{"assessments":[],"deployments":[],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"99b7f274-b8e7-4ba9-a30b-75d7b91f75ae","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"209431b6c1ef0cccb924a6c364c9b18894d2a5f729775f72a6c5955d8e8d5d31","dependsOn":["implement_contract","write_foundry_tests"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"6b037a7b6601e883cf8a906c1520c0624817d42d8310b65c2f43679204608af3","skillId":"adversarial-review","tools":[]},"key":"adversarial_review","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"6b037a7b6601e883cf8a906c1520c0624817d42d8310b65c2f43679204608af3","skillId":"adversarial-review","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"303fb2bbf471c35a644e79d2f3f3f58740966e8b17addbb9e350d4344656dd56","dependsOn":["adversarial_review"],"execution":{"mustProduce":["dist/index.html"],"network":true,"optionalTools":["browser"],"profile":"none","requires":["network"],"skillHash":"6715a761ae197330be56ba3ef74f7628c405aa1d94f0e62b3dcf3715e0135cbc","skillId":"build-website","tools":[]},"key":"build_website","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"6715a761ae197330be56ba3ef74f7628c405aa1d94f0e62b3dcf3715e0135cbc","skillId":"build-website","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"4337dcdb606c0fe70e76a80b0e2a4ff83db107639a12fb19ee85c7f9206546e2","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"d37537abb20af46832b24602788d7895021ecaac20c6934313dc4f8aba4ad047","skillId":"implement-contract","tools":[]},"key":"implement_contract","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"d37537abb20af46832b24602788d7895021ecaac20c6934313dc4f8aba4ad047","skillId":"implement-contract","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"533beb2633f739f6c3738148b0bc9bf680a4ca610b8b3868c4b5934d4663920d","dependsOn":["implement_contract"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"73431852439ad3a343f3d2b7db1c43cd363b9f48f9bb51497374a0cf6d50b223","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","tools":[]},"key":"write_foundry_tests","kind":"code","role":"tests","skillHash":"73431852439ad3a343f3d2b7db1c43cd363b9f48f9bb51497374a0cf6d50b223","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"839d0bc5c87b9968b22940996b0be6476edf897a894123e2ed2a99dbd393ee35","dependsOn":["build_website"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"none","requires":[],"skillHash":"7e3e9a90f2342f72573636f539f0a3a3016b9f8bf53c7b77a17dc4608a09d0b2","skillId":"write-readme-and-docs","tools":[]},"key":"write_readme_and_docs","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"7e3e9a90f2342f72573636f539f0a3a3016b9f8bf53c7b77a17dc4608a09d0b2","skillId":"write-readme-and-docs","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"Build a complete in-wallet token-lock voting system for a newly issued ERC-20 whose contract we control. Deliver Solidity contracts, Foundry tests, deployment scripts, a usable web frontend, and documentation in a GitHub repository. This is a source-code development request; do not launch a tradable platform token or deploy to a production network.\n\nCore requirement: users vote without transferring, staking, wrapping, burning, or depositing their tokens into another address. balanceOf(voter) must still include their locked tokens. Only the quantity voluntarily committed to a vote is locked; the rest remains transferable. Implement enforcement inside the custom ERC-20 itself. Do not claim compatibility with arbitrary existing immutable ERC-20s or substitute snapshots, allowance, wallet delegation, UI disabling, or transfer monitoring for actual transfer prevention.\n\nImplement a configurable-name/symbol/fixed-supply demo token and its bound voting contract. One voting instance governs one token on one chain; the same implementation can be deployed again for another compatible token and EVM chain. Token and voting bindings must be fixed after safe one-time initialization; the delivered MVP must have no administrator or upgrade bypass that can move locked balances, shorten existing locks, change recorded votes, seize tokens, or replace enforcement. Only an explicit vote transaction from the token holder may create that holder's lock. An administrator cannot arbitrarily freeze holders.\n\nVoting: allow a configured proposal creator to create proposals with a title, description, future start, and fixed end time. Use For, Against, and Abstain. One vote per wallet per proposal; no delegation or vote replacement in this MVP. Users specify a positive token quantity. Locking and recording voting weight must be atomic; weight equals the committed quantity in token base units. Reject votes outside the window, zero amounts, duplicate votes, and amounts greater than unlocked balance. Existing proposal deadlines and choices cannot be edited. No proposal execution or treasury transfers are required.\n\nFor overlapping proposals, add together their still-active locked quantities: the same units cannot back two simultaneous votes in this MVP. Bound active lock entries per user and all loops; document the chosen bound and a maximum proposal duration. Expired entries must never prevent transfers or permanently consume active-lock capacity. Lock expiration depends on block.timestamp at the fixed end time, regardless of whether anyone finalizes the proposal or the frontend/backend is online. Voting weight remains recorded after expiration. Supply changes, if any implementation path exists, must not bypass active locks.\n\nEvery debit path must preserve balanceOf(account) >= activeLocked(account). Cover transfer, transferFrom including allowances granted before voting, router/DEX-style spending, burn, and burnFrom if present. New approvals do not override locks; approvals need not be disabled. Incoming transfers are allowed and do not increase an existing vote or extend its deadline. Expose total balance, active locked balance, transferable balance, individual locks/deadlines, vote receipt, and proposal totals with useful events.\n\nFrontend: connect an EVM wallet, verify its chain, list/create proposals, show choices and deadlines, display total/locked/available token balances, let a holder select quantity and vote, show transaction pending/failure/success and on-chain results. Display overlapping locks and unlock times. Use real contract reads and transactions, not mock balances or simulated success. No private keys in the frontend, no custodial backend, no secret APIs, and no DexScreener/dexscreen dependency or fallback. Provide a local test deployment and a clear wallet-to-vote-to-unlock walkthrough.\n\nMulti-chain: provide reusable deployment scripts and frontend configuration keyed by chainId and contract addresses. Target conventional EVM chains such as Ethereum, Base, Arbitrum and BNB Smart Chain after chain-specific validation. Keep governance and balances independent on each chain; do not add bridging or pooled cross-chain vote totals. Document compiler/EVM target assumptions and distinguish chains actually tested from merely configured. Use test fixtures/local networks for validation; no live wallet funds are authorized.\n\nAcceptance: with 1,000 tokens, a 300-token vote leaves balanceOf at 1,000 and transferable balance at 700; transferring 701 fails and transferring 700 succeeds. A pre-approved spender/router also cannot spend the remaining 300. Incoming tokens remain available without changing the vote. At the deadline the lock no longer restricts transfers without an administrator or finalization transaction. Test additive overlapping locks with different deadlines, duplicate/unauthorized votes and locks, boundary timestamps, historical approvals, signature/permit spending paths if included, all burn paths if included, initialization permissions, expiry cleanup, and attempts to borrow/vote/repay the same locked funds in one transaction. Include meaningful fuzz/invariant tests for locked-balance conservation and tally correctness and an adversarial review. Document all trust assumptions and outstanding findings. Deliver reproducible run/test/deploy instructions and a working frontend alongside the source.\n\nUse In-Wallet Voting Demo (symbol VDEMO), 18 decimals, and a fixed supply of 1,000,000 tokens solely as the configurable local test fixture. These are demonstration metadata, not a request to mint or launch a live asset. Deliver source code only in this job.","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"e14e39e5ebf739896fd2d955d2e0f15e512b7faf64f98e77c49bed750e920260","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"99b7f274-b8e7-4ba9-a30b-75d7b91f75ae","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-591-src-inwalletlocktoken-sol-src-inwalletvo"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"50959","feedbackHash":"20a1e586bc70314715f354f86c0b7fa8a5f02ac321ca90176ad61acfa1121dc4","nodeKey":"adversarial_review","submissionHash":"209431b6c1ef0cccb924a6c364c9b18894d2a5f729775f72a6c5955d8e8d5d31","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"50957","feedbackHash":"fcc624aa686042a695b14740d837e58794f21be747e0a3a71117bb5b42a99209","nodeKey":"build_website","submissionHash":"303fb2bbf471c35a644e79d2f3f3f58740966e8b17addbb9e350d4344656dd56","tag1":"verification:structural","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"50957","feedbackHash":"7294ee11f952630a31307021e303aa2ac1444ee6fc8ef06f478564b03fe36aef","nodeKey":"implement_contract","submissionHash":"4337dcdb606c0fe70e76a80b0e2a4ff83db107639a12fb19ee85c7f9206546e2","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"50957","feedbackHash":"a3035b9a6daeac88670b5e6873729651e6e3f3eb798b46e32b22befb686c32b9","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"533beb2633f739f6c3738148b0bc9bf680a4ca610b8b3868c4b5934d4663920d","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51725","feedbackHash":"57fc6bdc7dde01f557d2d335f4d0e3b45d897ec36d5a7eef491169437f4c12f4","nodeKey":"write_readme_and_docs","submissionHash":"839d0bc5c87b9968b22940996b0be6476edf897a894123e2ed2a99dbd393ee35","tag1":"verification:structural","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"cd008f6b3ef0d2e52b4ec404e0b9ae571bc916a444336759b8c981970c5f912e","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"468e82a89b9bfe18","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"The script compares block.chainid against EXPECTED_CHAIN_ID with strict equality and has no 'unset / 0 means local dry run' path. The IdentityMD verifier re-runs Foundry deliverables with `EXPECTED_CHAIN_ID=0 forge script script/Deploy.s.sol:Deploy --offline`; on the default local chain (31337) that command reverts before any deployment is simulated. The script's own documented invocation (no env var, or EXPECTED_CHAIN_ID=31337) succeeds, so this only affects the automated check, not the contracts. Suggested fix that preserves the design: treat EXPECTED_CHAIN_ID of 0 (or unset) as 'local only' and keep the strict match for any non-zero value, keeping the production-chain rejection list as is.","line":79,"path":"script/Deploy.s.sol","reproduction":"In the repository root run `EXPECTED_CHAIN_ID=0 forge script script/Deploy.s.sol:Deploy --offline`. Expected: the dry run deploys InWalletLockToken and prints the token/voting addresses, as it does with no env var set. Actual: `Error: script failed: UnexpectedChain(0, 31337 [3.133e4])` with gas used 24848 and no contract created. `forge script script/Deploy.s.sol:Deploy --offline` (no env var) succeeds, token at 0x5FbDB2315678afecb367f032d93F642f64180aa3.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (block.chainid != expectedChainId) revert UnexpectedChain(expectedChainId, block.chainid);","title":"Deploy dry run reverts under the network's standard verification command (EXPECTED_CHAIN_ID=0)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The task requires documented compiler/EVM target assumptions for conventional EVM chains (Ethereum, Base, Arbitrum, BNB Smart Chain). The tree contains no foundry.toml or remappings.txt (git tracks only 7 files), and both contracts use the floating pragma ^0.8.24. The build therefore depends entirely on the local Foundry defaults: here it compiled with solc 0.8.30, evmVersion 'osaka', optimizer disabled. The only mitigation is a NatSpec comment telling operators to pass --evm-version paris by hand; nothing in the repository enforces or records the target actually tested, so the artifacts the tests exercised are not the artifacts an operator following the README-less instructions would deploy. Accepted Foundry work on this network pins solc_version, optimizer, evm_version = \"paris\", offline = true and ffi = false in foundry.toml. Because configuration files are outside the paths a contributor may edit, this needs a scope decision by the requester rather than a contract change. Measured with the current unoptimized default: transfer with 32 active locks 217,226 gas; vote that sweeps 32 expired entries 754,196 gas; cleanupExpiredLocks of 32 expired entries 664,987 gas. All bounded, but roughly 2x what the optimized build would cost.","line":44,"path":"script/Deploy.s.sol","reproduction":"Run `git ls-files foundry.toml remappings.txt` (empty output), then `forge build --offline` and `jq -r '.metadata.compiler.version, .metadata.settings.evmVersion, .metadata.settings.optimizer.enabled' out/InWalletLockToken.sol/InWalletLockToken.json`. Expected: a pinned compiler and a conservative EVM target (paris or cancun) recorded in the repository. Actual: `0.8.30+commit.73712a01`, `osaka`, `false`; a different Foundry install yields different bytecode.","severity":"low","snippet":" * Compiler assumption: standard Solidity >=0.8.24 <0.9.0. The supplied Foundry default EVM target is\n * Osaka; specify --evm-version paris for conservative conventional-EVM compilation and simulation.","title":"No foundry.toml: solc version, EVM target and optimizer are unpinned; shipped build targets osaka with optimizer off"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The requested design asks for reusable deployment scripts keyed by chainId for Ethereum, Base, Arbitrum and BNB Smart Chain 'after chain-specific validation', while also forbidding production deployment in this job. The script resolves that tension by hard-coding a revert for chain IDs 1, 8453, 42161 and 56, so the delivered script can never be used on the named targets without a source edit. This is a reasonable safety choice for the source-only deliverable and is not a defect; it is recorded so the requester can decide whether the eventual multi-chain path should be an env-gated allowlist instead of a code change.","line":80,"path":"script/Deploy.s.sol","reproduction":"`EXPECTED_CHAIN_ID=8453 forge script script/Deploy.s.sol:Deploy --offline --chain-id 8453` reverts with ProductionChainNotAllowed(8453); the same holds for 1, 42161 and 56. Any other chain ID with DEPLOYER/INITIAL_HOLDER set succeeds.","severity":"info","snippet":"        if (block.chainid == 1 || block.chainid == 8453 || block.chainid == 42161 || block.chainid == 56) {","title":"Scope observation: deploy script permanently rejects the four named target chain IDs"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The overall job requires a usable web frontend (wallet connect, chain check, proposal list/create, vote, lock display), a wallet-to-vote-to-unlock walkthrough, reproducible run/test/deploy instructions and a documented adversarial review. The checkout under review holds only src/, test/, script/ (7 tracked files). The contracts' NatSpec and the deploy script header carry the trust assumptions and run instructions, and the test file header carries the review scope, so the contract-side documentation exists in code comments only. If the frontend and documents are produced by another node of this job this is not a defect; if this tree is the whole deliverable those requirements are unmet. Recorded as a scope question, not a code defect.","line":42,"path":"test/InWalletVoting.t.sol","reproduction":"`git ls-files` lists exactly script/Deploy.s.sol, src/InWalletLockToken.sol, src/InWalletVoting.sol, test/InWalletVoting.t.sol, test/InWalletVotingInvariant.t.sol, test/mocks/FlashBorrower.sol, test/mocks/Spender.sol. No README.md, REVIEW.md, web/, dist/ or docs/ exists.","severity":"info","snippet":" * Frontend wallet/chain/transaction-status behavior cannot be validated: this checkout\n * contains only the two contracts and deployment script, with no frontend sources.","title":"Scope observation: frontend, README walkthrough and REVIEW.md are not in this tree"}],"hash":"209431b6c1ef0cccb924a6c364c9b18894d2a5f729775f72a6c5955d8e8d5d31","nodeId":"3ce11845-4729-43fb-8337-d62c12f0695a","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is done. The findings file is written at `.imd-findings.json` and no source, test or script file was changed.\n\n**Outcome: the contracts hold.** I found no defect in lock enforcement, permissions, accounting, expiry, voting integrity or the loop bounds. Both reproducible findings are in the deployment and build setup, and both are low severity.\n\nWhat I checked and how:\n\n- **Enforcement and accounting.** Every debit goes through one private transfer that checks the amount against balance minus unexpired locks, and the only path that raises locks checks the same quantity. The acceptance scenario reproduces exactly: 300 locked of 1,000 leaves balanceOf at 1,000, a 701 transfer reverts, 700 succeeds, and a pre-approved router cannot spend the remaining 300.\n- **Permissions and binding.** The token constructs its voting contract atomically, the voting contract refuses any deployer other than its token, and no initializer, owner, mint, burn, permit or upgrade selector exists. Only a holder's own vote call can create that holder's lock.\n- **Expiry and bounds.** Expiry is purely block.timestamp against the fixed end time, with no finalization or cleanup needed. Lock capacity is 32 entries and expired entries are swept before a new vote, so they never consume capacity. I measured worst cases with a scratch test: a transfer with 32 active locks costs about 217k gas and a vote that sweeps 32 expired entries about 754k, both far inside block limits.\n- **Voting integrity.** Receipt and tally writes revert together with any lock failure. One vote per wallet per proposal, window inclusive at start and exclusive at end, matching lock expiry. The flash borrow, vote, repay path reverts on repayment.\n- **Tests.** All 40 tests pass offline, including four fuzz tests and an invariant suite with an independent ledger and fail-on-revert. Formatting passes.\n\nFindings recorded:\n\n1. **Low.** The deploy dry run reverts with `UnexpectedChain(0, 31337)` under the network's standard check command `EXPECTED_CHAIN_ID=0 forge script ... --offline`. The script's own documented invocation succeeds.\n2. **Low.** There is no foundry.toml, so the compiler and EVM target are unpinned. The build here used solc 0.8.30, EVM target osaka, optimizer off. This needs a requester decision because configuration files are outside contributor edit scope.\n3. **Info.** The script hard-rejects chain IDs 1, 8453, 42161 and 56, so the named multi-chain targets require a source edit later. Reasonable for a source-only job, recorded as a scope question.\n4. **Info.** The tree holds only contracts, tests and the script. Frontend, README walkthrough and REVIEW.md are absent, which may belong to another node of this job.\n\nThe coverage record answers all seven listed entry points as holding, plus the constructors, two invariants, and the deploy script as the carrier of finding 1.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":913753,"inputTokens":354,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":26744,"runtime":"claude","turns":19,"wallClockMs":442651}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"5b6aa337250eb20499945e3791ba8b438c06ac005c175586fb342c7ed02091f5","device":"0256823ae36e7900","findings":[],"hash":"303fb2bbf471c35a644e79d2f3f3f58740966e8b17addbb9e350d4344656dd56","nodeId":"c7e999ea-dc45-4f28-ba96-41323b576321","outcome":"completed","summary":"Delivered the wallet frontend, `dist/` export, local Solidity fixture, tests, and documentation.\n\nBuild, typecheck, 29 frontend tests, 16 Foundry tests, and real Anvil browser flows passed. Delivery size: **1.44 MiB**.\n\nSee [README.md](README.md), [DESIGN.md](DESIGN.md), and [validation results](artifacts/validation.md).\n\nNo production deployment occurred. Real wallet extensions and nonlocal chains remain untested.","treeHash":"ccf07a99affdfa160da05c25e351e9715f826ee9","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":4487168,"inputTokens":139010,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":49789,"runtime":"codex","turns":9,"wallClockMs":2348946}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"9ea90639934b834d9a97d4509842c513c4aa72d60150e465049fc5203d8afd74","device":"0256823ae36e7900","findings":[],"hash":"4337dcdb606c0fe70e76a80b0e2a4ff83db107639a12fb19ee85c7f9206546e2","nodeId":"01d3d45a-9b0a-4dec-aa93-44da680f93d7","outcome":"completed","summary":"Implemented the three permitted files with immutable bindings, additive locks, permanent vote records, and configurable demo deployment. Limits: 32 active locks per holder and 30-day proposals.\n\nValidation passed: `forge build`, all 21 tests—including fuzzing and 8,192 stateful actions—and local deployment simulation.\n\nNo dependencies or configuration changed. No transactions broadcast. Other chains remain unvalidated.","treeHash":"224e61d9550c6a7cf4a102578de9f792c9beb246","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1827968,"inputTokens":73651,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":12223,"runtime":"codex","turns":9,"wallClockMs":698149}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"9e0f640b65bc0209e31d6898859ed79fa67a5d020ad1020bb47b0407b5cd84ed","device":"0256823ae36e7900","findings":[{"description":"The supplied repository contains the token, voting contract and deployment script, but no web frontend. There is no runnable wallet connection flow, chain verification, chainId/address configuration, proposal listing/creation interface, balance and overlapping-lock display, voting transaction status, or wallet-to-vote-to-unlock walkthrough. These required deliverables cannot be exercised or accepted through Solidity tests. The deployment script does contain local dry-run instructions and trust/compiler notes; those do not provide the missing UI. This is a deliverable completeness finding, not a demonstrated Solidity lock bypass.","line":1,"path":"frontend/","reproduction":"Run git ls-files on the supplied implementation before these test additions: the complete output is script/Deploy.s.sol, src/InWalletLockToken.sol, and src/InWalletVoting.sol. Inspect the repository for frontend sources, a frontend package manifest and a wallet walkthrough: none exist. Expected: a runnable web app using real wallet reads/transactions and documented local wallet-to-vote-to-unlock steps. Actual: only the Solidity contracts and deployment script are present, so no frontend can be started or validated. The added tests and mocks do not supply a frontend.","severity":"medium","title":"Required wallet frontend and wallet-to-unlock walkthrough are absent"}],"hash":"533beb2633f739f6c3738148b0bc9bf680a4ca610b8b3868c4b5934d4663920d","nodeId":"9faadd71-3527-4c6d-ac45-077b22f7648e","outcome":"completed","summary":"Added adversarial tests, spender/flash-borrower mocks, and stateful invariants.\n\nOffline `forge build` and `forge test` pass: **40 tests**, including **4,000 fuzz cases** and **8,192 invariant calls**.\n\nReported the missing frontend and wallet walkthrough in [.imd-findings.json](/home/imd-worker/.identitymd/work/99b7f274-b8e7-4ba9-a30b-75d7b91f75ae/9faadd71-3527-4c6d-ac45-077b22f7648e/.imd-findings.json). No Solidity defect found; implementation and configuration remain unchanged.","treeHash":"ee2d9b400c1e4d240719592ef12e7e340096fdd0","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":948096,"inputTokens":107980,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":22055,"runtime":"codex","turns":6,"wallClockMs":1876073}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"f6ed3d567b4ad74b6f645ce0cce435958f1729c92304ced405544c0bfaed263b","device":"004eae350f695d24","findings":[],"hash":"839d0bc5c87b9968b22940996b0be6476edf897a894123e2ed2a99dbd393ee35","nodeId":"b6a9b6f5-de19-436b-85fb-cf03f818e0b3","outcome":"completed","summary":"Updated `README.md` and added documentation for contract APIs, frontend pages, permissions, failure modes, deployment, and validation.\n\nBuild, typecheck, frontend tests, Solidity tests/invariants, and local deployment/client checks passed.\n\nDocumented unresolved dependency findings, unavailable offline builds, the broken legacy delivery checker, and untested public-chain/wallet compatibility. Only `README.md` and `docs/` changed.","treeHash":"fb796642624abc38b7090f125283cd964b3cba5b","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":707712,"inputTokens":83536,"model":null,"outputTokens":10511,"runtime":"codex","turns":5,"wallClockMs":497552}}],"verification":[{"checks":[],"detail":"paths and tree verified; no suite was run for this kind of work","evaluation":"structural","profile":"none","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"303fb2bbf471c35a644e79d2f3f3f58740966e8b17addbb9e350d4344656dd56","verifiedTreeHash":"ccf07a99affdfa160da05c25e351e9715f826ee9","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+68ddf5e4"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":249,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 3 files with Solc 0.8.30\nSolc 0.8.30 finished in 203.29ms\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/InWalletLockToken.sol:71:9\n   │\n71 │         emit Transfer(address(0), initialHolder, fixedSupply);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n   ╭▸ src/InWalletVoting.sol:94:13\n   │\n94 │         if (startTime <= block.timestamp || endTime <= startTime || endTime - startTime > MAX_PROPOSAL_DURATION) {\n   │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/InWalletLockToken.sol:72:9\n   │\n72 │         emit VotingBound(address(voting), proposalCreator);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n    ╭▸ src/InWalletVoting.sol:108:13\n    │\n108 │         if (block.timestamp < proposal.startTime || block.timestamp >= proposal.endTime) revert VotingClosed();\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n    ╭▸ src/InWalletVoting.sol:108:53\n    │\n108 │         if (block.timestamp < proposal.startTime || block.timestamp >= proposal.endTime) revert VotingClosed();\n    │                                                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/InWalletVoting.sol:124:9\n    │\n124 │         emit VoteCast(proposalId, msg.sender, choice, amount, proposal.endTime);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n    ╭▸ src/InWalletLockToken.sol:107:17\n    │\n107 │             if (block.timestamp < entries[i].unlockTime) locked += entries[i].amount;\n    │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n    ╭▸ src/InWalletLockToken.sol:129:71\n    │\n129 │             holder == address(0) || proposalId == 0 || amount == 0 || unlockTime <= block.timestamp\n    │                                                                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n    ╭▸ src/InWalletLockToken.sol:130:20\n    │\n130 │                 || unlockTime - block.timestamp > MAX_LOCK_DURATION\n    │                    ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n    ╭▸ src/InWalletLockToken.sol:152:17\n    │\n152 │             if (block.timestamp >= entries[i].unlockTime) {\n    │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":47,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\nWarning: No tests found in project! Forge looks for functions that start with `test`\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":19,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"InWalletLockToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"InWalletLockToken.cleanupExpiredLocks(address)\",\"InWalletLockToken.lockForVote(address,uint256,uint256,uint256)\",\"InWalletLockToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"InWalletLockToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"InWalletVoting.createProposal(string,string,uint256,uint256)\",\"InWalletVoting.vote(uint256,uint8,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":105,\"src/InWalletLockToken.sol\":173,\"src/InWalletVoting.sol\":143},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":786,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"slither: no results at low impact or above","passed":true},{"durationMs":617,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[low] costly-loop at src/InWalletLockToken.sol:151: Costly operations inside loop\n[low] missing-inheritance at src/InWalletLockToken.sol:18: Missing Inheritance\n[low] push-zero-opcode at src/InWalletLockToken.sol:2: PUSH0 Opcode (2 places)\n[low] state-variable-could-be-immutable at src/InWalletLockToken.sol:29: State Variable Could Be Immutable (2 places)\n[low] unchecked-return at src/InWalletLockToken.sol:134: Unchecked Return\n[low] uninitialized-local-variable at src/InWalletLockToken.sol:106: Uninitialized Local Variable\n[low] unspecific-solidity-pragma at src/InWalletLockToken.sol:2: Unspecific Solidity Pragma (2 places)","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"4337dcdb606c0fe70e76a80b0e2a4ff83db107639a12fb19ee85c7f9206546e2","verifiedTreeHash":"224e61d9550c6a7cf4a102578de9f792c9beb246","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+68ddf5e4"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":862,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 7 files with Solc 0.8.30\nSolc 0.8.30 finished in 646.90ms\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/InWalletLockToken.sol:71:9\n   │\n71 │         emit Transfer(address(0), initialHolder, fixedSupply);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/InWalletLockToken.sol:72:9\n   │\n72 │         emit VotingBound(address(voting), proposalCreator);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n   ╭▸ src/InWalletVoting.sol:94:13\n   │\n94 │         if (startTime <= block.timestamp || endTime <= startTime || endTime - startTime > MAX_PROPOSAL_DURATION) {\n   │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n    ╭▸ src/InWalletVoting.sol:108:13\n    │\n108 │         if (block.timestamp < proposal.startTime || block.timestamp >= proposal.endTime) revert VotingClosed();\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n    ╭▸ src/InWalletVoting.sol:108:53\n    │\n108 │         if (block.timestamp < proposal.startTime || block.timestamp >= proposal.endTime) revert VotingClosed();\n    │                                                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/InWalletVoting.sol:124:9\n    │\n124 │         emit VoteCast(proposalId, msg.sender, choice, amount, proposal.endTime);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n    ╭▸ src/InWalletLockToken.sol:107:17\n    │\n107 │             if (block.timestamp < entries[i].unlockTime) locked += entries[i].amount;\n    │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n    ╭▸ src/InWalletLockToken.sol:129:71\n    │\n129 │             holder == address(0) || proposalId == 0 || amount == 0 || unlockTime <= block.timestamp\n    │                                                                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n    ╭▸ src/InWalletLockToken.sol:130:20\n    │\n130 │                 || unlockTime - block.timestamp > MAX_LOCK_DURATION\n    │                    ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n    ╭▸ src/InWalletLockToken.sol:152:17\n    │\n152 │             if (block.timestamp >= entries[i].unlockTime) {\n    │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":46328,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 3 tests for test/InWalletVoting.t.sol:InWalletVotingCapacityTest\n[PASS] testCapRejectsVoteAtomicallyAndExpiryAutomaticallyRecoversCapacity() (gas: 16612166)\n[PASS] testCapacityCanBeReusedForMoreThan32HistoricalVotes() (gas: 44801160)\n[PASS] testPermissionlessCleanupHandlesSwappedMixedEntriesAndPreservesHistory() (gas: 2633170)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 96.82ms (46.45ms CPU time)\n\nRan 3 tests for test/InWalletVoting.t.sol:InWalletVotingEventsTest\n[PASS] testApprovalAndRouterDebitEventsMatchActualAllowanceAndBalances() (gas: 140807)\n[PASS] testConstructorEmitsInitialSupplyAndImmutableBinding() (gas: 15229)\n[PASS] testProposalVoteAndCleanupEmitQueryableDeadlinesAndWeights() (gas: 445417)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 153.98ms (9.66ms CPU time)\n\nRan 18 tests for test/InWalletVoting.t.sol:InWalletVotingTest\n[PASS] testAcceptanceBalanceStaysInWalletAndEverySpenderRespectsLock() (gas: 656250)\n[PASS] testAllChoicesAndBaseUnitWeights() (gas: 894540)\n[PASS] testApprovalsGrantedAfterVoteNeverOverrideLock() (gas: 525307)\n[PASS] testFlashBorrowVoteRepayRevertsEveryIntermediateEffect() (gas: 852763)\n[PASS] testHistoricalFiniteAllowanceAndFailedDebitRollback() (gas: 705298)\n[PASS] testIncomingTransferDoesNotChangeVoteOrDeadline() (gas: 605768)\n[PASS] testMalformedChoiceIsRejectedBeforeAnyLockOrTally() (gas: 254407)\n[PASS] testNoCreatorHolderOrSpenderCanLockOnBehalfOfAnotherHolder() (gas: 480897)\n[PASS] testOverlappingLocksAreAdditiveAndExpireIndividually() (gas: 1042819)\n[PASS] testOverlappingLocksFinishWithoutCleanupOrFinalization() (gas: 849370)\n[PASS] testPrefundedBorrowerCanRepayOnlyWhileRetainingCommittedCollateral() (gas: 561800)\n[PASS] testSelfTransfersAndZeroTransfersPreserveLocksAndSupply() (gas: 655841)\n[PASS] testTokenRejectsInvalidLockInputsEvenAtItsTrustedVotingBoundary() (gas: 352242)\n[PASS] testTransferFromRequiresAllowanceEvenForHolder() (gas: 135511)\n[PASS] testUnknownProposalReadsAndVotesRevert() (gas: 320248)\n[PASS] testWindowIsInclusiveAtStartAndExclusiveAtEnd() (gas: 845087)\n[PASS] testZeroAddressTransfersAndApprovalRevertIncludingAllowanceRollback() (gas: 196435)\n[PASS] testZeroOversizedAndDuplicateVotesLeaveStateUnchanged() (gas: 711304)\nSuite result: ok. 18 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 154.57ms (46.68ms CPU time)\n\nRan 10 tests for test/InWalletVoting.t.sol:InWalletVotingConfigurationTest\n[PASS] testAbsentBurnPermitInitializationAndAdminBypassesCannotChangeState() (gas: 1122034)\n[PASS] testConstructorRejectsZeroAddressesSupplyAndEmptyMetadata() (gas: 5530)\n[PASS] testFarFutureProposalDoesNotLockBeforeExplicitVote() (gas: 429712)\n[PASS] testFixtureMetadataSupplyAndBindings() (gas: 68732)\n[PASS] testOneSecondProposalAndNearUint256TimestampDoNotOverflow() (gas: 427006)\n[PASS] testOnlyConfiguredCreatorCanCreateEvenInitialHolderCannot() (gas: 383102)\n[PASS] testProposalTextByteLimitsAndEmptyDescription() (gas: 1075378)\n[PASS] testProposalWindowValidationAndMaximumDuration() (gas: 573475)\n[PASS] testSeparateDeploymentHasIndependentMetadataBalancesAndVotes() (gas: 833224)\n[PASS] testVotingConstructorRejectsMismatchedAndZeroBindings() (gas: 6654)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 154.59ms (46.51ms CPU time)\n\nRan 5 tests for test/InWalletVoting.t.sol:InWalletVotingFuzzTest\n[PASS] testFuzzAdditiveQuantitiesAndDistinctDeadlines(uint256,uint256,uint32) (runs: 1000, μ: 958233, ~: 958230)\n[PASS] testFuzzCommittedQuantityExactlyBoundsDebit(uint256,uint8) (runs: 1000, μ: 561399, ~: 561434)\n[PASS] testFuzzFullUint256SupplyConservesBalancesAndTally(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 762911, ~: 771307)\n[PASS] testFuzzHistoricalAllowanceCannotSpendCommitment(uint256,bool) (runs: 1000, μ: 653148, ~: 661163)\n[PASS] testMaximumSupplyExactArithmeticEdge() (gas: 771855)\nSuite result: ok. 5 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 154.72ms (532.69ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/InWalletVotingInvariant.t.sol:InWalletVotingInvariantTest\n[PASS] invariant_lockedBalanceConservationAndPermanentTallies() (runs: 128, calls: 8192, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract              | Selector         | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=======================================================================+\n| InWalletVotingHandler | advanceTime      | 1030  | 0       | 0        |\n|-----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| InWalletVotingHandler | approve          | 987   | 0       | 0        |\n|-----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| InWalletVotingHandler | cleanup          | 1063  | 0       | 0        |\n|-----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| InWalletVotingHandler | createProposal   | 1026  | 0       | 0        |\n|-----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| InWalletVotingHandler | transfer         | 978   | 0       | 0        |\n|-----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| InWalletVotingHandler | transferFrom     | 1032  | 0       | 0        |\n|-----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| InWalletVotingHandler | unauthorizedLock | 1033  | 0       | 0        |\n|-----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| InWalletVotingHandler | vote             | 1043  | 0       | 0        |\n╰-----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 46.24s (46.21s CPU time)\n\nRan 6 test suites in 46.25s (46.96s CPU time): 40 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (40 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":28,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"InWalletLockToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"InWalletLockToken.cleanupExpiredLocks(address)\",\"InWalletLockToken.lockForVote(address,uint256,uint256,uint256)\",\"InWalletLockToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"InWalletLockToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"InWalletVoting.createProposal(string,string,uint256,uint256)\",\"InWalletVoting.vote(uint256,uint8,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":105,\"src/InWalletLockToken.sol\":173,\"src/InWalletVoting.sol\":143,\"test/InWalletVoting.t.sol\":941,\"test/InWalletVotingInvariant.t.sol\":386,\"test/mocks/FlashBorrower.sol\":24,\"test/mocks/Spender.sol\":11},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"533beb2633f739f6c3738148b0bc9bf680a4ca610b8b3868c4b5934d4663920d","verifiedTreeHash":"ee2d9b400c1e4d240719592ef12e7e340096fdd0","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+68ddf5e4"},{"checks":[],"detail":"paths and tree verified; no suite was run for this kind of work","evaluation":"structural","profile":"none","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"839d0bc5c87b9968b22940996b0be6476edf897a894123e2ed2a99dbd393ee35","verifiedTreeHash":"fb796642624abc38b7090f125283cd964b3cba5b","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+68ddf5e4"}]}