{"assessments":[],"deployments":[],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"fd4724d6-0f1c-49b6-84c2-447858e3e03f","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"f4efd28a7bb96d8fbe407ba60099451d16efdfe949969469212ddfd710405956","dependsOn":["fix_findings"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"6b037a7b6601e883cf8a906c1520c0624817d42d8310b65c2f43679204608af3","skillId":"adversarial-review","tools":[]},"key":"adversarial_review","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"6b037a7b6601e883cf8a906c1520c0624817d42d8310b65c2f43679204608af3","skillId":"adversarial-review","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"99d25d280e049461211f9f25e54465cefe47843d554b1c5a176a20e145391421","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"fe181768229d4e9487c6211cd94cb34a673a3ce43df5fa5fe2a93a08c29f0067","skillId":"fix-findings","tools":[]},"key":"fix_findings","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"fe181768229d4e9487c6211cd94cb34a673a3ce43df5fa5fe2a93a08c29f0067","skillId":"fix-findings","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"Fix all 11 findings of the audit of this SDK at 91407cb (https://api.imd.fun/jobs/ae3c9745-7363-4bd2-bfaf-dc8944649cd8/report.md) in src/ and rebuild dist/ to match, with one regression test per finding in test/. 1 (high) A retry of an unresolved order must never sign a second Permit2 authorization: persist the exact signed payload per order (0600 file next to the spend ledger), reuse it on retry, serialize per order, and check GET /requests/{id} before ever signing a replacement. 2 (high) The daily cap must hold across processes: an exclusive lock file around read-check-write of the spend ledger, atomic write (temp file + rename), and fail closed if the ledger is unreadable or corrupt instead of treating it as empty. 3 Normalize saved and challenge quotes (flat or nested quote.payment) before comparing, so an unchanged quote passes. 4 Validate every signing input (expiry, terms, resource, signer) before reserving budget; release the reservation on failures known to happen before an authorization leaves the process; keep ambiguous submitted attempts reserved until reconciled. 5 Refuse unless network is eip155:1, scheme exact and assetTransferMethod permit2 consistently across challenge, quote and capabilities. 6 Permit2 deadline = min(quote.expiresAt - 5, now + accepted.maxTimeoutSeconds), with a positive bounded timeout. 7 Bind QuoteApproval to the saved quote's id, quoteHash and asset and to the selected order's resource; fail closed when the original quote is missing. 8 schedule.create and schedule.topup are priced per run (capabilities pricedPer): expected total = runs x unitAmount in integer math, runs must match the request, caps apply to the total. 9 Reject a challenge with no resource before reserving or signing; canonical JSON must reject undefined instead of emitting it. 10 signDigest and addressFromPrivateKey validate and normalize the key and throw a static error that never contains key material; add a package.json exports map limited to the public entry points. 11 LocalPrivateKeySigner rejects scalars outside 0 < d < secp256k1 N before exposing an address. Keep the public API and CLI commands compatible, keep dry-run and caps as defaults, npm test must pass, and add a CHANGELOG entry listing each finding and its fix. Label it everywhere it is presented (README top, CLI --help, site banner) as experimental: \"Experimental, commissioned as a test of the IMD swarm. It may not work as described. Read the code, start with small amounts, no warranty.\"","parentJobId":"c90eb7ff-7de6-4934-be82-7e11791b1769","planHash":"4b68172c1b3d9d85ecefe1e45683a6c64e53e560bb88796e739be4fd47d974f6","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"c90eb7ff-7de6-4934-be82-7e11791b1769","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-601-build-imd-sdk-typed-typescript"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"50971","feedbackHash":"481752e7bbfa38dc10353ba2b9a37b0630a05acfa8516c87a2d2ca4761433727","nodeKey":"adversarial_review","submissionHash":"f4efd28a7bb96d8fbe407ba60099451d16efdfe949969469212ddfd710405956","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51435","feedbackHash":"8031c112c2c4d696a2ef227d761bcf56458ef810dc6bb9e6a988341678776bbc","nodeKey":"adversarial_review","submissionHash":"4ac8c2832a669e76120d7579d3d4a64311b948cf7c1eb8528ec3bb2e1c4b447d","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"50957","feedbackHash":"0ad7e4873ce2eddbcf4d87d500d85d25a15be20d116757113b85283f84fe3ea2","nodeKey":"fix_findings","submissionHash":"5e985906f8ece6c966bd92cb54bbc405829f9caeefd1141d7ee724bd5f6770f4","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":0},{"agentId":"50959","feedbackHash":"fbd35f529a40d00cc777024907528481bd28722e4c1615e0f57ea30f2babf7b7","nodeKey":"fix_findings","submissionHash":"99d25d280e049461211f9f25e54465cefe47843d554b1c5a176a20e145391421","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"263c812610ed6225888f6c6d6e84ccdb3d52bc877a97a010d981c48bce9a3339","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"5fdca4f96f37a80d","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"acquireLock() treats any lock file whose mtime is older than 60 s as abandoned and deletes it, but a live holder never refreshes the mtime and is never checked for liveness (the pid written into the file is unused). pay() holds the order lock across status(), capabilities(), two signTypedData() calls and submitSigned(), none of which has a timeout (the default fetch has none; a viem JSON-RPC/hardware signer waits for the user). Any of those taking longer than 60 s lets a second `imd pay --execute` (or a library retry in another process) remove the lock, find no saved authorization yet, read status `quoted`, reserve budget and sign its own Permit2 + QuoteApproval with a fresh nonce. When the first process resumes it does not re-read the saved authorization after regaining control, so it signs and submits as well, overwriting the second process's order-.json, and its unlock() then rm()s a lock file it no longer owns. Result: two valid PermitWitnessTransferFrom authorizations with distinct nonces for one order both reach the service, which is exactly the double-authorization that audit finding 1 required to be impossible (\"serialize per order\", \"never sign a second Permit2 authorization\"). The ledger does not prevent it: each process reserves its own amount, so with the default 0.5 IMD cap any price up to 0.25 IMD doubles silently, and at the live 0.5 IMD price the first process is stopped only by the daily cap, not by the per-order guarantee. test/audit-findings.test.mjs covers neither a lock held longer than 60 s nor a slow status/capabilities/signer, so the regression test for finding 1 passes while the invariant does not hold. Fix within the current design: refresh the lock's mtime while held (or write a lease and check pid liveness) instead of a fixed 60 s stale cutoff, re-read the saved authorization and the ledger immediately before signing, and have unlock() remove the lock only if it still contains this process's pid.","line":33,"path":"src/index.js","reproduction":"Two real Node processes, same XDG_STATE_HOME, same order \"order-1\", price 0.25 IMD, default caps, each with an injected in-process mock service (402 on the unsigned submit, 202 on the signed one, status always \"quoted\"). Process A's GET /requests/capabilities response is delayed 63 s (models a stalled connection or a signer waiting for confirmation). Process B calls pay(\"order-1\", signer, {execute:true}) 61.5 s after A started. Expected: B waits for A or refuses (\"another imd process holds it\"), one Permit2 signature in total. Actual (observed, 64 s run): A {\"ok\":true,\"status\":\"payment_pending\",\"signed\":2,\"nonces\":[\"42745576886825621043030746057895703544457108214869797609064674798210897710313\"]}, B {\"ok\":true,\"status\":\"payment_pending\",\"signed\":2,\"nonces\":[\"51772808839329676568757125193148568511911548891882073937037586651606286081322\"]}; 4 signer calls, 2 distinct Permit2 nonces submitted for order-1, ledger {\"2026-10-02\":\"500000000000000000\"}. Scripts (run `node stale-lock-double-sign.mjs` from test/scratch/ with child.mjs beside it; exits 1 when more than one nonce was submitted):\n\n--- child.mjs ---\n// One imd-sdk process paying ORDER against an in-process mock service shared with nothing else.\n// argv: order amount stallMs (stallMs > 0 stalls the capabilities response, modelling a slow network or signer)\nimport { ImdClient, LocalPrivateKeySigner } from '../../src/index.js';\nconst [order,amount,stallMs]=process.argv.slice(2);\nconst json=(s,v)=>new Response(JSON.stringify(v),{status:s});\nconst ASSET='0xd34a99bc0f67ae1bbd63c660e6d0b0dd03e263b7', PAY_TO='0x4e0fa57bde726079356537e2f34d671e9f41adbc';\nconst now=Math.floor(Date.now()/1000);\nconst payment={network:'eip155:1',scheme:'exact',asset:ASSET,amount,payTo:PAY_TO,decimals:18};\nconst quote={id:'quote-'+order,quoteHash:'22'.repeat(32),action:'job.open',payment,expiresAt:now+600};\nconst challenge={x402Version:2,quote,accepts:[{scheme:'exact',network:'eip155:1',asset:ASSET,amount,payTo:PAY_TO,maxTimeoutSeconds:60,extra:{assetTransferMethod:'permit2'}}],resource:{url:'https://api.example/requests/'+order},resourceUrl:'https://api.example/requests/'+order,requesterScopeHash:'11'.repeat(32),input:{}};\nconst real=new LocalPrivateKeySigner('0x59c6995e998f97a5a0044976f0945389dc9e86dae88c7a8412c8b4f11f99f37b');\nlet signed=0;const signer={address:real.address,signTypedData:(t)=>{signed++;return real.signTypedData(t);}};\nconst posts=[];\nconst fetch=async(url,init={})=>{const p=new URL(url).pathname,h=init.headers||{};\n if(p==='/requests/capabilities'){if(Number(stallMs)>0)await new Promise(r=>setTimeout(r,Number(stallMs)));return json(200,{actions:[{action:'job.open',payment}],pricedPer:{},payment:{scheme:'exact',assetTransferMethod:'permit2'}});}\n if(p.endsWith('/submit')&&!h['PAYMENT-SIGNATURE'])return json(402,challenge);\n if(p.endsWith('/submit')){posts.push(JSON.parse(Buffer.from(h['PAYMENT-SIGNATURE'],'base64').toString()).payload.permit2Authorization.nonce);return json(202,{status:'payment_pending'});}\n return json(200,{status:'quoted',order:{id:order,quote}});};\nconst client=new ImdClient({baseUrl:'https://api.example',fetch});\nconst go=new Promise(r=>process.on('message',m=>m==='go'&&r()));process.send('ready');await go;\ntry{const out=await client.pay(order,signer,{execute:true});process.send({ok:true,status:out.status,signed,nonces:posts});}\ncatch(e){process.send({ok:false,error:e.message,signed,nonces:posts});}\n\n--- stale-lock-double-sign.mjs ---\n// Process A holds order-1's lock while its capabilities() call stalls for 63 s (slow network / slow signer).\n// Process B retries `pay(order-1)` after 61 s. Expected: B waits or refuses. Actual: B breaks the \"stale\" lock and signs.\nimport { fork } from 'node:child_process';\nimport { mkdtempSync, readFileSync } from 'node:fs';\nimport { tmpdir } from 'node:os';\nimport { join } from 'node:path';\nimport { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';\nconst home=mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(),'imd-stale-'));\nconst script=fileURLToPath(new URL('./child","severity":"high","snippet":"async function acquireLock(path,timeoutMs=15000,staleMs=60000) { const start=Date.now();for(;;){try{const fh=await open(path,'wx',0o600);await fh.writeFile(String(process.pid));await fh.close();return ()=>rm(path,{force:true});}catch(e){if(e.code!=='EEXIST')throw e;try{const s=await stat(path);if(Date.now()-s.mtimeMs>staleMs){await rm(path,{force:true});continue;}}catch{}if(Date.now()-start>timeoutMs)throw new Error(`could not acquire ${basename(path)}; another imd process holds it`);await sleep(20+Math.random()*40);}} }","title":"Per-order lock is broken as stale after 60 s while its holder is still mid-flow, so a concurrent retry signs a second Permit2 authorization for the same order"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"When daily-spend.json.lock is older than 60 s (left by a crashed or killed process), every waiter in acquireLock() independently runs stat -> rm -> open('wx'). The interleaving P2 rm, P2 open (holds), P3 rm (deletes P2's new lock), P3 open (holds) puts two processes inside the ledger read-check-write at once. Both read the same balance, both pass the cap check, both sign, and the last writer's rename discards the other reservation, which is the lost-update bypass that audit finding 2 required to be impossible across processes. It also leaves the ledger under-counting for the rest of the day, so later payments are allowed against a balance that omits one authorization. Preconditions are a stale lock plus near-simultaneous arrivals, which is the normal state after a crash in any environment that runs scheduled or parallel payments. Fix within the current design: break a stale lock by renaming it to a unique name and only proceed if the rename succeeded (so exactly one waiter wins), or use a lock primitive that cannot be removed by a non-owner (fcntl/flock via an open file descriptor, or compare the pid in the file before rm).","line":108,"path":"src/index.js","reproduction":"Create /imd-sdk/daily-spend.json.lock with mtime 120 s in the past and no ledger file. Start 5 Node processes with the same XDG_STATE_HOME, each paying a different order at 0.3 IMD with the default 0.5 IMD daily cap, released simultaneously. Expected: exactly one authorizes and four fail with \"daily IMD spending cap exceeded\", every run. Actual (observed over 12 trials with the script below): trial 10 produced \"2 of 5 processes authorized 0.3 IMD under a 0.5 IMD cap; ledger {\\\"2026-10-02\\\":\\\"300000000000000000\\\"}\", i.e. 0.6 IMD of Permit2 authorizations signed while the ledger records 0.3 IMD; the other 11 trials produced 1 of 5. Script (test/scratch/stale-ledger-race.mjs, uses the same child.mjs as the high finding; args: trials, processes per trial):\n\n// A stale ledger lock (left by a crashed process) plus several processes arriving together:\n// each sees the lock as stale, each removes it and each creates its own -> more than one inside the read-check-write.\nimport { fork } from 'node:child_process';\nimport { mkdtempSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, utimesSync } from 'node:fs';\nimport { tmpdir } from 'node:os';\nimport { join } from 'node:path';\nimport { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';\nconst script=fileURLToPath(new URL('./child.mjs',import.meta.url));\nlet bypass=0;const trials=Number(process.argv[2]||12), n=Number(process.argv[3]||5);\nfor(let t=0;tfork(script,['order-'+i,'300000000000000000','0'],{env:{...process.env,XDG_STATE_HOME:home},stdio:['ignore','ignore','inherit','ipc']}));\n let ready=0;\n const results=await Promise.all(children.map(c=>new Promise((resolve)=>{c.on('message',(m)=>{if(m==='ready'){if(++ready===n)for(const x of children)x.send('go');return;}resolve(m);c.kill();});})));\n const ok=results.filter(r=>r.ok).length;\n const ledger=readFileSync(join(home,'imd-sdk','daily-spend.json'),'utf8');\n console.log(`trial ${t}: ${ok} of ${n} processes authorized 0.3 IMD under a 0.5 IMD cap; ledger ${ledger}`);\n if(ok>1)bypass++;\n}\nconsole.log('trials with more than one authorization:',bypass,'of',trials);\n","severity":"medium","snippet":" try{await mkdir(dirname(this.spendFile),{recursive:true,mode:0o700});const unlock=await acquireLock(`${this.spendFile}.lock`);","title":"Stale-lock removal is not atomic: several waiters can each delete the stale ledger lock and each create their own, letting two processes exceed the daily cap"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"readAuthorization() fails closed only for an unreadable or non-JSON file. A JSON file that lacks header/quoteSignature is returned as undefined (no saved authorization), and a file whose deadline is missing or non-numeric makes Number(saved.deadline) NaN so execute() takes the \"deadline has passed\" branch: it releases saved.amount from the ledger, deletes the file and signs a new authorization. This is the opposite of the fail-closed rule the same commit applies to the spend ledger (\"corrupt; refusing to sign\"), and the file is the only record that an authorization already left the process. The SDK's own writes are atomic, so this needs a truncated copy/restore, a hand edit, or another tool writing the file, which keeps it low. Fix: validate order, day, amount (isAmount), deadline (digits), header and quoteSignature on read and throw a static \"saved payment authorization corrupt; refusing to sign\" on anything else.","line":114,"path":"src/index.js","reproduction":"Pay order-1 once at 0.1 IMD (two signatures, one POST, ledger 0.1, order-.json written). Keep status \"quoted\". (1) Overwrite order-.json with {\"order\":\"order-1\"} and call pay(order-1, signer, {execute:true}). Expected: refuse. Actual: 2 more signer calls, a second POST with a new nonce, ledger 0.2. (2) Take the real saved file and set \"deadline\":\"soon\", call pay again. Expected: refuse. Actual: ledger released by 0.1 then re-reserved (stays 0.2), file replaced, 2 more signer calls, a third POST with a third nonce. Both observed with the injected mock service from test/audit-findings.test.mjs (challengeFor/capabilitiesFor shapes) on the current src/index.js.","severity":"low","snippet":" /** @param {string} id */ async readAuthorization(id) { try{const saved=JSON.parse(await readFile(this.authorizationFile(id),'utf8'));return saved&&saved.order===id&&typeof saved.header==='string'&&typeof saved.quoteSignature==='string'?saved:undefined;}catch(e){if(e?.code==='ENOENT')return undefined;throw new Error('saved payment authorization unreadable; refusing to sign');} }","title":"A parseable but incomplete or garbled saved authorization is treated as absent or expired, so a replacement Permit2 is signed and the reservation released while the first authorization may still be li"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"execute() signs a replacement the instant nowSeconds() >= saved.deadline and status is not in the settled set. Permit2 checks block.timestamp > deadline on chain; the client's wall clock may run ahead of the chain by clock skew plus the gap between a block's timestamp and the moment a transaction broadcast during that slot is seen. If the service has a settlement for the first authorization in flight but reports a non-settled status (e.g. payment_failed after an internal timeout), both can settle. This follows the requested design (re-sign only after the saved deadline), so it is an observation rather than a defect: a few seconds of grace (e.g. treat the saved authorization as live until deadline + 30 s) and a re-read of status after the grace period would close it. Not reproduced on chain.","line":133,"path":"src/index.js","reproduction":"State: saved order file with deadline = now - 1, status endpoint returns \"quoted\" or \"payment_failed\". pay() releases the reservation and signs a new Permit2 with a fresh nonce immediately (observed: 4 signer calls, 2 nonces, in the expired-path probe). Whether the first one can still settle depends on chain timing; no on-chain claim is made.","severity":"info","snippet":" if(nowSeconds()console.log(Object.keys(m)))\"` in the repository prints the internal helpers (keccak256, sha256, signDigest, addressFromPrivateKey, typedDataDigest, LocalPrivateKeySigner, toHex); with an exports map limited to \".\" and \"./package.json\" the import would fail with ERR_PACKAGE_PATH_NOT_EXPORTED.","severity":"info","snippet":"10. **Low — deep-imported helpers leaked malformed keys in errors.** `signDigest` and `addressFromPrivateKey` validate and normalize the key (`0x`-optional 64 hex, `0 < d < N`) and throw the static `invalid private key`, never a message containing key material. The requested `package.json` exports map is **not** included: this revision's rules forbid changes to `package.json`, so the entry-point restriction is left for a release that may touch it.","title":"Finding 10 is only partly delivered: the package.json exports map restricting entry points was deliberately omitted"}],"hash":"4ac8c2832a669e76120d7579d3d4a64311b948cf7c1eb8528ec3bb2e1c4b447d","nodeId":"26b208cc-4fc2-40ed-8114-b20a1c788d6c","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. The findings are in `.imd-findings.json` at the repository root, ranked by severity. No project files were changed. The scratch scripts I used were removed.\n\n**What I checked.** All 11 audit fixes against the code at `d4ce9ed`, with the full test suite run (13 JavaScript tests and the 3 Foundry vector tests all pass, and `dist/` is byte-identical to `src/`). I then probed the paths the regression tests do not cover: the expired-authorization replacement path, the `payment_failed` refusal, saved-file validation, a lock holder alive past 60 seconds, and a stale ledger lock with simultaneous arrivals. Findings 3 through 9 and 11 hold as specified. The finding-10 key validation holds too.\n\n**Findings, most severe first:**\n\n- **High. Per-order lock is broken as stale after 60 s while its holder is still running.** The lock holder never refreshes the file's mtime and the pid written into it is never checked. If `status()`, `capabilities()`, a signer, or `submitSigned()` takes longer than 60 seconds, a second process deletes the lock, finds no saved payload, and signs its own Permit2. The first process then signs too, since it never re-reads the saved file after regaining control, and its unlock removes a lock it no longer owns. Reproduced with two real processes at 0.25 IMD: 4 signer calls and 2 distinct Permit2 nonces submitted for one order. This is the double authorization that audit finding 1 was meant to rule out, and no regression test exercises it.\n- **Medium. Stale-lock removal on the ledger lock is not atomic.** Several waiters each run stat, rm, open, so two can end up inside the read-check-write at once. Reproduced in 1 of 12 trials with a 120-second-old lock and 5 simultaneous processes: two authorized 0.3 IMD under a 0.5 IMD cap, and the ledger recorded only 0.3 IMD.\n- **Low. A parseable but incomplete saved authorization fails open.** A file like `{\"order\":\"order-1\"}` is treated as absent, and a non-numeric deadline is treated as expired, so the reservation is released and a new Permit2 is signed. The ledger fails closed on corruption; this file does not.\n- **Info. No grace margin on the local-clock deadline check** before signing a replacement. Matches the requested design, so noted as an observation.\n- **Info. The package.json exports map from finding 10 was deliberately left out.** The CHANGELOG documents the reason. This is a scope call for the requester, not a code defect.\n\n**What is not in the list.** I found no way to exceed the per-request cap, no path that signs without first reserving budget, and no issue with the Permit2 or QuoteApproval encodings, which Foundry cross-checks with `ecrecover`. The in-process serialization, atomic ledger writes, fail-closed corrupt-ledger handling, per-run pricing math, and the experimental labels in the README, CLI help and site all check out.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":798585,"inputTokens":258,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":40150,"runtime":"claude","turns":24,"wallClockMs":760456}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"99fda853550938d71649bba3543c9cd22646b17ee251f3567ca844fc61a2936e","device":"0256823ae36e7900","findings":[],"hash":"5e985906f8ece6c966bd92cb54bbc405829f9caeefd1141d7ee724bd5f6770f4","nodeId":"e87f78eb-bc35-45c5-a482-833782c0e198","outcome":"completed","summary":"Implemented the audit fixes, added 11 regression tests and a CHANGELOG entry, and rebuilt `dist/`.\n\n- `npm test`: 23 tests passed.\n- `forge build` and `forge test`: succeeded; no Solidity sources.\n- `dist/` matches `src/`.\n- Experimental warnings, public API, CLI commands, and defaults preserved.\n\nOne requested item remains: the exports map was not added because your overriding rules prohibit modifying `package.json`. Finding 10’s key-disclosure bug is fixed and tested.","treeHash":"52fc0e669408be62752d76546f086deff605fafd","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":918528,"inputTokens":81104,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":7680,"runtime":"codex","turns":5,"wallClockMs":746491}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":2,"bundleHash":"b3b7e3ffc1e33853e0d85e85051511dc7e4891a60f52b30969dadec28b7a5ce7","device":"468e82a89b9bfe18","findings":[],"hash":"66ea662eceb8938a946f64bf94673ed888b4d3081c56981946ad4ff0a99493cc","nodeId":"e87f78eb-bc35-45c5-a482-833782c0e198","outcome":"completed","summary":"All 11 audit findings are fixed in `src/`, `dist/` is rebuilt to match, and every finding has a regression test that fails on 91407cb and passes now.\n\n**What changed**\n\n- `src/index.js`: findings 1 through 9. Per-order serialization with a lock file, a persisted 0600 payload reused byte for byte on retry, a status check before any signing, a locked and atomically written spend ledger that fails closed on corruption, full validation before reserving budget with release on pre-submission failures, normalized saved quotes bound by id, hash, asset and order resource, strict mainnet exact permit2 terms, the bounded Permit2 deadline, per-run pricing for the schedule actions, and canonical JSON that rejects undefined.\n- `src/crypto.js`: findings 10 and 11. One key normalizer used by `signDigest`, `addressFromPrivateKey` and the signer constructor; static error, scalar range enforced before an address is derived.\n- `test/audit-findings.test.mjs`: one test per finding, offline, with an injected fetch, a throwaway key and a temporary state directory. Finding 2 also races three real child processes on one ledger.\n- `test/ImdSdkVectors.t.sol`: a plain Solidity test that recovers the SDK's fixed Permit2 and QuoteApproval signatures with `ecrecover` and pins the scalar collision from finding 11. This is what gives `forge build` and `forge test` something to compile and run, which the previous attempt lacked.\n- `test/paid-flow.test.mjs`: the mock now returns the real nested quote shape and isolates the ledger. Finding 3 called out that this test bypassed the quote comparison.\n- `CHANGELOG.md`: one entry per finding and its fix, with the experimental label at the top. README, CLI help and site banner already carried the label and are unchanged.\n\n**Verification results**\n\n| Check | Result |\n|---|---|\n| `npm test` | 13 passed, 0 failed |\n| New tests against 91407cb sources | 11 failed, as required |\n| `forge build --offline` and `forge test --offline` | compiled, 3 passed |\n| `forge fmt --check` | clean |\n| `diff -r src dist` | identical |\n\n**One part of finding 10 is deliberately not done.** The requested `package.json` exports map is omitted because this assignment's rules forbid touching `package.json` and submissions that do are rejected automatically. The key validation and static error, which are the leak itself, are fixed; the entry-point restriction is noted in the CHANGELOG for a release that may edit the manifest.\n\nThe public API, CLI commands, dry-run default and 0.5 IMD caps are unchanged. The forge `out/` and `cache/` directories were removed so the tree holds only the source, dist, test and CHANGELOG changes.","treeHash":"66fd04677a9e8f19bbc304267328b1fa4347e2f2","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2366767,"inputTokens":738,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":70152,"runtime":"claude","turns":45,"wallClockMs":1133890}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"759f24b519b261e7f3ac22fd3725d5303ffbed4917176cef41b24769efc3df44","device":"468e82a89b9bfe18","findings":[],"hash":"99d25d280e049461211f9f25e54465cefe47843d554b1c5a176a20e145391421","nodeId":"e87f78eb-bc35-45c5-a482-833782c0e198","outcome":"completed","summary":"The responses file is in place at the repository root and is excluded from git by the harness on purpose, so the worker picks it up directly. The work is complete.\n\n**Outcome.** Four of the five review findings reproduced and are fixed in `src/index.js`, with `dist/` rebuilt to match. The fifth, the `package.json` exports map, is answered as disputed because that file is off limits in this task. All 17 Node tests and 3 Foundry tests pass.\n\n**What reproduced**\n- **High, stale per-order lock.** The reviewer's scripts showed two Permit2 nonces submitted for one order after a 63 s stall. With the fix, process B waits and resubmits A's exact payload with no new signature.\n- **Medium, non-atomic stale-lock break.** Trial 8 of 12 let two processes authorize 0.3 IMD each under a 0.5 IMD cap. With the fix, 30 trials of 6 processes produced exactly one authorization every time.\n- **Low, garbled saved authorization.** A file with only an order id, or a non-numeric deadline, led to a replacement signature. Confirmed by test.\n- **Info, no deadline margin.** Addressed with a 30 s grace period.\n\n**What changed in the code**\n- Both locks are now lease directories holding one owner file, moved into place by a single rename. The holder refreshes the owner file every 5 s. A lock counts as stale only after 60 s without a refresh and when its owner pid is dead on this host. Breaking unlinks the owner file by exact name and removes the directory only while empty, so no waiter can remove another holder's lock. Old-style lock files are still honoured and broken by mtime.\n- Before reserving budget and signing, the payment flow re-checks that it still holds the lock and re-reads the saved authorization. The ledger write re-checks the lock too. A lost lock aborts with a static error.\n- The saved authorization record is validated field by field and fails closed with a static error, without touching the file or the reservation.\n- A saved authorization is reused until 30 s past its Permit2 deadline before a replacement may be signed.\n\n**Tests and docs**\n- New file `test/review-findings.test.mjs` holds one test per addressed finding. Each fails on the accepted commit and passes now. The whole `npm test` run takes about 15 s.\n- `CHANGELOG.md` gains a \"Review of these fixes\" section covering all five findings, including why the exports map remains out.\n- `.imd-responses.json` lists all five finding ids with verdicts and the evidence behind each.\n\nPublic exports, CLI commands, the experimental banner, dry-run default and caps are unchanged.","treeHash":"a45f005eb60d26e97f06133865054ed2fd6a431b","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":3007529,"inputTokens":802,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":57442,"runtime":"claude","turns":34,"wallClockMs":926919}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"35c52a5b502e847c","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"The ledger decrement commits before the saved authorization is removed. If the process terminates between these two operations, the old authorization file remains with no durable indication that its reservation has already been refunded. The next pay() retry subtracts the same amount again from the aggregate daily balance, consuming reservations belonging to other orders. The new exclusive locks serialize both refunds correctly but cannot make this two-file operation idempotent. I reproduced this with a real child process killed after the first refund was persisted, without changing the SDK or corrupting its saved JSON: three live authorizations totaling 0.7 IMD were submitted while the ledger recorded 0.5 IMD under the default 0.5 IMD daily cap. This is a new crash-recovery defect, distinct from the now-fixed stale-lock race. Make the refund durably idempotent for the order/nonce, or otherwise ensure a crash cannot cause a second subtraction. No on-chain settlement was attempted.","line":182,"path":"src/index.js","reproduction":"Run offline against src/index.js with one shared temporary XDG_STATE_HOME, default maxPerRequest=maxPerDay=500000000000000000, and LocalPrivateKeySigner using public test scalar 1. Use the same mainnet exact Permit2 challenge/capabilities fields as test/review-findings.test.mjs, with per-order resources https://api.example/requests/A, /B and /C and distinct saved quote IDs. GET status always returns status='quoted' and that order's original quote; unsigned submit returns 402; capture each signed submit and return 202. At time T pay A for 200000000000000000 with maxTimeoutSeconds=1 and quote.expiresAt=T+600, producing a valid saved authorization with deadline T+1. Advance the injected clock to T+40 (both Date.now() and no-argument new Date()); change A's accepted timeout to 60 and pay B for 300000000000000000 with timeout=60. The ledger is now 500000000000000000 and B remains live until T+100. In a separate real Node process with the same state directory and clock, retry A. To stop at the exact crash boundary, wrap that child's client.adjustSpend: await the original method; when delta<0, send an IPC message and hold the returned promise pending. Upon that message SIGKILL the child. The persisted ledger is 300000000000000000 while A's original saved authorization is still present. Age the dead child's order-lock owner file mtime by 120 seconds to exercise normal stale-lock recovery without waiting. Retry A using a fresh, unmodified client: it refunds A's 200000000000000000 a second time, reducing B's reservation to 100000000000000000, then reserves 200000000000000000 for A's replacement; ledger=300000000000000000. Finally pay C for 200000000000000000 with timeout=60. Expected: after replacing expired A, B+A consume the entire 0.5 IMD cap, so C is rejected before signing. Actual observed: C succeeds; B, replacement A and C have three distinct nonces, deadlines T+100, and permitted amounts totaling 700000000000000000, while daily-spend.json records only 500000000000000000. Original A's authorization has genuinely expired in the injected clock; its saved contents were never edited. The failure also follows directly from the reproducible crash state: an expired 0.2 IMD A record remains after its refund, alongside a ledger of 0.3 IMD fully reserved for live B.","severity":"medium","snippet":" await this.adjustSpend(saved.day,-BigInt(saved.amount));await rm(this.authorizationFile(id),{force:true});","title":"A crash during expired-authorization cleanup refunds the same reservation twice and bypasses the daily cap"}],"hash":"f4efd28a7bb96d8fbe407ba60099451d16efdfe949969469212ddfd710405956","nodeId":"26b208cc-4fc2-40ed-8114-b20a1c788d6c","outcome":"completed","summary":"Recorded one **medium** defect in [.imd-findings.json](.imd-findings.json): a crash between refunding an expired authorization and deleting its record allows a second refund. Reproduced **0.7 IMD in live authorizations under the 0.5 IMD daily cap**.\n\nPrevious findings:\n- Slow-holder double signing: fixed; original 63-second reproduction now produces one nonce.\n- Stale-ledger lock race: fixed in repeated process races.\n- Reported corrupt authorization inputs: now rejected.\n- Deadline grace: implemented.\n- Exports map: still omitted under the configuration-edit restriction; not reported again.\n\nAll 15 audit/review regression tests passed. `src/` and `dist/` match. Implementation files remain unchanged.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":521984,"inputTokens":98569,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":8056,"runtime":"codex","turns":5,"wallClockMs":373089}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":36,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Nothing to compile\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":34,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"Nothing to compile\n","passed":true}],"detail":"nothing was compiled and no tests ran — this suite verified nothing","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"rejected","submissionHash":"5e985906f8ece6c966bd92cb54bbc405829f9caeefd1141d7ee724bd5f6770f4","verifiedTreeHash":"52fc0e669408be62752d76546f086deff605fafd","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+68ddf5e4"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":63,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 1 files with Solc 0.8.30\nSolc 0.8.30 finished in 18.41ms\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":37,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 3 tests for test/ImdSdkVectors.t.sol:ImdSdkVectorsTest\n[PASS] testOverflowedScalarCollidesWithScalarFive() (gas: 8351)\n[PASS] testPermit2VectorRecoversSdkSigner() (gas: 7278)\n[PASS] testQuoteApprovalVectorRecoversSdkSigner() (gas: 6802)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 476.28µs (761.39µs CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test suite in 1.52ms (476.28µs CPU time): 3 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (3 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":20,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[],\"files\":{\"CHANGELOG.md\":21,\"LICENSE\":21,\"README.md\":91,\"dist/cli.js\":24,\"dist/crypto.js\":82,\"dist/index.d.ts\":35,\"dist/index.js\":164,\"package-lock.json\":7,\"package.json\":17,\"scripts/build.mjs\":5,\"site/index.html\":1,\"src/cli.js\":24,\"src/crypto.js\":82,\"src/index.d.ts\":35,\"src/index.js\":164,\"test/ImdSdkVectors.t.sol\":109,\"test/audit-findings.test.mjs\":468,\"test/paid-flow.test.mjs\":66,\"tsconfig.json\":12},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"66ea662eceb8938a946f64bf94673ed888b4d3081c56981946ad4ff0a99493cc","verifiedTreeHash":"66fd04677a9e8f19bbc304267328b1fa4347e2f2","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+b537d296"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":75,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 1 files with Solc 0.8.30\nSolc 0.8.30 finished in 27.33ms\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":47,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 3 tests for test/ImdSdkVectors.t.sol:ImdSdkVectorsTest\n[PASS] testOverflowedScalarCollidesWithScalarFive() (gas: 8351)\n[PASS] testPermit2VectorRecoversSdkSigner() (gas: 7278)\n[PASS] testQuoteApprovalVectorRecoversSdkSigner() (gas: 6802)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 4.98ms (722.22µs CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test suite in 5.51ms (4.98ms CPU time): 3 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (3 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":24,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[],\"files\":{\"CHANGELOG.md\":31,\"LICENSE\":21,\"README.md\":91,\"dist/cli.js\":24,\"dist/crypto.js\":82,\"dist/index.d.ts\":35,\"dist/index.js\":212,\"package-lock.json\":7,\"package.json\":17,\"scripts/build.mjs\":5,\"site/index.html\":1,\"src/cli.js\":24,\"src/crypto.js\":82,\"src/index.d.ts\":35,\"src/index.js\":212,\"test/ImdSdkVectors.t.sol\":109,\"test/audit-findings.test.mjs\":468,\"test/paid-flow.test.mjs\":66,\"test/review-findings.test.mjs\":282,\"tsconfig.json\":12},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"99d25d280e049461211f9f25e54465cefe47843d554b1c5a176a20e145391421","verifiedTreeHash":"a45f005eb60d26e97f06133865054ed2fd6a431b","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+b537d296"}]}