{"assessments":[],"deployments":[],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"7a9950a7-b480-4315-8298-0d990571d9af","kind":"audit","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"65fb547a338f49bcc0f54113abf89a4ce1a8a476cbc691937eb84e78e88c6d91","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_economics","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"37084c189dbfbdedda6ec2de9d372877ff2410fedf755f691a879efb78c15036","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_flow","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"0202019895d6d98fd962ed0d226c684341decfafc3d032d374c214977b2638ca","dependsOn":["audit_math","audit_permissions","audit_economics","audit_flow"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"af3aa01159bbf354f621cafa5c0006f6169e0938a8b015be508b7377dbf165bc","skillId":"audit-judge","tools":[]},"key":"audit_judge","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"af3aa01159bbf354f621cafa5c0006f6169e0938a8b015be508b7377dbf165bc","skillId":"audit-judge","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"392a04c34fa89042283af576788d02dcf361c76189f49d6d88da0d9af2fbb8b8","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_math","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"1bbaf49cb1fc05454dbd1a81c84b698c1afdf8dd1c1da216b7c4f908d3f6697e","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_permissions","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"Audit the money of the delta of moneycanbuy.fun between commit 84b446c and commit 14c4e30, four changed payout and lock rules. Repository at commit 14c4e308019a0cff83fdaf2d17425867af3cf301. Run forge at the repo root, import as \"src/...\". Modify no existing file; new files only under contracts/test/audit/.\n\nSOURCE OF TRUTH. The RULES below are the money rules for these four changes; docs/MECHANICS.md and docs/YOLO.md restate them. Code or docs off the RULES = a finding. Do not re-report what contracts/test/audit/ proves fixed.\n\nSCOPE. Only the money effect of these four changes between commit 84b446c and commit 14c4e30. Not a full payout audit: ignore anything unchanged in this range. Code security and role scenarios are separate orders: one info line each if relevant.\n\nTHE FOUR CHANGES AND THEIR NEW RULES.\n1. Lock extension power. YoloLockHub.lock(): extending (a call with a nonzero new term) now fixes power = amount * weeks_left / 52 (the whole current amount at the new term), replacing the old max(old_power + added*weeks_left/52, amount*weeks_left/52). Adding without a new term still does old_power + added*weeks_left/52.\n2. Stake-bonus base = the whole pot. CaseDesk._stakeBps(): the doer stake bonus b = 4% x min(1, power / R) now uses R = DevPrices.yoloValue(t.currency, t.pot) where t.pot is the task's whole reward at submission (the author's own share plus every top-up), replacing R = yoloValue(t.currency, t.base) (the author's own share only).\n3. $YOLO add-on in the stake-bonus base. After computing r from t.pot, CaseDesk._stakeBps() now does r += t.addon, so the YoloSweetener $YOLO add-on is added to R too; the bond base (t.base) is unchanged, author's own share only.\n4. Predict pokes the task first. YoloPredict.predict(): if a submission is active and the deadline has not passed, predict() now calls vault.poke(taskId) and re-reads task status before the SubmissionActive check, so a submission whose own timer already ended no longer blocks new positions; no money rule changes other than when the window opens.\n\nPrices (no network): IMD $4.50, ETH $2,398, YOLO $0.001 (parameter), swarm call 0.5 IMD = $2.25, gas 0.12 gwei; in code every price is a dev-wallet parameter, USDC = $1.\n\nKNOWN LIMITATIONS. Every line under Known limitations in docs/MECHANICS.md is an accepted rule, not a finding, including the self-dispute-from-a-second-wallet line and its ~4.5% of R example. Report one only if a changed line above makes a documented rule itself economically worse than its own stated number.\n\nGOAL. Every high and medium finding with a Foundry PoC; low and info in a separate list at the end, one line each, no PoC needed.\n\nREPORT FORMAT, MANDATORY. One entry per item below, same order, even \"no issue\"; a missing item = INCOMPLETE. Entry 0: VERDICT, max 8 lines: payouts vs RULES, every money blocker. Items 1-6: what you checked, file:line, severity (critical = theft, permanent loss or freeze; high = a RULES amount broken; medium = bounded loss or profitable gaming; low = dust, edge case; info = drift), loss in tokens and $ at a stated R, smallest fix, a Foundry PoC (full source, contracts/test/audit/, exact amounts, fails now, passes once fixed, no fork, no ffi) if real, else one line why not.\n\n1. LOCK POWER AMOUNTS. $100 task, YOLO at $0.001: a doer locks 50,000 YOLO for 52 weeks (power 50,000), waits 26 weeks (power unchanged per docs), then extends to a new 52-week term. Compute power before and after under both the old max()-formula and the new amount*weeks_left/52 formula; state the $ difference in the doer's stake bonus b this enables or removes, and whether the new rule can ever let a doer buy a higher power for the same YOLO than locking the full amount fresh for 52 weeks would cost.\n2. STAKE BASE t.pot vs t.base, WORKED EXAMPLE. $100 task, author put in $60 of it (t.base=$60), others topped up $40 (t.pot=$100), no $YOLO add-on. A doer with lock power worth $100 in YOLO: under the old rule (base=t.base=$60) b would floor at 4% (power >= base); under the new rule (base=t.pot=$100) b is still 4% here, but power worth $60 now gives b=2.4% instead of 4% under the old rule. State exactly which doers gain and which lose stake-bonus $ from this change, at $100 and at $10,000 reward, and whether any party can engineer t.pot upward (extra top-ups) or downward right before submit() to move b in their favor at someone else's expense.\n3. ADD-ON IN STAKE BASE, WORKED EXAMPLE. $100 task, $50 $YOLO add-on from YoloSweetener (t.addon = 50,000 YOLO at $0.001). Old rule: stake base = t.base only, add-on excluded from the power comparison but bonus still paid on the add-on amount. New rule: base = t.pot + t.addon = $150 worth. Give the doer's bonus $ under both rules for a doer with power worth $75, at $100 and $10,000 reward (scaled add-on), and state who pays for the difference (burn vs treasury split, per docs/MECHANICS.md \"(5% - b) half burn, half treasury\").\n4. STAKE BASE INFLATION ATTACK. Can the author or a colluding contributor top up the task (raising t.pot) or deposit a sweetener add-on (raising t.addon) in the same transaction as, or immediately before, a submission, specifically to lower a hostile doer's b below what their real lock power should earn, or to raise their own colluding doer's apparent eligibility? Give the cheapest such plan and its $ cost vs $ gained at $100 and $10,000 reward, or state why t.pot/t.addon cannot be moved in time for a specific submission.\n5. PREDICT WINDOW TIMING, NOT AMOUNTS. Confirm the poke-before-check change in YoloPredict.predict() moves no money by itself (no split, no claim changes): state in one line whether it only changes when a position is accepted, with no $ effect of its own, or whether poke's side effects (e.g. expiring a task) change any payout amount.\n6. COVERAGE. What was checked for these four changes, forge build and test result (passed/failed).\n\nNot findings: anything unchanged between 84b446c and 14c4e30; test/mocks, brand/, landing/; the known-limitations self-dispute line itself.\n","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"37b3bdc0498269721d06284a47cd2dabd7b93d7a3fc16b485f37465514601114","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"7a9950a7-b480-4315-8298-0d990571d9af","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":null},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"52190","feedbackHash":"66e176ed4fd93084c8ecb8a85baf99d303cd070ea3b07d361744b1f4ee50b193","nodeKey":"audit_economics","submissionHash":"65fb547a338f49bcc0f54113abf89a4ce1a8a476cbc691937eb84e78e88c6d91","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51485","feedbackHash":"fce4635912586d8cc4c2cbb5ed1d8e1583fa89c14b32413c972b889af28833cf","nodeKey":"audit_flow","submissionHash":"37084c189dbfbdedda6ec2de9d372877ff2410fedf755f691a879efb78c15036","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51024","feedbackHash":"032b87c660ca5115b7761af1d141e6fc111327f615e16e4ae2681cdc5a0db401","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"0202019895d6d98fd962ed0d226c684341decfafc3d032d374c214977b2638ca","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52600","feedbackHash":"d60c7555a9e66e484b3fc37f94d4a36a50a802fdc8cb5cae01512609f732165f","nodeKey":"audit_math","submissionHash":"392a04c34fa89042283af576788d02dcf361c76189f49d6d88da0d9af2fbb8b8","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52223","feedbackHash":"c3b4eb4c4df1503584f6489bfc4feff7e970817cefdc4599023ca0ed7595bdf4","nodeKey":"audit_permissions","submissionHash":"1bbaf49cb1fc05454dbd1a81c84b698c1afdf8dd1c1da216b7c4f908d3f6697e","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"719f1e647a867b8cf6042cb63e1fb3f64453517fef39d385958d8932796dda78","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"e6de8d4c6cf97551","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Change 1 (line 84: `uint256 pw = weeks_ != 0 ? amount * left / MAX_WEEKS : old + add * left / MAX_WEEKS;`) makes every call with a nonzero term an extension that fixes power = amount x weeks left / 52, as the RULES say. The term guard at line 73 rejects only a strictly earlier end, so lock(add, k) with block.timestamp + k weeks == the current end passes as an 'extension' although the end does not move, and the natspec at lines 17-18 ('the end can only move later') and docs/YOLO.md ('the end only moves later') do not match what is enforced. The one effect of such a call is a power drop: the whole amount is re-rated at the weeks left (50,000 YOLO, 26 weeks served of 52: power 50,000 -> 25,000; adding 10 YOLO with the remaining 26-week term gives 25,005 instead of 50,005 from lock(10, 0)). Same mechanism, rule-compliant: a term that lengthens the lock by less than the full 52 weeks (e.g. 30 weeks with 26 left) also lowers the power (50,000 -> 28,846). Money effect is self-inflicted only: the doer's next stake bonus falls; a bonus already fixed at an earlier submission is kept (powerAt/stakePower read the earlier checkpoint), and no third party gains or loses. At YOLO $0.001 on a $100 task (R = 100,000 YOLO): b 2% -> 1%, $2.00 -> $1.00 per accepted task, the difference going half to the burn, half to the treasury; same $1.00 at $10,000. The new rule never yields more power than a fresh 52-week lock of the whole amount (power <= amount in both branches, fuzzed), so no doer can buy power cheaper than before; the old max() formula was >= the new one in every case. In the task's own scenario (extend to a new 52-week term after 26 weeks) power is 50,000 under both formulas: $0 difference. Merged from audit_math, audit_permissions (2), audit_flow, audit_economics, which all describe this one behaviour. Smallest fix: when weeks_ != 0 and newEnd == end, treat the call as add-only (pw = old + add * left / 52), or revert BadTerm when add == 0; or state the trap in the lock quote on the site.","line":73,"path":"contracts/src/YoloLockHub.sol","reproduction":"Reproduced on 14c4e30 with contracts/test/scratch/JudgeDelta.t.sol (FOUNDRY_OPTIMIZER=false forge test --match-path ...): doer2 hub.lock(50_000e18, 52); vm.warp(+26 weeks - 1 s) so exactly 26 weeks are left; hub.power(doer2) == 50_000e18; doer2 hub.lock(0, 26): the call succeeds, locks(doer2).end is unchanged, hub.power(doer2) == 25_000e18. Expected (natspec 'the end can only move later', old max() formula): BadTerm or power unchanged at 50_000e18. Actual: power halved. Control: doer hub.lock(0, 52) in the same state keeps 50_000e18. Fuzz (256 runs): after any lock/extend/add sequence power <= total amount locked.","severity":"low","snippet":"            if (newEnd < end) revert BadTerm();","title":"lock(): a term that lands exactly on the current end is accepted as an extension and only re-fixes (lowers) the running power"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Change 3 (CaseDesk._stakeBps line 527, `r += t.addon;`) measures the power against the pot in $YOLO plus the task's $YOLO add-on, as the RULES, docs/MECHANICS.md and docs/YOLO.md state. The hub's contract notice (lines 13-14: '4% x min(1, power / reward)') still names the whole reward only, and the test header of contracts/test/YoloLockHub.t.sol lines 12-13 says 'the whole pot at the submission (no add-on)'. Docs drift only: the paying code is on the RULES (test/MoneyRules.t.sol test_AddonInPowerBase asserts 200 bps for 1M power against $100 + a 1M add-on). Merged from audit_permissions and audit_economics (two entries). Fix: reword the two comments to 'the pot in $YOLO plus the $YOLO add-on'.","line":13,"path":"contracts/src/YoloLockHub.sol","reproduction":"Read contracts/src/YoloLockHub.sol lines 13-14 and contracts/test/YoloLockHub.t.sol lines 12-13 against contracts/src/desks/CaseDesk.sol lines 523-528. Scratch test (JudgeDelta.t.sol test_Item3_AddonInBase_PowerWorth75, YOLO at $0.0001): $100 USDC task + 500,000 YOLO add-on, doer power 750,000 YOLO -> stakeBps 200 (750k / 1.5M), not 300 as the notice's 'power / reward' would give.","severity":"info","snippet":"///         the CaseDesk reads `powerAt` at a submission and compares it with the task's whole reward in $YOLO","title":"YoloLockHub notice and the hub test header still describe the stake-bonus base without the $YOLO add-on"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Changes 2 and 3 fix R = yoloValue(t.pot) + t.addon as of the submission block (line 523-527); the bonus is then paid as s.stakeBps of s.reward, re-read as the final pot at acceptance (line 468), and YoloSweetener pays the same bps on bonusOf at payout. So a pot or add-on grown after the submission earns the bps fixed against the smaller base. This is the cheapest sequencing plan for item 4 of the order: author creates a $5 task, a doer with $5 of power submits (400 bps), the author tops up $9,995 during the 24 h review, the doer takes 4% of $10,000 = $400 from the fee; the treasury gets $50 instead of $1,000 (no stake) and the burn $550. The pair still pays the $1,000 fee minus the $400, and an honest staker with $10,000 of power would be paid the same, so it is a bypass of the stake requirement, not a loss to a third party. The mechanism is identical at 84b446c (R was t.base, also fixed at submission and also paid on the final pot), so by the order's scope it is not a finding of this delta; recorded as info. Pre-submission moves cannot be used against a doer: a top-up or an add-on deposited right before a submit lowers the bps but not the bonus dollars (bonus = 4% x min(power, R + A) when nothing changes afterwards), and neither can be withdrawn while the task is open (TaskVault.withdrawContribution reverts TaskNotOpen; YoloSweetener.withdraw reverts BonusLocked while a submission is in flight), so the base cannot be inflated and then deflated during the review. Fix, if wanted (a design change, out of this delta): pay the bonus on min(final pot + add-on, pot + add-on at submission) or re-rate the bps at acceptance.","line":468,"path":"contracts/src/desks/CaseDesk.sol","reproduction":"Reproduced on 14c4e30 with contracts/test/scratch/JudgeDelta.t.sol (YOLO at $0.0001 in Base: $5 = 50,000 YOLO). test_Item4_PostSubmitTopUp_PaidAtFixedBps: doer hub.lock(50_000e18, 52); author _create(usdc, 5e6); doer submits -> stakeBps == 400; author topUp(t, 9_995e6) under review; 24 h later poke -> Completed, getSettlement(s).stakeBps == 400, credits(usdc, doer) == 9_000e6 + 400e6 + 0.15e6, treasuryPot(usdc) == 50e6. Controls: test_Item4_PreSubmitTopUp_NeverLowersBonusDollars ($100 task, alice tops up $100 before the submit of a doer with $100 of power -> stakeBps 200 but credits 180e6 + 4e6 + 3e6, the same $4; alice's withdrawContribution reverts TaskNotOpen) and test_Item4_PreSubmitAddon_CannotBeWithdrawnDuringReview ($100 add-on before submit -> 200 bps; sweetener.withdraw reverts BonusLocked; doer gets $2 on R + 20,000 YOLO = $2 on the add-on = the same $4).","severity":"info","snippet":"        if (o == Outcome.Accepted) s.reward = SafeCast.toUint128(_bank().potOf(taskId));","title":"Stake bps fixed at submission against pot + add-on are paid on the final pot and final add-on: a top-up during the review earns the bps fixed against the smaller base (unchanged mechanism)"}],"hash":"0202019895d6d98fd962ed0d226c684341decfafc3d032d374c214977b2638ca","nodeId":"6536b27c-5d9c-48b5-b348-3131c9b6a8aa","outcome":"completed","summary":"The findings file is validated, the snippets match the tree, and the scratch tests are removed. The review is complete.\n\n**0. VERDICT.** The four changed rules are implemented as the RULES state. No high or medium finding survives: no RULES amount is broken, no party can move another's stake bonus, and no money blocker exists. The specialists' eleven entries collapse into three: one low, two info, all reproduced on commit 14c4e30. The stake-bonus dollars a doer earns equal 4% of min(power, pot plus add-on) whenever nothing changes after submission, so pre-submit top-ups and add-ons cannot be used against a doer, and neither can be withdrawn while the task is open. Written to `.imd-findings.json`.\n\n**1. LOCK POWER AMOUNTS** (`contracts/src/YoloLockHub.sol:84`, guard at line 73). In the scenario given, 50,000 YOLO for 52 weeks is power 50,000, still 50,000 after 26 weeks, and a new 52-week term keeps 50,000 under both formulas: $0 difference in b. The new formula is always at most the old one, and power never exceeds the amount (fuzzed, 256 runs), so no doer buys more power than a fresh 52-week lock. Kept as **low**: a term landing exactly on the current end passes the guard and halves power to 25,000, cutting b from 2% to 1% on a $100 task at YOLO $0.001, a $1.00 self-inflicted loss to burn and treasury. Fix: treat an unchanged end as add-only, or revert when nothing is added. All five lock entries from the specialists were this one behaviour and are merged.\n\n**2. STAKE BASE t.pot vs t.base** (`contracts/src/desks/CaseDesk.sol:523`). Reproduced: $60 author share plus $40 top-up, doer power worth $60 gives 240 bps and credits 92.4 USDC plus bond, not 400 bps. Losers are doers whose power is below the pot on tasks with others' top-ups: they now earn 4% of power instead of 4% of power scaled by pot over base. Gainers are burn and treasury. Figures scale linearly at $10,000. Nobody can engineer t.pot: a top-up cannot leave while the task is open, and a pre-submit top-up lowers bps but not dollars. No finding.\n\n**3. ADD-ON IN STAKE BASE** (`contracts/src/desks/CaseDesk.sol:527`). Reproduced: $100 task, $50 add-on, power worth $75 gives 200 bps. Bonus is $2 on R plus $1 on the add-on, against $4 plus $2 under the old rule. The $3 difference goes half burn, half treasury on R, and burns on the add-on. Scales to $300 at $10,000. This is the stated rule. No finding.\n\n**4. STAKE BASE INFLATION ATTACK.** Not possible against a hostile doer: contributions and add-ons are locked while the task is open, and pre-submit inflation never lowers bonus dollars. Kept as **info** (unchanged mechanism): bps fixed at submission are paid on the final pot, so a $5 task topped up to $10,000 during review pays a $5-power doer $400. The pair still pays the fee, so this bypasses the stake requirement rather than taking from a third party.\n\n**5. PREDICT WINDOW TIMING** (`contracts/src/YoloPredict.sol:137`). Only changes when a position is accepted. The poke is the public guarded transition anyone could trigger in the same block, and no YoloPredict state is written before it. No $ effect, not recorded as a finding.\n\n**6. COVERAGE.** All four diffs read against RULES and docs, with scratch reproductions of every number above. The optimized via_ir build did not finish within 10 minutes here, so the suite ran without the optimizer: 682 passed, 1 skipped, 4 failed. The four failures are gas and code-size assertions tied to optimizer settings, not behaviour. Low and info list: lock no-op extension lowers power (low); hub notice and test header omit the add-on from the base (info); bps fixed at submission paid on final pot (info); add-only rounding costs 1 wei per add (dropped as dust pinned by the project's own test).","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1741053,"inputTokens":484,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":26542,"runtime":"claude","turns":32,"wallClockMs":1969526}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"f20ec62b0213db3f","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Change 1 (commit 45236ca) implements the RULES exactly: an extension fixes power = amount x weeks_left / 52, and power can never exceed the amount, so no extension buys more than a fresh 52-week lock (old formula >= new formula in every case; the rolling one-week extension that kept a year's power under max() is closed). The money effect is one-directional and hits only the extending doer: any term k < 52 sets power = amount x k / 52 even when k lengthens the lock. Worked numbers at YOLO $0.001 on a $100 task (R = 100,000 YOLO): 50,000 YOLO locked 52 weeks = power 50,000, b = 2% = $2.00; after 26 weeks power is still 50,000; a new 52-week term keeps 50,000 under both the old max() formula and the new one ($0 difference); a 30-week term (4 weeks longer than the current end) gives 28,846 under the new rule vs 50,000 under the old one: b 2% -> 1.15%, $2.00 -> $1.15 per accepted $100 task (same $0.85 at $10,000, since b x R = 4% x power while power < R). The difference goes half to the burn, half to the treasury. This is the documented rule (docs/MECHANICS.md, docs/YOLO.md), so it is a footgun, not a rule break; the smallest change that preserves the rule is a site/UI warning, or treating a term that does not move the end (see the next finding) as an add-only call.","line":84,"path":"contracts/src/YoloLockHub.sol","reproduction":"YoloLockHub with any ERC20 as yolo. doer: lock(50_000e18, 52) -> power(doer) == 50_000e18. warp +26 weeks -> power still 50_000e18. doer: lock(0, 30) (end moves 4 weeks later). Expected (old rule / a doer's reading of 'extend'): >= 50_000e18. Actual: power(doer) == 50_000e18 * 30 / 52 == 28_846_153_846_153_846_153_846 (28,846.15 YOLO). Scratch test contracts/test/scratch/LockExtensionPowerDrop.t.sol: test_Extend30_DropsPower, test_Extend52_KeepsPower, testFuzz_PowerNeverAboveAmount.","severity":"low","snippet":"        uint256 pw = weeks_ != 0 ? amount * left / MAX_WEEKS : old + add * left / MAX_WEEKS;","title":"Extending a running lock with a term shorter than 52 weeks lowers the doer's power although the commitment gets longer"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The term check rejects only a strictly earlier end, so lock(0, k) with block.timestamp + k weeks == current end passes as an 'extension' and, under the new power rule at line 84, recomputes power = amount x weeks_left / 52 from the weeks left. Nothing is added and the end does not move, so the call has one effect: the power drops (and the Locked event reports the lower power). It cannot be used against anyone else (powerAt at an earlier submission and stakePower at its payout read the earlier checkpoint), so it is a self-only footgun with no gain for the caller; a wallet or front end that 're-locks' with the current remaining term would silently cut the doer's next stake bonus. $ at YOLO $0.001: 50,000 YOLO for 52 weeks, 26 weeks served, lock(0, 26): power 50,000 -> 25,000; on a $100 task b 2% -> 1%, $2.00 -> $1.00 (same $1.00 at $10,000). Smallest fix: when weeks_ != 0 and newEnd == end, treat the call as add-only (pw = old + add * left / 52) or revert with BadTerm when add == 0.","line":73,"path":"contracts/src/YoloLockHub.sol","reproduction":"doer: lock(50_000e18, 52) at time T; warp to T + 26 weeks; doer: lock(0, 26). Expected: BadTerm (nothing to extend) or power unchanged at 50_000e18. Actual: call succeeds, locks(doer).end unchanged, power(doer) == 25_000e18. Scratch test contracts/test/scratch/LockExtensionPowerDrop.t.sol: test_SameEndTerm_DropsPowerWithoutExtending.","severity":"low","snippet":"            if (newEnd < end) revert BadTerm();","title":"A lock call with a term that lands exactly on the current end is accepted and only lowers the power"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Drift between the hub's notice and the RULES/CaseDesk: since commit 14c4e30 the base is the pot in $YOLO plus the task's $YOLO add-on (CaseDesk._stakeBps line 527, docs/MECHANICS.md, docs/YOLO.md). The hub's notice (lines 13-14, '4% x min(1, power / reward)') still omits the add-on; the test header of contracts/test/YoloLockHub.t.sol says 'the whole pot at the submission (no add-on)'. No money effect: the code paying the bonus is right.","line":13,"path":"contracts/src/YoloLockHub.sol","reproduction":"Read contracts/src/YoloLockHub.sol lines 13-14 against contracts/src/desks/CaseDesk.sol line 527 (`r += t.addon;`): a doer with power 100,000 YOLO on a $100 task (100,000 YOLO at $0.001) with a 50,000 YOLO add-on gets stakeBps 266 (power / 150,000), not 400 as the hub's notice reads.","severity":"info","snippet":"///         the CaseDesk reads `powerAt` at a submission and compares it with the task's whole reward in $YOLO","title":"YoloLockHub notice describes the bonus base as the whole reward without the $YOLO add-on"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Under the old max() formula the whole amount x weeks_left / 52 term rounded once; the add-only path now accumulates one floor per add. Two adds of 100e18 for 2 weeks give 7_692_307_692_307_692_306 instead of 7_692_307_692_307_692_307 (contracts/test/YoloLockHub.t.sol line 238). Loss: 1 wei of power per add, far below 1 bps of any reward; no $ effect.","line":84,"path":"contracts/src/YoloLockHub.sol","reproduction":"Same block: lock(100e18, 2) then lock(100e18, 0): powerAt(bob, now + 1) == 7_692_307_692_307_692_306; a single lock(200e18, 2) gives 7_692_307_692_307_692_307.","severity":"info","snippet":"        uint256 pw = weeks_ != 0 ? amount * left / MAX_WEEKS : old + add * left / MAX_WEEKS;","title":"Add-only power now rounds down per call instead of once on the whole amount (dust)"}],"hash":"1bbaf49cb1fc05454dbd1a81c84b698c1afdf8dd1c1da216b7c4f908d3f6697e","nodeId":"51819597-2dc8-4b47-b123-8a7d62d6218e","outcome":"completed","summary":"The findings file validates, and the quoted snippets match the tree. Here is the report.\n\n**0. VERDICT.** The four changes implement the RULES exactly. No high, medium or critical finding. The lock extension rule can only lower power (old formula ≥ new in every case) and power never exceeds the amount. The stake base is the pot plus the add-on at submission, as stated. The bonus in dollars is now 4% × min(power, R + A), so nobody can cut a doer's bonus by inflating the pot or the add-on, and nobody can shrink the base. The predict poke moves no money. Two low footguns in YoloLockHub (a shorter term lowers power; a same-end term is accepted and only lowers power) and two info drifts, all in `.imd-findings.json`. Known-limitations lines are not made worse.\n\n**1. Lock power amounts.** Checked `contracts/src/YoloLockHub.sol:64-89`. At YOLO $0.001 a $100 task is R = 100,000 YOLO.\n\n| Step | Old max() formula | New amount × left / 52 |\n|---|---|---|\n| Lock 50,000 for 52 weeks | 50,000 | 50,000 |\n| After 26 weeks, no call | 50,000 | 50,000 |\n| Extend to a new 52-week term | 50,000 | 50,000 |\n| Extend to 30 weeks (4 weeks longer) | 50,000 | 28,846 |\n| Call with 26 weeks (same end) | 50,000 | 25,000 |\n\nThe 52-week extension changes nothing: b stays 2%, $2.00, $0 difference. The new rule never buys more power than a fresh 52-week lock, since power ≤ amount in both branches (fuzzed in my scratch test). It can only remove bonus: a 30-week extension takes b from 2% to 1.15%, $2.00 to $1.15 on $100, and the same $0.85 at $10,000 because the bonus is 4% × power while power < R. Severity low (two findings, lines 84 and 73). Smallest fix: treat a term that does not move the end as add-only, or revert it when nothing is added. Proof: `contracts/test/scratch/LockExtensionPowerDrop.t.sol`, 4 tests, passing on current code as a demonstration (no rule is broken, so no failing PoC).\n\n**2. Stake base t.pot vs t.base.** Checked `contracts/src/desks/CaseDesk.sol:523` and `contracts/src/TaskVault.sol:408-411`. Author $60, bob $40, pot $100: power worth $100 gives 400 bps under both rules, $94 to the doer. Power worth $60 gives 240 bps instead of 400, $92.40 instead of $94. Verified in `contracts/test/scratch/StakeBaseExamples.t.sol`. Who loses: every doer whose power is below pot plus add-on on a task with top-ups or an add-on, since the old bonus was 4% × (power / base) × (R + A) and the new one is 4% × min(power, R + A). Nobody gains. At $100 the $60-power doer loses $1.60; at $10,000 with the same proportions $160. The difference goes half to the burn, half to the treasury. Engineering: t.pot can only rise, by anyone's top-up at any time while Open and before the deadline, including the block before a submission; it cannot fall, since withdrawContribution reverts while Open. A rise lowers b in bps but not the doer's dollars, apart from whole-bps flooring worth at most 1 bps of R. Not a finding.\n\n**3. Add-on in the stake base.** Checked `CaseDesk.sol:527` and `contracts/src/YoloSweetener.sol:146-152`. $100 task, 50,000 YOLO add-on, power worth $75.\n\n| Reward | Old rule (base $100): b = 3% | New rule (base $150): b = 2% |\n|---|---|---|\n| $100 + $50 add-on | $3.00 + 1,500 YOLO ($1.50) = $4.50 | $2.00 + 1,000 YOLO ($1.00) = $3.00 |\n| $10,000 + $5,000 add-on | $300 + $150 = $450 | $200 + $100 = $300 |\n\nThe reward part of the difference goes half to the burn, half to the treasury. The add-on part burns entirely, since the sweetener burns whatever the doer and voters do not take. Verified by test at the Base price. Not a finding.\n\n**4. Stake base inflation attack.** No viable plan. Top-ups and sweetener deposits can both land in the block before a submission, and even during an active one. But the bonus is 4% × min(power, R + A), so inflating the base never lowers a doer's dollars, apart from flooring to whole bps. To cost a hostile doer $1 on a $100 task the attacker must push R + A to $10,000, of which 90% goes to that doer. At $10,000 the flooring loss is","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2656808,"inputTokens":740,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":40342,"runtime":"claude","turns":44,"wallClockMs":1999778}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"234a4a00ca903cb9","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Under the new rule, any call with a nonzero term sets power = amount*left/52. Under the old max() formula, power never dropped. Now a doer who calls lock(0, 26) half-way through a 52-week lock (end unchanged) drops from power 50,000 to 25,000. This matches RULE 1 and the docs, so there is no RULES breach. It only lowers the caller's own bonus, and nobody else gains.","line":84,"path":"contracts/src/YoloLockHub.sol","reproduction":"Lock 50,000 YOLO for 52 weeks (power 50,000). Warp 26 weeks, then call lock(0,26): power becomes 25,000 (old formula: 50,000). Calling lock(0,52) instead gives power 50,000 under both formulas, so in the task's scenario the difference is $0. Power can never exceed the amount, which equals a fresh 52-week lock.","severity":"info","snippet":"        uint256 pw = weeks_ != 0 ? amount * left / MAX_WEEKS : old + add * left / MAX_WEEKS;","title":"Extending with a term no longer than the weeks already left lowers lock power (rule-compliant, doer self-harm only)"}],"hash":"37084c189dbfbdedda6ec2de9d372877ff2410fedf755f691a879efb78c15036","nodeId":"8a5139a1-bc33-4540-ac48-6c4940f91cee","outcome":"completed","summary":"The second full `forge test` run was also stopped at its 10-minute limit, so I still have no result for the whole suite. I'm not restarting it, since it already had the longest timeout allowed.\n\nThe suites that cover these four changes did all pass: `ContractRulesTest` 9 of 9, `YoloLockHubTest` 22 of 22 and `PredictAfterTimerTest` 1 of 1. The report and `.imd-findings.json` are unchanged.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":50287,"inputTokens":4,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":153,"runtime":"claude","turns":1,"wallClockMs":1875869}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"fa4b91aed45c94fa","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Change 1 replaced max(old + added*left/52, amount*left/52) by the term branch alone. The guard at line 73 (`if (newEnd < end) revert BadTerm();`) lets `newEnd == end` through, so a call with a term equal to the weeks left is treated as an extension although the end does not move, and the natspec at lines 17-18 and docs/YOLO.md line 243 (\"the end only moves later\") are not what the code enforces. Money effect: self-inflicted only. The doer's own power for FUTURE submissions drops; a bonus already fixed at a submission is kept (stakePower returns the checkpoint before `since`). At YOLO $0.001 on a $100 task: 50,000 YOLO locked 52 weeks = power 50,000 = b 2% ($2.00); after the drop to 25,000, b = 1% ($1.00) on the next task, i.e. $1.00 per $100 task moved from the doer to the burn/treasury split. No third party loses; the new rule never yields more power than a fresh 52-week lock of the whole amount (both branches are <= amount). Smallest fix: treat `newEnd == end` as add-only (compute `old + add*left/52`) or require `newEnd > end` when `weeks_ != 0`.","line":84,"path":"contracts/src/YoloLockHub.sol","reproduction":"Scratch test run on 14c4e30 (passes, pinning the behaviour): doer2 `hub.lock(50_000e18, 52)`; `vm.warp(+26 weeks)`; `hub.lock(0, 26)` (end unchanged) -> `hub.power(doer2)` = 25_000e18, was 50_000e18 (old max() formula: 50_000e18). alice `hub.lock(50_000e18, 52)`; warp 26 weeks; `hub.lock(10_000e18, 26)` -> power 30_000e18, while bob doing `hub.lock(10_000e18, 0)` in the same state gets 55_000e18. Expected (per the natspec 'the end can only move later'): a call that does not move the end should not re-fix the power. Actual: power cut by half.","severity":"low","snippet":"        uint256 pw = weeks_ != 0 ? amount * left / MAX_WEEKS : old + add * left / MAX_WEEKS;","title":"lock(): a term that does not move the end (or barely moves it) re-fixes power at amount x weeks_left / 52 and cuts a running power"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Changes 2 and 3 set R = yoloValue(t.pot) + t.addon as of the submission block. The bonus is then paid on `s.reward`, re-read as the final pot at acceptance (CaseDesk.sol line 468: `s.reward = SafeCast.toUint128(_bank().potOf(taskId))`) and YoloSweetener pays the same bps on `bonusOf` at payout. Top-ups and add-ons during the review therefore earn the bps fixed against the smaller base. This structure is identical at 84b446c (R was t.base, also fixed at submission and also paid on the final pot), so by the scope it is not a finding of this delta; recorded as info because item 4 of the order asks for the cheapest plan. The plan costs the author/doer pair their own 10% fee minus the $400 bonus and no outside party is hurt beyond the fee split: treasury $50 + burn $550 instead of treasury $1,000 (no stake) or the same $50/$550 as an honest full-power staker. Pre-submission top-ups or add-ons can only raise, never lower, the doer's bonus dollars (bonus = 4% x min(R + A, power)), so no hostile plan exists against a doer.","line":527,"path":"contracts/src/desks/CaseDesk.sol","reproduction":"Scratch test on 14c4e30 (USDC, YOLO $0.001): doer `hub.lock(5_000e18, 52)` ($5 of power); author `_create(usdc, 5e6)`; doer submits -> `stakeBps == 400`; author `topUp(t, 9_995e6)` while the submission is under review; 24 h later `poke` -> Completed, `getSettlement(s).stakeBps == 400`, doer credits 9_000e6 + 400e6 + 0.15e6 (4% of $10,000 from $5 of power), `treasuryPot(usdc) == 50e6`. Control: `_create(usdc, 100e6)`, alice `topUp(100e6)` before the submit of a doer with 100,000 YOLO power -> `stakeBps == 200` but the doer's bonus stays $4 (credits 180e6 + 4e6 + 3e6): a pre-submit top-up lowers the bps, never the bonus dollars.","severity":"info","snippet":"        r += t.addon;","title":"Stake bps fixed against pot + add-on at submission are paid on the final pot and final add-on (unchanged mechanism; sequencing gives 4% on a pot grown after submit)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Change 4 calls the public `vault.poke` (nonReentrant `_advance`) before the SubmissionActive check, only when a submission is active and the deadline has not passed. `_advance` runs the same transitions anyone could trigger with `poke` in the same block; an acceptance by timer makes the task Completed and predict reverts TaskNotOpen; a rejection clears `activeSub` (or activates the next queued submission, which still blocks); the final `s.reward` is read inside the same `_advance`, so no top-up or add-on can slip between the timer end and the settlement. The entry split (5% burn, 5% deferred, 90% pool) and `points` (deadline and createdAt unchanged by poke) are untouched. No YoloPredict state is written before the external call, so there is no reentrancy surface. Security and role note (one line, separate order): the only new external call is to the trusted vault's guarded `poke`; no role gains a power.","line":138,"path":"contracts/src/YoloPredict.sol","reproduction":"contracts/test/audit/PredictAfterTimer.t.sol (passes on 14c4e30): a submission rejected by 20 NFT, 24 h + 1 s later and before the deadline, `predict(t, true, 1e18)` succeeds and `getTask(t).activeSub == 0`. Expected and actual: the position is accepted; no balance other than the predictor's 1e18 YOLO into YoloPredict changes.","severity":"info","snippet":"            vault.poke(taskId); // play the timers: a submission ended by its timer does not pause predictions","title":"predict() poke-before-check changes only when a position is accepted; no payout amount moves"}],"hash":"392a04c34fa89042283af576788d02dcf361c76189f49d6d88da0d9af2fbb8b8","nodeId":"d4db6feb-35df-4d29-a294-9076ba781750","outcome":"completed","summary":"The findings file is written and validated, the scratch test is removed, and the working tree is clean apart from the findings file. Here is the report.\n\n**0. VERDICT.** Payouts match the RULES for all four changes. Lock extension power is `amount × weeks_left / 52`, add-only is `old + added × weeks_left / 52`. The stake bonus base is `yoloValue(t.pot) + t.addon` at the submission block, paid on the pot and the add-on at the fixed bps. Predict's poke changes only timing. No critical, high or medium finding. No money blocker. Docs (MECHANICS.md, YOLO.md, TOKENOMICS.md, LAUNCH-TASK.md, natspec) restate the new rules consistently. One low: a lock call whose term does not move the end still re-fixes power and halves it (self-inflicted). Two info lines, listed at the end.\n\n**1. LOCK POWER AMOUNTS.** Checked `contracts/src/YoloLockHub.sol:64-89`, formula at line 84. Scenario: 50,000 YOLO for 52 weeks gives power 50,000. After 26 weeks it is still 50,000. Extending to a new 52-week term: old formula max(50,000 + 0, 50,000 × 52/52) = 50,000; new formula 50,000 × 52/52 = 50,000. Difference in b: $0 (b = 2% of R = $2.00 on the $100 task under both). The new rule can never buy more power than a fresh 52-week lock of the whole amount: both branches are bounded by `amount`, and the new value is always one of the two operands of the old max(), so new ≤ old everywhere. Severity: no issue for the RULES. Low, self-inflicted: with the guard at line 73 allowing `newEnd == end`, `lock(0, 26)` at week 26 drops power to 25,000, and `lock(10,000, 26)` gives 30,000 where `lock(10,000, 0)` gives 55,000. Loss at YOLO $0.001 on a $100 task: b falls from 2% to 1%, $1.00 per task, to the burn/treasury split. Smallest fix: treat a term that does not move the end as add-only. No PoC: a low, verified by a scratch test that pins the numbers.\n\n**2. STAKE BASE t.pot vs t.base.** Checked `contracts/src/desks/CaseDesk.sol:523-528` and `TaskVault.submitTerms` lines 400-413. $100 task, author $60, others $40, doer power worth $60: old b = 4%, new b = 2.4%. Verified on chain in a scratch test: stakeBps 240, doer credit $90 + $2.40 + $1.80 bond, treasury $1.30, burn $1.30 + $5. Who loses: every doer with power below the pot in YOLO, in proportion. Who gains: burn and treasury, half each of the removed b. At $100: a $60-power doer loses $1.60. At $10,000 (base $6,000, pot $10,000): a $6,000-power doer loses $160 ($400 → $240). Doers with power ≥ pot are unchanged. Engineering t.pot upward: possible by top-up at any time before submit, but the bonus in dollars equals 4% × min(pot + add-on, power), so raising the pot never lowers the doer's bonus and hands the doer 90% of the top-up. Downward: impossible, withdrawContribution reverts while Open. Severity: no issue.\n\n**3. ADD-ON IN STAKE BASE.** Checked `CaseDesk.sol:527` and `YoloSweetener.payout`. $100 task + 50,000 YOLO add-on ($50), doer power worth $75. Old rule (base $100 at this commit's predecessor, t.base = $100 with no top-ups): b = 3%, paid on $150 total = $4.50 ($3.00 USDC + 1,500 YOLO). New rule R = 150,000 YOLO: b = 2%, $3.00 total ($2.00 USDC + 1,000 YOLO). Verified: stakeBps 200, sweetener pays 45,000 + 1,000 YOLO. At $10,000 with a $5,000 add-on and $7,500 power: old $450, new $300. The $1.50 (or $150) difference goes half to burn, half to treasury, per the (5% − b) split. Severity: no issue.\n\n**4. STAKE BASE INFLATION ATTACK.** Checked `TaskVault.topUp` lines 314-329 and `YoloSweetener.sweeten` lines 92-104, both allowed while a submission is active. Hostile direction: a pre-submit top-up or add-on lowers the bps but never the doer's bonus dollars (verified: pot doubled to $200 before submit, bps 400 → 200, doer bonus still $4 plus $90 of the top-up). Cost to the attacker: 90% of the amount, gain $0. No attack. Colluding direction: R cannot be lowered, but the pair can submit first against a tiny pot and top up during the review. Verified: $5 pot, $5 power, bps 400, then a $9,995 top-up: doer bonus $400","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1660177,"inputTokens":580,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":31058,"runtime":"claude","turns":29,"wallClockMs":1181995}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"3beb94a990617d46","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Change 1 makes any call with a nonzero term an extension that sets power = amount x weeks left / 52, also when the term only restates the current end (newEnd == end is allowed at line 73). A doer who adds tokens and passes the weeks that remain (the natural 'keep my end' call) loses the running power instead of keeping it: 1,000,000 YOLO locked 52 weeks (power 1,000,000); 26 weeks later lock(10e18, 26) gives power 500,005 instead of 1,000,005 (lock(10e18, 0)). At YOLO $0.001 that is $1,000 of power turned into $500: on a $1,000 task b falls from 4% to 2%, $20 less per task, to burn/treasury. Under the old max() rule the power never dropped. The RULES and docs/MECHANICS.md state the new rule, so this is an accepted edge; it is self-inflicted and not exploitable by a third party. Smallest fix: treat weeks_ whose end equals the current end as an add only (compute old + add x left / 52), or document the trap in the site's lock quote.","line":84,"path":"contracts/src/YoloLockHub.sol","reproduction":"vm.prank(doer); hub.lock(1_000_000e18, 52); warp 26 weeks; hub.power(doer) == 1_000_000e18; vm.prank(doer); hub.lock(10e18, 26); expected (keep the end, add 10): 1_000_005e18; actual: 500_005e18 (verified: contracts/test/scratch/EconDelta.t.sol test_LockExtensionPower, forge test with FOUNDRY_OPTIMIZER=false, passes with these actual values).","severity":"low","snippet":"        uint256 pw = weeks_ != 0 ? amount * left / MAX_WEEKS : old + add * left / MAX_WEEKS;","title":"lock(): adding tokens while restating the remaining term recomputes the whole power from the weeks left and can halve it"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Change 3 (CaseDesk._stakeBps line 527, r += t.addon) measures the power against the pot plus the task's $YOLO add-on. The hub's contract notice still says the comparison is against the task's whole reward only (4% x min(1, power / reward)). Docs drift only, no money effect.","line":13,"path":"contracts/src/YoloLockHub.sol","reproduction":"Compare contracts/src/YoloLockHub.sol:13-14 with contracts/src/desks/CaseDesk.sol:523-528 and docs/MECHANICS.md 'Doer stake share' (4% x min(1, power / (R in $YOLO + the $YOLO add-on))). Expected: the add-on named in the base; actual: reward only.","severity":"info","snippet":"///         the CaseDesk reads `powerAt` at a submission and compares it with the task's whole reward in $YOLO","title":"YoloLockHub NatSpec omits the $YOLO add-on from the stake-bonus base"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The test file's rule summary was updated for change 2 (whole pot) but not for change 3 (add-on in the base). Comment drift in a test; the assertions in test/MoneyRules.t.sol test_AddonInPowerBase and test/Sweetener.t.sol are on the new rule.","line":13,"path":"contracts/test/YoloLockHub.t.sol","reproduction":"contracts/test/YoloLockHub.t.sol:12-13 vs contracts/src/desks/CaseDesk.sol:527 (r += t.addon). Expected 'plus the $YOLO add-on'; actual '(no add-on)'.","severity":"info","snippet":"/// whole pot at the submission (no add-on), converted at the DevPrices $YOLO price; any power counts, no threshold. The DisputeDesk pays it if","title":"YoloLockHub.t.sol header says the stake base has 'no add-on'"}],"hash":"65fb547a338f49bcc0f54113abf89a4ce1a8a476cbc691937eb84e78e88c6d91","nodeId":"d6c9ea7d-13c9-4f47-b919-df835ff3cb47","outcome":"completed","summary":"That notification is the leftover wait loop from the first build being stopped. It is no longer needed: the compile it waited on had already died, and the later run with the optimizer off compiled and passed all 122 tests. Nothing changes in the report above. The findings file at `.imd-findings.json` holds the one low and two info items, and the scratch test under `contracts/test/scratch/` is the only new file.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":130009,"inputTokens":4,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":127,"runtime":"claude","turns":1,"wallClockMs":1989220}}],"verification":[]}