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uniswap v4 hook that charges 4% on swaps, always settles in ETH, and sends the fee to 0x047F606fD5b2BaA5f5C6c4aB8958E45CB6B054B7 on the swap.\n\nthe token name should be taxy and t4 ticker\n\nWhich pools: v4 pools\nWho can change it: no one","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"86bddc0a877b356acb5e2c64db4fd10527baa5cc91df268b49f8c81ca72c5f88","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"96fd49b6-af35-4421-9328-40c9358fab4f","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-551-uniswap-v4-hook-charges"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"50955","feedbackHash":"9dd8af2a87c422298217f934e0a4370d37c03eab8ffdbb7f64c56561ee360c30","nodeKey":"audit_economics","submissionHash":"bd75aec77da0949e7b0468d0c433c45fd21baa2cf37d6ffe52776416bf520013","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"50974","feedbackHash":"9d5fc11524872da2e01ca6f91194f3f18c84fc18de3f9daeb89ab5719a22ff1e","nodeKey":"audit_flow","submissionHash":"30309ad0eda029490faabcadd3297a2fc726ea1fa1af99622448a3dc3597a510","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51432","feedbackHash":"61a5e61283836006e1f627ae93a157ea0fd7000de98485150a3358dbe3d3ce68","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"bac924c1c0482a3ea9ba37614a3f025e2ae54d0fc08ba9d928295733bc5dd3d1","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"50959","feedbackHash":"ad344d3484192503a627dd193628d99a0d70e454f1b9d0516c4b114d252025c2","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"4f8375627ea7250fa2f1b019250b499781948a0bbf115d8a59542a48fb5500b4","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51046","feedbackHash":"8dedc7e072574f78d78843dd294c0a43f725ba2b957bc0b26779cda7eb940701","nodeKey":"audit_math","submissionHash":"561d1b84d5b0d11e66212b9111ecab5c9d5f48228718a99d6394d8940639cc21","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"50971","feedbackHash":"f401b7a582a79080d4aca65dc59493113cc559ed07140612f53f008b7b80d9f5","nodeKey":"audit_permissions","submissionHash":"77c91c473ba0a2c6ce67a4c2765af1c443a5882c8058b56d548880fd0a355b03","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"50957","feedbackHash":"fd8ade437989ace825646a17dc36583e87015a1c2d298537071819349c7a1d44","nodeKey":"build_contract_project","submissionHash":"1efe3701cd55cc4a35acc72689b210dd40e9a9a4af92d434dfb46fd27b057081","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"50971","feedbackHash":"abdf7b3f4f27a0dcc6b38a1575f176c473c907c134db0f98101acc7f78996ac5","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"08bb4adafc655cc3331667748436b7e3fab50e9f087021cf3dbce9aaf61ed43a","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"50974","feedbackHash":"2888060fdebbd5e2298f39b6ccb653f29498765f2f471790cb1751dab79c216a","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"7a43ccda6eaa064ade2b2235d9c7642394d86460b45016bd5764445c36dce33b","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"50957","feedbackHash":"d5de12bc1e1b6cacf8e98a14cc5063f0f3f7e993c7abfa608833f1d5943262cf","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"5959f086211ea1847201707590d13bb76b19978164b041e386232e344bb51fbb","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"50955","feedbackHash":"42e8f4ccfcccf7f440eeceb2598f98ca4ce3c084ce949e27cb9dc5014de098fe","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"d89acf68adf5d47aecc326547ae0415233e2a48748088684a84ab32d4a827fa6","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"d31a2360e9ba53bc3f2f83dbb5033148dd96115762b89246ea6ab4414f3e058b","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"01118eb2af84727afb9fa05f7a681b69526da757d9b42f5bb03c43b098883384","device":"35c52a5b502e847c","findings":[],"hash":"08bb4adafc655cc3331667748436b7e3fab50e9f087021cf3dbce9aaf61ed43a","nodeId":"4d9601d4-222f-481c-925b-5470be166a57","outcome":"completed","summary":"Updated [launch.json](/home/identitymd5/.identitymd/work/96fd49b6-af35-4421-9328-40c9358fab4f/4d9601d4-222f-481c-925b-5470be166a57/launch.json) to accurately describe the existing native-ETH claim fallback.\n\n- Schema, constructor, and permissions checks passed.\n- Notes: 3,103/4,000 characters.\n- `forge build` passed with existing lint warnings.\n- `forge test`: 57 passed, including protected checks.\n\nOnly the manifest changed outside permitted scratch files.","treeHash":"5c6751e68a5526ef0b436336ac401c4c8a623435","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":281984,"inputTokens":47138,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":4216,"runtime":"codex","turns":3,"wallClockMs":145268}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"16a0aa108b53e9b0577f29e626ba004add2acdd18935529b6caf5c5b6424a73e","device":"0256823ae36e7900","findings":[],"hash":"1efe3701cd55cc4a35acc72689b210dd40e9a9a4af92d434dfb46fd27b057081","nodeId":"5b0991b6-b438-402b-8151-7f5469d8b53e","outcome":"completed","summary":"Fixed the shortfall: swaps credit redeemable native-ETH claims when the manager lacks ETH; otherwise fees transfer immediately.\n\nAdded regression tests and redemption documentation. Recorded all three findings in `.imd-responses.json`; advisory behaviors remain documented and unchanged.\n\nValidation passed: `forge build`, 48 tests, formatting, and all three supplied proof cases.","treeHash":"f53a1f9fac09c520eb99f903cc8f74f7d84a9412","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1121792,"inputTokens":85473,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":7523,"runtime":"codex","turns":5,"wallClockMs":316312}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":2,"bundleHash":null,"device":"98b4506bef931d13","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"afterSwap pays the 4% fee immediately with poolManager.take(native, FEE_RECIPIENT, fee). take() performs a real ETH transfer out of the PoolManager at that moment, inside PoolManager.swap, i.e. before the router has settled the trader's ETH input (every ordinary v4 router, including the project's test/helpers/SettlementRouter.sol, calls settle after swap returns). The hook therefore implicitly assumes address(poolManager).balance >= fee at the time of afterSwap. Nothing in this project establishes that: a launch pool is normally seeded single-sided with the token only (a position entirely below the current tick holds only currency1), which deposits zero ETH, and on an ETH-side buy the pool receives ETH only after the hook has already tried to pay the fee. Result: on a PoolManager whose native balance is below floor(A/25) (a freshly deployed manager, or a chain where the canonical manager holds little ETH), every exact-input buy, exact-output buy, and any swap with a non-zero ETH leg reverts inside take with NativeTransferFailed (wrapped as HookCallFailed). The AMM leg itself has already succeeded at that point (trace shows Swap(amount0=-0.96e18, amount1=+0.951e18) emitted), so the revert is caused solely by the hook. Sells are unaffected only because the pool pays ETH out anyway. The same ordering also means a buyer's fee is temporarily fronted by other pools' ETH on a shared manager, which works but is an unstated dependency on third-party liquidity. README.md line 188-191 acknowledges the dependency ('PoolManager must therefore already hold enough native ETH') but no test, deployment check or hook logic enforces it, and the launch factory's seed shape is outside this repository's control. Possible fixes (design decision for the author): (a) require the launch to seed two-sided liquidity so the manager always holds ETH, and add a test that pins it; (b) in afterSwap, when address(poolManager).balance < fee, credit the recipient with native ERC-6909 claims via poolManager.mint(FEE_RECIPIENT, 0, fee) instead of take, so the fee is still charged on the swap and still denominated in ETH (redeemable 1:1 later) but no swap is bricked; this changes 'immediate ETH delivery' in that edge case only and must be an explicit scope decision. Slither/aderyn reentrancy leads on this line were checked and rejected: the swapping guard stays set across take, so a reentrant swap via the recipient reverts ReentrantSwap and afterSwap requires msg.sender == poolManager.","line":122,"path":"src/TaxyHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {IUnlockCallback} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/callback/IUnlockCallback.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {BalanceDelta} from \"v4-core/src/types/BalanceDelta.sol\";\nimport {ModifyLiquidityParams, SwapParams} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\nimport {Hooks} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/Hooks.sol\";\nimport {TickMath} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/TickMath.sol\";\nimport {IERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol\";\nimport {TaxyHook} from \"src/TaxyHook.sol\";\nimport {TaxyToken} from \"src/TaxyToken.sol\";\n\n/// @dev Minimal router using the ordinary v4 flow: manager.swap first, then settle the trader's\n/// debts. The project's own test router (test/helpers/SettlementRouter.sol) settles in the same order.\ncontract PlainRouter is IUnlockCallback {\n    IPoolManager immutable manager;\n\n    constructor(IPoolManager m) {\n        manager = m;\n    }\n\n    function addLiquidity(PoolKey memory key, ModifyLiquidityParams memory p) external payable {\n        manager.unlock(abi.encode(true, key, p, SwapParams(false, 0, 0), msg.sender));\n        if (address(this).balance > 0) payable(msg.sender).transfer(address(this).balance);\n    }\n\n    function swap(PoolKey memory key, SwapParams memory p) external payable returns (BalanceDelta d) {\n        d = abi.decode(\n            manager.unlock(abi.encode(false, key, ModifyLiquidityParams(0, 0, 0, 0), p, msg.sender)), (BalanceDelta)\n        );\n        if (address(this).balance > 0) payable(msg.sender).transfer(address(this).balance);\n    }\n\n    function unlockCallback(bytes calldata raw) external returns (bytes memory) {\n        require(msg.sender == address(manager), \"manager only\");\n        (bool isLiq, PoolKey memory key, ModifyLiquidityParams memory lp, SwapParams memory sp, address payer) =\n            abi.decode(raw, (bool, PoolKey, ModifyLiquidityParams, SwapParams, address));\n        BalanceDelta d;\n        if (isLiq) (d,) = manager.modifyLiquidity(key, lp, \"\");\n        else d = manager.swap(key, sp, \"\");\n        _settle(key.currency0, payer, d.amount0());\n        _settle(key.currency1, payer, d.amount1());\n        return abi.encode(d);\n    }\n\n    function _settle(Currency c, address payer, int128 amt) internal {\n        if (amt > 0) {\n            manager.take(c, payer, uint256(int256(amt)));\n        } else if (amt < 0) {\n            uint256 debt = uint256(-int256(amt));\n            manager.sync(c);\n            if (Currency.unwrap(c) == address(0)) {\n                manager.settle{value: debt}();\n            } else {\n                IERC20(Currency.unwrap(c)).transferFrom(payer, address(manager), debt);\n                manager.settle();\n            }\n        }\n    }\n\n    receive() external payable {}\n}\n\n/// @notice Finding: afterSwap pays the 4% fee with PoolManager.take BEFORE the buyer's ETH is settled,\n/// so a fee-bearing buy needs the PoolManager to already hold >= fee wei of native ETH from somewhere.\n/// A launch pool seeded single-sided (tokens only, the usual shape for a token launch) deposits no\n/// ETH, so on a PoolManager that holds no ETH every buy reverts with NativeTransferFailed inside take.\ncontract ManagerEthShortfallTest is Test {\n    address constant RECIPIENT = 0x047F606fD5b2BaA5f5C6c4aB8958E45CB6B054B7;\n    uint160 constant ONE = 79228162514264337593543950336;\n\n    IPoolManager manager;\n    TaxyHook hook;\n    TaxyToken token;\n    PlainRouter router;\n    PoolKey key;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        manager = IPoolManager(address(new PoolManager(address(this))));\n        token = new TaxyToken();\n        hook = _deployHook();\n        router = new PlainRouter(manager);\n        key = PoolKey(Currency.wrap(address(0)), Currency.wrap(address(token)), 3000, 60, IHooks(address(hook)));\n        manager.initialize(key, ONE);\n        token.approve(address(router), type(uint256).max);\n        // Launch-style seed: the position sits entirely below the current tick, so it holds only t4.\n        router.addLiquidity(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(-600, -60, 1_000_000 ether, bytes32(0)));\n        assertEq(address(manager).balance, 0, \"a token-only seed leaves the PoolManager with no ETH\");\n        vm.deal(address(this), 100 ether);\n    }\n\n    /// @dev Expected: a solvent buyer paying 1 ETH exact input gets tokens and the recipient gets 0.04 ETH.\n    /// Actual on current code: PoolManager.take(ETH, recipient, 0.04e18) in afterSwap fails with\n    /// OutOfFunds -> NativeTransferFailed, wrapped as HookCallFailed, and the whole swap reverts.\n    function test_firstBuyerCannotBuyWhenManagerHoldsNoEth() public {\n        uint256 feeBefore = RECIPIENT.balance;\n        BalanceDelta d = router.swap{value: 1 ether}(key, SwapParams(true, -1 ether, TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1));\n        assertEq(int256(d.amount0()), -1 ether, \"buyer pays exactly 1 ETH\");\n        assertGt(d.amount1(), 0, \"buyer receives tokens\");\n        assertEq(RECIPIENT.balance - feeBefore, 0.04 ether, \"recipient receives the 4% fee\");\n    }\n\n    function _deployHook() internal returns (TaxyHook) {\n        bytes memory creation = abi.encodePacked(type(TaxyHook).creationCode, abi.encode(manager));\n        bytes32 h = keccak256(creation);\n        for (uint256 i; i < 200_000; ++i) {\n            bytes32 salt = bytes32(i);\n            address predicted =\n                address(uint160(uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0xff), address(this), salt, h)))));\n            if (uint160(predicted) & Hooks.ALL_HOOK_MASK != 0x20cc) continue;\n            address at;\n            assembly (\"memory-safe\") {\n                at := create2(0, add(creation, 32), mload(creation), salt)\n            }\n            require(at != address(0), \"create2 failed\");\n            return TaxyHook(at);\n        }\n        revert(\"no salt\");\n    }\n\n    receive() external payable {}\n}","reproduction":"State: fresh PoolManager (balance 0 ETH), TaxyHook deployed at a 0x20cc address, pool ETH/t4 fee 3000 tickSpacing 60 initialized at sqrtPrice 2^96 (tick 0). Seed liquidity with a single position tickLower=-600, tickUpper=-60, liquidityDelta=1_000_000e18 through an ordinary router: delta.amount0 == 0, so address(manager).balance stays 0. Call: router.swap{value: 1 ether}(key, SwapParams(zeroForOne=true, amountSpecified=-1e18, sqrtPriceLimitX96=MIN_SQRT_PRICE+1)) from a buyer holding 100 ETH. Expected: swap succeeds, buyer delta amount0 == -1e18, recipient 0x047F606fD5b2BaA5f5C6c4aB8958E45CB6B054B7 gains 0.04e18 wei. Actual: beforeSwap returns specified delta +0.04e18; the AMM swaps 0.96e18 ETH for ~0.9514e18 t4 (Swap event emitted); afterSwap emits SwapFeePaid(gross=1e18, fee=4e16) then calls poolManager.take(address(0), recipient, 4e16); the manager's call to the recipient fails with EvmError: OutOfFunds; PoolManager reverts WrappedError(recipient, 0x00000000, 0x, NativeTransferFailed 0xf4b3b1bc); Hooks.callHook wraps it as WrappedError(hook, afterSwap 0xb47b2fb1, ..., HookCallFailed 0xa9e35b2f); the whole unlock reverts. Control checks run in the same harness: with vm.deal(manager, 0.04 ether - 1) the swap still reverts; with vm.deal(manager, 0.04 ether) it succeeds and the recipient receives exactly 0.04 ether. Run: forge test --match-path test/scratch/ManagerEthShortfall.t.sol (fails on current code).","severity":"medium","snippet":"        // take creates an ETH debt for this hook. Its positive return delta cancels that exact debt.\n        // The manager transfers native ETH directly; there is no accrued balance or claim step.\n        emit SwapFeePaid(key.toId(), sender, params.zeroForOne, gross, fee);\n        if (fee != 0) poolManager.take(Currency.wrap(address(0)), FEE_RECIPIENT, fee);","title":"Fee is taken from the PoolManager's ETH before the buyer settles, so buys revert whenever the manager holds less native ETH than the fee (token-only seeded launch pool on a fresh PoolManager)"}],"hash":"30309ad0eda029490faabcadd3297a2fc726ea1fa1af99622448a3dc3597a510","nodeId":"d2f45f5c-3116-45ef-aa26-483791ac7d06","outcome":"completed","summary":"The findings file is in place at the repository root, excluded from git by the repo's own info/exclude, and the scratch directory is gone. No tracked file was changed.\n\n**Review outcome: one medium finding, no critical or high.**\n\nThe hook's delta accounting is correct in all four swap modes. I traced `take(-fee)` cancelling against the positive return delta through v4-core's `Hooks.afterSwap` packing for both specified and unspecified orientations, verified the `floor((B+floor(B/24))/25) == floor(B/24)` gross-up identity, and confirmed the partial-fill guard, int128 bounds, caller authentication and the reentrancy guard spanning the ETH transfer. The slither and aderyn reentrancy leads at lines 90 and 122 are rejected: `swapping` stays set across `take`, so a nested swap from the recipient reverts, and `afterSwap` cannot be reached without `beforeSwap` or from a non-manager caller. The token is unmodified OpenZeppelin ERC20 v5.1.0 with the requested name and ticker and a fixed supply minted to its deployer.\n\n**Finding 1 (medium), `src/TaxyHook.sol:122`.** The fee is paid with `poolManager.take` inside `afterSwap`, which is before any router settles the buyer's ETH. The hook therefore depends on the PoolManager already holding at least the fee in native ETH. A launch pool seeded single-sided with tokens only deposits no ETH, so on a PoolManager with an empty native balance every buy reverts inside `take` with `NativeTransferFailed` even though the AMM leg already succeeded. Reproduced with a Foundry test: 1 ETH exact-input buy fails on a fresh manager, still fails with the balance one wei under the fee, and succeeds at exactly the fee. The README acknowledges the dependency, but nothing enforces it. The report gives the author two options and flags that choosing between them is a scope decision: require two-sided seed liquidity with a pinning test, or fall back to minting native ERC-6909 claims to the recipient when the manager's balance is short. The proof test is embedded in the finding.\n\n**Coverage.** All five listed entry points have rows: `afterSwap` is `finding` (ref 1), `beforeSwap` and the three token functions are `holds`. Additional rows cover `beforeInitialize`, the zero-net-hook-delta invariant, the fee identity, the rejected reentrancy leads, the periphery helpers (HookFlags, MineTaxySalt, SafeCast, LPFeeLibrary), and the disabled callbacks. Nothing in my area was left unreached.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1467283,"inputTokens":386,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":36497,"runtime":"claude","turns":34,"wallClockMs":455698}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"468e82a89b9bfe18","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"afterSwap runs inside PoolManager.swap, before the router settles the trader's ETH input (every ordinary router, including test/helpers/SettlementRouter.sol, calls settle after swap returns). poolManager.take(native, FEE_RECIPIENT, fee) performs a real CALL with value out of the PoolManager at that moment, funded from whatever native ETH the manager already holds from all pools. If address(poolManager).balance < fee, Currency.transfer fails (NativeTransferFailed 0xf4b3b1bc), Hooks wraps it as HookCallFailed 0xa9e35b2f, and the whole swap reverts although the trader is solvent and the AMM leg already executed. The state is reachable without any attacker: a token-only seeded launch pool (a position entirely below the current tick deposits zero ETH) on a fresh or ETH-poor PoolManager. Sells are unaffected because the ETH they pay out is already in the manager; exact-input ETH buys and exact-output token buys both fail. Calibration: no funds are lost and the transaction rolls back, so this is a conditional availability defect, not loss. On the canonical managers the precondition does not currently hold (measured 2026-10-01 via eth_getBalance: Sepolia 0xE03A1074c86CFeDd5C142C4F04F1a1536e203543 holds about 3,862 ETH, mainnet 0x000000000004444c5dc75cB358380D2e3dE08A90 about 44,700 ETH), so a buy there would only fail if its 4% fee exceeded that pooled balance. The hook is nevertheless written to be deployed against any chain's manager (\"$poolManager\"), the README and launch.json notes acknowledge the dependency but nothing in the hook enforces or guards it, and the guarantee \"a solvent swap executes and pays 4%\" silently depends on unrelated pools' ETH. Three specialists reported the same root cause (audit_math medium, audit_economics low, audit_flow medium); their three proofs were run from test/scratch and all fail here with the identical trace (take -> recipient receive{value} -> OutOfFunds -> NativeTransferFailed -> HookCallFailed), controls with ETH in the manager pass. Possible fixes are a scope decision for the author: (a) keep immediate take but fall back to poolManager.mint(FEE_RECIPIENT, 0, fee) (native ERC-6909 claim, redeemable 1:1) when address(poolManager).balance < fee, which keeps the swap delta-neutral and the fee charged on the swap; or (b) require two-sided (ETH-bearing) seed liquidity and router pre-settlement, pinned by a deployment check and a test. The attached proof accepts either ETH delivery or a native claim credit so it passes under fix (a) and under any fix that makes the buy execute. Slither/aderyn reentrancy leads on this line were checked and rejected: the swapping guard is set in beforeSwap and remains set through take, a reentrant swap from the recipient reverts ReentrantSwap (test_recipientCannotReenterSwapDuringFeePayment), and afterSwap requires msg.sender == poolManager.","line":122,"path":"src/TaxyHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {IUnlockCallback} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/callback/IUnlockCallback.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {BalanceDelta} from \"v4-core/src/types/BalanceDelta.sol\";\nimport {ModifyLiquidityParams, SwapParams} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\nimport {Hooks} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/Hooks.sol\";\nimport {TickMath} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/TickMath.sol\";\nimport {IERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol\";\nimport {TaxyHook} from \"src/TaxyHook.sol\";\nimport {TaxyToken} from \"src/TaxyToken.sol\";\n\n/// @dev Ordinary v4 router: call manager.swap first, then settle the trader's debts. This is the\n/// order every standard router (and the project's own test/helpers/SettlementRouter.sol) uses.\ncontract OrdinaryRouter is IUnlockCallback {\n    IPoolManager immutable manager;\n\n    constructor(IPoolManager m) {\n        manager = m;\n    }\n\n    function modifyLiquidity(PoolKey memory key, ModifyLiquidityParams memory p) external payable {\n        manager.unlock(abi.encode(true, key, p, SwapParams(false, 0, 0), msg.sender));\n        if (address(this).balance > 0) payable(msg.sender).transfer(address(this).balance);\n    }\n\n    function swap(PoolKey memory key, SwapParams memory p) external payable returns (BalanceDelta d) {\n        d = abi.decode(\n            manager.unlock(abi.encode(false, key, ModifyLiquidityParams(0, 0, 0, 0), p, msg.sender)), (BalanceDelta)\n        );\n        if (address(this).balance > 0) payable(msg.sender).transfer(address(this).balance);\n    }\n\n    function unlockCallback(bytes calldata raw) external returns (bytes memory) {\n        require(msg.sender == address(manager), \"manager only\");\n        (bool isLiq, PoolKey memory key, ModifyLiquidityParams memory lp, SwapParams memory sp, address payer) =\n            abi.decode(raw, (bool, PoolKey, ModifyLiquidityParams, SwapParams, address));\n        BalanceDelta d;\n        if (isLiq) (d,) = manager.modifyLiquidity(key, lp, \"\");\n        else d = manager.swap(key, sp, \"\");\n        _settle(key.currency0, payer, d.amount0());\n        _settle(key.currency1, payer, d.amount1());\n        return abi.encode(d);\n    }\n\n    function _settle(Currency c, address payer, int128 amt) internal {\n        if (amt > 0) {\n            manager.take(c, payer, uint256(int256(amt)));\n        } else if (amt < 0) {\n            uint256 debt = uint256(-int256(amt));\n            manager.sync(c);\n            if (Currency.unwrap(c) == address(0)) {\n                manager.settle{value: debt}();\n            } else {\n                IERC20(Currency.unwrap(c)).transferFrom(payer, address(manager), debt);\n                manager.settle();\n            }\n        }\n    }\n\n    receive() external payable {}\n}\n\n/// @notice TaxyHook.afterSwap pays the fee with PoolManager.take BEFORE the buyer's ETH input is\n/// settled, so the transfer is funded from whatever native ETH the PoolManager already holds. When\n/// the manager holds less than the fee (fresh manager, token-only seeded launch pool), every\n/// fee-bearing buy reverts with NativeTransferFailed wrapped in HookCallFailed.\n/// Expected: a solvent buyer's swap executes and the recipient is credited the 4% fee in ETH\n/// (either delivered directly or as a native ERC-6909 claim, whichever the fix chooses).\ncontract JudgeManagerShortfallTest is Test {\n    address constant RECIPIENT = 0x047F606fD5b2BaA5f5C6c4aB8958E45CB6B054B7;\n    uint160 constant ONE = 79228162514264337593543950336;\n\n    IPoolManager manager;\n    TaxyHook hook;\n    TaxyToken token;\n    OrdinaryRouter router;\n    PoolKey key;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        manager = IPoolManager(address(new PoolManager(address(this))));\n        token = new TaxyToken();\n        hook = _deployHook();\n        router = new OrdinaryRouter(manager);\n        key = PoolKey(Currency.wrap(address(0)), Currency.wrap(address(token)), 3000, 60, IHooks(address(hook)));\n        manager.initialize(key, ONE);\n        token.approve(address(router), type(uint256).max);\n        // Launch-style seed: a position entirely below the current tick holds only currency1 (t4).\n        router.modifyLiquidity(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(-600, -60, 1_000_000 ether, bytes32(0)));\n        assertEq(address(manager).balance, 0, \"token-only seed leaves the manager with no ETH\");\n        vm.deal(address(this), 100 ether);\n    }\n\n    function _recipientCredit() internal view returns (uint256) {\n        return RECIPIENT.balance + manager.balanceOf(RECIPIENT, 0);\n    }\n\n    function test_exactInputBuyExecutesWhenManagerHoldsNoEth() public {\n        uint256 creditBefore = _recipientCredit();\n        BalanceDelta d = router.swap{value: 1 ether}(key, SwapParams(true, -1 ether, TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1));\n        assertEq(int256(d.amount0()), -1 ether, \"buyer pays exactly 1 ETH\");\n        assertGt(d.amount1(), 0, \"buyer receives tokens\");\n        assertEq(_recipientCredit() - creditBefore, 0.04 ether, \"recipient is credited the 4% fee in ETH\");\n    }\n\n    function test_exactOutputBuyExecutesWhenManagerHoldsNoEth() public {\n        uint256 creditBefore = _recipientCredit();\n        BalanceDelta d = router.swap{value: 10 ether}(key, SwapParams(true, 1 ether, TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1));\n        assertEq(int256(d.amount1()), 1 ether, \"buyer receives exactly 1 t4\");\n        assertLt(d.amount0(), 0, \"buyer pays ETH\");\n        assertGt(_recipientCredit() - creditBefore, 0, \"recipient is credited the fee\");\n    }\n\n    /// @dev Control: identical swap once the manager holds ETH from an unrelated position.\n    function test_controlBuyWorksOnceManagerHoldsEth() public {\n        router.modifyLiquidity{value: 10 ether}(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(-600, 600, 100 ether, bytes32(0)));\n        assertGt(address(manager).balance, 0);\n        uint256 creditBefore = _recipientCredit();\n        router.swap{value: 1 ether}(key, SwapParams(true, -1 ether, TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1));\n        assertEq(_recipientCredit() - creditBefore, 0.04 ether);\n    }\n\n    function _deployHook() internal returns (TaxyHook) {\n        bytes memory creation = abi.encodePacked(type(TaxyHook).creationCode, abi.encode(manager));\n        bytes32 h = keccak256(creation);\n        for (uint256 i; i < 200_000; ++i) {\n            bytes32 salt = bytes32(i);\n            address predicted =\n                address(uint160(uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0xff), address(this), salt, h)))));\n            if (uint160(predicted) & Hooks.ALL_HOOK_MASK != 0x20cc) continue;\n            address at;\n            assembly (\"memory-safe\") {\n                at := create2(0, add(creation, 32), mload(creation), salt)\n            }\n            require(at != address(0), \"create2 failed\");\n            return TaxyHook(at);\n        }\n        revert(\"no salt\");\n    }\n\n    receive() external payable {}\n}","reproduction":"State: fresh PoolManager (native balance 0), TaxyToken, TaxyHook deployed by CREATE2 at an address with low 14 bits 0x20cc, pool PoolKey(currency0=address(0), currency1=t4, fee=3000, tickSpacing=60, hooks=hook) initialized at sqrtPriceX96 2^96, one token-only position ModifyLiquidityParams(-600, -60, 1_000_000e18) added through an ordinary router (delta.amount0 == 0, manager balance stays 0). Call: router.swap{value: 1 ether}(key, SwapParams(zeroForOne=true, amountSpecified=-1e18, sqrtPriceLimitX96=MIN_SQRT_PRICE+1)) where the router calls manager.swap and then settles the returned debts. Expected: swap succeeds, buyer delta amount0 == -1e18, recipient 0x047F606fD5b2BaA5f5C6c4aB8958E45CB6B054B7 credited 0.04e18 wei. Actual: beforeSwap returns specified delta +4e16; the AMM swaps 0.96e18 ETH for about 1.0153e18 t4 (Swap event emitted); afterSwap emits SwapFeePaid(gross=1e18, fee=4e16) then calls poolManager.take(address(0), recipient, 4e16); the manager's CALL to the recipient fails OutOfFunds; PoolManager reverts WrappedError(recipient, 0x00000000, 0x, NativeTransferFailed 0xf4b3b1bc); Hooks.callHook wraps it as WrappedError(hook, afterSwap 0xb47b2fb1, ..., HookCallFailed 0xa9e35b2f); the unlock reverts. Same result for the exact-output buy SwapParams(true, 1e18, MIN_SQRT_PRICE+1) (fee 39396614083030472 wei at the 0.9455e18 AMM input). Control: after any party adds an ETH-bearing position (10 ether into ticks -600..600) the identical swap succeeds and the recipient receives exactly 0.04 ether. Ran: forge test --offline --match-path test/scratch/JudgeManagerShortfall.t.sol -> test_exactInputBuyExecutesWhenManagerHoldsNoEth FAIL, test_exactOutputBuyExecutesWhenManagerHoldsNoEth FAIL (both WrappedError(..., 0xb47b2fb1, ..., 0xa9e35b2f) carrying 0xf4b3b1bc), test_controlBuyWorksOnceManagerHoldsEth PASS. The three specialist proofs (Proof_3e88b83658a0, Proof_17b83bede138, Proof_03c990bc2996) were also run from test/scratch and fail for the same reason with their controls passing.","severity":"medium","snippet":"        if (fee != 0) poolManager.take(Currency.wrap(address(0)), FEE_RECIPIENT, fee);","title":"afterSwap pays the fee with PoolManager.take before the buyer settles, so every fee-bearing buy reverts when the manager holds less native ETH than the fee (merged from audit_math, audit_economics, au"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Not a code defect against the brief (\"no one can change it\"), reported as a privileged-actor trust assumption. PoolManager.take performs a checked native CALL to FEE_RECIPIENT with all remaining gas; a revert there reverts the swap, and the recipient address is a constant with no alternate path. Only the recipient can trigger it (deploying non-payable code at that address on a chain where it has none, or an EIP-7702 delegation whose receive reverts). Liquidity add/remove is unaffected (test_liquidityExitRemainsPossibleWhenRecipientRejectsETH). Release check: keep the recipient a plain EOA or payable contract on the launch chain.","line":22,"path":"src/TaxyHook.sol","reproduction":"State: launch pool with liquidity, recipient given code whose receive() reverts: vm.etch(0x047F606fD5b2BaA5f5C6c4aB8958E45CB6B054B7, RejectingRecipient runtime). Call: router.swap{value: 10 ether}(key, SwapParams(true, -10 ether, MIN_SQRT_PRICE+1)). Expected if the pool is to remain usable: swap executes. Actual: afterSwap -> take -> recipient reverts -> NativeTransferFailed -> HookCallFailed, whole swap reverts; after vm.etch(recipient, \"\") the same swap succeeds. This is exactly test_recipientRejectingETHRevertsWholeSwap in test/TaxyHook.t.sol, which passed in the full run (forge test --offline: 71 passed).","severity":"info","snippet":"    address public constant FEE_RECIPIENT = 0x047F606fD5b2BaA5f5C6c4aB8958E45CB6B054B7;","title":"Trust assumption: the immutable fee recipient can halt every fee-bearing swap by refusing ETH; there is no claim or fallback path (from audit_economics)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Inherent to a hook-based tax and consistent with the brief (\"Which pools: v4 pools\" using this hook); the README states it. Reported so the author confirms the pool-scoped guarantee matches intent: TaxyToken is a plain OpenZeppelin ERC20 with no transfer restriction, and TaxyHook._validatePool only constrains pools whose key names this hook, so anyone can initialize PoolKey(ETH, t4, 3000, 60, hooks=address(0)) on the same PoolManager and route volume there with no fee to the recipient. Changing this would require token-level restrictions and is a scope decision outside this review.","line":8,"path":"src/TaxyToken.sol","reproduction":"State: same PoolManager and TaxyToken. Call: manager.initialize(PoolKey(Currency.wrap(address(0)), Currency.wrap(address(t4)), 3000, 60, IHooks(address(0))), 2^96) succeeds without consulting any hook; add ModifyLiquidityParams(-600, 600, 1000 ether) with 100 ETH; router.swap{value: 10 ether}(key, SwapParams(true, -10 ether, MIN_SQRT_PRICE+1)). Expected under \"every t4 swap pays 4%\": recipient +0.4 ether. Actual: delta.amount0 == -10 ether and the recipient balance is unchanged. Ran test/scratch/JudgeHooklessPool.t.sol: test_hooklessPoolPaysNoFee PASS (demonstrates the behaviour on current code).","severity":"info","snippet":"contract TaxyToken is ERC20 {","title":"The 4% fee is enforced only by pools that name this hook; t4 itself imposes nothing, so a hookless ETH/t4 v4 pool (or any other venue) trades tax-free (from audit_economics)"}],"hash":"4f8375627ea7250fa2f1b019250b499781948a0bbf115d8a59542a48fb5500b4","nodeId":"da6a34f2-7656-46d2-a53a-74aaf49cbe1a","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The only file written is `.imd-findings.json`; no source, test, or config was changed and the scratch tests were removed.\n\n**Outcome.** One substantiated defect, two informational trust notes, and a full coverage record.\n\n- **Medium, merged from three specialists.** `afterSwap` pays the fee with `poolManager.take` before the buyer's ETH input is settled. The transfer is funded from whatever ETH the PoolManager already holds, so a solvent buy reverts whenever the manager balance is below the fee. I reproduced it on a fresh manager with a token-only seeded pool: exact-input and exact-output buys both fail with NativeTransferFailed wrapped in HookCallFailed, and the control with ETH in the manager passes. The three specialist proofs all fail here for the same reason. I calibrated it as medium rather than high because no funds are lost, and I noted that the canonical Sepolia and mainnet managers currently hold thousands of ETH, so the precondition does not hold on the launch target today. The attached proof credits either direct ETH or a native ERC-6909 claim, so it passes under either fix shape.\n- **Info.** The immutable recipient can halt fee-bearing swaps by refusing ETH. Reproduced by the existing recipient-rejection test. Reported as a trust assumption, not a defect.\n- **Info.** The fee is hook-scoped. A hookless ETH/t4 pool trades tax-free. Reproduced with a scratch test. Inherent to the brief's design.\n\n**Dropped or rejected.** The slither and aderyn reentrancy leads on the `take` line do not hold. The swap guard stays set across the transfer, a reentrant swap reverts, and `afterSwap` is PoolManager-only. The project suite passes 71 of 71.\n\n**Coverage.** All five listed entry points are answered, plus rows for `beforeInitialize`, the disabled callbacks, the constructor and manifest, the delta-netting invariant, and the rejected static-analysis lead.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1121178,"inputTokens":290,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":29498,"runtime":"claude","turns":29,"wallClockMs":402197}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"02ae6543274731ab","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"The external take boundary assumes that PoolManager already holds at least fee wei. In v4, swap updates accounting before the caller settles its input; a successful ETH-input swap has not yet delivered that ETH when afterSwap executes. An ETH/token pool can legitimately hold only token1 at its upper liquidity tick. With zero pre-existing native reserves, every buy with a positive fee through swap-then-settle ordering reverts in the native transfer, despite sufficient user funds and token liquidity. This is a conditional availability/integration defect, not a loss of principal: the transaction rolls back. It affects ETH exact-input and token exact-output buys and also applies whenever the manager's existing ETH balance is smaller than the fee. SECURITY_REVIEW.md acknowledges pre-settlement as a workaround, but the hook neither supplies nor enforces an integration that provides it. Preserve same-transaction ETH payment by integrating and enforcing a funding step before take (or an atomic settlement/payment flow); relying on unrelated pools' native balances is not a liquidity guarantee.","line":122,"path":"src/TaxyHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {TaxyHook} from \"src/TaxyHook.sol\";\nimport {TaxyToken} from \"src/TaxyToken.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IUnlockCallback} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/callback/IUnlockCallback.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {Hooks} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/Hooks.sol\";\nimport {TickMath} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/TickMath.sol\";\nimport {TransientStateLibrary} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/TransientStateLibrary.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {BalanceDelta} from \"v4-core/src/types/BalanceDelta.sol\";\nimport {ModifyLiquidityParams, SwapParams} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\n\ncontract NativeReserveBoundaryTest is Test, IUnlockCallback {\n    using TransientStateLibrary for IPoolManager;\n\n    address constant RECIPIENT = 0x047F606fD5b2BaA5f5C6c4aB8958E45CB6B054B7;\n    IPoolManager manager;\n    TaxyHook hook;\n    TaxyToken token;\n    PoolKey key;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        manager = IPoolManager(address(new PoolManager(address(this))));\n        token = new TaxyToken();\n        bytes memory creation = abi.encodePacked(type(TaxyHook).creationCode, abi.encode(manager));\n        bytes32 hash = keccak256(creation);\n        for (uint256 i; i < 200_000; ++i) {\n            bytes32 salt = bytes32(i);\n            address predicted = address(uint160(uint256(keccak256(\n                abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0xff), address(this), salt, hash)\n            ))));\n            if ((uint160(predicted) & Hooks.ALL_HOOK_MASK) != 0x20cc) continue;\n            address at;\n            assembly (\"memory-safe\") {\n                at := create2(0, add(creation, 32), mload(creation), salt)\n            }\n            require(at != address(0), \"deployment failed\");\n            hook = TaxyHook(at);\n            break;\n        }\n        require(address(hook) != address(0), \"salt not found\");\n        key = PoolKey(Currency.wrap(address(0)), Currency.wrap(address(token)), 3000, 60, IHooks(address(hook)));\n        manager.initialize(key, TickMath.getSqrtPriceAtTick(600));\n        vm.deal(address(this), 10 ether);\n        // At the upper tick, this valid position requires token1 only.\n        manager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(0), int256(0), false));\n        assertEq(address(manager).balance, 0);\n        assertGt(token.balanceOf(address(manager)), 0);\n    }\n\n    function test_validBuyAtTokenOnlyBoundary() public {\n        uint256 recipientBefore = RECIPIENT.balance;\n        uint256 tokenBefore = token.balanceOf(address(this));\n        uint256 ethBefore = address(this).balance;\n        // Ordinary v4 ordering: swap, then settle the returned input debt.\n        BalanceDelta delta = abi.decode(manager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(1), -int256(1 ether), false)), (BalanceDelta));\n        assertEq(int256(delta.amount0()), -int256(1 ether));\n        assertGt(token.balanceOf(address(this)), tokenBefore);\n        assertEq(ethBefore - address(this).balance, 1 ether);\n        assertEq(RECIPIENT.balance - recipientBefore, 0.04 ether);\n        assertEq(address(manager).balance, 0.96 ether);\n        assertEq(manager.getNonzeroDeltaCount(), 0);\n    }\n\n    function test_controlSameBuyWithNativePreSettlement() public {\n        uint256 recipientBefore = RECIPIENT.balance;\n        uint256 tokenBefore = token.balanceOf(address(this));\n        BalanceDelta delta = abi.decode(manager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(1), -int256(1 ether), true)), (BalanceDelta));\n        assertEq(int256(delta.amount0()), -int256(1 ether));\n        assertGt(token.balanceOf(address(this)), tokenBefore);\n        assertEq(RECIPIENT.balance - recipientBefore, 0.04 ether);\n        assertEq(address(manager).balance, 0.96 ether);\n        assertEq(manager.getNonzeroDeltaCount(), 0);\n    }\n\n    function test_tokenExactOutputAtTokenOnlyBoundary() public {\n        uint256 recipientBefore = RECIPIENT.balance;\n        BalanceDelta delta = abi.decode(manager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(1), int256(1 ether), false)), (BalanceDelta));\n        assertEq(int256(delta.amount1()), int256(1 ether));\n        assertEq(RECIPIENT.balance - recipientBefore, uint256(-int256(delta.amount0())) / 25);\n        assertEq(manager.getNonzeroDeltaCount(), 0);\n    }\n\n    function unlockCallback(bytes calldata data) external returns (bytes memory) {\n        require(msg.sender == address(manager), \"manager only\");\n        (uint8 action, int256 amount, bool preSettle) = abi.decode(data, (uint8, int256, bool));\n        BalanceDelta delta;\n        if (action == 0) {\n            (delta,) = manager.modifyLiquidity(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(-600, 600, 1000 ether, bytes32(0)), \"\");\n        } else {\n            if (preSettle) {\n                manager.sync(key.currency0);\n                manager.settle{value: 1 ether}();\n            }\n            delta = manager.swap(key, SwapParams(true, amount, TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1), \"\");\n        }\n        _settle(key.currency0);\n        _settle(key.currency1);\n        return abi.encode(delta);\n    }\n\n    function _settle(Currency currency) internal {\n        int256 debt = manager.currencyDelta(address(this), currency);\n        if (debt < 0) {\n            uint256 amount = uint256(-debt);\n            manager.sync(currency);\n            if (Currency.unwrap(currency) == address(0)) {\n                manager.settle{value: amount}();\n            } else {\n                token.transfer(address(manager), amount);\n                manager.settle();\n            }\n        } else if (debt > 0) {\n            manager.take(currency, address(this), uint256(debt));\n        }\n    }\n\n    receive() external payable {}\n}","reproduction":"Deploy the real vendored PoolManager, TaxyToken and a TaxyHook at matching flags 0x20cc. Initialize PoolKey(currency0=address(0), currency1=address(token), fee=3000, tickSpacing=60, hooks=hook) at TickMath.getSqrtPriceAtTick(600). During an unlock, add ModifyLiquidityParams(-600,600,1000 ether,bytes32(0)) and settle its token debt. This deposits exactly 60005999255049926843 token units and zero ETH; manager.balance is 0. Give the caller 10 ETH. In a fresh unlock, call manager.swap(key, SwapParams(true,-1 ether,4295128740),hex\"\"), intending to settle the returned ETH debt and take token output before returning from unlockCallback. The AMM fully executes with nativeDelta=-960000000000000000 and tokenDelta=1015300589089480076. afterSwap computes fee=40000000000000000 and calls take(native,recipient,fee) while manager.balance is still zero. The ETH CALL fails OutOfFunds, wrapped as NativeTransferFailed/HookCallFailed, so the whole swap reverts. Expected: debit 1 ETH, deliver the quoted tokens, pay 0.04 ETH to the fixed recipient and leave 0.96 ETH in the manager. The control test makes the identical trade after sync(native); settle{value:1 ether}() within the same unlock and succeeds with exactly those balances, demonstrating that liquidity, price limits and arithmetic are not the cause. A separate SwapParams(true,1 ether,4295128740) token-exact-output test fails at the same take boundary. Ran forge test --match-path test/scratch/NativeReserveBoundary.t.sol: both unprefunded buys fail, the prefunded control passes.","severity":"medium","snippet":"        if (fee != 0) poolManager.take(Currency.wrap(address(0)), FEE_RECIPIENT, fee);","title":"Paying the input-side ETH fee before settlement rejects valid buys at low native reserves"}],"hash":"561d1b84d5b0d11e66212b9111ecab5c9d5f48228718a99d6394d8940639cc21","nodeId":"b256023e-8f6c-4f88-ae69-aac5780db4af","outcome":"completed","summary":"Recorded one medium finding in [.imd-findings.json](.imd-findings.json): valid buys revert when PoolManager lacks ETH before input settlement.\n\nAll five entry points covered. Existing tests: 38 passed. Targeted reproduction: two failing buys; prefunded control passed.\n\nProduction files unchanged.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":792320,"inputTokens":96501,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":9769,"runtime":"codex","turns":5,"wallClockMs":340728}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"197eaef74d74eb0af34c9ece6a62491cedd567ed2c3786cde25824a03aa608b0","device":"0256823ae36e7900","findings":[],"hash":"5959f086211ea1847201707590d13bb76b19978164b041e386232e344bb51fbb","nodeId":"773a048f-4231-4691-bc31-4600a25f4e84","outcome":"completed","summary":"Added five test suites under `test/` covering fee accounting, callback failures, settlement rollback, token edge cases, and multi-actor invariants.\n\n- `forge build`: passed\n- `forge test`: **71 passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped**\n- New fuzz tests: 1,000 runs each\n- New invariant campaigns: 256 × 64 calls\n\nNo reproducible defect found. Checks ran offline; live-chain fork testing remains outstanding.","treeHash":"e1ef16f069698da020454d626592fe0e97e8bf1c","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2046080,"inputTokens":72623,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":11380,"runtime":"codex","turns":6,"wallClockMs":551348}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"0256823ae36e7900","findings":[],"hash":"7324c271707f5be816e8badcdfea4a19510ea36c4f66340c2411d94625f4953c","nodeId":"773a048f-4231-4691-bc31-4600a25f4e84","outcome":"failed","summary":"This content was flagged for possible cybersecurity risk. If this seems wrong, try rephrasing your request. If you’re doing authorized security work that requires more cyber permissive safeguards, apply for Daybreak access via https://platform.openai.com/settings/organization/status-and-access before retrying.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":0,"inputTokens":0,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":0,"runtime":"codex","turns":3,"wallClockMs":245179}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"35c52a5b502e847c","findings":[],"hash":"77c91c473ba0a2c6ce67a4c2765af1c443a5882c8058b56d548880fd0a355b03","nodeId":"614d6774-c6f6-4e02-a7c5-fa980c05471a","outcome":"completed","summary":"Saved [.imd-findings.json](/home/identitymd5/.identitymd/work/96fd49b6-af35-4421-9328-40c9358fab4f/614d6774-c6f6-4e02-a7c5-fa980c05471a/.imd-findings.json).\n\nNo substantiated defects in the assigned area. All five entry points covered; 47 tests passed, including nine protected tests. Production files unchanged. Deployment-specific verification remains unperformed.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1058688,"inputTokens":99530,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":6449,"runtime":"codex","turns":5,"wallClockMs":234464}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"0c70befd3fb0c0f60a25d2a3de3ea893892e6c68516c4b777496d799a6544e71","device":"98b4506bef931d13","findings":[],"hash":"7a43ccda6eaa064ade2b2235d9c7642394d86460b45016bd5764445c36dce33b","nodeId":"4d9601d4-222f-481c-925b-5470be166a57","outcome":"completed","summary":"Done. `launch.json` is written and is the only change in the working tree.\n\n**What the manifest declares**\n\n- Hook `TaxyHook`, constructor argument written as `\"$poolManager\"`, permissions beforeInitialize, beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta, afterSwapReturnDelta. These are exactly what `getHookPermissions` returns and encode to the 0x20cc flags the constructor validates.\n- Token `TaxyToken`, name taxy, symbol t4, 18 decimals.\n- Pool paired with native ETH at the zero address, LP fee 3000, tick spacing 60. This is the configuration the README names and the test suite exercises.\n- initialPrice is sqrtPriceX96 for 100,000,000 t4 per ETH, computed as 10000 times 2^96. The hook does not read the price, so the choice is a launch starting point only. The notes say this and that local tests use 1:1.\n- Notes at 2526 characters describe the fee mechanics, immutability, pool restrictions, address mining and settlement caveats.\n\n**Verification**\n\n- The manifest validates against the schema from the reference with the jsonschema library, and the first key is the `kind` discriminator.\n- The protected hook and token tests were run in scratch against the real creation code with flags 8396 and decimals 18 from the manifest. All 9 passed.\n- The full repository suite ran offline from a clean build with an empty environment. All 38 tests passed.\n- `git status --porcelain` shows only the untracked `launch.json`. Scratch files were removed.\n\nI did not commit, since the task did not ask for one.","treeHash":"4f09ef641439d2338079c2bf9fdf969f67a46153","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":457336,"inputTokens":226,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":7320,"runtime":"claude","turns":8,"wallClockMs":112433}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"f9fd2203e230ea1d223454dfb94966c73939d50f1ac38b7714d59c8a125dc75a","device":"0256823ae36e7900","findings":[],"hash":"961bbd8f0a03d1e8ec6eba0d334a09f7e751480fd00d7ab9e238da9ece38d592","nodeId":"5b0991b6-b438-402b-8151-7f5469d8b53e","outcome":"completed","summary":"Implemented the immutable 4% ETH fee hook and **taxy (t4)** token with a fixed 1 billion supply. Fees go directly to the requested recipient during swaps.\n\nVerified: `forge build`, `forge test` (**38 passed**, including fuzz and 2,048 invariant swaps), and `forge fmt --check`.\n\nSupports native ETH/token v4 pools. ETH-specified partial fills revert. Deployment parameters and operational responsibilities are documented in [README.md](/home/imd-worker/.identitymd/work/96fd49b6-af35-4421-9328-40c9358fab4f/5b0991b6-b438-402b-8151-7f5469d8b53e/README.md).","treeHash":"168febccfbc8439b39f95cb804a6fe286b2d66a6","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2086016,"inputTokens":73877,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":15223,"runtime":"codex","turns":6,"wallClockMs":580615}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"03f15d1296244279","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Settlement of advisory 2f8589dfc9c0: confirmed and kept as a documented trust assumption, not a defect; the author's dispute is accepted and no change is required. The revision narrows it: when address(poolManager).balance < fee the hook now mints a native ERC-6909 claim to FEE_RECIPIENT with no ETH call, so a rejecting recipient only reverts swaps while the manager holds at least the fee in ETH (the common state once any buyer has settled). Only the recipient can trigger it (non-payable code or an EIP-7702 delegation at 0x047F606fD5b2BaA5f5C6c4aB8958E45CB6B054B7). Operational consequence of the fix the recipient must own: claims minted in a shortfall sit at poolManager.balanceOf(recipient, 0) and are redeemed only by an unlock that burns them and takes ETH; no vendored library carries such a router (lib has no BURN_6909 action), so the recipient needs a small reviewed contract plus an ERC-6909 allowance. README and docs/SECURITY_REVIEW.md state both points. Release check: keep the recipient a plain EOA or payable contract on the launch chain and rehearse claim redemption before launch.","line":130,"path":"src/TaxyHook.sol","reproduction":"State: fresh PoolManager, launch pool ETH/t4 fee 3000 spacing 60 at sqrtPrice 2^96, token-only seed ModifyLiquidityParams(-600,-60,1_000_000e18), vm.etch(0x047F606fD5b2BaA5f5C6c4aB8958E45CB6B054B7, code whose receive() reverts). Call 1: router.swap{value:1 ether}(key, SwapParams(true,-1e18,MIN_SQRT_PRICE+1)) with manager balance 0. Actual (revised code): swap executes, delta.amount0 == -1e18, manager.balanceOf(recipient,0) == 0.04e18, recipient.balance unchanged, hook holds 0 claims and 0 delta. Call 2: the same swap now that the manager holds 1 ETH >= fee. Actual: take -> recipient reverts -> NativeTransferFailed wrapped in HookCallFailed, whole swap reverts; after vm.etch(recipient, \"\") it succeeds and the recipient receives 0.04 ether. Ran: forge test --offline --match-path test/scratch/JudgeRound2.t.sol -> test_rejectingRecipientDoesNotBlockClaimPath PASS; delivered test_recipientRejectingETHRevertsWholeSwap and test_liquidityExitRemainsPossibleWhenRecipientRejectsETH PASS in the full run (90 passed).","severity":"info","snippet":"                poolManager.take(Currency.wrap(address(0)), FEE_RECIPIENT, fee);","title":"Trust assumption (unchanged, now narrower): the immutable fee recipient can still halt fee-bearing swaps on the direct-payment branch by refusing ETH, and must operate its own claim redemption"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Settlement of advisory 150f403c1231: confirmed unchanged and kept as an accepted design note, not a defect; the author's dispute is accepted and no change is required. TaxyToken is a plain OpenZeppelin v5.1.0 ERC20 with no transfer restriction and TaxyHook._validatePool only constrains pools whose key names this hook, so anyone can initialize PoolKey(ETH, t4, 3000, 60, hooks=address(0)) on the same PoolManager and route volume there with no fee to the recipient. Consistent with the brief ('Which pools: v4 pools' using this hook) and stated in README and docs/SECURITY_REVIEW.md. Changing it would require token-level restrictions outside the brief.","line":8,"path":"src/TaxyToken.sol","reproduction":"State: same PoolManager and TaxyToken as the launch. Call: manager.initialize(PoolKey(Currency.wrap(address(0)), Currency.wrap(address(t4)), 3000, 60, IHooks(address(0))), 2^96) succeeds without consulting any hook; add ModifyLiquidityParams(-600, 600, 1000 ether) with ETH; router.swap{value: 10 ether}(key, SwapParams(true, -10 ether, MIN_SQRT_PRICE+1)). Expected under 'every t4 swap pays 4%': recipient +0.4 ether. Actual: delta.amount0 == -10 ether and recipient balance and claims unchanged. The author reproduced the same in their round-one scratch test (AdvisoryHooklessPool.t.sol:test_hooklessPoolPaysNoFee); src/TaxyToken.sol and _validatePool are unchanged in this revision (git diff HEAD~4 -- src/).","severity":"info","snippet":"contract TaxyToken is ERC20 {","title":"The 4% fee is enforced only by pools that name this hook; t4 itself imposes nothing, so a hookless ETH/t4 v4 pool (or any other venue) trades tax-free"}],"hash":"bac924c1c0482a3ea9ba37614a3f025e2ae54d0fc08ba9d928295733bc5dd3d1","nodeId":"da6a34f2-7656-46d2-a53a-74aaf49cbe1a","outcome":"completed","summary":"The round-one medium finding is fixed, and I have nothing new that blocks this launch. The findings file holds two unchanged informational trust assumptions plus the coverage record.\n\n**Settled finding (medium, fee take before buyer settlement).** Fixed. The revised afterSwap mints a native ERC-6909 claim to the fixed recipient when the manager holds less ETH than the fee, and otherwise takes ETH as before. I traced PoolManager.mint and take: both charge the hook the identical debt, which the returned hook delta cancels, and the ERC-6909 mint has no receiver callback. My attached proof, copied under test/scratch and run on the revised code, passes all three cases. The three specialist proofs now fail only because they assert the recipient's ETH balance rises; the swap executes and the fee is credited as a claim, which is the option (a) I offered last round. All 90 delivered tests pass offline.\n\n**Settled advisories (both info, no change needed).**\n- **Recipient can halt swaps by refusing ETH.** Still true but narrower: a rejecting recipient no longer blocks buys while the manager is ETH-poor, since the claim branch makes no ETH call. I confirmed this with a scratch test. The recipient now also carries the duty to redeem claims with its own burn-and-take contract, since no vendored router can burn ERC-6909 claims. The README documents both.\n- **Hookless ETH/t4 pools trade tax-free.** Unchanged token and pool validation; accepted as inherent to a hook-scoped fee.\n\n**Coverage.** All five entry points hold. Static-analysis reentrancy leads on afterSwap were rejected again: the swap guard stays set through the recipient call and mint has no callback. The manifest matches the constructor, permissions, token metadata and a valid initial price.\n\nScratch tests were removed. The only file I wrote is .imd-findings.json.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":967528,"inputTokens":322,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":20230,"runtime":"claude","turns":23,"wallClockMs":389487}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":2,"bundleHash":null,"device":"3c7630b22a73c1fb","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"afterSwap runs inside PoolManager.swap, i.e. before the router settles the swapper's ETH debt. The hook pays the recipient immediately via poolManager.take, whose native transfer is funded from the PoolManager's current ETH balance (all native pools' reserves), not from the current buyer. If that balance is below the fee, CurrencyLibrary.transfer fails (NativeTransferFailed, 0xf4b3b1bc) and the whole swap reverts. The state is reachable on a manager with little or no native ETH: a fresh/non-canonical PoolManager, or a launch whose factory seeds a token-only (currency1-only, below-price) position so the pool starts with zero ETH. In that state no buy with gross >= 25 wei can execute until some unrelated party deposits ETH into the manager (another native pool's liquidity, or a router that pre-settles native credit before calling swap). Sells are unaffected because the ETH they pay out already sits in the manager. On the canonical Ethereum/Base/Arbitrum PoolManagers the pooled balance is large, so the failing condition there requires a single swap whose 4% fee exceeds all native reserves held by the manager; the README documents the precondition. Flow-gap seam: execution x periphery x first principles (the trace is internally balanced; the periphery call depends on third-party liquidity; the guarantee 'swaps pay 4% and execute' breaks). No fund loss; availability only, hence low. Fix options need a scope decision: (a) keep immediate payment and have the launch factory seed ETH (two-sided liquidity) or require routers to pre-settle; (b) fall back to poolManager.mint(FEE_RECIPIENT, 0, fee) (ERC-6909 claim) when address(poolManager).balance < fee, which keeps the hook delta-neutral but changes 'sends ETH on the swap' to 'credits a claim in that edge case'.","line":122,"path":"src/TaxyHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {IUnlockCallback} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/callback/IUnlockCallback.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {BalanceDelta} from \"v4-core/src/types/BalanceDelta.sol\";\nimport {ModifyLiquidityParams, SwapParams} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\nimport {Hooks} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/Hooks.sol\";\nimport {TickMath} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/TickMath.sol\";\nimport {IERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol\";\nimport {TaxyHook} from \"src/TaxyHook.sol\";\nimport {TaxyToken} from \"src/TaxyToken.sol\";\n\n/// @dev Minimal router: swap, then settle every debt (ETH via settle{value}, token via transferFrom).\ncontract ScratchRouter is IUnlockCallback {\n    IPoolManager immutable manager;\n\n    constructor(IPoolManager m) {\n        manager = m;\n    }\n\n    struct Data {\n        address payer;\n        bool isSwap;\n        PoolKey key;\n        SwapParams s;\n        ModifyLiquidityParams l;\n    }\n\n    function swap(PoolKey memory key, SwapParams memory p) external payable returns (BalanceDelta d) {\n        d = abi.decode(manager.unlock(abi.encode(Data(msg.sender, true, key, p, ModifyLiquidityParams(0, 0, 0, 0)))), (BalanceDelta));\n        uint256 r = address(this).balance;\n        if (r != 0) {\n            (bool ok,) = msg.sender.call{value: r}(\"\");\n            require(ok);\n        }\n    }\n\n    function modifyLiquidity(PoolKey memory key, ModifyLiquidityParams memory p) external payable returns (BalanceDelta d) {\n        d = abi.decode(manager.unlock(abi.encode(Data(msg.sender, false, key, SwapParams(false, 0, 0), p))), (BalanceDelta));\n        uint256 r = address(this).balance;\n        if (r != 0) {\n            (bool ok,) = msg.sender.call{value: r}(\"\");\n            require(ok);\n        }\n    }\n\n    function unlockCallback(bytes calldata raw) external returns (bytes memory) {\n        require(msg.sender == address(manager));\n        Data memory d = abi.decode(raw, (Data));\n        BalanceDelta delta;\n        if (d.isSwap) delta = manager.swap(d.key, d.s, \"\");\n        else (delta,) = manager.modifyLiquidity(d.key, d.l, \"\");\n        _settle(d.key.currency0, d.payer, delta.amount0());\n        _settle(d.key.currency1, d.payer, delta.amount1());\n        return abi.encode(delta);\n    }\n\n    function _settle(Currency c, address payer, int128 amt) internal {\n        if (amt > 0) {\n            manager.take(c, payer, uint256(int256(amt)));\n        } else if (amt < 0) {\n            uint256 debt = uint256(-int256(amt));\n            manager.sync(c);\n            if (Currency.unwrap(c) == address(0)) {\n                manager.settle{value: debt}();\n            } else {\n                IERC20(Currency.unwrap(c)).transferFrom(payer, address(manager), debt);\n                manager.settle();\n            }\n        }\n    }\n\n    receive() external payable {}\n}\n\ncontract FreshManagerFirstBuyTest is Test {\n    address constant RECIPIENT = 0x047F606fD5b2BaA5f5C6c4aB8958E45CB6B054B7;\n    uint160 constant FLAGS = 0x20cc;\n    uint160 constant ONE = 79228162514264337593543950336;\n\n    IPoolManager manager;\n    TaxyHook hook;\n    TaxyToken token;\n    ScratchRouter router;\n    PoolKey key;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        manager = IPoolManager(address(new PoolManager(address(this))));\n        token = new TaxyToken();\n        hook = _deployHook();\n        router = new ScratchRouter(manager);\n        key = PoolKey(Currency.wrap(address(0)), Currency.wrap(address(token)), 3000, 60, IHooks(address(hook)));\n        manager.initialize(key, ONE);\n        token.approve(address(router), type(uint256).max);\n        vm.deal(address(this), 1000 ether);\n        // Launch-style seed: token-only (currency1-only) position strictly below the current price\n        // (tick 0). The pool therefore starts with zero ETH; the manager's native balance is zero.\n        router.modifyLiquidity(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(-6000, -60, 1_000_000 ether, bytes32(0)));\n        assertEq(address(manager).balance, 0, \"manager starts with no ETH\");\n    }\n\n    function _deployHook() internal returns (TaxyHook deployed) {\n        bytes memory creation = abi.encodePacked(type(TaxyHook).creationCode, abi.encode(manager));\n        bytes32 hash = keccak256(creation);\n        for (uint256 i; i < 200_000; ++i) {\n            bytes32 salt = bytes32(i);\n            address predicted =\n                address(uint160(uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0xff), address(this), salt, hash)))));\n            if (uint160(predicted) & Hooks.ALL_HOOK_MASK != FLAGS) continue;\n            address at;\n            assembly (\"memory-safe\") {\n                at := create2(0, add(creation, 32), mload(creation), salt)\n            }\n            require(at != address(0));\n            return TaxyHook(at);\n        }\n        revert(\"no salt\");\n    }\n\n    /// The first buyer pays 1 ETH exact-in. The fee (0.04 ETH) is `take`n in afterSwap before the\n    /// buyer's ETH is settled, out of a manager that holds 0 ETH. Expected: swap succeeds and\n    /// recipient receives 0.04 ETH. Actual on current code: NativeTransferFailed, every buy reverts.\n    function test_firstBuyOnFreshManagerSucceeds() public {\n        uint256 before = RECIPIENT.balance;\n        router.swap{value: 1 ether}(key, SwapParams(true, -1 ether, TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1));\n        assertEq(RECIPIENT.balance - before, 0.04 ether);\n    }\n\n    // Control: a buy succeeds once the manager holds ETH from some other source.\n    function test_buyWorksOnceManagerHoldsETH() public {\n        // Someone seeds ETH into a different full-range position so the manager has native balance.\n        router.modifyLiquidity{value: 10 ether}(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(-600, 600, 100 ether, bytes32(0)));\n        assertGt(address(manager).balance, 0);\n        uint256 before = RECIPIENT.balance;\n        router.swap{value: 1 ether}(key, SwapParams(true, -1 ether, TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1));\n        assertEq(RECIPIENT.balance - before, 0.04 ether);\n    }\n\n    receive() external payable {}\n}","reproduction":"State: fresh PoolManager (native balance 0), TaxyHook mined at flags 0x20cc, ETH/t4 pool initialised at sqrtPrice 2^96, one token-only position ModifyLiquidityParams(-6000, -60, 1_000_000 ether) so the pool holds 0 ETH. Call: router.swap{value: 1 ether}(key, SwapParams(true, -1 ether, MIN_SQRT_PRICE+1)) through any router that settles after swap. Expected: swap executes, recipient 0x047F...54B7 receives 0.04 ether, buyer receives ~0.951 t4. Actual: afterSwap -> PoolManager.take(ETH, recipient, 0.04 ether) -> call to recipient fails OutOfFunds -> NativeTransferFailed wrapped in HookCallFailed; entire swap reverts. Control: after any party adds an ETH-bearing position (10 ether into ticks -600..600) the same swap succeeds and pays 0.04 ether. Proof file test/scratch/FreshManagerFirstBuy.t.sol: test_firstBuyOnFreshManagerSucceeds FAILS on current code, test_buyWorksOnceManagerHoldsETH passes.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (fee != 0) poolManager.take(Currency.wrap(address(0)), FEE_RECIPIENT, fee);","title":"Fee is paid from the PoolManager's pooled native balance before the buyer settles, so a manager holding less ETH than the fee rejects every fee-bearing buy"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Economic-security lens: the brief says the hook 'charges 4% on swaps' and 'no one can change it', but the enforcement point is the pool key, not the token. TaxyToken is a plain OpenZeppelin ERC20 with no transfer restriction, and TaxyHook._validatePool only checks that pools *using this hook* are native/static-fee. Anyone can initialise PoolKey(ETH, t4, 3000, 60, hooks=address(0)) on the same PoolManager (or any WETH/t4 pool, or a v3/v2 pool) and LPs/traders who prefer the untaxed venue will migrate there; the recipient then collects nothing on that volume. This is inherent to a hook-based (rather than token-based) tax and the README states it. It is reported so the author can confirm the pool-scoped guarantee matches intent; it is not a code defect in the hook. If the intent is that *all* t4 swaps pay 4%, the design must change (e.g. token-level transfer restriction to a whitelisted pool, or the hook's beforeAddLiquidity gating), which is a scope decision outside this review.","line":8,"path":"src/TaxyToken.sol","reproduction":"State: same PoolManager and TaxyToken as the launch. Call: manager.initialize(PoolKey(Currency.wrap(address(0)), Currency.wrap(address(t4)), 3000, 60, IHooks(address(0))), 2^96) — succeeds (no hook consulted). Add liquidity ModifyLiquidityParams(-600, 600, 1000 ether) with 100 ETH, then router.swap{value: 10 ether}(key, SwapParams(true, -10 ether, MIN_SQRT_PRICE+1)). Expected under 'every t4 swap pays 4%': recipient +0.4 ether. Actual: delta.amount0 == -10 ether, recipient balance unchanged (0 fee). Reproduced in test/scratch/HooklessPool.t.sol (passes on current code, i.e. demonstrates the behaviour).","severity":"info","snippet":"contract TaxyToken is ERC20 {","title":"The 4% fee is enforced only in pools that include this hook; t4 itself imposes nothing, so a hookless ETH/t4 v4 pool (or WETH/t4, v3, v2) trades tax-free"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Economic-security 'break dependencies' lens, documented as a privileged-actor trust assumption rather than a defect. PoolManager.take performs a checked native call to the recipient; a revert there reverts the swap. The recipient is immutable and there is no claim/mint fallback. Verified present state (2026-10-01, via cast code): the address has NO code on Ethereum, Base, Arbitrum One, Optimism and Unichain and holds small ETH balances on four of them, so today it is a plain EOA and swaps will succeed. The residual risk is that only the recipient (a trusted party) can trigger it: by delegating the EOA under EIP-7702 to code whose receive() reverts, or by deploying a non-payable contract there on a chain where it has none yet. Impact: all swaps with gross >= 25 wei on every pool using this hook revert; liquidity add/remove still works (test_liquidityExitRemainsPossibleWhenRecipientRejectsETH). No unprivileged amplifier exists, so per the validation gates this stays informational. Recommended release check: keep the recipient a plain EOA (or a payable contract) on the launch chain and monitor for delegation.","line":22,"path":"src/TaxyHook.sol","reproduction":"State: launch pool with liquidity. Make the recipient reject ETH: vm.etch(0x047F606fD5b2BaA5f5C6c4aB8958E45CB6B054B7, code of a contract whose receive() reverts) — equivalent on-chain to a 7702 delegation by the recipient. Call: router.swap{value: 10 ether}(key, SwapParams(true, -10 ether, MIN_SQRT_PRICE+1)). Expected (for the pool to remain usable): swap executes. Actual: afterSwap -> take -> recipient reverts -> NativeTransferFailed -> whole swap reverts; identical for exact-output buys and both sell modes. Existing test test_recipientRejectingETHRevertsWholeSwap in test/TaxyHook.t.sol shows this exact path.","severity":"info","snippet":"    address public constant FEE_RECIPIENT = 0x047F606fD5b2BaA5f5C6c4aB8958E45CB6B054B7;","title":"Trust assumption: the immutable fee recipient can halt every fee-bearing swap by refusing ETH (smart-account or EIP-7702 delegation); no fallback path exists"}],"hash":"bd75aec77da0949e7b0468d0c433c45fd21baa2cf37d6ffe52776416bf520013","nodeId":"6b096257-2236-4558-92e2-fe48f158dc9f","outcome":"completed","summary":"All three snippets match the tree, the proof test fails on the current code for the stated reason, and no tracked files changed. The review is complete.\n\n## Review result\n\nThe hook's economics hold up. I traced all four swap modes (exact ETH in, exact token out, exact token in, exact ETH out) through the vendored Hooks library and PoolManager. In every mode the hook's `take` debt is cancelled exactly by its returned delta, the trader absorbs the fee, and the fee equals floor(gross ETH / 25). The gross-up identity for the two \"divide by 24\" modes is exact, and buy-side modes are economically symmetric. The Slither and Aderyn reentrancy leads do not survive: a re-entered swap on any pool using this hook reverts in `beforeSwap`, and `afterSwap` is unreachable without it.\n\nI wrote three findings to `.imd-findings.json`, none above low:\n\n- **Low, with a failing proof.** The fee is taken from the PoolManager's pooled native balance before the buyer settles. On a manager holding less ETH than the fee (a fresh or non-canonical manager, or a launch seeded with a token-only position), every buy reverts with `NativeTransferFailed` until someone else deposits ETH. The proof test in `test/scratch/FreshManagerFirstBuy.t.sol` fails on the current code and its control passes once the manager holds ETH. The README documents the precondition, and canonical managers hold large balances, so this is availability-only and conditional.\n- **Info.** The 4% is pool-scoped. A hookless ETH/t4 pool trades tax-free, reproduced in a scratch test. This is inherent to a hook-based tax and is flagged for intent confirmation, not as a code defect.\n- **Info.** The immutable recipient can halt all fee-bearing swaps by refusing ETH. I checked the address on Ethereum, Base, Arbitrum, Optimism and Unichain. It has no code and holds balances, so it is a live EOA today. The residual risk is recipient-only (EIP-7702 delegation) and is recorded as a trust assumption.\n\nThe coverage record answers all five listed entry points plus `beforeInitialize`, six invariants and behaviours I traced, and one honest `unreached` row: a fork rehearsal against a canonical PoolManager with real routers, which no-fork rules prevented. I reasoned about Universal Router and V4Router settlement from their source semantics only.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1673574,"inputTokens":450,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":39513,"runtime":"claude","turns":35,"wallClockMs":505476}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"05778e691c371384","findings":[],"hash":"c3ba04503bc6a09fe3b6f8fe39222b2f50ade42bc072c9d133ca6ac7f1b5377e","nodeId":"d2f45f5c-3116-45ef-aa26-483791ac7d06","outcome":"failed","summary":"This content was flagged for possible cybersecurity risk. If this seems wrong, try rephrasing your request. If you’re doing authorized security work that requires more cyber permissive safeguards, apply for Daybreak access via https://platform.openai.com/settings/organization/status-and-access before retrying.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":0,"inputTokens":0,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":0,"runtime":"codex","turns":2,"wallClockMs":131831}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":2,"bundleHash":"31838c97e4b53a7bff746ae3980d8fb4d6e5320940308aab0f661563aae43243","device":"3c7630b22a73c1fb","findings":[],"hash":"d89acf68adf5d47aecc326547ae0415233e2a48748088684a84ab32d4a827fa6","nodeId":"773a048f-4231-4691-bc31-4600a25f4e84","outcome":"completed","summary":"Done. The suite now has 100 passing tests, up from 81, and nothing outside `test/` changed.\n\n**What I found about the rejected round.** Nothing from it survived, and the accepted tree passed under every fuzz seed I tried, so the fault was in whatever that round added. This revision is a single new file plus a README paragraph, written to be deterministic: no environment reads, no FFI, no filesystem, no fork, and a handler that never reverts unexpectedly.\n\n**What the new file covers.** The implementer's latest commit added a native-claim fallback in response to my earlier manager-balance shortfall finding: when the PoolManager holds less ETH than the fee, the hook mints the recipient an ERC-6909 ETH claim instead of transferring. Only the implementer's own tests touched that path, and none drove it through random sequences. `test/TaxyClaimFallback.t.sol` adds:\n\n- **An invariant campaign** on the real PoolManager over a token-only launch pool that starts with no ETH. Random buys, sells, recipient redemptions and LP changes move the manager's balance across the fee threshold. The handler predicts the branch from the balance before each call and records only observed payments. Invariants: every fee is paid exactly once as ETH or as a claim, only the recipient ever holds native claims, manager ETH always covers outstanding claims, and after every LP exits the recipient can redeem everything and ends with exactly 4% of every gross amount.\n- **Failure paths inside the campaign**: over-redemption refused on every redeem call, unfillable exact-ETH-output sells refused with the hook's own `PartialFillNotSupported` and no state change, price-limit refusals once the pool is drained, and partial token sells allowed only when the pool has no ETH left.\n- **Edge tests**: a 24-wei buy at zero ETH mints nothing and emits no claim event; the claim branch emits both events with equal fees; a direct payment drawn from ETH that backs an earlier claim is restored by the buyer's settlement, and rolled back when the buyer cannot settle; a third party cannot transfer or burn the recipient's claims; a near-complete drain leaves claims backed and redeemable.\n- **A 1000-run fuzz** over arbitrary manager balances confirming the branch is selected by balance versus fee alone.\n\nI measured branch coverage across 16 seeded campaigns after rebalancing the handler. Every campaign hit the claim branch, redemptions, refused exact-output sells and partial fills, so the invariant is not vacuous.\n\n**Defects.** I found none in the fallback path, so I did not write a findings file. One limitation remains documented rather than fixable by tests: a recipient contract that rejects ETH still halts swaps on the direct-payment branch. The implementer's security review already records this.\n\n**Verification.** `forge build` succeeds. `forge test` passes 100 tests under the default seed and seeds 0, 17 and 4242. The new file alone passes under eight further seeds.","treeHash":"05e2ec7d34a9f7f053d216c35626d1a79ef04e4f","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":3240659,"inputTokens":770,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":72706,"runtime":"claude","turns":39,"wallClockMs":1132767}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"720122d0ca9f60ca","findings":[],"hash":"d9322e6643cb0dc5c996d5ca6f3bb02d3d70b1f91b607182eefabb1c569a0302","nodeId":"6b096257-2236-4558-92e2-fe48f158dc9f","outcome":"failed","summary":"Your access token could not be refreshed because your refresh token was already used. Please log out and sign in again.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":0,"inputTokens":0,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":0,"runtime":"codex","turns":0,"wallClockMs":10304}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":2283,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 83 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 2.15s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:85:47\n   │\n85 │             if (params.amountSpecified > 0 && uint256(params.amountSpecified) + fee > MAX_AMOUNT) {\n   │                                               ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `swapping` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:127:17\n    │\n127 │                 poolManager.mint(FEE_RECIPIENT, 0, fee);\n    │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `swapping` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:130:17\n    │\n130 │                 poolManager.take(Currency.wrap(address(0)), FEE_RECIPIENT, fee);\n    │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:128:17\n    │\n128 │                 emit SwapFeeClaimMinted(key.toId(), fee);\n    │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:107:57\n    │\n107 │             if (nativeDelta != params.amountSpecified + int256(fee)) revert PartialFillNotSupported();\n    │                                                         ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:112:23\n    │\n112 │                 fee = uint256(-nativeDelta) / 24;\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:115:23\n    │\n115 │                 fee = uint256(nativeDelta) / 25;\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:119:45\n    │\n119 │         uint256 gross = params.zeroForOne ? uint256(-nativeDelta) + fee : uint256(nativeDelta);\n    │                                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:119:75\n    │\n119 │         uint256 gross = params.zeroForOne ? uint256(-nativeDelta) + fee : uint256(nativeDelta);\n    │                                                                           ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:142:45\n    │\n142 │         return params.amountSpecified < 0 ? uint256(-params.amountSpecified) / 25 : uint256(params.amountSpecified) / 24;\n    │                                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:142:85\n    │\n142 │         return params.amountSpecified < 0 ? uint256(-params.amountSpecified) / 25 : uint256(params.amountSpecified) / 24;\n    │                                                                                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":661,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 10 tests for test/TaxyToken.t.sol:TaxyTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transfersConserveSupply(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 179741, ~: 181760)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 6\n\n[PASS] test_approveAndTransferFromConsumeAllowance() (gas: 150564)\n[PASS] test_deployerIsNotHardcoded() (gas: 17775)\n[PASS] test_infiniteAllowanceIsPreserved() (gas: 115602)\n[PASS] test_metadataAndWholeSupplyBelongToDeployer() (gas: 63261)\n[PASS] test_noMintOrAdministrativeEntryPointsForAnyCaller() (gas: 351927)\n[PASS] test_transferChargesNoTokenTax() (gas: 86405)\n[PASS] test_transferFromWithoutAllowanceReverts() (gas: 50858)\n[PASS] test_transferToZeroRevertsWithoutBurning() (gas: 47595)\n[PASS] test_transferWithoutBalanceReverts() (gas: 39811)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 7.12ms (7.62ms CPU time)\n\nRan 3 tests for test/Deployment.t.sol:DeploymentTest\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsManagerWithoutCode() (gas: 3767)\n[PASS] test_minerProducesDeployableAddressAndPoolInitializes() (gas: 15609981)\n[PASS] test_minerRejectsInvalidArguments() (gas: 1323357)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 21.82ms (21.22ms CPU time)\n\nRan 10 tests for test/TaxyHookShortfall.t.sol:TaxyHookShortfallTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_buysAtZeroETHConserveFundsAndChargeFourPercent(uint96,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 431907, ~: 431380)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 68420214674482894668\n\n[PASS] test_exactInputBuyAtZeroETHMintsNativeClaim() (gas: 441718)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputBuyAtZeroETHMintsNativeClaim() (gas: 426769)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBuyerFundingRollsBackClaimAndSwap() (gas: 833571)\n[PASS] test_managerHoldingExactlyTheFeePaysETH() (gas: 357918)\n[PASS] test_managerOneWeiShortMintsTheWholeFee() (gas: 429181)\n[PASS] test_recipientRedeemsClaimForETHWithAuthorizedRouter() (gas: 1038297)\n[PASS] test_slippageFailureRollsBackClaimAndSwap() (gas: 825912)\n[PASS] test_subsequentBuyPaysETHAndPreservesPriorClaim() (gas: 724482)\n[PASS] test_unapprovedRedeemerCannotBurnRecipientClaims() (gas: 952032)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 33.53ms (30.34ms CPU time)\n\nRan 25 tests for test/TaxyHook.t.sol:TaxyHookTest\n[PASS] invariant_feesAndFundsConservedAcrossSwapSequences() (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract    | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=====================================================+\n| SwapHandler | swap     | 2048  | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_allModesConserveFunds(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 369059, ~: 374600)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 20500633901756614831\n\n[PASS] test_ERC20PairCannotInitialize() (gas: 44846)\n[PASS] test_ETHExactInputChargesFourPercentAndPaysImmediately() (gas: 372688)\n[PASS] test_ETHExactOutputDeliversExactNetETH() (gas: 358160)\n[PASS] test_TokenExactInputChargesFourPercentInETH() (gas: 356936)\n[PASS] test_TokenExactOutputChargesFourPercentInETH() (gas: 371052)\n[PASS] test_afterSwapRequiresMatchingBeforeSwap() (gas: 44642)\n[PASS] test_allEnabledCallbacksRejectUnauthorizedCaller() (gas: 83993)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsMissingManagerCode() (gas: 3787)\n[PASS] test_dynamicLPFeeCannotInitialize() (gas: 47423)\n[PASS] test_initializationRejectsWrongHookKey() (gas: 16672)\n[PASS] test_liquidityExitRemainsPossibleWhenRecipientRejectsETH() (gas: 704288)\n[PASS] test_partialETHInputRevertsAtomically() (gas: 704041)\n[PASS] test_partialETHOutputRevertsAtomically() (gas: 676116)\n[PASS] test_partialTokenInputChargesOnlyActualETHOutput() (gas: 286022)\n[PASS] test_partialTokenOutputChargesOnlyActualETHInput() (gas: 300139)\n[PASS] test_permissionsAndInitialization() (gas: 33159)\n[PASS] test_recipientCannotReenterSwapDuringFeePayment() (gas: 1137145)\n[PASS] test_recipientRejectingETHRevertsWholeSwap() (gas: 817117)\n[PASS] test_roundingChargesZeroBelow25WeiAndOneAt25Wei() (gas: 1012615)\n[PASS] test_sequentialSwapsDoNotLeakAccountingState() (gas: 1349003)\n[PASS] test_signedAmountBoundsRejectBeforeAccountingChanges() (gas: 562365)\n[PASS] test_slippageIncludesFeeAndRevertsPayment() (gas: 315971)\n[PASS] test_zeroAmountRejectedAndNextSwapWorks() (gas: 429282)\nSuite result: ok. 25 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 562.79ms (588.98ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 test suites in 563.90ms (625.27ms CPU time): 48 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (48 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":64,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"TaxyHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"TaxyHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"TaxyToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"TaxyToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"TaxyToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":3,\"DEPENDENCIES.json\":30,\"README.md\":233,\"docs/SECURITY_REVIEW.md\":47,\"foundry.toml\":22,\"launch.json\":27,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/MineTaxySalt.s.sol\":31,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":31,\"src/TaxyHook.sol\":214,\"src/TaxyToken.sol\":12,\"test/Deployment.t.sol\":76,\"test/TaxyHook.t.sol\":378,\"test/TaxyHookShortfall.t.sol\":240,\"test/TaxyToken.t.sol\":114,\"test/helpers/FeeRecipients.sol\":37,\"test/helpers/SettlementRouter.sol\":115,\"test/helpers/SwapHandler.sol\":48,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":11},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"08bb4adafc655cc3331667748436b7e3fab50e9f087021cf3dbce9aaf61ed43a","verifiedTreeHash":"5c6751e68a5526ef0b436336ac401c4c8a623435","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+da6bdbe5"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":4078,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 83 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 3.72s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:85:47\n   │\n85 │             if (params.amountSpecified > 0 && uint256(params.amountSpecified) + fee > MAX_AMOUNT) {\n   │                                               ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `swapping` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:127:17\n    │\n127 │                 poolManager.mint(FEE_RECIPIENT, 0, fee);\n    │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `swapping` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:130:17\n    │\n130 │                 poolManager.take(Currency.wrap(address(0)), FEE_RECIPIENT, fee);\n    │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:128:17\n    │\n128 │                 emit SwapFeeClaimMinted(key.toId(), fee);\n    │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:107:57\n    │\n107 │             if (nativeDelta != params.amountSpecified + int256(fee)) revert PartialFillNotSupported();\n    │                                                         ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:112:23\n    │\n112 │                 fee = uint256(-nativeDelta) / 24;\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:115:23\n    │\n115 │                 fee = uint256(nativeDelta) / 25;\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:119:45\n    │\n119 │         uint256 gross = params.zeroForOne ? uint256(-nativeDelta) + fee : uint256(nativeDelta);\n    │                                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:119:75\n    │\n119 │         uint256 gross = params.zeroForOne ? uint256(-nativeDelta) + fee : uint256(nativeDelta);\n    │                                                                           ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:142:45\n    │\n142 │         return params.amountSpecified < 0 ? uint256(-params.amountSpecified) / 25 : uint256(params.amountSpecified) / 24;\n    │                                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:142:85\n    │\n142 │         return params.amountSpecified < 0 ? uint256(-params.amountSpecified) / 25 : uint256(params.amountSpecified) / 24;\n    │                                                                                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":824,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 3 tests for test/Deployment.t.sol:DeploymentTest\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsManagerWithoutCode() (gas: 3767)\n[PASS] test_minerProducesDeployableAddressAndPoolInitializes() (gas: 15609981)\n[PASS] test_minerRejectsInvalidArguments() (gas: 1323357)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 39.65ms (44.95ms CPU time)\n\nRan 10 tests for test/TaxyToken.t.sol:TaxyTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transfersConserveSupply(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 179649, ~: 181784)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 33313973202939181106904742\n  Bound result 3\n\n[PASS] test_approveAndTransferFromConsumeAllowance() (gas: 150564)\n[PASS] test_deployerIsNotHardcoded() (gas: 17775)\n[PASS] test_infiniteAllowanceIsPreserved() (gas: 115602)\n[PASS] test_metadataAndWholeSupplyBelongToDeployer() (gas: 63261)\n[PASS] test_noMintOrAdministrativeEntryPointsForAnyCaller() (gas: 351927)\n[PASS] test_transferChargesNoTokenTax() (gas: 86405)\n[PASS] test_transferFromWithoutAllowanceReverts() (gas: 50858)\n[PASS] test_transferToZeroRevertsWithoutBurning() (gas: 47595)\n[PASS] test_transferWithoutBalanceReverts() (gas: 39811)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 39.71ms (27.88ms CPU time)\n\nRan 10 tests for test/TaxyHookShortfall.t.sol:TaxyHookShortfallTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_buysAtZeroETHConserveFundsAndChargeFourPercent(uint96,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 431943, ~: 432169)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 4079202582101992431\n\n[PASS] test_exactInputBuyAtZeroETHMintsNativeClaim() (gas: 441718)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputBuyAtZeroETHMintsNativeClaim() (gas: 426769)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBuyerFundingRollsBackClaimAndSwap() (gas: 833571)\n[PASS] test_managerHoldingExactlyTheFeePaysETH() (gas: 357918)\n[PASS] test_managerOneWeiShortMintsTheWholeFee() (gas: 429181)\n[PASS] test_recipientRedeemsClaimForETHWithAuthorizedRouter() (gas: 1038297)\n[PASS] test_slippageFailureRollsBackClaimAndSwap() (gas: 825912)\n[PASS] test_subsequentBuyPaysETHAndPreservesPriorClaim() (gas: 724482)\n[PASS] test_unapprovedRedeemerCannotBurnRecipientClaims() (gas: 952032)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 72.48ms (46.07ms CPU time)\n\nRan 25 tests for test/TaxyHook.t.sol:TaxyHookTest\n[PASS] invariant_feesAndFundsConservedAcrossSwapSequences() (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract    | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=====================================================+\n| SwapHandler | swap     | 2048  | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_allModesConserveFunds(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 368951, ~: 374600)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 11812\n\n[PASS] test_ERC20PairCannotInitialize() (gas: 44846)\n[PASS] test_ETHExactInputChargesFourPercentAndPaysImmediately() (gas: 372688)\n[PASS] test_ETHExactOutputDeliversExactNetETH() (gas: 358160)\n[PASS] test_TokenExactInputChargesFourPercentInETH() (gas: 356936)\n[PASS] test_TokenExactOutputChargesFourPercentInETH() (gas: 371052)\n[PASS] test_afterSwapRequiresMatchingBeforeSwap() (gas: 44642)\n[PASS] test_allEnabledCallbacksRejectUnauthorizedCaller() (gas: 83993)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsMissingManagerCode() (gas: 3787)\n[PASS] test_dynamicLPFeeCannotInitialize() (gas: 47423)\n[PASS] test_initializationRejectsWrongHookKey() (gas: 16672)\n[PASS] test_liquidityExitRemainsPossibleWhenRecipientRejectsETH() (gas: 704288)\n[PASS] test_partialETHInputRevertsAtomically() (gas: 704041)\n[PASS] test_partialETHOutputRevertsAtomically() (gas: 676116)\n[PASS] test_partialTokenInputChargesOnlyActualETHOutput() (gas: 286022)\n[PASS] test_partialTokenOutputChargesOnlyActualETHInput() (gas: 300139)\n[PASS] test_permissionsAndInitialization() (gas: 33159)\n[PASS] test_recipientCannotReenterSwapDuringFeePayment() (gas: 1137145)\n[PASS] test_recipientRejectingETHRevertsWholeSwap() (gas: 817117)\n[PASS] test_roundingChargesZeroBelow25WeiAndOneAt25Wei() (gas: 1012615)\n[PASS] test_sequentialSwapsDoNotLeakAccountingState() (gas: 1349003)\n[PASS] test_signedAmountBoundsRejectBeforeAccountingChanges() (gas: 562365)\n[PASS] test_slippageIncludesFeeAndRevertsPayment() (gas: 315971)\n[PASS] test_zeroAmountRejectedAndNextSwapWorks() (gas: 429282)\nSuite result: ok. 25 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 667.76ms (681.25ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 test suites in 676.17ms (819.61ms CPU time): 48 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (48 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":85,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"TaxyHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"TaxyHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"TaxyToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"TaxyToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"TaxyToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":3,\"DEPENDENCIES.json\":30,\"README.md\":233,\"docs/SECURITY_REVIEW.md\":47,\"foundry.toml\":22,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/MineTaxySalt.s.sol\":31,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":31,\"src/TaxyHook.sol\":214,\"src/TaxyToken.sol\":12,\"test/Deployment.t.sol\":76,\"test/TaxyHook.t.sol\":378,\"test/TaxyHookShortfall.t.sol\":240,\"test/TaxyToken.t.sol\":114,\"test/helpers/FeeRecipients.sol\":37,\"test/helpers/SettlementRouter.sol\":115,\"test/helpers/SwapHandler.sol\":48,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":11},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":2054,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[medium/medium] reentrancy-no-eth at src/TaxyHook.sol:93: Reentrancy in TaxyHook.afterSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,BalanceDelta,bytes) (src/TaxyHook.sol#93-135):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/TaxyHook.sol:93: Reentrancy in TaxyHook.afterSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,BalanceDelta,bytes) (src/TaxyHook.sol#93-135):","passed":true},{"durationMs":880,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[high] reentrancy-state-change at src/TaxyHook.sol:127: Reentrancy: State change after external call (2 places)\n[low] internal-function-used-once at src/HookFlags.sol:24: Internal Function Used Only Once\n[low] large-numeric-literal at src/TaxyToken.sol:10: Large Numeric Literal\n[low] literal-instead-of-constant at src/TaxyHook.sol:112: Literal Instead of Constant (4 places)\n[low] state-change-without-event at src/TaxyHook.sol:68: State Change Without Event","passed":true},{"durationMs":2927,"exitCode":0,"name":"proof ebef0f9fca14","output":"Compiling 77 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 2.10s\nCompiler run successful!\n\nRan 3 tests for test/imd-proof-aa7cf0ad/Proof_ebef0f9fca14.t.sol:JudgeManagerShortfallTest\n[PASS] test_controlBuyWorksOnceManagerHoldsEth() (gas: 471543)\n[PASS] test_exactInputBuyExecutesWhenManagerHoldsNoEth() (gas: 243151)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputBuyExecutesWhenManagerHoldsNoEth() (gas: 248275)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 14.29ms (1.98ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test suite in 15.01ms (14.29ms CPU time): 3 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (3 total tests)\n","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"1efe3701cd55cc4a35acc72689b210dd40e9a9a4af92d434dfb46fd27b057081","verifiedTreeHash":"f53a1f9fac09c520eb99f903cc8f74f7d84a9412","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+da6bdbe5"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":3336,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 87 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 3.19s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:82:47\n   │\n82 │             if (params.amountSpecified > 0 && uint256(params.amountSpecified) + fee > MAX_AMOUNT) {\n   │                                               ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `swapping` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:122:23\n    │\n122 │         if (fee != 0) poolManager.take(Currency.wrap(address(0)), FEE_RECIPIENT, fee);\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:104:57\n    │\n104 │             if (nativeDelta != params.amountSpecified + int256(fee)) revert PartialFillNotSupported();\n    │                                                         ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:109:23\n    │\n109 │                 fee = uint256(-nativeDelta) / 24;\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:112:23\n    │\n112 │                 fee = uint256(nativeDelta) / 25;\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:116:45\n    │\n116 │         uint256 gross = params.zeroForOne ? uint256(-nativeDelta) + fee : uint256(nativeDelta);\n    │                                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:116:75\n    │\n116 │         uint256 gross = params.zeroForOne ? uint256(-nativeDelta) + fee : uint256(nativeDelta);\n    │                                                                           ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:132:45\n    │\n132 │         return params.amountSpecified < 0 ? uint256(-params.amountSpecified) / 25 : uint256(params.amountSpecified) / 24;\n    │                                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:132:85\n    │\n132 │         return params.amountSpecified < 0 ? uint256(-params.amountSpecified) / 25 : uint256(params.amountSpecified) / 24;\n    │                                                                                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":8378,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 10 tests for test/TaxyToken.t.sol:TaxyTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transfersConserveSupply(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 180086, ~: 181760)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 96\n  Bound result 94\n\n[PASS] test_approveAndTransferFromConsumeAllowance() (gas: 150564)\n[PASS] test_deployerIsNotHardcoded() (gas: 17775)\n[PASS] test_infiniteAllowanceIsPreserved() (gas: 115602)\n[PASS] test_metadataAndWholeSupplyBelongToDeployer() (gas: 63261)\n[PASS] test_noMintOrAdministrativeEntryPointsForAnyCaller() (gas: 351927)\n[PASS] test_transferChargesNoTokenTax() (gas: 86405)\n[PASS] test_transferFromWithoutAllowanceReverts() (gas: 50858)\n[PASS] test_transferToZeroRevertsWithoutBurning() (gas: 47595)\n[PASS] test_transferWithoutBalanceReverts() (gas: 39811)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 7.22ms (7.63ms CPU time)\n\nRan 12 tests for test/TaxyTokenEdges.t.sol:TaxyTokenEdgesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_splitDelegatedTransfersMatchSingleTransfer(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 193506, ~: 194746)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 582234360766581599090352552\n  Bound result 142618031959817843622798908\n\n[PASS] test_approvingZeroSpenderRevertsWithoutChangingExistingAllowance() (gas: 105904)\n[PASS] test_finiteAllowanceCanBeExhaustedButNotReplayed() (gas: 220744)\n[PASS] test_fullSupplyCanMoveAndReturnWithoutTax() (gas: 150730)\n[PASS] test_maximumTransferRevertsWithBalanceErrorWithoutOverflow() (gas: 60865)\n[PASS] test_oneWeiTransferAndSelfTransferPreserveSupply() (gas: 114323)\n[PASS] test_replacingAndRevokingInfiniteAllowanceTakesEffectImmediately() (gas: 272209)\n[PASS] test_selfTransferFromSpendsAllowanceWithoutChangingBalance() (gas: 111170)\n[PASS] test_transferFromInsufficientBalanceRestoresSpentAllowance() (gas: 124754)\n[PASS] test_transferFromZeroReceiverRestoresSpentAllowance() (gas: 122228)\n[PASS] test_zeroAmountDoesNotBypassInvalidAddresses() (gas: 74510)\n[PASS] test_zeroTransfersSucceedWithoutBalanceOrAllowance() (gas: 122999)\nSuite result: ok. 12 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 15.18ms (16.26ms CPU time)\n\nRan 3 tests for test/Deployment.t.sol:DeploymentTest\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsManagerWithoutCode() (gas: 3767)\n[PASS] test_minerProducesDeployableAddressAndPoolInitializes() (gas: 55817131)\n[PASS] test_minerRejectsInvalidArguments() (gas: 1261578)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 107.20ms (49.02ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/TaxyHookPresettlement.t.sol:TaxyHookPresettlementTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_prepaidBuysConserveFundsAndRefundSurplus(uint96,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 429283, ~: 429159)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 34482401856532938480\n  Bound result 8144542211983178197\n\n[PASS] test_emptyPoolTokenSpecifiedSwapsRefundAllCreditAndPayNoFee() (gas: 1442720)\n[PASS] test_prepaidBuyPaysFeeImmediatelyFromZeroNativeReserves() (gas: 413366)\n[PASS] test_unusedPrepaidCreditIsRefundedWithoutDoublePayment() (gas: 422092)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 107.14ms (66.65ms CPU time)\n\nRan 10 tests for test/TaxyHookCallbacks.t.sol:TaxyHookCallbacksTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_feeDeltasMatchETHDeliveredAcrossInt128Domain(uint128,uint8) (runs: 1000, μ: 238354, ~: 249867)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 2836007697602969015079732377867240\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_senderCannotImpersonatePoolManager(address,uint8) (runs: 1000, μ: 309907, ~: 309185)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 3\n\n[PASS] test_allUnsupportedPoolShapesRejectedBeforeInitializeAndSwap() (gas: 588209)\n[PASS] test_disabledCallbacksAuthenticateAndRejectEvenManager() (gas: 401286)\n[PASS] test_duplicateBeforeAndAfterCallbacksCannotChargeTwice() (gas: 428148)\n[PASS] test_grossedUpNativeExactOutputLimitAndOneBeyond() (gas: 632301)\n[PASS] test_oneWeiAndRoundingBoundariesInEveryMode() (gas: 4296185)\n[PASS] test_tokenSpecifiedBuyRejectsGrossBeyondInt128() (gas: 382715)\n[PASS] test_unexpectedNativeSignsCannotCausePayment() (gas: 275077)\n[PASS] test_zeroInputRejectedByHookForBothDirections() (gas: 201525)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 113.39ms (174.87ms CPU time)\n\nRan 25 tests for test/TaxyHook.t.sol:TaxyHookTest\n[PASS] invariant_feesAndFundsConservedAcrossSwapSequences() (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract    | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=====================================================+\n| SwapHandler | swap     | 2048  | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_allModesConserveFunds(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 368225, ~: 362403)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1695\n\n[PASS] test_ERC20PairCannotInitialize() (gas: 44846)\n[PASS] test_ETHExactInputChargesFourPercentAndPaysImmediately() (gas: 372544)\n[PASS] test_ETHExactOutputDeliversExactNetETH() (gas: 358016)\n[PASS] test_TokenExactInputChargesFourPercentInETH() (gas: 356792)\n[PASS] test_TokenExactOutputChargesFourPercentInETH() (gas: 370908)\n[PASS] test_afterSwapRequiresMatchingBeforeSwap() (gas: 44642)\n[PASS] test_allEnabledCallbacksRejectUnauthorizedCaller() (gas: 83993)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsMissingManagerCode() (gas: 3787)\n[PASS] test_dynamicLPFeeCannotInitialize() (gas: 47423)\n[PASS] test_initializationRejectsWrongHookKey() (gas: 16672)\n[PASS] test_liquidityExitRemainsPossibleWhenRecipientRejectsETH() (gas: 704144)\n[PASS] test_partialETHInputRevertsAtomically() (gas: 703897)\n[PASS] test_partialETHOutputRevertsAtomically() (gas: 675972)\n[PASS] test_partialTokenInputChargesOnlyActualETHOutput() (gas: 285878)\n[PASS] test_partialTokenOutputChargesOnlyActualETHInput() (gas: 299995)\n[PASS] test_permissionsAndInitialization() (gas: 33159)\n[PASS] test_recipientCannotReenterSwapDuringFeePayment() (gas: 1137001)\n[PASS] test_recipientRejectingETHRevertsWholeSwap() (gas: 816829)\n[PASS] test_roundingChargesZeroBelow25WeiAndOneAt25Wei() (gas: 1012327)\n[PASS] test_sequentialSwapsDoNotLeakAccountingState() (gas: 1348427)\n[PASS] test_signedAmountBoundsRejectBeforeAccountingChanges() (gas: 562221)\n[PASS] test_slippageIncludesFeeAndRevertsPayment() (gas: 315827)\n[PASS] test_zeroAmountRejectedAndNextSwapWorks() (gas: 429138)\nSuite result: ok. 25 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 605.54ms (584.00ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/TaxyTokenInvariant.t.sol:TaxyTokenInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nTaxyTokenInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_allowancesMatchIndependentLedger\n[PASS] invariant_balancesMatchIndependentLedgerAndConserveFixedSupply\n[PASS] invariant_metadataCannotChange\n TaxyTokenInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭--------------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract                 | Selector                    | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=====================================================================================+\n| TaxyTokenSequenceHandler | approve                     | 2044  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TaxyTokenSequenceHandler | rejectDelegatedOverspend    | 2011  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TaxyTokenSequenceHandler | rejectInsufficientAllowance | 2053  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TaxyTokenSequenceHandler | rejectOverspend             | 2080  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TaxyTokenSequenceHandler | rejectSupplyOrAdminChanges  | 2064  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TaxyTokenSequenceHandler | rejectZeroReceiver          | 2072  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TaxyTokenSequenceHandler | transfer                    | 2023  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TaxyTokenSequenceHandler | transferFrom                | 2037  | 0       | 0        |\n╰--------------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 4097\n  Bound result 1396\n  Bound result 659918\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 4372\n  Bound result 95\n  Bound result 415109272588147973119081271\n  Bound result 242\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 255\n  Bound result 517440283\n  Bound result 5186\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 2497\n  Bound result 2592286112\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 758\n  Bound result 8506\n\n[PASS] test_seededSequenceExercisesSuccessFailureAndAllowanceRevocation() (gas: 1340494)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 100\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 1\n\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 4.23s (4.23s CPU time)\n\nRan 5 tests for test/TaxyLifecycle.t.sol:TaxyLifecycleTest\n[PASS] invariant_multiPoolLifecycleConservesFundsAndPositions() (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭----------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract             | Selector        | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=====================================================================+\n| TaxyLifecycleHandler | changeLiquidity | 4082  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TaxyLifecycleHandler | rejectedTrade   | 4143  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TaxyLifecycleHandler | roundTrip       | 4091  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TaxyLifecycleHandler | trade           | 4068  | 0       | 0        |\n╰----------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 999000000000000000018\n  Bound result 4660\n  Bound result 202917450549024\n  Bound result 999000000000000008328\n  Bound result 10000000000000000000\n  Bound result 2148987109534759966\n  Bound result 999000000000000002041\n  Bound result 17522\n  Bound result 8958535884592215995\n  Bound result 2978\n  Bound result 48879\n  Bound result 488\n  Bound result 12\n  Bound result 9594\n  Bound result 8298919751978667770\n  Bound result 12\n  Bound result 999000000000000006762\n  Bound result 999000000000000000764\n  Bound result 40000000000000000000\n  Bound result 9999999999999999997\n  Bound result 999000000000000000096\n  Bound result 999000000000000017262\n  Bound result 13282\n  Bound result 1112786062\n  Bound result 9999999999000015134\n  Bound result 781910097570360570562\n  Bound result 10000000000000000000\n  Bound result 23\n  Bound result 1687303715884105728\n  Bound result 21195884643634065099\n  Bound result 24\n  Bound result 3660487015314994044\n  Bound result 9999999999000014676\n  Bound result 9999999999000659919\n  Bound result 711277694593907134131\n  Bound result 9999999999000008652\n  Bound result 9120\n  Bound result 9999999999000010001\n  Bound result 8994\n  Bound result 999000000000000004665\n  Bound result 9999999999000000121\n  Bound result 3064508665\n  Bound result 9999999999000000096\n  Bound result 5308\n  Bound result 129930290510970890\n  Bound result 999000000000000004098\n  Bound result 9613861758316043621\n  Bound result 999000000000000004207\n  Bound result 9999999999000010001\n  Bound result 999000000000000000317\n  Bound result 999000000000000000026\n  Bound result 9999999999000000480\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_feeEventsAgreeWithActualNativePayment(uint256,bool,bool,bool) (runs: 1000, μ: 686137, ~: 689450)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 7778333644708345641\n  Bound result 7778333644708345641\n\n[PASS] test_handlerExercisesEveryActionAndModeAcrossBothPools() (gas: 12199500)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000\n\n[PASS] test_oneWeiRequestsAllModesSettleWithoutTokenFee() (gas: 1171325)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1\n\n[PASS] test_tokenSettlementFailureRollsBackAlreadyPaidFeeAndGuard() (gas: 985247)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n\nSuite result: ok. 5 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 8.28s (8.33s CPU time)\n\nRan 8 test suites in 8.28s (13.46s CPU time): 71 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (71 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":43,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"TaxyHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"TaxyHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"TaxyToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"TaxyToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"TaxyToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":3,\"DEPENDENCIES.json\":30,\"README.md\":203,\"docs/SECURITY_REVIEW.md\":44,\"foundry.toml\":22,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/MineTaxySalt.s.sol\":31,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":31,\"src/TaxyHook.sol\":204,\"src/TaxyToken.sol\":12,\"test/Deployment.t.sol\":76,\"test/README.md\":35,\"test/TaxyHook.t.sol\":378,\"test/TaxyHookCallbacks.t.sol\":309,\"test/TaxyHookPresettlement.t.sol\":207,\"test/TaxyLifecycle.t.sol\":389,\"test/TaxyToken.t.sol\":114,\"test/TaxyTokenEdges.t.sol\":171,\"test/TaxyTokenInvariant.t.sol\":217,\"test/helpers/FeeRecipients.sol\":37,\"test/helpers/SettlementRouter.sol\":115,\"test/helpers/SwapHandler.sol\":48,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":11},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"5959f086211ea1847201707590d13bb76b19978164b041e386232e344bb51fbb","verifiedTreeHash":"e1ef16f069698da020454d626592fe0e97e8bf1c","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+da6bdbe5"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":1893,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 82 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 1.76s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:82:47\n   │\n82 │             if (params.amountSpecified > 0 && uint256(params.amountSpecified) + fee > MAX_AMOUNT) {\n   │                                               ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `swapping` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:122:23\n    │\n122 │         if (fee != 0) poolManager.take(Currency.wrap(address(0)), FEE_RECIPIENT, fee);\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:104:57\n    │\n104 │             if (nativeDelta != params.amountSpecified + int256(fee)) revert PartialFillNotSupported();\n    │                                                         ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:109:23\n    │\n109 │                 fee = uint256(-nativeDelta) / 24;\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:112:23\n    │\n112 │                 fee = uint256(nativeDelta) / 25;\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:116:45\n    │\n116 │         uint256 gross = params.zeroForOne ? uint256(-nativeDelta) + fee : uint256(nativeDelta);\n    │                                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:116:75\n    │\n116 │         uint256 gross = params.zeroForOne ? uint256(-nativeDelta) + fee : uint256(nativeDelta);\n    │                                                                           ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:132:45\n    │\n132 │         return params.amountSpecified < 0 ? uint256(-params.amountSpecified) / 25 : uint256(params.amountSpecified) / 24;\n    │                                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:132:85\n    │\n132 │         return params.amountSpecified < 0 ? uint256(-params.amountSpecified) / 25 : uint256(params.amountSpecified) / 24;\n    │                                                                                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":640,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 10 tests for test/TaxyToken.t.sol:TaxyTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transfersConserveSupply(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 180879, ~: 181760)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 774020268830135553461070676\n  Bound result 1\n\n[PASS] test_approveAndTransferFromConsumeAllowance() (gas: 150564)\n[PASS] test_deployerIsNotHardcoded() (gas: 17775)\n[PASS] test_infiniteAllowanceIsPreserved() (gas: 115602)\n[PASS] test_metadataAndWholeSupplyBelongToDeployer() (gas: 63261)\n[PASS] test_noMintOrAdministrativeEntryPointsForAnyCaller() (gas: 351927)\n[PASS] test_transferChargesNoTokenTax() (gas: 86405)\n[PASS] test_transferFromWithoutAllowanceReverts() (gas: 50858)\n[PASS] test_transferToZeroRevertsWithoutBurning() (gas: 47595)\n[PASS] test_transferWithoutBalanceReverts() (gas: 39811)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 5.70ms (6.64ms CPU time)\n\nRan 3 tests for test/Deployment.t.sol:DeploymentTest\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsManagerWithoutCode() (gas: 3767)\n[PASS] test_minerProducesDeployableAddressAndPoolInitializes() (gas: 55817131)\n[PASS] test_minerRejectsInvalidArguments() (gas: 1261578)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 33.85ms (33.73ms CPU time)\n\nRan 25 tests for test/TaxyHook.t.sol:TaxyHookTest\n[PASS] invariant_feesAndFundsConservedAcrossSwapSequences() (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract    | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=====================================================+\n| SwapHandler | swap     | 2048  | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_allModesConserveFunds(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 368642, ~: 374456)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 2966\n\n[PASS] test_ERC20PairCannotInitialize() (gas: 44846)\n[PASS] test_ETHExactInputChargesFourPercentAndPaysImmediately() (gas: 372544)\n[PASS] test_ETHExactOutputDeliversExactNetETH() (gas: 358016)\n[PASS] test_TokenExactInputChargesFourPercentInETH() (gas: 356792)\n[PASS] test_TokenExactOutputChargesFourPercentInETH() (gas: 370908)\n[PASS] test_afterSwapRequiresMatchingBeforeSwap() (gas: 44642)\n[PASS] test_allEnabledCallbacksRejectUnauthorizedCaller() (gas: 83993)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsMissingManagerCode() (gas: 3787)\n[PASS] test_dynamicLPFeeCannotInitialize() (gas: 47423)\n[PASS] test_initializationRejectsWrongHookKey() (gas: 16672)\n[PASS] test_liquidityExitRemainsPossibleWhenRecipientRejectsETH() (gas: 704144)\n[PASS] test_partialETHInputRevertsAtomically() (gas: 703897)\n[PASS] test_partialETHOutputRevertsAtomically() (gas: 675972)\n[PASS] test_partialTokenInputChargesOnlyActualETHOutput() (gas: 285878)\n[PASS] test_partialTokenOutputChargesOnlyActualETHInput() (gas: 299995)\n[PASS] test_permissionsAndInitialization() (gas: 33159)\n[PASS] test_recipientCannotReenterSwapDuringFeePayment() (gas: 1137001)\n[PASS] test_recipientRejectingETHRevertsWholeSwap() (gas: 816829)\n[PASS] test_roundingChargesZeroBelow25WeiAndOneAt25Wei() (gas: 1012327)\n[PASS] test_sequentialSwapsDoNotLeakAccountingState() (gas: 1348427)\n[PASS] test_signedAmountBoundsRejectBeforeAccountingChanges() (gas: 562221)\n[PASS] test_slippageIncludesFeeAndRevertsPayment() (gas: 315827)\n[PASS] test_zeroAmountRejectedAndNextSwapWorks() (gas: 429138)\nSuite result: ok. 25 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 546.29ms (545.65ms CPU time)\n\nRan 3 test suites in 547.46ms (585.84ms CPU time): 38 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (38 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":54,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"TaxyHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"TaxyHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"TaxyToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"TaxyToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"TaxyToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":3,\"DEPENDENCIES.json\":30,\"README.md\":203,\"docs/SECURITY_REVIEW.md\":44,\"foundry.toml\":22,\"launch.json\":27,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/MineTaxySalt.s.sol\":31,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":31,\"src/TaxyHook.sol\":204,\"src/TaxyToken.sol\":12,\"test/Deployment.t.sol\":76,\"test/TaxyHook.t.sol\":378,\"test/TaxyToken.t.sol\":114,\"test/helpers/FeeRecipients.sol\":37,\"test/helpers/SettlementRouter.sol\":115,\"test/helpers/SwapHandler.sol\":48,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":11},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"7a43ccda6eaa064ade2b2235d9c7642394d86460b45016bd5764445c36dce33b","verifiedTreeHash":"4f09ef641439d2338079c2bf9fdf969f67a46153","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+da6bdbe5"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":2175,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 82 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 2.05s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:82:47\n   │\n82 │             if (params.amountSpecified > 0 && uint256(params.amountSpecified) + fee > MAX_AMOUNT) {\n   │                                               ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `swapping` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:122:23\n    │\n122 │         if (fee != 0) poolManager.take(Currency.wrap(address(0)), FEE_RECIPIENT, fee);\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:104:57\n    │\n104 │             if (nativeDelta != params.amountSpecified + int256(fee)) revert PartialFillNotSupported();\n    │                                                         ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:109:23\n    │\n109 │                 fee = uint256(-nativeDelta) / 24;\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:112:23\n    │\n112 │                 fee = uint256(nativeDelta) / 25;\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:116:45\n    │\n116 │         uint256 gross = params.zeroForOne ? uint256(-nativeDelta) + fee : uint256(nativeDelta);\n    │                                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:116:75\n    │\n116 │         uint256 gross = params.zeroForOne ? uint256(-nativeDelta) + fee : uint256(nativeDelta);\n    │                                                                           ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:132:45\n    │\n132 │         return params.amountSpecified < 0 ? uint256(-params.amountSpecified) / 25 : uint256(params.amountSpecified) / 24;\n    │                                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:132:85\n    │\n132 │         return params.amountSpecified < 0 ? uint256(-params.amountSpecified) / 25 : uint256(params.amountSpecified) / 24;\n    │                                                                                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":722,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 10 tests for test/TaxyToken.t.sol:TaxyTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transfersConserveSupply(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 180114, ~: 181760)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 178\n  Bound result 142\n\n[PASS] test_approveAndTransferFromConsumeAllowance() (gas: 150564)\n[PASS] test_deployerIsNotHardcoded() (gas: 17775)\n[PASS] test_infiniteAllowanceIsPreserved() (gas: 115602)\n[PASS] test_metadataAndWholeSupplyBelongToDeployer() (gas: 63261)\n[PASS] test_noMintOrAdministrativeEntryPointsForAnyCaller() (gas: 351927)\n[PASS] test_transferChargesNoTokenTax() (gas: 86405)\n[PASS] test_transferFromWithoutAllowanceReverts() (gas: 50858)\n[PASS] test_transferToZeroRevertsWithoutBurning() (gas: 47595)\n[PASS] test_transferWithoutBalanceReverts() (gas: 39811)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 6.94ms (7.49ms CPU time)\n\nRan 3 tests for test/Deployment.t.sol:DeploymentTest\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsManagerWithoutCode() (gas: 3767)\n[PASS] test_minerProducesDeployableAddressAndPoolInitializes() (gas: 55817131)\n[PASS] test_minerRejectsInvalidArguments() (gas: 1261578)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 63.07ms (39.93ms CPU time)\n\nRan 25 tests for test/TaxyHook.t.sol:TaxyHookTest\n[PASS] invariant_feesAndFundsConservedAcrossSwapSequences() (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract    | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=====================================================+\n| SwapHandler | swap     | 2048  | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_allModesConserveFunds(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 368639, ~: 374456)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 55561158781660821155\n\n[PASS] test_ERC20PairCannotInitialize() (gas: 44846)\n[PASS] test_ETHExactInputChargesFourPercentAndPaysImmediately() (gas: 372544)\n[PASS] test_ETHExactOutputDeliversExactNetETH() (gas: 358016)\n[PASS] test_TokenExactInputChargesFourPercentInETH() (gas: 356792)\n[PASS] test_TokenExactOutputChargesFourPercentInETH() (gas: 370908)\n[PASS] test_afterSwapRequiresMatchingBeforeSwap() (gas: 44642)\n[PASS] test_allEnabledCallbacksRejectUnauthorizedCaller() (gas: 83993)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsMissingManagerCode() (gas: 3787)\n[PASS] test_dynamicLPFeeCannotInitialize() (gas: 47423)\n[PASS] test_initializationRejectsWrongHookKey() (gas: 16672)\n[PASS] test_liquidityExitRemainsPossibleWhenRecipientRejectsETH() (gas: 704144)\n[PASS] test_partialETHInputRevertsAtomically() (gas: 703897)\n[PASS] test_partialETHOutputRevertsAtomically() (gas: 675972)\n[PASS] test_partialTokenInputChargesOnlyActualETHOutput() (gas: 285878)\n[PASS] test_partialTokenOutputChargesOnlyActualETHInput() (gas: 299995)\n[PASS] test_permissionsAndInitialization() (gas: 33159)\n[PASS] test_recipientCannotReenterSwapDuringFeePayment() (gas: 1137001)\n[PASS] test_recipientRejectingETHRevertsWholeSwap() (gas: 816829)\n[PASS] test_roundingChargesZeroBelow25WeiAndOneAt25Wei() (gas: 1012327)\n[PASS] test_sequentialSwapsDoNotLeakAccountingState() (gas: 1348427)\n[PASS] test_signedAmountBoundsRejectBeforeAccountingChanges() (gas: 562221)\n[PASS] test_slippageIncludesFeeAndRevertsPayment() (gas: 315827)\n[PASS] test_zeroAmountRejectedAndNextSwapWorks() (gas: 429138)\nSuite result: ok. 25 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 619.51ms (625.39ms CPU time)\n\nRan 3 test suites in 620.77ms (689.52ms CPU time): 38 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (38 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":73,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"TaxyHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"TaxyHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"TaxyToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"TaxyToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"TaxyToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":3,\"DEPENDENCIES.json\":30,\"README.md\":203,\"docs/SECURITY_REVIEW.md\":44,\"foundry.toml\":22,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/MineTaxySalt.s.sol\":31,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":31,\"src/TaxyHook.sol\":204,\"src/TaxyToken.sol\":12,\"test/Deployment.t.sol\":76,\"test/TaxyHook.t.sol\":378,\"test/TaxyToken.t.sol\":114,\"test/helpers/FeeRecipients.sol\":37,\"test/helpers/SettlementRouter.sol\":115,\"test/helpers/SwapHandler.sol\":48,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":11},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":931,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[medium/medium] reentrancy-no-eth at src/TaxyHook.sol:90: Reentrancy in TaxyHook.afterSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,BalanceDelta,bytes) (src/TaxyHook.sol#90-125):","passed":true},{"durationMs":332,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[high] reentrancy-state-change at src/TaxyHook.sol:122: Reentrancy: State change after external call\n[low] internal-function-used-once at src/HookFlags.sol:24: Internal Function Used Only Once\n[low] large-numeric-literal at src/TaxyToken.sol:10: Large Numeric Literal\n[low] literal-instead-of-constant at src/TaxyHook.sol:109: Literal Instead of Constant (4 places)\n[low] state-change-without-event at src/TaxyHook.sol:65: State Change Without Event","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"961bbd8f0a03d1e8ec6eba0d334a09f7e751480fd00d7ab9e238da9ece38d592","verifiedTreeHash":"168febccfbc8439b39f95cb804a6fe286b2d66a6","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+da6bdbe5"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":4301,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 89 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 4.15s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:85:47\n   │\n85 │             if (params.amountSpecified > 0 && uint256(params.amountSpecified) + fee > MAX_AMOUNT) {\n   │                                               ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `swapping` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:127:17\n    │\n127 │                 poolManager.mint(FEE_RECIPIENT, 0, fee);\n    │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `swapping` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:130:17\n    │\n130 │                 poolManager.take(Currency.wrap(address(0)), FEE_RECIPIENT, fee);\n    │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:128:17\n    │\n128 │                 emit SwapFeeClaimMinted(key.toId(), fee);\n    │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:107:57\n    │\n107 │             if (nativeDelta != params.amountSpecified + int256(fee)) revert PartialFillNotSupported();\n    │                                                         ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:112:23\n    │\n112 │                 fee = uint256(-nativeDelta) / 24;\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:115:23\n    │\n115 │                 fee = uint256(nativeDelta) / 25;\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:119:45\n    │\n119 │         uint256 gross = params.zeroForOne ? uint256(-nativeDelta) + fee : uint256(nativeDelta);\n    │                                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:119:75\n    │\n119 │         uint256 gross = params.zeroForOne ? uint256(-nativeDelta) + fee : uint256(nativeDelta);\n    │                                                                           ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:142:45\n    │\n142 │         return params.amountSpecified < 0 ? uint256(-params.amountSpecified) / 25 : uint256(params.amountSpecified) / 24;\n    │                                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/TaxyHook.sol:142:85\n    │\n142 │         return params.amountSpecified < 0 ? uint256(-params.amountSpecified) / 25 : uint256(params.amountSpecified) / 24;\n    │                                                                                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":9032,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 10 tests for test/TaxyToken.t.sol:TaxyTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transfersConserveSupply(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 180241, ~: 181802)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 95\n  Bound result 6\n\n[PASS] test_approveAndTransferFromConsumeAllowance() (gas: 150564)\n[PASS] test_deployerIsNotHardcoded() (gas: 17775)\n[PASS] test_infiniteAllowanceIsPreserved() (gas: 115602)\n[PASS] test_metadataAndWholeSupplyBelongToDeployer() (gas: 63261)\n[PASS] test_noMintOrAdministrativeEntryPointsForAnyCaller() (gas: 351927)\n[PASS] test_transferChargesNoTokenTax() (gas: 86405)\n[PASS] test_transferFromWithoutAllowanceReverts() (gas: 50858)\n[PASS] test_transferToZeroRevertsWithoutBurning() (gas: 47595)\n[PASS] test_transferWithoutBalanceReverts() (gas: 39811)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 7.90ms (9.53ms CPU time)\n\nRan 3 tests for test/Deployment.t.sol:DeploymentTest\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsManagerWithoutCode() (gas: 3767)\n[PASS] test_minerProducesDeployableAddressAndPoolInitializes() (gas: 15609981)\n[PASS] test_minerRejectsInvalidArguments() (gas: 1323357)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 33.72ms (22.70ms CPU time)\n\nRan 10 tests for test/TaxyHookShortfall.t.sol:TaxyHookShortfallTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_buysAtZeroETHConserveFundsAndChargeFourPercent(uint96,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 431887, ~: 431380)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 15701164495987541156\n\n[PASS] test_exactInputBuyAtZeroETHMintsNativeClaim() (gas: 441718)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputBuyAtZeroETHMintsNativeClaim() (gas: 426769)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBuyerFundingRollsBackClaimAndSwap() (gas: 833571)\n[PASS] test_managerHoldingExactlyTheFeePaysETH() (gas: 357918)\n[PASS] test_managerOneWeiShortMintsTheWholeFee() (gas: 429181)\n[PASS] test_recipientRedeemsClaimForETHWithAuthorizedRouter() (gas: 1038297)\n[PASS] test_slippageFailureRollsBackClaimAndSwap() (gas: 825912)\n[PASS] test_subsequentBuyPaysETHAndPreservesPriorClaim() (gas: 724482)\n[PASS] test_unapprovedRedeemerCannotBurnRecipientClaims() (gas: 952032)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 104.81ms (95.34ms CPU time)\n\nRan 12 tests for test/TaxyTokenEdges.t.sol:TaxyTokenEdgesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_splitDelegatedTransfersMatchSingleTransfer(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 193568, ~: 194734)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 892596831086088598987061699\n  Bound result 433555836494559640116444233\n\n[PASS] test_approvingZeroSpenderRevertsWithoutChangingExistingAllowance() (gas: 105904)\n[PASS] test_finiteAllowanceCanBeExhaustedButNotReplayed() (gas: 220744)\n[PASS] test_fullSupplyCanMoveAndReturnWithoutTax() (gas: 150730)\n[PASS] test_maximumTransferRevertsWithBalanceErrorWithoutOverflow() (gas: 60865)\n[PASS] test_oneWeiTransferAndSelfTransferPreserveSupply() (gas: 114323)\n[PASS] test_replacingAndRevokingInfiniteAllowanceTakesEffectImmediately() (gas: 272209)\n[PASS] test_selfTransferFromSpendsAllowanceWithoutChangingBalance() (gas: 111170)\n[PASS] test_transferFromInsufficientBalanceRestoresSpentAllowance() (gas: 124754)\n[PASS] test_transferFromZeroReceiverRestoresSpentAllowance() (gas: 122228)\n[PASS] test_zeroAmountDoesNotBypassInvalidAddresses() (gas: 74510)\n[PASS] test_zeroTransfersSucceedWithoutBalanceOrAllowance() (gas: 122999)\nSuite result: ok. 12 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 108.66ms (110.67ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/TaxyHookPresettlement.t.sol:TaxyHookPresettlementTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_prepaidBuysConserveFundsAndRefundSurplus(uint96,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 429473, ~: 429303)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 75279940122549865338\n  Bound result 148393068752349379\n\n[PASS] test_emptyPoolTokenSpecifiedSwapsRefundAllCreditAndPayNoFee() (gas: 1442720)\n[PASS] test_prepaidBuyPaysFeeImmediatelyFromZeroNativeReserves() (gas: 413510)\n[PASS] test_unusedPrepaidCreditIsRefundedWithoutDoublePayment() (gas: 422236)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 108.64ms (96.59ms CPU time)\n\nRan 10 tests for test/TaxyHookCallbacks.t.sol:TaxyHookCallbacksTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_feeDeltasMatchETHDeliveredAcrossInt128Domain(uint128,uint8) (runs: 1000, μ: 238689, ~: 250035)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 8005230616017801794073745734\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_senderCannotImpersonatePoolManager(address,uint8) (runs: 1000, μ: 310057, ~: 309329)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 0\n\n[PASS] test_allUnsupportedPoolShapesRejectedBeforeInitializeAndSwap() (gas: 588353)\n[PASS] test_disabledCallbacksAuthenticateAndRejectEvenManager() (gas: 401286)\n[PASS] test_duplicateBeforeAndAfterCallbacksCannotChargeTwice() (gas: 428292)\n[PASS] test_grossedUpNativeExactOutputLimitAndOneBeyond() (gas: 632733)\n[PASS] test_oneWeiAndRoundingBoundariesInEveryMode() (gas: 4298777)\n[PASS] test_tokenSpecifiedBuyRejectsGrossBeyondInt128() (gas: 382859)\n[PASS] test_unexpectedNativeSignsCannotCausePayment() (gas: 275077)\n[PASS] test_zeroInputRejectedByHookForBothDirections() (gas: 201525)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 109.27ms (193.76ms CPU time)\n\nRan 25 tests for test/TaxyHook.t.sol:TaxyHookTest\n[PASS] invariant_feesAndFundsConservedAcrossSwapSequences() (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract    | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=====================================================+\n| SwapHandler | swap     | 2048  | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_allModesConserveFunds(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 368601, ~: 374588)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 37062721325\n\n[PASS] test_ERC20PairCannotInitialize() (gas: 44846)\n[PASS] test_ETHExactInputChargesFourPercentAndPaysImmediately() (gas: 372688)\n[PASS] test_ETHExactOutputDeliversExactNetETH() (gas: 358160)\n[PASS] test_TokenExactInputChargesFourPercentInETH() (gas: 356936)\n[PASS] test_TokenExactOutputChargesFourPercentInETH() (gas: 371052)\n[PASS] test_afterSwapRequiresMatchingBeforeSwap() (gas: 44642)\n[PASS] test_allEnabledCallbacksRejectUnauthorizedCaller() (gas: 83993)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsMissingManagerCode() (gas: 3787)\n[PASS] test_dynamicLPFeeCannotInitialize() (gas: 47423)\n[PASS] test_initializationRejectsWrongHookKey() (gas: 16672)\n[PASS] test_liquidityExitRemainsPossibleWhenRecipientRejectsETH() (gas: 704288)\n[PASS] test_partialETHInputRevertsAtomically() (gas: 704041)\n[PASS] test_partialETHOutputRevertsAtomically() (gas: 676116)\n[PASS] test_partialTokenInputChargesOnlyActualETHOutput() (gas: 286022)\n[PASS] test_partialTokenOutputChargesOnlyActualETHInput() (gas: 300139)\n[PASS] test_permissionsAndInitialization() (gas: 33159)\n[PASS] test_recipientCannotReenterSwapDuringFeePayment() (gas: 1137145)\n[PASS] test_recipientRejectingETHRevertsWholeSwap() (gas: 817117)\n[PASS] test_roundingChargesZeroBelow25WeiAndOneAt25Wei() (gas: 1012615)\n[PASS] test_sequentialSwapsDoNotLeakAccountingState() (gas: 1349003)\n[PASS] test_signedAmountBoundsRejectBeforeAccountingChanges() (gas: 562365)\n[PASS] test_slippageIncludesFeeAndRevertsPayment() (gas: 315971)\n[PASS] test_zeroAmountRejectedAndNextSwapWorks() (gas: 429282)\nSuite result: ok. 25 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 599.60ms (630.59ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/TaxyTokenInvariant.t.sol:TaxyTokenInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nTaxyTokenInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_allowancesMatchIndependentLedger\n[PASS] invariant_balancesMatchIndependentLedgerAndConserveFixedSupply\n[PASS] invariant_metadataCannotChange\n TaxyTokenInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭--------------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract                 | Selector                    | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=====================================================================================+\n| TaxyTokenSequenceHandler | approve                     | 2085  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TaxyTokenSequenceHandler | rejectDelegatedOverspend    | 2025  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TaxyTokenSequenceHandler | rejectInsufficientAllowance | 1954  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TaxyTokenSequenceHandler | rejectOverspend             | 2066  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TaxyTokenSequenceHandler | rejectSupplyOrAdminChanges  | 2073  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TaxyTokenSequenceHandler | rejectZeroReceiver          | 2107  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TaxyTokenSequenceHandler | transfer                    | 2055  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TaxyTokenSequenceHandler | transferFrom                | 2019  | 0       | 0        |\n╰--------------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 26\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 500000000000000000\n  Bound result 385\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 333\n  Bound result 433953791597135845885533339\n  Bound result 6000\n  Bound result 50000000000000000000\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 1581846317\n  Bound result 2920000000000000000\n  Bound result 13421676694042197895133751\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 57777701960871627628510282\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 210703774808857837295362167\n  Bound result 452324591611508335133991065\n\n[PASS] test_seededSequenceExercisesSuccessFailureAndAllowanceRevocation() (gas: 1340494)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 100\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 1\n\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 4.10s (4.10s CPU time)\n\nRan 5 tests for test/TaxyLifecycle.t.sol:TaxyLifecycleTest\n[PASS] invariant_multiPoolLifecycleConservesFundsAndPositions() (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭----------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract             | Selector        | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=====================================================================+\n| TaxyLifecycleHandler | changeLiquidity | 3955  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TaxyLifecycleHandler | rejectedTrade   | 4132  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TaxyLifecycleHandler | roundTrip       | 4205  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TaxyLifecycleHandler | trade           | 4092  | 0       | 0        |\n╰----------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 5578\n  Bound result 2855065572049380817\n  Bound result 999000000000000016131\n  Bound result 999999999999998999000\n  Bound result 999000000000000003096\n  Bound result 574773008133693676973\n  Bound result 4271202052610776413\n  Bound result 999288230376151711746\n  Bound result 6203982298865519528\n  Bound result 12\n  Bound result 9999999999000002228\n  Bound result 12\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 600\n  Bound result 3374607431768211455\n  Bound result 9999999999000013025\n  Bound result 13663\n  Bound result 4091784835050222816\n  Bound result 1536\n  Bound result 47\n  Bound result 469267777868698144398\n  Bound result 7381\n  Bound result 6414981148699890391\n  Bound result 267557769\n  Bound result 4921135067723478364\n  Bound result 1512398212368360317\n  Bound result 9999999999000000061\n  Bound result 9999999999999999998\n  Bound result 5999999994\n  Bound result 2876006549721548144\n  Bound result 5873369759859791763\n  Bound result 9999999999000002830\n  Bound result 10000000000000000000\n  Bound result 9999999999000000101\n  Bound result 8000010298999007927\n  Bound result 1617213156573880002\n  Bound result 4264337593543950336\n  Bound result 999000000000000012901\n  Bound result 10000000000000000000\n  Bound result 9999999999000009947\n  Bound result 1920000000000000000\n  Bound result 346\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 999000000000000015763\n  Bound result 40000000000000000\n  Bound result 680\n  Bound result 95\n  Bound result 9999999999000001021\n  Bound result 1684597038097791668\n  Bound result 999000000000000008397\n  Bound result 16777215\n  Bound result 7849\n  Bound result 9999999999000007499\n  Bound result 2514000705\n  Bound result 9999999999000000224\n  Bound result 9999999999016777216\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_feeEventsAgreeWithActualNativePayment(uint256,bool,bool,bool) (runs: 1000, μ: 686055, ~: 689593)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 6756592456361113081\n  Bound result 6756592456361113081\n\n[PASS] test_handlerExercisesEveryActionAndModeAcrossBothPools() (gas: 12206412)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000\n\n[PASS] test_oneWeiRequestsAllModesSettleWithoutTokenFee() (gas: 1171325)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1\n\n[PASS] test_tokenSettlementFailureRollsBackAlreadyPaidFeeAndGuard() (gas: 985535)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n\nSuite result: ok. 5 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 8.37s (8.46s CPU time)\n\nRan 9 tests for test/TaxyClaimFallback.t.sol:TaxyClaimFallbackTest\n[PASS] invariant_everyFeeIsETHOrABackedClaimOwnedByTheRecipient() (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭--------------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract                 | Selector        | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=========================================================================+\n| TaxyClaimFallbackHandler | buy             | 4064  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TaxyClaimFallbackHandler | changeLiquidity | 4066  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TaxyClaimFallbackHandler | redeem          | 4104  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TaxyClaimFallbackHandler | sell            | 4150  | 0       | 0        |\n╰--------------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 6771\n  Bound result 6909004440854147680\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 23496\n  Bound result 10000000000000000000\n  Bound result 99000000000000000128\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 23\n  Bound result 16645\n  Bound result 191128917752348113\n  Bound result 887191\n  Bound result 99000000000000008280\n  Bound result 127\n  Bound result 17410\n  Bound result 244\n  Bound result 6910\n  Bound result 36\n  Bound result 23519\n  Bound result 4727527537411848370\n  Bound result 85231259881794296\n  Bound result 23684\n  Bound result 12806\n  Bound result 89388071204521222329\n  Bound result 16822\n  Bound result 10112\n  Bound result 120\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 990000000000000000\n  Bound result 990000000000000000\n  Bound result 630817509\n  Bound result 2920000000000000000\n  Bound result 1143\n  Bound result 600\n  Bound result 9074\n  Bound result 7366692966025986005\n  Bound result 99000000000000002096\n  Bound result 2094\n  Bound result 15680\n  Bound result 857534482674902\n  Bound result 99000000000000015059\n  Bound result 2533\n  Bound result 2827\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 99000000000000025682\n  Bound result 13940\n  Bound result 48879\n  Bound result 5126769693\n  Bound result 242\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 31508897868269834823\n  Bound result 10000000000000000000\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 72017141715631544\n  Bound result 6728\n  Bound result 13214118166069537\n  Bound result 2000000000000000000\n  Bound result 15521\n  Bound result 7182\n  Bound result 7945\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 99000000002542115379\n  Bound result 8388608\n  Bound result 268701452\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_branchFollowsManagerBalanceAgainstFee(uint96,uint96,bool) (runs: 1000, μ: 431816, ~: 433233)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 13016983393108\n  Bound result 14850649\n  Bound result 14850649\n\n[PASS] test_claimBranchEmitsSwapFeePaidThenSwapFeeClaimMinted() (gas: 248924)\n[PASS] test_directPaymentDrawnFromClaimBackingIsRestoredBySettlement() (gas: 704342)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 2000000000000000000\n\n[PASS] test_fullExitLeavesClaimsBackedAndRedeemable() (gas: 2008720)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 951393851284142531\n\n[PASS] test_handlerExercisesEveryBranchDeterministically() (gas: 5489314)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000\n  Bound result 10000000000000000000\n  Bound result 50000000000000000000\n  Bound result 20000000000000000\n  Bound result 50000000000000000000\n  Bound result 10000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n\n[PASS] test_thirdPartyCannotMoveOrBurnRecipientClaims() (gas: 488756)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n\n[PASS] test_underfundedBuyerRollsBackDirectPaymentDrawnFromClaimBacking() (gas: 676277)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n\n[PASS] test_zeroFeeBuyAtZeroETHMintsNoClaimAndEmitsOnlySwapFeePaid() (gas: 278380)\nSuite result: ok. 9 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 8.94s (9.01s CPU time)\n\nRan 10 test suites in 8.94s (22.48s CPU time): 90 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (90 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":42,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"TaxyHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"TaxyHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"TaxyToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"TaxyToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"TaxyToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":3,\"DEPENDENCIES.json\":30,\"README.md\":233,\"docs/SECURITY_REVIEW.md\":47,\"foundry.toml\":22,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/MineTaxySalt.s.sol\":31,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":31,\"src/TaxyHook.sol\":214,\"src/TaxyToken.sol\":12,\"test/Deployment.t.sol\":76,\"test/README.md\":47,\"test/TaxyClaimFallback.t.sol\":627,\"test/TaxyHook.t.sol\":378,\"test/TaxyHookCallbacks.t.sol\":309,\"test/TaxyHookPresettlement.t.sol\":207,\"test/TaxyHookShortfall.t.sol\":240,\"test/TaxyLifecycle.t.sol\":389,\"test/TaxyToken.t.sol\":114,\"test/TaxyTokenEdges.t.sol\":171,\"test/TaxyTokenInvariant.t.sol\":217,\"test/helpers/FeeRecipients.sol\":37,\"test/helpers/SettlementRouter.sol\":115,\"test/helpers/SwapHandler.sol\":48,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":11},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"d89acf68adf5d47aecc326547ae0415233e2a48748088684a84ab32d4a827fa6","verifiedTreeHash":"05e2ec7d34a9f7f053d216c35626d1a79ef04e4f","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+da6bdbe5"}]}