{"assessments":[],"deployments":[],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"7350b953-b817-4a46-bc2c-a38eab44de55","kind":"skill:research-report","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"2a5fb52b6b119bbaad5e8798d160b605ba97feb6d4e605a0e08d6af0cc1a4525","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":true,"profile":"none","requires":["network"],"skillHash":"3ddca93330036359dd721585e58e67820336a0398b7927b3c89369d6134f30f6","skillId":"research-report","tools":[]},"key":"research_report","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"3ddca93330036359dd721585e58e67820336a0398b7927b3c89369d6134f30f6","skillId":"research-report","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"Research question: how can the owner of an IMD seat limit, on the FLOP chain itself, what an agent's key can spend on FLOP inference, so that a daily cap is enforced by the runtime and not only by the agent's own bookkeeping?\nWhy: uxp-labs/flop-devnet-lab holds imd-flop, a tool that lets an IMD worker pay FLOP for inference under a daily cap, one FLOP identity per seat. Today the cap is local accounting plus one bound the gateway enforces: each paid call mints a single use child key capped at the call's quote. An earlier report (https://github.com/Identity-md/research/blob/main/jobs/2f111874-d780-4578-80a7-2198c62bf86a/files/artifacts/report.md) found that chain data proves a compute channel's settlement but not one request's amount, because channels are opened by a shared gateway account. So the hard bound has to sit on the payer's side. FLOP's docs describe agent accounts with pre-set spend limits and bounded proxies. This research is the specification for using them. Our own code will implement it, so be exact, and label every statement [RPC] (read from the node or its metadata), [source] (public source or docs), [inference] or [unknown].\nWhat we already know about FLOP devnet (2026-11-11), as leads to confirm or correct:\n- RPC wss://rpc.devnet.flop.network, node zkVerify 1.1.0, chain \"FLOP Devnet\", genesis 0x99c172c095340ace980631f9123544c6bebd4839f3437e463533422d8be2d631, runtime tzkv-runtime spec 1014014, metadata version 14 (482132 bytes, sha256 f4fd2addba7fff1129483d0e66b8e6bc69141292f56443e201d3f073aab03444), about one block a second, archive state back to block 1, 18 decimals.\n- Calls seen on the explorer: agentWallet.createWallet, agentWallet.fundWallet, flopSessionKeys.createSession, agentIdentity.registerAgent, depositStake, withdrawStake, setLicense, reportTaskCompletion, computeChannel.openChannel, topUpEscrow, settle, timeout, utility.batchAll.\n- Explorer API for finding transactions (an indexer, not proof): https://explorer.devnet.flop.network/api/transactions?limit=100&offset=0&section=agentWallet (also section=flopSessionKeys, agentIdentity).\n- Gateway: https://api.flop.network/openapi.json. A wallet enrolls through a signed challenge and gets a bearer key. POST /keys/ephemeral mints a child key with scope {models, max_spend}, uses and expiry. Receipts (CredentialReceipt) carry reserved_spend, settled_spend, settled_spend_raw, channel_id, terminal_event, state. New enrollments were answering 503 wallet_enrollment_cap_reached.\n- Our agent identity on devnet: SS58 5HEA8QECFwBg1F9cxoXzvQzryu2d5qj5zASJS7owNW2zebBz, with 25 FLOP from one faucet claim. It is not enrolled.\nAnswer these, in this order:\n1. Inventory. At spec 1014014, for the pallets agentWallet, flopSessionKeys, agentIdentity, and any proxy, multisig, utility or spending limit pallet the runtime has: pallet index; every call with its arguments and SCALE types; every storage item with hashers, key and value types; every event with fields in order; every error; every constant with its value. Say what each one is for.\n2. Who pays. For a paid inference call through the gateway by an enrolled wallet: which account's funds move, when, and by which extrinsics. Where the payer's money sits between enrollment and settlement (free balance, reserved balance, an agent wallet, a gateway ledger off chain). What the gateway's bearer key is bound to. Whether a child key's max_spend is enforced by the gateway alone or by anything on chain.\n3. The bounds the chain offers. For each mechanism (an agent wallet with a limit, a session key with a cap or expiry, funding a separate account with only the day's amount, a proxy restricted to certain calls, anything else): exactly what the runtime enforces (amount per call, per period, total, expiry, which calls, which callee), what it does not, whether the gateway or a miner can draw more than the bound, how the owner raises, lowers, pauses and revokes it, what deposits and fees it costs, and how it fails.\n4. A design. The smallest set up that gives \"one FLOP identity per seat with a daily cap the chain enforces\": the exact extrinsics in order, who signs each (the seat owner's wallet or the agent's device key), what is done once and what each day, and what happens at the cap. Say plainly if the chain cannot enforce a daily cap for gateway inference today and what the nearest thing is.\n5. What an observer can check. The storage keys and events a read only client reads to confirm the bound that is in force and how much of it is used, with the key construction for our identity above, and the fewest calls.\n6. What still rests on trusting the gateway after that design, and what a dishonest or faulty gateway could do within the bound.\n7. A worked example from the chain: find real agentWallet and flopSessionKeys transactions on devnet, decode their arguments, events and the storage they leave from the node (not from the explorer), and walk one wallet from creation to funding to a spend if one exists.\n8. Ways it can go wrong: a runtime upgrade that changes the pallet, a chain reset that keeps the genesis, a session that outlives its key, a limit that resets at a time the owner does not expect, dust and rounding.\nSources to use: the node's metadata and state through public read only RPC; the explorer API for discovery only; https://docs.flop.network (agent accounts and spend control, whitepaper, yellowpaper); the flop-labs organisation on GitHub (yellowpaper, SDK @flop-labs/sdk, CLI, network issues); the gateway OpenAPI; zkVerify's public runtime source for what FLOP inherits. Cite file and line or URL for every claim.\nRules: read only. No keys, no faucet, no transactions, no enrollment, no paid calls. Do not present an explorer answer as proof.\nDeliver: one report with the tables above, the worked example with every value read from the node, a list of what could not be confirmed, and the questions to put to the FLOP team.","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"ceb5b41b58fd2a2f233a1392ffaaef5347883fa942b8e4a87297e3bb587cb55c","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"7350b953-b817-4a46-bc2c-a38eab44de55","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":null},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"51422","feedbackHash":"f113b74238ea9e20cd1079e711074eb42e4c0b540dcdff28ceaad94b4378a2e3","nodeKey":"research_report","submissionHash":"2a5fb52b6b119bbaad5e8798d160b605ba97feb6d4e605a0e08d6af0cc1a4525","tag1":"verification:structural","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"c38a06d2e7516f130b9fe056574f7619e3a88a8f046046009f96c8763a37f5bf","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[{"bytes":552022,"hash":"baacd5657f0cd7a50d41a8f471f482b8e2f14b06b8932b1d8048bc6adc24c475","mediaType":"text/markdown","name":"report","path":"artifacts/report.md"}],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"2ff7d2bf889ea0a6b07ca61b6fd28ab4ba2d25f20e85c88aeb0d2c0b9b288704","device":"1d2eacca0a6e8449","findings":[],"hash":"2a5fb52b6b119bbaad5e8798d160b605ba97feb6d4e605a0e08d6af0cc1a4525","nodeId":"8e22f334-7b69-439f-b91c-67ab18b86cd6","outcome":"completed","summary":"Created [artifacts/report.md](artifacts/report.md) with the pallet inventories, node-decoded examples, exact storage keys, design, uncertainties and FLOP-team questions.\n\nKey finding: runtime caps exist, but their enforcement for hosted-gateway inference remains unconfirmed.\n\nOffline checks passed for 16 blocks, 234 storage records, metadata, hashes and report links.","treeHash":"7ffc4cbe1bd3757c2e6f83706a03546e98872ec5","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":8862976,"inputTokens":162494,"model":null,"outputTokens":57445,"runtime":"codex","turns":9,"wallClockMs":1727131}}],"verification":[{"checks":[],"detail":"paths and tree verified; no suite was run for this kind of work","evaluation":"structural","profile":"none","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"2a5fb52b6b119bbaad5e8798d160b605ba97feb6d4e605a0e08d6af0cc1a4525","verifiedTreeHash":"7ffc4cbe1bd3757c2e6f83706a03546e98872ec5","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+f03a8d70"}]}