{"assessments":[],"deployments":[],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"7a725489-0be1-4fbd-bed5-22efe829f2fa","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"1d7865142e17376df0d9e5643d6ba98e043cb0505ff6e5ba1ccc783f0d2351bf","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_economics","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"a9f11b8516fe32c3afe0e864833ba2f2280fda25002bc59c525535d7d32360e2","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_flow","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"2360a69cf953d6688e3c98b862c37e1fdfc7bd31e0a9ce8b47ffd1140827a2c5","dependsOn":["build_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest","audit_math","audit_permissions","audit_economics","audit_flow"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"af3aa01159bbf354f621cafa5c0006f6169e0938a8b015be508b7377dbf165bc","skillId":"audit-judge","tools":[]},"key":"audit_judge","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"af3aa01159bbf354f621cafa5c0006f6169e0938a8b015be508b7377dbf165bc","skillId":"audit-judge","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"1f09eabd845b39a95bf6cdfdf59bc9b934334b9530fb8ea2f3b73ae4dc356aa3","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_math","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"2077e89b2066f6e1f6648cd660d7197644263b5614836ef1aeee6824f02c90b4","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_permissions","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"8590d1af3c51c8dd1e713e30589e8eef9a809a09d1badc459147808177de3fe9","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"d59561da3b378461b7c749f6bd5084477d44993aa94972ddea90f542535751df","skillId":"build-contract-project","tools":[]},"key":"build_contract_project","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"d59561da3b378461b7c749f6bd5084477d44993aa94972ddea90f542535751df","skillId":"build-contract-project","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"247738bbfedeba1b6ae5dbf79684d3eaf97e8483034930de6d607052323b33d1","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"tools":[]},"key":"manifest","kind":"code","role":"integrate","skillHash":null,"skillId":null,"state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"7a29259f0db53c36a072215f405062495af70b0a59035eb8d2f3df3e2f998450","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"4c76766b00591dfe982fe85d3de589fdb2f810e5137c301155d1c5e36a1d3b23","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","tools":[]},"key":"write_foundry_tests","kind":"code","role":"tests","skillHash":"4c76766b00591dfe982fe85d3de589fdb2f810e5137c301155d1c5e36a1d3b23","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"A custom token: squeek (SQUEEK).\nToken name: squeek\nToken symbol: SQUEEK\nToken supply: 1,000,000,000 with 18 decimals, all minted once to the deployer in the constructor.\nWhat it does: X：@squeekchain\nwebsite：squeekchain.com","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"7fdb3d8dcbf4db49eb8b39b66dbca690dd833b5ae7d899e55c81b42389be0bdb","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"7a725489-0be1-4fbd-bed5-22efe829f2fa","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-1989-squeek"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"52165","feedbackHash":"c953ba5cbe0fcb3a44c9885bfdc97ba529aeaa929a09fae49a954734fb4c69fd","nodeKey":"audit_economics","submissionHash":"1d7865142e17376df0d9e5643d6ba98e043cb0505ff6e5ba1ccc783f0d2351bf","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51250","feedbackHash":"eef8d40cbba1ac32246ceab9c26af717cb28bba9dca5ccada084d213833dd6a7","nodeKey":"audit_flow","submissionHash":"a9f11b8516fe32c3afe0e864833ba2f2280fda25002bc59c525535d7d32360e2","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51557","feedbackHash":"a120f56347d5b53a5ad69e326654f6159aede20146b0eed17fa02640677154d4","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"2360a69cf953d6688e3c98b862c37e1fdfc7bd31e0a9ce8b47ffd1140827a2c5","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52017","feedbackHash":"9c822e6bb0f1775c31bcd5b29ffe247bd36d880bf0d6af0d14c0a3350c920a87","nodeKey":"audit_math","submissionHash":"1f09eabd845b39a95bf6cdfdf59bc9b934334b9530fb8ea2f3b73ae4dc356aa3","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51881","feedbackHash":"d3b79dc8915ffa44958391470619fe69ceed9a8749a26d17688ab797d0fd33bb","nodeKey":"audit_permissions","submissionHash":"2077e89b2066f6e1f6648cd660d7197644263b5614836ef1aeee6824f02c90b4","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51485","feedbackHash":"a15f57f4bc861a5f85783e641e2e027ccf41b1c9ea19e30967c91c23efa2ca16","nodeKey":"build_contract_project","submissionHash":"8590d1af3c51c8dd1e713e30589e8eef9a809a09d1badc459147808177de3fe9","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51140","feedbackHash":"9916bdff679be72f1d756fc8ddee54fe35453f68cf05367767367d6414cb7ab4","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"247738bbfedeba1b6ae5dbf79684d3eaf97e8483034930de6d607052323b33d1","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"53936","feedbackHash":"3634db67b3e6f6ef396cf8f354070d9d21aa9564f437c9a7466e187cdb85df0f","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"7a29259f0db53c36a072215f405062495af70b0a59035eb8d2f3df3e2f998450","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"7762145db311cd4a825b4e4f48aa97e70fa5ef8291798e70d3543682f2cc785d","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"e12f98dda6acc55f","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"_transfer validates the receiver but not the sender. transferFrom(address(0), to, 0) passes the allowance check (allowance[0][caller] is 0, and 0 < 0 is false), passes the balance check (balanceOf[0] is 0, and 0 < 0 is false), and emits Transfer(address(0), to, 0). ERC-20 consumers (explorers, indexers, the subgraph-style mint/burn accounting many launch dashboards use) treat a Transfer whose from is the zero address as a mint, so any unprivileged account can make the token appear to mint after launch, to any recipient, as often as it likes. No balance or totalSupply changes, so there is no loss of funds: the conservation invariant sum(balances) == totalSupply held across a 128,000-call stateful fuzz, and TOTAL_SUPPLY is the only supply ever recorded. The OpenZeppelin reference reverts this call with ERC20InvalidSender(address(0)). (Zero-value transferFrom from a non-zero holder without allowance also succeeds and emits Transfer(holder, anyone, 0), which is the address-poisoning vector seen on major tokens; that behaviour matches OpenZeppelin and the ERC-20 standard, so it is noted here as context rather than reported as a defect.) Minimal fix that preserves intended behaviour: add `if (from == address(0)) revert InvalidSender(from);` at the top of _transfer (with a matching custom error), or `if (from == address(0)) revert` in transferFrom.","line":56,"path":"src/SqueekToken.sol","reproduction":"State: fresh deployment, any caller (e.g. 0xB0B) holding no tokens and no allowance. Call: vm.prank(0xB0B); token.transferFrom(address(0), 0xA11CE, 0). Expected (reference ERC-20): revert, invalid sender. Actual: returns true and emits Transfer(from=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000, to=0xA11CE, value=0); totalSupply and all balances unchanged. Verified with a Foundry test using vm.expectEmit on the token address.","severity":"info","snippet":"    function _transfer(address from, address to, uint256 value) private {\n        if (to == address(0)) revert InvalidReceiver(to);\n        uint256 bal = balanceOf[from];\n        if (bal < value) revert InsufficientBalance(from, bal, value);","title":"transferFrom accepts from == address(0), so anyone can emit a zero-value Transfer event from the zero address (a phantom mint)"}],"hash":"1d7865142e17376df0d9e5643d6ba98e043cb0505ff6e5ba1ccc783f0d2351bf","nodeId":"b70c8cd6-81f2-490b-92e3-bd6f26271c66","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and the findings file is written at `.imd-findings.json`, valid JSON with the snippet matching lines 56 to 59 of the source. The scratch tests are removed, so the tree has no changes beyond the findings file.\n\n**Result: the SQUEEK token is economically sound.** It is a 66-line plain ERC-20 with no owner, mint, burn, pause, fee, or external call. I checked it against the Economic Security, Invariant, and Flow Gap guides and found no loss-of-funds or broken-guarantee defect.\n\nWhat I verified, with Foundry:\n\n- **Conservation invariant.** A stateful fuzz over four actors ran 128,000 random transfer, approve, and transferFrom calls with zero violations of `sum(balances) == totalSupply`. The supply has no writer after the constructor.\n- **Launch flows arrive whole.** Factory to distributor to claimant, factory to pool manager, and trader buy and sell all move the exact amount and return true.\n- **Boundaries.** Self-transfer, whole-supply round trip, max and max-minus-one allowance, and a transferFrom that reverts after the allowance debit all behave correctly.\n- **Surface.** The compiled ABI exposes only the three state-changing entry points plus views. No receive, fallback, assembly, or library linkage exists.\n\nOne informational finding was recorded. `transferFrom(address(0), to, 0)` succeeds from any caller and emits a zero-value Transfer from the zero address, which indexers read as a mint. No balance or supply changes. The OpenZeppelin reference rejects this sender, and a one-line check in `_transfer` closes it.\n\nCoverage rows mark `approve` and `transfer` as holds, `transferFrom` as finding 1, plus three invariant and flow rows. The protected launch harness could not run here because v4-core and LaunchLiquidity are not vendored, so its flows were reproduced with plain transfers. The two aderyn leads were checked and are style only.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":512591,"inputTokens":226,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":13449,"runtime":"claude","turns":19,"wallClockMs":200192}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"9df7d5d52e83c572","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Boundary (zero input) x invariant (Transfer(0x0, to, v) means a mint). transferFrom only checks allowance when it is below value and _transfer only rejects to == address(0); neither rejects from == address(0). Because allowance[address(0)][anyone] and balanceOf[address(0)] are both 0, the checks `current < value` (0 < 0) and `bal < value` (0 < 0) are false for value == 0, so the call succeeds and emits Transfer(address(0), to, 0). Under ERC-20 convention a Transfer whose from is the zero address signals a mint, so explorers and indexers that derive mint history from events will record a zero-amount mint authored by an arbitrary caller after launch. No balance or supply changes and no value is at risk; totalSupply stays 1e27. OpenZeppelin v5 rejects this path with ERC20InvalidSender. Minimal fix that preserves the design: `if (from == address(0)) revert InvalidSender(from);` at the top of _transfer (or in transferFrom). Not a launch blocker.","line":52,"path":"src/SqueekToken.sol","reproduction":"State: fresh deployment, any caller A with no balance and no allowance. Call: vm.prank(A); token.transferFrom(address(0), A, 0). Expected (OZ semantics): revert for invalid sender. Actual: returns true and emits Transfer(from=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000, to=A, value=0); totalSupply and all balances unchanged. Verified with a Foundry test using vm.expectEmit(true,true,false,true) on Transfer(address(0), A, 0).","severity":"info","snippet":"        _transfer(from, to, value);","title":"transferFrom accepts from == address(0) for zero value and emits a mint-shaped Transfer event"}],"hash":"1f09eabd845b39a95bf6cdfdf59bc9b934334b9530fb8ea2f3b73ae4dc356aa3","nodeId":"7e095452-71d2-4dd0-ae57-69a689d403b2","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and `.imd-findings.json` is written at the repository root. No project files were changed. The only files I created are the findings file and a scratch test under `test/scratch/`, both of which git ignores.\n\n**Outcome: the math, boundary and numerical-gap area is clean.** The token has no division, no casts, no decimal scaling, no external calls, no payable or fallback paths and no bytes decoding, so most of the three guides have nothing to attach to. I traced the remaining seams by hand and with a scratch Foundry suite of 12 edge-case tests, all passing:\n\n- **Unchecked arithmetic** in both blocks is guarded by the preceding `<` checks, so neither subtraction can wrap. The addition cannot overflow because the sum of balances equals the fixed supply of 1e27 forever, which a fuzzed random-transfer sequence confirmed.\n- **Self-transfer** re-reads the written slot, so the balance is unchanged for any amount up to the full supply.\n- **Allowance edges**: max is infinite and never decremented, max minus one is finite and decremented, and an infinite allowance with a value above the balance reverts on balance with the allowance intact.\n- **Launch-level arithmetic**: the supply is exactly 1e27, below 2^128, so the ten-percent split and Uniswap v4 uint128 fields involve no truncation. Every transfer moves exactly the requested value, so the floor's whole-arrival checks hold by construction.\n- **Bytecode scan**: no CALL, DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE, CREATE or SELFDESTRUCT opcodes in the runtime. ETH or unknown calldata sent to the token reverts.\n\n**One informational finding** is recorded. A zero-value `transferFrom` with the zero address as sender succeeds and emits a Transfer event from the zero address, which indexers read as a mint of zero. No balance or supply changes. OpenZeppelin rejects this path, and the minimal fix is a sender check in `_transfer` at src/SqueekToken.sol:56. It is not a launch blocker.\n\n**Coverage record** has eight rows: all three entry points, two invariants, both aderyn leads (dismissed as non-defects), and the external-boundary and launch-flow checks. I could not execute the protected floor test itself because its v4-core and LaunchLiquidity dependencies are not in this tree, and that limitation is noted in the coverage row.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":818775,"inputTokens":450,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":11484,"runtime":"claude","turns":16,"wallClockMs":187671}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"1a7ecd03bd365366","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Asymmetry guide, branch/pair diff between approve, transfer and transferFrom. approve rejects a zero spender (line 38) and _transfer rejects a zero receiver (line 57), but neither transferFrom (line 44) nor _transfer checks that `from` is nonzero. For from == address(0) the allowance guard at line 47 reads allowance[address(0)][msg.sender] == 0, so any nonzero value reverts with InsufficientAllowance, but value == 0 passes (0 < 0 is false), the balance check passes (0 < 0 is false), and line 64 emits Transfer(address(0), to, 0). OpenZeppelin v5 reverts here with ERC20InvalidSender; this token does not. No balance or totalSupply changes, so there is no loss and the launch floor is unaffected; the only effect is that an unprivileged caller can write an on-chain event that looks like a mint of 0 to an arbitrary address, which some indexers and explorers count as a mint/holder entry. Minimal fix that preserves the design: add `if (from == address(0)) revert InvalidSender(from);` at the top of _transfer (or in transferFrom).","line":57,"path":"src/SqueekToken.sol","reproduction":"State: fresh deployment, factory holds 1_000_000_000e18. Call sequence: vm.prank(alice) where alice has 0 balance and 0 allowance; token.transferFrom(address(0), bob, 0). Expected (OZ semantics): revert with an invalid-sender error. Actual: returns true and the token contract emits Transfer(from=address(0), to=bob, value=0); totalSupply stays 1_000_000_000e18 and balanceOf(bob) stays 0. Confirmed with a scratch Foundry test using vm.expectEmit(true,true,false,true,address(token)). With value=1 the same call reverts InsufficientAllowance(alice, 0, 1), so no path moves funds.","severity":"info","snippet":"        if (to == address(0)) revert InvalidReceiver(to);\n        uint256 bal = balanceOf[from];\n        if (bal < value) revert InsufficientBalance(from, bal, value);","title":"Asymmetric zero-address guard: transferFrom(address(0), to, 0) lets anyone emit a mint-shaped Transfer event"}],"hash":"2077e89b2066f6e1f6648cd660d7197644263b5614836ef1aeee6824f02c90b4","nodeId":"c21b3928-7b25-41e1-ab32-2782b46ebf86","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and `.imd-findings.json` holds the result. The scratch test directory is removed and no tracked file changed.\n\n**Outcome:** the SQUEEK token has no permission defects. It is a 66-line fixed-supply ERC-20 with no owner, no roles, no initializer, no external calls and no inheritance. The whole supply is minted once to the deploying factory, and the only writers of balances are the two transfer paths, each guarded by a balance check and, for `transferFrom`, by the caller's allowance. The factory has no special pull path. The project build and all 12 of its tests pass.\n\n**One informational finding:** `_transfer` rejects a zero receiver but never checks the sender. Because a zero address has no allowance, any nonzero amount reverts, but `transferFrom(address(0), bob, 0)` from any account succeeds and emits a Transfer event from the zero address with value 0. No balance or supply changes. The suggested fix is a one-line zero-sender revert, matching OpenZeppelin v5. I confirmed this and the surrounding guards with a scratch Foundry test before reporting.\n\n**Coverage:** all three listed entry points have rows. `approve` and `transfer` hold. `transferFrom` is marked as the finding above. Five extra rows record the invariants checked: supply conservation, constructor minting to the factory, the launch floor's forbidden privileged calls and opcodes, the trust-gap seams, and the two aderyn style leads, which are not defects.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":494307,"inputTokens":226,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":9312,"runtime":"claude","turns":20,"wallClockMs":139301}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"559cfaaab2c0d013","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from four identical specialist reports (write_foundry_tests, audit_flow, audit_permissions, audit_economics, audit_math): same root cause, one finding. _transfer (src/SqueekToken.sol:56-65) validates only the receiver; neither it nor transferFrom (line 44) rejects from == address(0). For from == address(0), transferFrom reads allowance[address(0)][msg.sender] == 0 at line 45; with value == 0 the guard `current < value` at line 47 is false, allowance is left at 0, and _transfer runs: `bal < value` (0 < 0) at line 59 is false, no balance changes, and line 64 emits Transfer(address(0), to, 0). Any unprivileged caller can therefore append a zero-amount Transfer-from-zero event, which ERC-20 indexers and explorers conventionally read as a mint, to any recipient at any time after launch. OpenZeppelin v5 ERC20._transfer reverts here with ERC20InvalidSender. Impact is cosmetic only: totalSupply and every balance are unchanged, the launch flows (factory to distributor, seed, swaps) are unaffected, and any value > 0 from address(0) reverts with InsufficientAllowance. Reproduced against the tree: test_transferFromZeroSenderZeroValueEmitsMintShapedEvent in test/scratch/ReviewRepro.t.sol passes on this code (vm.expectEmit on Transfer(address(0), bob, 0) matches, totalSupply stays 1e27, balanceOf(bob) stays 0). Not a launch blocker. Minimal fix that preserves the design: add `error InvalidSender(address sender);` and `if (from == address(0)) revert InvalidSender(from);` at the top of _transfer.","line":57,"path":"src/SqueekToken.sol","reproduction":"State: fresh deployment by any factory address F (F holds 1000000000000000000000000000). Caller alice (0xA11CE) holds 0 tokens and has no allowance from anyone. Call: vm.prank(alice); token.transferFrom(address(0), bob, 0). Expected (reference ERC-20 / OpenZeppelin v5): revert with an invalid-sender error. Actual: returns true and the token emits Transfer(from=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000, to=0xB0B, value=0); totalSupply() == 1000000000000000000000000000 and balanceOf(bob) == 0 afterwards. Control: vm.prank(alice); token.transferFrom(address(0), bob, 1) reverts InsufficientAllowance(alice, 0, 1), so no path moves funds.","severity":"info","snippet":"        if (to == address(0)) revert InvalidReceiver(to);","title":"transferFrom accepts from == address(0) for a zero value and emits a mint-shaped Transfer(0, to, 0) event"}],"hash":"2360a69cf953d6688e3c98b862c37e1fdfc7bd31e0a9ce8b47ffd1140827a2c5","nodeId":"16529910-67be-4420-afa0-b1cb69cd5bff","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. The findings file is written and validated, the snippet matches line 57 of the source, and the working tree is otherwise untouched.\n\n**Outcome:** one finding, severity info, and no blocker. The token is a 66-line fixed-supply ERC-20 with no owner, mint, burn, pause or fee, and it passes the launch floor.\n\n**Specialist findings:** all five areas reported the same defect, so I merged them into one finding. The call `transferFrom(address(0), to, 0)` passes the allowance and balance checks because both read zero, then emits a Transfer event from the zero address that indexers read as a mint. I reproduced it with a scratch test under test/scratch that confirms the event, the unchanged supply and the revert for any nonzero value. Nothing moves, so severity stays at info with a one-line fix suggested.\n\n**My own pass found nothing further.** Unchecked arithmetic is safe because the balance sum is pinned to the fixed supply. The approve race and zero-value transfers without allowance match the standard and OpenZeppelin. Static analysis leads were a gas nit and an underscore-formatted literal, not defects.\n\n**Coverage:** all three entry points answered, plus rows for the constructor, the launch invariants and the manifest. The manifest is schema-valid, its empty constructor list matches the no-argument constructor, and bytecode sizes are far under the deploy limits.\n\n| Check | Result |\n|---|---|\n| Project test suite | 88 passed, 0 failed |\n| Scratch reproduction tests | 11 passed |\n| Creation / runtime code | 1,429 / 1,311 bytes |","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":275146,"inputTokens":162,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":8067,"runtime":"claude","turns":12,"wallClockMs":147037}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"1fa27a32d2d17a035c0aab1bcbc91c92bae6e5ad38c40beebf08a6e7fe3de4b4","device":"ddc5542bddcad225","findings":[],"hash":"247738bbfedeba1b6ae5dbf79684d3eaf97e8483034930de6d607052323b33d1","nodeId":"ed7e4d91-9a6d-494c-9fe9-622d4ecfdb8c","outcome":"completed","summary":"Done. I wrote `launch.json` for the squeek (SQUEEK) custom token launch. It is the only new file in the working tree.\n\n**What the manifest says**\n- Token contract is `SqueekToken` with name squeek, symbol SQUEEK, 18 decimals, no constructor arguments, and a total supply of 1000000000000000000000000000 minor units. This matches the accepted source, whose constructor takes nothing and mints the constant supply once to msg.sender.\n- The contracts list is empty. The accepted tree contains only the token, so no application contracts are described.\n- Pool and economics are copied exactly as the launch gives them: IMD as the paired currency, fee 12500, tick spacing 60, the one-to-one provenance price, and the requester's economics object verbatim.\n- Notes describe the token's fixed supply, lack of privileged functions and exact-amount transfers, in about 860 characters.\n\n**Checks run**\n- `forge build` compiled cleanly and `forge test` with the verifier's fuzz seed passed all 12 tests.\n- A Node script confirmed every manifest field against the task's requirements, including key set, lowercase addresses, string supply, numeric fee and tickSpacing, and the notes length limit.\n- `git status --porcelain` shows only the new `launch.json`. No other file was changed and no scratch files remain.","treeHash":"ca3dba675aa516eb773a5be23e4e86591fd14d49","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":244663,"inputTokens":194,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":4176,"runtime":"claude","turns":11,"wallClockMs":59988}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"cbf7763c860e27ed732537e883b333617ce794584f0f3f25b4419edfa77f06f1","device":"1f78880cc572868c","findings":[{"description":"transferFrom checks the receiver and the allowance but never rejects a zero `from`. Because allowance[address(0)][spender] is 0 and balanceOf[address(0)] is 0, any caller can execute transferFrom(address(0), to, 0): the allowance check passes (0 < 0 is false), the balance check passes, and the token emits Transfer(address(0), to, 0). No balance and no supply change, so there is no value impact; the launch flows, the swarm share and the pool are unaffected. The only effect is a spurious zero-value event shaped like a mint, which an indexer that interprets Transfer-from-zero as issuance may record as a mint of zero. OpenZeppelin's ERC20 reverts with ERC20InvalidSender for this case. Any non-zero value from address(0) reverts with InsufficientAllowance as expected. Reported for completeness rather than blessed by a passing test; test_transferFromFromZeroAddressMovesNothing in test/SqueekTokenEdges.t.sol pins only that nothing moves.","line":44,"path":"src/SqueekToken.sol","reproduction":"Deploy SqueekToken from any deployer. From any address `alice`, call token.transferFrom(address(0), bob, 0). Expected (strict ERC-20 practice): revert on an invalid sender. Actual: the call returns true and emits Transfer(0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000, bob, 0); totalSupply stays 1000000000000000000000000000 and balanceOf(bob) stays 0. With value 1 instead of 0 the call reverts with InsufficientAllowance(alice, 0, 1).","severity":"info","title":"transferFrom accepts from == address(0) for a zero value and emits a mint-shaped Transfer event"}],"hash":"7a29259f0db53c36a072215f405062495af70b0a59035eb8d2f3df3e2f998450","nodeId":"4e2a445d-883b-4a11-b535-2a3d09b04739","outcome":"completed","summary":"Done. The suite passes under the verifier's seed, and the only observation about the implementation is informational.\n\n**What I added** (three new files under `test/`, alongside the existing unit file, which I left as is):\n\n- `test/SqueekTokenEdges.t.sol`: 46 unit tests on failure paths and edges. Zero, one wei, the whole supply, one wei over, the maximum, self-transfer, repeated calls, reverted calls leaving no trace, approvals that overwrite rather than add, self-approval, directional and per-spender allowances, unlimited versus max-minus-one allowance, strangers and the deployer having no power over holders, ether and unknown selectors refused, twenty admin-style selectors all reverting, no DELEGATECALL or SELFDESTRUCT in the runtime, and the launch flows. The launch flow test deploys through a factory stand-in and forwards the swarm's share in the same call, so it exercises the one-transaction path the real factory takes.\n- `test/SqueekTokenFuzz.t.sol`: 18 property tests at 1000 runs each. Exact movement, round trips, split-equals-whole, random transfer sequences conserving supply, allowance decrement and sticky unlimited allowance, every revert with its exact error arguments, and a random-selector probe that the supply never grows.\n- `test/SqueekTokenInvariant.t.sol`: a handler with six actors that calls transfer, approve and transferFrom in random order with bounded inputs, plus over-balance, over-allowance, zero-receiver, zero-spender and stranger attempts checked in place with try/catch for the exact error. Ghost balances and allowances back six invariants: fixed supply, balances summing to supply, balances and allowances matching the ghosts, no sink address holding anything, and constant metadata. It runs at 256 runs by 64 depth with fail-on-revert enabled.\n\n**Grounding.** I ran the same handler against a scratch mutant whose transferFrom never spends allowance. The allowance invariant failed on the first run, so the harness detects real defects rather than passing vacuously. The scratch files are removed.\n\n**Findings.** I found no value-affecting defect. The token is a plain fixed-supply ERC-20 with no admin surface, exact transfers, and no way to grow supply. One informational item is recorded in `.imd-findings.json`: transferFrom does not reject a zero `from` address, so a zero-value call from anyone succeeds and emits a mint-shaped Transfer event of zero. Nothing moves and supply is unchanged, so the launch flows are unaffected. The edge test for it pins only that balances and supply stay put rather than blessing the event.\n\n**Verification.** Final run under the verifier seed: 77 tests passed, 0 failed, across four suites. Files are formatted with forge fmt. Nothing outside `test/` and the findings file was touched, and nothing was committed.","treeHash":"4e767f82bf915d3d79868f796d1e0ff741c5ceea","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":599225,"inputTokens":322,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":30870,"runtime":"claude","turns":20,"wallClockMs":433297}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"dbf0c0e181136fd6ce35fc07bb5d1588fd40aeea6b1a725bf97f7eb9e11c666e","device":"234a4a00ca903cb9","findings":[],"hash":"8590d1af3c51c8dd1e713e30589e8eef9a809a09d1badc459147808177de3fe9","nodeId":"c8f799de-de93-4f94-9c07-e5b376269eec","outcome":"completed","summary":"I built the squeek (SQUEEK) token. `forge build`, `forge test` (12 of 12 pass, including a fuzz test run with the required seed) and `forge fmt --check` all pass with solc 0.8.26.\n\n- **Token:** `src/SqueekToken.sol` defines `contract SqueekToken`. It's a self-contained ERC-20 named `squeek` with symbol `SQUEEK` and 18 decimals. The constructor takes no arguments and mints 1,000,000,000 × 10^18 tokens once to the deployer, which is the launch factory.\n- **What it can't do:** there's no owner, mint, burn, pause, blacklist or transfer fee. The supply can never grow, nobody can move or freeze a holder's balance, and every transfer moves exactly the amount sent. It calls no libraries and contains no DELEGATECALL or SELFDESTRUCT.\n- **Your X and website:** `@squeekchain` and squeekchain.com are only in the README and the code comments, not stored on chain. Your brief listed them under \"what it does\", but they don't change how the token behaves.\n- **Tests:** `test/SqueekToken.t.sol` checks the name, symbol and decimals, the mint to the deployer, transfers and allowances. Failure tests cover a transfer larger than the balance, sending to the zero address, spending more than the allowance, approving the zero address and calling a `mint` function that doesn't exist. The fuzz test checks that transfers keep the total supply the same.\n- **Config:** `foundry.toml` sets `bytecode_hash = \"none\"` as the launch requires. I copied `forge-std` into `lib/` as ordinary files (no submodule) so the tests build without network access.\n- **Docs:** `README.md` covers the assumptions, deployment parameters and operating duties. Since nothing in the contract needs an admin, there are no \"After launch\" settings to make.\n- **Commit:** git had no author name set on this machine, so I made the commit with your email from the session. I didn't write `launch.json`, because the separate manifest step does that.\n\nI haven't run the protected launch checks from the task's inputs. They need setup values only the verifier supplies, though the token was written to pass them.","treeHash":"297a01450e858cb1f5210d537fe1e75286bb4dfd","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":295767,"inputTokens":16,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":5336,"runtime":"claude","turns":8,"wallClockMs":74267}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"0cf632e317dfab7a","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"First Principles / Execution Trace (sentinel path). _transfer validates only the receiver; it never rejects from == address(0). transferFrom reads allowance[address(0)][msg.sender], which is 0, and the check `current < value` passes when value == 0, so _transfer(address(0), to, 0) runs: balanceOf[0] (0) >= 0 passes, no balance changes, and Transfer(address(0), to, 0) is emitted. Any unprivileged caller can therefore emit an event that indexers and explorers classify as a mint, with value 0. The reference implementation (OpenZeppelin ERC20 v5 _transfer) reverts with ERC20InvalidSender for from == address(0). No balance or totalSupply changes, so there is no loss and no supply growth; the only effect is a spurious zero-value mint event in the log stream. Reported for completeness; not a blocker. Minimal fix that preserves intended behaviour: add `if (from == address(0)) revert InvalidSender(from);` at the top of _transfer (or in transferFrom).","line":57,"path":"src/SqueekToken.sol","reproduction":"State: fresh deployment, any caller A with no allowance. Call: vm.prank(A); token.transferFrom(address(0), B, 0). Expected (OZ-reference behaviour): revert (invalid sender). Actual: returns true and emits Transfer(address(0), B, 0); balanceOf(B) stays 0, totalSupply stays 1e27. With value 1 the call reverts InsufficientAllowance(A, 0, 1) as intended. Verified with a scratch Foundry test (test_transferFromZeroSenderZeroValue) that passed against this code.","severity":"info","snippet":"        if (to == address(0)) revert InvalidReceiver(to);\n        uint256 bal = balanceOf[from];\n        if (bal < value) revert InsufficientBalance(from, bal, value);","title":"transferFrom(address(0), to, 0) succeeds and emits a mint-shaped Transfer(0, to, 0) event"}],"hash":"a9f11b8516fe32c3afe0e864833ba2f2280fda25002bc59c525535d7d32360e2","nodeId":"4991a17f-cac4-410c-8fb7-5801903e8d90","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is written and the tree is otherwise unchanged.\n\n**Outcome:** no exploitable defect in the assigned area. The token in `src/SqueekToken.sol` is a 66-line self-contained ERC-20 with no owner, no libraries, no external calls and no exemption logic, so the Execution Trace, Periphery and First Principles checklists reduce to arithmetic, sentinel and event paths, all of which hold.\n\n**What I verified**\n\n- Built with solc 0.8.26 and ran the project suite: 12 tests passed.\n- Wrote a scratch Foundry suite of 15 tests covering self-transfer, zero-value transfer, exact and max-minus-one allowances, allowance preserved on balance revert, oversize transfer revert, receive and fallback rejection, and a conservation invariant over 128,000 handler calls. All passed. The scratch directory was removed afterwards.\n- Scanned the compiled runtime with the protected floor test's opcode walk: no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT. Metadata is solc-version-only.\n- Static analysis leads (large literal, non-immutable `totalSupply`) are style and gas only, not defects.\n\n**One informational finding**\n\nA zero-value `transferFrom` from the zero address succeeds and emits a mint-shaped `Transfer(0, to, 0)` event, where the OpenZeppelin reference reverts. Balances and supply are untouched, so there is no loss. The reproduction and a one-line fix are in the findings file.\n\n**Coverage:** all three verifier entry points have rows (two `holds`, one `finding` pointing at the info item), plus rows for the constructor, supply conservation, exact launch flows, forbidden opcodes and the empty periphery. The manifest row is `unreached` because `launch.json` does not exist yet. The protected floor test could not be executed locally since it imports v4-core and launch helpers that are not in this tree.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":699854,"inputTokens":386,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":12560,"runtime":"claude","turns":19,"wallClockMs":275913}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":822,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 25 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 754.88ms\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":84,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 12 tests for test/SqueekToken.t.sol:SqueekTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 109244, ~: 111180)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n\n[PASS] test_approveAndTransferFrom() (gas: 141690)\n[PASS] test_approveZeroSpenderReverts() (gas: 30311)\n[PASS] test_constructorEmitsMint() (gas: 5508)\n[PASS] test_infiniteAllowanceNotDecreased() (gas: 121951)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 26748)\n[PASS] test_noMintEntrypoint() (gas: 37733)\n[PASS] test_supplyMintedToDeployer() (gas: 23057)\n[PASS] test_transfer() (gas: 92429)\n[PASS] test_transferFromOverAllowanceReverts() (gas: 86846)\n[PASS] test_transferInsufficientReverts() (gas: 37410)\n[PASS] test_transferToZeroReverts() (gas: 32784)\nSuite result: ok. 12 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 4.16ms (5.82ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test suite in 4.52ms (4.16ms CPU time): 12 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (12 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":50,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"SqueekToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"SqueekToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"SqueekToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\"README.md\":32,\"foundry.toml\":8,\"launch.json\":24,\"remappings.txt\":1,\"src/SqueekToken.sol\":66,\"test/SqueekToken.t.sol\":106},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"247738bbfedeba1b6ae5dbf79684d3eaf97e8483034930de6d607052323b33d1","verifiedTreeHash":"ca3dba675aa516eb773a5be23e4e86591fd14d49","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+d952fceb"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":3009,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 28 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 2.90s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":17295,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 46 tests for test/SqueekTokenEdges.t.sol:SqueekTokenEdgesTest\n[PASS] test_allowanceIsDirectional() (gas: 102111)\n[PASS] test_allowancesAreIndependentPerSpender() (gas: 184398)\n[PASS] test_approveNeedsNoBalance() (gas: 115686)\n[PASS] test_approveOverwritesRatherThanAdds() (gas: 94741)\n[PASS] test_approveSelfIsAllowedAndSpendable() (gas: 130434)\n[PASS] test_approveZeroResetsAndEmits() (gas: 129997)\n[PASS] test_approveZeroSpenderRevertsForZeroValueToo() (gas: 32814)\n[PASS] test_chainOfTransfersConservesSupply() (gas: 292791)\n[PASS] test_deployerHasNoPowerOverHolders() (gas: 97268)\n[PASS] test_eachDeploymentIsIndependent() (gas: 44997)\n[PASS] test_emptyAccountCannotSendOneWei() (gas: 37572)\n[PASS] test_etherIsRefused() (gas: 68696)\n[PASS] test_failedTransferLeavesNoTrace() (gas: 111447)\n[PASS] test_infiniteAllowanceSpendsWholeBalanceButNotMore() (gas: 161849)\n[PASS] test_launchFlowsArriveWholeInOneTransaction() (gas: 541346)\n[PASS] test_maxMinusOneAllowanceIsFinite() (gas: 125507)\n[PASS] test_maxValueTransferReverts() (gas: 37845)\n[PASS] test_noAdminEntrypointsExist() (gas: 1101870)\n[PASS] test_nobodyElseHoldsAnythingAtDeployment() (gas: 44126)\n[PASS] test_oneWeiOverBalanceReverts() (gas: 44781)\n[PASS] test_oneWeiTransfer() (gas: 82245)\n[PASS] test_poolStylePullMovesExactly() (gas: 242709)\n[PASS] test_runtimeFitsEip170AndHasNoDelegatecallOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 1681791)\n[PASS] test_sameTransferTwiceMovesTwice() (gas: 117321)\n[PASS] test_selfTransferKeepsBalance() (gas: 93566)\n[PASS] test_selfTransferOverBalanceReverts() (gas: 35781)\n[PASS] test_supplyIsMintedToMsgSenderNotTxOrigin() (gas: 18443)\n[PASS] test_totalSupplyConstantMatchesStorage() (gas: 40121)\n[PASS] test_transferFromBySelfStillNeedsAllowance() (gas: 37979)\n[PASS] test_transferFromEmitsTransferNotApproval() (gas: 124423)\n[PASS] test_transferFromExactAllowanceThenOneMoreReverts() (gas: 164229)\n[PASS] test_transferFromFromZeroAddressMovesNothing() (gas: 97989)\n[PASS] test_transferFromOverBalanceRevertsAndKeepsAllowance() (gas: 166739)\n[PASS] test_transferFromSpentInPieces() (gas: 219381)\n[PASS] test_transferFromToOwnerItself() (gas: 108826)\n[PASS] test_transferFromToSpender() (gas: 117721)\n[PASS] test_transferFromToZeroRevertsAndKeepsAllowance() (gas: 107762)\n[PASS] test_transferFromWithoutApprovalReverts() (gas: 39987)\n[PASS] test_transferFromZeroValueWithoutApprovalSucceeds() (gas: 67277)\n[PASS] test_transferToContractWithoutReceiverSucceeds() (gas: 158141)\n[PASS] test_transferToTokenItselfIsAllowedAndStuck() (gas: 80191)\n[PASS] test_transferToZeroRevertsEvenForZeroValue() (gas: 32891)\n[PASS] test_unknownSelectorReverts() (gas: 51411)\n[PASS] test_wholeSupplyTransferLeavesDeployerEmpty() (gas: 87787)\n[PASS] test_zeroValueTransferFromEmptyAccountSucceeds() (gas: 59871)\n[PASS] test_zeroValueTransferSucceedsAndEmits() (gas: 62317)\nSuite result: ok. 46 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 236.18ms (14.79ms CPU time)\n\nRan 12 tests for test/SqueekToken.t.sol:SqueekTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 110006, ~: 111156)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1511\n\n[PASS] test_approveAndTransferFrom() (gas: 141690)\n[PASS] test_approveZeroSpenderReverts() (gas: 30311)\n[PASS] test_constructorEmitsMint() (gas: 5508)\n[PASS] test_infiniteAllowanceNotDecreased() (gas: 121951)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 26748)\n[PASS] test_noMintEntrypoint() (gas: 37733)\n[PASS] test_supplyMintedToDeployer() (gas: 23057)\n[PASS] test_transfer() (gas: 92429)\n[PASS] test_transferFromOverAllowanceReverts() (gas: 86846)\n[PASS] test_transferInsufficientReverts() (gas: 37410)\n[PASS] test_transferToZeroReverts() (gas: 32784)\nSuite result: ok. 12 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 236.30ms (18.87ms CPU time)\n\nRan 18 tests for test/SqueekTokenFuzz.t.sol:SqueekTokenFuzzTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_approveDoesNotMoveBalance(address,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 75003, ~: 75369)\n[PASS] testFuzz_approveOverwrites(address,uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 92972, ~: 93178)\n[PASS] testFuzz_approveSetsExactly(address,address,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 61164, ~: 61399)\n[PASS] testFuzz_approveZeroSpenderAlwaysReverts(address,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 30972, ~: 30911)\n[PASS] testFuzz_infiniteAllowanceIsSticky(address,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 131730, ~: 132035)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 18\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_noCallGrowsSupply(bytes4,address,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 100398, ~: 100680)\n[PASS] testFuzz_roundTripRestoresBalances(address,address,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 192781, ~: 194560)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 387355833188903422\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_sequenceConservesSupply(uint256[8],uint8) (runs: 1000, μ: 466203, ~: 468187)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 31611739487983\n  Bound result 25132571309550\n  Bound result 1627874310494\n  Bound result 222151183356023836572664670\n  Bound result 194803\n  Bound result 999999999999966760386006718\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_splitEqualsWhole(address,uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 127396, ~: 128106)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 873061771797270317332461255\n  Bound result 873061771797270317332461254\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFromDecrementsAllowance(address,address,uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 163937, ~: 166137)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 2\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFromOverAllowanceReverts(address,uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 109997, ~: 110201)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 23514665655027620366884738278363352360\n  Bound result 234476630264985755980195867680663648844456721\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFromOverBalanceRevertsAndKeepsAllowance(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 164995, ~: 165287)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 8193\n  Bound result 8575\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFromToZeroRevertsAndKeepsAllowance(address,uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 105724, ~: 106068)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 8909129557617766458648633\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFromWithoutApprovalRevertsForAnyPositiveValue(address,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 39181, ~: 39127)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 18\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferMovesExactly(address,uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 169028, ~: 170779)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 2\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferOverBalanceReverts(address,uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 101786, ~: 101923)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 27620366884738254848686705\n  Bound result 234476630264985755980195867680663648844456721\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferToZeroAlwaysReverts(uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 33077, ~: 33016)\n[PASS] testFuzz_zeroValueTransferFromAnyoneSucceeds(address,address) (runs: 1000, μ: 55826, ~: 55932)\nSuite result: ok. 18 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 237.79ms (4.05s CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/SqueekTokenInvariant.t.sol:SqueekTokenInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nSqueekTokenInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_allowancesMatchGhost\n[PASS] invariant_balancesMatchGhost\n[PASS] invariant_balancesSumToSupply\n[PASS] invariant_metadataIsConstant\n[PASS] invariant_noBalanceExceedsSupplyAndNoSinkHoldsAnything\n[PASS] invariant_totalSupplyIsFixed\n SqueekTokenInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭---------------+---------------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract      | Selector                  | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+========================================================================+\n| SqueekHandler | approve                   | 1676  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SqueekHandler | approveZeroSpender        | 1580  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SqueekHandler | strangerTries             | 1589  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SqueekHandler | transfer                  | 1571  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SqueekHandler | transferFrom              | 1774  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SqueekHandler | transferFromOverAllowance | 1606  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SqueekHandler | transferFromOverBalance   | 1673  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SqueekHandler | transferFromToZero        | 1661  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SqueekHandler | transferOverBalance       | 1640  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SqueekHandler | transferToZero            | 1614  | 0       | 0        |\n╰---------------+---------------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 100\n  Bound result 1717\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 289\n  Bound result 10376\n  Bound result 5323\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 78925\n  Bound result 328267467233007963173913216491350647197097166073764774979\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 255\n  Bound result 7523\n  Bound result 12387\n  Bound result 48\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 7701\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 289\n  Bound result 1151405999\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 6292\n  Bound result 184\n  Bound result 2913938207082367043194240673327334670425903643109014219246088535852907\n  Bound result 2951345942704178499741485578316306696554266753237890243995\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007912129639933\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 61453\n  Bound result 0\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 17.17s (17.17s CPU time)\n\nRan 4 test suites in 17.17s (17.88s CPU time): 77 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (77 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":72,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"SqueekToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"SqueekToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"SqueekToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\"README.md\":32,\"foundry.toml\":8,\"remappings.txt\":1,\"src/SqueekToken.sol\":66,\"test/SqueekToken.t.sol\":106,\"test/SqueekTokenEdges.t.sol\":540,\"test/SqueekTokenFuzz.t.sol\":254,\"test/SqueekTokenInvariant.t.sol\":322},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"7a29259f0db53c36a072215f405062495af70b0a59035eb8d2f3df3e2f998450","verifiedTreeHash":"4e767f82bf915d3d79868f796d1e0ff741c5ceea","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+d952fceb"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":809,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 25 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 738.44ms\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":100,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 12 tests for test/SqueekToken.t.sol:SqueekTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 109244, ~: 111180)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 64199\n\n[PASS] test_approveAndTransferFrom() (gas: 141690)\n[PASS] test_approveZeroSpenderReverts() (gas: 30311)\n[PASS] test_constructorEmitsMint() (gas: 5508)\n[PASS] test_infiniteAllowanceNotDecreased() (gas: 121951)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 26748)\n[PASS] test_noMintEntrypoint() (gas: 37733)\n[PASS] test_supplyMintedToDeployer() (gas: 23057)\n[PASS] test_transfer() (gas: 92429)\n[PASS] test_transferFromOverAllowanceReverts() (gas: 86846)\n[PASS] test_transferInsufficientReverts() (gas: 37410)\n[PASS] test_transferToZeroReverts() (gas: 32784)\nSuite result: ok. 12 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 5.83ms (7.18ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test suite in 6.55ms (5.83ms CPU time): 12 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (12 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":35,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"SqueekToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"SqueekToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"SqueekToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\"README.md\":32,\"foundry.toml\":8,\"remappings.txt\":1,\"src/SqueekToken.sol\":66,\"test/SqueekToken.t.sol\":106},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":335,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"slither: no results at low impact or above","passed":true},{"durationMs":209,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[low] large-numeric-literal at src/SqueekToken.sol:12: Large Numeric Literal\n[low] state-variable-could-be-immutable at src/SqueekToken.sol:14: State Variable Could Be Immutable","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"8590d1af3c51c8dd1e713e30589e8eef9a809a09d1badc459147808177de3fe9","verifiedTreeHash":"297a01450e858cb1f5210d537fe1e75286bb4dfd","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+d952fceb"}]}