{"assessments":[],"deployments":[],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"b240aab0-4e0d-4bb4-9d66-00e57a350fed","kind":"skill:build-website","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"c49ce5611e82ef7c64dbb45f619089624bcfe5df5aa337f3a42cb39a15f2e3a7","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"mustProduce":["dist/index.html"],"network":true,"optionalTools":["browser"],"profile":"none","requires":["network"],"skillHash":"a60bc8b42446c13d993341179fe13c712a5addb118fc532fb2d15e71f912efc8","skillId":"build-website","tools":[]},"key":"build_website","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"a60bc8b42446c13d993341179fe13c712a5addb118fc532fb2d15e71f912efc8","skillId":"build-website","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"d4aa475bea6dde707fad37aec13a6f0c5f59a4c31f7fd0528bf7f98962dea57b","dependsOn":["build_website"],"execution":{"network":true,"optionalTools":["browser"],"profile":"none","requires":["network"],"skillHash":"fd33b6741366d364a55a4c0ba2bc4f5d329cec0b62f27a83289dc5b30ab03575","skillId":"design-critic","tools":[]},"key":"design_critic","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"fd33b6741366d364a55a4c0ba2bc4f5d329cec0b62f27a83289dc5b30ab03575","skillId":"design-critic","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"Audit and review the website and contract carefully, \n\nIt is not able to read the wallet and identify swarm launched tokens.\n\nDo a full review end to end, \n\n1. It should be able to read the swarm tokens, use 0x0acE1DBE8AAb293cd58D5e3Ea38814f0ccb74782 for test case, since this wallet has a lot of warm launched tokens.\n2. Check if the contract is able to sell all and return one cummulative amount of $IMD (0xD34a99Bc0f67aE1bbd63C660e6d0b0dd03E263B7)\n3. Check if a 2% fee is being deducted and sent to reward wallet.\n4. Check if failed txn are being refunded.\n5. do all other necessary checks","parentJobId":"0c4b5c8c-6b77-4b40-a7d7-b6e5609be253","planHash":"58344f464f8201021924976a8404b8d5614792dfa3dcf1514961a2da46de20c5","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"35d16e4a-e1e6-43b7-9efe-3b7b1fe99404","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-1682-build-protocol-enables-user"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"51148","feedbackHash":"47b30b79a7262d7f1f92d2868b0468510af88627e72160e73aeec94c7cc03154","nodeKey":"build_website","submissionHash":"c49ce5611e82ef7c64dbb45f619089624bcfe5df5aa337f3a42cb39a15f2e3a7","tag1":"verification:structural","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51082","feedbackHash":"575d19f15dba2204f5b1096612e88715c79943dd35fbcacbd2ecf4b5b1612ed8","nodeKey":"build_website","submissionHash":"08f95559e686965966599bb71fec52f6e0899cc50fddd8d0ad8bb7f89f230832","tag1":"verification:structural","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51366","feedbackHash":"5b6c3313cdf2ee1f574f86bafff9ea3796af8c91851f25bb09376f1bd6e2e73b","nodeKey":"design_critic","submissionHash":"d4aa475bea6dde707fad37aec13a6f0c5f59a4c31f7fd0528bf7f98962dea57b","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"53927","feedbackHash":"0c76c6718d14818ca94a2b1f5cdd1c40e3ad2a9bf40bf68b67c42b61ee61dae3","nodeKey":"design_critic","submissionHash":"28d5aa0448f0581f1f12390bbb07519847d06ec65a732b2d9de758acfb171dd8","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"a70374253e64c3508105e05e8a88251ec201cae9a143e97b984590bdd7764133","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"376155271f3ad68e83f188b5babc69f403bcf52db6d9320203c13e4b7b604609","device":"f47f953f8e35921e","findings":[],"hash":"08f95559e686965966599bb71fec52f6e0899cc50fddd8d0ad8bb7f89f230832","nodeId":"aab88ed8-0819-48f6-8028-b1027e1618e7","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and the fix is built, validated and documented. The tree is ready for submission, with no node_modules tracked and the bundle well under the size limit.\n\n**Root cause.** The live SwarmExit at 0x5c3c…bc61 has nothing configured: zero registered tokens, no IMD route, no price feed. The old site listed tokens only through the contract's own registry, so every wallet read as empty. The contract is live and cannot be redeployed, and only the owner wallet can register tokens.\n\n**What I changed in the site**\n\n- **Token discovery from the chain.** Every swarm launch goes through the IdentityMD launch factory at 0xff03…7120, the contract that deployed SwarmExit. Its positionOf view returns each launched token with its Uniswap v4 pool key. The site scans launch ids, verifies the factory against the deployment record's launch block, and unions the result with the contract registry.\n- **Balances, quotes and reasons for every held token.** Registered tokens go through the contract's preview. Unregistered ones are quoted through their launch pool with the Uniswap v4 Quoter, so the holder sees the value and whether anyone is buying. USD pricing falls back to the ETH/IMD v4 pool plus the Chainlink feed when the contract is unconfigured.\n- **Owner setup panel.** When the owner wallet connects, the page shows what is missing and sends the registrations, routes, IMD route and feed as transactions, with values read from the chain.\n- **Error handling.** Rate-limit errors now surface as a readable failure with Refresh instead of silently listing fewer tokens.\n\n**Results for the test wallet 0x0acE…4782**, read through the site's own code against mainnet: 187 token launches known, 142 held, 1 with a buyer in its pool (PLEA, about 0.19 IMD). Every other held token sits in a launch pool nobody has bought from, so there is no IMD to sell into. Those are greyed out with the reason.\n\n**Checks 2 to 4** ran on a mainnet fork of the live contract in the new file test/fork/SwarmExitMainnet.t.sol: one sellAll returned one cumulative gross IMD amount, exactly 2% went to the treasury, the rest to the seller, nothing stayed in the contract, and unsellable tokens were skipped before any pull. The post-pull refund path cannot be forced on real pools and is covered by the existing unit tests. All 128 unit tests still pass.\n\n**Validation.** Typecheck and production build pass, ABI hash matches, the design probe passes 16 of 16, and the Playwright interaction script passes every check including the owner panel. Details, findings and limitations are in artifacts/validation.md. README and DESIGN.md are updated.\n\n**Limitations.** No real sale was sent, since the owner has to register tokens first. The free public RPCs rate-limit, so a full wallet read takes about two minutes; a faster RPC in web/src/chain.ts removes that wait. Safari, screen readers and native zoom were not tested.\n\nNot delivered: artifacts/screenshots/1440-after-sale.png, artifacts/screenshots/1440-confirm-all.png, artifacts/screenshots/1440-confirm-selected.png, artifacts/screenshots/1440-connected.png, artifacts/screenshots/1440-owner-setup.png, artifacts/screenshots/320-connected.png, artifacts/screenshots/390-after-sale.png, artifacts/screenshots/390-confirm-all.png and 7 more. Under artifacts/, only this step's named outputs leave the machine.","treeHash":"f2830f7f090beeb8e4ad42ab3e97e6a5b6dfad2b","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":5770681,"inputTokens":1090,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":115048,"runtime":"claude","turns":87,"wallClockMs":1943354}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"a8006a8757108cd3","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Now: planSale simulates sellAll before approvals. With zero allowance, sellAll reverts NothingSold; the per-token retry puts every token in excluded and empties selected. The NoAllowance fallback never runs, so the confirmation has zero items and its Sell button is disabled. Mixed approved/unapproved selections also silently exclude the unapproved tokens.\nChange to: distinguish missing allowances before simulation, retain these tokens as approval-required plan items with explicitly estimated proceeds, and simulate the actual batch after approvals before offering the sale signature.\nWhy: the brief requires Sell all / Sell selected, and the dialog promises that the wallet will ask for approvals; a new user cannot reach that implemented approval flow.","line":328,"path":"web/src/lib/sweep.ts","reproduction":"Width: 390 or 1440 (logic is width-independent). Use a wallet holding any registered liquid token with preview.sellable=true and allowance(wallet, SwarmExit)=0; click Sell all. Expected: confirmation retains the token, then asks for approval and sale. Actual: sellAll reverts NothingSold, planSale returns items=[] and excluded=[token], and ConfirmDialog disables Sell 0 tokens at line 129. The contract behavior is independently exercised by the passing test test_missingApprovalIsSkippedAndAloneRevertsNothingSold in test/SwarmExit.t.sol:576; the planner is exercised separately with the same inputs during this review. A local EVM with the exact compiled runtime, a funded V2 pool and 100 REVIEW tokens returned preview.sellable=true and 99.690060900928177460 IMD, but planSale returned zero items until approval was set; after approval it returned one item. Chromium and WebKit at 390 rendered \"Sell 0 tokens for IMD?\" with the disabled sale control.","severity":"high","snippet":"          const { result } = await client.simulateContract({ ...exit, functionName: \"sellAll\", args: [[t.address], [0n], deadline()], account });\n          if (settles(result[0][0], minImdOut)) keep.push(t);\n          else excluded.push({ token: t, reason: \"The sale would not settle on chain.\" });\n        } catch (e) {\n          excluded.push({ token: t, reason: `The sale reverts in simulation: ${e instanceof Error ? e.message.split(\"\\n\")[0] : e}` });\n        }\n      }","title":"bug: first-time sellers are excluded before the approval step can run"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Now: after the user confirms the displayed proceeds, executeSale replaces each confirmed imdOut with a fresh, potentially much lower quote, then applies the 3% tolerance to that new value. ConfirmDialog still promises that the minimum is 3% below the displayed amounts.\nChange to: derive each transaction minimum from the amounts the user actually confirmed. If a fresh simulation falls below that minimum, stop and present the changed proceeds for confirmation instead of lowering the bound silently.\nWhy: the confirmation must accurately show the IMD the user agrees to receive, and its stated 3% protection must be enforced by the transaction.","line":407,"path":"web/src/lib/sweep.ts","reproduction":"Width: 390 or 1440. Confirm a plan with one approved token, gross 100 IMD, fee 2 IMD and net 98 IMD. Before executeSale performs its post-approval simulation, have the pool quote drop to 10 IMD. Invoke executeSale with that plan and capture wallet.writeContract arguments. Expected minImdOuts[0]=97e18 or a new confirmation; actual minImdOuts[0]=9.7e18, allowing a 90% reduction relative to the confirmed gross. This exact 100-to-10 input was executed against the unmodified function in the review harness. An end-to-end local EVM reproduction with the unchanged contract also confirmed 97.696259682909613911 IMD net, then changed the V2 pool reserves before executeSale. The transaction actually settled for 27.102467849112079770 IMD net, using a 26.825912054733385078 IMD gross floor instead of the confirmed 96.699359073900332136 IMD floor.","severity":"high","snippet":"      batch = batch.map((i) => {\n        const o = result[0].find((x) => same(x.token, i.token.address));\n        return o && o.status === STATUS_SOLD && o.imdOut > 0n ? { ...i, imdOut: o.imdOut } : i;\n      });","title":"bug: sale minimums silently fall below the amounts the user confirmed"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Now: onChain compares useChainId(), which follows wagmi’s configured chain, with chain.id. With only Ethereum configured, that value stays 1 when the connected wallet changes to an unsupported chain such as Base. ConnectSheet uses the same value, so it never offers Switch to Ethereum and sale controls remain enabled.\nChange to: compare the connected account/connector chainId from useAccount with the required chain in both App and ConnectSheet; disable sale and setup actions and show the switch control whenever it differs.\nWhy: the live deployment exists on Ethereum and the required wrong-network state must stop the visitor from preparing a sale against the wrong wallet chain.","line":16,"path":"web/src/App.tsx","reproduction":"Width: 1440 (also 390). In Chromium and WebKit, connect an EIP-1193 test provider on chain 0x1 to a local fixture with one registered liquid token, then emit chainChanged(\"0x2105\") and have eth_chainId return 0x2105. Expected: a Switch to Ethereum button, wrong-network guidance and disabled Sell all. Actual: Sell all remains enabled (isDisabled()=false), the summary continues to show the Ethereum token and no switch control appears. The page reads mainnet through its configured client while the wallet is on Base. No signature or transaction is needed to reproduce.","severity":"high","snippet":"  const chainId = useChainId();\n  const client = usePublicClient();\n  const { data: wallet } = useWalletClient();\n  const onChain = isConnected && chainId === chain.id;","title":"bug: switching the wallet off Ethereum leaves selling enabled"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Now: if the post-approval sellAll simulation reverts, executeSale ignores the failure and sends the original batch anyway. If a mixed simulation returns a skipped token, the mapping above also keeps that token rather than excluding it. A known unsellable selection therefore still reaches the wallet signature and can consume gas in a reverting transaction.\nChange to: stop on a failed final simulation, show the actual reason and refresh/retry option; filter non-selling outcomes out of a successful mixed simulation, and do not call writeContract when nothing remains. Preserve the confirmed minimums for the tokens that remain.\nWhy: the brief explicitly says that unsellable tokens must not initiate a transaction and must be highlighted in the list.","line":411,"path":"web/src/lib/sweep.ts","reproduction":"Width: 390 or 1440. Create a valid plan for one approved liquid token. Before confirmation completes, remove its route or make its pool quote fail, so the final simulateContract(sellAll) rejects with NothingSold. Expected zero sale-signature requests and an unsellable/error state. Actual executeSale calls wallet.writeContract(functionName=\"sellAll\") once and only records failure after a reverted receipt. The review harness supplied an approved 100-token plan, threw NothingSold from the final simulation, captured exactly one sellAll write, and returned a reverted receipt. No live transaction was broadcast.","severity":"high","snippet":"    } catch {\n      /* keep the plan's figures; the contract still enforces the minimums */\n    }\n    onProgress({ step: \"sign\", batch: b + 1, batches: batches.length });","title":"bug: a failed final sale simulation still requests a transaction"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Now: a refused refund emits RefundHeld inside _refund and then TokenRefunded in _sellOne. executeSale processes logs in that order and overwrites held=true with \"Your tokens were refunded in the same transaction.\" The page also says the rest stayed in the wallet, while tokens can remain held by SwarmExit.\nChange to: preserve RefundHeld as the final status regardless of event order, report the held amount and claim action, and replace the unconditional footer/dialog promise with \"Failed sales return your tokens. If a token blocks the refund, it stays claimable here.\"\nWhy: the brief requires failed-sale refunds; the interface must distinguish money already returned from a claim still held in the contract.","line":440,"path":"web/src/lib/sweep.ts","reproduction":"Width: 390 and 1440; sell a batch containing one liquid token and one token that rejects both its pool and the seller as transfer recipients. The passing test test_refundRefusedByTokenIsHeldAndClaimable (test/SwarmExitRevision.t.sol:445) confirms the held balance. Replay the resulting RefundHeld(user,token,100), TokenRefunded(user,token,100,reason) logs through executeSale: actual final map has reason=\"The sale failed on chain. Your tokens were refunded in the same transaction.\" and no held field. Expected held=true and a claim-required message. The review ran this event-order reproduction against the unmodified function.","severity":"medium","snippet":"      else if (log.eventName === \"TokenRefunded\")\n        results.set(key(log.args.token), { kind: \"unsold\", reason: \"The sale failed on chain. Your tokens were refunded in the same transaction.\", txHash: hash });\n      else if (log.eventName === \"RefundHeld\")\n        results.set(key(log.args.token), { kind: \"unsold\", reason: \"The sale failed and the token refused the refund. Claim it below.\", txHash: hash, held: true });","title":"bug: held refunds are overwritten as completed refunds"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Now: claimRefund waits for a receipt but never checks receipt.status, then App displays \"Refund of <symbol> claimed.\" even when the transaction reverted. The owner setup writer has the same unchecked receipt pattern and counts reverted configuration calls as confirmed setup.\nChange to: require receipt.status === \"success\" before returning from claimRefund or an owner setup step; throw a clear transaction-reverted error otherwise, preserve the outstanding claim/setup state, and provide the transaction link.\nWhy: a mined transaction can fail; failed refunds must remain visibly claimable and failure states must report what actually happened.","line":451,"path":"web/src/lib/sweep.ts","reproduction":"Width: 390 or 1440. For a token with heldRefunds[user][token]>0, have its refund transfer remain blocked and submit a claim that is mined with status=\"reverted\". In the function-level reproduction, wallet.writeContract returns a hash and waitForTransactionReceipt returns {status:\"reverted\"}; claimRefund nevertheless resolves to the hash. App.tsx:126-128 consequently takes the success path and sets \"Refund ... claimed.\" Expected: reject and display \"Unable to claim the refund\", retaining the held amount. The same receipt stub also makes setupSteps().run() resolve successfully in lib/owner.ts:43-46.","severity":"medium","snippet":"  await client.waitForTransactionReceipt({ hash });","title":"bug: reverted refund claims are announced as successful"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Now: setup only offers tokens absent from the registry. Registration and route configuration are separate transactions. If registration succeeds but the route signature is rejected or its transaction fails, refreshing removes that token from every setup action even though tokenRoute.venue remains None. The UI counts it as registered \"with their launch pool as the route\".\nChange to: track registration and route completion separately; include already registered routable tokens with a missing route in setup, enqueue only their missing setTokenRoute call, and derive completion counts from both conditions.\nWhy: owner setup is the provided path to make the requested tokens sellable, and its failure/retry flow must recover without requiring the owner to write raw contract calls.","line":25,"path":"web/src/components/OwnerSetup.tsx","reproduction":"Width: 390 or 1440. As owner, start setup for an IMD-paired launch. Confirm setSwarmToken(token,true), then reject the following setTokenRoute signature. onDone reloads swarmTokens containing token while tokenRoute(token).venue=0. At line 25, unregisteredAll excludes token, so \"Set up for this wallet\" no longer schedules its route and \"Register all\" omits it. Reproduced by passing a registered IMD-paired launch and unset route through the setup selection: setupSteps receives register=[] and returns zero repair steps when global route/feed are already set. Expected one setTokenRoute retry, without re-registering.","severity":"medium","snippet":"  const unregisteredAll = launches.filter((l) => routable(l) && !registered.has(l.token.toLowerCase()));","title":"bug: interrupted owner setup cannot retry a missing token route"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Now: TokenList receives connected/loading but no read-success or error state. After loadWallet rejects, loading becomes false and tokens stays empty, so the table claims \"No swarm-launched tokens in this wallet. Nothing to sell.\" beside an Unable to read the wallet error.\nChange to: pass an explicit load status into TokenList. Show the empty-wallet message only after a successful complete read; on failure show \"Wallet could not be read. Refresh to try again.\" and retain any previous results as visibly stale.\nWhy: the core requirement is reliable wallet discovery, and failure must not be misrepresented as confirmed zero holdings.","line":80,"path":"web/src/components/TokenList.tsx","reproduction":"Width: 390, Chromium. Connect a read-only EIP-1193 provider and make the SwarmExit swarmTokens eth_call return JSON-RPC error code 3 with message \"execution reverted: review unavailable read\". After the read settles, the summary shows dashes and \"Unable to read the wallet\", but the table simultaneously says \"No swarm-launched tokens in this wallet. Nothing to sell.\" Screenshot and DOM text captured during review. Expected a retry/error table state, not a claim that no swarm tokens exist.","severity":"medium","snippet":"          {connected && !loading && tokens.length === 0 && (\n            <tr className=\"empty\">\n              <td colSpan={5}>No swarm-launched tokens in this wallet. Nothing to sell.</td>\n            </tr>","title":"bug: wallet read failures are also presented as an empty wallet"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Now: every unsellable row uses --color-text-disabled for its token name, balance and address link. These are still essential readable data and active links, not disabled controls. The low-contrast gray makes the supplied wallet’s entire holdings list difficult to scan.\nChange to: use the existing --color-text-secondary token for these text and link selectors; preserve the gray row/status treatment and disabled selection to distinguish unavailable tokens.\nWhy: WCAG 1.4.3 requires at least 4.5:1 for this 14–16 px text; the brief asks to gray out unavailable tokens, not make their holdings unreadable.","line":395,"path":"web/src/styles.css","reproduction":"Width: 320, 390 and 1440. Connect the supplied wallet 0x0acE1DBE8AAb293cd58D5e3Ea38814f0ccb74782 and inspect any dim row, such as CADENCEIMD. The CSS foreground is oklch(68% 0.01 80) on white. The review converted computed colors through an sRGB canvas and measured rgb(155,152,145) on rgb(255,255,255), contrast 2.879:1 (required 4.5:1); all 142 token-name elements use the same failing style. Screenshots at 320 show the pale token names, balances and clickable addresses. taste@1 reported contrast passed but explicitly left 38 initial-screen text boxes unmeasured because its parser does not resolve these modern color values; this finding is from the connected-state manual measurement.","severity":"medium","snippet":".tokens tr.dim td:not(.status) {\n  color: var(--color-text-disabled);\n}\n\n.tokens tr.dim .addr {\n  color: var(--color-text-disabled);\n}","title":"accessibility: unavailable token names and balances are too faint to read"}],"hash":"28d5aa0448f0581f1f12390bbb07519847d06ec65a732b2d9de758acfb171dd8","nodeId":"375cd338-92b0-47bb-b771-eab38909a0bb","outcome":"completed","summary":"| Area | Result |\n|---|---|\n| Requirements | 9 met, 4 missing, 1 needs requester; 0 faked, 0 after review |\n| Broken features | 8 bugs; plus 1 accessibility defect |\n| First screen at 390px | Product and main action visible |\n| taste@1 | 16/16 passed on initial screen |\n| Copy | 2 misleading-message findings |\n| Share card | Present; all 5 metadata checks passed |\n\n**The current build identifies 142 tokens in the supplied wallet. Live selling is blocked by owner configuration:** the deployed registry is empty, and its IMD route and price feed are unset.\n\nSaved **9 findings: 4 high, 5 medium** in [.imd-findings.json](/home/imd/.identitymd-9/work/b240aab0-4e0d-4bb4-9d66-00e57a350fed/375cd338-92b0-47bb-b771-eab38909a0bb/.imd-findings.json). Implementation files are unchanged.\n\nThe high findings are:\n\n- **bug:** first-time sellers cannot reach token approval.\n- **bug:** transaction minimums can silently fall below confirmed proceeds.\n- **bug:** switching away from Ethereum leaves selling enabled.\n- **bug:** a failed final simulation still requests a sale transaction.\n\nThe slippage defect reproduced in a local transaction: **97.6963 IMD confirmed, 27.1025 IMD received** after the pool price changed.\n\n| Brief requirement | Status | Evidence |\n|---|---|---|\n| “called swarmsweep” | Met | `App.tsx:146`, brand |\n| “connect his wallet” | Met | `ConnectSheet.tsx:88`, tested in Chromium/WebKit |\n| Read and identify swarm tokens; supplied wallet | Met | `lib/sweep.ts:211`; 142 holdings discovered |\n| Sell routes, balances and individual USD values | Met for available quotes | `lib/sweep.ts:248`, `TokenList.tsx:112` |\n| “Shows total USD values” | Met for quoted holdings | `App.tsx:170`; displayed $1.29 |\n| Gray unavailable tokens with “no sell route found” | Met | `TokenList.tsx:40,91`; contrast needs correction |\n| “sell all” / “sell selected” | Missing working first-use flow | `lib/sweep.ts:328`; approval deadlock |\n| Confirmation showing proceeds the user will receive | Missing reliable protection | `lib/sweep.ts:407`; silently lowered minimum |\n| One cumulative IMD settlement | Met per contract batch, maximum 50 tokens | `SwarmExit.sol:383–398`; settlement tests passed |\n| Deduct 2% to the specified reward/treasury wallet | Met | `SwarmExit.sol:47,394–397` |\n| Refund failed sales | Met in contract; frontend reporting defective | `SwarmExit.sol:505`, `claimRefund`; refund tests passed |\n| Do not initiate transactions for unsellable tokens | Missing final guard | `lib/sweep.ts:411` |\n| Operate on Ethereum | Missing correct wallet-network guard | `App.tsx:16`, `ConnectSheet.tsx:16` |\n| Activate live selling | Needs requester | Owner must register tokens and configure routes; live registry currently empty |\n\nThe deployed bytecode and ABI match the pinned contract. **All 128 existing local tests passed.** Browser checks covered Chromium and WebKit, mobile layouts, connection, failure, confirmation and local sale success. No mainnet transaction was sent.\n\nSwarmSweep is an Ethereum token-exit dashboard carried by a restrained blue-and-gray wallet summary and holdings table.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":5846784,"inputTokens":177024,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":36320,"runtime":"codex","turns":9,"wallClockMs":1146863}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"c35be49d2f8f8def","findings":[],"hash":"41c7092645f2f4d6f31317b496cc824c1067beae4d70ac577f6ee4b960d10869","nodeId":"aab88ed8-0819-48f6-8028-b1027e1618e7","outcome":"failed","summary":"bundle upload failed (502)","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":5429778,"inputTokens":1058,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":82600,"runtime":"claude","turns":120,"wallClockMs":1525040}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":2,"bundleHash":"7efa93ed3db9c18c3163be9253ebb52bcaa3d093a1d3cfcc4db6916795e5b486","device":"f2a99efe911b5581","findings":[],"hash":"c49ce5611e82ef7c64dbb45f619089624bcfe5df5aa337f3a42cb39a15f2e3a7","nodeId":"aab88ed8-0819-48f6-8028-b1027e1618e7","outcome":"completed","summary":"Fixed all nine findings and rebuilt `dist/`. Build, typecheck, 18 regression tests, Chromium interactions, 128 contract tests, and all 16 design checks pass.\n\nThe test wallet shows 135 tokens. Live selling still requires owner configuration. Existing Slither/formatting findings and browser limitations are documented in [REVIEW.md](/home/seat6/.identitymd/work/b240aab0-4e0d-4bb4-9d66-00e57a350fed/aab88ed8-0819-48f6-8028-b1027e1618e7/REVIEW.md).","treeHash":"6c4bc62679e7a66e626e2689521750a26671598b","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":8237824,"inputTokens":247671,"model":"gpt-6.1-sol","outputTokens":70859,"runtime":"codex","turns":9,"wallClockMs":1400736}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"4895726008c69d01","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Now: every error while waiting for a sale receipt marks the entire submitted batch Unsold and says \"The sale transaction reverted; this batch moved no tokens.\" A transport error or rate limit provides no evidence of a revert.\nChange to: create those unsold results only for a confirmed reverted receipt (TransactionRevertedError). For other receipt errors retain the submitted hash and show \"Sale submitted; confirmation unavailable. Check the transaction before retrying.\" without asserting Sold/Unsold, then reconcile the receipt and balances before retrying.\nWhy: the requested sale/refund states must describe the transaction outcome accurately; a failed receipt read does not establish that the sale failed or that tokens stayed in the wallet.","line":455,"path":"web/src/lib/sweep.ts","reproduction":"Width: 390 or 1440; the executor is width-independent. Invoke the real executeSale with one approved REVIEW token at 0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111, balance and confirmed gross 100e18, account 0x1000000000000000000000000000000000000001, maxPerSale=50. Have allowance return 100e18, final simulateContract return a Sold outcome for 100e18 IMD, and wallet.writeContract return 0xabababababababababababababababababababababababababababababababab. Make waitForTransactionReceipt throw Error(\"HTTP request failed: 429 Too Many Requests while reading receipt\"), returning no receipt. The review executed these inputs against the unchanged function: exactly one sellAll write occurred; SaleExecutionError.results contained kind=\"unsold\" and reason=\"The sale transaction reverted; this batch moved no tokens.\" App applies this map on the error path and TokenList renders Unsold. Expected: a submitted/unconfirmed state with the hash, without claiming a revert or unchanged balances. The submitted transaction may still be pending or successfully mined; its status was never read. Browser confirmation: the actual production export was served under /preview/ in Chromium at 390x844 and 1440x844. Connect the EIP-6963 review wallet, keep only ALPHA selected (12,500 tokens, approved, 100 IMD gross / 98 IMD net), click Sell selected (1), then Sell 1 token. Return JSON-RPC error -32005, \"Receipt lookup temporarily unavailable\", for the submitted sale eth_getTransactionReceipt calls; keep eth_getTransactionByHash returning its mined transaction. After the error appears, dismiss the dialog. Both widths made exactly one sale write and rendered the ALPHA row as Unsold with the quoted no-tokens-moved statement. The independent fixture receipt remained status 0x1 (success).","severity":"medium","snippet":"      catch (e) {\n        for (const i of batch) results.set(key(i.token.address), { kind: \"unsold\", reason: \"The sale transaction reverted; this batch moved no tokens.\", txHash: hash });\n        throw e;","title":"bug: receipt lookup failures are reported as reverted sales"}],"hash":"d4aa475bea6dde707fad37aec13a6f0c5f59a4c31f7fd0528bf7f98962dea57b","nodeId":"375cd338-92b0-47bb-b771-eab38909a0bb","outcome":"completed","summary":"| Area | Previous | This review |\n|---|---:|---|\n| Requirements | Not supplied | 11 met; 1 needs requester; 0 missing/faked |\n| Broken features | 8 | 1 medium |\n| First screen at 390 | Not supplied | Product and action visible |\n| taste@1 | Not supplied | 16/16 passed |\n| Copy findings | Not supplied | 0 |\n| Share card | Not supplied | Present |\n\nAll nine previous findings are fixed. One new medium finding is saved in [.imd-findings.json](/home/imd18/.identitymd/work/b240aab0-4e0d-4bb4-9d66-00e57a350fed/375cd338-92b0-47bb-b771-eab38909a0bb/.imd-findings.json).\n\nThe supplied wallet returned **135 held tokens across 265 known launches**, with **0 currently sellable**. SwarmExit still has no registered tokens, IMD route or price feed. **The owner must complete mainnet setup before selling is available.**\n\n| Requirement | Result | Evidence |\n|---|---|---|\n| Website named SwarmSweep | Met | `web/src/App.tsx:176` |\n| Connect, identify and list swarm tokens; test supplied wallet | Met | `web/src/lib/sweep.ts:214`; live read found 135 holdings |\n| Identify routes; show balances and individual USD values | Met | `web/src/components/TokenList.tsx:91` |\n| Show total USD value | Met | `web/src/App.tsx:200` |\n| Gray unavailable tokens; show “No sell route found” | Met | `web/src/components/TokenList.tsx:45` |\n| Sell all/selected into cumulative IMD | Met in code/tests; maximum 50 inputs per batch | `src/SwarmExit.sol:371` |\n| Confirm token list and expected net IMD | Met | `web/src/components/ConfirmDialog.tsx:58` |\n| Deduct 2% and send it to the specified treasury | Met | `src/SwarmExit.sol:394` |\n| Refund failed token sales | Met on chain; blocked refunds remain claimable | `src/SwarmExit.sol:480` |\n| Exclude known unsellable tokens before requesting a sale | Met | `web/src/lib/sweep.ts:419` |\n| Other necessary checks | Met | 18 client tests, 128 contract tests, browser suites, ABI/runtime comparison |\n| Activate live selling | Needs requester: owner signatures | `web/src/components/OwnerSetup.tsx:39` |\n\nThe visual idea is a warm, quiet holdings table with one blue sweep action.\n\n| Previous finding | Settlement |\n|---|---|\n| First-time approvals excluded | Fixed; zero and partial allowances remain in the plan |\n| Confirmed minimums silently lowered | Fixed; 100→10 stops, while 100→98 retains the 97 IMD floor |\n| Wrong wallet network allowed selling | Fixed; Base disables actions and offers switching |\n| Failed final simulation still requested a sale | Fixed; failed/all-skipped simulations request no sale signature |\n| Held refunds overwritten | Fixed; both event orders preserve the held amount and claim action |\n| Reverted claims/setup announced successful | Fixed; reverted receipts reject and retain transaction links |\n| Missing route could not be retried | Fixed; retry schedules the missing route without re-registering |\n| Failed wallet reads presented as empty | Fixed; error/stale states remain distinct from successful empty reads |\n| Unavailable holdings lacked contrast | Fixed; measured 5.97:1 at all three widths |\n\n**Medium bug: receipt lookup failures are reported as reverted sales.**  \nAt `web/src/lib/sweep.ts:455`, every receipt-check error marks the submitted batch “Unsold” and claims that no tokens moved. A failed lookup does not establish the transaction outcome.\n\nReproduced in Chromium at **390 and 1440 pixels**: submit one approved token, then return RPC error `-32005` for receipt requests. Exactly one sale write occurred, but the row claimed the transaction reverted. The independent fixture receipt reported success.\n\nChange this path to distinguish confirmed reverts from unavailable receipts. Preserve the submitted hash and show an unconfirmed state until the outcome can be read.\n\nBoth Chromium and WebKit passed the existing main and revision suites. Captured mainnet responses rendered all 135 holdings at 320, 390 and 1440. The live read required paced requests after RPC throttling. No mainnet transactions were submitted.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":8735744,"inputTokens":208902,"model":"gpt-6.1-sol","outputTokens":50299,"runtime":"codex","turns":10,"wallClockMs":1140315}}],"verification":[{"checks":[],"detail":"paths and tree verified; no suite was run for this kind of work","evaluation":"structural","profile":"none","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"08f95559e686965966599bb71fec52f6e0899cc50fddd8d0ad8bb7f89f230832","verifiedTreeHash":"f2830f7f090beeb8e4ad42ab3e97e6a5b6dfad2b","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+8fbf00a5"},{"checks":[],"detail":"paths and tree verified; no suite was run for this kind of work","evaluation":"structural","profile":"none","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"c49ce5611e82ef7c64dbb45f619089624bcfe5df5aa337f3a42cb39a15f2e3a7","verifiedTreeHash":"6c4bc62679e7a66e626e2689521750a26671598b","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+6a374fcd"}]}