{"assessments":[],"deployments":[],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"9e4d8887-8df5-4386-8b0b-5cf7c94f6966","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"01c541fef34f0efa2f3007f0d80db55036116df15531395908323018336bb0d9","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_economics","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"8b5e9a55c4ca55bb311f21cce89548eda11750e9c66439990ff749885241d730","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_flow","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"c4fa945e3f41b767a2a6e442abc3f9654891330beff0ee03b7428e8c43ae1ba9","dependsOn":["build_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest","audit_math","audit_permissions","audit_economics","audit_flow"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"3014f1ea5961918ca059453a484bf4c8bcbbfc2248dbe31d94ac7c5cdf8f50bd","skillId":"audit-judge","tools":[]},"key":"audit_judge","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"3014f1ea5961918ca059453a484bf4c8bcbbfc2248dbe31d94ac7c5cdf8f50bd","skillId":"audit-judge","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"179fe56a65af8e23004ac68293fe1ec30801cc1867d8431f70d61eb146a3c634","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_math","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"a5af4716517713306c63954d9f7e2f23bd02e4242a93d736ff52ebe498870477","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_permissions","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"f59c53576faf50df07bee4d6c987f687781ae0887324b7d7d8104282c3cfeef9","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"b6503de65ad02f845827887c23da4c3b56ccc5df7a459db263bae6e549d92f7f","skillId":"build-contract-project","tools":[]},"key":"build_contract_project","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"b6503de65ad02f845827887c23da4c3b56ccc5df7a459db263bae6e549d92f7f","skillId":"build-contract-project","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"b3eb98b5b90d66cf2864673092c1da0dcd76a57d085c5794dd116d46dd35b112","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"tools":[]},"key":"manifest","kind":"code","role":"integrate","skillHash":null,"skillId":null,"state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"269c1c02b31ca92b91c2c8ab7b2a7d17c7916aecb477af3b91d59a6c285069e1","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"73431852439ad3a343f3d2b7db1c43cd363b9f48f9bb51497374a0cf6d50b223","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","tools":[]},"key":"write_foundry_tests","kind":"code","role":"tests","skillHash":"73431852439ad3a343f3d2b7db1c43cd363b9f48f9bb51497374a0cf6d50b223","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"A custom token: Infinite Money Glitch (IMB).\nToken name: Infinite Money Glitch\nToken symbol: IMB\nToken supply: 1,000,000,000 with 18 decimals, all minted once to the deployer in the constructor.","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"7495e57cd13c677555df5c5b2c98e1cb061e097a8856c8b50328cc17d556567d","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"9e4d8887-8df5-4386-8b0b-5cf7c94f6966","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-756-infinite-money-glitch"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"51331","feedbackHash":"89d5689c4686e23d16373dd53ec7e86c0a8b8dd54366dbfa11977ab1653f6935","nodeKey":"audit_economics","submissionHash":"01c541fef34f0efa2f3007f0d80db55036116df15531395908323018336bb0d9","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51419","feedbackHash":"7f9d81d1952eae33a68f6fc266287ac97b727d99363eafdbd185d439d05bc4cf","nodeKey":"audit_flow","submissionHash":"8b5e9a55c4ca55bb311f21cce89548eda11750e9c66439990ff749885241d730","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52082","feedbackHash":"f1154cd2d7c8bb28d3bc2e6064e6c9111573d00bb35653d1cfb0b6a7a6e34d90","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"c4fa945e3f41b767a2a6e442abc3f9654891330beff0ee03b7428e8c43ae1ba9","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"50955","feedbackHash":"82b2714d5ef02111b6c695ea465de136c43f2ea5c7f015d9124ea91a52ebc2df","nodeKey":"audit_math","submissionHash":"179fe56a65af8e23004ac68293fe1ec30801cc1867d8431f70d61eb146a3c634","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51432","feedbackHash":"984cfaef010fcc624f812e06bc4a51eefb4158352936e018909ed04492c55734","nodeKey":"audit_permissions","submissionHash":"a5af4716517713306c63954d9f7e2f23bd02e4242a93d736ff52ebe498870477","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51096","feedbackHash":"5456fc88b7f07b348118ecfab1141a139294a96df88b77f78e596de57c4ea66f","nodeKey":"build_contract_project","submissionHash":"f59c53576faf50df07bee4d6c987f687781ae0887324b7d7d8104282c3cfeef9","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51236","feedbackHash":"52a56b0217451202e049278769f16b1ace2f72ed2409bf2e67e4423cd8cd5084","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"b3eb98b5b90d66cf2864673092c1da0dcd76a57d085c5794dd116d46dd35b112","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51297","feedbackHash":"0261f473fcd93e2a78701f8b5a7fdaa00b7eaf34530ba9f84541eb82fccb9b38","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"269c1c02b31ca92b91c2c8ab7b2a7d17c7916aecb477af3b91d59a6c285069e1","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"4f2a5aa92650eea660935010a3a8f9dacbbc0f6447876a314eb358dd04075503","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"d2d5a117dd72f6b4","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"The token inherits OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 ERC20 unchanged, whose approve(spender, value) overwrites the allowance and whose transferFrom spends it. OpenZeppelin v5 deliberately dropped increaseAllowance/decreaseAllowance, so a holder lowering an existing allowance can be front-run: the spender uses the old allowance before the new approve is mined and then the new one after. This is the standard ERC-20 trait, not an implementation error; the README already instructs holders to revoke to zero before re-approving. Recorded so the judge has the one economic behaviour in this area that differs from naive expectation. No change to the contract is required; this is a trust note for integrators and holders.","line":8,"path":"src/InfiniteMoneyGlitch.sol","reproduction":"State: alice holds 1000e18 IMB. 1) alice: approve(spender, 100e18). 2) spender: transferFrom(alice, sink, 100e18) succeeds. 3) alice: approve(spender, 50e18) (intended as a reduction, mined after step 2). 4) spender: transferFrom(alice, sink, 50e18) succeeds. Result: sink holds 150e18 and alice 850e18, although alice never intended more than 100e18 to be spendable. Verified with a Foundry test (3 passes in test/scratch, not kept).","severity":"info","snippet":"contract InfiniteMoneyGlitch is ERC20 {","title":"Allowance replacement race inherent to ERC-20 approve (documented, no code defect)"}],"hash":"01c541fef34f0efa2f3007f0d80db55036116df15531395908323018336bb0d9","nodeId":"ea1f69f9-db69-4765-91b6-4458d6049812","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and `.imd-findings.json` holds the result. No source files were changed; the only new file in the tree is the findings report, and my scratch test directory was removed.\n\n**Outcome: no defects in the Economic Security, Invariant or Flow Gap areas.** The token in `src/InfiniteMoneyGlitch.sol` is an unmodified OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 ERC20 with one constructor mint of 1e27 units to the deployer. There are no fees, exemptions, hooks, external calls, owner powers, or mint and burn entry points. The compiled ABI exposes only approve, transfer and transferFrom as state-changing functions.\n\nWhat I verified, beyond reading the code against the three guides:\n\n- **Dependency integrity.** The vendored ERC20.sol and Context.sol hash identically to the pinned upstream OpenZeppelin commit, and `lib/` is tracked as 36 plain files with no submodules. A tampered `_update` was the only place a hidden tax or mint could live, and there is none.\n- **Conservation and supply.** The project's own test suite passes, including the stateful invariant run with zero reverts. A scratch test confirmed the full launch flow shape, factory to distributor to claimant to a pool-like address and back, moves exact amounts and conserves the sum.\n- **Sentinels and admin surface.** Zero-address transfer, approve and transferFrom paths revert. Common mint, burn, pause, freeze and upgrade selectors all revert from both deployer and stranger. The runtime contains no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT.\n- **Static analysis lead.** Aderyn's large-numeric-literal note on line 10 is the supply constant, which evaluates correctly to 1e27. Not a defect.\n\nThe report contains one info-level entry only. It records the standard ERC-20 allowance replacement race, where a spender uses an old allowance before a lowered one is mined and then the new one afterward. I reproduced it with concrete amounts, but it is inherent to ERC-20, OpenZeppelin v5 removed increaseAllowance deliberately, and the README already tells holders to revoke to zero first. It needs no code change and is there so the judge has the one behaviour in this area that differs from naive expectation.\n\nCoverage rows mark all three entry points as holds, plus five invariant and flow rows for supply conservation, no post-launch growth, exact launch flows, sentinel handling and dependency integrity. The end-to-end Uniswap v4 seed and swap checks in the protected harness could not be run here because its network-owned helper contracts are not in this tree, as the README also notes; that remains the launch verifier's step.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":445096,"inputTokens":194,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":11495,"runtime":"claude","turns":22,"wallClockMs":198907}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"3c7630b22a73c1fb","findings":[],"hash":"179fe56a65af8e23004ac68293fe1ec30801cc1867d8431f70d61eb146a3c634","nodeId":"1000154f-21c9-4798-97a5-82b30a14d2b3","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. No defects found in the math area, and `.imd-findings.json` holds an empty findings list with six coverage rows.\n\n**What I reviewed.** The token is a 16-line subclass of the vendored OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 ERC20 with one constant and one constructor mint. I read the vendored ERC20 implementation line by line and checked it against the Math Precision, Boundary and Numerical Gap guides, then ran the existing 31-test suite plus nine scratch boundary probes. All passed. The scratch directory was removed afterward.\n\n**Math Precision.** The only arithmetic is a checked add in the mint, a guarded unchecked subtraction and add in balance updates, and a guarded unchecked allowance decrement. The supply constant is a compile-time literal equal to exactly 10^27, matching the stated 1,000,000,000 tokens at 18 decimals. There is no division, scaling, downcast, or decimals conversion anywhere, so the guide's rounding, truncation and overflow items have no instance to apply to. The aderyn \"large numeric literal\" lead is that intended constant.\n\n**Boundary.** No payable function, no external call, no bytes decoding, no receive or fallback. The only sentinel branches are the zero-address reverts, and both sides were walked. Probes confirmed that a transfer of the max uint256 or supply plus one reverts cleanly, a self-transfer of the whole supply nets to zero change, an allowance spent exactly to zero refuses the next wei, an allowance of max minus one is finite and decrements, and an unlimited allowance is still capped by the owner's balance.\n\n**Numerical Gap.** With no fee, rebase, reflection or rounding, the supply-equals-sum-of-balances invariant has no precision seam. The repo's stateful invariant and a 512-run conservation fuzz both hold.\n\n**Coverage rows.** All three verifier entry points are marked `holds`, plus rows for the constructor constant and two checked invariants.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":521894,"inputTokens":226,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":8046,"runtime":"claude","turns":20,"wallClockMs":120355}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"8b58c0fc910b096decb1df91f07226f8c5177d4b33b6599e3feeac4ca24d015b","device":"8df16409e9706163","findings":[],"hash":"269c1c02b31ca92b91c2c8ab7b2a7d17c7916aecb477af3b91d59a6c285069e1","nodeId":"0413af6b-87db-4eac-801e-9fd9ae42c597","outcome":"completed","summary":"Added boundary and failure-path tests, plus stronger balance and allowance invariants over 256 random sequences of 64 calls.\n\n`forge build --offline` and `forge test --offline` pass: **43 tests, zero failures**.\n\nAll changes are under `test/`. No contract defects found.","treeHash":"34f0fc82e0f64b869d36f4e0f22d323f5f5b57f6","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":753408,"inputTokens":92756,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":11528,"runtime":"codex","turns":4,"wallClockMs":295557}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"fea57d3e9d0ca7bf","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"The lock file is the project's only machine-checkable provenance for the vendored dependencies, and README.md line 121 states 'Those files are unmodified upstream sources.' Seven forge-std files under lib/forge-std/src/ were reformatted (line wrapping only, consistent with this project's forge fmt line_length = 120: `forge fmt --check` passes on the vendored copy and fails on the upstream copy) but the lock file still carries the digests of the pristine upstream files. The affected entries are src/StdAssertions.sol (line 26), src/StdJson.sol (32), src/StdToml.sol (36), src/Vm.sol (39), src/console.sol (40), src/interfaces/IERC7540.sol (48) and src/interfaces/IMulticall3.sol (50). I fetched each file at the pinned commit 77041d2ce690e692d6e03cc812b57d1ddaa4d505 and confirmed the lock digests are upstream's and that the differences are whitespace-only (identical after stripping all whitespace), so no behaviour changed. All six OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 files match both the lock and upstream byte for byte, and forge-std is test-only, so the token's creation and runtime bytecode are unaffected. Impact: any offline verifier that recomputes the digests, as the lock file invites, rejects the tree or concludes the test library was tampered with; the integrity claim the project ships is false. Fix (either): restore the pristine upstream bytes for those seven files and keep lib/ out of forge fmt, or regenerate the seven digests from the files as vendored and reword the README claim to 'formatted with forge fmt, otherwise unmodified'.","line":39,"path":"dependencies.lock.json","reproduction":"From the repository root run:\n  sha256sum lib/forge-std/src/Vm.sol\nExpected (recorded at dependencies.lock.json:39): 9068805b59ac1d0ea03a8fa1f15ae49c094e0c6c852a2500e0dd112f264b2cb1\nActual: a1b1c82924aecf0f... (differs). Same for StdAssertions.sol (recorded d4c89eec..., actual 3fbf4a02...), StdJson.sol (0211b47e... vs 61bbf9b3...), StdToml.sol (de3fb35a... vs 187d2f0c...), console.sol (896c5a5a... vs a2e632dc...), interfaces/IERC7540.sol (c6a7854c... vs 3ae3eec9...), interfaces/IMulticall3.sol (6620d9c5... vs 1b63ca78...). A loop over every entry in dependencies.lock.json reports 7 mismatches and 0 for the OpenZeppelin section. `diff <(curl -sL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/foundry-rs/forge-std/77041d2ce690e692d6e03cc812b57d1ddaa4d505/src/Vm.sol) lib/forge-std/src/Vm.sol` shows only re-wrapped function signatures.","severity":"low","snippet":"      \"src/Vm.sol\": \"9068805b59ac1d0ea03a8fa1f15ae49c094e0c6c852a2500e0dd112f264b2cb1\",","title":"dependencies.lock.json records SHA-256 digests that do not match seven vendored forge-std files"}],"hash":"8b5e9a55c4ca55bb311f21cce89548eda11750e9c66439990ff749885241d730","nodeId":"6107117e-89de-4538-bfbe-f33c95091c78","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. No tracked file was changed; the only additions are the findings file at the repository root and a scratch test, both ignored by git.\n\n**Result: the token holds. One low-severity periphery finding, no defects in the token itself.**\n\nThe contract is a 16-line wrapper over OpenZeppelin ERC20 v5.0.2 that mints exactly 10^27 units to its deployer in the constructor. I traced all three state-changing entry points through the Execution Trace, Periphery and First Principles checklists and found their checks, state changes and failure paths behave as intended.\n\n**What I verified**\n- **approve, transfer, transferFrom** follow the unmodified OZ code path. Allowance is spent before the balance check, but the whole call reverts atomically, so a failed transferFrom restores the allowance. Zero-address sender, receiver, spender and approver all revert. Infinite allowance stays infinite and max-minus-one is finite. Self-transfers and whole-supply transfers move exact amounts.\n- **Launch flows** arrive whole in a token-only replica of the protected harness: the ten percent swarm share, a maximal ninety percent pool seed, claims out of the distributor, and swaps in both directions.\n- **Supply cannot grow.** The ABI exposes no mint, burn, owner, pause or initializer. The runtime and creation bytecode contain no CALL, STATICCALL, CREATE, DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT.\n- **Periphery.** All six vendored OpenZeppelin files match both the lock file and the real upstream commit byte for byte. None of the five published solc 0.8.26 bugs touch constructs this code uses.\n- **Static-analysis leads.** Slither reported nothing. The aderyn large-literal lead is the intended supply constant.\n\n**Finding 1 (low): stale dependency lock.** Seven forge-std files in `lib/forge-std/src/` were re-wrapped by the project's formatter, but `dependencies.lock.json` still records the digests of the pristine upstream files, and the README claims the files are unmodified. I confirmed against the pinned upstream commit that the differences are whitespace only, so behaviour is unchanged and the token bytecode is unaffected. The shipped provenance claim is still false, and an offline verifier that recomputes the digests rejects the tree. The fix is either to restore the pristine bytes or to regenerate those seven digests and reword the README.\n\n**Not reached.** The full Uniswap v4 PoolManager seed and swap from the protected harness could not be run because v4-core is not vendored. That remains the launch verifier's responsibility, as the README already notes.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":772780,"inputTokens":290,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":21284,"runtime":"claude","turns":27,"wallClockMs":357451}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"03f15d1296244279","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"The lock file records SHA-256 digests for every vendored file and README.md:120-121 states that the recorded digests cover the vendored files and that 'Those files are unmodified upstream sources.' For seven forge-std files the recorded digest matches upstream commit 77041d2ce690e692d6e03cc812b57d1ddaa4d505 but does NOT match the file actually committed under lib/forge-std/src/: StdAssertions.sol, StdJson.sol, StdToml.sol, Vm.sol, console.sol, interfaces/IERC7540.sol, interfaces/IMulticall3.sol. The committed copies were reformatted (forge fmt with line_length=120 collapsed multi-line function signatures); a whitespace-stripped comparison against upstream is identical for all seven, so the change is formatting-only and has no effect on compiled behaviour. All five OpenZeppelin files match their recorded digests. The production token (src/InfiniteMoneyGlitch.sol) is unaffected; the defect is a provenance/integrity record that fails its own check, which is the only mechanism the project offers for a reviewer or the offline verifier to confirm the vendored test library is what it claims to be. Fix: either re-vendor the seven files byte-for-byte from upstream (and exclude lib/ from forge fmt), or regenerate the digests from the committed files and amend the README to say the forge-std copies are reformatted.","line":39,"path":"dependencies.lock.json","reproduction":"In the repository root run: python3 -c \"import json,hashlib;[print(f,hashlib.sha256(open(d['directory']+'/'+f,'rb').read()).hexdigest()==h) for d in json.load(open('dependencies.lock.json')) for f,h in d['files'].items()]\". Expected: every line prints True. Actual: lib/forge-std/src/StdAssertions.sol, StdJson.sol, StdToml.sol, Vm.sol, console.sol, interfaces/IERC7540.sol and interfaces/IMulticall3.sol print False (e.g. src/Vm.sol committed digest a1b1c82924aecf0f38b53192fd1e801cccc1e1fd2ecd6b2301e4f4c4ab102a15 vs recorded 9068805b59ac1d0ea03a8fa1f15ae49c094e0c6c852a2500e0dd112f264b2cb1). Fetching the same seven paths from upstream at the recorded commit reproduces the recorded digests exactly, and `diff` shows only line-wrapping changes.","severity":"low","snippet":"      \"src/Vm.sol\": \"9068805b59ac1d0ea03a8fa1f15ae49c094e0c6c852a2500e0dd112f264b2cb1\",","title":"dependencies.lock.json SHA-256 values do not match seven vendored forge-std files; README's 'unmodified upstream sources' claim is false"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Asymmetry between the paired entry points: transfer() binds `from` to msg.sender, but transferFrom() only binds `from` through the allowance check, and _spendAllowance() with value 0 passes for any (owner, spender) pair because currentAllowance (0) is not < 0. _transfer then emits Transfer(from, to, 0) with a `from` the caller does not control. No balance or allowance changes, supply is conserved, and the project's own test test_zeroTransferFromNeedsNoAllowance documents the path, so this is not a loss of funds and is standard ERC-20/OpenZeppelin v5 behaviour. It is recorded so that off-chain consumers (indexers, airdrop or 'holder activity' tooling) are not built on the assumption that a Transfer event with a given `from` implies that holder acted or approved anything. No code change is recommended for the token; the fix, if any, is in consumers.","line":154,"path":"lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol","reproduction":"Deploy InfiniteMoneyGlitch from account D (D holds 1e27). From unrelated account X with allowance(D, X) == 0 call token.transferFrom(D, X, 0). Expected (if events were caller-bound like transfer): revert ERC20InsufficientAllowance. Actual: returns true and emits Transfer(from=D, to=X, value=0); balanceOf(D) stays 1e27 and allowance(D, X) stays 0. Verified with vm.recordLogs in a scratch test: exactly one log, topics[1] == D.","severity":"info","snippet":"    function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 value) public virtual returns (bool) {\n        address spender = _msgSender();\n        _spendAllowance(from, spender, value);\n        _transfer(from, to, value);\n        return true;\n    }","title":"transferFrom with value 0 lets any caller emit a Transfer event naming an arbitrary `from` without allowance (inherited OpenZeppelin behaviour)"}],"hash":"a5af4716517713306c63954d9f7e2f23bd02e4242a93d736ff52ebe498870477","nodeId":"45d9c67b-606f-4fe7-82e1-547d55a0c642","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. The findings file is written and validated, and the working tree is clean apart from it.\n\n**Result: no permission, trust-gap or asymmetry defect in the token.** The contract is a plain OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 ERC20 with a constructor that mints one billion IMB, with 18 decimals, to its immediate caller. It has no owner, minter, pauser, initializer, proxy, delegatecall or payable path. Every state write is keyed by the caller's own address. The Trust Gap seams need a privileged actor and there is none. All three listed entry points hold.\n\n**What I found**\n\n- **Low, provenance.** Seven vendored forge-std files do not match the SHA-256 digests in the lock file, and the README states the files are unmodified upstream sources. The digests match upstream, so the committed copies were changed. A whitespace-stripped comparison shows the change is formatting only, so compiled behaviour is unaffected and the production token is untouched. The OpenZeppelin files all match.\n- **Info, asymmetry.** A zero-value transferFrom from any caller emits a Transfer event naming an arbitrary sender without an allowance. This is inherited standard behaviour, moves no balance, and is already covered by the project's own tests. It is recorded for off-chain consumers, not as a code change.\n\n**What I ran**\n\n- Build, the full suite of 31 tests including fuzz and invariant runs, and the formatting check. All pass.\n- A scratch probe of six extra cases: factory versus transaction origin on mint, self-spender allowance, allowance isolation, storage slot for supply, payable rejection on every selector, and the zero-value event path. All passed as expected and the scratch directory is removed.\n- A SHA-256 check of every file in the lock file, with the mismatches diffed against upstream.\n\n**Coverage** has seven rows: the three entry points, the constructor and role assignment, the fixed-supply invariant, the no-payable-surface invariant, and dependency integrity. The supplied protected harness could not run here because it needs Uniswap v4 and network-owned helpers not in this tree, so its token-level assertions were traced by hand. The aderyn large-literal lead is the supply constant and is not a defect.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1396284,"inputTokens":546,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":14462,"runtime":"claude","turns":26,"wallClockMs":238990}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"7f2580e5bf9c841383feba92e90b1548ee099f79aad60ad95403522888f2f4cf","device":"08261d0cc6850daf","findings":[],"hash":"b3eb98b5b90d66cf2864673092c1da0dcd76a57d085c5794dd116d46dd35b112","nodeId":"0e9b12d7-2839-42d5-b371-4d5108eb6d27","outcome":"completed","summary":"Created [launch.json](/home/imd-worker/.identitymd/work/9e4d8887-8df5-4386-8b0b-5cf7c94f6966/0e9b12d7-2839-42d5-b371-4d5108eb6d27/launch.json) matching the accepted constructor, exact supply, and verbatim economics.\n\nValidation passed against the supplied schema and constructor ABI. `forge build` succeeded; all 31 tests passed. Only `launch.json` is changed for submission.","treeHash":"dd04f9e1c5a91b2d7f9ea2cb87ce1d6365ba929e","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":185856,"inputTokens":33842,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":3097,"runtime":"codex","turns":3,"wallClockMs":94514}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"077d2937780a81bc","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Reproduced. The lock file is the project's only machine-checkable provenance for vendored code, and README.md:120-121 states that it records the SHA-256 of every vendored file and that 'Those files are unmodified upstream sources.' For seven forge-std files the recorded digest is the digest of the pristine upstream file at the pinned commit 77041d2ce690e692d6e03cc812b57d1ddaa4d505, not of the file actually committed under lib/forge-std/src/: StdAssertions.sol (lock line 26), StdJson.sol (32), StdToml.sol (36), Vm.sol (39), console.sol (40), interfaces/IERC7540.sol (48), interfaces/IMulticall3.sol (50). I fetched upstream Vm.sol and StdAssertions.sol at that commit: their SHA-256 equals the lock entry exactly, and after stripping all whitespace they are identical to the vendored copies, so the committed copies were re-wrapped by `forge fmt` (line_length = 120) and nothing else changed. All six OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 entries match the lock, and ERC20.sol is byte-identical to upstream commit dbb6104ce834628e473d2173bbc9d47f81a9eec3 (2d874da1...). Impact: forge-std is test-only, so the token's creation and runtime bytecode are unaffected and no funds are at risk; but the integrity record the project ships fails its own check, so any offline verifier that recomputes the digests must either reject the tree or conclude the test library was tampered with, and the README statement is untrue. Two specialists (audit_flow, audit_permissions) reported the same root cause; this is the single merged finding at the severity both gave it. Fix (either): re-vendor the seven files byte-for-byte from upstream and exclude lib/ from `forge fmt`, or regenerate the seven digests from the committed files and reword the README to 'reformatted with forge fmt, otherwise unmodified'.","line":39,"path":"dependencies.lock.json","reproduction":"From the repository root run: python3 -c \"import json,hashlib;[print('OK' if hashlib.sha256(open(d['directory']+'/'+f,'rb').read()).hexdigest()==h else 'BAD', d['directory']+'/'+f) for d in json.load(open('dependencies.lock.json')) for f,h in d['files'].items()]\". Expected: every line OK. Actual: 7 BAD lines — lib/forge-std/src/StdAssertions.sol, StdJson.sol, StdToml.sol, Vm.sol, console.sol, interfaces/IERC7540.sol, interfaces/IMulticall3.sol; all 6 OpenZeppelin entries and the other 22 forge-std entries OK. Specifically `sha256sum lib/forge-std/src/Vm.sol` gives a1b1c82924aecf0f38b53192fd1e801cccc1e1fd2ecd6b2301e4f4c4ab102a15 while dependencies.lock.json:39 records 9068805b59ac1d0ea03a8fa1f15ae49c094e0c6c852a2500e0dd112f264b2cb1, which is the digest of https://raw.githubusercontent.com/foundry-rs/forge-std/77041d2ce690e692d6e03cc812b57d1ddaa4d505/src/Vm.sol (verified by fetching it); python ''.join(a.split())==''.join(b.split()) over upstream vs vendored is True, i.e. whitespace-only difference.","severity":"low","snippet":"      \"src/Vm.sol\": \"9068805b59ac1d0ea03a8fa1f15ae49c094e0c6c852a2500e0dd112f264b2cb1\",","title":"dependencies.lock.json SHA-256 digests do not match seven vendored forge-std files; README's 'unmodified upstream sources' claim is false (merged: audit_flow + audit_permissions)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Reproduced (audit_economics). The token inherits OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 ERC20 unchanged: approve(spender, value) overwrites the allowance and transferFrom spends it, and v5 deliberately dropped increaseAllowance/decreaseAllowance. A holder lowering an existing allowance can therefore be front-run: the spender uses the old allowance before the new approve is mined and the new allowance after it. This is the standard ERC-20 trait, not an implementation error; the README already instructs holders to revoke to zero before re-approving. Kept at info so the author and integrators have the one economic behaviour here that differs from naive expectation. No change to the contract is recommended.","line":8,"path":"src/InfiniteMoneyGlitch.sol","reproduction":"State: alice holds 1000e18 IMB. 1) alice: approve(spender, 100e18). 2) spender: transferFrom(alice, sink, 100e18) -> true. 3) alice: approve(spender, 50e18) (intended as a reduction, mined after step 2). 4) spender: transferFrom(alice, sink, 50e18) -> true. Expected by a naive holder: at most 100e18 spendable in total. Actual: balanceOf(sink) == 150e18, balanceOf(alice) == 850e18. Verified in a Foundry scratch test (test_approveRace, passes on this code), not kept.","severity":"info","snippet":"contract InfiniteMoneyGlitch is ERC20 {","title":"Allowance replacement race inherent to ERC-20 approve (OpenZeppelin v5 has no increase/decreaseAllowance) — documented trust note, no code defect"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Reproduced (audit_permissions). transfer() binds `from` to msg.sender, but transferFrom() binds `from` only through _spendAllowance, and with value 0 the check `currentAllowance < value` is false for every (owner, spender) pair, so _transfer runs and emits Transfer(from, to, 0) with a `from` the caller does not control. No balance, allowance or supply changes; the project's own test test_zeroTransferFromNeedsNoAllowance (test/InfiniteMoneyGlitch.t.sol:199) documents the path, and it is standard ERC-20/OZ v5 behaviour. Recorded so indexers, airdrop or holder-activity tooling are not built on the assumption that a Transfer event with a given `from` implies that holder acted or approved anything. No change to the token is recommended; any fix is in consumers.","line":154,"path":"lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol","reproduction":"Deploy InfiniteMoneyGlitch from account D (D holds 1e27). From unrelated account X with allowance(D, X) == 0, call token.transferFrom(D, X, 0). Expected (if `from` were caller-bound like transfer): revert ERC20InsufficientAllowance. Actual: returns true and emits exactly one log, Transfer(from=D, to=X, value=0), with topics[1] == D; balanceOf(D) and allowance(D, X) unchanged. Verified with vm.recordLogs in a Foundry scratch test (test_zeroTransferFromEmitsForeignFrom, passes on this code), not kept.","severity":"info","snippet":"    function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 value) public virtual returns (bool) {","title":"transferFrom with value 0 succeeds without allowance and emits Transfer naming an arbitrary `from` (inherited OpenZeppelin behaviour) — note for off-chain consumers, no code defect"}],"hash":"c4fa945e3f41b767a2a6e442abc3f9654891330beff0ee03b7428e8c43ae1ba9","nodeId":"2a9a530e-23af-48d7-aa09-794012d82357","outcome":"completed","summary":"All three snippets match the tree line-for-line, the scratch directory is gone, and `git status` is clean apart from the untracked `.imd-findings.json` (which git's short format omitted since `.gitignore` covers it or it is the only change — either way, no tracked file was modified). Nothing further is needed.\n\n## Review result\n\n**Output:** `.imd-findings.json` in the repository root — 3 findings (1 low, 2 info) and 7 coverage rows (all 3 listed entry points plus 4 invariants). No files in the tree were changed; my scratch test under `test/scratch/` was run and then deleted.\n\n### How I judged the specialist findings\n\n| Specialist | Finding | Verdict |\n|---|---|---|\n| audit_flow [low] | lock-file digest mismatch | **Reproduced, kept** |\n| audit_permissions [low] | same root cause | **Merged into #1** |\n| audit_economics [info] | approve replacement race | Reproduced, kept as info note (#2) |\n| audit_permissions [info] | `transferFrom(…, 0)` without allowance | Reproduced, kept as info note (#3) |\n| audit_math, write_foundry_tests | none | — |\n\n**Finding 1 (low, merged):** `dependencies.lock.json` records SHA-256 digests for 7 forge-std files (`StdAssertions`, `StdJson`, `StdToml`, `Vm`, `console`, `IERC7540`, `IMulticall3`) that do not match the committed files. I recomputed all 36 digests locally (7 BAD, 29 OK), fetched `Vm.sol` and `StdAssertions.sol` from upstream at the pinned commit `77041d2…` and confirmed (a) the lock digests are upstream's exactly, and (b) the vendored copies are whitespace-identical to upstream — a `forge fmt` re-wrap only. All 6 OpenZeppelin files match the lock, and `ERC20.sol` is byte-identical to upstream v5.0.2. Impact is limited to the provenance record and the README's \"unmodified upstream sources\" claim being false; forge-std is test-only, so token bytecode is unaffected. Low is the right severity.\n\n**Findings 2–3 (info):** both are standard ERC-20 / OZ v5 behaviour, not implementation defects. I verified each with a Foundry test (3/3 passed on the current code) and kept them as trust notes with \"no code change recommended\" stated explicitly.\n\n### My own pass\n\nThe token is 16 lines over pristine OZ v5.0.2 `ERC20`: zero-arg constructor minting `1_000_000_000e18` to `msg.sender`, no owner, no hooks, no admin selectors. I checked the protected floor's requirements against it (supply to factory, decimals 18, whole transfers through factory/distributor/PoolManager, no DELEGATECALL/CALLCODE/SELFDESTRUCT, no supply growth) and the manifest's consistency (`constructorArgs: []`, `totalSupply` = 1e27, `initialPrice` = sqrt(1e27/1e19)·2⁹⁶ matches the recorded value). The 43 shipped tests including invariants pass. The aderyn large-literal lead is a style note only. I found nothing the specialists missed; no critical/high findings, so no proof files were attached.\n\n**Not done:** I did not verify that `economics` in `launch.json` equals the job's — the job object is not in my inputs, and the manifest reference says admission checks that copy.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":602800,"inputTokens":330,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":11031,"runtime":"claude","turns":11,"wallClockMs":191377}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"f2ac0fdda097c606264aab13deaef9fe88b71150ee70dd8e02de630c187c0603","device":"1d142f9c9d30c62a","findings":[],"hash":"f59c53576faf50df07bee4d6c987f687781ae0887324b7d7d8104282c3cfeef9","nodeId":"cafba661-e8b2-450d-8d1c-41326d13bd13","outcome":"completed","summary":"Implemented Infinite Money Glitch (IMB): 1,000,000,000 tokens with 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer. Dependencies are vendored, and deployment assumptions and responsibilities are documented.\n\nValidation passed:\n\n- `forge build`\n- `forge test`: 31 tests, including fuzz and invariant coverage\n- `forge fmt --check`\n- Forced offline rebuild and parallel tests with an empty environment\n\nProtected pool integration checks require launch infrastructure not supplied in this assignment.","treeHash":"5716c14da405a60476fefa072325e4ab7dbb6a16","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":402944,"inputTokens":57647,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":12408,"runtime":"codex","turns":5,"wallClockMs":302361}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":1395,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 28 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 1.27s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":5850,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 30 tests for test/InfiniteMoneyGlitch.t.sol:InfiniteMoneyGlitchTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesBalances(uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 158109, ~: 158699)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 108280636892680078146091572\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFromRespectsAllowance(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 157571, ~: 158205)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 207160043547168039621048722\n  Bound result 228155904715303350472112271344151527\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferOverBalanceAlwaysReverts(uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 54358, ~: 54706)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000000001\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_unapprovedSpenderCannotMoveTokens(address,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 58299, ~: 58043)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1222255406806751797585149857259750446279523267306\n  Bound result 178934254147389906491308346\n\n[PASS] test_approveEmitsEventReplacesAndRevokesAllowance() (gas: 177888)\n[PASS] test_approveZeroSpenderReverts() (gas: 37596)\n[PASS] test_constructorEmitsMintAndUsesDirectDeployer() (gas: 28238)\n[PASS] test_deployerCannotSpendHoldersTokensWithoutApproval() (gas: 150677)\n[PASS] test_factoryCreate2ReceivesEntireSupply() (gas: 228337)\n[PASS] test_factoryDistributorAndPoolTransfersArriveWhole() (gas: 544954)\n[PASS] test_infiniteAllowanceIsNotReducedAndCanBeRevoked() (gas: 162244)\n[PASS] test_metadataAndInitialSupply() (gas: 92801)\n[PASS] test_noMintBurnOrAdministrativeEntryPoints() (gas: 1339422)\n[PASS] test_plainEtherTransferIsRejected() (gas: 43057)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoPrivilegedExecutionOpcodes() (gas: 786610)\n[PASS] test_selfTransferDoesNotChangeBalance() (gas: 51496)\n[PASS] test_selfTransferStillRequiresBalance() (gas: 33278)\n[PASS] test_transferDoesNotCallRecipient() (gas: 172166)\n[PASS] test_transferEmitsEventAndDeliversExactAmount() (gas: 88993)\n[PASS] test_transferEntireSupply() (gas: 81671)\n[PASS] test_transferFromEmitsEventAndConsumesFiniteAllowance() (gas: 228194)\n[PASS] test_transferFromOverAllowanceRevertsWithoutChanges() (gas: 108580)\n[PASS] test_transferFromOverBalanceRestoresAllowance() (gas: 124619)\n[PASS] test_transferFromToSelfConsumesAllowanceWithoutMovingBalance() (gas: 105106)\n[PASS] test_transferFromToZeroRestoresAllowance() (gas: 111489)\n[PASS] test_transferFromZeroCannotMint() (gas: 78055)\n[PASS] test_transferOverBalanceRevertsWithoutChanges() (gas: 60797)\n[PASS] test_transferToZeroRevertsEvenForZeroAmount() (gas: 71992)\n[PASS] test_zeroTransferFromEmptyAccountEmitsEvent() (gas: 66472)\n[PASS] test_zeroTransferFromNeedsNoAllowance() (gas: 67512)\nSuite result: ok. 30 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 70.47ms (232.91ms CPU time)\n\nRan 12 tests for test/InfiniteMoneyGlitch.edge.t.sol:InfiniteMoneyGlitchEdgeTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_approvalsAreIsolatedByOwnerAndSpender(uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 479921, ~: 481926)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 5572\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_failedOverdrawPreservesUsableAllowance(uint256,uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 284989, ~: 285248)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 4145\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913129635800\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_failedOverspendPreservesUsableAllowance(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 212223, ~: 212873)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 793984983758218057177765166\n  Bound result 831566340454332061245393510\n\n[PASS] test_fullSupplyDelegatedTransferCannotBeReplayedAfterRefill() (gas: 248497)\n[PASS] test_infiniteAllowanceCanBeReplacedByFiniteLimit() (gas: 204140)\n[PASS] test_infiniteAllowanceDoesNotBypassBalanceAndSurvivesFailure() (gas: 204991)\n[PASS] test_maxMinusOneAllowanceIsFinite() (gas: 199081)\n[PASS] test_maxUintTransferCannotOverflowBalances() (gas: 60938)\n[PASS] test_oneWeiRoundTrip() (gas: 138331)\n[PASS] test_zeroDelegatedTransferPreservesExistingFiniteApproval() (gas: 190080)\n[PASS] test_zeroSenderCannotTransferOrApprove() (gas: 94200)\n[PASS] test_zeroValueStillRejectsZeroSpenderAndDelegatedRecipient() (gas: 154697)\nSuite result: ok. 12 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 89.88ms (226.89ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/InfiniteMoneyGlitch.invariant.t.sol:InfiniteMoneyGlitchInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nInfiniteMoneyGlitchInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_balancesAndAllowancesMatchAuthorizedCalls\n[PASS] invariant_supplyAndAllBalancesAreConserved\n InfiniteMoneyGlitchInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭--------------+----------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract     | Selector             | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+==================================================================+\n| TokenHandler | approve              | 1867  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+----------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | approveBoundary      | 1830  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+----------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | rejectOverdraw       | 1760  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+----------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | rejectOverspend      | 1748  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+----------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | rejectZeroRecipient  | 1865  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+----------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | rejectZeroSpender    | 1872  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+----------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | roundTripFullBalance | 1738  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+----------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | transfer             | 1861  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+----------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | transferFrom         | 1843  | 0       | 0        |\n╰--------------+----------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640314039457584007913129641426\n  Bound result 2060\n  Bound result 127\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 410\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 5764680969488408210074333\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 321\n  Bound result 7143\n  Bound result 53261\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640314039456584007913129639940\n  Bound result 14\n  Bound result 11\n  Bound result 499671044750\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640319804138553496321339714281\n  Bound result 2827\n  Bound result 46724001010897441196982727\n  Bound result 1646\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 255\n  Bound result 375\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 100736518588503721566943071\n  Bound result 14\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640308276342699733437492126843\n  Bound result 539\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 79555618808312611963073247\n  Bound result 30951491101560440779560074143282280944638568281445969876608995268351315350549\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640314039456584007913129673445\n  Bound result 131703218413822830647049145\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 921598\n  Bound result 176209062161175796246997706\n  Bound result 250000000999999999999081757\n  Bound result 461258836222135442610123033\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 5.76s (5.76s CPU time)\n\nRan 3 test suites in 5.76s (5.92s CPU time): 43 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (43 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":44,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"InfiniteMoneyGlitch.approve(address,uint256)\",\"InfiniteMoneyGlitch.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"InfiniteMoneyGlitch.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"README.md\":121,\"dependencies.lock.json\":54,\"foundry.toml\":23,\"remappings.txt\":2,\"src/InfiniteMoneyGlitch.sol\":16,\"test/InfiniteMoneyGlitch.edge.t.sol\":239,\"test/InfiniteMoneyGlitch.invariant.t.sol\":214,\"test/InfiniteMoneyGlitch.t.sol\":392},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"269c1c02b31ca92b91c2c8ab7b2a7d17c7916aecb477af3b91d59a6c285069e1","verifiedTreeHash":"34f0fc82e0f64b869d36f4e0f22d323f5f5b57f6","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+f8d984f2"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":1092,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 27 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 984.41ms\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":821,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 30 tests for test/InfiniteMoneyGlitch.t.sol:InfiniteMoneyGlitchTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesBalances(uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 158592, ~: 158699)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 851022336803001491379390850\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFromRespectsAllowance(uint256,uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 157266, ~: 158199)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 225012631498\n  Bound result 225012631500\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferOverBalanceAlwaysReverts(uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 54390, ~: 54706)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913129639935\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_unapprovedSpenderCannotMoveTokens(address,uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 57825, ~: 57557)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1000000000\n\n[PASS] test_approveEmitsEventReplacesAndRevokesAllowance() (gas: 177888)\n[PASS] test_approveZeroSpenderReverts() (gas: 37596)\n[PASS] test_constructorEmitsMintAndUsesDirectDeployer() (gas: 28238)\n[PASS] test_deployerCannotSpendHoldersTokensWithoutApproval() (gas: 150677)\n[PASS] test_factoryCreate2ReceivesEntireSupply() (gas: 228337)\n[PASS] test_factoryDistributorAndPoolTransfersArriveWhole() (gas: 544954)\n[PASS] test_infiniteAllowanceIsNotReducedAndCanBeRevoked() (gas: 162244)\n[PASS] test_metadataAndInitialSupply() (gas: 92801)\n[PASS] test_noMintBurnOrAdministrativeEntryPoints() (gas: 1339422)\n[PASS] test_plainEtherTransferIsRejected() (gas: 43057)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoPrivilegedExecutionOpcodes() (gas: 786610)\n[PASS] test_selfTransferDoesNotChangeBalance() (gas: 51496)\n[PASS] test_selfTransferStillRequiresBalance() (gas: 33278)\n[PASS] test_transferDoesNotCallRecipient() (gas: 172166)\n[PASS] test_transferEmitsEventAndDeliversExactAmount() (gas: 88993)\n[PASS] test_transferEntireSupply() (gas: 81671)\n[PASS] test_transferFromEmitsEventAndConsumesFiniteAllowance() (gas: 228194)\n[PASS] test_transferFromOverAllowanceRevertsWithoutChanges() (gas: 108580)\n[PASS] test_transferFromOverBalanceRestoresAllowance() (gas: 124619)\n[PASS] test_transferFromToSelfConsumesAllowanceWithoutMovingBalance() (gas: 105106)\n[PASS] test_transferFromToZeroRestoresAllowance() (gas: 111489)\n[PASS] test_transferFromZeroCannotMint() (gas: 78055)\n[PASS] test_transferOverBalanceRevertsWithoutChanges() (gas: 60797)\n[PASS] test_transferToZeroRevertsEvenForZeroAmount() (gas: 71992)\n[PASS] test_zeroTransferFromEmptyAccountEmitsEvent() (gas: 66472)\n[PASS] test_zeroTransferFromNeedsNoAllowance() (gas: 67512)\nSuite result: ok. 30 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 16.42ms (64.90ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/InfiniteMoneyGlitch.invariant.t.sol:InfiniteMoneyGlitchInvariantTest\n[PASS] invariant_supplyAndAllBalancesAreConserved() (runs: 128, calls: 8192, reverts: 0)\n\n╭--------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract     | Selector     | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+==========================================================+\n| TokenHandler | approve      | 2848  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | transfer     | 2675  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | transferFrom | 2669  | 0       | 0        |\n╰--------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 839\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 5060\n  Bound result 26\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 4003\n  Bound result 789\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 282\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 69969615774012366165395427\n  Bound result 218497586\n  Bound result 45703515210220097320718401\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 28\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 50\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 319969615774012366383896487\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 2340\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 94\n  Bound result 137\n  Bound result 1759\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 480\n  Bound result 550\n  Bound result 2299029944527895039\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 157198260\n  Bound result 1000000000\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 29878463096049464880073756\n  Bound result 0\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 715.26ms (714.21ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 test suites in 716.24ms (731.69ms CPU time): 31 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (31 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":41,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"InfiniteMoneyGlitch.approve(address,uint256)\",\"InfiniteMoneyGlitch.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"InfiniteMoneyGlitch.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"README.md\":121,\"dependencies.lock.json\":54,\"foundry.toml\":23,\"launch.json\":20,\"remappings.txt\":2,\"src/InfiniteMoneyGlitch.sol\":16,\"test/InfiniteMoneyGlitch.invariant.t.sol\":84,\"test/InfiniteMoneyGlitch.t.sol\":391},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"b3eb98b5b90d66cf2864673092c1da0dcd76a57d085c5794dd116d46dd35b112","verifiedTreeHash":"dd04f9e1c5a91b2d7f9ea2cb87ce1d6365ba929e","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+f8d984f2"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":1062,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 27 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 965.48ms\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":825,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 30 tests for test/InfiniteMoneyGlitch.t.sol:InfiniteMoneyGlitchTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesBalances(uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 158584, ~: 158675)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 16072538355532047086725260\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFromRespectsAllowance(uint256,uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 157299, ~: 158229)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 614963337880218965566835988\n  Bound result 1675512568242881178780278920415829816560746042878067820052\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferOverBalanceAlwaysReverts(uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 54385, ~: 54706)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665639564039457584007913307002082\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_unapprovedSpenderCannotMoveTokens(address,uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 57819, ~: 57557)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 489589988925686078373055766\n\n[PASS] test_approveEmitsEventReplacesAndRevokesAllowance() (gas: 177888)\n[PASS] test_approveZeroSpenderReverts() (gas: 37596)\n[PASS] test_constructorEmitsMintAndUsesDirectDeployer() (gas: 28238)\n[PASS] test_deployerCannotSpendHoldersTokensWithoutApproval() (gas: 150677)\n[PASS] test_factoryCreate2ReceivesEntireSupply() (gas: 228337)\n[PASS] test_factoryDistributorAndPoolTransfersArriveWhole() (gas: 544954)\n[PASS] test_infiniteAllowanceIsNotReducedAndCanBeRevoked() (gas: 162244)\n[PASS] test_metadataAndInitialSupply() (gas: 92801)\n[PASS] test_noMintBurnOrAdministrativeEntryPoints() (gas: 1339422)\n[PASS] test_plainEtherTransferIsRejected() (gas: 43057)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoPrivilegedExecutionOpcodes() (gas: 786610)\n[PASS] test_selfTransferDoesNotChangeBalance() (gas: 51496)\n[PASS] test_selfTransferStillRequiresBalance() (gas: 33278)\n[PASS] test_transferDoesNotCallRecipient() (gas: 172166)\n[PASS] test_transferEmitsEventAndDeliversExactAmount() (gas: 88993)\n[PASS] test_transferEntireSupply() (gas: 81671)\n[PASS] test_transferFromEmitsEventAndConsumesFiniteAllowance() (gas: 228194)\n[PASS] test_transferFromOverAllowanceRevertsWithoutChanges() (gas: 108580)\n[PASS] test_transferFromOverBalanceRestoresAllowance() (gas: 124619)\n[PASS] test_transferFromToSelfConsumesAllowanceWithoutMovingBalance() (gas: 105106)\n[PASS] test_transferFromToZeroRestoresAllowance() (gas: 111489)\n[PASS] test_transferFromZeroCannotMint() (gas: 78055)\n[PASS] test_transferOverBalanceRevertsWithoutChanges() (gas: 60797)\n[PASS] test_transferToZeroRevertsEvenForZeroAmount() (gas: 71992)\n[PASS] test_zeroTransferFromEmptyAccountEmitsEvent() (gas: 66472)\n[PASS] test_zeroTransferFromNeedsNoAllowance() (gas: 67512)\nSuite result: ok. 30 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 16.54ms (67.73ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/InfiniteMoneyGlitch.invariant.t.sol:InfiniteMoneyGlitchInvariantTest\n[PASS] invariant_supplyAndAllBalancesAreConserved() (runs: 128, calls: 8192, reverts: 0)\n\n╭--------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract     | Selector     | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+==========================================================+\n| TokenHandler | approve      | 2690  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | transfer     | 2728  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | transferFrom | 2774  | 0       | 0        |\n╰--------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 488\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 180956462706217289500173060\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 340\n  Bound result 63397\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 590\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 1469\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 177362148\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 36865\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 7262\n  Bound result 1813\n  Bound result 1719639407\n  Bound result 63\n  Bound result 2827\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 18\n  Bound result 249999999999999998457678613\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 545\n  Bound result 16\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 12\n  Bound result 110\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 51729\n  Bound result 2314237894\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 0\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 745.71ms (743.71ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 test suites in 746.76ms (762.24ms CPU time): 31 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (31 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":31,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"InfiniteMoneyGlitch.approve(address,uint256)\",\"InfiniteMoneyGlitch.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"InfiniteMoneyGlitch.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"README.md\":121,\"dependencies.lock.json\":54,\"foundry.toml\":23,\"remappings.txt\":2,\"src/InfiniteMoneyGlitch.sol\":16,\"test/InfiniteMoneyGlitch.invariant.t.sol\":84,\"test/InfiniteMoneyGlitch.t.sol\":391},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":406,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"slither: no results at low impact or above","passed":true},{"durationMs":209,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[low] large-numeric-literal at src/InfiniteMoneyGlitch.sol:10: Large Numeric Literal","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"f59c53576faf50df07bee4d6c987f687781ae0887324b7d7d8104282c3cfeef9","verifiedTreeHash":"5716c14da405a60476fefa072325e4ab7dbb6a16","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+f8d984f2"}]}