{"assessments":[],"deployments":[{"attestationHash":"7c11a691cc2b26dc76463c85c631a1feb57923bc48e808109c09b4461d2d24fa","chainId":11155111,"contracts":[],"id":"4c5a62a2-9b05-4591-b224-cc4743e05ecc","manifestHash":"330d4a9d41941f90d572f0ecdb4e377f3175a227d91600954fc2cb91f083d98c","status":"parked"}],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"08e0b212-b09e-414e-b786-c852a10b4b6f","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"eba2e9e71baa73463e6232616e814a8b5fc9e7cb63f1458a0a28cad88f2e9a9e","dependsOn":["implement_contract","write_foundry_tests","manifest"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_economics","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"bbbda837f7fac6461ea99194151166f37b08abe9cbeb36c08302345dece81edd","dependsOn":["implement_contract","write_foundry_tests","manifest"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_flow","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"4bbb8de554d340e59e0432aedf1772a5d6044ca6b7271641eb00e30e098eebe3","dependsOn":["implement_contract","write_foundry_tests","manifest","audit_math","audit_permissions","audit_economics","audit_flow"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"3014f1ea5961918ca059453a484bf4c8bcbbfc2248dbe31d94ac7c5cdf8f50bd","skillId":"audit-judge","tools":[]},"key":"audit_judge","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"3014f1ea5961918ca059453a484bf4c8bcbbfc2248dbe31d94ac7c5cdf8f50bd","skillId":"audit-judge","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"2d20ee0d6a6b9726871cc9b0d14114065a20fb3de005f25c61b4be1c797e41f4","dependsOn":["implement_contract","write_foundry_tests","manifest"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_math","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"ac61b9050b85234520c71d4b69c1d5c3afc041f7d2035f7199baa7c7a647a68c","dependsOn":["implement_contract","write_foundry_tests","manifest"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_permissions","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"2ae3e24ddf57c14235859db6ed5853828c1addb3ada89991d35ef141dbb9ebf2","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"d37537abb20af46832b24602788d7895021ecaac20c6934313dc4f8aba4ad047","skillId":"implement-contract","tools":[]},"key":"implement_contract","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"d37537abb20af46832b24602788d7895021ecaac20c6934313dc4f8aba4ad047","skillId":"implement-contract","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"08ddfac2f560795af671151ed93939d41320ec9abbde25da0cfa606897d8dee9","dependsOn":["implement_contract","write_foundry_tests"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"tools":[]},"key":"manifest","kind":"code","role":"integrate","skillHash":null,"skillId":null,"state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"2bde6a2a4a0770bd797d753aac82fc91210dccb07cb081750f2046f1f1100e80","dependsOn":["implement_contract"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"73431852439ad3a343f3d2b7db1c43cd363b9f48f9bb51497374a0cf6d50b223","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","tools":[]},"key":"write_foundry_tests","kind":"code","role":"tests","skillHash":"73431852439ad3a343f3d2b7db1c43cd363b9f48f9bb51497374a0cf6d50b223","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"Token name: IMD Offsets. Token symbol: IMDO. Chain id 11155111, paired with ETH.\n\nPURPOSE. IMDO funds regenerative contributions: ecological credits bought and retired on Regen Network by a public treasury. Holders get NO payouts, rewards, yield or staking; do not add any.\n\nTOKEN (ERC-20). Plain ERC-20 with plain transfers: NO transfer tax, NO fee-on-transfer, NO owner, NO mint after deployment, NO blacklist, NO pause, NO trading gate, NO upgradeability. Fixed supply minted once at launch. A public burn(uint256) is allowed (holders may burn their own tokens). It must behave normally with wallets, routers and bridges and must not look like a honeypot to scanners.\nHOOK. Build the pool hook as an IMMUTABLE contract attached to the launch pool. Behaviour:\n- Sell-only fee: buys cost nothing. A sell is a swap where the token is paid in (use the settled BalanceDelta in afterSwap so exact-in and exact-out sells are sized correctly).\n- Graduated by sell size relative to the pool's token reserve: a sell of less than 1% of the reserve (under 100 bps) pays 0%; from 1% up to 3% of the reserve (100 to 299 bps) pays 0.5%; from 3% up to 5% (300 to 499 bps) pays 1%; 5% of the reserve or more (500 bps+) pays 2% (fee ppm 0 / 5,000 / 10,000 / 20,000). Hard cap in code: 2% (20,000 ppm); no bracket may ever exceed it.\n- Anti-splitting: accumulate each tx.origin's sells within one transaction (transient storage) and bill the cumulative size.\n- Anti-manipulation: size against a reserve snapshot LAGGED BY ONE BLOCK so a same-transaction reserve inflation cannot lower the bracket.\n- Fee is taken in the pool's quote asset (native ETH) and sent DIRECTLY to the immutable treasury 0xb1eC9d1C36974d05eb9889eBf8A150b05791E559. Any token-side fee (exact-out sells) is burned. A permissionless harvest() may only move already-accrued claims to the treasury / burn.\n- No owner, no setters, no upgradeability: brackets, cap, treasury and burn behaviour are constructor constants.\n- COMPATIBILITY WITH THE LAUNCH FACTORY (critical): the pool is initialized by the launch factory with this hook attached. The factory's own liquidity position, its pool-fee accounting and distribution (to whoever the factory pays today) and the swarm's Merkle distributor must keep working UNCHANGED; the hook only adds its own fee on large sells and must never block, revert or re-route the factory's accounting. Prove this in tests with a pool that has a factory-style liquidity position and show the pool-fee accounting and distribution are unaffected by the hook. State in the README exactly where the pool's own LP fee goes and where the hook's fee goes.\n- Use OpenZeppelin uniswap-hooks BaseHookFee patterns; the hook address must satisfy v4 permission-bit mining (afterSwap, afterSwapReturnDelta).\nTESTS (Foundry; a different worker writes them). Cover: buys free; exact fee per bracket for exact-in AND exact-out sells; treasury receives exactly the fee in ETH; the pool-fee distribution and swarm claims are unaffected by the hook; split sells in one tx are billed cumulatively; same-tx reserve inflation does not lower the bracket; no function can change brackets/cap/treasury; sells are never blocked; invariant that the hook never holds user funds beyond accrued fee claims; fixed supply, burn works, plain transfers untaxed, no privileged roles, deploy script runs from configuration.\nDELIVER a README stating every number and who can call what, a deploy script, and the launch attestation. Do not claim an audit was performed.\nBUILD REPRODUCIBILITY (admission check `bytecode`, critical): the repository MUST contain a root foundry.toml that sets bytecode_hash = \"none\" under [profile.default], so the compiled metadata carries no ipfs hash and the build is byte-for-byte reproducible. Pin solc version, optimizer runs, evm_version and via_ir in the same file. The README must quote foundry.toml verbatim and must not tell readers to use --no-metadata or any build flag instead. Verify by running forge build and confirming the artifacts' metadata has no ipfs hash.","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"dfdd5e97ad457b483c73aa2fa38d61a2b901eaf3270d0da492cba608fc761cf6","previousHash":"84b065c21f435ad01e0cacf424bd9f6ee5154184bb96b9f58b5e5fa8d068446a","projectId":"08e0b212-b09e-414e-b786-c852a10b4b6f","publication":{"commit":"c498748e255d2c0e3ce4e613e3d75fd7d4d5ed0a","deliveredAt":"2026-10-04T02:49:15.544Z","repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-684-imd-offsets-token-symbol-imdo-chain-id-1"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"3ff18f47c6439c07330226a6c0e33285dc9fc347e73da23195f9f5d1e38902fc","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"4243add47a75f9174f49d40ef3b10e35c6f276800a8b87b8ee25440012cc3220","device":"3c7630b22a73c1fb","findings":[],"hash":"0419b296c22fbdb9feb05840f1dfad8c86143d11f79d7df80db0f5b9a623f9a5","nodeId":"1cfd6a17-70a7-47c0-8860-7c91b3008406","outcome":"completed","summary":"The revision is complete. The medium finding reproduced and is fixed; the three advisory findings are answered as disputed with reasons. All answers are in `.imd-responses.json`.\n\n**What reproduced.** The reviewer's proof, run in scratch against the starting tree, failed exactly as reported: a 5% sell split as 0.99% + 4.01% paid 0.802 ETH, and as three legs paid 0.5035 ETH, against 1.0 ETH for a single sell. The cause was that `afterSwap` chose the bracket from the cumulative amount but applied it only to the current leg's own basis.\n\n**The fix in `src/IMDOFeeHook.sol`.** Billing now runs through a per-origin transient ledger with sold amount, ETH basis, IMDO basis, and fees paid on each side.\n\n- After every leg the amount owed is the schedule applied to the cumulative basis, and the leg collects the shortfall. Earlier legs are repriced the moment a later leg lifts the bracket, so a split pays exactly what one sell of the same total pays.\n- A leg can only charge its unspecified currency, so a shortfall on the other side is converted at that leg's own realized price. An exact-output leg pays an ETH shortfall in extra IMDO (burned); an exact-input leg pays an IMDO shortfall in ETH.\n- An exact-input leg stays bounded by its own gross ETH output so routers settle normally. Any remainder carries to the origin's next sell in the transaction.\n\n**Verification.** The proof's two tests pass. A scratch suite against a real v4 PoolManager (hooked pool beside an identical hookless twin) passed 16 tests: every bracket boundary for exact-in and exact-out, two- and three-leg splits equal to a single sell, mixed-mode splits, the dust-leg carry case, a fuzz that splits never pay less than a single sell nor more than the schedule, same-block inflation, factory LP-fee parity on collect and remove, and the launch-block cap. All 9 protected floor tests pass against the new creation code.\n\n**Build reproducibility.** `foundry.toml` is now committed at the root with `bytecode_hash = \"none\"`, solc 0.8.26, 200 optimizer runs, cancun, and `via_ir = false`. Root `forge build` succeeds and the artifact metadata shows no ipfs hash. The README quotes the file verbatim and the delivery-status, accumulation, attestation and verification sections are updated.\n\n**Two notes for the test author.** Foundry clears transient storage between top-level calls in a test, so multi-leg scenarios must be driven from inside one helper-contract call. The README says so. Also, the proof imports forge-std, which the root project does not vendor since the hook has no library dependencies, so it only compiles inside a harness that provides it.","treeHash":"57068038dcbc89642b9610cde662e046fd8f85d5","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":4071909,"inputTokens":1090,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":75005,"runtime":"claude","turns":47,"wallClockMs":947200}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"7a95c1aa9a2cc466a6786ad002cbafe9300709b2c47737141cfcfd6d9be509fe","device":"30a6c1a419ef4f9c","findings":[],"hash":"08ddfac2f560795af671151ed93939d41320ec9abbde25da0cfa606897d8dee9","nodeId":"0c276a55-c5a0-47a8-a12a-24a28fc6bf6d","outcome":"completed","summary":"The revised manifest validates and only launch.json is modified. The scratch test under test/scratch/ is outside the submission and is deleted before build.\n\n**Outcome.** launch.json is verified against the accepted implementation and revised in three places in its notes. No findings were quoted in this round's assignment, so I re-checked every manifest field against the current source rather than guessing.\n\n**What was verified and left unchanged**\n\n- Permissions list matches getHookPermissions exactly: beforeInitialize, afterAddLiquidity, afterRemoveLiquidity, beforeSwap, afterSwap, afterDonate, afterSwapReturnDelta. Those bits sum to the hook's FLAGS constant 0x25d4, which the protected test also checks against the mined address.\n- Constructor arguments are \"$poolManager\" then \"$token\", in the declared order of the hook constructor.\n- Token contract IMDOToken, name IMD Offsets, symbol IMDO, 18 decimals, no constructor arguments.\n- Pool is native ETH (zero address), LP fee 3000, tick spacing 60. The initial price string equals TickMath at tick 69060, confirmed by a scratch Foundry test, and matches the integration fixture and the deploy script defaults.\n- The first key is `\"kind\": \"univ4_hook\"` and the file validates against the launch manifest schema with jsonschema.\n\n**What I changed in the notes**\n\n- Stated what each non-swap callback does, so a reviewer comparing the seven permissions to the code sees why each is enabled: beforeInitialize restricts the pool key and accepts only the three fee tiers, the liquidity and donate callbacks track IMDO inventory and return zero deltas, and beforeSwap only snapshots protocol fees.\n- Corrected the sizing reserve description to the lower of the one-block-lagged snapshot and the pre-swap booked inventory, which is what afterSwap computes.\n- Corrected the exact-output fee description: the IMDO fee is always booked as an ERC-6909 claim and burned by harvest, and a failed ETH payment accrues a claim rather than reverting the sell.\n\nNotes are now 3391 characters, under the 4000 cap. forge build succeeds and forge test passes all 64 tests. The protected lifecycle fork rehearsal and signed attestation are separate downstream checks and are not claimed here.","treeHash":"ce3c5def28a2c8533a4629552d34212ddddb2916","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":571661,"inputTokens":258,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":10122,"runtime":"claude","turns":20,"wallClockMs":199597}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"da9ced18bde889b7afbe01f6c058fd92c20601b3477540d714189aae34605966","device":"0238a59bba722237","findings":[],"hash":"26ab1055d5c594b6d4cecf6564ba90f6c71ac50c5b78d63b5da38a7946c2e1cb","nodeId":"1cfd6a17-70a7-47c0-8860-7c91b3008406","outcome":"completed","summary":"The revision is done: all five reported defects reproduced on the previous code, four are fixed in the hook and deploy script, and the README and `.imd-responses.json` are written. The reviewer's proof now passes, along with 13 scratch checks against a real v4 PoolManager; the proof and the per-defect checks fail on the old tree. A clean `forge build` without the scratch directory succeeds with no ipfs hash in the metadata.\n\n- **Shared `tx.origin` over-charge (medium, fixed):** no swap is now charged more than 2% of its own basis, whatever the same origin sold earlier. Shortfall above that carries to the origin's later sells in the same transaction and is dropped at transaction end.\n- **Exact-output fee double-charge (medium, fixed):** the IMDO fee is always minted as a claim and burned by `harvest()`, never taken from the manager mid-swap. Pay-first and settle-after routers both pay sold + fee exactly once.\n- **Parked liquidity lowering the bracket (low, fixed):** sells are sized against the lower of the lagged snapshot and the booked reserve just before the swap.\n- **Deploy script accepting any pool (low, fixed):** it now requires the bound pool id to match `POOL_FEE` (default 3000) and `TICK_SPACING` (default 60), and the initial price when `SQRT_PRICE_X96` is set.\n- **README mismatch (info, fixed):** it no longer claims tests live only in scratch or that `launch.json` cannot exist, and the numbers reflect what I ran this round.\n- **Uncollected carry (info, answered \"disputed\"):** this is the documented limitation, not a defect; I left it and spelled it out with numbers.\n\nThings you should know:\n\n- **Splits can now pay less than a single sell.** With the per-swap cap, 0.99% then 4.01% pays 0 + 2% of the second leg (0.802 ETH in the README example) instead of the full 1.0 ETH. This is the trade-off of the reviewer's \"bound and carry\" option; each leg still pays at least its own basis at the cumulative bracket.\n- **A small seller under a shared origin can still pay up to 2% instead of 0%.** That follows from grouping by `tx.origin`, which the brief requires; it is capped, not removed.\n- **The token fee is not burned at swap time any more.** It sits as a claim in the manager until someone calls `harvest()`.\n- **Same-block buys or liquidity removals can raise the bracket** for later sells in that block, because sizing uses the smaller reserve.\n- **The other contributor's test suite was not in my tree.** I could not run `test/IMDO.t.sol`; any of its tests that assert the old behaviour (a dust leg forfeiting its whole output, burn during the swap, lagged-only sizing) will need updating.","treeHash":"1cb7524c9435e406627bb8da9b70311db4dbeeba","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1688141,"inputTokens":36,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":31641,"runtime":"claude","turns":21,"wallClockMs":338772}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"1719c63be97ab4431e9f5c49c7781bcdc0dd634d85049d87981387778e7c397c","device":"ca080fd306399669","findings":[],"hash":"2ae3e24ddf57c14235859db6ed5853828c1addb3ada89991d35ef141dbb9ebf2","nodeId":"1cfd6a17-70a7-47c0-8860-7c91b3008406","outcome":"completed","summary":"This revision changes no contract or script code: five of the six findings describe behaviour the tree no longer has, and the sixth I dispute rather than fix. Only `README.md` changed, and `.imd-responses.json` answers every finding.\n\nI reproduced each finding in `test/scratch/` against a real Uniswap v4 PoolManager (200 ETH / 200,000 IMDO pool, LP fee 3000, plus a hookless twin). `forge build` succeeds, and the reviewer's proof and my scratch checks pass. The three deploy-script checks pass when run one at a time; run together they collide on shared environment variables, which is a quirk of my scratch tests, not of the script.\n\n| Finding | Verdict | What I found |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `1b344ddd…` split sells pay less than one sell | disputed | Reproduces: one 5% sell pays 0.1900 ETH, 2.5% + 2.5% pays 0.1170 ETH, and 4.99% then dust pays 0.0955 ETH. |\n| `d76a25dd…` later user pays an earlier user's repricing | not_reproducible | Already capped: the second user pays exactly 2% of their own output in both of the reviewer's cases, and the attached proof passes. |\n| `a1913a48…` pay-first exact-output sell charged twice | not_reproducible | The token fee is already minted as a claim and burned by `harvest()`; a pay-first router pays sold + fee once, and prepaying exactly that amount does not revert. |\n| `4954981f…` park, withdraw, sell lowers the bracket | not_reproducible | Sizing already uses the lower of the lagged snapshot and the booked reserve; the scenario is billed at 20,000 ppm. |\n| `1a032b61…` deploy script accepts any bound pool | not_reproducible | The script already rejects a 10000/200 key and an unexpected price, and accepts the configured 3000/60 pool. |\n| `6391998b…` README describes a different delivery | fixed | README no longer makes claims about `test/` or `launch.json`, which are not in my tree, and lists only what I ran this round. |\n\nWhy I dispute the split-sell finding: billing a split like a single sell means a later leg must pay more than 2% of itself for volume sold before it. The hook cannot tell a seller's own second leg from a different user's sell settled under the same `tx.origin`, because `afterSwap` only sees the router. The reviewer's suggested fix (keying on the swap sender) would take a bundled user's whole output again whenever users share a router, while a deliberate splitter keeps the discount by using one forwarding contract per leg. The code already collects the most the per-swap cap allows.\n\nDecision for you: exact cumulative billing and the 2%-per-swap cap cannot both hold. I kept the cap because it protects third parties; choosing exact billing instead would reopen finding `d76a25dd…`.\n\nThe README now states the worst-case split discount with these numbers and the bounds a split-sell test can assert. I also re-checked the build artifacts: `bytecodeHash` is `none` and there is no ipfs hash in the metadata.","treeHash":"6099faee899aba5736e733f78d7e2c5ac3ee7c01","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1352191,"inputTokens":27,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":28113,"runtime":"claude","turns":17,"wallClockMs":327078}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"8d7c63dae9cebaf6bd2144bb4a4c46909f842415fc10b98aa6e771170190dda5","device":"ca080fd306399669","findings":[{"description":"The brief requires anti-splitting: accumulate each tx.origin's sells within one transaction and bill the cumulative size. Since revision 3, _collect bounds every leg's charge by ceil(its own basis * 20,000 / 1e6) (lines 361 and 374). The bracket is still chosen from the cumulative size, but when a later leg lifts the bracket, the extra fee owed on the EARLIER legs can only be collected up to 2% of the later leg; the rest stays in the transient ledger and is dropped at transaction end. A seller therefore pays less by putting most of the volume in a first leg that stays under a threshold and crossing it with a later leg. The discount is up to (2% - lower rate) on everything sold before the 5% threshold: a sell of just 5% of the reserve can be had for about half the fee (4.99% at 1%, then dust at 2% of itself), a 10% sell for about 25% less. The README documents this as the price of never charging one swap more than 2% of itself when several users share a tx.origin, so it is a deliberate trade-off, but the stated requirement (a split is billed on its cumulative size) is not met for the top brackets and the test list item 'split sells in one tx are billed cumulatively' can only be asserted as bounds. The delivered tests assert what does hold (each leg at least its own output at the cumulative bracket, never above 2% of itself, total never above the schedule on the total) and do not assert that a split pays what one sell pays. A fix that keeps the shared-origin protection needs a different grouping key or settlement point than 'tx.origin, collected on the next leg' (for example collecting the repricing only from legs of the same swap sender/recipient, or sizing each leg's cap by the volume the same sender contributed).","line":361,"path":"src/IMDOFeeHook.sol","reproduction":"Real v4 PoolManager, pool seeded with 200 ETH / 200,000 IMDO full range, LP fee 3000, one block after launch (R = snapshot reserve). (a) One exact-input sell of ceil(5% of R): hook fee 189931895032623709 wei (2% of gross output). (b) Same total by one tx.origin in one transaction as 2.5% + 2.5%: leg 1 pays 0.5% of its output, leg 2 pays its 2% cap; total 116975337235711740 wei. Expected (cumulative billing): about 189.9e15 wei as in (a); actual: 117.0e15 wei, 38% less. (c) README's own numbers: 0.99% then 4.01% pays 0 + 0.802 ETH instead of 1.0 ETH. (d) Worst case by construction: sell just under 5% of R first (1% bracket), then a dust leg that crosses 5%: total is about 1% of the output instead of 2%. Run in the delivered suite: test_splitSells_neverPayMoreThanOneSellOfTheSameTotal (asserts only total <= single) and test_splitSells_manyLegsEscalateThroughEveryBracket (legs #3 and #6 pay exactly their cap and the origin ends below the schedule on its total).","severity":"medium","title":"Splitting a sell inside one transaction still lowers the hook fee: the per-swap 2% cap stops later legs from collecting the repricing of earlier legs"}],"hash":"2bde6a2a4a0770bd797d753aac82fc91210dccb07cb081750f2046f1f1100e80","nodeId":"a4ced9f1-a815-4f18-854c-7332b607b078","outcome":"completed","summary":"The reviewer's finding reproduced and is fixed, and the suite now passes on both forge 1.8.3 (64 tests) and forge 1.7.1 (69, it counts invariants separately). Only `test/IMDO.t.sol` changed; the hook, README and config are untouched.\n\n**The finding (transient storage between top-level calls)**\n- **Reproduced:** forge 1.7.1 keeps transient storage for the whole test function, while the 1.8.3 installed here clears it after each top-level call.\n- **Fix:** the tests no longer depend on either behaviour.\n  - Expected fees are computed from the hook's own per-origin ledger as it stands just before each sell.\n  - No scenario reuses an origin that already sold on the hooked pool in the same test.\n  - The \"gone after the transaction\" assertions only run when a small probe shows the harness ends transactions between calls. On 1.7.1 they are skipped, backed by an unconditional check that the ledger is never written to persistent storage.\n- **Not fixed:** README line 38 still says Foundry clears transient storage between top-level calls. It is outside my write path, so I flagged it in `.imd-responses.json` for the README's author.\n\n**Realigning with the revised hook**\nThe hook was revised after my tests were accepted, which left 11 tests failing on this tree under either forge version. I updated them and added tests for the three changed behaviours:\n- No swap is charged more than 2% of its own basis, including a small sell that follows someone else's large sell under the same `tx.origin`.\n- The IMDO fee on exact-output sells is always booked as a claim and burned by `harvest()`, never mid-swap.\n- Sells are sized against the lower of the one-block-lagged snapshot and the reserve just before the swap, including liquidity parked across a block and withdrawn before selling.\n\nBoth versions also pass with `--isolate` and across fuzz seeds 1–6. Temporarily breaking the cap or the sizing reserve in the hook made the new tests fail, so they are live; the hook was restored afterwards.\n\n**Defect reported, not tested around** (`.imd-findings.json`, medium)\nThe per-swap cap means a split sell can still pay less than one sell of the same total. On the test pool, one 5% sell pays about 0.190 ETH, while 2.5% + 2.5% in one transaction pays about 0.117 ETH. The README documents this as a deliberate trade-off, but it does not meet the brief's \"bill the cumulative size\". The tests assert only the bounds that hold: each leg pays at least its own bracket and at most 2% of itself, and the total never exceeds the schedule.\n\nOne thing to know when re-running: forge 1.8.3 served stale hook bytecode from its cache after `src/` was edited, so use `forge test --force` if the hook changes.","treeHash":"1b524aa965be098ab34af062dd1e7e1ec008676a","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":3231659,"inputTokens":48,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":52923,"runtime":"claude","turns":28,"wallClockMs":1079454}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"30a6c1a419ef4f9c","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Billing is retroactive per tx.origin: when a later sell lifts the cumulative bracket, _bill() recomputes ethDue = ceil(ethBasis * rate / PPM) over ALL earlier legs and collects the whole shortfall from the current leg, bounded only by that leg's gross ETH output (fee = legEth). The hook cannot see the user: afterSwap's sender is the router and the ledger key is tx.origin. Whenever two different users' sells are settled in one transaction with one tx.origin (an ERC-4337 bundler, a CoW/batch settlement solver, a relayer batch, a multicall router), the later user is charged the earlier user's repricing and can lose every wei of their ETH output although their own sell is below 1% of the reserve and owes 0. The brief's 'hard cap 2% (20,000 ppm)' therefore does not bound what a single swap pays: the per-swap take ranges up to 100% of output. README line 36 documents forfeiture for the same origin but not that the bill lands on another user's swap. Seam: boundary (tx.origin shared by unrelated users) x invariant (per-swap fee <= cap). Fix options that keep the brief: charge each leg rate(cumulative) only on its own basis (no retroactive repricing of earlier legs), or bound a leg's take by ceil(legEth * MAX_FEE_PPM / PPM) and carry the rest in the ledger. Fees are not stolen (they reach the treasury) but are paid by the wrong party.","line":345,"path":"src/IMDOFeeHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {\n    IMDOFeeHook,\n    IMDOToken,\n    PoolKey,\n    SwapParams,\n    ModifyLiquidityParams,\n    Currency,\n    BalanceDelta\n} from \"src/IMDOFeeHook.sol\";\n\ninterface MiniVm {\n    function roll(uint256) external;\n}\n\n/// @dev Stand-in PoolManager: forwards callbacks to the hook as PoolManager would (with the settled swap\n///      delta), records what the hook takes, never reverts.\ncontract MockManager {\n    uint256 public ethTaken;\n    uint256 public ethMinted;\n\n    function protocolFeesAccrued(Currency) external pure returns (uint256) {\n        return 0;\n    }\n\n    function take(Currency, address, uint256 amount) external {\n        ethTaken += amount;\n    }\n\n    function mint(address, uint256, uint256 amount) external {\n        ethMinted += amount;\n    }\n\n    function burn(address, uint256, uint256) external {}\n\n    function unlock(bytes calldata) external pure returns (bytes memory) {\n        return \"\";\n    }\n\n    function initialize(IMDOFeeHook hook, PoolKey memory key) external {\n        hook.beforeInitialize(msg.sender, key, 0);\n    }\n\n    function addLiquidity(IMDOFeeHook hook, PoolKey memory key, BalanceDelta delta) external {\n        hook.afterAddLiquidity(\n            msg.sender, key, ModifyLiquidityParams(-887_220, 887_220, 1, 0), delta, BalanceDelta.wrap(0), \"\"\n        );\n    }\n\n    function swap(IMDOFeeHook hook, address router, PoolKey memory key, SwapParams memory p, BalanceDelta delta)\n        external\n        returns (int128 hookFee)\n    {\n        (, hookFee) = hook.afterSwap(router, key, p, delta, \"\");\n    }\n}\n\ncontract ProofSharedOriginForfeit {\n    MiniVm constant vm = MiniVm(address(uint160(uint256(keccak256(\"hevm cheat code\")))));\n    uint256 constant PPM = 1_000_000;\n\n    MockManager manager;\n    IMDOToken token;\n    IMDOFeeHook hook;\n    PoolKey key;\n\n    // Reserve R = 200,000 IMDO. Alice sells 9,999 IMDO (just under 5%: 1% bracket alone, 1% fee on 10 ETH).\n    // Bob, a different user whose swap is settled in the same transaction by the same tx.origin (ERC-4337 bundler,\n    // batch settlement), sells 60 IMDO (0.03% of R: free alone) and should receive 0.06 ETH.\n    uint256 constant R = 200_000 ether;\n    uint256 constant ALICE_SOLD = 9_999 ether;\n    uint256 constant ALICE_ETH_OUT = 10 ether;\n    uint256 constant BOB_SOLD = 60 ether;\n    uint256 constant BOB_ETH_OUT = 0.06 ether;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        manager = new MockManager();\n        token = new IMDOToken();\n        bytes memory code =\n            abi.encodePacked(type(IMDOFeeHook).creationCode, abi.encode(address(manager), address(token)));\n        bytes32 initHash = keccak256(code);\n        for (uint256 i = 0; i < 300_000; i++) {\n            address predicted = address(\n                uint160(uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0xff), address(this), bytes32(i), initHash))))\n            );\n            if (uint160(predicted) & ((1 << 14) - 1) != 0x25d4) continue;\n            bytes32 salt = bytes32(i);\n            address at;\n            assembly (\"memory-safe\") {\n                at := create2(0, add(code, 0x20), mload(code), salt)\n            }\n            require(at == predicted, \"hook landed elsewhere\");\n            hook = IMDOFeeHook(at);\n            break;\n        }\n        require(address(hook) != address(0), \"no salt found\");\n        key = PoolKey(Currency.wrap(address(0)), Currency.wrap(address(token)), 3_000, 60, address(hook));\n    }\n\n    function _delta(int128 a0, int128 a1) internal pure returns (BalanceDelta) {\n        return BalanceDelta.wrap((int256(a0) << 128) | int256(uint256(uint128(a1))));\n    }\n\n    /// @dev All hook calls inside one external self-call so they share one transaction (transient storage).\n    function run() external returns (uint256 feeAlice, uint256 feeBob) {\n        require(msg.sender == address(this));\n        // launch block: bind the pool and seed R IMDO of liquidity\n        manager.initialize(hook, key);\n        manager.addLiquidity(hook, key, _delta(-200 ether, -int128(uint128(R))));\n        // next block: the snapshot is R\n        vm.roll(block.number + 1);\n        // Alice's sell, routed by 0xA11CE\n        int128 fA = manager.swap(\n            hook,\n            address(0xA11CE),\n            key,\n            SwapParams(false, -int256(ALICE_SOLD), 0),\n            _delta(int128(uint128(ALICE_ETH_OUT)), -int128(uint128(ALICE_SOLD)))\n        );\n        feeAlice = uint256(uint128(fA));\n        // Bob's sell, a different user, settled later in the same transaction\n        int128 fB = manager.swap(\n            hook,\n            address(0xB0B),\n            key,\n            SwapParams(false, -int256(BOB_SOLD), 0),\n            _delta(int128(uint128(BOB_ETH_OUT)), -int128(uint128(BOB_SOLD)))\n        );\n        feeBob = uint256(uint128(fB));\n    }\n\n    function _ceil(uint256 basis, uint256 ppm) internal pure returns (uint256) {\n        return (basis * ppm + PPM - 1) / PPM;\n    }\n\n    /// Fails on the current code: Bob's leg is charged its entire 0.06 ETH output (100%), far above the\n    /// 20,000 ppm hard cap the brief sets for any sell, to cover Alice's repricing. Passes once no single\n    /// swap can be charged more than the capped schedule on its own output.\n    function test_noSwapIsChargedMoreThanTheCapOnItsOwnOutput() public {\n        (uint256 feeAlice, uint256 feeBob) = this.run();\n        require(hook.laggedTokenReserve() == R, \"snapshot is R\");\n        require(feeAlice == _ceil(ALICE_ETH_OUT, 10_000), \"alice alone pays 1%\");\n        // Bob's own sell is 0.03% of the reserve; even the hard cap on his own output is 0.0012 ETH.\n        uint256 capOnBob = _ceil(BOB_ETH_OUT, 20_000);\n        require(feeBob <= capOnBob, \"a swap was charged more than 2% of its own output\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Real PoolManager, pool seeded 200 ETH / 200,000 IMDO, lagged reserve R = 199,580.329731979975848761 IMDO. One transaction, tx.origin = bundler 0xB0DD, two msg.senders (vm.startPrank(alice, bundler) then vm.startPrank(bob, bundler)), both exact-input sells via PoolSwapTest: alice sells 9,979.016486598998792438 IMDO (4.9999% of R, 1% bracket alone): gross 9.496594751631185423 ETH, hook fee 0.094965947516311855 ETH (1%). bob then sells 59.874098919593992754 IMDO (0.03% of R, 0% bracket alone): gross output 0.054258551009363444 ETH; cumulative 5.03% -> rate 20,000 ppm; ethDue = 2% * 9.550853302640548867 = 0.191017066052810978; ethShort = 0.096051118536499123 > bob's output, so fee = legEth = 0.054258551009363444 ETH (100%). bob receives 0 ETH. Expected: 0 (his own bracket), or at most 0.001085171020187269 ETH (2% cap on his own output). Attached proof reproduces the same with a stand-in manager: alice fee 1e17 wei on 10 ETH (1%), bob fee 6e16 wei on 0.06 ETH output (100%); test fails with 'a swap was charged more than 2% of its own output'.","severity":"medium","snippet":"                fee = legEth; // bounded by the leg's output; the rest carries forward","title":"Shortfall carry lets one swap be charged 100% of its ETH output; a different user sharing tx.origin pays another user's repricing"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"afterAddLiquidity books the full amount1 of any position into tokenReserve regardless of its range. A position entirely below the current tick holds only IMDO, costs no ETH, is never traded against, and can be removed one block later. Because the bracket denominator is the previous block's tokenReserve, a seller who already holds IMDO parks part of it in block N and sells in block N+1 against an inflated reserve, then removes the position in the same block. The brief's literal requirement (same-transaction inflation cannot lower the bracket) is met, and README line 42 notes the lag is not a TWAP, but the cost of the bypass is only gas plus holding the parked tokens for one block, so the graduated schedule is cheap to defeat by any holder with a multiple of their sell size. Seam: boundary (out-of-range position, no ETH) x invariant (sell sized against the pool's real tradeable reserve). Mitigation if wanted: size against in-range or liquidity-derived reserve, or require a longer lag; both are design decisions for the requester.","line":221,"path":"src/IMDOFeeHook.sol","reproduction":"Real PoolManager, pool seeded 200 ETH / 200,000 IMDO; honest lagged reserve R = 199,580.329731979975848761 IMDO. Block N: whale adds liquidity in ticks [INIT_TICK-6060, INIT_TICK-6000] (below price) with amount1 = 110,000 IMDO and amount0 = 0 ETH (asserted); tokenReserve becomes 309,580.329731979975848761. Block N+1: whale sells 9,979.016486598998792439 IMDO (5.0% of R, 20,000 ppm bracket on the honest reserve): gross 9.496594751631185423 ETH, hook fee charged 0.094965947516311855 ETH (10,000 ppm, since 9,979/309,580 = 3.22%), fee owed on the honest reserve 0.189931895032623709 ETH; whale removes the parked liquidity in the same block. Saving 0.094965947516311855 ETH per such sell; the parked IMDO was never at risk.","severity":"low","snippet":"        _updateReserve(_amount1(delta));","title":"Reserve snapshot counts out-of-range IMDO-only liquidity, so a seller parks tokens (no ETH) across one block boundary to lower the bracket"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The delivered tree contains test/IMDO.t.sol (62 tests, vendored v4 core, model factory and Merkle distributor) and a root launch.json, while README lines 81 and 142-144 still say tests live only under test/scratch/ (16 integration tests, 9 baseline checks, 2 reviewer tests) and that launch.json is 'outside the permitted delivery paths'. The brief requires the README to state the delivery accurately. The quoted numbers in the build-reproducibility paragraph (bytecodeHash none, runtime 1,586 and 8,930 bytes, CBOR tail a164736f6c634300081a000a, no ipfs key) were re-verified against out/ and are correct.","line":144,"path":"README.md","reproduction":"ls test/ shows IMDO.t.sol; `forge test` reports 62 tests across 5 suites; `ls launch.json` exists. README line 144 says tests live only under test/scratch/ and line 81 says launch.json cannot be delivered. Expected: README describes the delivered test file and manifest.","severity":"info","snippet":"Tests and their copied dependencies live only under the assignment's disposable `test/scratch/`. Production code does not import them and has no network dependency.","title":"README verification section describes a test layout that is not the delivered one"}],"hash":"2d20ee0d6a6b9726871cc9b0d14114065a20fb3de005f25c61b4be1c797e41f4","nodeId":"88297107-3f8f-4ffd-b260-1bee205d5e1b","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. The findings file is written at `.imd-findings.json` with three findings and an 18-row coverage record.\n\n**What I checked (Math Precision, Boundary, Numerical Gap).** I traced the bracket thresholds, the ceiling fee math, the per-origin ledger in `_bill`, the mixed exact-in/exact-out conversions, the reserve ledger against pool inventory, every narrowing cast and every division, and the claim/harvest paths. The existing suite of 62 tests passes. The README's build-reproducibility numbers (metadata hash none, runtime sizes, CBOR tail, no ipfs key) were re-verified against the artifacts and are correct. The core arithmetic is sound: thresholds equal exact ceil(R·p/100), rounding always favours the treasury by under one wei, intermediates are far from overflow, and the ledger never drifts from the manager's inventory.\n\n**Findings**\n\n1. **Medium, with proof.** The shortfall carry in `_bill` lets a single swap be charged its entire ETH output. Because the ledger is keyed by `tx.origin` and the hook cannot see the end user, any batch that settles two users' sells in one transaction (ERC-4337 bundler, batch settlement solver, relayer) bills the later user for the earlier user's repricing. Reproduced on a real PoolManager: one user sold 4.9999% of the reserve and paid 1%; the next user sold 0.03% (owes 0) and lost 100% of their 0.054 ETH output. The brief's 2% hard cap does not bound what one swap pays. The attached self-contained test fails on the current code with Bob charged 0.06 ETH on a 0.06 ETH output.\n\n2. **Low.** The reserve snapshot counts out-of-range IMDO-only liquidity. Parking 110,000 IMDO below the price for one block (no ETH, never traded) dropped a 5% sell from the 2% bracket to 1%, saving 0.095 ETH, then the position was removed in the same block. The brief's literal same-transaction requirement is met, so this is reported as a cheap bypass, not a spec violation.\n\n3. **Info.** The README's verification section still describes tests living only under `test/scratch/` and says `launch.json` cannot be delivered, while the tree contains `test/IMDO.t.sol` and a root `launch.json`.\n\n**Coverage.** All 14 listed entry points have rows: `afterSwap` and `afterAddLiquidity` carry findings, the other 12 hold. Four extra rows record checked invariants. Nothing was left unreached. Scratch tests are under `test/scratch/` and no delivered file was changed.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2635964,"inputTokens":610,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":59590,"runtime":"claude","turns":39,"wallClockMs":920563}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"5739ce0d803a43cd","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_permissions, audit_economics, audit_flow and audit_math (same root cause). _bill keys the transient ledger only by tx.origin (line 322) and, when a later leg lifts the cumulative bracket, recomputes the schedule over EVERY earlier leg's basis and collects the whole shortfall from the current leg, bounded only by that leg's gross ETH output (line 345, `fee = legEth`). afterSwap cannot see the user (its `sender` is the router), so whenever two different users' sells are executed under one tx.origin (ERC-4337 bundler handleOps, meta-tx relayer, batch/solver settlement, any contract that sells IMDO earlier in the victim's transaction) the later user pays the earlier user's repricing out of their own output. The brief's hard cap of 20,000 ppm then bounds only the rate variable, not what a single swap loses: the per-swap take ranges up to 100% of output, and with any nonzero minimum-output check the victim's sell reverts, i.e. it is blocked by somebody else's earlier sell. For an exact-output victim leg the shortfall is converted into extra IMDO input with no bound at all (lines 353-354). The fee reaches the treasury, so this is funds taken from the wrong party rather than theft. It is also triggerable deliberately at zero cost: a 0.99% userOp is free for its sender and makes every later small seller in the same bundle pay 0.5% of that volume. README line 36 documents forfeiture for the same origin but not that the bill lands on another user's swap. A fix inside the agreed design needs a scope decision: bill each leg at rate(cumulative) on its own basis only (marginal billing, no retroactive collection from a later leg), or bound a leg's take by ceil(legBasis * MAX_FEE_PPM / PPM) and carry the rest.","line":345,"path":"src/IMDOFeeHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {\n    IMDOFeeHook,\n    IMDOToken,\n    PoolKey,\n    SwapParams,\n    ModifyLiquidityParams,\n    Currency,\n    BalanceDelta\n} from \"src/IMDOFeeHook.sol\";\n\ninterface MiniVm {\n    function roll(uint256) external;\n}\n\n/// @dev Stand-in PoolManager: forwards callbacks to the hook as PoolManager would (with the settled swap\n///      delta), records what the hook takes, never reverts.\ncontract MockManager {\n    uint256 public ethTaken;\n    uint256 public ethMinted;\n\n    function protocolFeesAccrued(Currency) external pure returns (uint256) {\n        return 0;\n    }\n\n    function take(Currency, address, uint256 amount) external {\n        ethTaken += amount;\n    }\n\n    function mint(address, uint256, uint256 amount) external {\n        ethMinted += amount;\n    }\n\n    function burn(address, uint256, uint256) external {}\n\n    function unlock(bytes calldata) external pure returns (bytes memory) {\n        return \"\";\n    }\n\n    function initialize(IMDOFeeHook hook, PoolKey memory key) external {\n        hook.beforeInitialize(msg.sender, key, 0);\n    }\n\n    function addLiquidity(IMDOFeeHook hook, PoolKey memory key, BalanceDelta delta) external {\n        hook.afterAddLiquidity(\n            msg.sender, key, ModifyLiquidityParams(-887_220, 887_220, 1, 0), delta, BalanceDelta.wrap(0), \"\"\n        );\n    }\n\n    function swap(IMDOFeeHook hook, address router, PoolKey memory key, SwapParams memory p, BalanceDelta delta)\n        external\n        returns (int128 hookFee)\n    {\n        (, hookFee) = hook.afterSwap(router, key, p, delta, \"\");\n    }\n}\n\ncontract ProofSharedOriginForfeit {\n    MiniVm constant vm = MiniVm(address(uint160(uint256(keccak256(\"hevm cheat code\")))));\n    uint256 constant PPM = 1_000_000;\n\n    MockManager manager;\n    IMDOToken token;\n    IMDOFeeHook hook;\n    PoolKey key;\n\n    // Reserve R = 200,000 IMDO. Alice sells 9,999 IMDO (just under 5%: 1% bracket alone, 1% fee on 10 ETH).\n    // Bob, a different user whose swap is settled in the same transaction by the same tx.origin (ERC-4337 bundler,\n    // batch settlement), sells 60 IMDO (0.03% of R: free alone) and should receive 0.06 ETH.\n    uint256 constant R = 200_000 ether;\n    uint256 constant ALICE_SOLD = 9_999 ether;\n    uint256 constant ALICE_ETH_OUT = 10 ether;\n    uint256 constant BOB_SOLD = 60 ether;\n    uint256 constant BOB_ETH_OUT = 0.06 ether;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        manager = new MockManager();\n        token = new IMDOToken();\n        bytes memory code =\n            abi.encodePacked(type(IMDOFeeHook).creationCode, abi.encode(address(manager), address(token)));\n        bytes32 initHash = keccak256(code);\n        for (uint256 i = 0; i < 300_000; i++) {\n            address predicted = address(\n                uint160(uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0xff), address(this), bytes32(i), initHash))))\n            );\n            if (uint160(predicted) & ((1 << 14) - 1) != 0x25d4) continue;\n            bytes32 salt = bytes32(i);\n            address at;\n            assembly (\"memory-safe\") {\n                at := create2(0, add(code, 0x20), mload(code), salt)\n            }\n            require(at == predicted, \"hook landed elsewhere\");\n            hook = IMDOFeeHook(at);\n            break;\n        }\n        require(address(hook) != address(0), \"no salt found\");\n        key = PoolKey(Currency.wrap(address(0)), Currency.wrap(address(token)), 3_000, 60, address(hook));\n    }\n\n    function _delta(int128 a0, int128 a1) internal pure returns (BalanceDelta) {\n        return BalanceDelta.wrap((int256(a0) << 128) | int256(uint256(uint128(a1))));\n    }\n\n    /// @dev All hook calls inside one external self-call so they share one transaction (transient storage).\n    function run() external returns (uint256 feeAlice, uint256 feeBob) {\n        require(msg.sender == address(this));\n        // launch block: bind the pool and seed R IMDO of liquidity\n        manager.initialize(hook, key);\n        manager.addLiquidity(hook, key, _delta(-200 ether, -int128(uint128(R))));\n        // next block: the snapshot is R\n        vm.roll(block.number + 1);\n        // Alice's sell, routed by 0xA11CE\n        int128 fA = manager.swap(\n            hook,\n            address(0xA11CE),\n            key,\n            SwapParams(false, -int256(ALICE_SOLD), 0),\n            _delta(int128(uint128(ALICE_ETH_OUT)), -int128(uint128(ALICE_SOLD)))\n        );\n        feeAlice = uint256(uint128(fA));\n        // Bob's sell, a different user, settled later in the same transaction\n        int128 fB = manager.swap(\n            hook,\n            address(0xB0B),\n            key,\n            SwapParams(false, -int256(BOB_SOLD), 0),\n            _delta(int128(uint128(BOB_ETH_OUT)), -int128(uint128(BOB_SOLD)))\n        );\n        feeBob = uint256(uint128(fB));\n    }\n\n    function _ceil(uint256 basis, uint256 ppm) internal pure returns (uint256) {\n        return (basis * ppm + PPM - 1) / PPM;\n    }\n\n    /// Fails on the current code: Bob's leg is charged its entire 0.06 ETH output (100%), far above the\n    /// 20,000 ppm hard cap the brief sets for any sell, to cover Alice's repricing. Passes once no single\n    /// swap can be charged more than the capped schedule on its own output.\n    function test_noSwapIsChargedMoreThanTheCapOnItsOwnOutput() public {\n        (uint256 feeAlice, uint256 feeBob) = this.run();\n        require(hook.laggedTokenReserve() == R, \"snapshot is R\");\n        require(feeAlice == _ceil(ALICE_ETH_OUT, 10_000), \"alice alone pays 1%\");\n        // Bob's own sell is 0.03% of the reserve; even the hard cap on his own output is 0.0012 ETH.\n        uint256 capOnBob = _ceil(BOB_ETH_OUT, 20_000);\n        require(feeBob <= capOnBob, \"a swap was charged more than 2% of its own output\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Repository fixture (test/IMDO.t.sol V4Fixture: real v4 PoolManager, hooked ETH/IMDO pool seeded 200 ETH / 200,000 IMDO, LP fee 3000, one block rolled so laggedTokenReserve R = 199,580.329731979975848761 IMDO). Inside ONE external call (one transaction), both legs through PoolSwapTest with tx.origin = 0xB0DD but different msg.sender. Case 1: vm.prank(alice, 0xB0DD) exact-input sell of R*499/10000 = 9,959.058453625800794853 IMDO: gross 9.478501697022615775 ETH, hook fee 0.094785016970226158 ETH (1% bracket, correct alone). Then vm.prank(bob, 0xB0DD) exact-input sell of R*2/10000 = 39.916065946395995169 IMDO (0.02% of R, 0 ppm alone): gross 0.036182673095305127 ETH. Expected: bob pays 0 (or at most 2% of his own output = 0.000723653461906103 ETH). Actual: fee == legEth, treasury receives all 0.036182673095305127 ETH, bob receives 0 wei. Case 2: alice sells R*99/10000 (0.99%, free: gross 1.954765874390008304 ETH, fee 0), bob sells R*2/10000: bob gross 0.039096529362920828 ETH, fee 0.009969312018764646 ETH = ceil((grossA+grossB)*5000/1e6), 25.5% of bob's own output; alice keeps her full fee-free output. Scratch tests test_sharedOrigin_case1_bobLosesWholeOutput and test_sharedOrigin_case2_bobPaysAlicesHalfPercent (test/scratch/Review.t.sol) pass with exactly these numbers. The attached proof reproduces the same against a stand-in manager (alice 10 ETH gross / 1% fee, then bob 0.06 ETH gross charged 0.06 ETH = 100%) and fails on this code with 'a swap was charged more than 2% of its own output'.","severity":"medium","snippet":"                fee = legEth; // bounded by the leg's output; the rest carries forward","title":"Shared tx.origin ledger charges a later, unrelated seller the earlier seller's repricing: one swap can lose 100% of its ETH output, far above the 2% cap, or revert on its min-out"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"From audit_flow; reproduced. For exact-output sells afterSwap calls this.takeAndBurn(fee, false), which executes poolManager.take(token, hook, fee) and burns, lowering the manager's real IMDO ERC-20 balance in the middle of the swapper's unlock. v4 settles ERC-20s by balance difference: settle() credits balanceOf(manager) minus the reserves recorded at sync(). A legal integrator that pays first (sync IMDO, transfer the maximum input, swap, settle, take back the surplus) therefore has its credit reduced by `fee` while the swap delta already charged it sold + fee (the hook return delta). It pays sold + 2*fee; the second fee is neither burned nor sent anywhere, it is stranded as unaccounted IMDO in the PoolManager (manager balance rises by sold + fee, hook.tokenReserve by sold). If the integrator transferred exactly sold + fee, settle leaves a -fee delta and the whole sell reverts with CurrencyNotSettled, contradicting 'sells are never blocked'. Routers that settle after the swap (PoolSwapTest, V4Router) do not see it, which is why the suite passes. The BaseHookFee pattern the brief names takes the fee as an ERC-6909 claim and never touches the manager's ERC-20 balance. Fix that keeps behaviour: always mint the token claim in afterSwap (poolManager.mint(address(this), uint160(token), fee); pendingToken += fee) and burn it in harvest(), as the catch branch at lines 289-291 already does; the ETH path is unaffected because native settlement uses msg.value.","line":287,"path":"src/IMDOFeeHook.sol","reproduction":"Repository fixture (real PoolManager, 200 ETH / 200,000 IMDO, fee 3000, next block). Control: alice does an exact-output sell of 10 ETH on the identical hookless twin through PoolSwapTest: input 10,535.835386790897718864 IMDO. Hooked pool, PayFirstRouter (test/scratch/Review.t.sol) whose unlockCallback does manager.sync(IMDO); IMDO.transferFrom(alice, manager, 20_000e18); manager.swap(key, SwapParams(false, 10 ether, MAX_SQRT_PRICE-1), ''); manager.settle(); then takes its positive IMDO and ETH deltas back to alice. Swap delta charges alice 10,746.552094526715673242 IMDO = control + 2% fee 210.716707735817954378 (burned once, totalSupply falls by exactly that). Expected alice spend: 10,746.552094526715673242 IMDO. Actual: 10,957.268802262533627620 IMDO, i.e. control + 2*fee; the manager's IMDO balance rises by 10,746.55 while hook.tokenReserve rises by 10,535.84, leaving 210.716707735817954378 IMDO owned by nobody. Second case, same router transferring exactly control + fee = 10,746.552094526715673242: the call reverts with selector 0x5212cba1 (CurrencyNotSettled()). Scratch tests test_payFirstRouter_exactOutSell_doubleChargesTheFee and test_payFirstRouter_exactInputOfExactlySoldPlusFee_reverts pass with these values.","severity":"medium","snippet":"            try this.takeAndBurn(fee, false) {}","title":"Exact-output sell fee is taken as real IMDO out of the PoolManager mid-swap, so a pay-first (sync, transfer, swap, settle) integrator is charged the fee twice or reverts with CurrencyNotSettled"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_permissions, audit_economics and audit_math (same root cause, strongest variant kept). tokenReserve books the full amount1 of every position, including single-sided positions far below the price that are never traded against, and _rollReserve freezes whatever the ledger held at the end of the previous active block. The first callback of a block takes the snapshot BEFORE applying its own delta, so a holder can add IMDO-only liquidity below the current tick in block N-1 (no ETH, no price exposure, no fee earned), remove it as the first callback in block N (the snapshot is frozen with the parked tokens still counted) and sell those very same tokens in block N against R + parked. Cost: gas and holding the tokens for one block; the capital is not locked during the sell. Any seller holding more IMDO than they sell can push the bracket down to 0%. The brief's literal requirement (same-transaction inflation cannot lower the bracket) is met and README line 42 says inflation held through a block boundary affects the next snapshot, so this is a design limitation rather than a broken guarantee; the treasury loses part of the graduated fee. Possible mitigations inside the design, for the requester to decide: size against min(laggedTokenReserve, tokenReserve before this swap) so parked tokens must stay parked, or exclude the previous block's liquidity additions from the snapshot (min of the last two block-end ledgers).","line":451,"path":"src/IMDOFeeHook.sol","reproduction":"Repository fixture (real PoolManager, 200 ETH / 200,000 IMDO, R = 199,580.329731979975848761 IMDO). s = R*51/1000 = 10,178.596816330978768287 IMDO (5.1% of R, 20,000 ppm bracket; control fee on the hookless twin's gross 9.677 ETH would be 0.193546729447769276 ETH). Block N-1: mallory adds liquidity in ticks [60000, 66000] (current tick 69060, position is IMDO-only) with liquidity = getLiquidityForAmount1(sqrt(60000), sqrt(66000), s): 10,178.596816330978768286 IMDO leave mallory, hook.tokenReserve = R + parked. vm.roll(+1). Block N: mallory removes that liquidity first (hook.laggedTokenReserve becomes 209,758.926548310954617047 = R + parked), then exact-input sells s. Actual: gross 9.677336472388463798 ETH, fee 0.096773364723884638 ETH = 10,000 ppm (s is 4.85% of the inflated snapshot). Expected: 20,000 ppm = 0.193546729447769276 ETH. Scratch test test_parkWithdrawAndSellSameTokens_lowersBracket passes with these values.","severity":"low","snippet":"            laggedTokenReserve = tokenReserve;","title":"Lagged reserve snapshot counts out-of-range IMDO-only liquidity: a seller parks tokens across one block boundary, withdraws them and sells the same tokens against the inflated denominator"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"From audit_permissions; reproduced. beforeInitialize (src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:200-210) accepts fee 500, 3000 or 10000, any tickSpacing and any sqrtPriceX96 from any initiator and binds exactly once. Deploy.run()'s only post-condition about the pool is hook.initialized(); it never derives the expected key (currency0 0, TOKEN, FEE, TICK_SPACING, hook) from configuration and compares it with hook.poolId(), nor reads the initial price. A LAUNCH_CALLDATA or factory default that initializes a different key passes every require and emits LaunchVerified, and because the binding cannot be undone the manifest pool (launch.json: fee 3000, tickSpacing 60, initialPrice 2502784483440051878955016419363) can never be created with this hook afterwards; a redeploy with a new mined address is the only remedy. Fix: add FEE/TICK_SPACING (and optionally INITIAL_SQRT_PRICE) to the configuration, require keccak256(abi.encode(PoolKey(0, TOKEN, FEE, TICK_SPACING, hook))) == hook.poolId(), and read slot0 for the price.","line":128,"path":"script/Deploy.s.sol","reproduction":"test/scratch/Review.t.sol test_deployScript_acceptsWrongPoolKey: vm.chainId(11155111); a factory whose launch(salt, hookCode, fee, spacing, price) creates the IMDOToken, CREATE2-deploys the hook and calls manager.initialize with the given key. Env: POOL_MANAGER = fresh PoolManager, LAUNCH_FACTORY = that factory, TOKEN = the factory's predicted first CREATE address, HOOK_SALT = Deploy.mine(factory, manager, TOKEN, 0, 200000), LAUNCH_CALLDATA = abi.encodeCall(launch, (salt, hookCreationCode(manager, TOKEN), 10000, 200, sqrtPrice(69060))). Expected: Deploy.run() fails because the pool is not the manifest's 3000/60 pool. Actual: run() returns normally, hook.initialized() is true, hook.poolId() == keccak256(abi.encode(PoolKey(0, token, 10000, 200, hook))) != the id of PoolKey(0, token, 3000, 60, hook), LaunchVerified is emitted, and a subsequent manager.initialize of the 3000/60 key reverts with the hook's InvalidPool. Test passes.","severity":"low","snippet":"        require(hook.initialized(), \"factory did not initialize attached pool\");","title":"Deploy script accepts any pool the factory binds to the hook: it never checks the bound poolId against the configured fee tier, tick spacing or price, and the binding is irreversible"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Plain `forge test` on this tree with the installed forge 1.7.1 (the only toolchain in the environment) reports 5 failures: IMDOHookTest.test_cumulativeSoldIsVisibleWithinTheTransactionAndGoneAfter ('gone after the transaction [1197481978391879855092 != 0]'), test_splitSells_sameTx_secondLegRepricesTheFirst ('counter is transient: gone once the transaction ends [2394963956783759710184 != 0]'), test_splitSells_dustLegWithoutASuccessor_neverCheaperThanThePrefixAlone ('which disappears with the transaction'), test_harvestCannotBeAbusedToMoveUserClaims ('hook holds more claims than it accrued [551072701145742590 != 543849885023480212]'), and IMDOHookInvariantTest.test_handlerChecksAreLive ('every fee matched the schedule [3 != 0]'). Root cause is the test harness, not the hook: the suite (and README line 38, 'Foundry clears transient storage between top-level calls made by a test') assumes each top-level call in a test is a separate transaction, so the per-origin ledger would be empty afterwards. In forge 1.7.1 without `isolate`, tstore values persist for the whole test function, so the ledger carries over into later 'transactions' and the follow-up sells are repriced cumulatively (the harvest test's second sell by alice is billed on top of her first, hence the larger claim; the handler's sells are billed on carried volume, hence 3 mismatches). The task rules require the tree to pass plain `forge test` at all times; the fix is to run each simulated transaction through a helper that resets state (e.g. `isolate = true` per test via forge-config, or vm.roll plus an explicit fresh universe per transaction), and to correct README line 38. On chain the ledger does clear at transaction end, so no hook change is implied.","line":6194,"path":"test/IMDO.t.sol","reproduction":"`forge --version` -> 1.7.1 (4072e48). `forge test --no-match-path 'test/scratch/*'` -> '62 tests passed, 5 failed' with the messages above. Probe (test/scratch/TloadProbe.t.sol): a contract whose bump() does tstore(0, tload(0)+1); a test calling t.bump(); t.get(); t.bump(); t.get() observes 1 then 2 (transient storage survives between top-level calls), whereas the suite's comments and README line 38 expect 0 after every call.","severity":"low","snippet":"        assertEq(U.hook.cumulativeSold(alice), 0, \"counter is transient: gone once the transaction ends\");","title":"Delivered suite fails 5 of 67 tests under the pinned toolchain: it assumes forge clears transient storage between top-level calls, which forge 1.7.1 does not"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"From audit_math; verified. README line 81 says the attestation is kept inline 'because a separate launch.json is outside the permitted delivery paths', but the tree contains a root launch.json (kind univ4_hook, fee 3000, tickSpacing 60) whose notes differ from the README's candidate record. README lines 142-144 say the scratch suite passed 16 integration tests, 9 baseline checks and 2 reviewer tests and that 'Tests and their copied dependencies live only under the assignment's disposable test/scratch/', whereas the delivered tree ships test/IMDO.t.sol (vendored v4-core, model factory, Merkle distributor, 67 tests across 5 suites, 5 of which currently fail, see the previous finding). The brief makes the README an acceptance criterion that states the delivery; the numbers it quotes for the build (bytecodeHash none, CBOR tail a164736f6c634300081a000a, no ipfs key) were re-verified against out/ and are correct.","line":144,"path":"README.md","reproduction":"`ls launch.json test/` shows launch.json and test/IMDO.t.sol; `forge test` reports 67 tests in 5 suites from test/IMDO.t.sol; README line 81 and lines 142-144 state otherwise. Artifact check: out/IMDOFeeHook.sol/IMDOFeeHook.json metadata.settings.metadata == {bytecodeHash: none}; deployedBytecode ends a164736f6c634300081a000a.","severity":"info","snippet":"Tests and their copied dependencies live only under the assignment's disposable `test/scratch/`. Production code does not import them and has no network dependency. The protected suite receives the compiled token/hook initcode and declared permissions through its prescribed environment variables; pinned inputs are untouched and scratch copies only adapt one import path to the harness. Scratch tests are removed by the task runner and are not a delivered regression suite. No fork rehearsal, live factory/distributor verification, Slither, Mythril, or external audit is claimed.","title":"README describes a delivery that is not the one in the tree: it says tests live only under test/scratch/ and that launch.json cannot be delivered, while test/IMDO.t.sol (67 tests) and a root launch.js"}],"hash":"389924053580e57f049a62b35e086e705eb327c463f308d7b954d5ff43a444ea","nodeId":"537df49c-fcf3-4c6d-a8d2-d5bbd53e2627","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. The findings file is written at `.imd-findings.json` with 6 findings and 21 coverage rows, and no tracked file was changed.\n\n**What I kept, after reproducing each on the repository's own real-PoolManager fixture**\n\n- **Medium, shared tx.origin billing** (all four specialists, merged). A later seller under the same tx.origin pays the earlier seller's repricing. On the fixture, bob's 0.02% sell after alice's 4.99% sell returned 0 wei. In the second case he paid 25.5% of his own output. The specialist's attached proof fails on this code as stated, so it rides on this finding.\n- **Medium, pay-first exact-output integrator** (audit_flow). The hook takes real IMDO out of the manager mid-swap, so an integrator that syncs and transfers before swapping is charged the fee twice. The surplus equals the burned fee exactly and is stranded in the manager. Transferring exactly sold plus fee reverts with CurrencyNotSettled.\n- **Low, out-of-range parking** (three specialists, merged, strongest variant kept). Park IMDO below the price, withdraw it as the first callback of the next block, then sell the same tokens. A 5.1% sell was billed at the 1% bracket instead of 2%.\n- **Low, deploy script pins no pool key**. A factory that initializes a fee 10000, spacing 200 pool passes every check in the script, and the manifest's 3000/60 pool is rejected by the hook forever after.\n- **Low, delivered suite fails under the pinned toolchain** (my own finding). Five of 67 tests fail on forge 1.7.1 because the suite and README assume transient storage clears between top-level calls. A probe shows it persists. The hook itself is not at fault.\n- **Info, README describes a different delivery** (audit_math). It says tests live only in scratch and launch.json cannot be shipped, while both exist in the tree. Its build-reproducibility numbers were re-verified and are correct.\n\n**Dropped**: the cross-transaction splitting finding, because per-transaction accumulation is exactly what the brief specifies. All static-analysis leads were traced and none hold: the divide-before-multiply is an exact ceiling, and the reentrancy lines are covered by the payment guard and the harvest slot.\n\n**Coverage**: all 14 entry points answered, plus 7 invariant rows. The token's four entry points hold. Permissions match 0x25d4 and launch.json, and the artifacts carry no ipfs hash.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1884355,"inputTokens":418,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":45492,"runtime":"claude","turns":30,"wallClockMs":626633}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"3f91b58cf7cd2d45","findings":[],"hash":"4bbb8de554d340e59e0432aedf1772a5d6044ca6b7271641eb00e30e098eebe3","nodeId":"537df49c-fcf3-4c6d-a8d2-d5bbd53e2627","outcome":"completed","summary":"All five of my earlier findings are settled and I have nothing new to report. `.imd-findings.json` holds an empty findings list and a coverage record with all 14 entry points marked `holds`.\n\nI re-ran each earlier reproduction against the revised code on the real v4 PoolManager fixture:\n\n- **Shared `tx.origin` over-charge (medium):** fixed. The later seller now pays at most 2% of their own basis in both of my cases and for an exact-output leg. My attached proof passes.\n- **Exact-output fee taken mid-swap (medium):** fixed. The fee is always minted as a claim, so a pay-first router pays sold plus fee exactly once. Prepaying exactly that amount no longer reverts, and `harvest()` burns exactly the fee with nothing stranded.\n- **Park, withdraw and sell (low):** fixed. Sizing now uses the lower of the lagged snapshot and the live reserve, so the same scenario is billed at 20,000 ppm.\n- **Deploy script accepting any bound pool (low):** fixed. A 10000/200 launch and a wrong initial price are both rejected, and the configured 3000/60 launch passes.\n- **Suite failing under forge 1.7.1 (low):** dropped. The installed toolchain is now forge 1.8.3, where the suite passes 64 of 64. I could not re-run 1.7.1 here, but the transaction-end assertions are now gated on a transient-storage probe.\n- **README describing a different delivery (info):** fixed. The stale statements are gone, and the build numbers match the artifacts: no ipfs hash, `bytecodeHash` none, 9,050 and 1,586 bytes.\n\nThe per-swap cap lets a deliberate splitter pay about 1% instead of 2% on a sell that just crosses 5%. This is the tradeoff I proposed last round, and the README states it with measured numbers, so I did not raise it as a finding.\n\nNo tracked files were changed, and my scratch tests were removed.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":888654,"inputTokens":20,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":13912,"runtime":"claude","turns":15,"wallClockMs":185181}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":2,"bundleHash":"5b267149a890e84fe0b551fd6e1d0a21495c1c9db0bb4bed3cb9078999857506","device":"3c7630b22a73c1fb","findings":[{"description":"The brief requires the hook to \"accumulate each tx.origin's sells within one transaction and bill the cumulative size\". afterSwap does accumulate (`cumulative = _load(slot) + sold`) and picks the bracket from the cumulative amount (`feePpm(cumulative, laggedTokenReserve)`), but it then charges that rate only on the current leg's own basis (`fee = (basis * rate + PPM - 1) / PPM` where `basis` is this swap's gross ETH output / token input). Earlier legs are never repriced, so everything sold while the running total was below 1% stays free, and later legs are billed at a rate the earlier legs escaped. With a reserve R and price 1,000 IMDO/ETH, one 5% sell (50,000 IMDO -> 50 ETH gross) pays 2% = 1.0 ETH; the same 5% sold as 0.99% + 4.01% in one transaction pays 0 + 2% x 40.1 ETH = 0.802 ETH; sold as 0.99% + 1.99% + 2.02% it pays 0 + 0.5% x 19.9 + 2% x 20.2 = 0.5035 ETH. The README acknowledges this (\"does not make the total fee independent of splitting ... Full retrospective billing is not implemented\") and argues that retroactive billing on the last leg could exceed that leg's ETH output. That is a real constraint for an afterSwap return delta, but it does not require giving up cumulative billing: the shortfall can be charged on the token side (the unspecified currency for exact-output legs is already burned this way, and for exact-input legs the hook can take/burn tokens via a claim) or the fee due on the running total can be billed up to the leg's output and the remainder carried in transient storage to the next leg. As delivered, a bot that splits every sell into a sub-1% leg plus the rest pays at most ~80% of the schedule, and with finer splits roughly half. The delivered suite asserts only lower bounds for split legs (`assertGe`) so that it does not bless this behaviour; the proof below asserts the brief's requirement and fails on the current code.","line":264,"path":"src/IMDOFeeHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {\n    IMDOToken,\n    IMDOFeeHook,\n    IPoolManager,\n    PoolKey,\n    Currency,\n    SwapParams,\n    ModifyLiquidityParams,\n    BalanceDelta\n} from \"src/IMDOFeeHook.sol\";\n\n/// @notice Finding: splitting a sell across several swaps in one transaction pays less than one sell of the same\n/// total size. The brief requires the cumulative size to be BILLED, not merely used to pick the current leg's\n/// bracket. The hook charges each leg at the bracket of the running total but only on that leg's own output, so\n/// every leg below the first threshold is free and every later leg is billed at a rate the earlier legs escaped.\n///\n/// The fee arithmetic lives entirely in `afterSwap`; the manager only delivers deltas and receives `take`/`mint`.\n/// This stub drives the callbacks exactly as v4 does (beforeSwap, then afterSwap with the settled delta), with a\n/// fixed price of 1,000 IMDO per ETH so the gross ETH output of a split equals the gross output of a single sell.\ncontract ManagerStub {\n    uint256 public taken;\n    uint256 public minted;\n\n    function protocolFeesAccrued(Currency) external pure returns (uint256) {\n        return 0;\n    }\n\n    function take(Currency, address, uint256 amount) external {\n        taken += amount;\n    }\n\n    function mint(address, uint256, uint256 amount) external {\n        minted += amount;\n    }\n\n    function burn(address, uint256, uint256) external {}\n\n    function unlock(bytes calldata) external pure returns (bytes memory) {\n        return \"\";\n    }\n\n    function init(IMDOFeeHook hook, PoolKey memory key) external {\n        hook.beforeInitialize(address(this), key, 0);\n    }\n\n    function seed(IMDOFeeHook hook, PoolKey memory key, uint256 tokens) external {\n        hook.afterAddLiquidity(\n            address(this),\n            key,\n            ModifyLiquidityParams(0, 0, 0, bytes32(0)),\n            _delta(0, -int128(int256(tokens))),\n            BalanceDelta.wrap(0),\n            \"\"\n        );\n    }\n\n    /// @dev `legs[i]` exact-input sells by one tx.origin, all inside this one call (one transaction).\n    ///      Returns the sum of the hook fees returned on the unspecified (ETH) side.\n    function sellLegs(IMDOFeeHook hook, PoolKey memory key, uint256[] memory legs) external returns (uint256 total) {\n        for (uint256 i = 0; i < legs.length; i++) {\n            SwapParams memory p = SwapParams(false, -int256(legs[i]), 0);\n            hook.beforeSwap(address(this), key, p, \"\");\n            (, int128 fee) = hook.afterSwap(address(this), key, p, _delta(int128(int256(legs[i] / 1000)), -int128(int256(legs[i]))), \"\");\n            total += uint256(uint128(fee));\n        }\n    }\n\n    function _delta(int128 a0, int128 a1) internal pure returns (BalanceDelta) {\n        return BalanceDelta.wrap(int256((uint256(uint128(a0)) << 128) | uint256(uint128(a1))));\n    }\n}\n\ncontract SplitBillingProofTest is Test {\n    uint256 constant RESERVE = 1_000_000 ether; // last block's token reserve\n\n    ManagerStub manager;\n    IMDOToken token;\n    IMDOFeeHook hook;\n    PoolKey key;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        manager = new ManagerStub();\n        token = new IMDOToken();\n        bytes memory code =\n            abi.encodePacked(type(IMDOFeeHook).creationCode, abi.encode(IPoolManager(address(manager)), address(token)));\n        bytes32 initHash = keccak256(code);\n        address predicted;\n        uint256 salt;\n        while (true) {\n            predicted = address(\n                uint160(uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0xff), address(this), bytes32(salt), initHash))))\n            );\n            if (uint160(predicted) & ((1 << 14) - 1) == 0x25d4) break;\n            salt++;\n        }\n        address at;\n        assembly (\"memory-safe\") {\n            at := create2(0, add(code, 0x20), mload(code), salt)\n        }\n        require(at == predicted, \"create2\");\n        hook = IMDOFeeHook(at);\n        key = PoolKey(Currency.wrap(address(0)), Currency.wrap(address(token)), 3000, 60, at);\n        manager.init(hook, key);\n        manager.seed(hook, key, RESERVE);\n        vm.roll(block.number + 1); // the seeded reserve becomes the lagged snapshot\n    }\n\n    function _legs(uint256 a, uint256 b, uint256 c) internal pure returns (uint256[] memory l) {\n        l = new uint256[](c == 0 ? 2 : 3);\n        l[0] = a;\n        l[1] = b;\n        if (c != 0) l[2] = c;\n    }\n\n    function _single(uint256 a) internal pure returns (uint256[] memory l) {\n        l = new uint256[](1);\n        l[0] = a;\n    }\n\n    /// @dev One 5% sell versus 0.99% + 4.01% in one transaction: same tokens sold, same gross ETH output.\n    function test_splitIntoTwoLegsPaysLessThanOneSell() public {\n        uint256 single = manager.sellLegs(hook, key, _single(RESERVE * 5 / 100));\n        assertEq(single, RESERVE * 5 / 100 / 1000 * 20_000 / 1_000_000, \"single 5% sell pays 2% of gross\");\n        assertEq(hook.cumulativeSold(address(this)), 0, \"fresh transaction\");\n\n        address splitter = address(0x5111);\n        vm.prank(splitter, splitter);\n        uint256 split = manager.sellLegs(hook, key, _legs(RESERVE * 99 / 10_000, RESERVE * 401 / 10_000, 0));\n\n        // Expected (brief): the cumulative 5% is billed, so the split pays at least what the single sell paid.\n        // Actual: the first 0.99% leg is free and only the second leg's own output is charged 2%.\n        assertGe(split, single, \"splitting a 5% sell into 0.99% + 4.01% must not reduce the fee\");\n    }\n\n    /// @dev 0.99% + 1.99% + 2.02%: each leg is billed at the running bracket on its own output only.\n    function test_splitIntoThreeLegsPaysLessThanOneSell() public {\n        uint256 single = manager.sellLegs(hook, key, _single(RESERVE * 5 / 100));\n        address splitter = address(0x5222);\n        vm.prank(splitter, splitter);\n        uint256 split =\n            manager.sellLegs(hook, key, _legs(RESERVE * 99 / 10_000, RESERVE * 199 / 10_000, RESERVE * 202 / 10_000));\n        assertGe(split, single, \"three legs totalling 5% must not pay less than one 5% sell\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Bind the hook to its pool, seed 1,000,000 IMDO of inventory, roll one block so the snapshot is 1,000,000. (a) tx.origin A sells 50,000 IMDO (5%) exact-in with 50 ETH gross output: afterSwap returns fee 1.0 ETH (expected 1.0 ETH). (b) tx.origin B, in ONE transaction, sells 9,900 IMDO (9.9 ETH gross) then 40,100 IMDO (40.1 ETH gross): afterSwap returns 0 then 0.802 ETH, total 0.802 ETH. Expected per the brief: the cumulative 5% is billed, total >= 1.0 ETH. Actual: 0.802 ETH (two legs) / 0.5035 ETH (three legs 0.99%+1.99%+2.02%). Run: forge test --match-path test/scratch/SplitBillingProof.t.sol  -> both tests fail with `802000000000000000 < 1000000000000000000` and `503500000000000000 < 1000000000000000000`.","severity":"medium","title":"Anti-splitting bills each leg at the running bracket on its own output, not the cumulative size: a split sell pays 50-80% less than one sell of the same size"},{"description":"`feePpm` returns MAX_FEE_PPM whenever `reserve == 0` and anything is sold. `laggedTokenReserve` is 0 until the first state mutation of the block AFTER the pool is bound, so in the launch block itself (the factory initializes and seeds in one transaction, and trading opens in the same block) a 0.01% sell is charged 2% of its ETH output, where the schedule says 0%. The README documents this as intended (\"With positive sales and no previous-block reserve, the rate is 20,000 ppm, including the initialization block\"). It is a conservative, anti-manipulation choice and it never exceeds the cap, but it contradicts the bracket table for one block and is worth an explicit decision by the launch owner. The same happens if the pool is ever seeded ETH-only (token ledger 0) until tokens arrive. The delivered suite only asserts that launch-block sells are not blocked and never exceed the cap.","line":306,"path":"src/IMDOFeeHook.sol","reproduction":"Build a pool with the hook, seed 200,000 IMDO + 200 ETH in block N, and in block N sell 100 IMDO (0.05% of the reserve) exact-in. Expected per the schedule: 0 fee. Actual: TREASURY receives ceil(grossETH x 20,000 / 1e6), i.e. 2%. See test_launchBlock_sellsNotBlockedAndNeverAboveCap in test/IMDO.t.sol (asserts only the cap).","severity":"low","title":"Every sell in the launch block pays the 2% cap regardless of size (no lagged snapshot yet)"},{"description":"For an exact-output sell the fee is `ceil(sold x rate / 1e6)` tokens added to the input and burned. The user pays `sold + fee`, so the effective rate on the total paid is rate/(1+rate): 1.961% instead of 2%, 0.990% instead of 1%, 0.498% instead of 0.5%. This mirrors OpenZeppelin BaseHookFee's convention and the README states the formula, so it is reported for the record only. Also for the record: the token-side fee on exact-output sells is burned rather than sent to the treasury, as the brief allows; the treasury therefore receives nothing from exact-output sells.","line":279,"path":"src/IMDOFeeHook.sol","reproduction":"Exact-output sell with 10,000 IMDO input in the 2% bracket: the hook adds 200 IMDO; the user pays 10,200, of which 200 is 1.96%.","severity":"info","title":"Exact-output sells pay the nominal rate on the pre-fee input, so the effective rate on the total paid is slightly below the bracket"},{"description":"run() reads POOL_MANAGER, LAUNCH_FACTORY, TOKEN, HOOK_SALT and LAUNCH_CALLDATA from the environment and calls an external factory whose ABI is not part of the delivery. The suite covers the chain-id guard, mine/predict/hookCreationCode/tokenCreationCode (including CREATE2 landing on the mined address with the declared permission bits, used-address skipping and exhausted-range reverts), and a model factory that performs the deploy-token / CREATE2-hook / initialize / seed sequence atomically. A full rehearsal of run() needs the real factory and a configured environment and is left to the fork rehearsal.","line":80,"path":"script/Deploy.s.sol","reproduction":"n/a","severity":"info","title":"Deploy.run() could not be executed end-to-end in tests (environment-driven), only its guards and helpers"}],"hash":"6449b286e3b0dc99fbf4891bc2188c7f95a48cf1c0dd04af23be7fcaf0a9d8e5","nodeId":"a4ced9f1-a815-4f18-854c-7332b607b078","outcome":"completed","summary":"Done. The deliverable is `test/IMDO.t.sol`, plus `.imd-findings.json` with one proof-backed defect report.\n\n**What was delivered**\n\n- `test/IMDO.t.sol` is fully self-contained because the repo has no `lib/`, no `foundry.toml` and no forge-std, and the verifier runs offline. It carries a minimal cheatcode interface, revert-based asserts, and Uniswap v4-core (commit 46c6834) flattened verbatim, so the hook is exercised against the real `PoolManager` and v4 test routers rather than a mock.\n- A model launch factory deploys the token, CREATE2-deploys the hook at its mined address (using the delivery's `Deploy.mine`), initializes and seeds in one transaction, and distributes position fees to a fixed recipient. A hookless twin pool on a second manager is the control for gross quotes and fee accounting.\n- 55 tests pass at root defaults with scratch removed, including a 1,600-call invariant campaign with zero reverts.\n\n| Suite | Coverage |\n|---|---|\n| IMDOTokenTest (10) | fixed supply, exact transfers, allowance paths, burn, no admin or mint selectors, no DELEGATECALL/SELFDESTRUCT, fuzzed conservation |\n| IMDOHookTest (33) | buys free (both modes), exact fee per bracket for exact-in and exact-out at every boundary, treasury gets the fee to the wei, factory position state/fee collection/withdrawal identical with and without hook, Merkle distributor, same-tx split sells, same-tx liquidity/donation/buy inflation, one-block lag, treasury-rejects claim path and harvest, callbacks refuse strangers, no setters, rebinding and wrong-pool rejections, constructor guards |\n| IMDOHookEdgePoolsTest (4) | launch-block sells, token-only pool on a fresh manager with zero ETH, ETH-only pool where the token fee becomes a claim then burns on harvest, atomic init |\n| IMDODeployScriptTest (6) | chain guard, mine/predict/CREATE2 agreement, used-address skipping, exhausted-range reverts, creation code |\n| IMDOHookInvariantTest (2) | hook holds nothing beyond claims, ledger equals manager inventory minus protocol fees, supply only falls by burns, treasury equals observed fees, sells never blocked, policy immutable; plus a deterministic handler smoke test |\n\n**Finding reported, not tested around**\n\n- Medium: anti-splitting picks the bracket from the cumulative size but bills only the current leg's own output. One 5% sell pays 1.0 ETH; the same 5% split 0.99% + 4.01% in one transaction pays 0.802 ETH, and a three-leg split pays 0.5035 ETH. The proof in `test/scratch/SplitBillingProof.t.sol` (also embedded in the findings file) fails on the current code with those numbers. The delivered suite asserts only lower bounds on split legs so it does not bless this.\n- Low: every sell in the launch block pays the 2% cap because there is no lagged snapshot yet. Two info items cover the exact-output effective rate and that `Deploy.run()` could only be covered through its guards and helpers, since it is environment-driven and `vm.setEnv` is off limits.\n\n**One thing worth knowing**\n\nforge 1.8 wipes transient storage after every top-level call from a test contract. Same-transaction scenarios therefore run inside one external self-call, and the file documents this. If the verifier's forge behaves differently, the two assertions that the counter is zero after a call would be the ones to look at.","treeHash":"d5e6ad8a4984b8a5ef09846ea681cc201d95b340","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":7740922,"inputTokens":1410,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":159106,"runtime":"claude","turns":45,"wallClockMs":1888376}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"4ea3f10cf94f2ebda9e5d77676016cde82c313cc57aefc775e5d4a28df5e79a0","device":"0256823ae36e7900","findings":[],"hash":"86c349dba070f7bd94a18733739be0461b596e9ad94cecf1e46d0bd6a8d8933a","nodeId":"1cfd6a17-70a7-47c0-8860-7c91b3008406","outcome":"completed","summary":"Implemented the token/hook, deployment script, README, and candidate launch attestation. Source build succeeds; **35 scratch tests pass**, including the pinned checks.\n\nAdmission remains incomplete:\n\n- Missing `foundry.toml` cannot be added under the configuration ban; default artifacts retain IPFS metadata.\n- Cumulative volume sets each sell’s bracket, but earlier sells are not retroactively billed.\n- Factory compatibility passed against a model; production factory details were not supplied.\n\nThese limitations are documented in `README.md`.","treeHash":"d8ab57cd71d23a4841172959a6be8cfb7444b2ca","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2356864,"inputTokens":101648,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":18812,"runtime":"codex","turns":7,"wallClockMs":1028287}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"355d85855691ad68cf34052faa000e10eed1a8a60ab64de07afb65f8095b120d","device":"35c52a5b502e847c","findings":[],"hash":"90d626ab462b19ba5a8b3c3d189e57ff4d32445eb7d3472fe628a4d3486272ca","nodeId":"0c276a55-c5a0-47a8-a12a-24a28fc6bf6d","outcome":"completed","summary":"Created [launch.json](/home/identitymd5/.identitymd/work/08e0b212-b09e-414e-b786-c852a10b4b6f/0c276a55-c5a0-47a8-a12a-24a28fc6bf6d/launch.json), matching the contracts, permissions, constructor arguments, and tested ETH pool settings.\n\nValidation passed: supplied schema and refinements, `forge build`, and all 62 tests. Bytecode metadata has no IPFS hash. Notes document the existing split-fee collection limitation.\n\nOnly `launch.json` changed.","treeHash":"4003f5856b8e709b6c7af7c6338340f0f3b42974","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":762368,"inputTokens":92114,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":6464,"runtime":"codex","turns":4,"wallClockMs":157125}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"f3f423c4ebb25c3ac9855c3dc244858d5f8a3080f1024a4755df28ef5565b677","device":"3c7630b22a73c1fb","findings":[{"description":"In _bill, an exact-input leg never charges more than its own gross ETH output; the remainder of the repriced schedule is carried in the transient ledger and collected only if the same origin sells again in the same transaction. If the bracket-lifting leg is the last one, the carried remainder is never collected. This is documented in the README (\"One bound remains\") and is not a way to pay less than selling the prefix alone: the forfeited leg pays 100% of its own output, so the total collected is always at least the fee the prefix alone owes and at most the schedule on the total. It is recorded here so the limitation is explicit in the review record, not asserted as the schedule being met. Covered by test_splitSells_dustLegWithoutASuccessor_neverCheaperThanThePrefixAlone (collected < schedule, >= prefix) and test_splitSells_dustLegForfeitsItsOutputAndTheNextLegCollectsTheRemainder (a later leg collects the remainder exactly).","line":344,"path":"src/IMDOFeeHook.sol","reproduction":"Snapshot reserve R. In one transaction, same tx.origin: exact-input sell of ceil(3% of R) - 1 wei (0.5% bracket, pays 0.5% of its gross g0), then an exact-input sell of 1e12 base units (lifts the total to the 1% bracket, gross g1 of about 1e9 wei). Expected by the schedule: ceil((g0 + g1) * 10000 / 1e6). Actual: ceil(g0 * 5000 / 1e6) + g1, with originLedger(origin).ethPaid below ceil(ethBasis * 10000 / 1e6) until the transaction ends.","severity":"info","title":"Cumulative schedule stays partly uncollected when the leg that lifts the bracket has less ETH output than the repricing and no later sell follows"}],"hash":"96dfb3c4b7902f8be1db5511251914f6880d72a93e4f0144810752a45d6e5026","nodeId":"a4ced9f1-a815-4f18-854c-7332b607b078","outcome":"completed","summary":"The revision is complete and verified. `forge build` succeeds and `forge test` passes all 62 tests, with the full suite run under six different fuzz seeds.\n\n**What happened since the last accepted round.** The implementer changed the hook's split-sell billing from per-leg brackets to retroactive cumulative billing with shortfall carry (commit b6ebd61) and added the root foundry.toml. One accepted test encoded the old per-leg rounding and failed by one wei. Only `test/IMDO.t.sol` was changed in this round.\n\n**Changes to the test file.**\n- Rewrote the anti-splitting section around the new semantics. After every leg the origin's total paid now has to equal the schedule applied to everything sold so far, as an exact equality instead of the old lower bound.\n- Added coverage for the new code paths: exact-in then exact-out and exact-out then exact-in splits with the converted shortfall computed independently, two exact-out legs billed cumulatively, two origins in one transaction kept separate, a dust leg forfeiting its whole output with the next leg collecting the carried remainder, and the ledger view being populated inside the transaction and empty after it.\n- Added a comparison of one 5% sell against three different splits of the same total on identical pool copies. They agree within 16 wei on a fee of roughly one ETH.\n- Added a bounded three-leg fuzz asserting the total equals the schedule on the cumulative size.\n- Added a same-transaction split action to the invariant handler so the cumulative path runs under random sequences, and a `lastDiag` string so an invariant failure reports what mismatched.\n\n**One thing worth knowing about forge.** The invariant handler's first version produced a mismatch that no unit test could reproduce. A minimal experiment showed that forge 1.8.3 clears transient storage after every direct call the handler makes, because the handler is the top-level frame under the invariant executor. The handler now runs both legs inside one external self-call, which keeps them in one transaction, as the hook would see on chain.\n\n**Findings.** I found no defect in the revised hook that needed reporting with a proof. `.imd-findings.json` carries one informational note: when the leg that lifts the bracket has less ETH output than the repricing and no later sell follows, the remainder of the schedule stays uncollected. The README documents this, and the tests show the amount collected is never below what the prefix alone owes and never above the schedule.","treeHash":"38a1856304f93aa2cf7efa7718899ec9d8069867","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":8986026,"inputTokens":1794,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":69152,"runtime":"claude","turns":57,"wallClockMs":1248252}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"0256823ae36e7900","findings":[],"hash":"9ccdae5d184f20b3e1db328671b0ecde38a79b320f7a6d19b77377cb95957c75","nodeId":"a4ced9f1-a815-4f18-854c-7332b607b078","outcome":"failed","summary":"This content was flagged for possible cybersecurity risk. If this seems wrong, try rephrasing your request. If you’re doing authorized security work that requires more cyber permissive safeguards, apply for Daybreak access via https://platform.openai.com/settings/organization/status-and-access before retrying.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":0,"inputTokens":0,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":0,"runtime":"codex","turns":2,"wallClockMs":508512}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"0238a59bba722237","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"seam: access x economics x asymmetry. The billing ledger is keyed only by tx.origin (line 272 / 322), but the fee is charged to whoever is the swapper of the CURRENT leg. _bill reprices everything the origin sold earlier in the transaction and collects the whole shortfall from the current leg, bounded only by that leg's gross ETH output (lines 339-349: `fee = legEth`). When several independent sellers share one tx.origin (ERC-4337 bundler, meta-tx relayer, keeper/solver settling many users' orders, multisend batcher), the seller that happens to cross a bracket pays the back-fee on the other sellers' volume. For that seller the hook fee is far above the 2% hard cap of the brief (up to 100% of proceeds), funds go to the treasury on behalf of the wrong party, and any victim using a normal minOut reverts, i.e. their sell is blocked by somebody else's earlier sell in the bundle. An adversary can do this deliberately at no cost: a userOp selling just under 1% of the reserve is free for the adversary and makes every later small seller in the same bundle pay 0.5% of the adversary's volume. The exact-output branch (lines 353-355) has the same flaw with no bound at all: the victim's token input is increased by the converted shortfall (reverting on the router's max-input check, or overcharging tokens). README mentions that bundled users 'share the bracket' but not that one user pays another's arrears. A fix inside the agreed design needs a scope decision: e.g. keep rate = bracket(cumulative origin volume) but cap what one leg can be charged for earlier legs to legs with the same swap `sender`/recipient, or charge each leg rate(cumulative) on its own basis only; both trade some anti-splitting strength for not taxing third parties.","line":272,"path":"src/IMDOFeeHook.sol","reproduction":"Fixture as test/IMDO.t.sol (real PoolManager, hooked ETH/IMDO pool seeded 200 ETH / 200,000 IMDO, fee 3000, R = hook.tokenReserve() = 199,580.33 IMDO after one block roll). Inside ONE top-level call (one transaction): (1) vm.prank(whale, bundler); swapRouter.swap(key, SwapParams(false, -int(R*499/10000), MAX_SQRT_PRICE-1), ...) -> whale sells 4.99% of R and pays the 1% bracket. (2) vm.prank(victim, bundler); swapRouter.swap(key, SwapParams(false, -int(R*2/10000), MAX_SQRT_PRICE-1), ...) -> victim sells 0.02% of R. Expected: victim receives ~0.03618 ETH less at most 2% (>= 0.03546 ETH). Actual (measured): gross output 36182673095305127 wei, hook fee to TREASURY 36182673095305127 wei, victim receives 0 wei (100% fee). Second case: whale leg R*99/10000 (0.99%, pays 0), victim leg R*2/10000: victim gross 35498436486110884 wei, fee 9047617349259003 wei (25.5% of the victim's output, instead of 0% for a 0.02% sell). With TestSettings/minOut slippage protection the victim's swap reverts instead.","severity":"medium","snippet":"        (uint24 rate, uint256 fee, uint256 cumulative) = _bill(tx.origin, exactInput, sold, legEth);","title":"Shared tx.origin ledger makes a later, unrelated seller pay an earlier seller's repriced fee (up to 100% of their output)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"seam: economics x asymmetry. The bracket is sized only against laggedTokenReserve, which is frozen by the first callback of a block (_rollReserve, lines 449-453) and counts all pool inventory including out-of-range liquidity. The add side inflates the snapshot, but the mirror remove in the next block does not deflate it: afterRemoveLiquidity lowers only tokenReserve. A seller can therefore add his own IMDO as out-of-range, token-only liquidity (no price exposure, no fee paid) in block N-1, then in block N remove it (this first callback freezes the inflated snapshot) and sell those very same tokens against the inflated denominator. No extra capital, two blocks, no cost beyond gas. Anyone holding more IMDO than he sells (or borrowing for one block) lowers the bracket further, down to 0%. README notes that inflation kept through a block boundary affects the snapshot, but not that the capital can be withdrawn and reused for the sell itself. Fix that keeps the design: size against min(laggedTokenReserve, tokenReserve before this swap's delta), so same-tx inflation still cannot lower the bracket and parked liquidity must stay parked (cannot be the tokens being sold).","line":328,"path":"src/IMDOFeeHook.sol","reproduction":"Fixture as test/IMDO.t.sol (hooked pool 200 ETH / 200,000 IMDO, tick 69060, R = 199580329731979975848761). Control: mallory sells s = R*51/1000 (5.1% -> 2% bracket) exact-in: fee to TREASURY 193546729447769276 wei. Attack: block N-1: mallory lpRouter.modifyLiquidity(key, {tickLower 60000, tickUpper 66000, liquidityDelta = getLiquidityForAmounts(sqrtP, sqrt(60000), sqrt(66000), 0, s)}) (token-only, below the current tick). vm.roll(+1). Block N: mallory removes that liquidity (recovers 10178596816330978768285 = s; hook.laggedTokenReserve() is now 209758926548310954617047 = R + s), then sells the same s exact-in. Expected fee 2% (0.1935 ETH); actual fee 96773364723884638 wei (1% bracket, 4.85% of the inflated snapshot): the treasury receives half.","severity":"low","snippet":"        rate = feePpm(l.sold, laggedTokenReserve);","title":"One-block lag is bypassed by parking tokens across a block boundary and selling the same tokens after withdrawing them"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"beforeInitialize (src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:201-204) accepts any of three LP fees, any tickSpacing and any sqrtPriceX96, from any initiator, and binds exactly once. The script's only post-condition about the pool is hook.initialized(); it never compares hook.poolId() with the manifest pool (ETH, token, fee 3000, tickSpacing 60, hook) nor the initial price. A LAUNCH_CALLDATA (or factory default) that initializes a different key passes every check and emits LaunchVerified, and because the binding is irreversible the manifest pool can never be created with this hook afterwards. Fix: compute keccak256(abi.encode(address(0), token, fee, tickSpacing, hook)) from configured FEE/TICK_SPACING and require it equals hook.poolId() (and optionally read slot0 for the price).","line":128,"path":"script/Deploy.s.sol","reproduction":"Run Deploy.run() with LAUNCH_CALLDATA whose factory call initializes PoolKey{currency0: 0, currency1: TOKEN, fee: 10000, tickSpacing: 200, hooks: hook} at an arbitrary sqrtPriceX96. Expected: script fails because launch.json says fee 3000 / tickSpacing 60 / initialPrice 2502784483440051878955016419363. Actual: line 203 accepts fee 10000, hook.initialized() is true, all requires pass, LaunchVerified is emitted; a later initialize of the 3000/60 pool reverts InvalidPool forever.","severity":"low","snippet":"        require(hook.initialized(), \"factory did not initialize attached pool\");","title":"Deploy script accepts any pool bound to the hook; hook binding is one-time and does not pin tickSpacing/price"}],"hash":"ac61b9050b85234520c71d4b69c1d5c3afc041f7d2035f7199baa7c7a647a68c","nodeId":"e2a0061f-e0c0-4667-a164-19032aeb6b19","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is written to `.imd-findings.json`: three findings (one medium, two low) and a coverage row for all 14 entry points plus one invariant. No repository files were changed; the scratch probe I used was deleted afterwards.\n\n## Findings\n\n1. **Medium — a later, unrelated seller pays an earlier seller's fee when they share `tx.origin`** (`src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:272`). The billing ledger is keyed by `tx.origin` only, and each leg collects the whole repriced shortfall, bounded only by that leg's ETH output.\n   - Measured on the project's own fixture (real PoolManager): a whale sells 4.99% of the reserve, then a different user under the same origin sells 0.02%. The second user's gross output is 0.03618 ETH and the fee is 0.03618 ETH, so they receive 0.\n   - With a 0.99% (free) first leg, the second user pays 25.5% instead of 0%.\n   - This affects bundlers, relayers and batch keepers. With a normal minimum-output check the victim's sell reverts instead.\n   - The README says bundled users \"share the bracket\" but not that one pays another's arrears. A fix needs a scope decision because it trades off against anti-splitting strength.\n\n2. **Low — the one-block lag is bypassed by parking tokens across a block boundary and selling the same tokens** (`src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:328`). A seller adds their tokens as out-of-range liquidity in block N−1, removes them first thing in block N (which freezes the inflated snapshot), then sells them.\n   - Measured: a 5.1% sell paid 0.0968 ETH instead of 0.1935 ETH, dropping from the 2% bracket to the 1% bracket.\n   - Suggested fix that keeps the design: size against the smaller of the lagged snapshot and the live reserve before the swap.\n\n3. **Low — the deploy script accepts any pool bound to the hook** (`script/Deploy.s.sol:128`). The only pool check is `hook.initialized()`; the hook itself accepts any tick spacing, any starting price and any of three fee tiers, and binds once. This one is from reading the code, not a run: launch calldata that initializes, say, fee 10000 / spacing 200 would pass every check, and the manifest's 3000/60 pool could then never be created with this hook.\n\n## Coverage\n\nTwelve entry points hold on access control. `afterSwap` carries finding 1; `afterAddLiquidity` is marked against finding 2 because its reserve increase feeds the abused snapshot.\n\n- Every hook callback and `unlockCallback` accepts only the pool manager, and `redeemETH` / `takeAndBurn` accept only self-calls.\n- `harvest()` moves only tracked claims to the fixed treasury or to burn.\n- Nothing can change brackets, cap, treasury, token, manager or the bound pool.\n- The reserve ledger mirrors pool inventory, so I found no path where the liquidity callbacks revert and block the factory's fee collection or withdrawal.\n- The token has no privileged path.\n\n## Not covered\n\n- No proof test files are attached: the repo has no `forge-std`, so a self-contained proof would not compile here, and none of the findings is high or critical.\n- The repository's test suite and the two protected suites were not run; I read parts of the former and did not open the latter.\n- Splitting a sell across several transactions in one block evades cumulative billing, but the brief scopes that to one transaction, so I did not report it.\n- A treasury that is itself a hostile contract was treated as out of scope.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":882781,"inputTokens":19,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":32416,"runtime":"claude","turns":11,"wallClockMs":368791}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"ca080fd306399669","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"The per-transaction ledger is keyed only by tx.origin, and _bill() collects the whole cumulative shortfall (owed on every earlier leg at the new bracket, minus what was paid) from whichever leg lifts the bracket (lines 331-350). When several independent sellers share one tx.origin (an ERC-4337 bundler's handleOps, a relayer/meta-transaction forwarder, a batch executor or solver, or any contract that sells IMDO earlier in the victim's transaction) the later seller pays the repricing of the earlier seller's volume out of their own swap. An exact-input leg is charged up to its entire gross ETH output (line 345 `fee = legEth`), so the effective hook fee on that user's sell is far above the 20,000 ppm hard cap the brief sets for a sell, and the ETH that reaches the treasury was owed by a different party. With any nonzero amountOutMinimum on the router the victim's sell reverts instead, which contradicts 'sells are never blocked'. The README only says bundled users 'share the bracket'; it does not say one user pays another's fee. The existing test test_splitSells_differentOriginsInOneTransactionAreSeparate only covers different origins.","line":272,"path":"src/IMDOFeeHook.sol","reproduction":"Real v4 PoolManager fixture from test/IMDO.t.sol (full-range pool, 200 ETH / 200,000 IMDO, LP fee 3000, roll one block so laggedTokenReserve R = 200,000e18). Inside ONE external call (one transaction), both swaps through PoolSwapTest with the same tx.origin `bundler` but different msg.sender: (1) vm.prank(alice, bundler): exact-input sell of R*499/10000 = 9,980 IMDO -> 1% bracket, alice nets 9.383716680052389617 ETH. (2) vm.prank(bob, bundler): exact-input sell of R*2/10000 = 40 IMDO (0.02% of the reserve; alone it is in the 0% bracket). Cumulative becomes 5.01% -> 20,000 ppm, shortfall = extra 1% of alice's ~9.48 ETH basis + 2% of bob's. Expected: bob pays 0 (or at most 2% of his own 0.036182673095305127 ETH gross output). Actual: the hook returns fee == legEth, the treasury receives all 0.036182673095305127 ETH and bob receives 0 wei for his 40 IMDO. Second case: alice sells R*99/10000 = 1,980 IMDO (free, nets 1.954765874390008304 ETH), then bob sells 40 IMDO: bob's gross is 0.039096529362920828 ETH but he receives 0.029127217344156182 ETH, i.e. 25.5% of his output is taken to pay 0.5% on alice's sell, while alice keeps her full fee-free output. For an exact-output victim leg the shortfall is converted to extra IMDO input with no bound (line 353-354). A fix that keeps the design: bill each leg at the cumulative bracket on its own basis only (marginal billing), or cap what a leg can pay at MAX_FEE_PPM of that leg's own basis.","severity":"medium","snippet":"        (uint24 rate, uint256 fee, uint256 cumulative) = _bill(tx.origin, exactInput, sold, legEth);","title":"Shared tx.origin: a later seller's leg is charged the retroactive fee shortfall of an unrelated earlier seller (up to 100% of its ETH output)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"For exact-output sells the hook calls takeAndBurn(fee,false), which does poolManager.take(token, hook, fee) and burns, i.e. it lowers the manager's real IMDO balance in the middle of the swap. OpenZeppelin BaseHookFee (the pattern the brief requires) takes the fee as an ERC-6909 claim (mint), which never touches the manager's ERC-20 balance. v4 settlement credits `balanceOf(manager) - reserves recorded at sync()`. If the caller has an open sync on IMDO when the swap runs (the legal pay-first order: sync, transfer the maximum input, swap, settle, take back the surplus), the hook's take reduces the balance that settle() measures, so the seller is credited `fee` less than they transferred while the swap delta already charged them sold + fee. The seller pays sold + 2*fee; the second `fee` is neither burned nor given to the treasury or LPs, it is stranded as unaccounted surplus in the PoolManager. If the caller transferred exactly sold + fee instead, settle leaves a negative delta and the sell reverts with CurrencyNotSettled. Routers that settle after the swap (PoolSwapTest, V4Router's adjacent sync/transfer/settle) are not affected, which is why the suite does not see it.","line":287,"path":"src/IMDOFeeHook.sol","reproduction":"Real v4 PoolManager fixture from test/IMDO.t.sol (full-range pool 200 ETH / 200,000 IMDO, fee 3000, next block). A router's unlockCallback does: manager.sync(IMDO); IMDO.transferFrom(alice, manager, 20_000e18); manager.swap(key, SwapParams(false, int256(10 ether), MAX_SQRT_PRICE-1), \"\"); manager.settle(); then takes its remaining positive IMDO delta and the 10 ETH back to alice. Control (identical twin pool, PoolSwapTest, same 10 ETH exact-output sell): alice spends 10746.552094526715673242 IMDO, of which 210.716707735817954378 is the 2% hook fee that is burned. Pay-first router on the hooked pool: alice spends 10957.268802262533627620 IMDO = control + 210.716707735817954378; totalSupply still falls by only 210.716707735817954378; the manager's IMDO balance rises by 10746.55 while hook.tokenReserve rises by 10535.835386790897718864, so 210.716707735817954378 IMDO of alice's is left unowned in the manager. Expected: same cost as the control. Fix that keeps behaviour: in afterSwap always mint the IMDO claim (poolManager.mint(address(this), uint160(token), fee); pendingToken += fee) and burn it in harvest(), as the fallback branch at lines 289-291 already does.","severity":"medium","snippet":"            try this.takeAndBurn(fee, false) {}","title":"Exact-output sell fee is transferred out of the PoolManager as real ERC-20 during afterSwap instead of minted as a claim: a pay-first (sync -> transfer -> swap -> settle) integrator is charged the tok"}],"hash":"bbbda837f7fac6461ea99194151166f37b08abe9cbeb36c08302345dece81edd","nodeId":"4fdbe4f9-3e01-4906-8545-64c4ec2d7fe4","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is written to `.imd-findings.json`: two medium findings, plus coverage rows for all 14 entry points and two invariants. No tracked files were changed.\n\nBoth findings were reproduced against the real v4 PoolManager fixture in `test/IMDO.t.sol` using scratch tests, which I then deleted. Neither carries a `proof` file: they are medium, and the repository has no forge-std to run a self-contained proof against.\n\n1. **Shared `tx.origin` cross-charging** (`src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:272`). The ledger is keyed only by `tx.origin`, and the leg that lifts the bracket pays the whole retroactive shortfall. When unrelated sellers share an origin (ERC-4337 bundler, relayer, batch executor), the later seller pays the earlier seller's repricing.\n   - Alice sells 4.99% of the reserve, then Bob sells 0.02%: Bob's entire 0.0362 ETH output goes to the treasury and he receives 0.\n   - Alice sells 0.99% for free, then Bob sells 0.02%: Bob loses 25.5% of his output while Alice pays nothing.\n   - If Bob sets any minimum output, his sell reverts instead.\n\n2. **Exact-output token fee taken as real ERC-20 mid-swap** (`src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:287`). The hook pulls IMDO out of the manager and burns it during `afterSwap`, rather than minting a claim as the BaseHookFee pattern does (that comparison is from memory; the library is not in the repo). A router that pays first (sync, transfer, swap, settle) is charged the fee twice.\n   - On a 10 ETH exact-output sell, Alice pays an extra 210.72 IMDO, which is left unowned in the PoolManager.\n   - Routers that settle after the swap are unaffected, which is why the existing suite does not see it.\n   - The fix is to always mint the claim and burn it in `harvest()`, as the fallback branch already does.\n\nCoverage: `afterSwap` is marked against finding 1 and `takeAndBurn` against finding 2; the other twelve entry points hold, with reserve tracking, the harvest and unlock path, the reentrancy guard, and the helper math each traced. The deploy script was read and no defect found.\n\nNot reported, because the README already discloses them as design limits:\n- Every sell in the launch block pays the 2% cap.\n- Reserve inflation held across a block boundary can lower the bracket.\n- Splitting a sell across separate transactions avoids the cumulative billing.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1560600,"inputTokens":29,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":46233,"runtime":"claude","turns":19,"wallClockMs":668503}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"ca080fd306399669","findings":[],"hash":"dff8a4ea30558162056d28be0ae8bf3ce8b447a63e53a407aaf9f78e254b13b9","nodeId":"a4ced9f1-a815-4f18-854c-7332b607b078","outcome":"no_change","summary":"The reported failures do not reproduce on this tree, so I left `test/IMDO.t.sol` unchanged and answered the finding as `not_reproducible` in `.imd-responses.json`.\n\n- **Harness difference is real:** a transient-storage probe reads 1 then 2 under forge 1.7.1 and 0 then 0 under the installed forge 1.8.3, as the reviewer described.\n- **Suite passes under both:** with a forge 1.7.1 release binary downloaded into `test/scratch/`, `forge test` gives 69 passed, 0 failed; with forge 1.8.3 it gives 64 passed, 0 failed (the versions count the invariant suite differently). `forge build` succeeds.\n- **The five named tests pass under 1.7.1** when run on their own.\n- **Why:** the accepted suite already detects which behaviour the harness has and only makes the \"ledger is gone after the transaction\" assertions where it applies. The report's line number and 67-test count don't match this file, so it appears to describe an earlier revision.\n\nREADME line 42 still says Foundry clears transient storage between top-level calls, which is false for forge 1.7.1. `README.md` is outside my writable paths, so I noted it in the response for its owner rather than changing it.\n\nI wrote no `.imd-findings.json`, since I found no new defect in the implementation this round.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":444998,"inputTokens":16,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":5314,"runtime":"claude","turns":9,"wallClockMs":131929}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"72b617d4b615473a","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Seam: economics x asymmetry (Flow Gap / Invariant guides). _bill keeps one ledger per tx.origin and collects the whole cumulative shortfall (schedule on everything the origin sold, minus what was paid) from whichever leg lifts the bracket, bounded only by that leg's gross ETH output (fee = legEth). tx.origin does not identify the seller: a relayer, ERC-4337 bundler, solver or batching contract executes sells for unrelated users under one origin. The later user then pays the repricing of the earlier user's sale, and when the earlier sale is large the later user receives 0 ETH. The fee taken from that swap is not bounded by MAX_FEE_PPM of the swap: the brief's \"hard cap 2%\" holds for the rate variable only, not for what a swapper actually loses. A user with a minimum-output check in the router instead has the swap reverted, i.e. the sell is blocked by somebody else's earlier sell. The treasury, not the earlier seller, receives the excess, so this is misdirected cost / griefing rather than theft; the README mentions that bundled users \"share the bracket\" but not that one user pays for another or can forfeit the full output. Fix needs a scope decision because the brief mandates tx.origin accumulation: e.g. charge each leg rate(cumulative) on its OWN basis only (no retroactive collection from a later leg), or cap what a leg pays at MAX_FEE_PPM of its own output and carry the rest.","line":345,"path":"src/IMDOFeeHook.sol","reproduction":"Reproduced on the repository's own fixture (real v4 PoolManager, full-range pool 200 ETH / 200,000 IMDO, LP fee 3000, snapshot R = 200,000 IMDO, block after launch). In ONE transaction with tx.origin = relayer 0x4E1A: (1) alice (msg.sender alice, vm.prank(alice, relayer)) exact-input sells 9,980 IMDO (4.99% of R) through PoolSwapTest -> pays the 1% bracket; (2) bob (vm.prank(bob, relayer)) exact-input sells 40 IMDO (0.02% of R; alone it is in the 0% bracket and would return about 0.038 ETH). Cumulative for the origin is 5.01% -> 20,000 ppm on both legs; shortfall (about 0.094 ETH) exceeds bob's output, so fee = legEth. Actual: bob receives 0 wei for 40 IMDO (100% fee), treasury total 0.130967690065531285 ETH, alice nets 9.383716680052389617 ETH. Expected: bob pays 0 (or at most 2% of his own output). Second case, same setup, alice sells 1,980 IMDO (0.99%) then bob sells 1,980 IMDO (0.99%) under the same origin: alice nets 1.954765874390008304 ETH and pays nothing; bob nets 1.897566179467610002 ETH because he alone paid 0.019358452531947831 ETH (0.5% of BOTH outputs, about 1% of his own) although each sale alone is in the free bracket.","severity":"medium","snippet":"                fee = legEth; // bounded by the leg's output; the rest carries forward","title":"Sellers sharing a tx.origin pay each other's repricing: a later leg can lose up to 100% of its ETH output, far above the 2% cap"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Economic Security guide (\"push fee formulas to zero\"). The cumulative ledger lives in transient storage, so it resets with every transaction, while the denominator (laggedTokenReserve) is constant for the whole block. A seller therefore splits a large sell into several transactions (same block, same sender, a builder bundle or simply consecutive nonces), each under 1% of the snapshot, and every one is billed 0 ppm. Cost of the bypass is base gas for the extra transactions only; the treasury loses the entire graduated fee. The brief literally asks for per-transaction accumulation and the README states that different transactions have separate totals, so this is the specified behaviour, but it means the size-graduated fee is optional for any seller who can send more than one transaction. Closing it (e.g. accumulating per origin per block number in storage, or per snapshot period) changes the agreed design and needs a scope decision.","line":322,"path":"src/IMDOFeeHook.sol","reproduction":"Fixture as above (R = 200,000 IMDO, 200 ETH, block after launch). alice sends six separate transactions in the same block, each an exact-input sell of 1,800 IMDO (0.9% of R). laggedTokenReserve stays R for all six; cumulativeSold(alice) restarts at 0 each time. Actual: 10,800 IMDO sold (539 bps of R), alice receives 10.217509712118940498 ETH, TREASURY balance 0. The same 10,800 IMDO in one transaction: treasury receives 0.204350194242378810 ETH (2%) and alice 10.013159517876561689 ETH. The split saves the seller exactly the 0.2043 ETH fee.","severity":"low","snippet":"        bytes32 base = keccak256(abi.encode(SOLD_NAMESPACE, origin));\n        Ledger memory l = _loadLedger(base);","title":"Anti-splitting is void across transactions: the same seller dumps 5.39% of the reserve in one block and pays 0 instead of 2%"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Invariant guide (denominator manipulable through a secondary path). tokenReserve counts every IMDO booked in the pool, including single-sided positions far from the price that can never be traded against, and the snapshot is whatever the ledger held at the end of the previous active block. A holder adds an IMDO-only position at unreachable ticks in block N, sells in block N+1 against the inflated snapshot, and removes the position in the same block: no price risk, no fee, 1 wei of rounding. The lag only defeats same-transaction inflation, as the brief requires, and the README says inflation held through a block boundary affects the next snapshot; the gap is that the inflation is free and risk-free because out-of-range inventory counts in full. It needs the seller to hold the parked IMDO, so the bracket moves by parked/R; combined with finding 2 it is the weaker of the two bypasses. A fix inside the design: do not let liquidity added in the previous block raise the snapshot (e.g. snapshot = min of the last two block-end ledgers), which is a design decision for the author.","line":451,"path":"src/IMDOFeeHook.sol","reproduction":"Fixture as above (R = 200,000 IMDO). Block N: alice calls modifyLiquidity on the hooked pool with tickLower -60000, tickUpper 0 (current tick 69060, so the position is IMDO-only and unreachable by sells) and liquidity = getLiquidityForAmount1(sqrt(-60000), sqrt(0), 50,000e18); 50,000 IMDO are booked, tokenReserve = 250,000. vm.roll(+1). Block N+1: alice exact-input sells 2,400 IMDO. feePpm(2400e18, 200000e18) = 5,000 (1.2% of the honest reserve), but the hook sizes against laggedTokenReserve = 250,000 (0.96%) and charges 0: TREASURY balance stays 0. Alice then removes the same liquidity and gets back 50,000 IMDO minus 1 wei. Expected: 0.5% of the ETH output to the treasury.","severity":"low","snippet":"            laggedTokenReserve = tokenReserve;","title":"IMDO parked out of range over one block boundary inflates the lagged reserve and lowers the bracket at no cost"}],"hash":"eba2e9e71baa73463e6232616e814a8b5fc9e7cb63f1458a0a28cad88f2e9a9e","nodeId":"fa0f105e-b84e-4c5c-9c7d-7fe37111eb06","outcome":"completed","summary":"The economics audit found no critical or high defect; `.imd-findings.json` in the repository root holds three findings (one medium, two low) and a coverage row for all 14 entry points.\n\nAll three findings were reproduced against the repository's own fixture (real v4 PoolManager, 200 ETH / 200,000 IMDO pool) in a scratch test, which I then deleted. The existing suite passes 62/62, and no tracked file was changed.\n\n## Findings\n\n1. **Medium — sellers sharing a `tx.origin` pay each other's repricing** (`src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:345`). Under one relayer origin, alice sells 4.99% of the reserve, then bob sells 0.02%. Bob receives 0 wei for 40 IMDO, because his leg is charged the repricing of alice's sale up to his whole output. With two 0.99% sellers, the second alone pays 0.5% on both outputs. The 2% cap holds for the rate, not for what a single swap loses. The README says bundled users \"share the bracket\" but not that one pays for another.\n\n2. **Low — anti-splitting does not hold across transactions** (`src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:322`). Six separate 0.9% sells in one block move 5.39% of the reserve and pay nothing; the same size in one transaction pays 0.2043 ETH (2%). This is what the brief specifies (transient, per-transaction) and the README states it.\n\n3. **Low — IMDO parked out of range over one block boundary lowers the bracket for free** (`src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:451`). Parking 50,000 IMDO at ticks [-60000, 0], rolling one block, then selling 1.2% of the honest reserve pays 0 instead of 0.5%. The parked liquidity comes back minus 1 wei. The README acknowledges cross-block inflation but not that it is costless.\n\nFixing any of the three changes the agreed design, so each finding names the trade-off rather than a drop-in patch.\n\n## Coverage\n\n- **Holds:** fee side and delta netting in `afterSwap`, the claim fallback and `harvest` path, the reserve ledger across swap, add, remove, donate and protocol fee, bracket boundaries, and the one-time pool bind. Factory LP-fee collection cannot be blocked by a ledger underflow.\n- **Mixed-mode conversions and the dust-leg bound:** I found no way for a single origin to pay less than selling the prefix alone.\n- **Treasury:** the address has no code on Sepolia (checked with `cast code`), so the direct ETH transfer cannot be rejected.\n\n## Not reached\n\n- The production launch factory and swarm Merkle distributor — only the model factory in the tests exists here.\n- Universal Router / V4Router settlement behaviour.\n- A fork rehearsal.\n\nNo finding carries a `proof` test, since none is critical or high. The repository also has no `forge-std`, so a proof in the required form would not compile here.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":937591,"inputTokens":17,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":40654,"runtime":"claude","turns":11,"wallClockMs":559877}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":435,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 2 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 313.31ms\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[uninitialized-local]: local variable is read before being initialized\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:294:89\n    │\n294 │         emit SellFee(tx.origin, cumulative, rate, exactInput ? address(0) : token, fee, claimed);\n    │                                                                                         ━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/uninitialized-local\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:294:9\n    │\n294 │         emit SellFee(tx.origin, cumulative, rate, exactInput ? address(0) : token, fee, claimed);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:267:24\n    │\n267 │         uint256 sold = uint256(-int256(tokenDelta));\n    │                        ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:269:41\n    │\n269 │         uint256 legEth = ethDelta > 0 ? uint256(uint128(ethDelta)) : 0;\n    │                                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:269:49\n    │\n269 │         uint256 legEth = ethDelta > 0 ? uint256(uint128(ethDelta)) : 0;\n    │                                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:295:42\n    │\n295 │         return (this.afterSwap.selector, int128(int256(fee)));\n    │                                          ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:295:49\n    │\n295 │         return (this.afterSwap.selector, int128(int256(fee)));\n    │                                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:358:23\n    │\n358 │             if (fee > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) fee = uint256(uint128(type(int128).max));\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:358:31\n    │\n358 │             if (fee > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) fee = uint256(uint128(type(int128).max));\n    │                               ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:358:65\n    │\n358 │             if (fee > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) fee = uint256(uint128(type(int128).max));\n    │                                                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:358:73\n    │\n358 │             if (fee > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) fee = uint256(uint128(type(int128).max));\n    │                                                                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[divide-before-multiply]: division before multiplication may lose precision\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:386:16\n    │\n386 │         return (reserve / 100) * percent + ((reserve % 100) * percent + 99) / 100;\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/divide-before-multiply\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `pendingETH` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:414:17\n    │\n414 │             try this.redeemETH(ethAmount) {\n    │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `pendingToken` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:421:17\n    │\n421 │             try this.takeAndBurn(tokenAmount, true) {\n    │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:427:9\n    │\n427 │         emit Harvested(ethAmount, tokenAmount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:458:51\n    │\n458 │         if (callerTokenDelta < 0) tokenReserve += uint256(-int256(callerTokenDelta));\n    │                                                   ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:459:30\n    │\n459 │         else tokenReserve -= uint128(callerTokenDelta);\n    │                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:463:16\n    │\n463 │         return int128(BalanceDelta.unwrap(delta) >> 128);\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:467:16\n    │\n467 │         return int128(BalanceDelta.unwrap(delta));\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":50,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\nWarning: No tests found in project! Forge looks for functions that start with `test`\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":27,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"IMDOFeeHook.afterAddLiquidity(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(int24,int24,int256,bytes32),int256,int256,bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.afterDonate(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint256,uint256,bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.afterRemoveLiquidity(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(int24,int24,int256,bytes32),int256,int256,bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.harvest()\",\"IMDOFeeHook.redeemETH(uint256)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.takeAndBurn(uint256,bool)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\",\"IMDOToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"IMDOToken.burn(uint256)\",\"IMDOToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"IMDOToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\"README.md\":144,\"foundry.toml\":12,\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":134,\"src/IMDOFeeHook.sol\":493},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":1162,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[medium/medium] divide-before-multiply at src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:385: IMDOFeeHook._ceilPercent(uint256,uint256) (src/IMDOFeeHook.sol#385-387) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:\n[medium/medium] reentrancy-no-eth at src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:408: Reentrancy in IMDOFeeHook.unlockCallback(bytes) (src/IMDOFeeHook.sol#408-429):\n[medium/medium] reentrancy-no-eth at src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:408: Reentrancy in IMDOFeeHook.unlockCallback(bytes) (src/IMDOFeeHook.sol#408-429):\n[medium/medium] uninitialized-local at src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:275: IMDOFeeHook.afterSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,BalanceDelta,bytes).claimed (src/IMDOFeeHook.sol#275) is a local variable never initialized\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:401: IMDOFeeHook.harvest() (src/IMDOFeeHook.sol#401-406) ignores return value by poolManager.unlock() (src/IMDOFeeHook.sol#404)\n[low/medium] events-maths at src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:298: IMDOFeeHook.afterDonate(address,PoolKey,uint256,uint256,bytes) (src/IMDOFeeHook.sol#298-307) should emit an event for: \n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:251: Reentrancy in IMDOFeeHook.afterSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,BalanceDelta,bytes) (src/IMDOFeeHook.sol#251-296):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:251: Reentrancy in IMDOFeeHook.afterSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,BalanceDelta,bytes) (src/IMDOFeeHook.sol#251-296):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:251: Reentrancy in IMDOFeeHook.afterSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,BalanceDelta,bytes) (src/IMDOFeeHook.sol#251-296):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:408: Reentrancy in IMDOFeeHook.unlockCallback(bytes) (src/IMDOFeeHook.sol#408-429):","passed":true},{"durationMs":437,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[high] reentrancy-state-change at src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:258: Reentrancy: State change after external call (2 places)\n[low] large-numeric-literal at src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:9: Large Numeric Literal (5 places)\n[low] literal-instead-of-constant at src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:203: Literal Instead of Constant (10 places)\n[low] state-change-without-event at src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:212: State Change Without Event (3 places)","passed":true},{"durationMs":98,"exitCode":0,"name":"proof 111725c3487c","output":"Owed nothing: on the tree this revision started from the proof did not compile or run, so it never reproduced the finding.\n\nError: Compiler run failed:\nError (6275): Source \"forge-std/Test.sol\" not found: File not found. Searched the following locations: \"/tmp/imd-verify-pijwH1/repo\".\nParserError: Source \"forge-std/Test.sol\" not found: File not found. Searched the following locations: \"/tmp/imd-verify-pijwH1/repo\".\n --> test/imd-proof-52cd344d/Proof_111725c3487c.t.sol:4:1:\n  |\n4 | import {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\n  | ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^\n","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"0419b296c22fbdb9feb05840f1dfad8c86143d11f79d7df80db0f5b9a623f9a5","verifiedTreeHash":"57068038dcbc89642b9610cde662e046fd8f85d5","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+6698e07d"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":5233,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 3 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 4.72s\nCompiler run successful with warnings:\nWarning (2519): This declaration shadows an existing declaration.\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:2107:105:\n     |\n2107 |     function getNextSqrtPriceFromAmount0RoundingUp(uint160 sqrtPX96, uint128 liquidity, uint256 amount, bool add)\n     |                                                                                                         ^^^^^^^^\nNote: The shadowed declaration is here:\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:1350:1:\n     |\n1350 | function add(BalanceDelta a, BalanceDelta b) pure returns (BalanceDelta) {\n     | ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\n\nWarning (2519): This declaration shadows an existing declaration.\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:2162:107:\n     |\n2162 |     function getNextSqrtPriceFromAmount1RoundingDown(uint160 sqrtPX96, uint128 liquidity, uint256 amount, bool add)\n     |                                                                                                           ^^^^^^^^\nNote: The shadowed declaration is here:\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:1350:1:\n     |\n1350 | function add(BalanceDelta a, BalanceDelta b) pure returns (BalanceDelta) {\n     | ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\n\nWarning (2519): This declaration shadows an existing declaration.\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:3410:5:\n     |\n3410 |     struct ModifyLiquidityParams {\n     |     ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\nNote: The shadowed declaration is here:\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:2658:1:\n     |\n2658 | struct ModifyLiquidityParams {\n     | ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\n\nWarning (2519): This declaration shadows an existing declaration.\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:3565:5:\n     |\n3565 |     struct SwapParams {\n     |     ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\nNote: The shadowed declaration is here:\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:2669:1:\n     |\n2669 | struct SwapParams {\n     | ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\n\nwarning[uninitialized-local]: local variable is read before being initialized\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:300:89\n    │\n300 │         emit SellFee(tx.origin, cumulative, rate, exactInput ? address(0) : token, fee, claimed);\n    │                                                                                         ━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/uninitialized-local\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:300:9\n    │\n300 │         emit SellFee(tx.origin, cumulative, rate, exactInput ? address(0) : token, fee, claimed);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:273:24\n    │\n273 │         uint256 sold = uint256(-int256(tokenDelta));\n    │                        ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:275:41\n    │\n275 │         uint256 legEth = ethDelta > 0 ? uint256(uint128(ethDelta)) : 0;\n    │                                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:275:49\n    │\n275 │         uint256 legEth = ethDelta > 0 ? uint256(uint128(ethDelta)) : 0;\n    │                                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:301:42\n    │\n301 │         return (this.afterSwap.selector, int128(int256(fee)));\n    │                                          ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:301:49\n    │\n301 │         return (this.afterSwap.selector, int128(int256(fee)));\n    │                                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[divide-before-multiply]: division before multiplication may lose precision\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:414:16\n    │\n414 │         return (reserve / 100) * percent + ((reserve % 100) * percent + 99) / 100;\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/divide-before-multiply\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `pendingETH` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:442:17\n    │\n442 │             try this.redeemETH(ethAmount) {\n    │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `pendingToken` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:449:17\n    │\n449 │             try this.takeAndBurn(tokenAmount, true) {\n    │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:455:9\n    │\n455 │         emit Harvested(ethAmount, tokenAmount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:486:51\n    │\n486 │         if (callerTokenDelta < 0) tokenReserve += uint256(-int256(callerTokenDelta));\n    │                                                   ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:487:30\n    │\n487 │         else tokenReserve -= uint128(callerTokenDelta);\n    │                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:491:16\n    │\n491 │         return int128(BalanceDelta.unwrap(delta) >> 128);\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:495:16\n    │\n495 │         return int128(BalanceDelta.unwrap(delta));\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":941,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 10 tests for test/IMDO.t.sol:IMDOTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_burnIsExact(uint256,uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 99590, ~: 104099)\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 85932, ~: 86114)\n[PASS] test_approveAndTransferFrom() (gas: 336751)\n[PASS] test_burnReducesSupplyAndOnlyOwnBalance() (gas: 207182)\n[PASS] test_infiniteAllowanceIsNotDecremented() (gas: 169666)\n[PASS] test_metadataAndFixedSupplyMintedToDeployer() (gas: 37754)\n[PASS] test_noPrivilegedOrSupplyChangingCalls() (gas: 1166309)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoDelegatecallOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 381264)\n[PASS] test_transferFailurePaths() (gas: 188320)\n[PASS] test_transferMovesExactlyWhatWasAsked() (gas: 149084)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 28.82ms (29.48ms CPU time)\n\nRan 6 tests for test/IMDO.t.sol:IMDODeployScriptTest\n[PASS] test_constantsAgreeWithTheHookAndTheBrief() (gas: 21758)\n[PASS] test_hookCreationCodeDependsOnBothConstructorArguments() (gas: 111241)\n[PASS] test_mineFailurePaths() (gas: 125278)\n[PASS] test_mineFindsAnAddressWithTheDeclaredFlagsAndPredictsIt() (gas: 14704506)\n[PASS] test_run_refusesTheWrongChain() (gas: 30023)\n[PASS] test_tokenCreationCodeMintsTheFixedSupplyToItsDeployer() (gas: 499137)\nSuite result: ok. 6 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 57.73ms (42.44ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/IMDO.t.sol:IMDOHookEdgePoolsTest\n[PASS] test_cannotInitializeBeforeHookExists_butFactoryDoesItAtomically() (gas: 54617133)\n[PASS] test_ethOnlyPool_exactOutSellTokenFeeIsAClaimAndBurnsOnHarvest() (gas: 59916474)\n[PASS] test_freshManager_tokenOnlyPool_buysWorkWithNoEthInManager() (gas: 59754284)\n[PASS] test_launchBlock_sellsNotBlockedAndNeverAboveCap() (gas: 59364490)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 234.05ms (278.34ms CPU time)\n\nRan 42 tests for test/IMDO.t.sol:IMDOHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_feePpm_matchesScheduleAndCap(uint256,uint256) (runs: 2000, μ: 22208, ~: 23653)\n[PASS] testFuzz_sellExactIn_feeMatchesBracket(uint256) (runs: 48, μ: 364471, ~: 349688)\n[PASS] testFuzz_sellExactOut_feeMatchesBracket(uint256) (runs: 48, μ: 483265, ~: 439015)\n[PASS] testFuzz_splitSells_threeLegsFollowTheBillingRuleAndItsBounds(uint256,uint256,uint256) (runs: 32, μ: 668038, ~: 675156)\n[PASS] test_buysAreFree_exactIn() (gas: 397134)\n[PASS] test_buysAreFree_exactOut() (gas: 360364)\n[PASS] test_callbacksRefuseCallersOtherThanTheManager() (gas: 301050)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsBadArguments() (gas: 695340)\n[PASS] test_cumulativeSoldIsVisibleWithinTheTransactionAndGoneAfter() (gas: 924599)\n[PASS] test_factoryFeeCollectionAndDistribution_unaffectedByHook() (gas: 2171917)\n[PASS] test_factoryPositionAndPoolState_identicalWithAndWithoutHook() (gas: 1845070)\n[PASS] test_factoryWithdrawal_unaffectedByHook() (gas: 2262655)\n[PASS] test_feeIsHardCappedAtTwoPercent() (gas: 28400)\n[PASS] test_harvestCannotBeAbusedToMoveUserClaims() (gas: 623047)\n[PASS] test_hookFeeNeverExceedsOutputAndIsWithinCapForLargeSells() (gas: 654207)\n[PASS] test_initialize_rejectsRebindingAndWrongPools() (gas: 204780735)\n[PASS] test_liquidityParkedAcrossABlockAndWithdrawnBeforeSelling_doesNotLowerBracket() (gas: 1188892)\n[PASS] test_lpFeeGoesToPosition_hookFeeGoesToTreasury() (gas: 545477)\n[PASS] test_noFunctionCanChangeBracketsCapOrTreasury() (gas: 2541358)\n[PASS] test_permissionsMatchDeclaredFlagsAndSpec() (gas: 11965)\n[PASS] test_poolBoundAndConstantsFixed() (gas: 93320)\n[PASS] test_reserveLedgerExcludesProtocolFees() (gas: 1063732)\n[PASS] test_reserveLedgerTracksPoolInventoryAndLagsOneBlock() (gas: 1251218)\n[PASS] test_sameTxBuyThenSell_doesNotChangeBracket() (gas: 972974)\n[PASS] test_sameTxDonation_doesNotLowerBracket() (gas: 726603)\n[PASS] test_sameTxLiquidityInflation_doesNotLowerBracket() (gas: 1247067)\n[PASS] test_sellExactIn_feePerBracket() (gas: 5529354)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOut_feePerBracket() (gas: 4268196)\n[PASS] test_sellNotBlockedWhenTreasuryRejectsEth_claimThenHarvest() (gas: 952550)\n[PASS] test_sellsNeverBlocked_byRouterWithClaims() (gas: 832445)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_differentOriginsInOneTransactionAreSeparate() (gas: 296806)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_dustLegPaysAtMostItsCapAndTheNextLegCollectsTheRemainder() (gas: 675742)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_dustLegWithoutASuccessor_neverCheaperThanThePrefixAlone() (gas: 684362)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_exactInLegCollectsTheEarlierExactOutLegsShortfallInEth() (gas: 535735)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_exactOutLegCollectsTheEarlierExactInLegsShortfallInTokens() (gas: 541073)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_manyLegsEscalateThroughEveryBracket() (gas: 1321472)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_neverPayMoreThanOneSellOfTheSameTotal() (gas: 134943197)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_sameTx_secondLegRepricesTheFirst() (gas: 821761)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_sharedOrigin_laterSellersLegNeverPaysMoreThanTwoPercentOfItself() (gas: 534024)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_threeSmallLegsCannotStayFree() (gas: 639679)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_twoExactOutLegsBilledCumulatively() (gas: 542415)\n[PASS] test_swarmMerkleDistributor_unaffected() (gas: 1817852)\nSuite result: ok. 42 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 234.12ms (540.81ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/IMDO.t.sol:IMDOHookInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nIMDOHookInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_hookNeverHoldsFundsBeyondAccruedClaims\n[PASS] invariant_policyIsImmutable\n[PASS] invariant_reserveLedgerEqualsPoolInventory\n[PASS] invariant_sellsAreNeverBlocked\n[PASS] invariant_supplyOnlyFallsByBurnsAndBalancesSum\n[PASS] invariant_treasuryReceivesExactlyTheFeesInEth\n IMDOHookInvariantTest invariants (runs: 40, calls: 1600, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract    | Selector                | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+====================================================================+\n| HookHandler | burn                    | 110   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | buyExactIn              | 92    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | buyExactOut             | 82    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | donate                  | 89    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | factoryAddLiquidity     | 94    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | factoryCollectFees      | 94    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | factoryRemoveLiquidity  | 103   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | harvest                 | 94    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | roll                    | 91    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | sellExactIn             | 196   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | sellExactOut            | 102   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | sellSplitExactIn        | 97    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | strangerAddLiquidity    | 82    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | strangerRemoveLiquidity | 76    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | toggleTreasury          | 104   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | transfer                | 94    | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\n[PASS] test_handlerChecksAreLive() (gas: 4181042)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 828.90ms (739.93ms CPU time)\n\nRan 5 test suites in 839.56ms (1.38s CPU time): 64 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (64 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":51,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"IMDOFeeHook.afterAddLiquidity(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(int24,int24,int256,bytes32),int256,int256,bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.afterDonate(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint256,uint256,bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.afterRemoveLiquidity(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(int24,int24,int256,bytes32),int256,int256,bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.harvest()\",\"IMDOFeeHook.redeemETH(uint256)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.takeAndBurn(uint256,bool)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\",\"IMDOToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"IMDOToken.burn(uint256)\",\"IMDOToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"IMDOToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\"README.md\":152,\"foundry.toml\":12,\"launch.json\":29,\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":168,\"src/IMDOFeeHook.sol\":521,\"test/IMDO.t.sol\":7733},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"08ddfac2f560795af671151ed93939d41320ec9abbde25da0cfa606897d8dee9","verifiedTreeHash":"ce3c5def28a2c8533a4629552d34212ddddb2916","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+3906ad8b"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":361,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 2 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 291.77ms\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[uninitialized-local]: local variable is read before being initialized\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:300:89\n    │\n300 │         emit SellFee(tx.origin, cumulative, rate, exactInput ? address(0) : token, fee, claimed);\n    │                                                                                         ━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/uninitialized-local\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:300:9\n    │\n300 │         emit SellFee(tx.origin, cumulative, rate, exactInput ? address(0) : token, fee, claimed);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:273:24\n    │\n273 │         uint256 sold = uint256(-int256(tokenDelta));\n    │                        ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:275:41\n    │\n275 │         uint256 legEth = ethDelta > 0 ? uint256(uint128(ethDelta)) : 0;\n    │                                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:275:49\n    │\n275 │         uint256 legEth = ethDelta > 0 ? uint256(uint128(ethDelta)) : 0;\n    │                                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:301:42\n    │\n301 │         return (this.afterSwap.selector, int128(int256(fee)));\n    │                                          ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:301:49\n    │\n301 │         return (this.afterSwap.selector, int128(int256(fee)));\n    │                                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[divide-before-multiply]: division before multiplication may lose precision\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:414:16\n    │\n414 │         return (reserve / 100) * percent + ((reserve % 100) * percent + 99) / 100;\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/divide-before-multiply\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `pendingETH` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:442:17\n    │\n442 │             try this.redeemETH(ethAmount) {\n    │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `pendingToken` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:449:17\n    │\n449 │             try this.takeAndBurn(tokenAmount, true) {\n    │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:455:9\n    │\n455 │         emit Harvested(ethAmount, tokenAmount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:486:51\n    │\n486 │         if (callerTokenDelta < 0) tokenReserve += uint256(-int256(callerTokenDelta));\n    │                                                   ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:487:30\n    │\n487 │         else tokenReserve -= uint128(callerTokenDelta);\n    │                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:491:16\n    │\n491 │         return int128(BalanceDelta.unwrap(delta) >> 128);\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:495:16\n    │\n495 │         return int128(BalanceDelta.unwrap(delta));\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":45,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\nWarning: No tests found in project! Forge looks for functions that start with `test`\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":25,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"IMDOFeeHook.afterAddLiquidity(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(int24,int24,int256,bytes32),int256,int256,bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.afterDonate(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint256,uint256,bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.afterRemoveLiquidity(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(int24,int24,int256,bytes32),int256,int256,bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.harvest()\",\"IMDOFeeHook.redeemETH(uint256)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.takeAndBurn(uint256,bool)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\",\"IMDOToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"IMDOToken.burn(uint256)\",\"IMDOToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"IMDOToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\"README.md\":150,\"foundry.toml\":12,\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":168,\"src/IMDOFeeHook.sol\":521},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":706,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[medium/medium] divide-before-multiply at src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:413: IMDOFeeHook._ceilPercent(uint256,uint256) (src/IMDOFeeHook.sol#413-415) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:\n[medium/medium] reentrancy-no-eth at src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:436: Reentrancy in IMDOFeeHook.unlockCallback(bytes) (src/IMDOFeeHook.sol#436-457):\n[medium/medium] reentrancy-no-eth at src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:436: Reentrancy in IMDOFeeHook.unlockCallback(bytes) (src/IMDOFeeHook.sol#436-457):\n[medium/medium] uninitialized-local at src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:281: IMDOFeeHook.afterSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,BalanceDelta,bytes).claimed (src/IMDOFeeHook.sol#281) is a local variable never initialized\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:429: IMDOFeeHook.harvest() (src/IMDOFeeHook.sol#429-434) ignores return value by poolManager.unlock() (src/IMDOFeeHook.sol#432)\n[low/medium] events-maths at src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:304: IMDOFeeHook.afterDonate(address,PoolKey,uint256,uint256,bytes) (src/IMDOFeeHook.sol#304-313) should emit an event for: \n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:252: Reentrancy in IMDOFeeHook.afterSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,BalanceDelta,bytes) (src/IMDOFeeHook.sol#252-302):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:252: Reentrancy in IMDOFeeHook.afterSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,BalanceDelta,bytes) (src/IMDOFeeHook.sol#252-302):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:436: Reentrancy in IMDOFeeHook.unlockCallback(bytes) (src/IMDOFeeHook.sol#436-457):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:252: Reentrancy in IMDOFeeHook.afterSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,BalanceDelta,bytes) (src/IMDOFeeHook.sol#252-302):","passed":true},{"durationMs":240,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[high] reentrancy-state-change at src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:259: Reentrancy: State change after external call (3 places)\n[low] large-numeric-literal at src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:9: Large Numeric Literal (5 places)\n[low] literal-instead-of-constant at src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:204: Literal Instead of Constant (10 places)\n[low] state-change-without-event at src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:213: State Change Without Event (3 places)","passed":true},{"durationMs":362,"exitCode":0,"name":"proof d76a25dd4a0f","output":"Compiling 2 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 291.63ms\nCompiler run successful!\n\nRan 1 test for test/imd-proof-6d5c7ad0/Proof_d76a25dd4a0f.t.sol:ProofSharedOriginForfeit\n[PASS] test_noSwapIsChargedMoreThanTheCapOnItsOwnOutput() (gas: 227293)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 5.85ms (230.98µs CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test suite in 6.19ms (5.85ms CPU time): 1 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (1 total tests)\n","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"26ab1055d5c594b6d4cecf6564ba90f6c71ac50c5b78d63b5da38a7946c2e1cb","verifiedTreeHash":"1cb7524c9435e406627bb8da9b70311db4dbeeba","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+3906ad8b"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":1061,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 2 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 762.15ms\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[uninitialized-local]: local variable is read before being initialized\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:300:89\n    │\n300 │         emit SellFee(tx.origin, cumulative, rate, exactInput ? address(0) : token, fee, claimed);\n    │                                                                                         ━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/uninitialized-local\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:300:9\n    │\n300 │         emit SellFee(tx.origin, cumulative, rate, exactInput ? address(0) : token, fee, claimed);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:273:24\n    │\n273 │         uint256 sold = uint256(-int256(tokenDelta));\n    │                        ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:275:41\n    │\n275 │         uint256 legEth = ethDelta > 0 ? uint256(uint128(ethDelta)) : 0;\n    │                                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:275:49\n    │\n275 │         uint256 legEth = ethDelta > 0 ? uint256(uint128(ethDelta)) : 0;\n    │                                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:301:42\n    │\n301 │         return (this.afterSwap.selector, int128(int256(fee)));\n    │                                          ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:301:49\n    │\n301 │         return (this.afterSwap.selector, int128(int256(fee)));\n    │                                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[divide-before-multiply]: division before multiplication may lose precision\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:414:16\n    │\n414 │         return (reserve / 100) * percent + ((reserve % 100) * percent + 99) / 100;\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/divide-before-multiply\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `pendingETH` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:442:17\n    │\n442 │             try this.redeemETH(ethAmount) {\n    │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `pendingToken` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:449:17\n    │\n449 │             try this.takeAndBurn(tokenAmount, true) {\n    │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:455:9\n    │\n455 │         emit Harvested(ethAmount, tokenAmount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:486:51\n    │\n486 │         if (callerTokenDelta < 0) tokenReserve += uint256(-int256(callerTokenDelta));\n    │                                                   ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:487:30\n    │\n487 │         else tokenReserve -= uint128(callerTokenDelta);\n    │                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:491:16\n    │\n491 │         return int128(BalanceDelta.unwrap(delta) >> 128);\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:495:16\n    │\n495 │         return int128(BalanceDelta.unwrap(delta));\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":109,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\nWarning: No tests found in project! Forge looks for functions that start with `test`\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":40,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"IMDOFeeHook.afterAddLiquidity(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(int24,int24,int256,bytes32),int256,int256,bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.afterDonate(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint256,uint256,bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.afterRemoveLiquidity(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(int24,int24,int256,bytes32),int256,int256,bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.harvest()\",\"IMDOFeeHook.redeemETH(uint256)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.takeAndBurn(uint256,bool)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\",\"IMDOToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"IMDOToken.burn(uint256)\",\"IMDOToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"IMDOToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\"README.md\":152,\"foundry.toml\":12,\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":168,\"src/IMDOFeeHook.sol\":521},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":646,"exitCode":0,"name":"proof d76a25dd4a0f","output":"Compiling 1 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 483.19ms\nCompiler run successful!\n\nRan 1 test for test/imd-proof-842cecc1/Proof_d76a25dd4a0f.t.sol:ProofSharedOriginForfeit\n[PASS] test_noSwapIsChargedMoreThanTheCapOnItsOwnOutput() (gas: 227293)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 38.47ms (4.08ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test suite in 48.69ms (38.47ms CPU time): 1 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (1 total tests)\n","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"2ae3e24ddf57c14235859db6ed5853828c1addb3ada89991d35ef141dbb9ebf2","verifiedTreeHash":"6099faee899aba5736e733f78d7e2c5ac3ee7c01","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+3906ad8b"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":3027,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 3 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 2.77s\nCompiler run successful with warnings:\nWarning (2519): This declaration shadows an existing declaration.\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:2107:105:\n     |\n2107 |     function getNextSqrtPriceFromAmount0RoundingUp(uint160 sqrtPX96, uint128 liquidity, uint256 amount, bool add)\n     |                                                                                                         ^^^^^^^^\nNote: The shadowed declaration is here:\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:1350:1:\n     |\n1350 | function add(BalanceDelta a, BalanceDelta b) pure returns (BalanceDelta) {\n     | ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\n\nWarning (2519): This declaration shadows an existing declaration.\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:2162:107:\n     |\n2162 |     function getNextSqrtPriceFromAmount1RoundingDown(uint160 sqrtPX96, uint128 liquidity, uint256 amount, bool add)\n     |                                                                                                           ^^^^^^^^\nNote: The shadowed declaration is here:\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:1350:1:\n     |\n1350 | function add(BalanceDelta a, BalanceDelta b) pure returns (BalanceDelta) {\n     | ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\n\nWarning (2519): This declaration shadows an existing declaration.\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:3410:5:\n     |\n3410 |     struct ModifyLiquidityParams {\n     |     ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\nNote: The shadowed declaration is here:\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:2658:1:\n     |\n2658 | struct ModifyLiquidityParams {\n     | ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\n\nWarning (2519): This declaration shadows an existing declaration.\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:3565:5:\n     |\n3565 |     struct SwapParams {\n     |     ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\nNote: The shadowed declaration is here:\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:2669:1:\n     |\n2669 | struct SwapParams {\n     | ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\n\nwarning[uninitialized-local]: local variable is read before being initialized\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:300:89\n    │\n300 │         emit SellFee(tx.origin, cumulative, rate, exactInput ? address(0) : token, fee, claimed);\n    │                                                                                         ━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/uninitialized-local\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:300:9\n    │\n300 │         emit SellFee(tx.origin, cumulative, rate, exactInput ? address(0) : token, fee, claimed);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:273:24\n    │\n273 │         uint256 sold = uint256(-int256(tokenDelta));\n    │                        ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:275:41\n    │\n275 │         uint256 legEth = ethDelta > 0 ? uint256(uint128(ethDelta)) : 0;\n    │                                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:275:49\n    │\n275 │         uint256 legEth = ethDelta > 0 ? uint256(uint128(ethDelta)) : 0;\n    │                                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:301:42\n    │\n301 │         return (this.afterSwap.selector, int128(int256(fee)));\n    │                                          ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:301:49\n    │\n301 │         return (this.afterSwap.selector, int128(int256(fee)));\n    │                                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[divide-before-multiply]: division before multiplication may lose precision\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:414:16\n    │\n414 │         return (reserve / 100) * percent + ((reserve % 100) * percent + 99) / 100;\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/divide-before-multiply\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `pendingETH` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:442:17\n    │\n442 │             try this.redeemETH(ethAmount) {\n    │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `pendingToken` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:449:17\n    │\n449 │             try this.takeAndBurn(tokenAmount, true) {\n    │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:455:9\n    │\n455 │         emit Harvested(ethAmount, tokenAmount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:486:51\n    │\n486 │         if (callerTokenDelta < 0) tokenReserve += uint256(-int256(callerTokenDelta));\n    │                                                   ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:487:30\n    │\n487 │         else tokenReserve -= uint128(callerTokenDelta);\n    │                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:491:16\n    │\n491 │         return int128(BalanceDelta.unwrap(delta) >> 128);\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:495:16\n    │\n495 │         return int128(BalanceDelta.unwrap(delta));\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":630,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 6 tests for test/IMDO.t.sol:IMDODeployScriptTest\n[PASS] test_constantsAgreeWithTheHookAndTheBrief() (gas: 21758)\n[PASS] test_hookCreationCodeDependsOnBothConstructorArguments() (gas: 111241)\n[PASS] test_mineFailurePaths() (gas: 125278)\n[PASS] test_mineFindsAnAddressWithTheDeclaredFlagsAndPredictsIt() (gas: 14704506)\n[PASS] test_run_refusesTheWrongChain() (gas: 30023)\n[PASS] test_tokenCreationCodeMintsTheFixedSupplyToItsDeployer() (gas: 499137)\nSuite result: ok. 6 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 20.95ms (21.04ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/IMDO.t.sol:IMDOHookEdgePoolsTest\n[PASS] test_cannotInitializeBeforeHookExists_butFactoryDoesItAtomically() (gas: 54617133)\n[PASS] test_ethOnlyPool_exactOutSellTokenFeeIsAClaimAndBurnsOnHarvest() (gas: 59916474)\n[PASS] test_freshManager_tokenOnlyPool_buysWorkWithNoEthInManager() (gas: 59754284)\n[PASS] test_launchBlock_sellsNotBlockedAndNeverAboveCap() (gas: 59364490)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 43.67ms (155.56ms CPU time)\n\nRan 10 tests for test/IMDO.t.sol:IMDOTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_burnIsExact(uint256,uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 99502, ~: 103944)\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 85915, ~: 86114)\n[PASS] test_approveAndTransferFrom() (gas: 336751)\n[PASS] test_burnReducesSupplyAndOnlyOwnBalance() (gas: 207182)\n[PASS] test_infiniteAllowanceIsNotDecremented() (gas: 169666)\n[PASS] test_metadataAndFixedSupplyMintedToDeployer() (gas: 37754)\n[PASS] test_noPrivilegedOrSupplyChangingCalls() (gas: 1166309)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoDelegatecallOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 381264)\n[PASS] test_transferFailurePaths() (gas: 188320)\n[PASS] test_transferMovesExactlyWhatWasAsked() (gas: 149084)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 155.43ms (18.03ms CPU time)\n\nRan 42 tests for test/IMDO.t.sol:IMDOHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_feePpm_matchesScheduleAndCap(uint256,uint256) (runs: 2000, μ: 22305, ~: 23653)\n[PASS] testFuzz_sellExactIn_feeMatchesBracket(uint256) (runs: 48, μ: 361860, ~: 349115)\n[PASS] testFuzz_sellExactOut_feeMatchesBracket(uint256) (runs: 48, μ: 481192, ~: 438879)\n[PASS] testFuzz_splitSells_threeLegsFollowTheBillingRuleAndItsBounds(uint256,uint256,uint256) (runs: 32, μ: 670617, ~: 675873)\n[PASS] test_buysAreFree_exactIn() (gas: 397134)\n[PASS] test_buysAreFree_exactOut() (gas: 360364)\n[PASS] test_callbacksRefuseCallersOtherThanTheManager() (gas: 301050)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsBadArguments() (gas: 695340)\n[PASS] test_cumulativeSoldIsVisibleWithinTheTransactionAndGoneAfter() (gas: 924599)\n[PASS] test_factoryFeeCollectionAndDistribution_unaffectedByHook() (gas: 2171917)\n[PASS] test_factoryPositionAndPoolState_identicalWithAndWithoutHook() (gas: 1845070)\n[PASS] test_factoryWithdrawal_unaffectedByHook() (gas: 2262655)\n[PASS] test_feeIsHardCappedAtTwoPercent() (gas: 28400)\n[PASS] test_harvestCannotBeAbusedToMoveUserClaims() (gas: 623047)\n[PASS] test_hookFeeNeverExceedsOutputAndIsWithinCapForLargeSells() (gas: 654207)\n[PASS] test_initialize_rejectsRebindingAndWrongPools() (gas: 204780735)\n[PASS] test_liquidityParkedAcrossABlockAndWithdrawnBeforeSelling_doesNotLowerBracket() (gas: 1188892)\n[PASS] test_lpFeeGoesToPosition_hookFeeGoesToTreasury() (gas: 545477)\n[PASS] test_noFunctionCanChangeBracketsCapOrTreasury() (gas: 2541358)\n[PASS] test_permissionsMatchDeclaredFlagsAndSpec() (gas: 11965)\n[PASS] test_poolBoundAndConstantsFixed() (gas: 93320)\n[PASS] test_reserveLedgerExcludesProtocolFees() (gas: 1063732)\n[PASS] test_reserveLedgerTracksPoolInventoryAndLagsOneBlock() (gas: 1251218)\n[PASS] test_sameTxBuyThenSell_doesNotChangeBracket() (gas: 972974)\n[PASS] test_sameTxDonation_doesNotLowerBracket() (gas: 726603)\n[PASS] test_sameTxLiquidityInflation_doesNotLowerBracket() (gas: 1247067)\n[PASS] test_sellExactIn_feePerBracket() (gas: 5529354)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOut_feePerBracket() (gas: 4268196)\n[PASS] test_sellNotBlockedWhenTreasuryRejectsEth_claimThenHarvest() (gas: 952550)\n[PASS] test_sellsNeverBlocked_byRouterWithClaims() (gas: 832445)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_differentOriginsInOneTransactionAreSeparate() (gas: 296806)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_dustLegPaysAtMostItsCapAndTheNextLegCollectsTheRemainder() (gas: 675742)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_dustLegWithoutASuccessor_neverCheaperThanThePrefixAlone() (gas: 684362)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_exactInLegCollectsTheEarlierExactOutLegsShortfallInEth() (gas: 535735)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_exactOutLegCollectsTheEarlierExactInLegsShortfallInTokens() (gas: 541073)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_manyLegsEscalateThroughEveryBracket() (gas: 1321472)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_neverPayMoreThanOneSellOfTheSameTotal() (gas: 134943197)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_sameTx_secondLegRepricesTheFirst() (gas: 821761)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_sharedOrigin_laterSellersLegNeverPaysMoreThanTwoPercentOfItself() (gas: 534024)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_threeSmallLegsCannotStayFree() (gas: 639679)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_twoExactOutLegsBilledCumulatively() (gas: 542415)\n[PASS] test_swarmMerkleDistributor_unaffected() (gas: 1817852)\nSuite result: ok. 42 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 155.51ms (362.11ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/IMDO.t.sol:IMDOHookInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nIMDOHookInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_hookNeverHoldsFundsBeyondAccruedClaims\n[PASS] invariant_policyIsImmutable\n[PASS] invariant_reserveLedgerEqualsPoolInventory\n[PASS] invariant_sellsAreNeverBlocked\n[PASS] invariant_supplyOnlyFallsByBurnsAndBalancesSum\n[PASS] invariant_treasuryReceivesExactlyTheFeesInEth\n IMDOHookInvariantTest invariants (runs: 40, calls: 1600, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract    | Selector                | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+====================================================================+\n| HookHandler | burn                    | 98    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | buyExactIn              | 98    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | buyExactOut             | 99    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | donate                  | 65    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | factoryAddLiquidity     | 86    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | factoryCollectFees      | 96    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | factoryRemoveLiquidity  | 90    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | harvest                 | 104   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | roll                    | 86    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | sellExactIn             | 182   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | sellExactOut            | 85    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | sellSplitExactIn        | 90    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | strangerAddLiquidity    | 120   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | strangerRemoveLiquidity | 98    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | toggleTreasury          | 107   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | transfer                | 96    | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\n[PASS] test_handlerChecksAreLive() (gas: 4181042)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 566.76ms (524.34ms CPU time)\n\nRan 5 test suites in 568.77ms (942.32ms CPU time): 64 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (64 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":51,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"IMDOFeeHook.afterAddLiquidity(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(int24,int24,int256,bytes32),int256,int256,bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.afterDonate(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint256,uint256,bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.afterRemoveLiquidity(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(int24,int24,int256,bytes32),int256,int256,bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.harvest()\",\"IMDOFeeHook.redeemETH(uint256)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.takeAndBurn(uint256,bool)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\",\"IMDOToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"IMDOToken.burn(uint256)\",\"IMDOToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"IMDOToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\"README.md\":150,\"foundry.toml\":12,\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":168,\"src/IMDOFeeHook.sol\":521,\"test/IMDO.t.sol\":7733},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"2bde6a2a4a0770bd797d753aac82fc91210dccb07cb081750f2046f1f1100e80","verifiedTreeHash":"1b524aa965be098ab34af062dd1e7e1ec008676a","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+3906ad8b"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":1042,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 3 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 843.92ms\nCompiler run successful with warnings:\nWarning (2519): This declaration shadows an existing declaration.\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:2107:105:\n     |\n2107 |     function getNextSqrtPriceFromAmount0RoundingUp(uint160 sqrtPX96, uint128 liquidity, uint256 amount, bool add)\n     |                                                                                                         ^^^^^^^^\nNote: The shadowed declaration is here:\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:1350:1:\n     |\n1350 | function add(BalanceDelta a, BalanceDelta b) pure returns (BalanceDelta) {\n     | ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\n\nWarning (2519): This declaration shadows an existing declaration.\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:2162:107:\n     |\n2162 |     function getNextSqrtPriceFromAmount1RoundingDown(uint160 sqrtPX96, uint128 liquidity, uint256 amount, bool add)\n     |                                                                                                           ^^^^^^^^\nNote: The shadowed declaration is here:\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:1350:1:\n     |\n1350 | function add(BalanceDelta a, BalanceDelta b) pure returns (BalanceDelta) {\n     | ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\n\nWarning (2519): This declaration shadows an existing declaration.\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:3410:5:\n     |\n3410 |     struct ModifyLiquidityParams {\n     |     ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\nNote: The shadowed declaration is here:\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:2658:1:\n     |\n2658 | struct ModifyLiquidityParams {\n     | ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\n\nWarning (2519): This declaration shadows an existing declaration.\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:3565:5:\n     |\n3565 |     struct SwapParams {\n     |     ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\nNote: The shadowed declaration is here:\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:2669:1:\n     |\n2669 | struct SwapParams {\n     | ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\n\nwarning[uninitialized-local]: local variable is read before being initialized\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:286:89\n    │\n286 │         emit SellFee(tx.origin, cumulative, rate, exactInput ? address(0) : token, fee, claimed);\n    │                                                                                         ━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/uninitialized-local\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:286:9\n    │\n286 │         emit SellFee(tx.origin, cumulative, rate, exactInput ? address(0) : token, fee, claimed);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:255:24\n    │\n255 │         uint256 sold = uint256(-int256(tokenDelta));\n    │                        ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:261:38\n    │\n261 │         uint256 basis = exactInput ? uint256(int256(_amount0(delta))) : sold;\n    │                                      ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:287:42\n    │\n287 │         return (this.afterSwap.selector, int128(int256(fee)));\n    │                                          ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:287:49\n    │\n287 │         return (this.afterSwap.selector, int128(int256(fee)));\n    │                                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[divide-before-multiply]: division before multiplication may lose precision\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:315:16\n    │\n315 │         return (reserve / 100) * percent + ((reserve % 100) * percent + 99) / 100;\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/divide-before-multiply\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `pendingETH` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:337:17\n    │\n337 │             try this.redeemETH(ethAmount) {\n    │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `pendingToken` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:344:17\n    │\n344 │             try this.takeAndBurn(tokenAmount, true) {\n    │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:350:9\n    │\n350 │         emit Harvested(ethAmount, tokenAmount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:381:51\n    │\n381 │         if (callerTokenDelta < 0) tokenReserve += uint256(-int256(callerTokenDelta));\n    │                                                   ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:382:30\n    │\n382 │         else tokenReserve -= uint128(callerTokenDelta);\n    │                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:386:16\n    │\n386 │         return int128(BalanceDelta.unwrap(delta) >> 128);\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:390:16\n    │\n390 │         return int128(BalanceDelta.unwrap(delta));\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":920,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 10 tests for test/IMDO.t.sol:IMDOTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_burnIsExact(uint256,uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 103049, ~: 107406)\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 90026, ~: 90052)\n[PASS] test_approveAndTransferFrom() (gas: 349514)\n[PASS] test_burnReducesSupplyAndOnlyOwnBalance() (gas: 214149)\n[PASS] test_infiniteAllowanceIsNotDecremented() (gas: 174657)\n[PASS] test_metadataAndFixedSupplyMintedToDeployer() (gas: 40442)\n[PASS] test_noPrivilegedOrSupplyChangingCalls() (gas: 1222896)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoDelegatecallOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 805439)\n[PASS] test_transferFailurePaths() (gas: 194418)\n[PASS] test_transferMovesExactlyWhatWasAsked() (gas: 155347)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 28.87ms (30.77ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/IMDO.t.sol:IMDOHookEdgePoolsTest\n[PASS] test_cannotInitializeBeforeHookExists_butFactoryDoesItAtomically() (gas: 38750228)\n[PASS] test_ethOnlyPool_exactOutSellTokenFeeBecomesClaimAndBurnsOnHarvest() (gas: 46251864)\n[PASS] test_freshManager_tokenOnlyPool_buysWorkWithNoEthInManager() (gas: 46432455)\n[PASS] test_launchBlock_sellsNotBlockedAndNeverAboveCap() (gas: 46003235)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 70.84ms (237.70ms CPU time)\n\nRan 6 tests for test/IMDO.t.sol:IMDODeployScriptTest\n[PASS] test_constantsAgreeWithTheHookAndTheBrief() (gas: 22669)\n[PASS] test_hookCreationCodeDependsOnBothConstructorArguments() (gas: 161843)\n[PASS] test_mineFailurePaths() (gas: 149523)\n[PASS] test_mineFindsAnAddressWithTheDeclaredFlagsAndPredictsIt() (gas: 35840673)\n[PASS] test_run_refusesTheWrongChain() (gas: 30808)\n[PASS] test_tokenCreationCodeMintsTheFixedSupplyToItsDeployer() (gas: 877175)\nSuite result: ok. 6 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 86.01ms (61.49ms CPU time)\n\nRan 33 tests for test/IMDO.t.sol:IMDOHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_feePpm_matchesScheduleAndCap(uint256,uint256) (runs: 2000, μ: 32134, ~: 35428)\n[PASS] testFuzz_sellExactIn_feeMatchesBracket(uint256) (runs: 48, μ: 427734, ~: 412950)\n[PASS] testFuzz_sellExactOut_feeMatchesBracket(uint256) (runs: 48, μ: 462307, ~: 451384)\n[PASS] test_buysAreFree_exactIn() (gas: 458129)\n[PASS] test_buysAreFree_exactOut() (gas: 419527)\n[PASS] test_callbacksRefuseCallersOtherThanTheManager() (gas: 344503)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsBadArguments() (gas: 1683017)\n[PASS] test_cumulativeSoldIsVisibleWithinTheTransactionAndGoneAfter() (gas: 600484)\n[PASS] test_factoryFeeCollectionAndDistribution_unaffectedByHook() (gas: 2579218)\n[PASS] test_factoryPositionAndPoolState_identicalWithAndWithoutHook() (gas: 2222965)\n[PASS] test_factoryWithdrawal_unaffectedByHook() (gas: 2701224)\n[PASS] test_feeIsHardCappedAtTwoPercent() (gas: 37828)\n[PASS] test_harvestCannotBeAbusedToMoveUserClaims() (gas: 702221)\n[PASS] test_hookFeeNeverExceedsOutputAndIsWithinCapForLargeSells() (gas: 730484)\n[PASS] test_initialize_rejectsRebindingAndWrongPools() (gas: 204832138)\n[PASS] test_lpFeeGoesToPosition_hookFeeGoesToTreasury() (gas: 634990)\n[PASS] test_noFunctionCanChangeBracketsCapOrTreasury() (gas: 3952143)\n[PASS] test_permissionsMatchDeclaredFlagsAndSpec() (gas: 15187)\n[PASS] test_poolBoundAndConstantsFixed() (gas: 98337)\n[PASS] test_reserveLedgerExcludesProtocolFees() (gas: 1200506)\n[PASS] test_reserveLedgerTracksPoolInventoryAndLagsOneBlock() (gas: 1457371)\n[PASS] test_sameTxBuyThenSell_doesNotChangeBracket() (gas: 671314)\n[PASS] test_sameTxDonation_doesNotLowerBracket() (gas: 852297)\n[PASS] test_sameTxLiquidityInflation_doesNotLowerBracket() (gas: 1453776)\n[PASS] test_sellExactIn_feePerBracket() (gas: 6112119)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOut_feePerBracket() (gas: 4471539)\n[PASS] test_sellNotBlockedWhenTreasuryRejectsEth_claimThenHarvest() (gas: 1101490)\n[PASS] test_sellsNeverBlocked_byRouterWithClaims() (gas: 977278)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_exactOutLegCountsTowardsCumulative() (gas: 634689)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_manyLegsEscalateThroughEveryBracket() (gas: 1751493)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_sameTx_secondLegBilledAtCumulativeBracket() (gas: 841784)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_threeSmallLegsCannotStayFree() (gas: 834640)\n[PASS] test_swarmMerkleDistributor_unaffected() (gas: 2322105)\nSuite result: ok. 33 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 339.89ms (437.98ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/IMDO.t.sol:IMDOHookInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nIMDOHookInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_hookNeverHoldsFundsBeyondAccruedClaims\n[PASS] invariant_policyIsImmutable\n[PASS] invariant_reserveLedgerEqualsPoolInventory\n[PASS] invariant_sellsAreNeverBlocked\n[PASS] invariant_supplyOnlyFallsByBurnsAndBalancesSum\n[PASS] invariant_treasuryReceivesExactlyTheFeesInEth\n IMDOHookInvariantTest invariants (runs: 40, calls: 1600, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract    | Selector                | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+====================================================================+\n| HookHandler | burn                    | 92    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | buyExactIn              | 93    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | buyExactOut             | 101   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | donate                  | 111   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | factoryAddLiquidity     | 104   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | factoryCollectFees      | 98    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | factoryRemoveLiquidity  | 102   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | harvest                 | 107   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | roll                    | 97    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | sellExactIn             | 185   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | sellExactOut            | 102   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | strangerAddLiquidity    | 109   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | strangerRemoveLiquidity | 107   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | toggleTreasury          | 97    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | transfer                | 95    | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\n[PASS] test_handlerChecksAreLive() (gas: 3837102)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 832.88ms (751.63ms CPU time)\n\nRan 5 test suites in 845.21ms (1.36s CPU time): 55 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (55 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":48,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"IMDOFeeHook.afterAddLiquidity(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(int24,int24,int256,bytes32),int256,int256,bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.afterDonate(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint256,uint256,bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.afterRemoveLiquidity(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(int24,int24,int256,bytes32),int256,int256,bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.harvest()\",\"IMDOFeeHook.redeemETH(uint256)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.takeAndBurn(uint256,bool)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\",\"IMDOToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"IMDOToken.burn(uint256)\",\"IMDOToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"IMDOToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\"README.md\":136,\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":134,\"src/IMDOFeeHook.sol\":400,\"test/IMDO.t.sol\":7127},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"6449b286e3b0dc99fbf4891bc2188c7f95a48cf1c0dd04af23be7fcaf0a9d8e5","verifiedTreeHash":"d5e6ad8a4984b8a5ef09846ea681cc201d95b340","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+6698e07d"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":134,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 2 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 79.28ms\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[uninitialized-local]: local variable is read before being initialized\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:286:89\n    │\n286 │         emit SellFee(tx.origin, cumulative, rate, exactInput ? address(0) : token, fee, claimed);\n    │                                                                                         ━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/uninitialized-local\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:286:9\n    │\n286 │         emit SellFee(tx.origin, cumulative, rate, exactInput ? address(0) : token, fee, claimed);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:255:24\n    │\n255 │         uint256 sold = uint256(-int256(tokenDelta));\n    │                        ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:261:38\n    │\n261 │         uint256 basis = exactInput ? uint256(int256(_amount0(delta))) : sold;\n    │                                      ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:287:42\n    │\n287 │         return (this.afterSwap.selector, int128(int256(fee)));\n    │                                          ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:287:49\n    │\n287 │         return (this.afterSwap.selector, int128(int256(fee)));\n    │                                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[divide-before-multiply]: division before multiplication may lose precision\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:315:16\n    │\n315 │         return (reserve / 100) * percent + ((reserve % 100) * percent + 99) / 100;\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/divide-before-multiply\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `pendingETH` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:337:17\n    │\n337 │             try this.redeemETH(ethAmount) {\n    │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `pendingToken` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:344:17\n    │\n344 │             try this.takeAndBurn(tokenAmount, true) {\n    │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:350:9\n    │\n350 │         emit Harvested(ethAmount, tokenAmount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:381:51\n    │\n381 │         if (callerTokenDelta < 0) tokenReserve += uint256(-int256(callerTokenDelta));\n    │                                                   ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:382:30\n    │\n382 │         else tokenReserve -= uint128(callerTokenDelta);\n    │                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:386:16\n    │\n386 │         return int128(BalanceDelta.unwrap(delta) >> 128);\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:390:16\n    │\n390 │         return int128(BalanceDelta.unwrap(delta));\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":38,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\nWarning: No tests found in project! Forge looks for functions that start with `test`\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":19,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"IMDOFeeHook.afterAddLiquidity(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(int24,int24,int256,bytes32),int256,int256,bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.afterDonate(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint256,uint256,bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.afterRemoveLiquidity(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(int24,int24,int256,bytes32),int256,int256,bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.harvest()\",\"IMDOFeeHook.redeemETH(uint256)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.takeAndBurn(uint256,bool)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\",\"IMDOToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"IMDOToken.burn(uint256)\",\"IMDOToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"IMDOToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\"README.md\":136,\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":134,\"src/IMDOFeeHook.sol\":400},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":301,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"slither: no results at low impact or above","passed":true},{"durationMs":270,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[high] reentrancy-state-change at src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:246: Reentrancy: State change after external call (2 places)\n[low] large-numeric-literal at src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:9: Large Numeric Literal (5 places)\n[low] literal-instead-of-constant at src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:191: Literal Instead of Constant (5 places)\n[low] state-change-without-event at src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:200: State Change Without Event (3 places)","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"86c349dba070f7bd94a18733739be0461b596e9ad94cecf1e46d0bd6a8d8933a","verifiedTreeHash":"d8ab57cd71d23a4841172959a6be8cfb7444b2ca","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+6698e07d"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":3274,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 3 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 3.06s\nCompiler run successful with warnings:\nWarning (2519): This declaration shadows an existing declaration.\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:2107:105:\n     |\n2107 |     function getNextSqrtPriceFromAmount0RoundingUp(uint160 sqrtPX96, uint128 liquidity, uint256 amount, bool add)\n     |                                                                                                         ^^^^^^^^\nNote: The shadowed declaration is here:\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:1350:1:\n     |\n1350 | function add(BalanceDelta a, BalanceDelta b) pure returns (BalanceDelta) {\n     | ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\n\nWarning (2519): This declaration shadows an existing declaration.\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:2162:107:\n     |\n2162 |     function getNextSqrtPriceFromAmount1RoundingDown(uint160 sqrtPX96, uint128 liquidity, uint256 amount, bool add)\n     |                                                                                                           ^^^^^^^^\nNote: The shadowed declaration is here:\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:1350:1:\n     |\n1350 | function add(BalanceDelta a, BalanceDelta b) pure returns (BalanceDelta) {\n     | ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\n\nWarning (2519): This declaration shadows an existing declaration.\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:3410:5:\n     |\n3410 |     struct ModifyLiquidityParams {\n     |     ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\nNote: The shadowed declaration is here:\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:2658:1:\n     |\n2658 | struct ModifyLiquidityParams {\n     | ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\n\nWarning (2519): This declaration shadows an existing declaration.\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:3565:5:\n     |\n3565 |     struct SwapParams {\n     |     ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\nNote: The shadowed declaration is here:\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:2669:1:\n     |\n2669 | struct SwapParams {\n     | ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\n\nwarning[uninitialized-local]: local variable is read before being initialized\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:294:89\n    │\n294 │         emit SellFee(tx.origin, cumulative, rate, exactInput ? address(0) : token, fee, claimed);\n    │                                                                                         ━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/uninitialized-local\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:294:9\n    │\n294 │         emit SellFee(tx.origin, cumulative, rate, exactInput ? address(0) : token, fee, claimed);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:267:24\n    │\n267 │         uint256 sold = uint256(-int256(tokenDelta));\n    │                        ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:269:41\n    │\n269 │         uint256 legEth = ethDelta > 0 ? uint256(uint128(ethDelta)) : 0;\n    │                                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:269:49\n    │\n269 │         uint256 legEth = ethDelta > 0 ? uint256(uint128(ethDelta)) : 0;\n    │                                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:295:42\n    │\n295 │         return (this.afterSwap.selector, int128(int256(fee)));\n    │                                          ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:295:49\n    │\n295 │         return (this.afterSwap.selector, int128(int256(fee)));\n    │                                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:358:23\n    │\n358 │             if (fee > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) fee = uint256(uint128(type(int128).max));\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:358:31\n    │\n358 │             if (fee > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) fee = uint256(uint128(type(int128).max));\n    │                               ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:358:65\n    │\n358 │             if (fee > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) fee = uint256(uint128(type(int128).max));\n    │                                                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:358:73\n    │\n358 │             if (fee > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) fee = uint256(uint128(type(int128).max));\n    │                                                                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[divide-before-multiply]: division before multiplication may lose precision\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:386:16\n    │\n386 │         return (reserve / 100) * percent + ((reserve % 100) * percent + 99) / 100;\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/divide-before-multiply\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `pendingETH` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:414:17\n    │\n414 │             try this.redeemETH(ethAmount) {\n    │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `pendingToken` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:421:17\n    │\n421 │             try this.takeAndBurn(tokenAmount, true) {\n    │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:427:9\n    │\n427 │         emit Harvested(ethAmount, tokenAmount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:458:51\n    │\n458 │         if (callerTokenDelta < 0) tokenReserve += uint256(-int256(callerTokenDelta));\n    │                                                   ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:459:30\n    │\n459 │         else tokenReserve -= uint128(callerTokenDelta);\n    │                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:463:16\n    │\n463 │         return int128(BalanceDelta.unwrap(delta) >> 128);\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:467:16\n    │\n467 │         return int128(BalanceDelta.unwrap(delta));\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":665,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 10 tests for test/IMDO.t.sol:IMDOTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_burnIsExact(uint256,uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 99522, ~: 103956)\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 85658, ~: 86114)\n[PASS] test_approveAndTransferFrom() (gas: 336751)\n[PASS] test_burnReducesSupplyAndOnlyOwnBalance() (gas: 207182)\n[PASS] test_infiniteAllowanceIsNotDecremented() (gas: 169666)\n[PASS] test_metadataAndFixedSupplyMintedToDeployer() (gas: 37754)\n[PASS] test_noPrivilegedOrSupplyChangingCalls() (gas: 1166309)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoDelegatecallOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 381264)\n[PASS] test_transferFailurePaths() (gas: 188320)\n[PASS] test_transferMovesExactlyWhatWasAsked() (gas: 149084)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 7.95ms (19.12ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/IMDO.t.sol:IMDOHookEdgePoolsTest\n[PASS] test_cannotInitializeBeforeHookExists_butFactoryDoesItAtomically() (gas: 15627542)\n[PASS] test_ethOnlyPool_exactOutSellTokenFeeBecomesClaimAndBurnsOnHarvest() (gas: 20604120)\n[PASS] test_freshManager_tokenOnlyPool_buysWorkWithNoEthInManager() (gas: 20758869)\n[PASS] test_launchBlock_sellsNotBlockedAndNeverAboveCap() (gas: 20371570)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 15.85ms (58.49ms CPU time)\n\nRan 6 tests for test/IMDO.t.sol:IMDODeployScriptTest\n[PASS] test_constantsAgreeWithTheHookAndTheBrief() (gas: 21758)\n[PASS] test_hookCreationCodeDependsOnBothConstructorArguments() (gas: 110288)\n[PASS] test_mineFailurePaths() (gas: 124971)\n[PASS] test_mineFindsAnAddressWithTheDeclaredFlagsAndPredictsIt() (gas: 22279323)\n[PASS] test_run_refusesTheWrongChain() (gas: 30023)\n[PASS] test_tokenCreationCodeMintsTheFixedSupplyToItsDeployer() (gas: 499137)\nSuite result: ok. 6 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 70.53ms (35.36ms CPU time)\n\nRan 40 tests for test/IMDO.t.sol:IMDOHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_feePpm_matchesScheduleAndCap(uint256,uint256) (runs: 2000, μ: 22214, ~: 23587)\n[PASS] testFuzz_sellExactIn_feeMatchesBracket(uint256) (runs: 48, μ: 367093, ~: 349030)\n[PASS] testFuzz_sellExactOut_feeMatchesBracket(uint256) (runs: 48, μ: 395730, ~: 394814)\n[PASS] testFuzz_splitSells_threeLegsPayExactlyTheScheduleOnTheTotal(uint256,uint256,uint256) (runs: 32, μ: 648227, ~: 661021)\n[PASS] test_buysAreFree_exactIn() (gas: 396661)\n[PASS] test_buysAreFree_exactOut() (gas: 359913)\n[PASS] test_callbacksRefuseCallersOtherThanTheManager() (gas: 301027)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsBadArguments() (gas: 688816)\n[PASS] test_cumulativeSoldIsVisibleWithinTheTransactionAndGoneAfter() (gas: 495627)\n[PASS] test_factoryFeeCollectionAndDistribution_unaffectedByHook() (gas: 2163887)\n[PASS] test_factoryPositionAndPoolState_identicalWithAndWithoutHook() (gas: 1837107)\n[PASS] test_factoryWithdrawal_unaffectedByHook() (gas: 2254648)\n[PASS] test_feeIsHardCappedAtTwoPercent() (gas: 28400)\n[PASS] test_harvestCannotBeAbusedToMoveUserClaims() (gas: 613880)\n[PASS] test_hookFeeNeverExceedsOutputAndIsWithinCapForLargeSells() (gas: 653461)\n[PASS] test_initialize_rejectsRebindingAndWrongPools() (gas: 121292187)\n[PASS] test_lpFeeGoesToPosition_hookFeeGoesToTreasury() (gas: 544665)\n[PASS] test_noFunctionCanChangeBracketsCapOrTreasury() (gas: 2510426)\n[PASS] test_permissionsMatchDeclaredFlagsAndSpec() (gas: 11965)\n[PASS] test_poolBoundAndConstantsFixed() (gas: 93320)\n[PASS] test_reserveLedgerExcludesProtocolFees() (gas: 1060381)\n[PASS] test_reserveLedgerTracksPoolInventoryAndLagsOneBlock() (gas: 1247011)\n[PASS] test_sameTxBuyThenSell_doesNotChangeBracket() (gas: 543295)\n[PASS] test_sameTxDonation_doesNotLowerBracket() (gas: 725725)\n[PASS] test_sameTxLiquidityInflation_doesNotLowerBracket() (gas: 1245377)\n[PASS] test_sellExactIn_feePerBracket() (gas: 5523538)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOut_feePerBracket() (gas: 4050773)\n[PASS] test_sellNotBlockedWhenTreasuryRejectsEth_claimThenHarvest() (gas: 950838)\n[PASS] test_sellsNeverBlocked_byRouterWithClaims() (gas: 825785)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_differentOriginsInOneTransactionAreSeparate() (gas: 295160)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_dustLegForfeitsItsOutputAndTheNextLegCollectsTheRemainder() (gas: 640795)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_dustLegWithoutASuccessor_neverCheaperThanThePrefixAlone() (gas: 511448)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_exactInLegCollectsTheEarlierExactOutLegsShortfallInEth() (gas: 531118)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_exactOutLegCollectsTheEarlierExactInLegsShortfallInTokens() (gas: 508919)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_manyLegsEscalateThroughEveryBracket() (gas: 1275762)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_sameTx_secondLegRepricesTheFirst() (gas: 682383)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_splitPaysWhatOneSellOfTheSameTotalPays() (gas: 101537826)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_threeSmallLegsCannotStayFree() (gas: 637243)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_twoExactOutLegsBilledCumulatively() (gas: 509987)\n[PASS] test_swarmMerkleDistributor_unaffected() (gas: 1809055)\nSuite result: ok. 40 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 108.23ms (341.85ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/IMDO.t.sol:IMDOHookInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nIMDOHookInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_hookNeverHoldsFundsBeyondAccruedClaims\n[PASS] invariant_policyIsImmutable\n[PASS] invariant_reserveLedgerEqualsPoolInventory\n[PASS] invariant_sellsAreNeverBlocked\n[PASS] invariant_supplyOnlyFallsByBurnsAndBalancesSum\n[PASS] invariant_treasuryReceivesExactlyTheFeesInEth\n IMDOHookInvariantTest invariants (runs: 40, calls: 1600, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract    | Selector                | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+====================================================================+\n| HookHandler | burn                    | 94    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | buyExactIn              | 95    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | buyExactOut             | 77    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | donate                  | 109   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | factoryAddLiquidity     | 115   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | factoryCollectFees      | 89    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | factoryRemoveLiquidity  | 105   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | harvest                 | 93    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | roll                    | 103   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | sellExactIn             | 180   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | sellExactOut            | 88    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | sellSplitExactIn        | 93    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | strangerAddLiquidity    | 68    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | strangerRemoveLiquidity | 88    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | toggleTreasury          | 91    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | transfer                | 112   | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\n[PASS] test_handlerChecksAreLive() (gas: 3683449)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 591.96ms (577.13ms CPU time)\n\nRan 5 test suites in 594.25ms (794.52ms CPU time): 62 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (62 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":50,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"IMDOFeeHook.afterAddLiquidity(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(int24,int24,int256,bytes32),int256,int256,bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.afterDonate(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint256,uint256,bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.afterRemoveLiquidity(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(int24,int24,int256,bytes32),int256,int256,bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.harvest()\",\"IMDOFeeHook.redeemETH(uint256)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.takeAndBurn(uint256,bool)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\",\"IMDOToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"IMDOToken.burn(uint256)\",\"IMDOToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"IMDOToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\"README.md\":144,\"foundry.toml\":12,\"launch.json\":29,\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":134,\"src/IMDOFeeHook.sol\":493,\"test/IMDO.t.sol\":7491},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"90d626ab462b19ba5a8b3c3d189e57ff4d32445eb7d3472fe628a4d3486272ca","verifiedTreeHash":"4003f5856b8e709b6c7af7c6338340f0f3b42974","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+6698e07d"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":3677,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 3 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 3.46s\nCompiler run successful with warnings:\nWarning (2519): This declaration shadows an existing declaration.\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:2107:105:\n     |\n2107 |     function getNextSqrtPriceFromAmount0RoundingUp(uint160 sqrtPX96, uint128 liquidity, uint256 amount, bool add)\n     |                                                                                                         ^^^^^^^^\nNote: The shadowed declaration is here:\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:1350:1:\n     |\n1350 | function add(BalanceDelta a, BalanceDelta b) pure returns (BalanceDelta) {\n     | ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\n\nWarning (2519): This declaration shadows an existing declaration.\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:2162:107:\n     |\n2162 |     function getNextSqrtPriceFromAmount1RoundingDown(uint160 sqrtPX96, uint128 liquidity, uint256 amount, bool add)\n     |                                                                                                           ^^^^^^^^\nNote: The shadowed declaration is here:\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:1350:1:\n     |\n1350 | function add(BalanceDelta a, BalanceDelta b) pure returns (BalanceDelta) {\n     | ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\n\nWarning (2519): This declaration shadows an existing declaration.\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:3410:5:\n     |\n3410 |     struct ModifyLiquidityParams {\n     |     ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\nNote: The shadowed declaration is here:\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:2658:1:\n     |\n2658 | struct ModifyLiquidityParams {\n     | ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\n\nWarning (2519): This declaration shadows an existing declaration.\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:3565:5:\n     |\n3565 |     struct SwapParams {\n     |     ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\nNote: The shadowed declaration is here:\n    --> test/IMDO.t.sol:2669:1:\n     |\n2669 | struct SwapParams {\n     | ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\n\nwarning[uninitialized-local]: local variable is read before being initialized\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:294:89\n    │\n294 │         emit SellFee(tx.origin, cumulative, rate, exactInput ? address(0) : token, fee, claimed);\n    │                                                                                         ━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/uninitialized-local\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:294:9\n    │\n294 │         emit SellFee(tx.origin, cumulative, rate, exactInput ? address(0) : token, fee, claimed);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:267:24\n    │\n267 │         uint256 sold = uint256(-int256(tokenDelta));\n    │                        ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:269:41\n    │\n269 │         uint256 legEth = ethDelta > 0 ? uint256(uint128(ethDelta)) : 0;\n    │                                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:269:49\n    │\n269 │         uint256 legEth = ethDelta > 0 ? uint256(uint128(ethDelta)) : 0;\n    │                                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:295:42\n    │\n295 │         return (this.afterSwap.selector, int128(int256(fee)));\n    │                                          ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:295:49\n    │\n295 │         return (this.afterSwap.selector, int128(int256(fee)));\n    │                                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:358:23\n    │\n358 │             if (fee > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) fee = uint256(uint128(type(int128).max));\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:358:31\n    │\n358 │             if (fee > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) fee = uint256(uint128(type(int128).max));\n    │                               ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:358:65\n    │\n358 │             if (fee > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) fee = uint256(uint128(type(int128).max));\n    │                                                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:358:73\n    │\n358 │             if (fee > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) fee = uint256(uint128(type(int128).max));\n    │                                                                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[divide-before-multiply]: division before multiplication may lose precision\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:386:16\n    │\n386 │         return (reserve / 100) * percent + ((reserve % 100) * percent + 99) / 100;\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/divide-before-multiply\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `pendingETH` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:414:17\n    │\n414 │             try this.redeemETH(ethAmount) {\n    │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `pendingToken` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:421:17\n    │\n421 │             try this.takeAndBurn(tokenAmount, true) {\n    │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:427:9\n    │\n427 │         emit Harvested(ethAmount, tokenAmount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:458:51\n    │\n458 │         if (callerTokenDelta < 0) tokenReserve += uint256(-int256(callerTokenDelta));\n    │                                                   ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:459:30\n    │\n459 │         else tokenReserve -= uint128(callerTokenDelta);\n    │                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:463:16\n    │\n463 │         return int128(BalanceDelta.unwrap(delta) >> 128);\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/IMDOFeeHook.sol:467:16\n    │\n467 │         return int128(BalanceDelta.unwrap(delta));\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":699,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 6 tests for test/IMDO.t.sol:IMDODeployScriptTest\n[PASS] test_constantsAgreeWithTheHookAndTheBrief() (gas: 21758)\n[PASS] test_hookCreationCodeDependsOnBothConstructorArguments() (gas: 110288)\n[PASS] test_mineFailurePaths() (gas: 124971)\n[PASS] test_mineFindsAnAddressWithTheDeclaredFlagsAndPredictsIt() (gas: 22279323)\n[PASS] test_run_refusesTheWrongChain() (gas: 30023)\n[PASS] test_tokenCreationCodeMintsTheFixedSupplyToItsDeployer() (gas: 499137)\nSuite result: ok. 6 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 73.45ms (34.41ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/IMDO.t.sol:IMDOHookEdgePoolsTest\n[PASS] test_cannotInitializeBeforeHookExists_butFactoryDoesItAtomically() (gas: 15627542)\n[PASS] test_ethOnlyPool_exactOutSellTokenFeeBecomesClaimAndBurnsOnHarvest() (gas: 20604120)\n[PASS] test_freshManager_tokenOnlyPool_buysWorkWithNoEthInManager() (gas: 20758869)\n[PASS] test_launchBlock_sellsNotBlockedAndNeverAboveCap() (gas: 20371570)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 120.68ms (73.44ms CPU time)\n\nRan 10 tests for test/IMDO.t.sol:IMDOTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_burnIsExact(uint256,uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 98893, ~: 90327)\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 85932, ~: 86150)\n[PASS] test_approveAndTransferFrom() (gas: 336751)\n[PASS] test_burnReducesSupplyAndOnlyOwnBalance() (gas: 207182)\n[PASS] test_infiniteAllowanceIsNotDecremented() (gas: 169666)\n[PASS] test_metadataAndFixedSupplyMintedToDeployer() (gas: 37754)\n[PASS] test_noPrivilegedOrSupplyChangingCalls() (gas: 1166309)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoDelegatecallOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 381264)\n[PASS] test_transferFailurePaths() (gas: 188320)\n[PASS] test_transferMovesExactlyWhatWasAsked() (gas: 149084)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 120.64ms (19.31ms CPU time)\n\nRan 40 tests for test/IMDO.t.sol:IMDOHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_feePpm_matchesScheduleAndCap(uint256,uint256) (runs: 2000, μ: 22194, ~: 23587)\n[PASS] testFuzz_sellExactIn_feeMatchesBracket(uint256) (runs: 48, μ: 360300, ~: 348215)\n[PASS] testFuzz_sellExactOut_feeMatchesBracket(uint256) (runs: 48, μ: 394358, ~: 384715)\n[PASS] testFuzz_splitSells_threeLegsPayExactlyTheScheduleOnTheTotal(uint256,uint256,uint256) (runs: 32, μ: 649685, ~: 653920)\n[PASS] test_buysAreFree_exactIn() (gas: 396661)\n[PASS] test_buysAreFree_exactOut() (gas: 359913)\n[PASS] test_callbacksRefuseCallersOtherThanTheManager() (gas: 301027)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsBadArguments() (gas: 688816)\n[PASS] test_cumulativeSoldIsVisibleWithinTheTransactionAndGoneAfter() (gas: 495627)\n[PASS] test_factoryFeeCollectionAndDistribution_unaffectedByHook() (gas: 2163887)\n[PASS] test_factoryPositionAndPoolState_identicalWithAndWithoutHook() (gas: 1837107)\n[PASS] test_factoryWithdrawal_unaffectedByHook() (gas: 2254648)\n[PASS] test_feeIsHardCappedAtTwoPercent() (gas: 28400)\n[PASS] test_harvestCannotBeAbusedToMoveUserClaims() (gas: 613880)\n[PASS] test_hookFeeNeverExceedsOutputAndIsWithinCapForLargeSells() (gas: 653461)\n[PASS] test_initialize_rejectsRebindingAndWrongPools() (gas: 121292187)\n[PASS] test_lpFeeGoesToPosition_hookFeeGoesToTreasury() (gas: 544665)\n[PASS] test_noFunctionCanChangeBracketsCapOrTreasury() (gas: 2510426)\n[PASS] test_permissionsMatchDeclaredFlagsAndSpec() (gas: 11965)\n[PASS] test_poolBoundAndConstantsFixed() (gas: 93320)\n[PASS] test_reserveLedgerExcludesProtocolFees() (gas: 1060381)\n[PASS] test_reserveLedgerTracksPoolInventoryAndLagsOneBlock() (gas: 1247011)\n[PASS] test_sameTxBuyThenSell_doesNotChangeBracket() (gas: 543295)\n[PASS] test_sameTxDonation_doesNotLowerBracket() (gas: 725725)\n[PASS] test_sameTxLiquidityInflation_doesNotLowerBracket() (gas: 1245377)\n[PASS] test_sellExactIn_feePerBracket() (gas: 5523538)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOut_feePerBracket() (gas: 4050773)\n[PASS] test_sellNotBlockedWhenTreasuryRejectsEth_claimThenHarvest() (gas: 950838)\n[PASS] test_sellsNeverBlocked_byRouterWithClaims() (gas: 825785)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_differentOriginsInOneTransactionAreSeparate() (gas: 295160)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_dustLegForfeitsItsOutputAndTheNextLegCollectsTheRemainder() (gas: 640795)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_dustLegWithoutASuccessor_neverCheaperThanThePrefixAlone() (gas: 511448)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_exactInLegCollectsTheEarlierExactOutLegsShortfallInEth() (gas: 531118)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_exactOutLegCollectsTheEarlierExactInLegsShortfallInTokens() (gas: 508919)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_manyLegsEscalateThroughEveryBracket() (gas: 1275762)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_sameTx_secondLegRepricesTheFirst() (gas: 682383)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_splitPaysWhatOneSellOfTheSameTotalPays() (gas: 101537826)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_threeSmallLegsCannotStayFree() (gas: 637243)\n[PASS] test_splitSells_twoExactOutLegsBilledCumulatively() (gas: 509987)\n[PASS] test_swarmMerkleDistributor_unaffected() (gas: 1809055)\nSuite result: ok. 40 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 120.71ms (351.04ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/IMDO.t.sol:IMDOHookInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nIMDOHookInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_hookNeverHoldsFundsBeyondAccruedClaims\n[PASS] invariant_policyIsImmutable\n[PASS] invariant_reserveLedgerEqualsPoolInventory\n[PASS] invariant_sellsAreNeverBlocked\n[PASS] invariant_supplyOnlyFallsByBurnsAndBalancesSum\n[PASS] invariant_treasuryReceivesExactlyTheFeesInEth\n IMDOHookInvariantTest invariants (runs: 40, calls: 1600, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract    | Selector                | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+====================================================================+\n| HookHandler | burn                    | 100   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | buyExactIn              | 104   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | buyExactOut             | 82    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | donate                  | 91    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | factoryAddLiquidity     | 92    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | factoryCollectFees      | 91    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | factoryRemoveLiquidity  | 102   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | harvest                 | 85    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | roll                    | 84    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | sellExactIn             | 192   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | sellExactOut            | 84    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | sellSplitExactIn        | 103   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | strangerAddLiquidity    | 102   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | strangerRemoveLiquidity | 98    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | toggleTreasury          | 98    | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | transfer                | 92    | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------+-------------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\n[PASS] test_handlerChecksAreLive() (gas: 3683449)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 621.73ms (604.25ms CPU time)\n\nRan 5 test suites in 624.68ms (1.06s CPU time): 62 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (62 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":53,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"IMDOFeeHook.afterAddLiquidity(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(int24,int24,int256,bytes32),int256,int256,bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.afterDonate(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint256,uint256,bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.afterRemoveLiquidity(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(int24,int24,int256,bytes32),int256,int256,bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.harvest()\",\"IMDOFeeHook.redeemETH(uint256)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.takeAndBurn(uint256,bool)\",\"IMDOFeeHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\",\"IMDOToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"IMDOToken.burn(uint256)\",\"IMDOToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"IMDOToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\"README.md\":144,\"foundry.toml\":12,\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":134,\"src/IMDOFeeHook.sol\":493,\"test/IMDO.t.sol\":7491},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"96dfb3c4b7902f8be1db5511251914f6880d72a93e4f0144810752a45d6e5026","verifiedTreeHash":"38a1856304f93aa2cf7efa7718899ec9d8069867","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+6698e07d"}]}