812a00e56061fb7a72ba34438a1dae6fb9b","verifiedTreeHash":"d85c966fa713e09b3c888ecc70174789d6eb507a","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+ad90ce4c"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":54376,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 99 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 54.17s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[missing-events-arithmetic]: `reserve` is changed without an event but is used in arithmetic\n    ╭▸ src/Kiln.sol:192:9\n    │\n192 │         reserve += cut;\n    │         ━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-events-arithmetic\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/Launcher.sol:43:9\n   │\n43 │         emit Opened(address(deployed), key.toId());\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n   ╭▸ src/Launcher.sol:42:9\n   │\n42 │         poolManager.initialize(key, sqrtPriceX96);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/Kiln.sol:110:9\n    │\n110 │         emit Bought(id, msg.sender, price);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[uninitialized-local]: local variable is read before being initialized\n    ╭▸ src/Kiln.sol:133:73\n    │\n133 │         return (IHooks.beforeSwap.selector, toBeforeSwapDelta(_asInt128(cut), 0), 0);\n    │                                                                         ━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/uninitialized-local\n\nwarning[uninitialized-local]: local variable is read before being initialized\n    ╭▸ src/Kiln.sol:161:44\n    │\n161 │         return (IHooks.afterSwap.selector, returnDelta);\n    │                                            ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/uninitialized-local\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/Kiln.sol:160:9\n    │\n160 │         emit Passed(tx.origin, pepes, rate, cut);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/Kiln.sol:148:81\n    │\n148 │             if (cut != 0 && int256(delta.amount1()) != params.amountSpecified + int256(cut)) {\n    │                                                                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/Kiln.sol:153:30\n    │\n153 │             uint256 amount = uint256(ztoDelta < 0 ? -ztoDelta : ztoDelta);\n    │                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/Kiln.sol:180:29\n    │\n180 │         uint256 magnitude = uint256(amount < 0 ? -amount : amount);\n    │                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/Kiln.sol:186:22\n    │\n186 │         if (amount > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                      ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/Kiln.sol:186:30\n    │\n186 │         if (amount > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/Kiln.sol:187:16\n    │\n187 │         return int128(uint128(amount));\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/Kiln.sol:187:23\n    │\n187 │         return int128(uint128(amount));\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":10136,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 13 tests for test/Launcher.t.sol:LauncherTest\n[PASS] test_constructorsWorkWithNoCodeAtSepoliaDependencies() (gas: 23702)\n[PASS] test_eachMissingOrExtraHookBitRejectsDeployment() (gas: 25004724)\n[PASS] test_everyZeroDependencyIsRejectedByBothConstructors() (gas: 8879)\n[PASS] test_initCodeHashIncludesExactlyTheThreeDependencies() (gas: 24063)\n[PASS] test_invalidPriceRollsBackDeploymentAndAllowsRetry() (gas: 99470115)\n[PASS] test_openInitializesExactlyOnceWithoutLiquidity() (gas: 69102)\n[PASS] test_openPermissionlessMatchesCreate2AndEmits() (gas: 98460181)\n[PASS] test_permissionDeclarationHasOnlyFourSwapFlags() (gas: 8533)\n[PASS] test_preinitializedSaltCanBeReplacedAfterAtomicFailure() (gas: 172158615)\n[PASS] test_priceBoundariesRollBackAndMinimumPriceCanOpen() (gas: 102640028)\n[PASS] test_runtimesHaveNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 2135810)\n[PASS] test_wrongPermissionBitsRevertAtomicallyAndCanRetry() (gas: 99452414)\n[PASS] test_zeroDependenciesFailWithoutExternalCalls() (gas: 8834)\nSuite result: ok. 13 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 219.56ms (438.58ms CPU time)\n\nRan 31 tests for test/Swaps.t.sol:SwapsTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_dustSwapsStillSettleAndEmit(uint8,bool,bool,uint16) (runs: 1000, μ: 358132, ~: 344732)\n[PASS] testFuzz_feeRounding(uint8,bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 376809, ~: 380706)\n[PASS] test_callbacksRejectNonManagerAndOtherPools() (gas: 350444)\n[PASS] test_ethExactInTier0() (gas: 378338)\n[PASS] test_ethExactInTier1() (gas: 378243)\n[PASS] test_ethExactInTier21() (gas: 329003)\n[PASS] test_ethExactInTier4() (gas: 378702)\n[PASS] test_ethExactOutTier0() (gas: 378977)\n[PASS] test_ethExactOutTier1() (gas: 379820)\n[PASS] test_ethExactOutTier21() (gas: 330047)\n[PASS] test_ethExactOutTier4() (gas: 379647)\n[PASS] test_extremeSpecifiedAmountFailsWithCustomError() (gas: 51297)\n[PASS] test_failedZtoSettlementRollsBackBothFeeCallbacksAndAllowsRetry() (gas: 1516499)\n[PASS] test_falseReturningSettlementCannotLeaveAnUnbackedReserve() (gas: 810587)\n[PASS] test_freeTierStillAllowsSpecifiedZtoPartialFills() (gas: 372979)\n[PASS] test_liquidityCanBeAddedRemovedAndFeesCollectedFreely() (gas: 452836)\n[PASS] test_oneWeiSwapsInAllSixteenCases() (gas: 5128767)\n[PASS] test_originPassWorksThroughAnUnqualifiedRouterAndMovesSameBlock() (gas: 870813)\n[PASS] test_peripheryRouterAllSixteenCases() (gas: 5482079)\n[PASS] test_routerHoldingsAndForgedHookDataDoNotGrantAPass() (gas: 1321542)\n[PASS] test_specifiedZtoPartialFillsRevertInsteadOfOvercharging() (gas: 384702)\n[PASS] test_unspecifiedZtoPartialFillChargesOnlyExecutedOutput() (gas: 237799)\n[PASS] test_zeroSwapRevertsWithoutChangingPoolOrReserve() (gas: 333445)\n[PASS] test_ztoExactInTier0() (gas: 392757)\n[PASS] test_ztoExactInTier1() (gas: 392801)\n[PASS] test_ztoExactInTier21() (gas: 343405)\n[PASS] test_ztoExactInTier4() (gas: 392861)\n[PASS] test_ztoExactOutTier0() (gas: 391627)\n[PASS] test_ztoExactOutTier1() (gas: 391758)\n[PASS] test_ztoExactOutTier21() (gas: 342232)\n[PASS] test_ztoExactOutTier4() (gas: 391293)\nSuite result: ok. 31 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 241.32ms (475.85ms CPU time)\n\nRan 17 tests for test/Pieces.t.sol:PiecesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_geometricBidsAndBacking(uint96,uint8) (runs: 1000, μ: 3879087, ~: 2016488)\n[PASS] test_buyChargesAskAndSendsPieceWithoutReceiverCallback() (gas: 702820)\n[PASS] test_buyUnknownIdReverts() (gas: 32647)\n[PASS] test_donatedZtoIsNotSpendableReserveAndCannotBeWithdrawn() (gas: 614725)\n[PASS] test_failedBuyAndSeedRollBackAccounting() (gas: 607332)\n[PASS] test_failedNFTDeliveryRollsBackPaymentAndInventory() (gas: 688082)\n[PASS] test_failedSellPayoutRollsBackPieceAndReserve() (gas: 490810)\n[PASS] test_insufficientAllowanceCannotBuyOrSeed() (gas: 536351)\n[PASS] test_inventoryCannotBeSoldTwice() (gas: 484149)\n[PASS] test_inventorySwapAndPopPreservesIdsAndAllowsResale() (gas: 1532911)\n[PASS] test_onlyOwnersApprovedPiecesCanBeSold() (gas: 437152)\n[PASS] test_plainTransferIsStuckAndIsNotInventory() (gas: 447620)\n[PASS] test_seedGrowsReserveAndBid() (gas: 215951)\n[PASS] test_sellPaysPreTransferBidAndLowersNextBid() (gas: 488163)\n[PASS] test_tierBoundariesAndPassCanMoveInSameBlock() (gas: 37426092)\n[PASS] test_zeroAskFollowsFormulaAtDustReserve() (gas: 550621)\n[PASS] test_zeroReserveOrDustCannotBuyASellersPiece() (gas: 317777)\nSuite result: ok. 17 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 241.37ms (251.09ms CPU time)\n\nRan 8 tests for test/MarketEdges.t.sol:MarketEdgesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_fullWidthReservePaysSellerWithoutOverflow(uint256,uint16) (runs: 1000, μ: 513827, ~: 515064)\n[PASS] testFuzz_roundTripCannotProfitAtNonDustReserves(uint128,uint8) (runs: 1000, μ: 4211472, ~: 3418526)\n[PASS] test_failedMiddleRemovalCanBeRetriedThenEveryRemainingIdBought() (gas: 1917815)\n[PASS] test_failedSellRestoresApprovalAndCanBeRetried() (gas: 723942)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceRevertsBuyAndSeedAfterApproval() (gas: 718077)\n[PASS] test_maximumReserveStillQuotesAndPays() (gas: 515767)\n[PASS] test_operatorApprovalDoesNotLetOperatorSellAnothersPiece() (gas: 661020)\n[PASS] test_zeroSeedDoesNotCreateAClaimOrChangeQuotes() (gas: 261910)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 244.57ms (446.81ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/ReserveInvariant.t.sol:ReserveInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nReserveInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_inventoryContainsExactlyPurchasedPiecesWithoutDuplicates\n[PASS] invariant_reserveIsBackedAndOnlyAuthorizedFlowsChangeIt\n ReserveInvariantTest invariants (runs: 128, calls: 8192, reverts: 0)\n\n╭---------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract      | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=======================================================+\n| MarketHandler | buy      | 2027  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| MarketHandler | donate   | 2065  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| MarketHandler | seed     | 2005  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| MarketHandler | sell     | 2095  | 0       | 0        |\n╰---------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 949.86ms (933.37ms CPU time)\n\nRan 3 tests for test/IntegratedInvariant.t.sol:IntegratedInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nIntegratedInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_inventoryAndTiersMatchIndependentOwnershipModel\n[PASS] invariant_reserveFlowsAndBothCurrenciesAreConserved\n IntegratedInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract          | Selector      | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+================================================================+\n| IntegratedHandler | buy           | 2092  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| IntegratedHandler | donateZto     | 2099  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| IntegratedHandler | plainTransfer | 1995  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| IntegratedHandler | rejectedSale  | 2053  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| IntegratedHandler | seed          | 2032  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| IntegratedHandler | sell          | 2053  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| IntegratedHandler | swap          | 2019  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| IntegratedHandler | transferPass  | 2041  | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\n[PASS] test_handlerExercisesEveryActionAndSwapMode() (gas: 3151051)\n[PASS] test_swapCutFundsSellerWithoutASeed() (gas: 1720164)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 10.02s (10.02s CPU time)\n\nRan 6 test suites in 10.03s (11.92s CPU time): 73 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (73 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":61,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"Kiln.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"Kiln.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"Kiln.buy(uint256)\",\"Kiln.seed(uint256)\",\"Kiln.sell(uint256)\",\"Launcher.open(bytes32,uint160)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":3,\"DEPENDENCIES.md\":14,\"DEPENDENCIES.sha256\":94,\"README.md\":100,\"foundry.toml\":25,\"launch.json\":14,\"remappings.txt\":5,\"src/Kiln.sol\":195,\"src/Launcher.sol\":45,\"src/interfaces/ITokens.sol\":13,\"test/IntegratedInvariant.t.sol\":344,\"test/Launcher.t.sol\":199,\"test/MarketEdges.t.sol\":161,\"test/Pieces.t.sol\":261,\"test/README.md\":74,\"test/ReserveInvariant.t.sol\":91,\"test/Swaps.t.sol\":505,\"test/mocks/Tokens.sol\":91,\"test/shared/KilnFixture.sol\":70},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"4b66080519773cff6b575f17bf632e93cc4409436b1681ecb952abe246cbb6a0","verifiedTreeHash":"65f33abadea1dbcff1d35dbc444144e9abb6af2f","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+ad90ce4c"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":36833,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 97 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 36.64s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[missing-events-arithmetic]: `reserve` is changed without an event but is used in arithmetic\n    ╭▸ src/Kiln.sol:192:9\n    │\n192 │         reserve += cut;\n    │         ━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-events-arithmetic\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/Launcher.sol:43:9\n   │\n43 │         emit Opened(address(deployed), key.toId());\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n   ╭▸ src/Launcher.sol:42:9\n   │\n42 │         poolManager.initialize(key, sqrtPriceX96);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/Kiln.sol:110:9\n    │\n110 │         emit Bought(id, msg.sender, price);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[uninitialized-local]: local variable is read before being initialized\n    ╭▸ src/Kiln.sol:133:73\n    │\n133 │         return (IHooks.beforeSwap.selector, toBeforeSwapDelta(_asInt128(cut), 0), 0);\n    │                                                                         ━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/uninitialized-local\n\nwarning[uninitialized-local]: local variable is read before being initialized\n    ╭▸ src/Kiln.sol:161:44\n    │\n161 │         return (IHooks.afterSwap.selector, returnDelta);\n    │                                            ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/uninitialized-local\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/Kiln.sol:160:9\n    │\n160 │         emit Passed(tx.origin, pepes, rate, cut);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/Kiln.sol:148:81\n    │\n148 │             if (cut != 0 && int256(delta.amount1()) != params.amountSpecified + int256(cut)) {\n    │                                                                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/Kiln.sol:153:30\n    │\n153 │             uint256 amount = uint256(ztoDelta < 0 ? -ztoDelta : ztoDelta);\n    │                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/Kiln.sol:180:29\n    │\n180 │         uint256 magnitude = uint256(amount < 0 ? -amount : amount);\n    │                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/Kiln.sol:186:22\n    │\n186 │         if (amount > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                      ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/Kiln.sol:186:30\n    │\n186 │         if (amount > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/Kiln.sol:187:16\n    │\n187 │         return int128(uint128(amount));\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/Kiln.sol:187:23\n    │\n187 │         return int128(uint128(amount));\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":962,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 24 tests for test/Swaps.t.sol:SwapsTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_feeRounding(uint8,bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 376754, ~: 380618)\n[PASS] test_callbacksRejectNonManagerAndOtherPools() (gas: 350406)\n[PASS] test_ethExactInTier0() (gas: 378256)\n[PASS] test_ethExactInTier1() (gas: 378161)\n[PASS] test_ethExactInTier21() (gas: 328880)\n[PASS] test_ethExactInTier4() (gas: 378576)\n[PASS] test_ethExactOutTier0() (gas: 378936)\n[PASS] test_ethExactOutTier1() (gas: 379647)\n[PASS] test_ethExactOutTier21() (gas: 329899)\n[PASS] test_ethExactOutTier4() (gas: 379518)\n[PASS] test_extremeSpecifiedAmountFailsWithCustomError() (gas: 51163)\n[PASS] test_liquidityCanBeAddedRemovedAndFeesCollectedFreely() (gas: 452778)\n[PASS] test_originPassWorksThroughAnUnqualifiedRouterAndMovesSameBlock() (gas: 870758)\n[PASS] test_peripheryRouterAllSixteenCases() (gas: 5482092)\n[PASS] test_specifiedZtoPartialFillsRevertInsteadOfOvercharging() (gas: 382192)\n[PASS] test_unspecifiedZtoPartialFillChargesOnlyExecutedOutput() (gas: 237608)\n[PASS] test_ztoExactInTier0() (gas: 392640)\n[PASS] test_ztoExactInTier1() (gas: 392684)\n[PASS] test_ztoExactInTier21() (gas: 343225)\n[PASS] test_ztoExactInTier4() (gas: 392744)\n[PASS] test_ztoExactOutTier0() (gas: 391510)\n[PASS] test_ztoExactOutTier1() (gas: 391641)\n[PASS] test_ztoExactOutTier21() (gas: 342074)\n[PASS] test_ztoExactOutTier4() (gas: 391220)\nSuite result: ok. 24 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 40.04ms (48.14ms CPU time)\n\nRan 8 tests for test/Launcher.t.sol:LauncherTest\n[PASS] test_constructorsWorkWithNoCodeAtSepoliaDependencies() (gas: 23491)\n[PASS] test_invalidPriceRollsBackDeploymentAndAllowsRetry() (gas: 99470015)\n[PASS] test_openInitializesExactlyOnceWithoutLiquidity() (gas: 68754)\n[PASS] test_openPermissionlessMatchesCreate2AndEmits() (gas: 98460037)\n[PASS] test_permissionDeclarationHasOnlyFourSwapFlags() (gas: 8511)\n[PASS] test_runtimesHaveNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 2135690)\n[PASS] test_wrongPermissionBitsRevertAtomicallyAndCanRetry() (gas: 99452336)\n[PASS] test_zeroDependenciesFailWithoutExternalCalls() (gas: 8690)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 71.22ms (166.68ms CPU time)\n\nRan 17 tests for test/Pieces.t.sol:PiecesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_geometricBidsAndBacking(uint96,uint8) (runs: 256, μ: 4012402, ~: 2531583)\n[PASS] test_buyChargesAskAndSendsPieceWithoutReceiverCallback() (gas: 702820)\n[PASS] test_buyUnknownIdReverts() (gas: 32647)\n[PASS] test_donatedZtoIsNotSpendableReserveAndCannotBeWithdrawn() (gas: 614725)\n[PASS] test_failedBuyAndSeedRollBackAccounting() (gas: 607332)\n[PASS] test_failedNFTDeliveryRollsBackPaymentAndInventory() (gas: 688082)\n[PASS] test_failedSellPayoutRollsBackPieceAndReserve() (gas: 490810)\n[PASS] test_insufficientAllowanceCannotBuyOrSeed() (gas: 536351)\n[PASS] test_inventoryCannotBeSoldTwice() (gas: 484149)\n[PASS] test_inventorySwapAndPopPreservesIdsAndAllowsResale() (gas: 1532911)\n[PASS] test_onlyOwnersApprovedPiecesCanBeSold() (gas: 437152)\n[PASS] test_plainTransferIsStuckAndIsNotInventory() (gas: 447620)\n[PASS] test_seedGrowsReserveAndBid() (gas: 215951)\n[PASS] test_sellPaysPreTransferBidAndLowersNextBid() (gas: 488163)\n[PASS] test_tierBoundariesAndPassCanMoveInSameBlock() (gas: 37426092)\n[PASS] test_zeroAskFollowsFormulaAtDustReserve() (gas: 550621)\n[PASS] test_zeroReserveOrDustCannotBuyASellersPiece() (gas: 317777)\nSuite result: ok. 17 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 83.20ms (92.63ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/ReserveInvariant.t.sol:ReserveInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nReserveInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_inventoryContainsExactlyPurchasedPiecesWithoutDuplicates\n[PASS] invariant_reserveIsBackedAndOnlyAuthorizedFlowsChangeIt\n ReserveInvariantTest invariants (runs: 128, calls: 8192, reverts: 0)\n\n╭---------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract      | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=======================================================+\n| MarketHandler | buy      | 2053  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| MarketHandler | donate   | 2042  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| MarketHandler | seed     | 2071  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| MarketHandler | sell     | 2026  | 0       | 0        |\n╰---------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 859.95ms (848.66ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 test suites in 861.18ms (1.05s CPU time): 50 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (50 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":51,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"Kiln.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"Kiln.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"Kiln.buy(uint256)\",\"Kiln.seed(uint256)\",\"Kiln.sell(uint256)\",\"Launcher.open(bytes32,uint160)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":3,\"DEPENDENCIES.md\":14,\"DEPENDENCIES.sha256\":94,\"README.md\":100,\"foundry.toml\":25,\"launch.json\":14,\"remappings.txt\":5,\"src/Kiln.sol\":195,\"src/Launcher.sol\":45,\"src/interfaces/ITokens.sol\":13,\"test/Launcher.t.sol\":116,\"test/Pieces.t.sol\":260,\"test/ReserveInvariant.t.sol\":91,\"test/Swaps.t.sol\":357,\"test/mocks/Tokens.sol\":91,\"test/shared/KilnFixture.sol\":70},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"93436640e49362c354d95f6330db72a7276380733f2cebac86a50563e7113b73","verifiedTreeHash":"dab0c4472735a04ba9abbebb2eaeb90da9398e8c","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+ad90ce4c"}]}