{"assessments":[],"deployments":[{"attestationHash":"b7c7dba06f60a5191d505fecb4a460b1806937c908c7fb8550ed51a9dfeadcbc","chainId":4663,"contracts":[{"address":"0xddf5e791e4e7cd09845b8bd8fa76758bb8e17c65","blockNumber":112783064,"name":"DisperseV2","role":"other","txHash":"0xeb57eb546e53199ac20a9e1de32024dbf2f673725fb9cc90926f5c646f8f18bf"}],"id":"3f27d263-a259-46ea-ba1f-2c53ad39a99f","manifestHash":"cc4937d83dc664c5ae04148234d4f6a5dcf6e5a69037ce6767e13234a15aaafd","status":"live"}],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"d89ba3f3-fd9a-4da9-8cb1-335343f4fc31","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"beb186090e1f11475d49b7046968c87a040c5bdef7041d10f79ec1c969833028","dependsOn":["manifest"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","subagents":3,"tools":[]},"key":"audit_economics","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"73546ad47008ac52799ca359c6ef5087544bf7397bcf1a08c3256e65ba5cffc7","dependsOn":["manifest"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","subagents":3,"tools":[]},"key":"audit_flow","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"1707ee68ca6d5dccdd0ba28cca2bc95ecca0d39b547f7bda5580fa2d03193241","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"b72293c3366fff3f0b93151bca72cc6cbd189dad31d1ccd1d34dd483f2165a36","skillId":"audit-imported-code","subagents":4,"tools":[]},"key":"audit_imported_code","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"b72293c3366fff3f0b93151bca72cc6cbd189dad31d1ccd1d34dd483f2165a36","skillId":"audit-imported-code","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"daa10601998d93fcdb2a89952430a03363a5abbb2d7446dceebc9a8b02c02721","dependsOn":["manifest","audit_math","audit_permissions","audit_economics","audit_flow"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"b89279670f5a00f5d26286edee00c97dd158b997031350a01cafe6e0329ad227","skillId":"audit-judge","subagents":4,"tools":[]},"key":"audit_judge","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"b89279670f5a00f5d26286edee00c97dd158b997031350a01cafe6e0329ad227","skillId":"audit-judge","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"818be48a2cfdddb664a4c439ee4a2cfff62117061fd9942b39d0513ccb564aeb","dependsOn":["manifest"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","subagents":3,"tools":[]},"key":"audit_math","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"d24e269f4f395df40b02810c1e420f0ee521e8ad52ff14d62ae2c42f87bd297e","dependsOn":["manifest"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","subagents":3,"tools":[]},"key":"audit_permissions","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"e34c6c8b479c2640be955419e95edb227af1c4d2ccfa4fad033fa97c5e2176f5","dependsOn":["audit_imported_code"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"tools":[]},"key":"manifest","kind":"code","role":"integrate","skillHash":null,"skillId":null,"state":"accepted"}],"objective":"Weir DisperseV2: deploy the DisperseV2 contract from this repository as a NEW contract on Robinhood Chain (chainId 4663, Arbitrum Orbit, cancun). Contracts only: NO launch token, NO pool, NO distributor, NO website. The code is already written and tested (90 Foundry tests: 79 unit and fuzz, 11 fork tests that skip without RH_RPC_URL) and was adversarially reviewed by its owner; this job audits it as it arrived, builds it and deploys it UNCHANGED. Do not edit src/, script/, lib/, README.md or foundry.toml. Do not edit test/ either, with ONE exception: if a gas-threshold assertion (an assertLt on measured gas) fails only because of the forge version, you may raise that one number and nothing else; an earlier run of this job blocked on exactly that (a per-row bound of 8,000 against 8,511 measured on forge 1.8.3), and the bounds have since been loosened so this should not arise. Build: forge build && forge test; the root foundry.toml pins solc 0.8.26, optimizer_runs 200, evm_version cancun, via_ir false, bytecode_hash none. Expected runtime: 3,838 bytes, keccak256 0x325962a1abe12d0b1de330d0e53257d11a059b9a6beaa0cb9ea38d6f5d13d9a3.\n\nWHAT IT IS. src/DisperseV2.sol pays many recipients one ERC-20 in a single transaction, from the caller, all or nothing. It keeps v1's ABI (src/Disperse.sol, already live at 0x49959c0326c4dF604a4d62D46CCBAe3C056CC158, NOT under review and NOT to be redeployed): disperse(IERC20 token, address[] to, uint256[] amounts); disperseWithPermit(token, to, amounts, deadline, v, r, s) which tries an EIP-2612 permit for exactly the sum inside try/catch (a front-run permit must not block the send; if the permit fails and the allowance is short, the permit's revert reason is bubbled); sumOf(to, amounts) view; event Dispersed(sender, token, total, count). New: disperseWithMemo(IERC20 token, address[] to, uint256[] amounts, bytes32 ref, string memo, string[] memos, Permit permit) where Permit is the struct (uint256 deadline, uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s) and deadline == 0 means no permit; memo is at most 280 bytes; memos is empty or has exactly to.length entries of at most 140 bytes each. It emits Dispersed always, Memo(sender, token, ref, total, count, memo) when ref is non-zero or memo non-empty, and Paid(sender, to, token, amount, ref, memo) for each recipient whose own memo is non-empty. Two deliberate differences from v1 in the kept functions: the token's own address is refused as a recipient (SelfRecipient), and transfers are made with a hand-written low-level call (_pull) instead of SafeERC20 so that a refused transfer reverts with TransferFailed(uint256 index, bytes reason), reason cut to 256 bytes. Errors: Empty, LengthMismatch, ZeroRecipient(index), SelfRecipient(index), ZeroAmount(index), InsufficientAllowance(needed, have), MemoLengthMismatch, MemoTooLong(index), TransferFailed(index, reason). No constructor arguments, no owner, no fee, no pause, no upgrade, no rescue, no storage, nothing payable; the contract never holds tokens. Fee-on-transfer and rebasing tokens are documented as unsupported. Tokens it will be used with: USDG 0x5fc5360D0400a0Fd4f2af552ADD042D716F1d168 (6 decimals, permit, can freeze addresses), WEIR 0x58b82fa656ecf47a0dca5be6bad06b92e22f7dbe, IMD 0x5f7bb59365ce557c26dbcaa4ee9d39a4b95b7127.\n\nKnown and accepted by design, documented in the NatSpec and README: TransferFailed's index is where the transfer failed, not proof the recipient is at fault (a frozen sender fails at row 0; a short balance names the first uncovered row; only the first failing row is named); Memo and Paid are notes any caller can emit for any reference or address, including with a made-up token; sumOf cannot check the token-as-recipient rule because v1's signature has no token; only address(0), the contract and the token are refused as recipients; the permit call copies its whole revert reason.\n\nPlease look hardest at: _pull (the assembly call, use of scratch space 0x00-0x1f, the memory-safe annotations, the acceptance rule against OpenZeppelin SafeERC20 v5.5.0 case by case, return-data handling after the code.length read, the free-memory-pointer update on the failure path); calldata decoding of string[] memos and the Permit struct (malformed offsets, aliasing, lying lengths) and whether any of it can change who is paid, skip validation or cost unbounded gas; whether anyone other than msg.sender can ever have tokens moved through any entry point, with or without a permit, including a third party's standing allowance to this contract and reentrancy from a malicious token or its permit; deadline == 0 semantics; overflow of the sum; anything that leaves tokens or ETH in the contract.\n\nDEPLOY. One contract, DisperseV2, with NO constructor arguments, EXACTLY as in launch.json (kind evm_contracts, chain 4663, constructorArgs []). Do not deploy Disperse (v1). Do not run script/Deploy.s.sol or script/DeployV2.s.sol; they are the owner's CREATE2 fallback. Report any finding at medium or above and block deployment on high or critical. Do not claim an independent audit.","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"41bbf86069fbc03a985ff90ac1d04d55cb121838ac68cd742f8a26881959dcd0","previousHash":"190285e38f7ff29d7b948efd99f53eadabec877ed6cd999e083effdf52de381c","projectId":"d89ba3f3-fd9a-4da9-8cb1-335343f4fc31","publication":{"commit":"774fbab075ebb34386125ba4c14443e5be9599ec","deliveredAt":"2026-11-12T19:45:02.658Z","repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-3244-weir-dispersev2-deploy-dispersev2"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"5975723d0c878381fea0bfdb008f3d9a8ffcfe6bdfcc8d73e4d9ab78a5918171","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"fe5e46fb044c6af1","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Solidity validates calldata struct fields on access, not at entry. Because permit.v is only read inside the deadline != 0 branch, a call whose v head word is e.g. 0x1ff (not a valid uint8) is accepted when deadline is 0: the permit is skipped as designed and the send runs on the standing allowance. The same word reverts (validator) as soon as deadline is non-zero. Nothing about who is paid, how much, or which checks run changes, so this is a note for the adapter and for tooling that assumes every argument is ABI-valid, not a defect.","line":114,"path":"src/DisperseV2.sol","reproduction":"Encode disperseWithMemo(token, [a,b], [100,200], ref 7, \"m\", [\"x\",\"yy\"], Permit(0,0,0,0)) with abi.encodeCall, overwrite head word index 7 (byte offset 4+7*32, the v field) with 0x1ff, send it from a sender with allowance >= 300. Expected by a strict ABI reader: revert. Actual: call succeeds, a receives 100, b receives 200, Paid x2 and Dispersed are emitted. With head word 6 (deadline) set to 1 instead, the same calldata reverts.","severity":"info","snippet":"        if (permit.deadline != 0) _tryPermit(token, total, permit.deadline, permit.v, permit.r, permit.s);","title":"disperseWithMemo accepts a Permit whose v word has dirty upper bits when deadline == 0 (lazy calldata validation); payment unaffected"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"In the kept v1 entry point a zero deadline is passed straight to token.permit, which an EIP-2612 token rejects as expired; the revert is caught and the standing allowance is used. The outcome is correct and identical to v1, but the caller pays for an external call plus the full copy of the token's revert data, and the two entry points give deadline == 0 different meanings (v1: 'try anyway', v2 memo path: 'no permit'). Documented in README ('On a token without permit, pass zeros and approve first'). No change needed for deployment; the app should prefer disperse or disperseWithMemo when it has no signature.","line":92,"path":"src/DisperseV2.sol","reproduction":"MockUSDC (ERC20Permit) with sender allowance 350e6+1 to DisperseV2; call disperseWithPermit(usdc, [a,b,c], [100e6,250e6,1], 0, 0, 0, 0). Expected and actual: succeeds; trace shows a permit call reverting ERC2612ExpiredSignature(0) that is swallowed, then allowance() and three transferFrom calls. Same inputs through disperseWithMemo with Permit(0,0,0,0) make no permit call at all.","severity":"info","snippet":"        _tryPermit(token, total, deadline, v, r, s);","title":"disperseWithPermit with deadline == 0 still makes the doomed permit call (v1 parity), unlike disperseWithMemo which skips it"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"solc 0.8.26 with evm_version cancun emits MCOPY (0x5e, at runtime offset 0xed2) when it ABI-encodes the `bytes memory reason` for TransferFailed. This opcode is executed only on the failure path, so a live-node gas estimate of a successful batch would not exercise it, and forge fork tests run in forge's own EVM, not the node's. Verified for this review: Robinhood Chain (chain id 4663) answers ArbSys(0x64).arbOSVersion() = 116, i.e. an ArbOS well past version 20 which introduced Cancun opcodes, so MCOPY is supported and TransferFailed decodes on chain. Keep evm_version = cancun unchanged (the expected runtime hash depends on it); do not retarget to another Orbit chain without re-checking ArbOS.","line":232,"path":"src/DisperseV2.sol","reproduction":"Scan of the compiled runtime (3,838 bytes, keccak 0x325962a1...d9a3) from the start and every JUMPDEST to the next terminator finds reachable opcodes CALL x2, STATICCALL x3, MCOPY x1 and none of DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE, SELFDESTRUCT. Failing input on a pre-Cancun chain would be any batch where a row's transferFrom reverts, e.g. FreezingToken with recipient c frozen and disperse(t, [a,b,c], [100e6,250e6,1]): expected TransferFailed(2, Frozen(c)); on such a chain the encoding would hit an invalid opcode and the call would revert empty, consuming all gas. On chain 4663 this does not occur (ArbOS supports MCOPY).","severity":"info","snippet":"        revert TransferFailed(index, reason);","title":"Runtime contains a reachable MCOPY (Cancun-only opcode) on the TransferFailed encoding path; target chain verified to support it"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"If the token has no permit function but a non-reverting fallback (proxy with a permissive fallback, WETH-style deposit fallback), permit() returns success without setting any allowance. The code is correct: _requireAllowance then reverts InsufficientAllowance(total, have) when nothing was approved, or proceeds on an existing allowance. The caller only loses the hint that the permit was ignored. None of USDG, WEIR or IMD behave this way today (fork tests confirm permit works on USDG and reverts cleanly on WEIR), but USDG is an upgradeable proxy so the app should keep reading the error as 'approve first' rather than 'bad signature'.","line":164,"path":"src/DisperseV2.sol","reproduction":"PlainFallback token (ERC-20 with `fallback() external {}`), sender balance 1e9, no allowance. disperseWithMemo(t, [a,b], [100,200], 0, \"\", [], Permit(block.timestamp+1, 27, 1, 2)): expected by a naive caller: a permit error; actual: InsufficientAllowance(300, 0). After approve(DisperseV2, 300) the same call succeeds and a/b receive 100/200.","severity":"info","snippet":"        try IERC20Permit(address(token)).permit(msg.sender, address(this), total, deadline, v, r, s) {}","title":"A token whose fallback silently accepts unknown selectors makes the permit appear to succeed; the allowance check is the only gate"}],"hash":"1707ee68ca6d5dccdd0ba28cca2bc95ecca0d39b547f7bda5580fa2d03193241","nodeId":"cc9b3777-86c0-4497-9146-90640a8ceb1c","outcome":"completed","summary":"**Verdict: nothing at medium or above. Deployment of DisperseV2 unchanged is not blocked.** The findings file holds four informational notes, each with a concrete input. This is a commissioned review of the author's own code, not an independent audit.\n\n**What was read and checked**\n- `src/DisperseV2.sol` in full, `src/Disperse.sol` (v1, for ABI parity only), all five test files and the four mocks, `launch.json`, `foundry.toml`, `README.md`, and the deploy scripts (read, not run).\n- Build reproduces the expected runtime exactly: 3,838 bytes, keccak `0x325962a1…d9a3`, on forge 1.8.3 with solc 0.8.26, cancun, 200 runs, no via-IR.\n- `forge test`: 79 passed, 0 failed, 11 skipped. No gas-bound assertion failed, so the one permitted test edit was not needed.\n- The network was reachable, so I also ran the 11 fork tests against the public Robinhood RPC: all 11 pass, including the real-USDG frozen-recipient row and the USDG permit path. The live v1 code hash matches the README, USDG answers `symbol()`, and the pinned CREATE2 address for v2 has no code yet.\n- Opcode scan of reachable runtime: CALL, STATICCALL and one MCOPY, none of DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT. No owner, storage, payable function, proxy or initializer. `launch.json` uses only the schema keys with one contract and an empty constructor list, matching the no-argument constructor.\n\n**Areas the brief asked me to look hardest at, all clean**\n- `_pull`: scratch-space use, the acceptance rule (stricter than SafeERC20 v5.5.0 for answers of 1 to 31 bytes, identical otherwise), return data surviving the `code.length` read (EXTCODESIZE does not clear it), and the free-memory-pointer update on the failure path are all correct. A 1 MB revert bomb is cut to 256 bytes.\n- Calldata: lying memo offsets, lying element lengths, a lying `memos` length and truncated calldata all revert before any transfer. Aliased memo tails are accepted and only affect the memo text.\n- Only `msg.sender`'s tokens ever move: every `transferFrom` and `permit` names the caller. A third party's standing allowance and a victim's signature are unusable from any entry point, and a reentering token acts only as itself.\n- `deadline == 0` skips the permit in the memo path. The sum uses checked arithmetic and reverts on overflow in every entry point. Nothing can leave ETH or tokens in the contract except someone sending tokens directly, which is documented as unrescuable.\n\n**The four informational notes written to `.imd-findings.json`**\n- A `Permit` whose `v` word is not a valid uint8 is accepted when `deadline` is zero, because calldata struct fields validate lazily. Payment is unaffected.\n- `disperseWithPermit` with a zero deadline still makes a doomed permit call, as v1 does, while the memo path skips it.\n- MCOPY is on the `TransferFailed` encoding path. The chain reports ArbOS via `arbOSVersion()` well past the Cancun cutoff, so it is supported. Keep `evm_version = cancun`.\n- A token with a non-reverting fallback makes a permit look successful. The allowance check remains the real gate and reverts correctly.\n\n**Not covered**: nothing in scope was unreachable. Fork tests ran at the node's current head rather than a pinned block. No helpers were used. Test coverage gaps worth adding later: a dirty-`v` case, aliased memo tails, and a 31-byte transfer answer. No file in the tree was changed; the scratch tests were removed after running.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":446105,"cost":{"source":"runtime","usdMicros":3122820},"inputTokens":226,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":30167,"runtime":"claude","turns":11,"wallClockMs":428806}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"efd34280ee1f56e8","findings":[],"hash":"73546ad47008ac52799ca359c6ef5087544bf7397bcf1a08c3256e65ba5cffc7","nodeId":"83ba1638-99be-4d4d-88f7-1c38c39167e9","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is written, parses, and the tree holds no changes to source, tests, scripts or configuration.\n\n**Outcome: no defects at any severity; deployment of DisperseV2 is not blocked from the control-flow area.** The findings file at `.imd-findings.json` holds an empty findings list and 11 coverage rows, one per listed entry point plus six invariants.\n\n**What I verified in my area (Execution Trace, Periphery, First Principles):**\n\n- **_pull against SafeERC20 5.5.0, case by case.** DisperseV2's accepted set is a strict subset of OZ's. Both accept a 32-byte-or-longer answer whose first word is 1, or an empty answer from an address with code. DisperseV2 additionally refuses every 1 to 31 byte answer, which OZ can accept only through a stale scratch byte. CALL output touches only scratch 0x00 to 0x1f, size and word are captured before the EXTCODESIZE read, the failure path allocates from the free pointer, caps the copy at 256 bytes and rounds the pointer correctly. Probes confirmed a 33-byte answer is accepted, a 31-byte answer gives the exact TransferFailed encoding, and a 1 MiB success return costs only the caller.\n- **Calldata decoding.** Out-of-range memos head, a nested element offset of -1 (which passes Solidity's signed check) and a huge nested offset all revert with nothing paid. Aliased offsets only change event text. A dirty permit.v is never read when deadline is 0 and reverts otherwise. All loops are bounded by the recipient count.\n- **Who can move tokens.** Every transferFrom is encoded with from equal to msg.sender and every permit with owner equal to msg.sender. A third party holding the victim's max standing allowance gets InsufficientAllowance in all three entry points. Reentrant tokens and permits only spend their own allowance.\n- **Boundaries.** Sum overflow panics. Precompiles and codeless addresses as token revert without payment. No ETH or token path leaves value in the contract.\n- **Deployment artefact.** Runtime is 3,838 bytes with the expected keccak. launch.json has only the schema keys, one contract with empty constructorArgs, and notes under the limit. Robinhood Chain answered chain ID 4663 and executed an MCOPY eth_call correctly, so the cancun runtime is usable there.\n\n**Not reached:** the 11 fork tests skipped because no Robinhood RPC variable is set; I did not run Slither or any formal tool, and this is a bounded review, not an independent audit.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":913521,"cost":{"source":"runtime","usdMicros":3512794},"inputTokens":386,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":31284,"runtime":"claude","turns":29,"wallClockMs":440876}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"1f9cb1750ebf47ed","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Seam boundary x invariant. For calls without a permit the suite's invariant is allowanceAfter == allowanceBefore - total. When a permit is supplied, EIP-2612 permit() SETS the allowance to `value` (= total), so a caller who already holds a larger standing approval on this contract ends the call with allowance 0, not allowanceBefore - total. The contract does what the signed permit says, so no funds move wrongly and no fix to code is required; the NatSpec on `Permit` and `disperseWithPermit` says only 'a permit for exactly the sum' and does not say a standing allowance is overwritten. An integrator that pre-approves a budget and also attaches permits per payout loses the remaining budget approval after the first permit call. Reported as information for the README/NatSpec, not as a defect that blocks deployment.","line":164,"path":"src/DisperseV2.sol","reproduction":"PToken is OpenZeppelin ERC20+ERC20Permit. sender approves DisperseV2 for 1_000e6. sender signs a permit for value 350e6 (the sum of amounts [100e6, 250e6]) and calls disperseWithPermit(tok, [a,b], [100e6,250e6], deadline, v, r, s). Expected by an integrator reading the NatSpec: a and b receive 100e6 and 250e6 and allowance(sender, DisperseV2) == 650e6. Actual: a and b receive 100e6 and 250e6 and allowance(sender, DisperseV2) == 0 (permit set it to 350e6, the send consumed 350e6). Verified by test_permit_overwritesLargerStandingAllowance in test/scratch/MathBoundary.t.sol (passes on current code, so it documents behaviour rather than failing).","severity":"info","snippet":"        try IERC20Permit(address(token)).permit(msg.sender, address(this), total, deadline, v, r, s) {}","title":"A permit for the sum replaces a larger standing allowance instead of adding to it (EIP-2612 semantics, undocumented)"}],"hash":"818be48a2cfdddb664a4c439ee4a2cfff62117061fd9942b39d0513ccb564aeb","nodeId":"84a20118-35c7-4b3e-86ff-e02fb12d6061","outcome":"completed","summary":"The math-area review of DisperseV2 is complete and the findings file is written. No defect at medium or above was found; deployment is not blocked from this area.\n\n**What was checked and holds** (all reproduced in `test/scratch/MathBoundary.t.sol`, 12 tests passing, plus the project suite: 79 passed, 11 fork tests skipped without an RPC, runtime hash matches the expected value):\n\n- **Sum overflow.** The sum uses checked arithmetic in every entry point and in `sumOf`. Inputs `[max, 1]` and `[2^255, 2^255]` revert with the arithmetic panic. A sum of exactly `max` passes validation and then fails on allowance or on balance at row 0, so nothing wraps.\n- **Return-data acceptance in `_pull`.** After a true 32-byte answer at row 0 leaves `1` in scratch space, a 1-byte `0x00` and a 31-byte zero answer at row 1 are both refused with `TransferFailed(1, data)`, so stale scratch bytes never turn a short answer into a yes. A 64-byte answer whose first word is 1 is accepted, a 32-byte `max` is refused, and an empty answer from an address with code is accepted. This is never looser than the vendored SafeERC20 5.5.0.\n- **Failure path memory.** Revert reasons of 0, 31, 255, 256 and 257 bytes produce exactly the expected `TransferFailed` encoding, which confirms the 256-byte cut and the free-memory-pointer rounding.\n- **Calldata boundaries.** A memo entry claiming 141 or a million bytes, or a memos array claiming a billion entries, reverts in the decoder with nothing paid. Aliased memo offsets only duplicate text. A dirty `v` word is unread at `deadline == 0` and refused when a deadline is set, and refused at entry on the legacy function.\n- **No-code token.** All three senders revert before reaching `_pull`.\n- **Conservation.** A 512-run fuzz over 1 to 40 rows with duplicate recipients and 1-wei rows keeps received, sent and allowance deltas equal and the contract balance zero.\n\n**One info note recorded.** A successful permit sets the allowance to the sum rather than adding to it, so a caller holding a 1,000e6 standing approval who attaches a 350e6 permit ends with allowance 0, not 650e6. This is EIP-2612 behaviour and the signed permit says so, so it is a documentation note, not a code defect.\n\n**Coverage.** All five listed entry points have rows, plus `sumOf`, five invariants and the gas-threshold check. The manifest has the three schema keys, one contract with empty constructor arguments, and notes under the 4,000-character limit. No tracked file was changed; the scratch tests are under `test/scratch/` and are not part of the submission.\n\n**Not reached.** The 11 fork tests against the live tokens could not run here without an RPC URL, so the USDG freeze and permit behaviour on chain was not exercised by me.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":806240,"cost":{"source":"runtime","usdMicros":3235927},"inputTokens":322,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":25052,"runtime":"claude","turns":18,"wallClockMs":348871}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"a7b8747ac077deb9","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Economic Security / Invariant pass. EIP-2612 permit SETS the allowance to `value`; it does not increase it. _tryPermit always asks for exactly `total`, so a caller who holds a larger standing approval (for example type(uint256).max, as a wallet UI may set once) and also attaches a valid permit ends the call with allowance 0: the standing approval is consumed as a side effect. No funds are lost or misdirected, the contract holds nothing, and only msg.sender's tokens move; the only effect is that a subsequent `disperse`/`disperseWithMemo` without a permit reverts with InsufficientAllowance(total, 0) until the caller re-approves or signs again. The README already lists this ('the permit replacing a standing allowance') as an informational note from the v1 panel, so this is recorded for completeness and for integrators, not as a defect to fix. A design that preserved a larger standing allowance would have to skip the permit when allowance >= total, which changes the stated 'permit for exactly the sum' behaviour and is the owner's call.","line":164,"path":"src/DisperseV2.sol","reproduction":"State: alice holds 1_000e6 MockUSDC (OZ ERC20Permit), alice.approve(DisperseV2, type(uint256).max). Call 1: alice -> disperseWithPermit(usdc, [r1, r2], [100e6, 200e6], deadline=now+1, v,r,s) with a valid permit signed by alice for value 300e6. Expected by a user who approved max: recipients paid and the max approval still standing. Actual: recipients are paid (r1 100e6, r2 200e6, alice 700e6) and usdc.allowance(alice, DisperseV2) == 0. Call 2: alice -> disperse(usdc, [r1, r2], [100e6, 200e6]) reverts InsufficientAllowance(300e6, 0). Reproduced in test/scratch/Econ.t.sol::test_permitReplacesStandingAllowance (passes on current code because it asserts the current behaviour).","severity":"info","snippet":"        try IERC20Permit(address(token)).permit(msg.sender, address(this), total, deadline, v, r, s) {}","title":"A permit for exactly the sum replaces (does not add to) a larger standing allowance, so the next permit-less call fails with InsufficientAllowance (documented in README; no fix required)"}],"hash":"beb186090e1f11475d49b7046968c87a040c5bdef7041d10f79ec1c969833028","nodeId":"32755591-52ee-4531-90da-ebd473f3d3c8","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and the findings file is written and validated.\n\n**Outcome: nothing at medium or above in the economics area. Deployment is not blocked by this review.**\n\n**What I checked** (Economic Security, Invariant and Flow Gap passes over `src/DisperseV2.sol`):\n- Build and the 79 non-fork tests pass on forge 1.8.3. The runtime is 3,838 bytes with the expected keccak. The 11 fork tests skipped because no RPC URL is set here.\n- Conservation holds on every path: the caller loses exactly the sum, each recipient gains its row, and the contract balance stays zero. The sum uses checked arithmetic and overflows before any external call.\n- Only the caller's tokens can move. The transfer source and the permit owner are both hard-wired to the caller. Another signer's permit reverts without consuming a nonce, and a token or recipient that reenters can only spend its own approval.\n- Token misbehaviour: a frozen spender fails at row zero and moves nothing. A reverting receiver hook reverts the whole batch, which is the documented all-or-nothing rule. Fee-on-transfer under-pays as documented. Precompile addresses used as the token never yield a successful payout.\n- Permit front-running falls through to the allowance gate as intended. A zero deadline skips the permit on the memo path and uses the standing allowance on the legacy path.\n\n**One informational note recorded** (no fix required): a permit for exactly the sum replaces a larger standing allowance, so the caller's max approval ends at zero and the next permit-less call reverts. The README already documents this. The reproduction is in `test/scratch/Econ.t.sol`, which is scratch space and not submitted.\n\n**Coverage record**: all five listed entry points answered, plus three invariant rows. One row is marked unreached: live USDG freeze and permit behaviour on Robinhood Chain, since fork tests could not run on this machine.\n\nNo repository files were changed. The findings and coverage are in `.imd-findings.json`.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":620566,"cost":{"source":"runtime","usdMicros":2775573},"inputTokens":290,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":24908,"runtime":"claude","turns":15,"wallClockMs":355715}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"5d667e4b0751bcb5","findings":[],"hash":"d24e269f4f395df40b02810c1e420f0ee521e8ad52ff14d62ae2c42f87bd297e","nodeId":"3cd058c3-74c6-43df-8e5c-c6a2bdfd7778","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file `.imd-findings.json` holds an empty findings list and eleven coverage rows, and the tree is otherwise unchanged.\n\n**Outcome: no finding at any severity in the permissions area.** DisperseV2 has no owner, role, storage, payable path or constructor argument, so the Access Control, Trust Gap and Asymmetry checks reduce to one question: can anyone but the caller ever have tokens moved. The answer is no on every path.\n\n- **Who moves tokens.** Every transfer is `transferFrom(msg.sender, to[i], amounts[i])` and every permit names `msg.sender` as owner, with the allowance check after the permit on all three entry points. A victim's signed permit replayed by another caller reverts with the token's invalid-signer error, and a permit front-run on the token leaves an allowance only its owner can spend.\n- **Reentrancy.** I wrote scratch tests with a malicious token whose permit and transferFrom re-enter all three entry points, and an ERC-777-style recipient hook that re-enters them. None of 28 attempts moved a victim's standing unlimited allowance. The scratch file was run and then removed, as nothing in it is kept.\n- **Asymmetries.** The legacy permit path always calls permit, the memo path skips it at deadline zero. Harmless, since the allowance gate follows on both. `sumOf` cannot refuse the token-as-recipient, which the brief lists as accepted by design.\n- **The `_pull` rule.** The vendored SafeERC20 is v5.5.0. `_pull` matches its acceptance rule and is strictly tighter for 1 to 31 byte answers. Only scratch space is written on the call, the failure path copies at most 256 bytes at the free pointer and rounds it, and EXTCODESIZE does not disturb return data.\n- **Manifest and build.** launch.json has exactly the three schema keys, one contract with no constructor arguments, and notes of 3,398 characters. The built runtime is 3,838 bytes with the expected keccak. All 79 unit and fuzz tests pass on forge 1.8.3 with no gas-bound change needed; the 11 fork tests skipped because no RPC URL is set.\n\n**Not covered.** Fork runs against live USDG, WEIR and IMD, the math, economics and control-flow guides beyond what the permission trace needed, and any static analyzer. This is a bounded contributor review, not an independent audit. Nothing blocks deployment from this area.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1269052,"cost":{"source":"runtime","usdMicros":3304402},"inputTokens":514,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":25384,"runtime":"claude","turns":28,"wallClockMs":376449}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"d2615e36794c4d42","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"EIP-2612 permit() SETS the allowance to value; _tryPermit always asks for exactly total. A caller who already holds a larger standing approval on DisperseV2 (for example type(uint256).max set once by a wallet UI) and also attaches a valid permit ends the call with allowance 0, so the next permit-less disperse/disperseWithMemo reverts with InsufficientAllowance(total, 0) until they re-approve or sign again. Only the caller's own tokens move, exactly the amounts requested, and the contract holds nothing, so there is no loss or misdirection; the permit does what the signer signed. The README already lists the permit replacing a standing allowance as an accepted note, and the NatSpec on Permit and disperseWithPermit says only 'a permit for exactly the sum'. Reported as information for the NatSpec and integrators, not as a defect blocking deployment. Both specialists reported the same root cause at the same line; merged here at info.","line":164,"path":"src/DisperseV2.sol","reproduction":"State: PTok is OpenZeppelin ERC20+ERC20Permit; alice holds 1_000e6 and has called approve(DisperseV2, type(uint256).max). Call 1: alice -> disperseWithPermit(PTok, [r1, r2], [100e6, 200e6], deadline = block.timestamp + 1, v, r, s) with a permit signed by alice for value 300e6, nonce 0. Expected by an integrator reading only the NatSpec: r1 gets 100e6, r2 gets 200e6, allowance(alice, DisperseV2) stays very large. Actual: r1 gets 100e6, r2 gets 200e6, allowance(alice, DisperseV2) == 0 (permit set it to 300e6, the send consumed 300e6). Call 2: alice -> disperse(PTok, [r1, r2], [100e6, 200e6]) reverts InsufficientAllowance(300000000, 0). Reproduced locally with a scratch Foundry test (forge 1.9.0, solc 0.8.26); it passes on current code because it asserts the current behaviour.","severity":"info","snippet":"        try IERC20Permit(address(token)).permit(msg.sender, address(this), total, deadline, v, r, s) {}","title":"A permit for exactly the sum replaces a larger standing allowance instead of adding to it (EIP-2612 semantics; merged from audit_math and audit_economics; no code fix required)"}],"hash":"daa10601998d93fcdb2a89952430a03363a5abbb2d7446dceebc9a8b02c02721","nodeId":"fe0e43a1-4bce-4269-b361-54ecd2c52a3c","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and the findings file is written. Nothing in the repository was changed; my scratch test directory was removed after use.\n\n**Verdict: no medium or higher finding. Deployment of DisperseV2 is not blocked.**\n\n**What I verified**\n- Build and the full suite pass on forge 1.9.0 with solc 0.8.26. The 79 unit and fuzz tests pass, and I ran the 11 fork tests against live Robinhood Chain state through the local endpoint, all passing, including USDG permit and freezing and exact WEIR and IMD payouts.\n- Runtime is 3,838 bytes with the expected keccak. The manifest has only the three schema keys, one contract with empty constructor arguments, and notes under the 4,000 limit. An MCOPY probe via eth_call on chain 4663 returned the expected word, so Cancun bytecode runs there.\n- _pull was checked case by case against the vendored SafeERC20 5.5.0 with a token returning 0, 1, 31, 32 and 64 bytes and words 0, 1 and 2. It matches OpenZeppelin or is stricter, never looser. The failure path caps the copy at 256 bytes and advances the free memory pointer by a 32-byte-rounded amount.\n- Calldata abuse on disperseWithMemo was tested: a lying memo element offset and a lying memo length both revert before any transfer. A dirty v of 0x1ff is ignored when deadline is 0 and rejected by the decoder when deadline is non-zero.\n- No one but msg.sender can have tokens moved. A malicious token reentering from permit or transferFrom becomes msg.sender itself and cannot spend a victim's standing allowance. Sum overflow reverts. ETH and unknown selectors are refused.\n\n**Specialist findings**\n- The two informational reports from the math and economics specialists are the same root cause at the same line. I reproduced it and merged them into one info finding: a permit for exactly the sum sets the allowance to that sum, so a larger standing approval is consumed and the next permit-less call reverts with InsufficientAllowance. No funds move wrongly and the README already notes it. The flow and permissions specialists had no findings.\n\n**Coverage**\nAll five listed entry points are answered, four as holds and disperseWithPermit as finding referencing the informational note, plus two invariant rows covering custody and the build and manifest.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":714146,"chain":[{"calls":385,"chainId":4663,"failed":0,"own":381,"public":0,"refused":4}],"cost":{"source":"runtime","usdMicros":2919817},"inputTokens":354,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":26173,"runtime":"claude","turns":17,"wallClockMs":462793}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"7b04e99730bc72529fe4a75c26bab6256725265621b46b65060ce1e9d4b9f058","device":"c0f94d5c3d395bef","findings":[],"hash":"e34c6c8b479c2640be955419e95edb227af1c4d2ccfa4fad033fa97c5e2176f5","nodeId":"d71b5648-fb13-4d0c-8adc-ddfca5b3afd3","outcome":"completed","summary":"Updated [launch.json](/home/imd3/.identitymd/work/d89ba3f3-fd9a-4da9-8cb1-335343f4fc31/d71b5648-fb13-4d0c-8adc-ddfca5b3afd3/launch.json) for unchanged `DisperseV2`, with no constructor arguments.\n\n- Build and all 102 tests passed, including 11 fork tests.\n- Runtime size and hash match exactly.\n- All four imported observations reproduced as informational; no medium-or-higher findings identified.\n- Manifest validation passed; only `launch.json` enters submission.\n\nDeployment remains with the launch service. No transaction was broadcast or deployment result fabricated.","treeHash":"64d0e2d39c6c69bcad5830b809097d295b73902b","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1235968,"cost":{"source":"estimated","usdMicros":2972218},"inputTokens":97115,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":15302,"runtime":"codex","turns":7,"wallClockMs":391147}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":3524,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 58 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 3.40s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":224,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 5 tests for test/DisperseV2Fork.t.sol:DisperseV2ForkTest\n[SKIP] test_fork_frozenUsdgRecipient_namesTheRow() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_gas_plainAndWithRowMemos() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_usdgItselfAsRecipient_isRefused() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_usdgPermit_withMemos() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_weirAndImd_exactAmounts_inEveryEntryPoint() (gas: 0)\nSuite result: ok. 0 passed; 0 failed; 5 skipped; finished in 671.68µs (522.46µs CPU time)\n\nRan 6 tests for test/DisperseFork.t.sol:DisperseForkTest\n[SKIP] test_fork_gasPerRecipient_250fit() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_imdApproveDisperse() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_usdgApproveDisperse() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_usdgPermitDisperse() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_weirApproveDisperse() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_weirPermitPathFallsBackToAllowance() (gas: 0)\nSuite result: ok. 0 passed; 0 failed; 6 skipped; finished in 721.17µs (589.91µs CPU time)\n\nRan 25 tests for test/DisperseV2Compat.t.sol:DisperseV2CompatTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_disperse_conserves(uint96[8]) (runs: 256, μ: 436254, ~: 436332)\n[PASS] testFuzz_disperse_lengths(uint8,uint64) (runs: 256, μ: 1899467, ~: 436041)\n[PASS] test_disperse_duplicateRecipientSums() (gas: 136884)\n[PASS] test_disperse_happy() (gas: 245066)\n[PASS] test_disperse_noReturnToken() (gas: 651182)\n[PASS] test_disperse_reentrantTokenCannotAmplify() (gas: 1366968)\n[PASS] test_disperse_revert_empty() (gas: 36065)\n[PASS] test_disperse_revert_insufficientAllowance() (gas: 103352)\n[PASS] test_disperse_revert_insufficientBalance() (gas: 159714)\n[PASS] test_disperse_revert_lengthMismatch() (gas: 41951)\n[PASS] test_disperse_revert_noCodeToken() (gas: 80343)\n[PASS] test_disperse_revert_selfRecipient() (gas: 47526)\n[PASS] test_disperse_revert_sumOverflow() (gas: 44097)\n[PASS] test_disperse_revert_tokenAsRecipient() (gas: 100267)\n[PASS] test_disperse_revert_zeroAmount() (gas: 47492)\n[PASS] test_disperse_revert_zeroRecipient() (gas: 46419)\n[PASS] test_gas_250recipients() (gas: 7168451)\nLogs:\n  gas for 250 recipients (fresh balances): 7035536\n\n[PASS] test_permit_existingAllowanceIgnoresPermit() (gas: 204403)\n[PASS] test_permit_frontRunStillSucceeds() (gas: 274014)\n[PASS] test_permit_happy() (gas: 243357)\n[PASS] test_permit_revert_expired_bubblesReason() (gas: 78715)\n[PASS] test_permit_revert_wrongSigner_bubblesSignerError() (gas: 158701)\n[PASS] test_permit_revert_wrongValue_bubblesSignerError() (gas: 111047)\n[PASS] test_permit_tokenWithoutPermit_fallsBackToAllowance() (gas: 827137)\n[PASS] test_sumOf() (gas: 15946)\nSuite result: ok. 25 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 92.59ms (131.85ms CPU time)\n\nRan 26 tests for test/Disperse.t.sol:DisperseTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_disperse_conserves(uint96[8]) (runs: 256, μ: 436149, ~: 436208)\n[PASS] testFuzz_disperse_lengths(uint8,uint64) (runs: 256, μ: 1766291, ~: 399867)\n[PASS] test_deploy_predictedAddressIsPinned() (gas: 912759)\n[PASS] test_disperse_duplicateRecipientSums() (gas: 136698)\n[PASS] test_disperse_happy() (gas: 245000)\n[PASS] test_disperse_noReturnToken() (gas: 650605)\n[PASS] test_disperse_reentrantTokenCannotAmplify() (gas: 1367188)\n[PASS] test_disperse_revert_empty() (gas: 35970)\n[PASS] test_disperse_revert_insufficientAllowance() (gas: 103638)\n[PASS] test_disperse_revert_insufficientBalance() (gas: 159079)\n[PASS] test_disperse_revert_lengthMismatch() (gas: 41878)\n[PASS] test_disperse_revert_noCodeToken() (gas: 80872)\n[PASS] test_disperse_revert_selfRecipient() (gas: 47885)\n[PASS] test_disperse_revert_sumOverflow() (gas: 44274)\n[PASS] test_disperse_revert_zeroAmount() (gas: 47804)\n[PASS] test_disperse_revert_zeroRecipient() (gas: 46465)\n[PASS] test_disperse_tokenAsRecipient_isNotRejected() (gas: 191598)\n[PASS] test_gas_250recipients() (gas: 7168543)\nLogs:\n  gas for 250 recipients (fresh balances): 7035717\n\n[PASS] test_permit_existingAllowanceIgnoresPermit() (gas: 204253)\n[PASS] test_permit_frontRunStillSucceeds() (gas: 273751)\n[PASS] test_permit_happy() (gas: 243242)\n[PASS] test_permit_revert_expired_bubblesReason() (gas: 78958)\n[PASS] test_permit_revert_wrongSigner_bubblesSignerError() (gas: 158944)\n[PASS] test_permit_revert_wrongValue_bubblesSignerError() (gas: 111290)\n[PASS] test_permit_tokenWithoutPermit_fallsBackToAllowance() (gas: 827207)\n[PASS] test_sumOf() (gas: 16321)\nSuite result: ok. 26 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 92.82ms (120.17ms CPU time)\n\nRan 28 tests for test/DisperseV2.t.sol:DisperseV2Test\n[PASS] testFuzz_memo_neverChangesWhoIsPaid(bytes,bytes,bytes32) (runs: 256, μ: 272412, ~: 272304)\n[PASS] test_deploy_predictedAddressIsPinned() (gas: 1259357)\n[PASS] test_gas_250recipients_threeWays() (gas: 23275341)\nLogs:\n  250 recipients, no memo: 6924016\n  250 recipients, a 280-byte payout memo: 6939654\n  250 recipients, each with a 140-byte memo: 9067425\n\n[PASS] test_memoPermit_expired_bubblesTheTokensReason() (gas: 79590)\n[PASS] test_memoPermit_frontRunStillSucceeds() (gas: 261250)\n[PASS] test_memoPermit_happy() (gas: 263960)\n[PASS] test_memoPermit_tokenWithoutPermit_fallsBackToAllowance() (gas: 835260)\n[PASS] test_memoPermit_zeroDeadlineMeansNoPermit() (gas: 266790)\n[PASS] test_memo_arbitraryBytesAreCarriedExactly() (gas: 239034)\n[PASS] test_memo_lengthLimits_atAndOverTheBoundary() (gas: 444078)\n[PASS] test_memo_malformedCalldata_neverChangesAPayment() (gas: 292371)\n[PASS] test_memo_noReturnToken_oneRecipient_andDuplicates() (gas: 698282)\n[PASS] test_memo_nothingGiven_emitsOnlyDispersed() (gas: 209616)\n[PASS] test_memo_payoutMemoAndRef() (gas: 254946)\n[PASS] test_memo_perRecipient_emitsPaidOnlyForNonEmpty() (gas: 258822)\n[PASS] test_memo_refOnly_andMemoOnly_eachEmitMemo() (gas: 290312)\n[PASS] test_memo_revert_wrongNumberOfRowMemos() (gas: 147033)\n[PASS] test_memo_sameInputChecksAsDisperse() (gas: 260174)\n[PASS] test_noEthAccepted() (gas: 77316)\n[PASS] test_reentrantToken_cannotSpendAVictimsApproval() (gas: 1327050)\n[PASS] test_refused_frozenRecipient_namesTheRow_andMovesNothing() (gas: 1012395)\n[PASS] test_refused_hugeRevertDataIsCutTo256Bytes() (gas: 382135)\n[PASS] test_refused_oddAnswersFromTheToken() (gas: 559295)\n[PASS] test_refused_onlyTheFirstBadRowIsNamed() (gas: 885339)\n[PASS] test_refused_plainTokenShortBalance_inMemoPath() (gas: 750860)\n[PASS] test_refused_shortBalance_namesTheRowWhereMoneyRanOut() (gas: 266744)\n[PASS] test_thirdPartyAllowance_unusableThroughMemoPath() (gas: 204596)\n[PASS] test_tokenAsRecipient_refusedByEveryEntryPoint() (gas: 192009)\nSuite result: ok. 28 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 93.08ms (42.93ms CPU time)\n\nRan 5 test suites in 94.13ms (279.88ms CPU time): 79 tests passed, 0 failed, 11 skipped (90 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":57,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"Disperse.disperse(address,address[],uint256[])\",\"Disperse.disperseWithPermit(address,address[],uint256[],uint256,uint8,bytes32,bytes32)\",\"DisperseV2.disperse(address,address[],uint256[])\",\"DisperseV2.disperseWithMemo(address,address[],uint256[],bytes32,string,string[],(uint256,uint8,bytes32,bytes32))\",\"DisperseV2.disperseWithPermit(address,address[],uint256[],uint256,uint8,bytes32,bytes32)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":3,\"LICENSE\":21,\"README.md\":170,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"launch.json\":10,\"remappings.txt\":2,\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":33,\"script/DeployV2.s.sol\":33,\"src/Disperse.sol\":96,\"src/DisperseV2.sol\":234,\"test/Disperse.t.sol\":398,\"test/DisperseFork.t.sol\":160,\"test/DisperseV2.t.sol\":746,\"test/DisperseV2Compat.t.sol\":407,\"test/DisperseV2Fork.t.sol\":208,\"test/mocks/MockUSDC.sol\":18,\"test/mocks/NoReturnToken.sol\":28,\"test/mocks/PlainToken.sol\":13,\"test/mocks/ReentrantToken.sol\":41},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"e34c6c8b479c2640be955419e95edb227af1c4d2ccfa4fad033fa97c5e2176f5","verifiedTreeHash":"64d0e2d39c6c69bcad5830b809097d295b73902b","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+9fc6a798"}]}