{"assessments":[],"deployments":[{"attestationHash":"3828938c4f34072f33b5f115c0e011c81f7584d1bde98dd95eb39f5cfeed5ba3","chainId":1,"contracts":[{"address":"0xf66c6c7a09e741843d4ede8795ac4267e3823037","blockNumber":26181764,"name":"IMDStockDex","role":"other","txHash":"0xf949886c0c836ae25a4eac0c7e8d98767091ec71da6f42ea04bfa408a96c7e21"}],"id":"42e04751-53a5-423d-9dfa-f44e3fece5e7","manifestHash":"2e91d034e0efeeb94bc9529b3ad25bfa97a74811e0b66c018fefdee2f55e7a37","status":"live"}],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"f10404ef-32cd-42fc-89db-158027f8f4c8","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"df93a53b924183d6fbdf1dc4a35414a25420f89a1f62c364d99facf14df5e535","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_economics","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"c37a9424be3b4edd12177f0a5a6af212ceea160a821be6bda2a8e26a00e61d81","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_flow","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"6c6858aa4a8374affc09fdd3ffadc828c47a3a4320ed0f80a6a70844bd075107","dependsOn":["build_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest","audit_math","audit_permissions","audit_economics","audit_flow"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"af3aa01159bbf354f621cafa5c0006f6169e0938a8b015be508b7377dbf165bc","skillId":"audit-judge","tools":[]},"key":"audit_judge","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"af3aa01159bbf354f621cafa5c0006f6169e0938a8b015be508b7377dbf165bc","skillId":"audit-judge","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"e4559ecccbfb9926b0dfe42fee5154424ef906925b1e1c69c94862f7e9e7a38f","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_math","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"727d9fb08747f00454051613014b261e437d4182b54f7ae66144f899502dc66f","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_permissions","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"d1bb7b4a827f091466f94ced1a24a0c257ef6efba8608f2e557d7767ebd81308","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"6b8d2c2ebd3301cff2be8edb1e1cc6ba65c858c02fe7247be81722b969842265","skillId":"build-contract-project","tools":[]},"key":"build_contract_project","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"6b8d2c2ebd3301cff2be8edb1e1cc6ba65c858c02fe7247be81722b969842265","skillId":"build-contract-project","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"ffb1f48336e2d8f98aa08e05a8d4d3984f82389d960677c9ba4a8758d746d522","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"tools":[]},"key":"manifest","kind":"code","role":"integrate","skillHash":null,"skillId":null,"state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"a8669f41368be35c9703f3c7f032b78789f2b88ae5339bdddb49140702635790","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"73431852439ad3a343f3d2b7db1c43cd363b9f48f9bb51497374a0cf6d50b223","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","tools":[]},"key":"write_foundry_tests","kind":"code","role":"tests","skillHash":"73431852439ad3a343f3d2b7db1c43cd363b9f48f9bb51497374a0cf6d50b223","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"create a dex to buying RWA stocks tokenize, buying stocks only using $IMD. Fee buying stock is 0,5%, every collected fee using for burn $IMD and send to creator propotional.\nStock price and contract using ondo finance or uniswap","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"7ef1a43070cc4bd85567200dc764ac99017ebb2351ab02da79f65dc81d21927a","previousHash":"bf59bba6d99df79a80ca246350dbf3a01276887b9dc2de5925ab08eb36563fbd","projectId":"f10404ef-32cd-42fc-89db-158027f8f4c8","publication":{"commit":"7933edf6f604a63d8b4de3f6c4455bfecbe3f87d","deliveredAt":"2026-10-13T06:25:33.626Z","repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-1513-create-dex-buying-rwa"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"15a0efb5f96fe9fff48708896fdad9d302972621939ff4f72fc06e64f689adfe","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"3d1594ebc88ebc2d5421f0c3b3fce98696c94282b1b6772fe8a877b344008758","device":"2e343a06f770172d","findings":[],"hash":"05899bea8407c755daabf7143457613fe929ffabff84e71b7d00c312b47e0366","nodeId":"175012f6-c981-4690-8b1f-732b040e0106","outcome":"completed","summary":"Implemented IMD-only stock purchases through Uniswap v3 with a fixed 0.5% fee and configurable burn/creator split.\n\n`forge build`, `forge test`, and `forge fmt --check` pass, including clean offline verification.\n\nDeployment settings and responsibilities are in [README.md](/home/seat/.identitymd/work/f10404ef-32cd-42fc-89db-158027f8f4c8/175012f6-c981-4690-8b1f-732b040e0106/README.md). Trading starts paused; the owner must configure verified addresses and confirm IMD supports `burn(uint256)`.","treeHash":"b951a096f9b6cae135921235cb8ed6316a00ff98","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1221248,"inputTokens":104877,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":37829,"runtime":"codex","turns":7,"wallClockMs":1460171}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"dedd4428da8fa41e","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Only remaining open item from the tester. _swap rejects a partial fill only by checking that the router spent all of the net IMD. On a route with more than one hop, the first hop always takes the full IMD amount. If a later pool runs out of liquidity, Uniswap v3 SwapRouter.exactInput uses up only part of the intermediate token, leaves the rest in the router (where anyone can take it with sweepToken), and returns the smaller output. buyStock then succeeds and still charges the full 0.5% fee (burn and creator share). The quoteBuy NatSpec says buyStock 'would then revert', and docs/SECURITY.md says a purchase cannot be 'partially settled'. That guarantee does not hold here: the only protection left is the buyer's minStockOut. This is low severity because loss is limited by the minStockOut the buyer chose. A buyer who took minStockOut from quoteBuy on a healthy route is protected, because the order reverts with InsufficientOutput. Fix: after exactInput, revert if the router's balance of any intermediate token went up. Alternatively, correct the NatSpec and SECURITY.md to say minStockOut is the only protection on later hops.","line":302,"path":"src/IMDStockDex.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {IMDStockDex} from \"src/IMDStockDex.sol\";\n\ncontract Tok {\n    mapping(address => uint256) public balanceOf;\n    mapping(address => mapping(address => uint256)) public allowance;\n    uint256 public totalSupply;\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 a) external {\n        balanceOf[to] += a;\n        totalSupply += a;\n    }\n\n    function burn(uint256 a) external {\n        balanceOf[msg.sender] -= a;\n        totalSupply -= a;\n    }\n\n    function approve(address s, uint256 a) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[msg.sender][s] = a;\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    function transfer(address to, uint256 a) external returns (bool) {\n        balanceOf[msg.sender] -= a;\n        balanceOf[to] += a;\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    function transferFrom(address f, address to, uint256 a) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[f][msg.sender] -= a;\n        balanceOf[f] -= a;\n        balanceOf[to] += a;\n        return true;\n    }\n}\n\n/// @dev Reproduces Uniswap v3 SwapRouter.exactInput on a 2-hop path whose second pool runs dry: the\n///      first hop consumes the whole IMD input, the second consumes only part of the intermediate\n///      token (the rest stays in the router), and the output is far below a fair fill.\ncontract PartialSecondHopRouter {\n    Tok public mid;\n\n    constructor(Tok m) {\n        mid = m;\n    }\n\n    struct ExactInputParams {\n        bytes path;\n        address recipient;\n        uint256 deadline;\n        uint256 amountIn;\n        uint256 amountOutMinimum;\n    }\n\n    function exactInput(ExactInputParams calldata p) external returns (uint256 out) {\n        address imd = address(bytes20(p.path[0:20]));\n        address stock = address(bytes20(p.path[p.path.length - 20:]));\n        Tok(imd).transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), p.amountIn); // hop 1 consumes everything\n        mid.mint(address(this), p.amountIn); // intermediate received by the router\n        out = p.amountIn / 1000; // hop 2 fills only a sliver; most intermediate stays in the router\n        require(out >= p.amountOutMinimum, \"Too little received\");\n        Tok(stock).mint(p.recipient, out);\n    }\n}\n\ncontract PartialFillLaterHopProof is Test {\n    function test_partialFillAtLaterHopMustNotChargeFullFee() public {\n        address owner = makeAddr(\"owner\");\n        address creator = makeAddr(\"creator\");\n        address buyer = makeAddr(\"buyer\");\n        Tok imd = new Tok();\n        Tok mid = new Tok();\n        Tok stock = new Tok();\n        PartialSecondHopRouter router = new PartialSecondHopRouter(mid);\n        IMDStockDex dex = new IMDStockDex(owner);\n        vm.startPrank(owner);\n        dex.setIMD(address(imd));\n        dex.setRouter(address(router));\n        dex.setFeeDistribution(creator, 6000);\n        dex.setMarket(\n            address(stock), abi.encodePacked(address(imd), uint24(3000), address(mid), uint24(3000), address(stock))\n        );\n        dex.unpause();\n        vm.stopPrank();\n        imd.mint(buyer, 1000 ether);\n        vm.prank(buyer);\n        imd.approve(address(dex), 1000 ether);\n        uint256 version = dex.configVersion();\n\n        // Expected (per quoteBuy's documentation): a partial fill makes buyStock revert, nothing charged.\n        // Actual: it succeeds; buyer pays 1000 IMD incl. the full 5 IMD fee, gets 0.995 STOCK, and\n        // 995 intermediate tokens are stranded in the router (sweepable by anyone on the real SwapRouter).\n        vm.prank(buyer);\n        try dex.buyStock(address(stock), 1000 ether, 1, block.timestamp, version) {\n            assertEq(mid.balanceOf(address(router)), 0, \"partial fill accepted; intermediate stranded in router\");\n        } catch {}\n        assertEq(imd.balanceOf(buyer), 1000 ether, \"buyer charged for a partial fill\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Ran .imd/reads/proofs/Proof_a51d2dec88ce.t.sol from test/scratch (`forge test --match-path test/scratch/Proof_a51d2dec88ce.t.sol`) against the current tree. Setup: a 2-hop route IMD->MID->STOCK and a router double that behaves like v3 SwapRouter when the second hop runs dry (it pulls the full IMD and gives back part of the output). Buyer calls buyStock(stock, 1000e18, 1, now, v). Expected: revert with nothing charged. Actual: the purchase succeeds, 3e18 is burned, 2e18 goes to the creator, and the assertion fails with 'partial fill accepted; intermediate stranded in router: 995000000000000000000 != 0'. Real v3 multi-hop exactInput (SwapRouter.exactInput loop) behaves the same way: in a partial swap, an intermediate hop's pool only pulls what it consumed, and the remainder stays in the router.","severity":"low","snippet":"        _requireDecrease(imd, address(this), imdBefore, amountIn);","title":"Partial fill at a later hop of a multi-hop route is accepted: full fee charged, intermediate token stranded in the router"}],"hash":"6c6858aa4a8374affc09fdd3ffadc828c47a3a4320ed0f80a6a70844bd075107","nodeId":"034fbfc6-8603-469a-aee1-0b8e2453d972","outcome":"completed","summary":"Of the earlier findings, one is fixed, three are settled by documentation and three are design or trust points I'm not reopening. One new issue holds up, at low severity. It's in `.imd-findings.json`, along with a coverage row for all 13 entry points: 12 `holds`, 1 `finding`. No source files were changed. I ran the tester's proof from a scratch test folder and deleted the folder afterwards.\n\n**New finding (low): a multi-hop purchase that runs dry on a later hop still succeeds and still charges the full fee.**\n- **Where:** `src/IMDStockDex.sol:302`, `_requireDecrease(imd, address(this), imdBefore, amountIn);`\n- **Why the guard misses it:** this line rejects a partial fill only by checking that the router spent all of the net IMD. On a route with more than one hop, the first hop always takes all the IMD. If a later pool runs out of liquidity, Uniswap v3's router consumes only part of the intermediate token. The rest stays in the router, where anyone can take it with `sweepToken`.\n- **Result:** the buyer receives less stock but still pays the full 0.5% fee, including the burn and the creator's share.\n- **What it contradicts:** the `quoteBuy` NatSpec and `docs/SECURITY.md` both say such a purchase reverts.\n- **Why only low:** the buyer's `minStockOut` limits the loss. A buyer who takes it from a quote on a healthy route is protected, because the purchase reverts on insufficient output.\n- **Proof:** I ran the tester's proof (`Proof_a51d2dec88ce.t.sol`) and attached it to the finding. It fails on the current code for the stated reason: the purchase is accepted and 995e18 of the intermediate token is left in the router. The proof uses a stand-in router, not the real Uniswap bytecode. I checked against the real Uniswap v3 router's multi-hop logic and it behaves the same way.\n- **Fix:** after the swap, revert if the router's balance of any intermediate token went up. Otherwise, correct the NatSpec and `docs/SECURITY.md` to say `minStockOut` is the only protection on later hops.\n\n**Earlier findings:**\n- **Fixed:**\n  - The creator can no longer be the router or the quoter.\n  - `quoteBuy` now reverts when any hop's liquidity would run out.\n- **Settled by documentation, no code change:**\n  - **Fee bypass:** a buyer can still swap directly on the Uniswap pool and skip the 0.5%. The author chose the option I offered of documenting that the fee applies only to purchases through this contract, and I accept that.\n  - **Global version bump:** disabling one market still invalidates pending orders on every other market. It's intended and now documented.\n  - **One-shot IMD setting:** the address can only be set once, with no check that its burn works. A dry-run purchase before launch is now documented.\n- **Design or trust points, not reopened:** the owner's control over router, quoter, listings and fees, and the single creator shared by every listed stock.\n- **Missing tests:** the test file has no thin-liquidity or 4-hop case. That is a test gap, not a code defect, so I haven't restated it.\n\nThe static-analysis leads didn't produce anything new. The reentrancy warnings are covered by the reentrancy guard and the exact balance checks. The divide-before-multiply warnings are the intended remainder-preserving fee calculation.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":226215,"inputTokens":8,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":3517,"runtime":"claude","turns":4,"wallClockMs":40204}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"4dd67dae195771b6","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Asymmetric sentinel validation (Asymmetry guide, step 6 / Trust Gap seam access x economics). setIMD rejects token == creator, token == router and token == quoter (line 93-97), and setRouter/setQuoter reject the IMD address, but setFeeDistribution only rejects address(0), address(this) and the IMD token. The configured router and quoter are not rejected as the creator. The original Uniswap v3 SwapRouter (the only router this integration supports, see src/interfaces/IUniswapV3.sol) exposes a permissionless sweepToken(token, amountMinimum, recipient), so any IMD _payCreator sends to it is taken by whoever calls sweepToken first (MEV bots routinely do). _payCreator's balance checks pass because the router's balance does increase by exactly the fee, so the purchase succeeds and emits StockPurchased with creator == router. Preconditions: owner misconfiguration of a value the contract already validates against the same address set elsewhere; the unprivileged amplifier is the public sweep. Impact is loss of the creator's fee share on every purchase until the owner notices; no buyer funds are at risk. Fix preserving the design: in setFeeDistribution also revert InvalidAddress when newCreator == address(router) || newCreator == address(quoter), and mirror in setRouter/setQuoter (newRouter == creator). No existing test covers creator == router or creator == quoter.","line":126,"path":"src/IMDStockDex.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {IERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol\";\nimport {IMDStockDex} from \"src/IMDStockDex.sol\";\nimport {MockToken} from \"test/mocks/MockTokens.sol\";\nimport {UniswapV3FactoryBytecode} from \"test/fixtures/UniswapV3FactoryBytecode.sol\";\nimport {SwapRouterBytecode} from \"test/fixtures/SwapRouterBytecode.sol\";\n\ninterface IV3Factory {\n    function createPool(address tokenA, address tokenB, uint24 fee) external returns (address pool);\n}\n\ninterface IV3Pool {\n    function token0() external view returns (address);\n    function token1() external view returns (address);\n    function initialize(uint160 sqrtPriceX96) external;\n    function mint(address recipient, int24 tickLower, int24 tickUpper, uint128 amount, bytes calldata data)\n        external\n        returns (uint256 amount0, uint256 amount1);\n}\n\n/// setFeeDistribution accepts the configured router as creator (setIMD rejects the symmetric case);\n/// the creator fee paid to the SwapRouter is then sweepable by anyone via sweepToken.\ncontract CreatorRouterSweepTest is Test {\n    IMDStockDex internal dex;\n    MockToken internal imd;\n    MockToken internal stock;\n    address internal factory;\n    address internal router;\n    address internal owner = makeAddr(\"owner\");\n    address internal buyer = makeAddr(\"buyer\");\n    mapping(address => bool) internal pools;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        imd = new MockToken(\"IMD\", 18);\n        stock = new MockToken(\"STOCK\", 18);\n        factory = _deploy(UniswapV3FactoryBytecode.creationCode());\n        router = _deploy(abi.encodePacked(SwapRouterBytecode.creationCode(), abi.encode(factory, address(stock))));\n        imd.mint(address(this), 1e28);\n        stock.mint(address(this), 1e28);\n        address pool = IV3Factory(factory).createPool(address(imd), address(stock), 3000);\n        pools[pool] = true;\n        IV3Pool(pool).initialize(uint160(1 << 96));\n        IV3Pool(pool).mint(address(this), -887220, 887220, 1e24, \"\");\n\n        dex = new IMDStockDex(owner);\n        vm.startPrank(owner);\n        dex.setIMD(address(imd));\n        dex.setRouter(router);\n        vm.stopPrank();\n        imd.mint(buyer, 10_000 ether);\n        vm.prank(buyer);\n        imd.approve(address(dex), type(uint256).max);\n    }\n\n    /// Fails on current code: the router is accepted as creator. Passes once setFeeDistribution\n    /// rejects address(router) (and address(quoter)) the way setIMD already rejects the mirror case.\n    /// With the real SwapRouter accepted here, the 2 IMD creator share of a 1000 IMD purchase lands on\n    /// the router and any account takes it with sweepToken(imd, 0, attacker).\n    function test_creatorMustNotBeConfiguredRouter() public {\n        vm.prank(owner);\n        vm.expectRevert(IMDStockDex.InvalidAddress.selector);\n        dex.setFeeDistribution(router, 6000);\n        assertEq(dex.creator(), address(0));\n    }\n\n    function uniswapV3MintCallback(uint256 amount0, uint256 amount1, bytes calldata) external {\n        require(pools[msg.sender], \"unknown pool\");\n        IERC20(IV3Pool(msg.sender).token0()).transfer(msg.sender, amount0);\n        IERC20(IV3Pool(msg.sender).token1()).transfer(msg.sender, amount1);\n    }\n\n    function _deploy(bytes memory initcode) private returns (address deployed) {\n        assembly (\"memory-safe\") {\n            deployed := create(0, add(initcode, 32), mload(initcode))\n        }\n        require(deployed != address(0), \"fixture deployment failed\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"State: DEX with setIMD(imd), setRouter(realSwapRouter), paused. Call (owner) setFeeDistribution(realSwapRouter, 6000): expected revert InvalidAddress (as setIMD does for the router), actual: accepted, creator() == router. Then setMarket(stock, imd|3000|stock), unpause. Buyer: buyStock(stock, 1000e18, 1, block.timestamp, configVersion()). fee = 5e18, burn = 3e18, creatorAmount = 2e18 is transferred to the router (imd.balanceOf(router) == 2e18). Attacker (any address): SwapRouter.sweepToken(imd, 0, attacker) -> imd.balanceOf(attacker) == 2e18, router balance 0. The sweep was executed against the vendored v3 SwapRouter 1.4.4 bytecode fixture (attacker balance 2e18 after sweepToken). The attached proof test expects InvalidAddress from setFeeDistribution(router, 6000): it fails on current code ('next call did not revert as expected') and passes once the router/quoter are rejected as creator.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (newCreator == address(0) || newCreator == address(this) || newCreator == address(imd)) {\n            revert InvalidAddress();\n        }","title":"setFeeDistribution accepts the configured router (or quoter) as creator; fee share paid to the SwapRouter is sweepable by anyone"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Documented per the adapter's requirement to record material privileged powers separately; this is the intended role, not a permission bypass. Powers (all onlyOwner, most whenPaused, each bumps configVersion): setRouter/setQuoter to any contract; setMarket to any token with any path; setFeeDistribution to any recipient and 1-9999 bps burn share; recoverToken of any token held by the DEX (only donations can be there); pause/unpause; disableMarket without pausing. The buyer's only protection against a malicious router is its own minStockOut, and the only source for that value is the owner-chosen quoter via quoteBuy. configVersion prevents a buyer executing against a configuration different from the one quoted, but not against a configuration that was already malicious when quoted. Ownership is two-step and renounce is disabled, so control cannot be lost by accident. Recommendation: publish the router/quoter/market addresses the owner sets and have the frontend verify quoter output against an independent source; consider a multisig/timelock owner. No code change is implied by this entry.","line":103,"path":"src/IMDStockDex.sol","reproduction":"Owner (paused): setQuoter(Q) where Q.quoteExactInput returns amountIn/1000; setRouter(R) where R.exactInput pulls amountIn IMD and sends exactly amountIn/1000 stock to recipient and returns that value; unpause. Buyer calls quoteBuy(stock, 1000e18) -> stockOut = 0.995e18, version v; follows README and calls buyStock(stock, 1000e18, 0.995e18, deadline, v). All DEX checks pass (output >= minimum, output == reported, router spent amountIn, burn and creator payment exact). Buyer paid 1000 IMD for ~1/1000 of fair output; the 995 IMD net is in R. Expected per brief: fair Uniswap execution; actual: depends entirely on the owner-chosen contracts.","severity":"info","snippet":"    function setRouter(address newRouter) external nonReentrant onlyOwner whenPaused {\n        _requireContract(newRouter);\n        if (newRouter == address(this) || newRouter == address(imd)) revert InvalidAddress();\n        router = IUniswapV3Router(newRouter);\n        _bumpVersion();\n        emit RouterConfigured(newRouter);\n    }","title":"Owner trust assumptions: router, quoter, listings, creator and donation recovery are fully owner-controlled; a lying quoter plus malicious router can drain the net amount of a purchase"}],"hash":"727d9fb08747f00454051613014b261e437d4182b54f7ae66144f899502dc66f","nodeId":"53b72c20-b7ef-4213-a9d7-1cdbfb10e043","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. The findings file is at the repository root with 2 findings and 15 coverage rows, and no source or configuration file was changed.\n\n**Outcome of the Access Control, Trust Gap and Asymmetry audit of `IMDStockDex`**\n\nThe permission model holds. Every configuration setter is owner-only and most also require the paused state. The purchase path writes no storage, pulls IMD only from the caller, delivers stock only to the caller, and delta-checks every leg. No unprivileged path can bump the configuration version, so nobody but the owner can invalidate pending purchases. Reentrancy from the router or token hooks into any admin or buy function is blocked. All nine Slither reentrancy and divide-before-multiply leads were traced and are false positives.\n\n**Findings recorded**\n\n- **Low. `setFeeDistribution` accepts the configured router or quoter as creator.** The function `setIMD` rejects the router, quoter and creator addresses, but the mirror check is missing on the creator side. With the real Uniswap v3 SwapRouter, the creator share lands on the router and anyone can take it with `sweepToken`. I executed the full sweep against the vendored SwapRouter bytecode. The attached proof test expects the revert and fails on current code, so it will pass once the fix lands.\n- **Info. Owner trust assumptions.** The router, quoter, listings, creator and donation recovery are fully owner-controlled by design. A buyer's only defense against a malicious router is the minimum output it derives from the owner-chosen quoter. The entry documents the concrete scenario and recommends operational safeguards rather than a code change.\n\n**Coverage**\n\nAll 13 entry points have rows. Twelve hold, `setFeeDistribution` points at finding 1, and two invariant rows record that only owner functions write the version counter and that no admin function is reachable mid-purchase. The existing suite of 65 tests passes unchanged. The only failing test is my scratch proof under `test/scratch/`, which is expected and is not kept.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1174364,"inputTokens":354,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":29165,"runtime":"claude","turns":32,"wallClockMs":427861}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"6ed09c2eb1ff6aec","findings":[],"hash":"99c19ea46c756352c908c7d93b46cc8d4bf67f2f89a28b9bb5c7e3644b471804","nodeId":"e828e401-e72f-4212-86b7-57015693cfac","outcome":"failed","summary":"could not restore accepted work: accepted work conflicts with a dependency that changed the same files after it was accepted: ","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":0,"inputTokens":0,"model":null,"outputTokens":0,"runtime":"claude","turns":0,"wallClockMs":498}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"048070e1566588f2501afc390fde49cc8d3eb7ec1211b79e53c171307892de4e","device":"ea62f3bebece9304","findings":[{"description":"buyStock relies on _requireDecrease(imd, ...) after exactInput to reject partial fills (the quoteBuy NatSpec at lines 203-205 says buyStock 'would then revert'). That only catches exhaustion at the first hop. On a multi-hop path, hop 1 takes the whole net IMD amount. If a later pool runs dry, it consumes only part of the intermediate token, which stays in the SwapRouter, where anyone can take it with the permissionless sweepToken. The buyer receives a fraction of the output and still pays the full 0.5% fee, burn and creator share included. quoteBuy correctly refuses such routes with InsufficientLiquidity, so the only guard on buyStock is the buyer's minStockOut. Impact is bounded by that minimum, hence low, but the documented atomic-revert guarantee does not hold. Suggested fix, keeping the design: fail on any intermediate-token balance left in the router, or check the per-hop sqrtPrice result. More simply, correct the NatSpec and state that minStockOut is the only protection.","line":302,"path":"src/IMDStockDex.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {IMDStockDex} from \"src/IMDStockDex.sol\";\n\ncontract Tok {\n    mapping(address => uint256) public balanceOf;\n    mapping(address => mapping(address => uint256)) public allowance;\n    uint256 public totalSupply;\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 a) external {\n        balanceOf[to] += a;\n        totalSupply += a;\n    }\n\n    function burn(uint256 a) external {\n        balanceOf[msg.sender] -= a;\n        totalSupply -= a;\n    }\n\n    function approve(address s, uint256 a) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[msg.sender][s] = a;\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    function transfer(address to, uint256 a) external returns (bool) {\n        balanceOf[msg.sender] -= a;\n        balanceOf[to] += a;\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    function transferFrom(address f, address to, uint256 a) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[f][msg.sender] -= a;\n        balanceOf[f] -= a;\n        balanceOf[to] += a;\n        return true;\n    }\n}\n\n/// @dev Reproduces Uniswap v3 SwapRouter.exactInput on a 2-hop path whose second pool runs dry: the\n///      first hop consumes the whole IMD input, the second consumes only part of the intermediate\n///      token (the rest stays in the router), and the output is far below a fair fill.\ncontract PartialSecondHopRouter {\n    Tok public mid;\n\n    constructor(Tok m) {\n        mid = m;\n    }\n\n    struct ExactInputParams {\n        bytes path;\n        address recipient;\n        uint256 deadline;\n        uint256 amountIn;\n        uint256 amountOutMinimum;\n    }\n\n    function exactInput(ExactInputParams calldata p) external returns (uint256 out) {\n        address imd = address(bytes20(p.path[0:20]));\n        address stock = address(bytes20(p.path[p.path.length - 20:]));\n        Tok(imd).transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), p.amountIn); // hop 1 consumes everything\n        mid.mint(address(this), p.amountIn); // intermediate received by the router\n        out = p.amountIn / 1000; // hop 2 fills only a sliver; most intermediate stays in the router\n        require(out >= p.amountOutMinimum, \"Too little received\");\n        Tok(stock).mint(p.recipient, out);\n    }\n}\n\ncontract PartialFillLaterHopProof is Test {\n    function test_partialFillAtLaterHopMustNotChargeFullFee() public {\n        address owner = makeAddr(\"owner\");\n        address creator = makeAddr(\"creator\");\n        address buyer = makeAddr(\"buyer\");\n        Tok imd = new Tok();\n        Tok mid = new Tok();\n        Tok stock = new Tok();\n        PartialSecondHopRouter router = new PartialSecondHopRouter(mid);\n        IMDStockDex dex = new IMDStockDex(owner);\n        vm.startPrank(owner);\n        dex.setIMD(address(imd));\n        dex.setRouter(address(router));\n        dex.setFeeDistribution(creator, 6000);\n        dex.setMarket(\n            address(stock), abi.encodePacked(address(imd), uint24(3000), address(mid), uint24(3000), address(stock))\n        );\n        dex.unpause();\n        vm.stopPrank();\n        imd.mint(buyer, 1000 ether);\n        vm.prank(buyer);\n        imd.approve(address(dex), 1000 ether);\n        uint256 version = dex.configVersion();\n\n        // Expected (per quoteBuy's documentation): a partial fill makes buyStock revert, nothing charged.\n        // Actual: it succeeds; buyer pays 1000 IMD incl. the full 5 IMD fee, gets 0.995 STOCK, and\n        // 995 intermediate tokens are stranded in the router (sweepable by anyone on the real SwapRouter).\n        vm.prank(buyer);\n        try dex.buyStock(address(stock), 1000 ether, 1, block.timestamp, version) {\n            assertEq(mid.balanceOf(address(router)), 0, \"partial fill accepted; intermediate stranded in router\");\n        } catch {}\n        assertEq(imd.balanceOf(buyer), 1000 ether, \"buyer charged for a partial fill\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Real v3 bytecode, four 0.3% pools IMD-A-B-C-THIN; C/THIN has a single -60..60 position with 1e18 liquidity. buyStock(THIN, 1000e18, minStockOut=1, ...). Expected: revert, nothing charged. Actual: succeeds; buyer pays 1000 IMD (3 burned, 2 to creator) and receives 0.002995 THIN, and 983.15 C is left in the SwapRouter. The proof reproduces this with a minimal router double on a 2-hop path.","severity":"low","title":"Partial fill at a non-first hop is accepted: full fee charged, intermediate tokens stranded in the router"}],"hash":"a8669f41368be35c9703f3c7f032b78789f2b88ae5339bdddb49140702635790","nodeId":"e828e401-e72f-4212-86b7-57015693cfac","outcome":"completed","summary":"I added two tests on the real Uniswap v3 code, and writing them turned up a defect in the contract that I've reported instead of testing around. `forge test` passes: 85 tests, not counting the scratch proof, which fails on purpose.\n\n**The reviewer's report: partly right.**\n- **Partial fill:** this case was already covered. `test_realExhaustedLiquidityQuoteRevertsInsteadOfPhantomOutput` uses a thin pool, checks that the purchase reverts, and checks nothing is charged. The line number in the report points to an older version of the file.\n- **4-hop route:** this gap was real. I added `test_realFourHopMaximumRoute` in `test/UniswapV3Integration.t.sol`, which buys through four pools (IMD → A → B → C → STOCK). It checks that:\n  - the buyer receives exactly the quoted amount;\n  - the burn and the creator's payment match the fee breakdown;\n  - the DEX keeps no leftover IMD, A, B, C or STOCK, and its router allowance is back to 0.\n\n**New defect (low), reported in `.imd-findings.json` with a failing proof:** a multi-hop purchase that runs out of liquidity after the first pool does not revert.\n- **Why it slips through:** the contract checks that the router spent all of the buyer's IMD, and the first pool always takes all of it. A pool further along the route that runs dry takes only part of the token it receives, and the rest stays in the Uniswap router, where anyone can take it.\n- **What I measured:** with the last of four pools nearly empty and a minimum output of 1, the buyer paid 1000 IMD. That included the full fee: 3 IMD burned, 2 to the creator. They received 0.003 of the stock, and about 983 of token C was left in the router.\n- **Why it's low:** `quoteBuy` already refuses these routes, and a buyer who sets a realistic minimum output is protected by Uniswap's slippage check. But the contract's own comment says the purchase reverts on a partial fill, and that isn't true.\n- **What I kept:** the kept test (`test_realFourHopExhaustedLastHopQuoteRefusedAndMinimumProtects`) asserts only the correct parts: the quote is refused, and a buyer with a realistic minimum loses nothing.\n- **The proof:** a test that fails on the current code and should pass once it's fixed.\n\nMy answer to the reviewer is in `.imd-responses.json`, marked \"fixed\". It notes that the partial-fill half was already covered.","treeHash":"3564030a856c34d148e760c8c92cc5c7d5f9df83","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":455937,"inputTokens":20,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":10653,"runtime":"claude","turns":12,"wallClockMs":117524}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"85f29f4c09dba910","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_economics and audit_math (same root cause). The brief asks for a DEX where stocks are bought only with $IMD, every purchase pays a 0.5% fee, and every collected fee is burned and paid to the creator. IMDStockDex holds no inventory, owns no liquidity and is not a pool hook: buyStock forwards the net IMD to the public Uniswap v3 SwapRouter over the owner-listed path (line 264) and then burns/pays the fee it withheld. The path is public via market(stock), so any buyer, aggregator or searcher can submit the identical path to the same SwapRouter and keep the 0.5%. The fee/burn stream the brief specifies is therefore not enforced on-chain; it is collected only from callers who voluntarily use this contract. The README says each successful purchase charges the fee but does not state the fee is avoidable by routing around the contract. No change inside IMDStockDex closes this; it is a scope decision for the requester: (a) make the DEX the pool's gatekeeper (v4 hook or DEX-owned liquidity), (b) make the DEX the sole primary issuer/minter of the stock token against IMD, or (c) accept and document that the fee applies only to purchases made through this contract. Reported as medium because it is a broken guarantee of the brief, not a loss of funds.","line":264,"path":"src/IMDStockDex.sol","reproduction":"Reproduced in test/scratch/ReviewRepro.t.sol::test_directRouterBypassesFee against the vendored real v3 factory/SwapRouter/QuoterV2 bytecode. State: IMD/STOCK 0.3% pool at price 1 with 1e24 full-range liquidity; dex configured with setFeeDistribution(creator, 6000), setMarket(stock, IMD|3000|STOCK), unpaused; buyer holds 1,000,000e18 IMD. (1) dex.quoteBuy(stock, 1000e18) returns 991031881508065776129 STOCK (995e18 swapped, 3e18 burned, 2e18 to creator). (2) Buyer reads (path,) = dex.market(stock), approves the router and calls SwapRouter.exactInput({path, recipient: buyer, deadline: now, amountIn: 1000e18, amountOutMinimum: 1}). Actual: buyer receives 996006981039903216493 STOCK (about 0.5% more), imd.totalSupply() unchanged, imd.balanceOf(creator) == 0. Expected per brief: every IMD->stock purchase pays 0.5% that is burned/paid to the creator.","severity":"medium","snippet":"        uint256 reported = router.exactInput(","title":"The 0.5% fee, burn and creator payment are opt-in: the listed route is a public Uniswap v3 pool anyone can swap on directly without the DEX"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_permissions and audit_flow (same root cause). The self-reference guards are asymmetric: setIMD rejects token == creator, router or quoter (lines 93-97) and setRouter/setQuoter reject imd, but setFeeDistribution rejects only zero, the DEX and imd, and setRouter/setQuoter do not reject the current creator. The creator may therefore be the Uniswap v3 SwapRouter (or QuoterV2). _payCreator then pushes the creator share into the router on every purchase, and the original SwapRouter exposes a permissionless sweepToken(token, amountMinimum, recipient), so any third party takes it. All DEX balance checks pass because the router's balance rises by exactly the fee. This requires an owner misconfiguration, so it is low; it is reported because the contract already enforces this class of check for the IMD/router/quoter triple but not for the creator. Minimal fix preserving the design: in setFeeDistribution also revert InvalidAddress when newCreator == address(router) || newCreator == address(quoter), and in setRouter/setQuoter when the new address == creator. The attached proof (from audit_permissions) fails on the current code with 'next call did not revert as expected' and passes once setFeeDistribution rejects the router.","line":126,"path":"src/IMDStockDex.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {IERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol\";\nimport {IMDStockDex} from \"src/IMDStockDex.sol\";\nimport {MockToken} from \"test/mocks/MockTokens.sol\";\nimport {UniswapV3FactoryBytecode} from \"test/fixtures/UniswapV3FactoryBytecode.sol\";\nimport {SwapRouterBytecode} from \"test/fixtures/SwapRouterBytecode.sol\";\n\ninterface IV3Factory {\n    function createPool(address tokenA, address tokenB, uint24 fee) external returns (address pool);\n}\n\ninterface IV3Pool {\n    function token0() external view returns (address);\n    function token1() external view returns (address);\n    function initialize(uint160 sqrtPriceX96) external;\n    function mint(address recipient, int24 tickLower, int24 tickUpper, uint128 amount, bytes calldata data)\n        external\n        returns (uint256 amount0, uint256 amount1);\n}\n\n/// setFeeDistribution accepts the configured router as creator (setIMD rejects the symmetric case);\n/// the creator fee paid to the SwapRouter is then sweepable by anyone via sweepToken.\ncontract CreatorRouterSweepTest is Test {\n    IMDStockDex internal dex;\n    MockToken internal imd;\n    MockToken internal stock;\n    address internal factory;\n    address internal router;\n    address internal owner = makeAddr(\"owner\");\n    address internal buyer = makeAddr(\"buyer\");\n    mapping(address => bool) internal pools;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        imd = new MockToken(\"IMD\", 18);\n        stock = new MockToken(\"STOCK\", 18);\n        factory = _deploy(UniswapV3FactoryBytecode.creationCode());\n        router = _deploy(abi.encodePacked(SwapRouterBytecode.creationCode(), abi.encode(factory, address(stock))));\n        imd.mint(address(this), 1e28);\n        stock.mint(address(this), 1e28);\n        address pool = IV3Factory(factory).createPool(address(imd), address(stock), 3000);\n        pools[pool] = true;\n        IV3Pool(pool).initialize(uint160(1 << 96));\n        IV3Pool(pool).mint(address(this), -887220, 887220, 1e24, \"\");\n\n        dex = new IMDStockDex(owner);\n        vm.startPrank(owner);\n        dex.setIMD(address(imd));\n        dex.setRouter(router);\n        vm.stopPrank();\n        imd.mint(buyer, 10_000 ether);\n        vm.prank(buyer);\n        imd.approve(address(dex), type(uint256).max);\n    }\n\n    /// Fails on current code: the router is accepted as creator. Passes once setFeeDistribution\n    /// rejects address(router) (and address(quoter)) the way setIMD already rejects the mirror case.\n    /// With the real SwapRouter accepted here, the 2 IMD creator share of a 1000 IMD purchase lands on\n    /// the router and any account takes it with sweepToken(imd, 0, attacker).\n    function test_creatorMustNotBeConfiguredRouter() public {\n        vm.prank(owner);\n        vm.expectRevert(IMDStockDex.InvalidAddress.selector);\n        dex.setFeeDistribution(router, 6000);\n        assertEq(dex.creator(), address(0));\n    }\n\n    function uniswapV3MintCallback(uint256 amount0, uint256 amount1, bytes calldata) external {\n        require(pools[msg.sender], \"unknown pool\");\n        IERC20(IV3Pool(msg.sender).token0()).transfer(msg.sender, amount0);\n        IERC20(IV3Pool(msg.sender).token1()).transfer(msg.sender, amount1);\n    }\n\n    function _deploy(bytes memory initcode) private returns (address deployed) {\n        assembly (\"memory-safe\") {\n            deployed := create(0, add(initcode, 32), mload(initcode))\n        }\n        require(deployed != address(0), \"fixture deployment failed\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Reproduced in test/scratch/ReviewRepro.t.sol::test_creatorIsRouter_feeSweptByThirdParty on the real SwapRouter bytecode. State: dex with setIMD(imd), setRouter(realSwapRouter), paused. Owner calls setFeeDistribution(realSwapRouter, 6000): expected InvalidAddress (mirror of setIMD's check), actual: accepted, creator() == router. Owner lists IMD|3000|STOCK (1e24 full-range liquidity) and unpauses. Buyer calls buyStock(stock, 1000e18, 1, block.timestamp, configVersion()): succeeds, imd.balanceOf(router) == 2e18. Any address calls router.sweepToken(imd, 0, thief): imd.balanceOf(thief) == 2e18, router balance 0. Proof file: the specialist's Proof_55c98059654d.t.sol run from test/scratch fails on the current code with 'next call did not revert as expected'.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (newCreator == address(0) || newCreator == address(this) || newCreator == address(imd)) {","title":"setFeeDistribution accepts the configured router or quoter as creator; a creator share paid to the SwapRouter is sweepable by anyone via sweepToken"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_economics (low) and audit_math (info). QuoterV2.quoteExactInput does not fail when pool liquidity is exhausted: it simulates up to the price limit and returns the output for the input actually consumed. quoteBuy forwards that number (line 196) and discards sqrtPriceX96AfterList, so the quote looks executable. buyStock requires the router to spend exactly swapAmount (_requireDecrease at line 274), which is correct, so on the same state the purchase can never succeed regardless of minStockOut or deadline. Integrators that treat quoteBuy as an executable quote will let the user sign and the transaction reverts after paying gas. No funds are lost (the revert is atomic). Fix: in quoteBuy read sqrtPriceX96AfterList[last] and revert (e.g. InsufficientLiquidity) when it sits at the final pool's price limit (MIN_SQRT_RATIO + 1 or MAX_SQRT_RATIO - 1), or document that quoteBuy may report unexecutable outputs and buyStock will revert with UnexpectedTokenBalance(imd).","line":196,"path":"src/IMDStockDex.sol","reproduction":"Reproduced in test/scratch/ReviewRepro.t.sol::test_partialFillQuoteDivergence on real v3 bytecode. State: IMD/STOCK 0.3% pool initialized at sqrtPrice 1<<96 with a single position mint(-60, 60, 1e18); dex configured (creator, 6000), market IMD|3000|STOCK, unpaused. (1) dex.quoteBuy(stock, 1000e18) returns stockOut = 2995354955910780 with fees.swapAmount = 995e18 and no error. (2) Buyer calls buyStock(stock, 1000e18, 1, block.timestamp, version). Expected from the quote: about 0.003 STOCK delivered. Actual: revert UnexpectedTokenBalance(imd) from line 274; totalSupply and buyer balance unchanged.","severity":"low","snippet":"        (stockOut,,,) = quoter.quoteExactInput(path, fees.swapAmount);","title":"quoteBuy reports a partial-fill output as if executable, but buyStock with the same inputs always reverts when the route cannot absorb swapAmount"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"From audit_economics; test-coverage gap, not a defect in src/. Every real-Uniswap pool in the integration suite is created by _createPool with one full-range position of 1e24 liquidity, so no test on real bytecode reaches a state where the router consumes less than amountIn, which is exactly the state where _requireDecrease (line 274) is the only guard against a partial fill charged a full fee. The partial-consumption path is only covered by MockVenue.spendShortfall, which under-pulls while returning full output, unlike v3. The suite also runs only 1- and 2-hop paths on the real SwapRouter although Configuration.t.sol accepts a 4-hop path structurally. Both scenarios behave correctly on the vendored bytecode (verified: partial fill reverts atomically with UnexpectedTokenBalance(imd); the 4-hop route settles with zero residue and zero allowance), so this is missing evidence. Add the thin-position partial-fill case and a four-pool IMD->A->B->C->STOCK case to the integration suite.","line":305,"path":"test/UniswapV3Integration.t.sol","reproduction":"grep -n 'mint(address(this), -887220' test/UniswapV3Integration.t.sol shows the only liquidity shape (line 305); grep for uint24( shows only 1- and 2-hop paths (lines 64, 94, 130, 216). Running test/scratch/ReviewRepro.t.sol: test_partialFillQuoteDivergence (thin -60..60 position, 1e18 liquidity) reaches the partial-fill state and asserts the revert; test_fourHopRealRoute (four 0.3% pools IMD-A-B-C-STOCK) passes with buyer receiving the quoted amount, creator receiving fees.creatorAmount, no A/B/C/IMD residue in the DEX and router allowance 0. Neither state is reached by the kept suite.","severity":"low","snippet":"        IV3PoolFixture(pool).mint(address(this), -887220, 887220, 1e24, \"\");","title":"Real-bytecode integration suite never exercises liquidity exhaustion, partial fills or the 4-hop maximum route"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_math (low) and audit_flow (info); recalibrated to info because the README documents that market disable increments the version and test/QuoteSafety.t.sol::test_disabledMarketDoesNotFreezeAnotherMarketButInvalidatesOldQuotes asserts this exact behavior as intended. The NatSpec at line 148 ('without pausing other markets') remains true: other markets stay enabled and execute after a re-quote. Cost is one failed transaction's gas for buyers of unrelated markets whose order was in flight when the disable landed. If the author prefers, a per-market version (or dropping the bump in disableMarket, since buyStock already rejects disabled markets via _marketPath) would avoid the cross-market invalidation. No funds at risk; owner-triggered only.","line":152,"path":"src/IMDStockDex.sol","reproduction":"Reproduced in test/scratch/ReviewRepro.t.sol::test_disableOtherMarketInvalidatesPending on real v3 bytecode. State: two enabled markets STOCK and STOCK2, unpaused. (1) (quoted,,v) = dex.quoteBuy(STOCK, 1000e18). (2) owner: dex.disableMarket(STOCK2); dex.market(STOCK) still returns enabled == true. (3) buyer: dex.buyStock(STOCK, 1000e18, quoted, block.timestamp, v). Actual: revert ConfigurationChanged(v, v+1). Expected under the NatSpec wording: STOCK purchase executes.","severity":"info","snippet":"        _bumpVersion();","title":"disableMarket bumps the global configVersion, so disabling one listing reverts every pending order on all other markets"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"From audit_permissions; recorded as the intended role per the adapter's requirement to document material privileged powers separately. All setters are onlyOwner and (except pause/disableMarket) whenPaused, each bumps configVersion. The owner may point router/quoter at any contract, list any token with any path, set any creator and 1-9999 bps burn share, and recover any token held by the DEX while paused (only donations can be there). The buyer's only protection against a malicious router is its own minStockOut, whose only on-chain source is the owner-chosen quoter via quoteBuy. configVersion pins the configuration a buyer quoted against but cannot detect one that was already malicious when quoted. Ownership is two-step and renounce is disabled. Recommendation: publish the router/quoter/market addresses the owner sets and have the frontend cross-check quotes against an independent source; consider a multisig/timelock owner. No code change is implied.","line":103,"path":"src/IMDStockDex.sol","reproduction":"Traced in _swap (lines 257-281): with router R whose exactInput pulls amountIn IMD and transfers exactly amountIn/1000 stock to the recipient and returns that value, and quoter Q returning amountIn/1000, a buyer following the README calls quoteBuy(stock, 1000e18) -> 0.995e18, then buyStock(stock, 1000e18, 0.995e18, deadline, v). Checks: imd decreased by amountIn (line 274) passes; stockOut >= minimum (279) passes; stockOut == reported (280) passes; burn and creator payment exact. The 995e18 net IMD stays in R. Expected per brief: fair Uniswap execution; actual: depends entirely on the owner-chosen contracts.","severity":"info","snippet":"    function setRouter(address newRouter) external nonReentrant onlyOwner whenPaused {","title":"Owner trust assumptions: router, quoter, listings, creator and recovery are fully owner-controlled; a lying quoter plus a malicious router can take the net amount of a purchase"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"From audit_economics; a design question for the requester, not a code defect. The brief says the collected fee is used 'for burn $IMD and send to creator proportional'. The implementation reads this as one creator address and one burn/creator proportion for the whole DEX (setFeeDistribution, line 130), and the README documents that choice. If 'creator' means the issuer/creator of each tokenized stock, there is no per-market beneficiary: Market stores only (path, enabled). Changing it would mean adding a creator per market in setMarket and paying markets[stock].creator in _payCreator.","line":130,"path":"src/IMDStockDex.sol","reproduction":"Code trace: struct Market { bytes path; bool enabled; } (lines 32-35) has no beneficiary; _payCreator (line 292-298) always transfers to the single storage variable creator. With two listed stocks from different issuers, buyStock(stockA, 1000e18, ...) and buyStock(stockB, 1000e18, ...) each add 2e18 (at 6000 bps burn share) to imd.balanceOf(creator); there is no call that directs stockB's share elsewhere.","severity":"info","snippet":"        creator = newCreator;","title":"A single global creator and split receives the fee for every listed stock; per-stock issuer payout is not implemented"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"From audit_economics; documented trust assumption, owner action only. The design intentionally fixes IMD once (line 91) and relies on the owner having verified that the token exposes a permissionless burn(uint256) of the caller's balance that reduces totalSupply. Nothing on-chain checks this at configuration time, and _burn (lines 283-290) reverts on every purchase if burn has a different selector, needs a burner role, or does not reduce supply. Since setIMD cannot be repeated, the only remedy is a new deployment. The README already states the prerequisite and that the canonical IMD was not verified in this assignment. Suggest the owner execute one minimal purchase with a controlled creator before public announcement.","line":91,"path":"src/IMDStockDex.sol","reproduction":"Code trace plus existing tests: test/Configuration.t.sol::test_IMDIdentityCannotBeChangedAfterConfiguration shows a second setIMD reverts IMDAlreadyConfigured; test/IMDStockDex.t.sol::test_burnFailureRevertsSwapAndCreatorPayment and test_noOpBurnCannotPretendToReduceSupply show every buyStock reverts (BurnDisabled / InvalidBurn) when burn reverts or does not reduce supply. Combined: setIMD(T) with T lacking a supply-reducing burn, then configure and unpause: every buyStock reverts; setIMD(correct) reverts IMDAlreadyConfigured; the DEX can never trade.","severity":"info","snippet":"        if (address(imd) != address(0)) revert IMDAlreadyConfigured();","title":"setIMD is one-shot and performs no burn-interface probe, so a wrong IMD choice bricks the deployment permanently"}],"hash":"a8b1698fce2c5255966db66527d934ea8f55a9a3de5ec04106c184354e7c5da7","nodeId":"034fbfc6-8603-469a-aee1-0b8e2453d972","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. All snippets validate against the tree, the scratch directory is removed, and `.imd-findings.json` is the only file added.\n\n**Outcome.** The contract itself is tight: every state-changing entry point is guarded and reentrancy-safe, settlement checks exact balances at each step, and the 102-test suite passes. The one medium finding is architectural, not a code bug.\n\n**Findings kept (8, after merging 13 specialist items):**\n- **Medium, fee bypass.** The listed route is a public Uniswap v3 pool. Calling the SwapRouter directly with the same path yields about 0.5% more stock, with no burn and no creator payment. Reproduced on the vendored real v3 bytecode. The fix is a scope decision for the requester, since nothing inside the contract can close it.\n- **Low, creator may be the router.** The self-reference guards are asymmetric. Owner can set the SwapRouter as creator, and the fee share then sits in the router where anyone can call sweepToken. Reproduced end to end, including the theft. The permissions specialist's proof fails on current code as claimed, so it is attached.\n- **Low, quote and execution diverge on thin liquidity.** QuoterV2 returns a partial-fill output, while buyStock always reverts on the same state. Reproduced with a thin position.\n- **Low, test gap.** The real-bytecode suite never reaches partial fills or a 4-hop route. I ran both; the contract behaves correctly, so this is missing evidence only.\n- **Four info notes.** Global version bump on disableMarket, owner trust assumptions, single global creator, and one-shot setIMD.\n\n**Dropped.** The minimum-order-size claim from the math specialist. FeeProperties.t.sol already pins that exact boundary for every split, so its \"untested\" premise was false and the behavior is documented.\n\n**Coverage.** All 13 entry points answered: 10 hold, 3 carry findings. Three invariant rows added for fee arithmetic, factory deployment, and the Slither reentrancy leads.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1056839,"inputTokens":450,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":22522,"runtime":"claude","turns":15,"wallClockMs":322579}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"29a0bbe49f5b440b6a24f9ce072fe604a6cb51b6ab29874c9a6c5afd2ba0a0dd","device":"68fd8dd6450ac70c","findings":[],"hash":"b9d8d3efe97b814a83a9db1e63d01d072f7fe8de6c1c017a0bc49a458acd0dee","nodeId":"e828e401-e72f-4212-86b7-57015693cfac","outcome":"completed","summary":"Added failure-path, fee fuzz, quote-safety, and multi-actor invariant tests, plus Uniswap rollback checks. All changes are under `test/`.\n\n`forge build` and `forge test` pass: **102 tests, zero failures**. The new invariant campaign exercised **16,384 calls**.\n\nNo reproducible application defects found. Live deployment/fork verification remains outstanding.","treeHash":"9d12a9d4963a097e4fd59dadd2e8c7eb50b5e16a","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1540992,"inputTokens":117627,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":28687,"runtime":"codex","turns":6,"wallClockMs":982751}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"8a05ec1ea94411ea","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"The address guards are asymmetric. setIMD (line 93-97) refuses a token that equals creator, router or quoter, and setRouter/setQuoter refuse imd, but setFeeDistribution only refuses zero, the DEX and imd, and setRouter/setQuoter do not refuse the current creator. The creator may therefore be the Uniswap v3 SwapRouter, the QuoterV2, or a listed stock contract. _payCreator then pushes the creator share into that contract every purchase. The original SwapRouter exposes permissionless sweepToken(token, amountMinimum, recipient), so every creator payment is immediately claimable by any third party (MEV searchers back-run each buy). This is an owner-configuration error, not an unprivileged bypass, and the trust assumption is documented; the defect is that the contract already enforces this class of self-reference check for IMD but not for the creator/router pair, so the author's own invariant (no protocol address may be a beneficiary or dependency of another) is only half enforced. Minimal fix: in setFeeDistribution also revert when newCreator == address(router) || newCreator == address(quoter) || markets[newCreator].enabled; in setRouter/setQuoter also revert when the new address == creator. Design (owner-chosen creator, 50 bps fee, burn/creator split) is unchanged.","line":126,"path":"src/IMDStockDex.sol","reproduction":"State: IMD, real SwapRouter (test fixture bytecode), IMD/STOCK 0.3% pool with liquidity, market listed. Owner calls setFeeDistribution(router, 6000): expected InvalidAddress (as setIMD would give for the mirror case), actual succeeds. Owner unpauses. Buyer calls buyStock(stock, 1000e18, 1, block.timestamp, configVersion): fee 5e18, burn 3e18, creatorAmount 2e18 transferred to the router. Any address then calls router.sweepToken(imd, 0, thief): imd.balanceOf(thief) == 2e18, router balance 0. Reproduced with test/scratch/CreatorIsRouter.t.sol: test_feePaidToRouterIsStolenByThirdParty passes (theft works) and test_creatorMayBeRouterAndFeeIsSweepableByAnyone fails with 'next call did not revert as expected'.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (newCreator == address(0) || newCreator == address(this) || newCreator == address(imd)) {\n            revert InvalidAddress();\n        }","title":"setFeeDistribution accepts the configured router (or quoter / a listed stock) as creator, so the creator fee lands in the SwapRouter where anyone can sweepToken it"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The NatSpec at line 148 says a problematic listing can be disabled 'immediately without pausing other markets', but _bumpVersion() changes the global configVersion that buyStock requires to match exactly (line 211, no wildcard). Every purchase of any other market that was signed against the previous version reverts with ConfigurationChanged once the disable lands, and those buyers must re-quote and resubmit (paying gas for the failed transaction). Disabling a market changes nothing a buyer of another market relies on (its path, fee split, router and creator are untouched), so the version bump is over-broad here. README documents that disable increments the version, so this is a documented trade-off and no funds are at risk; recorded so the author can decide whether a per-market version or dropping the bump in disableMarket better matches the stated intent. Not an unprivileged amplifier: only the owner triggers it.","line":149,"path":"src/IMDStockDex.sol","reproduction":"State: two enabled markets STOCK and OTHER, DEX unpaused, configVersion = v. Buyer prepares buyStock(STOCK, 1000e18, 1, deadline, v). Owner's disableMarket(OTHER) is mined first. Buyer's call reverts ConfigurationChanged(v, v+1) although nothing about the STOCK market changed; expected per line 148 wording: STOCK purchase executes. Reproduced with test/scratch/DisableOtherMarket.t.sol (passes, demonstrating the revert).","severity":"info","snippet":"    function disableMarket(address stock) external nonReentrant onlyOwner {\n        if (!markets[stock].enabled) revert MarketNotEnabled(stock);\n        markets[stock].enabled = false;\n        _bumpVersion();","title":"disableMarket bumps configVersion, so disabling one listing reverts every in-flight purchase of every other market, contradicting the 'without pausing other markets' intent"}],"hash":"c37a9424be3b4edd12177f0a5a6af212ceea160a821be6bda2a8e26a00e61d81","nodeId":"484538e9-f09e-4c94-95eb-45d447544b22","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. The findings file is in place at the repository root, no tracked files were changed, and the scratch tests sit in the git-ignored `test/scratch/` directory as the assignment allows.\n\n**Outcome:** no critical or high defects in `IMDStockDex`. The purchase path is sound end to end. Exact balance-delta checks cover the gross pull, the router spend, the stock delivery, the burn and the creator payment. A shared reentrancy guard spans every state-changing function, so even a router made owner cannot reconfigure mid-swap. The fee decomposition is exact and overflow-free across the full input range. The path validator's offsets match Uniswap v3 packed encoding. I confirmed all of this against the real SwapRouter and QuoterV2 bytecode fixtures as well as the mocks, and the existing 65 tests and two invariant campaigns pass.\n\n**Two substantiated findings, both reproduced with scratch tests:**\n\n- **Low, address-guard asymmetry.** `setIMD` refuses the creator, router and quoter, but `setFeeDistribution` accepts the router as creator. With the real SwapRouter fixture, a buy of 1000 IMD left the 2 IMD creator share inside the router, and an unrelated address took it with `sweepToken`. This needs an owner misconfiguration, so it is a half-enforced self-reference check rather than a bypass. The fix is to mirror the existing guard in `setFeeDistribution`, `setRouter` and `setQuoter`.\n- **Info, over-broad version bump.** `disableMarket` increments the global `configVersion`, so disabling one listing reverts every in-flight purchase on every other market with `ConfigurationChanged`. This contradicts the function's own comment about not disturbing other markets, though the README documents the bump. No funds are at risk.\n\n**Coverage:** all 13 listed entry points have a row, plus three invariant rows. Eleven hold, two point at the findings above. The static-analysis leads were all traced and none survived as defects. What I could not reach is behavior against the real IMD token's `burn` and against permissioned or rebasing Ondo assets on mainnet, since neither address was supplied. Those remain the documented deployment prerequisites.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1105068,"inputTokens":354,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":32905,"runtime":"claude","turns":34,"wallClockMs":503293}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"10d0011c837a0ae8117c27fda67a0fa9ac39b971ad757dce8f5999271c1816fe","device":"9b2fda471b13b14a","findings":[],"hash":"cb16accc79362f3815cf04da9283ff949cf2c6f2456299c3cbde94da4d87f9cd","nodeId":"7c6bf5f2-b52e-4398-b689-7dfdc153d2c5","outcome":"completed","summary":"Created `launch.json` for `IMDStockDex` with `constructorArgs: [\"$owner\"]`. Notes describe fees and the paused state pending owner configuration.\n\nManifest structure and constructor ABI checked. `forge build` succeeded; `forge test` passed all 65 tests. Only `launch.json` changed outside permitted scratch files.","treeHash":"80b64561d5598351fb87b54085a38c6ff2758c38","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":159232,"inputTokens":36055,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":2362,"runtime":"codex","turns":3,"wallClockMs":86870}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"1404b78e23284a74c731519934f36f7db3932468787277240275bf82c9995a63","device":"c0fc4ea4f50e3380","findings":[],"hash":"d1bb7b4a827f091466f94ced1a24a0c257ef6efba8608f2e557d7767ebd81308","nodeId":"175012f6-c981-4690-8b1f-732b040e0106","outcome":"completed","summary":"All checks pass and the work is complete. Summary of this revision:\n\n**Outcome**\n\n- 71 tests pass, `forge build` and `forge fmt --check` are clean with the pinned 0.8.26 compiler.\n- All seven findings are answered in `.imd-responses.json`. Every reproducible one was first reproduced in test/scratch against the real Uniswap v3 factory, SwapRouter and QuoterV2 bytecode before any change.\n\n**Code changes in `src/IMDStockDex.sol`**\n\n- **Creator/router/quoter guards made symmetric** (low finding, fixed). The creator can no longer be the router or quoter, and the router or quoter can no longer be set to the current creator. This closes the path where a creator share pushed to the SwapRouter could be taken by anyone via its permissionless sweep.\n- **Partial-fill quotes rejected** (low finding, fixed). `quoteBuy` now checks every hop's post-swap price against the v3 tick-math bounds and reverts with `InsufficientLiquidity` when a pool ran dry, instead of returning an output that `buyStock` could never execute. A quoter returning the wrong number of hop prices reverts with `InvalidQuote`. Purchase logic is unchanged.\n\n**Tests added**\n\n- Real-bytecode tests for exhausted single-hop and intermediate-hop liquidity, for the router and quoter being rejected as creator, and one recording the fee-scope boundary.\n- Mock-based tests for both directions of the creator guard and for quote metadata edge cases at and adjacent to the bounds. The mock quoter now returns one price per hop.\n\n**The medium finding is disputed, with documentation added.** The bypass is real: anyone can swap on the public pool and skip the fee. But it is inherent to a DEX over third-party, freely transferable tokens, and none of the reviewer's alternatives closes it. A v4 hook gates one pool while anyone can create another, and this contracts-only launch deploys no token so the DEX cannot be the sole issuer. Only a transfer-restricted stock token whose issuer allows the DEX as sole venue would make the fee unavoidable, and that is the issuer's power. I took the reviewer's option (c): the README now has a \"Scope of the fee\" section, the contract NatSpec and SECURITY.md state the boundary, and a test records it. The requester should decide whether this scope is acceptable or whether to order a gated token or hook launch separately.\n\n**Info findings.** Owner trust assumptions and the recommended post-launch rehearsal purchase are now documented in the README. The global version bump on `disableMarket` and the single DEX-level creator are kept as intended design and explicitly documented, with the per-stock creator noted as a possible scope change for the requester.\n\nNothing was committed, matching the previous round where the harness recorded the commit.","treeHash":"90a2f0ff72fccf9be18f46a19a790a02b7f2a583","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1527475,"inputTokens":546,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":33747,"runtime":"claude","turns":49,"wallClockMs":530463}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"776c025db24644e8","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Economic Security / First Principles. The brief asks for a DEX where stocks are bought only with $IMD, every purchase pays a 0.5% fee, and that fee is burned and paid to the creator. IMDStockDex does not own, gate or hook any liquidity: it is a thin wrapper that forwards the buyer's IMD to the public Uniswap v3 SwapRouter over an owner-listed path (line 264) and then burns/pays the fee it withheld. Nothing stops any buyer, aggregator or MEV searcher from calling the identical router with the identical path and keeping the 0.5%. The result is that the burn/creator revenue only accrues from users who voluntarily use this contract's front door, and the economically rational flow (anyone price-sensitive, every aggregator) routes around it, so the tokenomics the brief describes are not enforced on-chain. Verified against the vendored real v3-core/v3-periphery bytecode. Fixing this requires a scope decision, not a patch: either (a) the DEX must be the pool's gatekeeper (a Uniswap v4 hook on an IMD/stock pool that charges the fee and burns in afterSwap, or DEX-owned liquidity), or (b) the DEX must be the only party allowed to mint/issue the stock token in exchange for IMD (Ondo-style primary issuance with the DEX as authorized minter), or (c) the requester accepts and documents that the fee applies only to purchases made through this contract. The README currently states the fee is charged on 'each successful purchase' without saying the fee is avoidable.","line":264,"path":"src/IMDStockDex.sol","reproduction":"State: real Uniswap v3 factory/router/quoter bytecode from test/fixtures, IMD/STOCK pool at 1:1 with 1e24 full-range liquidity, dex configured (creator, burn share 6000) and unpaused with market STOCK -> path IMD|3000|STOCK. Buyer holds 1,000,000e18 IMD.\n1) Buyer calls router.exactInput({path: IMD|3000|STOCK, recipient: buyer, deadline: now, amountIn: 1000e18, amountOutMinimum: 1}) directly.\nActual: buyer receives 996006981039903216493 STOCK; imd.totalSupply() unchanged; imd.balanceOf(creator) == 0. No fee, no burn.\n2) Through the DEX for the same 1000e18 gross: previewFees gives swapAmount 995e18, fee 5e18, burn 3e18, creator 2e18, and the buyer receives ~0.5% less stock.\nExpected per brief: every stock purchase with IMD pays 0.5% that is burned/paid to the creator. Actual: fee is paid only by buyers who opt into this contract; anyone skipping it pays nothing. Scratch test: test/scratch/EconScratch.t.sol::test_directRouterPurchaseBypassesFeeAndBurn (passes on the current code, demonstrating the bypass).","severity":"medium","snippet":"        uint256 reported = router.exactInput(","title":"The 0.5% fee, burn and creator payment are voluntary: the same stock can be bought with IMD on the same Uniswap pools with no fee"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Invariant guide: view/write divergence. QuoterV2.quoteExactInput does not fail when a pool's liquidity is exhausted; it simulates the swap up to the price limit and returns the output for the input that was consumed. quoteBuy forwards that number (line 196) and discards sqrtPriceX96AfterList, so the quote looks like a valid executable price. buyStock, however, requires the router to spend exactly swapAmount (line 274: _requireDecrease(imd, address(this), imdBefore, amountIn)), so on the same state the purchase can never succeed regardless of minStockOut or deadline. Integrators that trust quoteBuy to be an executable quote will display a price, let the user sign, and the transaction reverts after paying gas. No funds are lost (the revert is atomic, verified), so severity is low. Fix: in quoteBuy, read the last element of sqrtPriceX96AfterList and revert (e.g. InsufficientLiquidity) when it equals TickMath.MIN_SQRT_RATIO + 1 or MAX_SQRT_RATIO - 1 for the final hop, which is the only post-state a partial fill can end in; or document that quoteBuy may report unexecutable outputs and that buyStock will revert with UnexpectedTokenBalance(imd) in that case.","line":196,"path":"src/IMDStockDex.sol","reproduction":"State: real v3 bytecode fixtures; IMD/STOCK pool initialized at sqrtPrice 1<<96 with a single thin position: mint(ticks -60..60, liquidity 1e18). dex configured, market STOCK -> IMD|3000|STOCK, unpaused; buyer approved.\n1) quoteBuy(STOCK, 1000e18) -> returns stockOut = 2995354955910780 (about 0.003 STOCK) with fees.swapAmount = 995e18 and version v. No revert.\n2) buyer calls buyStock(STOCK, 1000e18, 1, block.timestamp, v).\nActual: reverts with UnexpectedTokenBalance(imd) from line 274 because the router spent only the part of 995e18 the range could absorb; supply, buyer and creator balances unchanged.\nExpected: a quote that cannot be executed should revert or flag the shortfall instead of reporting an output. Scratch test: test/scratch/EconScratch.t.sol::test_partialFillOnExhaustedLiquidityReverts logs the quote and asserts the revert.","severity":"low","snippet":"        (stockOut,,,) = quoter.quoteExactInput(path, fees.swapAmount);","title":"quoteBuy returns a partial-fill output as if executable; buyStock with the same inputs always reverts when the route cannot absorb swapAmount"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Test coverage gap in the economics area. Every real-Uniswap pool in the integration suite is created with one full-range position of 1e24 liquidity, so no test on real bytecode reaches a state where the router consumes less than amountIn, which is exactly the state where _requireDecrease at line 274 is the only thing protecting the buyer from a partial fill with full fee. The partial-consumption path is only tested against MockVenue.spendShortfall, a mock that behaves differently from v3 (it under-pulls while still returning full output). The suite also never runs the MAX_HOPS=4 route against the real SwapRouter (only 1 and 2 hops), although Configuration.t.sol accepts a 4-hop path structurally. I ran both on the vendored bytecode and the contract behaves correctly (partial fill reverts atomically with UnexpectedTokenBalance(imd); 4-hop route settles with zero residue in the DEX and router), so this is a missing-evidence finding, not a defect in src/. Add the two scenarios from test/scratch/EconScratch.t.sol (thin -60..60 position with 1e18 liquidity; four pools IMD->A->B->C->STOCK) to the integration suite.","line":175,"path":"test/UniswapV3Integration.t.sol","reproduction":"Run `forge test --match-path test/UniswapV3Integration.t.sol -vvv` and observe every pool is minted at ticks -887220..887220 with 1e24 liquidity and paths are 1 or 2 hops. Then run the scratch file: `forge test --match-path test/scratch/EconScratch.t.sol -vv`: test_partialFillOnExhaustedLiquidityReverts shows the state the suite never reaches (quote 2995354955910780 for swapAmount 995e18, buy reverts UnexpectedTokenBalance(imd)); test_fourHopRealRoute shows a 4-hop real route settling (buyer receives quoted amount, creator gets fees.creatorAmount, no A/B/C residue, allowance 0).","severity":"low","snippet":"        IV3PoolFixture(pool).mint(address(this), -887220, 887220, 1e24, \"\");","title":"Real-bytecode integration tests never exercise liquidity exhaustion, partial fills or the 4-hop maximum route"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"First-principles note for the requester to confirm, not a code defect. The brief says the collected fee is used 'for burn $IMD and send to creator proportional'. The implementation reads this as one creator address and one burn/creator proportion for the whole DEX (setFeeDistribution, line 130), and the README documents that choice. If the intended reading is that the creator of each tokenized stock receives the creator share for purchases of their stock, the contract has no per-market beneficiary: Market only stores (path, enabled). Changing this is a design decision (add a creator per market in setMarket and pay markets[stock].creator in _payCreator).","line":130,"path":"src/IMDStockDex.sol","reproduction":"With the DexTestBase fixture: owner lists two stocks from different issuers via setMarket(stockA, pathA) and setMarket(stockB, pathB). Any buyer calls buyStock(stockA, 1000e18, 1, now, v) and later buyStock(stockB, 1000e18, 1, now, v'). Actual: imd.balanceOf(creator) increases by 2e18 both times; there is no way to direct stockB's share elsewhere. Expected under the per-issuer reading: each issuer receives its own purchases' share.","severity":"info","snippet":"        creator = newCreator;","title":"A single global creator and split receives the fee for every listed stock; if 'creator' in the brief means each stock's creator/issuer, this is not implemented"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Economic Security: dependency failure. The design intentionally fixes IMD once (line 91) and relies on the owner having verified that the token exposes a permissionless burn(uint256) of the caller's balance that reduces totalSupply. Nothing on-chain checks this at configuration time, and _burn (line 286-288) will revert on every purchase if IMD's burn has a different selector, requires a burner role, or burns to a dead address without reducing supply. Because setIMD cannot be repeated, the only remedy is a new deployment. This is a documented trust assumption and requires only owner action, so it is recorded as info; the requester should confirm the canonical IMD implements ERC20Burnable-style burn before the owner calls setIMD, and may want the owner to execute one minimal dust purchase while the creator is a controlled address before public announcement.","line":91,"path":"src/IMDStockDex.sol","reproduction":"Owner calls setIMD(T) where T is an ERC20 without burn(uint256) (or with burn gated by a role). Configure router/creator/market, unpause. Any buyStock reverts inside IBurnableIMD(imd).burn (line 286) with an empty revert or role error; totalSupply check at 288 would also reject a no-op burn. Owner calls setIMD(correctToken): reverts IMDAlreadyConfigured. The DEX can never trade.","severity":"info","snippet":"        if (address(imd) != address(0)) revert IMDAlreadyConfigured();","title":"setIMD is one-shot and performs no burn-interface probe, so a wrong IMD choice bricks the deployment permanently"}],"hash":"df93a53b924183d6fbdf1dc4a35414a25420f89a1f62c364d99facf14df5e535","nodeId":"f8db9af3-a635-4463-86ec-3b886f8a404a","outcome":"completed","summary":"The findings file is on disk at the repository root, every cited snippet matches its line, and the working tree has no tracked changes (the findings file and scratch directory are both covered by ignore rules, which is the expected shape for a review task). Nothing else is pending.\n\n## Review result\n\n**Area:** Economic Security, Invariant and Flow Gap guides, against `src/IMDStockDex.sol`. The full suite passes (65 tests plus 2 invariants), and I ran the economic edges the suite does not reach on the vendored real Uniswap v3 bytecode in a scratch test.\n\n**Findings written to `.imd-findings.json`** (5 findings, 17 coverage rows, all 13 entry points answered):\n\n1. **Medium. The 0.5% fee, burn and creator payment are voluntary.** The contract is a wrapper over public Uniswap pools it does not own or gate. Calling the router directly with the same path buys the same stock with IMD and pays no fee and no burn. Verified on real bytecode (direct buy of 1000 IMD gets ~996 stock, supply and creator balance unchanged). The fix is a scope decision for the requester: a v4 hook or DEX-owned liquidity, DEX-only primary issuance of the stock, or accept and document that the fee applies only to this front door.\n2. **Low. `quoteBuy` reports partial-fill outputs that `buyStock` always rejects.** On a thin pool the quoter returned ~0.003 stock for 995 IMD; the purchase with the same inputs reverts with `UnexpectedTokenBalance(imd)` every time. No funds lost. Suggested fix: reject quotes whose final sqrt price sits at the tick limit.\n3. **Low. Test gap.** The real-bytecode integration tests only use full-range 1e24 liquidity and 1 or 2 hops, so partial fills and the 4-hop maximum are never run against the real router. I ran both; the contract behaves correctly, so this is missing evidence, not a code defect.\n4. **Info.** One global creator and split for all stocks. If the brief's \"creator\" means each stock's issuer, that is not implemented.\n5. **Info.** `setIMD` is one-shot with no burn-interface probe, so a wrong IMD choice bricks the deployment.\n\n**What holds.** Fee math equals exact floor division without overflow over the full uint256 range. Every purchase conserves IMD exactly (final DEX balance check, zero residual router allowance, buyer stock delta equals router-reported output), the burn is verified by supply delta, partial fills and every failure mode revert atomically with no fee taken, and reentrancy through router, IMD hooks or stock hooks is blocked by the shared guard. No loss-of-funds path was found, so no finding carries a proof test.\n\n**Not reached.** Nothing in the assigned area was left unexamined. I did not verify Ondo token transfer-restriction behaviour against real Ondo bytecode, since none is vendored and no network address was supplied.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1148343,"inputTokens":386,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":34868,"runtime":"claude","turns":29,"wallClockMs":513706}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"52c98c0dc01791cd","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"The brief requires that buying tokenized stock costs a 0.5% fee which is burned and shared with the creator. The DEX implements this only for callers who voluntarily route through buyStock. Execution happens on a permissionless Uniswap v3 pool (router.exactInput with the owner-listed path); the DEX holds no inventory, is not a hook, and does not gate the pool. Any buyer can read market(stock) and submit the identical path to the public SwapRouter, receiving strictly more stock for the same IMD with zero burn and zero creator payment. Rational buyers and every aggregator will do so, so the fee/burn stream the brief specifies is not enforced by the contract. Boundary: router.exactInput; assumption: all IMD->stock purchases pass through buyStock; actual: the venue is public. This is a design gap rather than an arithmetic bug, and no change inside IMDStockDex can close it (it would require the DEX to be the pool's hook/owner, or to be the sole liquidity venue). It is reported so the requester can decide whether an opt-in wrapper satisfies the brief; the README does not state that the fee is avoidable.","line":264,"path":"src/IMDStockDex.sol","reproduction":"Setup: real v3 factory/router/quoter fixtures (test/fixtures), IMD/STOCK pool at price 1 with 1e24 full-range liquidity, dex configured with setFeeDistribution(creator, 6000) and setMarket(stock, encodePacked(imd, 3000, stock)). Buyer holds 1000 IMD. (a) dex.quoteBuy(stock, 1000e18) -> 991.031881508065776129 stock (995 IMD swapped, 3 burned, 2 to creator). (b) Instead, buyer approves the router and calls SwapRouter.exactInput({path: dex.market(stock).path, recipient: buyer, deadline: now, amountIn: 1000e18, amountOutMinimum: 1}) -> 996.006981039903216493 stock. Expected per brief: every stock purchase for IMD pays 0.5% that is burned/shared. Actual: imd.totalSupply() unchanged, imd.balanceOf(creator) == 0, buyer received ~0.5% more stock. Reproduced in a Foundry test (test/scratch/MathBoundary.t.sol::test_feeBypassByCallingRouterDirectly, not kept).","severity":"medium","snippet":"        uint256 reported = router.exactInput(","title":"0.5% fee and burn are opt-in: the listed route is a public Uniswap v3 pool anyone can swap on directly"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The NatSpec at line 148 says a problematic listing can be disabled 'without pausing other markets', and the README says buyers must pass the configVersion from their quote with no wildcard. Because disableMarket increments the single global configVersion, every buyStock transaction already signed or in the mempool for an unrelated, still-enabled market fails with ConfigurationChanged(expected, actual). Nothing about those markets changed (same path, same fee split, same router), so the version check gives no protection here; it only forces a re-quote and a second transaction, and the failed transaction's gas is lost. Seam: boundary (one market's enabled flag) x invariant (a version meant to pin the configuration a buyer relied on). Owner-triggered, no fund loss; low. Minimal fix preserving the design: track a per-market version (or hash the market path/fee state into the version check) so that disabling market A does not invalidate quotes for market B, or document that disableMarket invalidates all outstanding orders.","line":151,"path":"src/IMDStockDex.sol","reproduction":"Setup: two enabled markets stock and stock2 on real v3 fixtures. (1) buyer: (quoted,,version) = dex.quoteBuy(stock, 1000e18). (2) owner: dex.disableMarket(stock2). dex.market(stock) still returns enabled == true. (3) buyer: dex.buyStock(stock, 1000e18, quoted, block.timestamp, version). Expected: purchase of the still-enabled stock market executes. Actual: revert ConfigurationChanged(version, version + 1). Reproduced in test/scratch/MathBoundary.t.sol::test_disableOneMarketInvalidatesOtherMarketsPendingOrders (not kept).","severity":"low","snippet":"        markets[stock].enabled = false;\n        _bumpVersion();\n        emit MarketDisabled(stock);","title":"disableMarket bumps the global configVersion, so disabling one listing reverts every pending order on all other markets"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"burnAmount = floor(fee * S / 10,000) with fee = ceil(G/200). The guard rejects any order whose burn rounds to zero, so the smallest accepted gross is the smallest G with ceil(G/200) * S >= 10,000, i.e. G_min = 200 * ceil(10,000 / S) - 199. For S = 6000 that is 201 base units; for S = 100 it is 19,801; for S = 1 it is 1,999,801. The README only says 'tiny orders that cannot fund both revert' and does not give the dependence on the split, and no test pins it: testFuzz_feeConservationAcrossInputRange bounds gross >= 2,000,000, the invariant handler bounds gross >= 2,000,000, and test_tinyAndZeroPurchasesRevert only checks 0..200 at S = 6000. With an 18-decimal IMD the threshold is dust; with a low-decimal IMD (the canonical IMD has not been verified, per README) a small split makes real orders unbuyable, e.g. a 6-decimal IMD at S = 1 rejects every purchase under 2 IMD, and a 2-decimal IMD at S = 1 rejects purchases under 20,000 IMD. Seam: boundary x precision (zero-rounding of the burn share) feeding an availability invariant (every market order above dust executes). Not a fund-loss issue; the revert happens before any transfer. Suggested minimal change: document G_min(S) and add a boundary test around it, or enforce a floor on burnShareBps in setFeeDistribution.","line":181,"path":"src/IMDStockDex.sol","reproduction":"Owner: dex.pause(); dex.setFeeDistribution(creator, 1). Then dex.previewFees(1_999_800): fee = ceil(1,999,800/200) = 9,999; burnAmount = (9,999/10,000)*1 + (9,999 % 10,000)*1/10,000 = 0 -> revert AmountTooSmall. dex.previewFees(1_999_801): fee = 10,000, burnAmount = 1, creatorAmount = 9,999 -> accepted. Same input at S = 6000: 1,999,800 is accepted (burn 5,999). Any buyStock(stock, G <= 1,999,800, ...) reverts for S = 1 regardless of market liquidity. Reproduced in test/scratch/MathBoundary.t.sol::test_minimumOrderDependsOnSplit (not kept).","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (fees.swapAmount == 0 || fees.burnAmount == 0 || fees.creatorAmount == 0) revert AmountTooSmall();","title":"Minimum purchasable amount scales with 1/burnShareBps (up to 1,999,801 base units at 1 bps) and the region 201..2,000,000 is untested for small splits"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"When amountIn exceeds the liquidity reachable in the pool, Uniswap v3 exactInput consumes only part of the input and returns the output for the consumed part; QuoterV2 simulates the same swap and returns that output without indicating the shortfall (the discarded sqrtPriceX96AfterList would show the price pinned at the limit). buyStock then rejects the trade because the router did not spend the whole swapAmount (_requireDecrease in _swap, line 274), which is correct and documented. The seam is view/write divergence: quoteBuy presents an executable-looking price for an order that buyStock will always revert, so an integrator that displays the quote and sets minStockOut from it submits a transaction that fails with UnexpectedTokenBalance(imd) after paying gas. No funds are lost; the burn/creator transfer never happens. Optional improvement: in quoteBuy compare the quoter's sqrtPriceX96AfterList[last] against the tick limit, or re-quote the returned output as exactOutput, and revert the quote when the input would not be fully consumed.","line":196,"path":"src/IMDStockDex.sol","reproduction":"Setup: real v3 fixtures, IMD/STOCK pool initialized at price 1 with liquidity 1e21 only in ticks [-60, 60]; dex configured as in the repo tests. (1) dex.quoteBuy(stock, 1e22) returns stockOut = 2,995,354,955,910,780,937 (about 2.995 stock for 9,950 IMD net) with no error. (2) buyer: dex.buyStock(stock, 1e22, 1, block.timestamp, version). Expected (from the quote): about 2.995 stock delivered. Actual: revert UnexpectedTokenBalance(imd) because the router spent only the ~3 IMD the range could absorb; buyer balance, totalSupply and dex balance unchanged. Reproduced in test/scratch/PartialFill.t.sol::test_partialFillRevertsOnRealRouter (not kept).","severity":"info","snippet":"        (stockOut,,,) = quoter.quoteExactInput(path, fees.swapAmount);","title":"quoteBuy returns a quote for inputs that exhaust pool liquidity although buyStock can never execute them (partial fill is rejected)"}],"hash":"e4559ecccbfb9926b0dfe42fee5154424ef906925b1e1c69c94862f7e9e7a38f","nodeId":"f8603364-fce6-4f55-88b8-1c3389f78867","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is written at the repository root, all four snippets match the tree, and the scratch tests were removed so no source or test file changed.\n\n**Outcome: the fee arithmetic is sound; the defects are at the boundaries, not in the math.** The fee is `ceil(G/200)`, the burn share uses an exact quotient/remainder decomposition that cannot overflow for any uint256 input, and the split always conserves every base unit. I verified this by hand and against the repo's independent long-division fuzz. Balance-delta checks, allowance clearing, slippage, deadline and partial-fill handling were traced on the real vendored Uniswap v3 router bytecode and all fail safely.\n\nFindings written to `.imd-findings.json`:\n\n- **Medium. The 0.5% fee and burn are opt-in.** The DEX wraps a public Uniswap v3 pool it does not gate. A buyer submitting the listed path directly to the router got 996.0 stock for 1000 IMD against 991.0 through the DEX, with nothing burned and nothing paid to the creator. This is a design gap against the brief rather than a code bug, so no proof test is attached. Nothing inside the contract can close it.\n- **Low. Disabling one market invalidates every other market's pending orders.** The global version counter bumps on `disableMarket`, so a quoted buy of a still-enabled market reverts with `ConfigurationChanged`. The NatSpec says disabling happens \"without pausing other markets\".\n- **Low. Minimum order size scales with the inverse of the burn share.** At a 1 bps split, every order up to 1,999,800 base units reverts with `AmountTooSmall`. The fuzz and invariant tests start at 2,000,000, so this region is untested. With a low-decimal IMD this becomes a real availability limit.\n- **Info. The quoter returns a price for orders that exhaust pool liquidity.** The buy then correctly reverts because the router spends only part of the input, so integrators relying on the quote submit a doomed transaction. No funds move.\n\nCoverage has a row for all 13 entry points plus four invariants. Nothing was left unreached. The Slither reentrancy and divide-before-multiply leads were checked and do not hold: every state-changing and quote path is guarded, and both flagged divisions are exact decompositions.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1466622,"inputTokens":482,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":32360,"runtime":"claude","turns":30,"wallClockMs":478479}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"cf2efbfd4649495acb155b9ac252a5991328fc0a32b7be65ec535ad8da629293","device":"3516474d8a268bd8","findings":[],"hash":"ffb1f48336e2d8f98aa08e05a8d4d3984f82389d960677c9ba4a8758d746d522","nodeId":"7c6bf5f2-b52e-4398-b689-7dfdc153d2c5","outcome":"completed","summary":"The manifest at `launch.json` is correct as it stands and needs no change this round.\n\n**What I verified**\n\n- The accepted source has one application contract, `IMDStockDex`, whose only constructor parameter is the explicit owner address. The manifest lists exactly that contract with a single `$owner` argument, which resolves to the launch owner the README also documents.\n- The file has exactly the keys kind, contracts and notes. The kind is \"evm_contracts\", every argument is a string, the contract name is a valid identifier, and the notes are well under the limit at about 1,200 characters.\n- No creator address, fee split, IMD token, router or quoter is a constructor input. The accepted implementation leaves all of those to owner-only setters while paused, so the manifest carries no stand-in addresses and no initialization calls.\n- `forge build` succeeds and the full suite passes with 71 tests across 4 suites, including the accounting invariants.\n- A scratch rehearsal mirroring the protected probe deployed the contract via create2 from a factory on an empty chain id 1 with the owner argument. The deployed contract reports the launch owner, starts paused and unconfigured, fits under the EIP-170 size limit, and contains no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT opcodes.\n\n**Outcome.** No revision findings were supplied with this assignment, and the existing manifest matches the accepted implementation and the brief, so I left launch.json byte-for-byte as accepted. The working tree is clean apart from the scratch test, which is outside the submitted paths.","treeHash":"1119bbee20960c45738676a23e2ea61efa4b7481","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":304043,"inputTokens":226,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":4660,"runtime":"claude","turns":13,"wallClockMs":70983}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":2263,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 45 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 2.14s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[divide-before-multiply]: division before multiplication may lose precision\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:179:27\n    │\n179 │         fees.burnAmount = (fees.fee / BPS) * burnShareBps + (fees.fee % BPS) * burnShareBps / BPS;\n    │                           ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/divide-before-multiply\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:196:25\n    │\n196 │         (stockOut,,,) = quoter.quoteExactInput(path, fees.swapAmount);\n    │                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:196:9\n    │\n196 │         (stockOut,,,) = quoter.quoteExactInput(path, fees.swapAmount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:264:28\n    │\n264 │           uint256 reported = router.exactInput(\n    │ ┏━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┛\n265 │ ┃             IUniswapV3Router.ExactInputParams({\n266 │ ┃                 path: path,\n267 │ ┃                 recipient: msg.sender,\n    ‡ ┃\n271 │ ┃             })\n272 │ ┃         );\n    │ ┗━━━━━━━━━┛\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:286:9\n    │\n286 │         IBurnableIMD(address(imd)).burn(amount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:212:13\n    │\n212 │         if (block.timestamp > deadline) revert DeadlineExpired();\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:228:9\n    │\n228 │ ┏         emit StockPurchased(\n229 │ ┃             msg.sender,\n230 │ ┃             stock,\n231 │ ┃             grossIMD,\n    ‡ ┃\n237 │ ┃             expectedVersion\n238 │ ┃         );\n    │ ┗━━━━━━━━━━┛\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[incorrect-strict-equality]: dangerous strict equality check on an externally-influenced value\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:226:13\n    │\n226 │         if (imd.balanceOf(address(this)) != initialBalance) revert UnexpectedTokenBalance(address(imd));\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/incorrect-strict-equality\n\nwarning[divide-before-multiply]: division before multiplication may lose precision\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:319:69\n    │\n319 │         if (_pathToken(path, 0) != address(imd) || _pathToken(path, hops * 23) != stock) {\n    │                                                                     ━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/divide-before-multiply\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:342:36\n    │\n342 │         if (account == address(0)) revert InvalidAddress();\n    │                                    ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:343:39\n    │\n343 │         if (account.code.length == 0) revert NotAContract(account);\n    │                                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:325:41\n    │\n325 │             if (token == address(this)) revert InvalidPath();\n    │                                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:328:56\n    │\n328 │                 if (token == _pathToken(path, j * 23)) revert InvalidPath();\n    │                                                        ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:332:59\n    │\n332 │                 if (poolFee == 0 || poolFee >= 1_000_000) revert InvalidPath();\n    │                                                           ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":814,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 18 tests for test/Configuration.t.sol:ConfigurationTest\n[PASS] test_IMDIdentityCannotBeChangedAfterConfiguration() (gas: 110608)\n[PASS] test_allAdministrativeFunctionsRejectNonOwner() (gas: 360407)\n[PASS] test_configurationAndRecoveryRequirePause() (gas: 225520)\n[PASS] test_configurationChangesEmitEventsAndIncrementVersion() (gas: 155308)\n[PASS] test_dependenciesRequireNonzeroContractAddresses() (gas: 450732)\n[PASS] test_deploymentNeedsOnlyExplicitOwnerOnEmptyChain() (gas: 284774)\n[PASS] test_duplicateDisableRejected() (gas: 79664)\n[PASS] test_invalidCreatorAndSplitRejected() (gas: 274308)\n[PASS] test_malformedPathsAndInvalidStocksRejected() (gas: 651096)\n[PASS] test_maximumFourHopRouteAccepted() (gas: 3079109)\n[PASS] test_recoverOnlyAccidentalTokensWhilePaused() (gas: 384976)\n[PASS] test_renounceCannotTrapConfiguration() (gas: 25711)\n[PASS] test_routerEvenAsOwnerCannotReenterConfiguration() (gas: 676690)\n[PASS] test_runtimeFitsAndHasNoForbiddenOpcodes() (gas: 4803267)\n[PASS] test_twoStepOwnershipRequiresAcceptanceAndCanBeCancelled() (gas: 363961)\n[PASS] test_unconfiguredTradingAndQuotesHaveClearErrors() (gas: 1314429)\n[PASS] test_vanishedDependencyDetectedBeforeSpending() (gas: 152938)\n[PASS] test_zeroOwnerConstructorRejected() (gas: 4174)\nSuite result: ok. 18 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 42.09ms (19.71ms CPU time)\n\nRan 40 tests for test/IMDStockDex.t.sol:IMDStockDexTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_feeConservationAcrossInputRange(uint256,uint16) (runs: 512, μ: 322326, ~: 322228)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913129639933\n  Bound result 6179\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_purchaseConservesFunds(uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 513381, ~: 513304)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 8842\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_tokenCallbacksCannotReenter(uint8) (runs: 512, μ: 721496, ~: 722814)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 4\n\n[PASS] test_blockedStockRecipientRevertsWithoutFees() (gas: 495304)\n[PASS] test_burnFailureRevertsSwapAndCreatorPayment() (gas: 535673)\n[PASS] test_buyUsesOnlyIMDAndDistributesExactFee() (gas: 568363)\n[PASS] test_cannotSpendAnotherBuyersAllowance() (gas: 181487)\n[PASS] test_creatorCanBuyAndReceivesItsShare() (gas: 511517)\n[PASS] test_creatorTransferFailureRevertsSwapAndBurn() (gas: 552509)\n[PASS] test_creatorTransferTaxRejected() (gas: 606344)\n[PASS] test_decimalsAreRawUnitsNotAssumedEighteen() (gas: 1945669)\n[PASS] test_dexChecksSlippageEvenIfRouterIgnoresMinimum() (gas: 535642)\n[PASS] test_disabledStockRejected() (gas: 216613)\n[PASS] test_exactDeadlineIsAllowed() (gas: 402012)\n[PASS] test_existingDonationsAreNotSpent() (gas: 543180)\n[PASS] test_expiredDeadlineReverts() (gas: 154418)\n[PASS] test_extraTaxOnBuyerRejected() (gas: 292084)\n[PASS] test_failedVenueRevertsWithoutFees() (gas: 299993)\n[PASS] test_falseReturnTokenRejected() (gas: 222511)\n[PASS] test_feeRoundsUpAndSplitConservesDust() (gas: 436350)\n[PASS] test_inputTransferTaxRejected() (gas: 290817)\n[PASS] test_missingAllowanceRevertsWithoutFees() (gas: 216921)\n[PASS] test_multipleHopsForwardedExactly() (gas: 656239)\n[PASS] test_nativeETHIsRejected() (gas: 170009)\n[PASS] test_noOpBurnCannotPretendToReduceSupply() (gas: 536934)\n[PASS] test_noReturnTokensSupported() (gas: 519935)\n[PASS] test_outputTransferTaxRejected() (gas: 566076)\n[PASS] test_partialInputSwapRevertsInsteadOfStrandingFunds() (gas: 536635)\n[PASS] test_pausedDexRejectsPurchases() (gas: 210849)\n[PASS] test_pendingPurchaseCannotAcceptChangedCreatorOrSplit() (gas: 726863)\n[PASS] test_purchaseEventAccountsForEveryFeeUnit() (gas: 422417)\n[PASS] test_quoteUsesNetInputAndMatchesExecution() (gas: 481967)\n[PASS] test_routerCannotLieAboutOutput() (gas: 537747)\n[PASS] test_routerCannotReenterPurchase() (gas: 694756)\n[PASS] test_routerReplacementLeavesNoOldAllowance() (gas: 2035576)\n[PASS] test_stockApprovalCannotPayForPurchase() (gas: 212499)\n[PASS] test_tinyAndZeroPurchasesRevert() (gas: 8187391)\n[PASS] test_unlistedStockRejected() (gas: 154293)\n[PASS] test_venueSlippageRevertsAllEffects() (gas: 438379)\n[PASS] test_zeroMinimumReverts() (gas: 151981)\nSuite result: ok. 40 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 44.61ms (140.67ms CPU time)\n\nRan 6 tests for test/UniswapV3Integration.t.sol:UniswapV3IntegrationTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_realRouterMatchesQuotedNetInput(uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 482953, ~: 484353)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 8840229763910378581109\n\n[PASS] test_realMissingPoolRevertsWithoutFees() (gas: 395842)\n[PASS] test_realMultihopQuoteAndPurchase() (gas: 934517)\n[PASS] test_realSingleHopQuoteAndPurchase() (gas: 509728)\n[PASS] test_realSlippageFailureRollsBack() (gas: 519054)\n[PASS] test_secondQuoteReflectsPoolMovement() (gas: 807054)\nSuite result: ok. 6 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 54.18ms (55.67ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/AccountingInvariant.t.sol:AccountingInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nAccountingInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_noResidualRouterApprovalOrStockCustody\n[PASS] invariant_supplyAndDistributionConserveEveryIMDUnit\n AccountingInvariantTest invariants (runs: 128, calls: 4096, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract          | Selector        | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+==================================================================+\n| AccountingHandler | buy             | 666   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AccountingHandler | changeSplit     | 688   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AccountingHandler | donate          | 707   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AccountingHandler | recoverDonation | 700   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AccountingHandler | toggleMarket    | 653   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AccountingHandler | togglePause     | 682   | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 500\n  Bound result 245693579933181413396691\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 2070\n  Bound result 158944164163427989261452\n  Bound result 58\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 6000\n  Bound result 944\n  Bound result 7366\n  Bound result 1990000000000000000000\n  Bound result 999999999999999998000889\n  Bound result 2724\n  Bound result 999999999999999998005982\n  Bound result 999999999999999998003601\n  Bound result 2742\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 534464827825807766939808\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 729.54ms (727.90ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 test suites in 730.74ms (870.42ms CPU time): 65 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (65 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":45,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"IMDStockDex.acceptOwnership()\",\"IMDStockDex.buyStock(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256)\",\"IMDStockDex.disableMarket(address)\",\"IMDStockDex.pause()\",\"IMDStockDex.quoteBuy(address,uint256)\",\"IMDStockDex.recoverToken(address,address,uint256)\",\"IMDStockDex.setFeeDistribution(address,uint16)\",\"IMDStockDex.setIMD(address)\",\"IMDStockDex.setMarket(address,bytes)\",\"IMDStockDex.setQuoter(address)\",\"IMDStockDex.setRouter(address)\",\"IMDStockDex.transferOwnership(address)\",\"IMDStockDex.unpause()\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"LICENSE\":339,\"README.md\":109,\"THIRD_PARTY.md\":16,\"docs/SECURITY.md\":40,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"remappings.txt\":2,\"src/IMDStockDex.sol\":369,\"src/interfaces/IBurnableIMD.sol\":7,\"src/interfaces/IUniswapV3.sol\":29,\"test/AccountingInvariant.t.sol\":163,\"test/Configuration.t.sol\":345,\"test/IMDStockDex.t.sol\":423,\"test/UniswapV3Integration.t.sol\":184,\"test/fixtures/PROVENANCE.json\":47,\"test/fixtures/QuoterV2Bytecode.sol\":10,\"test/fixtures/SwapRouterBytecode.sol\":10,\"test/fixtures/UniswapV3FactoryBytecode.sol\":10,\"test/fixtures/upstream/v3-core-sources.tar.gz\":712,\"test/fixtures/upstream/v3-periphery-sources.tar.gz\":530,\"test/fixtures/v3-core-LICENSE\":100,\"test/fixtures/v3-core-LICENSE_GPL\":339,\"test/fixtures/v3-core-LICENSE_MIT\":20,\"test/fixtures/v3-periphery-LICENSE\":339,\"test/helpers/DexTestBase.sol\":77,\"test/mocks/MockTokens.sol\":128,\"test/mocks/MockVenue.sol\":76},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":779,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[high/medium] reentrancy-balance at src/IMDStockDex.sol:257: Reentrancy in IMDStockDex._swap(address,bytes,uint256,uint256,uint256) (src/IMDStockDex.sol#257-281):\n[high/medium] reentrancy-balance at src/IMDStockDex.sol:257: Reentrancy in IMDStockDex._swap(address,bytes,uint256,uint256,uint256) (src/IMDStockDex.sol#257-281):\n[high/medium] reentrancy-balance at src/IMDStockDex.sol:202: Reentrancy in IMDStockDex.buyStock(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256) (src/IMDStockDex.sol#202-239):\n[high/medium] reentrancy-balance at src/IMDStockDex.sol:202: Reentrancy in IMDStockDex.buyStock(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256) (src/IMDStockDex.sol#202-239):\n[high/medium] reentrancy-balance at src/IMDStockDex.sol:257: Reentrancy in IMDStockDex._swap(address,bytes,uint256,uint256,uint256) (src/IMDStockDex.sol#257-281):\n[medium/medium] divide-before-multiply at src/IMDStockDex.sol:175: IMDStockDex.previewFees(uint256) (src/IMDStockDex.sol#175-182) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:\n[medium/medium] divide-before-multiply at src/IMDStockDex.sol:314: IMDStockDex._validatePath(address,bytes) (src/IMDStockDex.sol#314-335) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/IMDStockDex.sol:186: IMDStockDex.quoteBuy(address,uint256) (src/IMDStockDex.sol#186-197) ignores return value by (stockOut,None,None,None) = quoter.quoteExactInput(path,fees.swapAmount) (src/IMDStockDex.sol#196)\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/IMDStockDex.sol:202: IMDStockDex.buyStock(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256) (src/IMDStockDex.sol#202-239) uses timestamp for comparisons","passed":true},{"durationMs":271,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[low] centralization-risk at src/IMDStockDex.sol:17: Centralization Risk (11 places)\n[low] large-numeric-literal at src/IMDStockDex.sol:21: Large Numeric Literal (2 places)\n[low] literal-instead-of-constant at src/IMDStockDex.sol:315: Literal Instead of Constant (14 places)\n[low] require-revert-in-loop at src/IMDStockDex.sol:322: Loop Contains `require`/`revert` (2 places)\n[low] state-change-without-event at src/IMDStockDex.sol:186: State Change Without Event\n[low] uninitialized-local-variable at src/IMDStockDex.sol:322: Uninitialized Local Variable (2 places)","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"05899bea8407c755daabf7143457613fe929ffabff84e71b7d00c312b47e0366","verifiedTreeHash":"b951a096f9b6cae135921235cb8ed6316a00ff98","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+327e1e9f"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":4192,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 45 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 4.02s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[divide-before-multiply]: division before multiplication may lose precision\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:196:27\n    │\n196 │         fees.burnAmount = (fees.fee / BPS) * burnShareBps + (fees.fee % BPS) * burnShareBps / BPS;\n    │                           ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/divide-before-multiply\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:217:41\n    │\n217 │         (stockOut, sqrtPricesAfter,,) = quoter.quoteExactInput(path, fees.swapAmount);\n    │                                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:222:17\n    │\n222 │                 revert InsufficientLiquidity();\n    │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:217:9\n    │\n217 │         (stockOut, sqrtPricesAfter,,) = quoter.quoteExactInput(path, fees.swapAmount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:292:28\n    │\n292 │           uint256 reported = router.exactInput(\n    │ ┏━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┛\n293 │ ┃             IUniswapV3Router.ExactInputParams({\n294 │ ┃                 path: path,\n295 │ ┃                 recipient: msg.sender,\n    ‡ ┃\n299 │ ┃             })\n300 │ ┃         );\n    │ ┗━━━━━━━━━┛\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:314:9\n    │\n314 │         IBurnableIMD(address(imd)).burn(amount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:240:13\n    │\n240 │         if (block.timestamp > deadline) revert DeadlineExpired();\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:256:9\n    │\n256 │ ┏         emit StockPurchased(\n257 │ ┃             msg.sender,\n258 │ ┃             stock,\n259 │ ┃             grossIMD,\n    ‡ ┃\n265 │ ┃             expectedVersion\n266 │ ┃         );\n    │ ┗━━━━━━━━━━┛\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[incorrect-strict-equality]: dangerous strict equality check on an externally-influenced value\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:254:13\n    │\n254 │         if (imd.balanceOf(address(this)) != initialBalance) revert UnexpectedTokenBalance(address(imd));\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/incorrect-strict-equality\n\nwarning[divide-before-multiply]: division before multiplication may lose precision\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:347:69\n    │\n347 │         if (_pathToken(path, 0) != address(imd) || _pathToken(path, hops * 23) != stock) {\n    │                                                                     ━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/divide-before-multiply\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:370:36\n    │\n370 │         if (account == address(0)) revert InvalidAddress();\n    │                                    ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:371:39\n    │\n371 │         if (account.code.length == 0) revert NotAContract(account);\n    │                                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:353:41\n    │\n353 │             if (token == address(this)) revert InvalidPath();\n    │                                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:356:56\n    │\n356 │                 if (token == _pathToken(path, j * 23)) revert InvalidPath();\n    │                                                        ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:360:59\n    │\n360 │                 if (poolFee == 0 || poolFee >= 1_000_000) revert InvalidPath();\n    │                                                           ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":1160,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 20 tests for test/Configuration.t.sol:ConfigurationTest\n[PASS] test_IMDIdentityCannotBeChangedAfterConfiguration() (gas: 110675)\n[PASS] test_allAdministrativeFunctionsRejectNonOwner() (gas: 360429)\n[PASS] test_configurationAndRecoveryRequirePause() (gas: 225498)\n[PASS] test_configurationChangesEmitEventsAndIncrementVersion() (gas: 159618)\n[PASS] test_creatorCanNeverBeTheRouterOrQuoter() (gas: 1570318)\n[PASS] test_dependenciesRequireNonzeroContractAddresses() (gas: 450822)\n[PASS] test_deploymentNeedsOnlyExplicitOwnerOnEmptyChain() (gas: 284796)\n[PASS] test_duplicateDisableRejected() (gas: 79642)\n[PASS] test_invalidCreatorAndSplitRejected() (gas: 287362)\n[PASS] test_malformedPathsAndInvalidStocksRejected() (gas: 651118)\n[PASS] test_maximumFourHopRouteAccepted() (gas: 3079079)\n[PASS] test_quoteRejectsMissingOrExhaustedHopPrices() (gas: 632570)\n[PASS] test_recoverOnlyAccidentalTokensWhilePaused() (gas: 384976)\n[PASS] test_renounceCannotTrapConfiguration() (gas: 25711)\n[PASS] test_routerEvenAsOwnerCannotReenterConfiguration() (gas: 676520)\n[PASS] test_runtimeFitsAndHasNoForbiddenOpcodes() (gas: 4981571)\n[PASS] test_twoStepOwnershipRequiresAcceptanceAndCanBeCancelled() (gas: 364027)\n[PASS] test_unconfiguredTradingAndQuotesHaveClearErrors() (gas: 1328886)\n[PASS] test_vanishedDependencyDetectedBeforeSpending() (gas: 152916)\n[PASS] test_zeroOwnerConstructorRejected() (gas: 4152)\nSuite result: ok. 20 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 84.89ms (56.63ms CPU time)\n\nRan 12 tests for test/UniswapV3Integration.t.sol:UniswapV3IntegrationTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_realRouterMatchesQuotedNetInput(uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 483357, ~: 484937)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 719206528\n\n[PASS] test_feeAppliesToEveryDexPurchaseButNotToDirectPoolSwaps() (gas: 764723)\n[PASS] test_realExhaustedIntermediateHopIsDetected() (gas: 8097290)\n[PASS] test_realExhaustedLiquidityQuoteRevertsInsteadOfPhantomOutput() (gas: 8448998)\n[PASS] test_realFourHopExhaustedLastHopQuoteRefusedAndMinimumProtects() (gas: 27530819)\n[PASS] test_realFourHopMaximumRoute() (gas: 25133695)\n[PASS] test_realMissingPoolRevertsWithoutFees() (gas: 395889)\n[PASS] test_realMultihopQuoteAndPurchase() (gas: 935685)\n[PASS] test_realRouterAndQuoterRejectedAsCreator() (gas: 154184)\n[PASS] test_realSingleHopQuoteAndPurchase() (gas: 510349)\n[PASS] test_realSlippageFailureRollsBack() (gas: 519719)\n[PASS] test_secondQuoteReflectsPoolMovement() (gas: 808373)\nSuite result: ok. 12 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 109.76ms (185.98ms CPU time)\n\nRan 40 tests for test/IMDStockDex.t.sol:IMDStockDexTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_feeConservationAcrossInputRange(uint256,uint16) (runs: 512, μ: 326629, ~: 326538)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 197741126410981505006518846\n  Bound result 1243\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_purchaseConservesFunds(uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 513138, ~: 513013)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 927589076411630256744525\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_tokenCallbacksCannotReenter(uint8) (runs: 512, μ: 721372, ~: 722695)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 2\n\n[PASS] test_blockedStockRecipientRevertsWithoutFees() (gas: 495196)\n[PASS] test_burnFailureRevertsSwapAndCreatorPayment() (gas: 535554)\n[PASS] test_buyUsesOnlyIMDAndDistributesExactFee() (gas: 568299)\n[PASS] test_cannotSpendAnotherBuyersAllowance() (gas: 181487)\n[PASS] test_creatorCanBuyAndReceivesItsShare() (gas: 511398)\n[PASS] test_creatorTransferFailureRevertsSwapAndBurn() (gas: 552390)\n[PASS] test_creatorTransferTaxRejected() (gas: 606225)\n[PASS] test_decimalsAreRawUnitsNotAssumedEighteen() (gas: 1945572)\n[PASS] test_dexChecksSlippageEvenIfRouterIgnoresMinimum() (gas: 535545)\n[PASS] test_disabledStockRejected() (gas: 216613)\n[PASS] test_exactDeadlineIsAllowed() (gas: 401893)\n[PASS] test_existingDonationsAreNotSpent() (gas: 543061)\n[PASS] test_expiredDeadlineReverts() (gas: 154418)\n[PASS] test_extraTaxOnBuyerRejected() (gas: 292084)\n[PASS] test_failedVenueRevertsWithoutFees() (gas: 299927)\n[PASS] test_falseReturnTokenRejected() (gas: 222511)\n[PASS] test_feeRoundsUpAndSplitConservesDust() (gas: 436231)\n[PASS] test_inputTransferTaxRejected() (gas: 290817)\n[PASS] test_missingAllowanceRevertsWithoutFees() (gas: 216921)\n[PASS] test_multipleHopsForwardedExactly() (gas: 656142)\n[PASS] test_nativeETHIsRejected() (gas: 170009)\n[PASS] test_noOpBurnCannotPretendToReduceSupply() (gas: 536815)\n[PASS] test_noReturnTokensSupported() (gas: 519816)\n[PASS] test_outputTransferTaxRejected() (gas: 565957)\n[PASS] test_partialInputSwapRevertsInsteadOfStrandingFunds() (gas: 536538)\n[PASS] test_pausedDexRejectsPurchases() (gas: 210849)\n[PASS] test_pendingPurchaseCannotAcceptChangedCreatorOrSplit() (gas: 731054)\n[PASS] test_purchaseEventAccountsForEveryFeeUnit() (gas: 422298)\n[PASS] test_quoteUsesNetInputAndMatchesExecution() (gas: 487826)\n[PASS] test_routerCannotLieAboutOutput() (gas: 537650)\n[PASS] test_routerCannotReenterPurchase() (gas: 694586)\n[PASS] test_routerReplacementLeavesNoOldAllowance() (gas: 2180073)\n[PASS] test_stockApprovalCannotPayForPurchase() (gas: 212499)\n[PASS] test_tinyAndZeroPurchasesRevert() (gas: 8187391)\n[PASS] test_unlistedStockRejected() (gas: 154293)\n[PASS] test_venueSlippageRevertsAllEffects() (gas: 438281)\n[PASS] test_zeroMinimumReverts() (gas: 151981)\nSuite result: ok. 40 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 110.45ms (321.60ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/AccountingInvariant.t.sol:AccountingInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nAccountingInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_noResidualRouterApprovalOrStockCustody\n[PASS] invariant_supplyAndDistributionConserveEveryIMDUnit\n AccountingInvariantTest invariants (runs: 128, calls: 4096, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract          | Selector        | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+==================================================================+\n| AccountingHandler | buy             | 723   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AccountingHandler | changeSplit     | 648   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AccountingHandler | donate          | 638   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AccountingHandler | recoverDonation | 662   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AccountingHandler | toggleMarket    | 730   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AccountingHandler | togglePause     | 695   | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 255\n  Bound result 9734\n  Bound result 3509\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 5199\n  Bound result 3954\n  Bound result 6622\n  Bound result 5455\n  Bound result 201\n  Bound result 3879\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.01s (1.01s CPU time)\n\nRan 4 test suites in 1.01s (1.31s CPU time): 73 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (73 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":98,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"IMDStockDex.acceptOwnership()\",\"IMDStockDex.buyStock(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256)\",\"IMDStockDex.disableMarket(address)\",\"IMDStockDex.pause()\",\"IMDStockDex.quoteBuy(address,uint256)\",\"IMDStockDex.recoverToken(address,address,uint256)\",\"IMDStockDex.setFeeDistribution(address,uint16)\",\"IMDStockDex.setIMD(address)\",\"IMDStockDex.setMarket(address,bytes)\",\"IMDStockDex.setQuoter(address)\",\"IMDStockDex.setRouter(address)\",\"IMDStockDex.transferOwnership(address)\",\"IMDStockDex.unpause()\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"LICENSE\":339,\"README.md\":119,\"THIRD_PARTY.md\":16,\"docs/SECURITY.md\":44,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"remappings.txt\":2,\"src/IMDStockDex.sol\":397,\"src/interfaces/IBurnableIMD.sol\":7,\"src/interfaces/IUniswapV3.sol\":29,\"test/AccountingInvariant.t.sol\":163,\"test/Configuration.t.sol\":392,\"test/IMDStockDex.t.sol\":423,\"test/UniswapV3Integration.t.sol\":367,\"test/fixtures/PROVENANCE.json\":47,\"test/fixtures/QuoterV2Bytecode.sol\":10,\"test/fixtures/SwapRouterBytecode.sol\":10,\"test/fixtures/UniswapV3FactoryBytecode.sol\":10,\"test/fixtures/upstream/v3-core-sources.tar.gz\":712,\"test/fixtures/upstream/v3-periphery-sources.tar.gz\":530,\"test/fixtures/v3-core-LICENSE\":100,\"test/fixtures/v3-core-LICENSE_GPL\":339,\"test/fixtures/v3-core-LICENSE_MIT\":20,\"test/fixtures/v3-periphery-LICENSE\":339,\"test/helpers/DexTestBase.sol\":77,\"test/mocks/MockTokens.sol\":128,\"test/mocks/MockVenue.sol\":88},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"a8669f41368be35c9703f3c7f032b78789f2b88ae5339bdddb49140702635790","verifiedTreeHash":"3564030a856c34d148e760c8c92cc5c7d5f9df83","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+327e1e9f"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":3500,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 49 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 3.38s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[divide-before-multiply]: division before multiplication may lose precision\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:179:27\n    │\n179 │         fees.burnAmount = (fees.fee / BPS) * burnShareBps + (fees.fee % BPS) * burnShareBps / BPS;\n    │                           ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/divide-before-multiply\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:196:25\n    │\n196 │         (stockOut,,,) = quoter.quoteExactInput(path, fees.swapAmount);\n    │                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:196:9\n    │\n196 │         (stockOut,,,) = quoter.quoteExactInput(path, fees.swapAmount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:264:28\n    │\n264 │           uint256 reported = router.exactInput(\n    │ ┏━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┛\n265 │ ┃             IUniswapV3Router.ExactInputParams({\n266 │ ┃                 path: path,\n267 │ ┃                 recipient: msg.sender,\n    ‡ ┃\n271 │ ┃             })\n272 │ ┃         );\n    │ ┗━━━━━━━━━┛\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:286:9\n    │\n286 │         IBurnableIMD(address(imd)).burn(amount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:212:13\n    │\n212 │         if (block.timestamp > deadline) revert DeadlineExpired();\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:228:9\n    │\n228 │ ┏         emit StockPurchased(\n229 │ ┃             msg.sender,\n230 │ ┃             stock,\n231 │ ┃             grossIMD,\n    ‡ ┃\n237 │ ┃             expectedVersion\n238 │ ┃         );\n    │ ┗━━━━━━━━━━┛\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[incorrect-strict-equality]: dangerous strict equality check on an externally-influenced value\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:226:13\n    │\n226 │         if (imd.balanceOf(address(this)) != initialBalance) revert UnexpectedTokenBalance(address(imd));\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/incorrect-strict-equality\n\nwarning[divide-before-multiply]: division before multiplication may lose precision\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:319:69\n    │\n319 │         if (_pathToken(path, 0) != address(imd) || _pathToken(path, hops * 23) != stock) {\n    │                                                                     ━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/divide-before-multiply\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:342:36\n    │\n342 │         if (account == address(0)) revert InvalidAddress();\n    │                                    ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:343:39\n    │\n343 │         if (account.code.length == 0) revert NotAContract(account);\n    │                                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:325:41\n    │\n325 │             if (token == address(this)) revert InvalidPath();\n    │                                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:328:56\n    │\n328 │                 if (token == _pathToken(path, j * 23)) revert InvalidPath();\n    │                                                        ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:332:59\n    │\n332 │                 if (poolFee == 0 || poolFee >= 1_000_000) revert InvalidPath();\n    │                                                           ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":6815,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 10 tests for test/UniswapV3Integration.t.sol:UniswapV3IntegrationTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_realRouterMatchesQuotedNetInput(uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 482786, ~: 484384)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 2000002\n\n[PASS] test_realBlockedStockTransferPreservesPoolAndBuyerState() (gas: 1143038)\n[PASS] test_realBurnFailureRestoresPoolPriceReservesAndFeeGrowth() (gas: 1975705)\n[PASS] test_realCreatorFailureRestoresBothMultihopPools() (gas: 2732037)\n[PASS] test_realMissingPoolRevertsWithoutFees() (gas: 395881)\n[PASS] test_realMultihopQuoteAndPurchase() (gas: 934649)\n[PASS] test_realQuoterDoesNotMovePoolStateOrSpendAnUnapprovedCallersTokens() (gas: 967675)\n[PASS] test_realSingleHopQuoteAndPurchase() (gas: 509767)\n[PASS] test_realSlippageFailureRollsBack() (gas: 519093)\n[PASS] test_secondQuoteReflectsPoolMovement() (gas: 807076)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 102.55ms (109.66ms CPU time)\n\nRan 6 tests for test/QuoteSafety.t.sol:QuoteSafetyTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_evenOwnerQuoterCannotReenterTradingOrConfiguration(uint8) (runs: 1000, μ: 1493720, ~: 1483492)\n[PASS] testFuzz_noConfigurationVersionActsAsAWildcard(uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 179138, ~: 179087)\n[PASS] test_disabledMarketDoesNotFreezeAnotherMarketButInvalidatesOldQuotes() (gas: 1118002)\n[PASS] test_quoteObtainedWhilePausedMustBeRefreshedAfterReopening() (gas: 818916)\n[PASS] test_quoterOutageDoesNotBlockBuyersUsingTheRouter() (gas: 1829865)\n[PASS] test_zeroAndMaximumVersionsAreNotWildcards() (gas: 358269)\nSuite result: ok. 6 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 107.99ms (199.62ms CPU time)\n\nRan 13 tests for test/SettlementAdversarial.t.sol:SettlementAdversarialTest\n[PASS] test_extraCreatorDebitCannotConsumeDonations() (gas: 951255)\n[PASS] test_extraIMDCreditOnInputRejected() (gas: 826650)\n[PASS] test_failedApprovalRevocationRollsBackAnExecutedSwap() (gas: 912799)\n[PASS] test_failedRouterApprovalPreservesBuyerApproval() (gas: 837136)\n[PASS] test_falseReturnAfterCreatorWasCreditedRollsBackEverything() (gas: 943118)\n[PASS] test_inputRebaseCannotReducePreexistingDonations() (gas: 826652)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBuyerBalanceCannotUseDexDonationOrAnotherBuyersFunds() (gas: 486370)\n[PASS] test_rejectBurnLargerThanAllocation() (gas: 926632)\n[PASS] test_rejectBurnSmallerThanAllocation() (gas: 926764)\n[PASS] test_rejectSupplyIncreaseDuringBurn() (gas: 926747)\n[PASS] test_rejectSupplyReductionFromTheWrongAccount() (gas: 933395)\n[PASS] test_stockBalanceDecreaseRejectedEvenWhenRouterReportsEnough() (gas: 936945)\n[PASS] test_transferToAnotherAccountIsNotSupplyBurning() (gas: 929274)\nSuite result: ok. 13 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 109.20ms (7.73ms CPU time)\n\nRan 18 tests for test/Configuration.t.sol:ConfigurationTest\n[PASS] test_IMDIdentityCannotBeChangedAfterConfiguration() (gas: 110608)\n[PASS] test_allAdministrativeFunctionsRejectNonOwner() (gas: 360407)\n[PASS] test_configurationAndRecoveryRequirePause() (gas: 225520)\n[PASS] test_configurationChangesEmitEventsAndIncrementVersion() (gas: 155308)\n[PASS] test_dependenciesRequireNonzeroContractAddresses() (gas: 450732)\n[PASS] test_deploymentNeedsOnlyExplicitOwnerOnEmptyChain() (gas: 284774)\n[PASS] test_duplicateDisableRejected() (gas: 79664)\n[PASS] test_invalidCreatorAndSplitRejected() (gas: 274308)\n[PASS] test_malformedPathsAndInvalidStocksRejected() (gas: 651096)\n[PASS] test_maximumFourHopRouteAccepted() (gas: 3079109)\n[PASS] test_recoverOnlyAccidentalTokensWhilePaused() (gas: 384976)\n[PASS] test_renounceCannotTrapConfiguration() (gas: 25711)\n[PASS] test_routerEvenAsOwnerCannotReenterConfiguration() (gas: 676690)\n[PASS] test_runtimeFitsAndHasNoForbiddenOpcodes() (gas: 4803267)\n[PASS] test_twoStepOwnershipRequiresAcceptanceAndCanBeCancelled() (gas: 363961)\n[PASS] test_unconfiguredTradingAndQuotesHaveClearErrors() (gas: 1314429)\n[PASS] test_vanishedDependencyDetectedBeforeSpending() (gas: 152938)\n[PASS] test_zeroOwnerConstructorRejected() (gas: 4174)\nSuite result: ok. 18 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 109.27ms (12.26ms CPU time)\n\nRan 12 tests for test/FeeProperties.t.sol:FeePropertiesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_feeAndSplitAreWithinOneUnitOfExactProportions(uint128,uint16) (runs: 1000, μ: 177345, ~: 177234)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 340282366920938463463374607431766220903\n  Bound result 500\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_minimumOrderFundsBothBeneficiaries(uint16) (runs: 1000, μ: 796129, ~: 796020)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 3193\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_oneMoreInputUnitCannotReduceAnyAllocation(uint256,uint16) (runs: 1000, μ: 185813, ~: 185725)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913127649382\n  Bound result 500\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_splitChangesDoNotChangeThePurchaseFeeOrNetInput(uint128,uint16,uint16) (runs: 1000, μ: 343419, ~: 343366)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 340282366920938463463374607431766214462\n  Bound result 3276\n  Bound result 8814\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_splittingOrdersCannotReduceTotalFee(uint128,uint128,uint16) (runs: 1000, μ: 198089, ~: 198135)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 340282366920938463463374607431766214462\n  Bound result 340282366920938463463374607431766214732\n  Bound result 9156\n\n[PASS] test_buyEntireBalanceThenRejectSecondPurchase() (gas: 545496)\n[PASS] test_minimumAtEqualShares() (gas: 791970)\n[PASS] test_minimumAtLargestBurnShare() (gas: 792014)\n[PASS] test_minimumAtOneBasisPointBurnShare() (gas: 792050)\n[PASS] test_sixDecimalIMDPaysFeeInIMDRawUnits() (gas: 2180334)\n[PASS] test_uint256MaximumCanBeSettledWithoutIntermediateOverflow() (gas: 659165)\n[PASS] test_zeroAndOneUnitOrdersDoNotConsumeApproval() (gas: 248015)\nSuite result: ok. 12 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 109.38ms (540.49ms CPU time)\n\nRan 40 tests for test/IMDStockDex.t.sol:IMDStockDexTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_feeConservationAcrossInputRange(uint256,uint16) (runs: 512, μ: 322315, ~: 322228)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 4620620392110936083761471981\n  Bound result 41\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_purchaseConservesFunds(uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 513365, ~: 513304)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 3500000000000000000\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_tokenCallbacksCannotReenter(uint8) (runs: 512, μ: 721508, ~: 722814)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1\n\n[PASS] test_blockedStockRecipientRevertsWithoutFees() (gas: 495304)\n[PASS] test_burnFailureRevertsSwapAndCreatorPayment() (gas: 535673)\n[PASS] test_buyUsesOnlyIMDAndDistributesExactFee() (gas: 568363)\n[PASS] test_cannotSpendAnotherBuyersAllowance() (gas: 181487)\n[PASS] test_creatorCanBuyAndReceivesItsShare() (gas: 511517)\n[PASS] test_creatorTransferFailureRevertsSwapAndBurn() (gas: 552509)\n[PASS] test_creatorTransferTaxRejected() (gas: 606344)\n[PASS] test_decimalsAreRawUnitsNotAssumedEighteen() (gas: 1945669)\n[PASS] test_dexChecksSlippageEvenIfRouterIgnoresMinimum() (gas: 535642)\n[PASS] test_disabledStockRejected() (gas: 216613)\n[PASS] test_exactDeadlineIsAllowed() (gas: 402012)\n[PASS] test_existingDonationsAreNotSpent() (gas: 543180)\n[PASS] test_expiredDeadlineReverts() (gas: 154418)\n[PASS] test_extraTaxOnBuyerRejected() (gas: 292084)\n[PASS] test_failedVenueRevertsWithoutFees() (gas: 299993)\n[PASS] test_falseReturnTokenRejected() (gas: 222511)\n[PASS] test_feeRoundsUpAndSplitConservesDust() (gas: 436350)\n[PASS] test_inputTransferTaxRejected() (gas: 290817)\n[PASS] test_missingAllowanceRevertsWithoutFees() (gas: 216921)\n[PASS] test_multipleHopsForwardedExactly() (gas: 656239)\n[PASS] test_nativeETHIsRejected() (gas: 170009)\n[PASS] test_noOpBurnCannotPretendToReduceSupply() (gas: 536934)\n[PASS] test_noReturnTokensSupported() (gas: 519935)\n[PASS] test_outputTransferTaxRejected() (gas: 566076)\n[PASS] test_partialInputSwapRevertsInsteadOfStrandingFunds() (gas: 536635)\n[PASS] test_pausedDexRejectsPurchases() (gas: 210849)\n[PASS] test_pendingPurchaseCannotAcceptChangedCreatorOrSplit() (gas: 726863)\n[PASS] test_purchaseEventAccountsForEveryFeeUnit() (gas: 422417)\n[PASS] test_quoteUsesNetInputAndMatchesExecution() (gas: 481967)\n[PASS] test_routerCannotLieAboutOutput() (gas: 537747)\n[PASS] test_routerCannotReenterPurchase() (gas: 694756)\n[PASS] test_routerReplacementLeavesNoOldAllowance() (gas: 2035576)\n[PASS] test_stockApprovalCannotPayForPurchase() (gas: 212499)\n[PASS] test_tinyAndZeroPurchasesRevert() (gas: 8187391)\n[PASS] test_unlistedStockRejected() (gas: 154293)\n[PASS] test_venueSlippageRevertsAllEffects() (gas: 438379)\n[PASS] test_zeroMinimumReverts() (gas: 151981)\nSuite result: ok. 40 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 109.41ms (327.63ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/AccountingInvariant.t.sol:AccountingInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nAccountingInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_noResidualRouterApprovalOrStockCustody\n[PASS] invariant_supplyAndDistributionConserveEveryIMDUnit\n AccountingInvariantTest invariants (runs: 128, calls: 4096, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract          | Selector        | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+==================================================================+\n| AccountingHandler | buy             | 640   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AccountingHandler | changeSplit     | 682   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AccountingHandler | donate          | 685   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AccountingHandler | recoverDonation | 692   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AccountingHandler | toggleMarket    | 684   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AccountingHandler | togglePause     | 713   | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 46\n  Bound result 135\n  Bound result 4465\n  Bound result 6755\n  Bound result 8559\n  Bound result 8474\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 49152\n  Bound result 2824\n  Bound result 95\n  Bound result 3066191508\n  Bound result 255\n  Bound result 256\n  Bound result 4042\n  Bound result 2730\n  Bound result 7999996000000\n  Bound result 6619\n  Bound result 1009568294\n  Bound result 76122124668904291920912\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 724.78ms (723.17ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/SequenceAccountingInvariant.t.sol:SequenceAccountingInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nSequenceAccountingInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_configurationTracksOnlyAuthorizedTransitions\n[PASS] invariant_everyBalanceAndAllowanceMatchesTheIndependentLedger\n SequenceAccountingInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭---------------------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract                  | Selector          | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+============================================================================+\n| SequenceAccountingHandler | advanceTime       | 1808  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SequenceAccountingHandler | buy               | 1774  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SequenceAccountingHandler | buyFullBalance    | 1886  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SequenceAccountingHandler | buyWithFailure    | 1875  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SequenceAccountingHandler | donateOrRecover   | 1867  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SequenceAccountingHandler | executeSavedQuote | 1827  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SequenceAccountingHandler | reconfigure       | 1752  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SequenceAccountingHandler | saveQuote         | 1819  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SequenceAccountingHandler | unauthorized      | 1776  | 0       | 0        |\n╰---------------------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 822180481622597609175609\n  Bound result 999999999999999998016253\n  Bound result 999999999999999998002546\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 999999999999999998001694\n  Bound result 1999999000000000000\n  Bound result 23315\n  Bound result 2000002\n  Bound result 999999999999999998000361\n  Bound result 999999999999999998000787\n  Bound result 495969007888224921273050\n  Bound result 15618\n  Bound result 2000000000000000000\n  Bound result 697514170097531587594959\n  Bound result 86397\n  Bound result 1127273434\n  Bound result 4608\n  Bound result 443885024415426530203458\n  Bound result 999999999999999998000325\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2000000\n  Bound result 999999999999999998001234\n  Bound result 999999999999999998003985\n  Bound result 925976525706454740601927\n  Bound result 4360\n  Bound result 999999999999999998001315\n  Bound result 3500000000000000000\n  Bound result 2000002\n  Bound result 999999999999999998000446\n  Bound result 237537013037994669745544\n  Bound result 83595\n  Bound result 423407162174512038248332\n  Bound result 15936\n  Bound result 999999999999999998001662\n  Bound result 10000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 3500000000000000000\n  Bound result 1754\n  Bound result 999999999999999998001234\n\n[PASS] test_handlerReachesTradesLateFailuresStaleOrdersAndRecoveries() (gas: 6631179)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 777\n  Bound result 333\n  Bound result 777\n  Bound result 333\n  Bound result 777\n  Bound result 333\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000\n\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 6.74s (6.74s CPU time)\n\nRan 8 test suites in 6.74s (8.11s CPU time): 102 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (102 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":49,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"IMDStockDex.acceptOwnership()\",\"IMDStockDex.buyStock(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256)\",\"IMDStockDex.disableMarket(address)\",\"IMDStockDex.pause()\",\"IMDStockDex.quoteBuy(address,uint256)\",\"IMDStockDex.recoverToken(address,address,uint256)\",\"IMDStockDex.setFeeDistribution(address,uint16)\",\"IMDStockDex.setIMD(address)\",\"IMDStockDex.setMarket(address,bytes)\",\"IMDStockDex.setQuoter(address)\",\"IMDStockDex.setRouter(address)\",\"IMDStockDex.transferOwnership(address)\",\"IMDStockDex.unpause()\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"LICENSE\":339,\"README.md\":109,\"THIRD_PARTY.md\":16,\"docs/SECURITY.md\":40,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"remappings.txt\":2,\"src/IMDStockDex.sol\":369,\"src/interfaces/IBurnableIMD.sol\":7,\"src/interfaces/IUniswapV3.sol\":29,\"test/ADVERSARIAL_TESTS.md\":29,\"test/AccountingInvariant.t.sol\":163,\"test/Configuration.t.sol\":345,\"test/FeeProperties.t.sol\":191,\"test/IMDStockDex.t.sol\":423,\"test/QuoteSafety.t.sol\":150,\"test/SequenceAccountingInvariant.t.sol\":477,\"test/SettlementAdversarial.t.sol\":282,\"test/UniswapV3Integration.t.sol\":314,\"test/fixtures/PROVENANCE.json\":47,\"test/fixtures/QuoterV2Bytecode.sol\":10,\"test/fixtures/SwapRouterBytecode.sol\":10,\"test/fixtures/UniswapV3FactoryBytecode.sol\":10,\"test/fixtures/upstream/v3-core-sources.tar.gz\":712,\"test/fixtures/upstream/v3-periphery-sources.tar.gz\":530,\"test/fixtures/v3-core-LICENSE\":100,\"test/fixtures/v3-core-LICENSE_GPL\":339,\"test/fixtures/v3-core-LICENSE_MIT\":20,\"test/fixtures/v3-periphery-LICENSE\":339,\"test/helpers/DexTestBase.sol\":77,\"test/mocks/MockTokens.sol\":128,\"test/mocks/MockVenue.sol\":76},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"b9d8d3efe97b814a83a9db1e63d01d072f7fe8de6c1c017a0bc49a458acd0dee","verifiedTreeHash":"9d12a9d4963a097e4fd59dadd2e8c7eb50b5e16a","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+327e1e9f"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":2575,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 45 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 2.42s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[divide-before-multiply]: division before multiplication may lose precision\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:179:27\n    │\n179 │         fees.burnAmount = (fees.fee / BPS) * burnShareBps + (fees.fee % BPS) * burnShareBps / BPS;\n    │                           ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/divide-before-multiply\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:196:25\n    │\n196 │         (stockOut,,,) = quoter.quoteExactInput(path, fees.swapAmount);\n    │                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:196:9\n    │\n196 │         (stockOut,,,) = quoter.quoteExactInput(path, fees.swapAmount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:264:28\n    │\n264 │           uint256 reported = router.exactInput(\n    │ ┏━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┛\n265 │ ┃             IUniswapV3Router.ExactInputParams({\n266 │ ┃                 path: path,\n267 │ ┃                 recipient: msg.sender,\n    ‡ ┃\n271 │ ┃             })\n272 │ ┃         );\n    │ ┗━━━━━━━━━┛\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:286:9\n    │\n286 │         IBurnableIMD(address(imd)).burn(amount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:212:13\n    │\n212 │         if (block.timestamp > deadline) revert DeadlineExpired();\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:228:9\n    │\n228 │ ┏         emit StockPurchased(\n229 │ ┃             msg.sender,\n230 │ ┃             stock,\n231 │ ┃             grossIMD,\n    ‡ ┃\n237 │ ┃             expectedVersion\n238 │ ┃         );\n    │ ┗━━━━━━━━━━┛\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[incorrect-strict-equality]: dangerous strict equality check on an externally-influenced value\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:226:13\n    │\n226 │         if (imd.balanceOf(address(this)) != initialBalance) revert UnexpectedTokenBalance(address(imd));\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/incorrect-strict-equality\n\nwarning[divide-before-multiply]: division before multiplication may lose precision\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:319:69\n    │\n319 │         if (_pathToken(path, 0) != address(imd) || _pathToken(path, hops * 23) != stock) {\n    │                                                                     ━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/divide-before-multiply\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:342:36\n    │\n342 │         if (account == address(0)) revert InvalidAddress();\n    │                                    ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:343:39\n    │\n343 │         if (account.code.length == 0) revert NotAContract(account);\n    │                                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:325:41\n    │\n325 │             if (token == address(this)) revert InvalidPath();\n    │                                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:328:56\n    │\n328 │                 if (token == _pathToken(path, j * 23)) revert InvalidPath();\n    │                                                        ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:332:59\n    │\n332 │                 if (poolFee == 0 || poolFee >= 1_000_000) revert InvalidPath();\n    │                                                           ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":983,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 18 tests for test/Configuration.t.sol:ConfigurationTest\n[PASS] test_IMDIdentityCannotBeChangedAfterConfiguration() (gas: 110608)\n[PASS] test_allAdministrativeFunctionsRejectNonOwner() (gas: 360407)\n[PASS] test_configurationAndRecoveryRequirePause() (gas: 225520)\n[PASS] test_configurationChangesEmitEventsAndIncrementVersion() (gas: 155308)\n[PASS] test_dependenciesRequireNonzeroContractAddresses() (gas: 450732)\n[PASS] test_deploymentNeedsOnlyExplicitOwnerOnEmptyChain() (gas: 284774)\n[PASS] test_duplicateDisableRejected() (gas: 79664)\n[PASS] test_invalidCreatorAndSplitRejected() (gas: 274308)\n[PASS] test_malformedPathsAndInvalidStocksRejected() (gas: 651096)\n[PASS] test_maximumFourHopRouteAccepted() (gas: 3079109)\n[PASS] test_recoverOnlyAccidentalTokensWhilePaused() (gas: 384976)\n[PASS] test_renounceCannotTrapConfiguration() (gas: 25711)\n[PASS] test_routerEvenAsOwnerCannotReenterConfiguration() (gas: 676690)\n[PASS] test_runtimeFitsAndHasNoForbiddenOpcodes() (gas: 4803267)\n[PASS] test_twoStepOwnershipRequiresAcceptanceAndCanBeCancelled() (gas: 363961)\n[PASS] test_unconfiguredTradingAndQuotesHaveClearErrors() (gas: 1314429)\n[PASS] test_vanishedDependencyDetectedBeforeSpending() (gas: 152938)\n[PASS] test_zeroOwnerConstructorRejected() (gas: 4174)\nSuite result: ok. 18 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 48.66ms (18.94ms CPU time)\n\nRan 40 tests for test/IMDStockDex.t.sol:IMDStockDexTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_feeConservationAcrossInputRange(uint256,uint16) (runs: 512, μ: 322315, ~: 322228)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 157324149889478414159\n  Bound result 3190\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_purchaseConservesFunds(uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 513282, ~: 513304)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 395438669496143024\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_tokenCallbacksCannotReenter(uint8) (runs: 512, μ: 721614, ~: 722814)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 4\n\n[PASS] test_blockedStockRecipientRevertsWithoutFees() (gas: 495304)\n[PASS] test_burnFailureRevertsSwapAndCreatorPayment() (gas: 535673)\n[PASS] test_buyUsesOnlyIMDAndDistributesExactFee() (gas: 568363)\n[PASS] test_cannotSpendAnotherBuyersAllowance() (gas: 181487)\n[PASS] test_creatorCanBuyAndReceivesItsShare() (gas: 511517)\n[PASS] test_creatorTransferFailureRevertsSwapAndBurn() (gas: 552509)\n[PASS] test_creatorTransferTaxRejected() (gas: 606344)\n[PASS] test_decimalsAreRawUnitsNotAssumedEighteen() (gas: 1945669)\n[PASS] test_dexChecksSlippageEvenIfRouterIgnoresMinimum() (gas: 535642)\n[PASS] test_disabledStockRejected() (gas: 216613)\n[PASS] test_exactDeadlineIsAllowed() (gas: 402012)\n[PASS] test_existingDonationsAreNotSpent() (gas: 543180)\n[PASS] test_expiredDeadlineReverts() (gas: 154418)\n[PASS] test_extraTaxOnBuyerRejected() (gas: 292084)\n[PASS] test_failedVenueRevertsWithoutFees() (gas: 299993)\n[PASS] test_falseReturnTokenRejected() (gas: 222511)\n[PASS] test_feeRoundsUpAndSplitConservesDust() (gas: 436350)\n[PASS] test_inputTransferTaxRejected() (gas: 290817)\n[PASS] test_missingAllowanceRevertsWithoutFees() (gas: 216921)\n[PASS] test_multipleHopsForwardedExactly() (gas: 656239)\n[PASS] test_nativeETHIsRejected() (gas: 170009)\n[PASS] test_noOpBurnCannotPretendToReduceSupply() (gas: 536934)\n[PASS] test_noReturnTokensSupported() (gas: 519935)\n[PASS] test_outputTransferTaxRejected() (gas: 566076)\n[PASS] test_partialInputSwapRevertsInsteadOfStrandingFunds() (gas: 536635)\n[PASS] test_pausedDexRejectsPurchases() (gas: 210849)\n[PASS] test_pendingPurchaseCannotAcceptChangedCreatorOrSplit() (gas: 726863)\n[PASS] test_purchaseEventAccountsForEveryFeeUnit() (gas: 422417)\n[PASS] test_quoteUsesNetInputAndMatchesExecution() (gas: 481967)\n[PASS] test_routerCannotLieAboutOutput() (gas: 537747)\n[PASS] test_routerCannotReenterPurchase() (gas: 694756)\n[PASS] test_routerReplacementLeavesNoOldAllowance() (gas: 2035576)\n[PASS] test_stockApprovalCannotPayForPurchase() (gas: 212499)\n[PASS] test_tinyAndZeroPurchasesRevert() (gas: 8187391)\n[PASS] test_unlistedStockRejected() (gas: 154293)\n[PASS] test_venueSlippageRevertsAllEffects() (gas: 438379)\n[PASS] test_zeroMinimumReverts() (gas: 151981)\nSuite result: ok. 40 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 61.22ms (158.80ms CPU time)\n\nRan 6 tests for test/UniswapV3Integration.t.sol:UniswapV3IntegrationTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_realRouterMatchesQuotedNetInput(uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 482917, ~: 484357)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 9999999999999998442307\n\n[PASS] test_realMissingPoolRevertsWithoutFees() (gas: 395842)\n[PASS] test_realMultihopQuoteAndPurchase() (gas: 934517)\n[PASS] test_realSingleHopQuoteAndPurchase() (gas: 509728)\n[PASS] test_realSlippageFailureRollsBack() (gas: 519054)\n[PASS] test_secondQuoteReflectsPoolMovement() (gas: 807054)\nSuite result: ok. 6 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 61.20ms (61.71ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/AccountingInvariant.t.sol:AccountingInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nAccountingInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_noResidualRouterApprovalOrStockCustody\n[PASS] invariant_supplyAndDistributionConserveEveryIMDUnit\n AccountingInvariantTest invariants (runs: 128, calls: 4096, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract          | Selector        | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+==================================================================+\n| AccountingHandler | buy             | 713   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AccountingHandler | changeSplit     | 672   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AccountingHandler | donate          | 683   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AccountingHandler | recoverDonation | 698   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AccountingHandler | toggleMarket    | 643   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AccountingHandler | togglePause     | 687   | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 4362\n  Bound result 13\n  Bound result 2000000\n  Bound result 12\n  Bound result 887367825707212529079896\n  Bound result 999999999999999998000019\n  Bound result 6903\n  Bound result 540\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 1095216660479\n  Bound result 1457\n  Bound result 11\n  Bound result 236632738236\n  Bound result 2930\n  Bound result 129\n  Bound result 489382308237\n  Bound result 5541\n  Bound result 999999999999999998005510\n  Bound result 100000\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 877.39ms (874.48ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 test suites in 879.01ms (1.05s CPU time): 65 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (65 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":52,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"IMDStockDex.acceptOwnership()\",\"IMDStockDex.buyStock(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256)\",\"IMDStockDex.disableMarket(address)\",\"IMDStockDex.pause()\",\"IMDStockDex.quoteBuy(address,uint256)\",\"IMDStockDex.recoverToken(address,address,uint256)\",\"IMDStockDex.setFeeDistribution(address,uint16)\",\"IMDStockDex.setIMD(address)\",\"IMDStockDex.setMarket(address,bytes)\",\"IMDStockDex.setQuoter(address)\",\"IMDStockDex.setRouter(address)\",\"IMDStockDex.transferOwnership(address)\",\"IMDStockDex.unpause()\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"LICENSE\":339,\"README.md\":109,\"THIRD_PARTY.md\":16,\"docs/SECURITY.md\":40,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"launch.json\":10,\"remappings.txt\":2,\"src/IMDStockDex.sol\":369,\"src/interfaces/IBurnableIMD.sol\":7,\"src/interfaces/IUniswapV3.sol\":29,\"test/AccountingInvariant.t.sol\":163,\"test/Configuration.t.sol\":345,\"test/IMDStockDex.t.sol\":423,\"test/UniswapV3Integration.t.sol\":184,\"test/fixtures/PROVENANCE.json\":47,\"test/fixtures/QuoterV2Bytecode.sol\":10,\"test/fixtures/SwapRouterBytecode.sol\":10,\"test/fixtures/UniswapV3FactoryBytecode.sol\":10,\"test/fixtures/upstream/v3-core-sources.tar.gz\":712,\"test/fixtures/upstream/v3-periphery-sources.tar.gz\":530,\"test/fixtures/v3-core-LICENSE\":100,\"test/fixtures/v3-core-LICENSE_GPL\":339,\"test/fixtures/v3-core-LICENSE_MIT\":20,\"test/fixtures/v3-periphery-LICENSE\":339,\"test/helpers/DexTestBase.sol\":77,\"test/mocks/MockTokens.sol\":128,\"test/mocks/MockVenue.sol\":76},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"cb16accc79362f3815cf04da9283ff949cf2c6f2456299c3cbde94da4d87f9cd","verifiedTreeHash":"80b64561d5598351fb87b54085a38c6ff2758c38","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+327e1e9f"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":2675,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 45 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 2.53s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[divide-before-multiply]: division before multiplication may lose precision\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:196:27\n    │\n196 │         fees.burnAmount = (fees.fee / BPS) * burnShareBps + (fees.fee % BPS) * burnShareBps / BPS;\n    │                           ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/divide-before-multiply\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:217:41\n    │\n217 │         (stockOut, sqrtPricesAfter,,) = quoter.quoteExactInput(path, fees.swapAmount);\n    │                                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:222:17\n    │\n222 │                 revert InsufficientLiquidity();\n    │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:217:9\n    │\n217 │         (stockOut, sqrtPricesAfter,,) = quoter.quoteExactInput(path, fees.swapAmount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:292:28\n    │\n292 │           uint256 reported = router.exactInput(\n    │ ┏━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┛\n293 │ ┃             IUniswapV3Router.ExactInputParams({\n294 │ ┃                 path: path,\n295 │ ┃                 recipient: msg.sender,\n    ‡ ┃\n299 │ ┃             })\n300 │ ┃         );\n    │ ┗━━━━━━━━━┛\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:314:9\n    │\n314 │         IBurnableIMD(address(imd)).burn(amount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:240:13\n    │\n240 │         if (block.timestamp > deadline) revert DeadlineExpired();\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:256:9\n    │\n256 │ ┏         emit StockPurchased(\n257 │ ┃             msg.sender,\n258 │ ┃             stock,\n259 │ ┃             grossIMD,\n    ‡ ┃\n265 │ ┃             expectedVersion\n266 │ ┃         );\n    │ ┗━━━━━━━━━━┛\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[incorrect-strict-equality]: dangerous strict equality check on an externally-influenced value\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:254:13\n    │\n254 │         if (imd.balanceOf(address(this)) != initialBalance) revert UnexpectedTokenBalance(address(imd));\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/incorrect-strict-equality\n\nwarning[divide-before-multiply]: division before multiplication may lose precision\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:347:69\n    │\n347 │         if (_pathToken(path, 0) != address(imd) || _pathToken(path, hops * 23) != stock) {\n    │                                                                     ━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/divide-before-multiply\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:370:36\n    │\n370 │         if (account == address(0)) revert InvalidAddress();\n    │                                    ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:371:39\n    │\n371 │         if (account.code.length == 0) revert NotAContract(account);\n    │                                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:353:41\n    │\n353 │             if (token == address(this)) revert InvalidPath();\n    │                                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:356:56\n    │\n356 │                 if (token == _pathToken(path, j * 23)) revert InvalidPath();\n    │                                                        ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:360:59\n    │\n360 │                 if (poolFee == 0 || poolFee >= 1_000_000) revert InvalidPath();\n    │                                                           ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":982,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 40 tests for test/IMDStockDex.t.sol:IMDStockDexTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_feeConservationAcrossInputRange(uint256,uint16) (runs: 512, μ: 326617, ~: 326516)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 107763528254337189753607224500477824964688012067449485087033316396359\n  Bound result 7\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_purchaseConservesFunds(uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 513252, ~: 513185)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 257541404461637785424835\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_tokenCallbacksCannotReenter(uint8) (runs: 512, μ: 721413, ~: 722695)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 4\n\n[PASS] test_blockedStockRecipientRevertsWithoutFees() (gas: 495196)\n[PASS] test_burnFailureRevertsSwapAndCreatorPayment() (gas: 535554)\n[PASS] test_buyUsesOnlyIMDAndDistributesExactFee() (gas: 568299)\n[PASS] test_cannotSpendAnotherBuyersAllowance() (gas: 181487)\n[PASS] test_creatorCanBuyAndReceivesItsShare() (gas: 511398)\n[PASS] test_creatorTransferFailureRevertsSwapAndBurn() (gas: 552390)\n[PASS] test_creatorTransferTaxRejected() (gas: 606225)\n[PASS] test_decimalsAreRawUnitsNotAssumedEighteen() (gas: 1945572)\n[PASS] test_dexChecksSlippageEvenIfRouterIgnoresMinimum() (gas: 535545)\n[PASS] test_disabledStockRejected() (gas: 216613)\n[PASS] test_exactDeadlineIsAllowed() (gas: 401893)\n[PASS] test_existingDonationsAreNotSpent() (gas: 543061)\n[PASS] test_expiredDeadlineReverts() (gas: 154418)\n[PASS] test_extraTaxOnBuyerRejected() (gas: 292084)\n[PASS] test_failedVenueRevertsWithoutFees() (gas: 299927)\n[PASS] test_falseReturnTokenRejected() (gas: 222511)\n[PASS] test_feeRoundsUpAndSplitConservesDust() (gas: 436231)\n[PASS] test_inputTransferTaxRejected() (gas: 290817)\n[PASS] test_missingAllowanceRevertsWithoutFees() (gas: 216921)\n[PASS] test_multipleHopsForwardedExactly() (gas: 656142)\n[PASS] test_nativeETHIsRejected() (gas: 170009)\n[PASS] test_noOpBurnCannotPretendToReduceSupply() (gas: 536815)\n[PASS] test_noReturnTokensSupported() (gas: 519816)\n[PASS] test_outputTransferTaxRejected() (gas: 565957)\n[PASS] test_partialInputSwapRevertsInsteadOfStrandingFunds() (gas: 536538)\n[PASS] test_pausedDexRejectsPurchases() (gas: 210849)\n[PASS] test_pendingPurchaseCannotAcceptChangedCreatorOrSplit() (gas: 731054)\n[PASS] test_purchaseEventAccountsForEveryFeeUnit() (gas: 422298)\n[PASS] test_quoteUsesNetInputAndMatchesExecution() (gas: 487826)\n[PASS] test_routerCannotLieAboutOutput() (gas: 537650)\n[PASS] test_routerCannotReenterPurchase() (gas: 694586)\n[PASS] test_routerReplacementLeavesNoOldAllowance() (gas: 2180073)\n[PASS] test_stockApprovalCannotPayForPurchase() (gas: 212499)\n[PASS] test_tinyAndZeroPurchasesRevert() (gas: 8187391)\n[PASS] test_unlistedStockRejected() (gas: 154293)\n[PASS] test_venueSlippageRevertsAllEffects() (gas: 438281)\n[PASS] test_zeroMinimumReverts() (gas: 151981)\nSuite result: ok. 40 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 67.92ms (191.89ms CPU time)\n\nRan 20 tests for test/Configuration.t.sol:ConfigurationTest\n[PASS] test_IMDIdentityCannotBeChangedAfterConfiguration() (gas: 110675)\n[PASS] test_allAdministrativeFunctionsRejectNonOwner() (gas: 360429)\n[PASS] test_configurationAndRecoveryRequirePause() (gas: 225498)\n[PASS] test_configurationChangesEmitEventsAndIncrementVersion() (gas: 159618)\n[PASS] test_creatorCanNeverBeTheRouterOrQuoter() (gas: 1570318)\n[PASS] test_dependenciesRequireNonzeroContractAddresses() (gas: 450822)\n[PASS] test_deploymentNeedsOnlyExplicitOwnerOnEmptyChain() (gas: 284796)\n[PASS] test_duplicateDisableRejected() (gas: 79642)\n[PASS] test_invalidCreatorAndSplitRejected() (gas: 287362)\n[PASS] test_malformedPathsAndInvalidStocksRejected() (gas: 651118)\n[PASS] test_maximumFourHopRouteAccepted() (gas: 3079079)\n[PASS] test_quoteRejectsMissingOrExhaustedHopPrices() (gas: 632570)\n[PASS] test_recoverOnlyAccidentalTokensWhilePaused() (gas: 384976)\n[PASS] test_renounceCannotTrapConfiguration() (gas: 25711)\n[PASS] test_routerEvenAsOwnerCannotReenterConfiguration() (gas: 676520)\n[PASS] test_runtimeFitsAndHasNoForbiddenOpcodes() (gas: 4981571)\n[PASS] test_twoStepOwnershipRequiresAcceptanceAndCanBeCancelled() (gas: 364027)\n[PASS] test_unconfiguredTradingAndQuotesHaveClearErrors() (gas: 1328886)\n[PASS] test_vanishedDependencyDetectedBeforeSpending() (gas: 152916)\n[PASS] test_zeroOwnerConstructorRejected() (gas: 4152)\nSuite result: ok. 20 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 67.89ms (18.05ms CPU time)\n\nRan 10 tests for test/UniswapV3Integration.t.sol:UniswapV3IntegrationTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_realRouterMatchesQuotedNetInput(uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 483424, ~: 484943)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 2514264353439168027520\n\n[PASS] test_feeAppliesToEveryDexPurchaseButNotToDirectPoolSwaps() (gas: 764701)\n[PASS] test_realExhaustedIntermediateHopIsDetected() (gas: 8097201)\n[PASS] test_realExhaustedLiquidityQuoteRevertsInsteadOfPhantomOutput() (gas: 8449008)\n[PASS] test_realMissingPoolRevertsWithoutFees() (gas: 395832)\n[PASS] test_realMultihopQuoteAndPurchase() (gas: 935639)\n[PASS] test_realRouterAndQuoterRejectedAsCreator() (gas: 154036)\n[PASS] test_realSingleHopQuoteAndPurchase() (gas: 510371)\n[PASS] test_realSlippageFailureRollsBack() (gas: 519719)\n[PASS] test_secondQuoteReflectsPoolMovement() (gas: 808461)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 73.98ms (80.02ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/AccountingInvariant.t.sol:AccountingInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nAccountingInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_noResidualRouterApprovalOrStockCustody\n[PASS] invariant_supplyAndDistributionConserveEveryIMDUnit\n AccountingInvariantTest invariants (runs: 128, calls: 4096, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract          | Selector        | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+==================================================================+\n| AccountingHandler | buy             | 689   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AccountingHandler | changeSplit     | 707   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AccountingHandler | donate          | 675   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AccountingHandler | recoverDonation | 667   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AccountingHandler | toggleMarket    | 646   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AccountingHandler | togglePause     | 712   | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 3690\n  Bound result 199846434595590345859373\n  Bound result 255\n  Bound result 32\n  Bound result 3500000000000000000\n  Bound result 3000\n  Bound result 3752\n  Bound result 1233\n  Bound result 839\n  Bound result 4402\n  Bound result 839\n  Bound result 50\n  Bound result 18\n  Bound result 1905\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 860.46ms (856.62ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 test suites in 861.88ms (1.07s CPU time): 71 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (71 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":54,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"IMDStockDex.acceptOwnership()\",\"IMDStockDex.buyStock(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256)\",\"IMDStockDex.disableMarket(address)\",\"IMDStockDex.pause()\",\"IMDStockDex.quoteBuy(address,uint256)\",\"IMDStockDex.recoverToken(address,address,uint256)\",\"IMDStockDex.setFeeDistribution(address,uint16)\",\"IMDStockDex.setIMD(address)\",\"IMDStockDex.setMarket(address,bytes)\",\"IMDStockDex.setQuoter(address)\",\"IMDStockDex.setRouter(address)\",\"IMDStockDex.transferOwnership(address)\",\"IMDStockDex.unpause()\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"LICENSE\":339,\"README.md\":119,\"THIRD_PARTY.md\":16,\"docs/SECURITY.md\":44,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"remappings.txt\":2,\"src/IMDStockDex.sol\":397,\"src/interfaces/IBurnableIMD.sol\":7,\"src/interfaces/IUniswapV3.sol\":29,\"test/AccountingInvariant.t.sol\":163,\"test/Configuration.t.sol\":392,\"test/IMDStockDex.t.sol\":423,\"test/UniswapV3Integration.t.sol\":280,\"test/fixtures/PROVENANCE.json\":47,\"test/fixtures/QuoterV2Bytecode.sol\":10,\"test/fixtures/SwapRouterBytecode.sol\":10,\"test/fixtures/UniswapV3FactoryBytecode.sol\":10,\"test/fixtures/upstream/v3-core-sources.tar.gz\":712,\"test/fixtures/upstream/v3-periphery-sources.tar.gz\":530,\"test/fixtures/v3-core-LICENSE\":100,\"test/fixtures/v3-core-LICENSE_GPL\":339,\"test/fixtures/v3-core-LICENSE_MIT\":20,\"test/fixtures/v3-periphery-LICENSE\":339,\"test/helpers/DexTestBase.sol\":77,\"test/mocks/MockTokens.sol\":128,\"test/mocks/MockVenue.sol\":88},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":864,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[high/medium] reentrancy-balance at src/IMDStockDex.sol:285: Reentrancy in IMDStockDex._swap(address,bytes,uint256,uint256,uint256) (src/IMDStockDex.sol#285-309):\n[high/medium] reentrancy-balance at src/IMDStockDex.sol:230: Reentrancy in IMDStockDex.buyStock(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256) (src/IMDStockDex.sol#230-267):\n[high/medium] reentrancy-balance at src/IMDStockDex.sol:285: Reentrancy in IMDStockDex._swap(address,bytes,uint256,uint256,uint256) (src/IMDStockDex.sol#285-309):\n[high/medium] reentrancy-balance at src/IMDStockDex.sol:230: Reentrancy in IMDStockDex.buyStock(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256) (src/IMDStockDex.sol#230-267):\n[high/medium] reentrancy-balance at src/IMDStockDex.sol:285: Reentrancy in IMDStockDex._swap(address,bytes,uint256,uint256,uint256) (src/IMDStockDex.sol#285-309):\n[medium/medium] divide-before-multiply at src/IMDStockDex.sol:192: IMDStockDex.previewFees(uint256) (src/IMDStockDex.sol#192-199) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:\n[medium/medium] divide-before-multiply at src/IMDStockDex.sol:342: IMDStockDex._validatePath(address,bytes) (src/IMDStockDex.sol#342-363) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/IMDStockDex.sol:206: IMDStockDex.quoteBuy(address,uint256) (src/IMDStockDex.sol#206-225) ignores return value by (stockOut,sqrtPricesAfter,None,None) = quoter.quoteExactInput(path,fees.swapAmount) (src/IMDStockDex.sol#217)\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/IMDStockDex.sol:230: IMDStockDex.buyStock(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256) (src/IMDStockDex.sol#230-267) uses timestamp for comparisons","passed":true},{"durationMs":309,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[low] centralization-risk at src/IMDStockDex.sol:20: Centralization Risk (11 places)\n[low] large-numeric-literal at src/IMDStockDex.sol:24: Large Numeric Literal (2 places)\n[low] literal-instead-of-constant at src/IMDStockDex.sol:218: Literal Instead of Constant (16 places)\n[low] require-revert-in-loop at src/IMDStockDex.sol:219: Loop Contains `require`/`revert` (3 places)\n[low] state-change-without-event at src/IMDStockDex.sol:206: State Change Without Event\n[low] uninitialized-local-variable at src/IMDStockDex.sol:219: Uninitialized Local Variable (3 places)","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"d1bb7b4a827f091466f94ced1a24a0c257ef6efba8608f2e557d7767ebd81308","verifiedTreeHash":"90a2f0ff72fccf9be18f46a19a790a02b7f2a583","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+327e1e9f"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":2404,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 45 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 2.29s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[divide-before-multiply]: division before multiplication may lose precision\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:196:27\n    │\n196 │         fees.burnAmount = (fees.fee / BPS) * burnShareBps + (fees.fee % BPS) * burnShareBps / BPS;\n    │                           ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/divide-before-multiply\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:217:41\n    │\n217 │         (stockOut, sqrtPricesAfter,,) = quoter.quoteExactInput(path, fees.swapAmount);\n    │                                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:222:17\n    │\n222 │                 revert InsufficientLiquidity();\n    │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:217:9\n    │\n217 │         (stockOut, sqrtPricesAfter,,) = quoter.quoteExactInput(path, fees.swapAmount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:292:28\n    │\n292 │           uint256 reported = router.exactInput(\n    │ ┏━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┛\n293 │ ┃             IUniswapV3Router.ExactInputParams({\n294 │ ┃                 path: path,\n295 │ ┃                 recipient: msg.sender,\n    ‡ ┃\n299 │ ┃             })\n300 │ ┃         );\n    │ ┗━━━━━━━━━┛\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:314:9\n    │\n314 │         IBurnableIMD(address(imd)).burn(amount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:240:13\n    │\n240 │         if (block.timestamp > deadline) revert DeadlineExpired();\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:256:9\n    │\n256 │ ┏         emit StockPurchased(\n257 │ ┃             msg.sender,\n258 │ ┃             stock,\n259 │ ┃             grossIMD,\n    ‡ ┃\n265 │ ┃             expectedVersion\n266 │ ┃         );\n    │ ┗━━━━━━━━━━┛\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[incorrect-strict-equality]: dangerous strict equality check on an externally-influenced value\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:254:13\n    │\n254 │         if (imd.balanceOf(address(this)) != initialBalance) revert UnexpectedTokenBalance(address(imd));\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/incorrect-strict-equality\n\nwarning[divide-before-multiply]: division before multiplication may lose precision\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:347:69\n    │\n347 │         if (_pathToken(path, 0) != address(imd) || _pathToken(path, hops * 23) != stock) {\n    │                                                                     ━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/divide-before-multiply\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:370:36\n    │\n370 │         if (account == address(0)) revert InvalidAddress();\n    │                                    ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:371:39\n    │\n371 │         if (account.code.length == 0) revert NotAContract(account);\n    │                                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:353:41\n    │\n353 │             if (token == address(this)) revert InvalidPath();\n    │                                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:356:56\n    │\n356 │                 if (token == _pathToken(path, j * 23)) revert InvalidPath();\n    │                                                        ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/IMDStockDex.sol:360:59\n    │\n360 │                 if (poolFee == 0 || poolFee >= 1_000_000) revert InvalidPath();\n    │                                                           ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":799,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 20 tests for test/Configuration.t.sol:ConfigurationTest\n[PASS] test_IMDIdentityCannotBeChangedAfterConfiguration() (gas: 110675)\n[PASS] test_allAdministrativeFunctionsRejectNonOwner() (gas: 360429)\n[PASS] test_configurationAndRecoveryRequirePause() (gas: 225498)\n[PASS] test_configurationChangesEmitEventsAndIncrementVersion() (gas: 159618)\n[PASS] test_creatorCanNeverBeTheRouterOrQuoter() (gas: 1570318)\n[PASS] test_dependenciesRequireNonzeroContractAddresses() (gas: 450822)\n[PASS] test_deploymentNeedsOnlyExplicitOwnerOnEmptyChain() (gas: 284796)\n[PASS] test_duplicateDisableRejected() (gas: 79642)\n[PASS] test_invalidCreatorAndSplitRejected() (gas: 287362)\n[PASS] test_malformedPathsAndInvalidStocksRejected() (gas: 651118)\n[PASS] test_maximumFourHopRouteAccepted() (gas: 3079079)\n[PASS] test_quoteRejectsMissingOrExhaustedHopPrices() (gas: 632570)\n[PASS] test_recoverOnlyAccidentalTokensWhilePaused() (gas: 384976)\n[PASS] test_renounceCannotTrapConfiguration() (gas: 25711)\n[PASS] test_routerEvenAsOwnerCannotReenterConfiguration() (gas: 676520)\n[PASS] test_runtimeFitsAndHasNoForbiddenOpcodes() (gas: 4981571)\n[PASS] test_twoStepOwnershipRequiresAcceptanceAndCanBeCancelled() (gas: 364027)\n[PASS] test_unconfiguredTradingAndQuotesHaveClearErrors() (gas: 1328886)\n[PASS] test_vanishedDependencyDetectedBeforeSpending() (gas: 152916)\n[PASS] test_zeroOwnerConstructorRejected() (gas: 4152)\nSuite result: ok. 20 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 49.61ms (16.43ms CPU time)\n\nRan 40 tests for test/IMDStockDex.t.sol:IMDStockDexTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_feeConservationAcrossInputRange(uint256,uint16) (runs: 512, μ: 326643, ~: 326538)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1044971650781230246729588991285753051598790470182902644409907242362107280689\n  Bound result 10\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_purchaseConservesFunds(uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 513171, ~: 513185)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 202\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_tokenCallbacksCannotReenter(uint8) (runs: 512, μ: 721568, ~: 722695)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 3\n\n[PASS] test_blockedStockRecipientRevertsWithoutFees() (gas: 495196)\n[PASS] test_burnFailureRevertsSwapAndCreatorPayment() (gas: 535554)\n[PASS] test_buyUsesOnlyIMDAndDistributesExactFee() (gas: 568299)\n[PASS] test_cannotSpendAnotherBuyersAllowance() (gas: 181487)\n[PASS] test_creatorCanBuyAndReceivesItsShare() (gas: 511398)\n[PASS] test_creatorTransferFailureRevertsSwapAndBurn() (gas: 552390)\n[PASS] test_creatorTransferTaxRejected() (gas: 606225)\n[PASS] test_decimalsAreRawUnitsNotAssumedEighteen() (gas: 1945572)\n[PASS] test_dexChecksSlippageEvenIfRouterIgnoresMinimum() (gas: 535545)\n[PASS] test_disabledStockRejected() (gas: 216613)\n[PASS] test_exactDeadlineIsAllowed() (gas: 401893)\n[PASS] test_existingDonationsAreNotSpent() (gas: 543061)\n[PASS] test_expiredDeadlineReverts() (gas: 154418)\n[PASS] test_extraTaxOnBuyerRejected() (gas: 292084)\n[PASS] test_failedVenueRevertsWithoutFees() (gas: 299927)\n[PASS] test_falseReturnTokenRejected() (gas: 222511)\n[PASS] test_feeRoundsUpAndSplitConservesDust() (gas: 436231)\n[PASS] test_inputTransferTaxRejected() (gas: 290817)\n[PASS] test_missingAllowanceRevertsWithoutFees() (gas: 216921)\n[PASS] test_multipleHopsForwardedExactly() (gas: 656142)\n[PASS] test_nativeETHIsRejected() (gas: 170009)\n[PASS] test_noOpBurnCannotPretendToReduceSupply() (gas: 536815)\n[PASS] test_noReturnTokensSupported() (gas: 519816)\n[PASS] test_outputTransferTaxRejected() (gas: 565957)\n[PASS] test_partialInputSwapRevertsInsteadOfStrandingFunds() (gas: 536538)\n[PASS] test_pausedDexRejectsPurchases() (gas: 210849)\n[PASS] test_pendingPurchaseCannotAcceptChangedCreatorOrSplit() (gas: 731054)\n[PASS] test_purchaseEventAccountsForEveryFeeUnit() (gas: 422298)\n[PASS] test_quoteUsesNetInputAndMatchesExecution() (gas: 487826)\n[PASS] test_routerCannotLieAboutOutput() (gas: 537650)\n[PASS] test_routerCannotReenterPurchase() (gas: 694586)\n[PASS] test_routerReplacementLeavesNoOldAllowance() (gas: 2180073)\n[PASS] test_stockApprovalCannotPayForPurchase() (gas: 212499)\n[PASS] test_tinyAndZeroPurchasesRevert() (gas: 8187391)\n[PASS] test_unlistedStockRejected() (gas: 154293)\n[PASS] test_venueSlippageRevertsAllEffects() (gas: 438281)\n[PASS] test_zeroMinimumReverts() (gas: 151981)\nSuite result: ok. 40 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 53.82ms (162.61ms CPU time)\n\nRan 10 tests for test/UniswapV3Integration.t.sol:UniswapV3IntegrationTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_realRouterMatchesQuotedNetInput(uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 483377, ~: 484921)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 5872223648178816272548\n\n[PASS] test_feeAppliesToEveryDexPurchaseButNotToDirectPoolSwaps() (gas: 764701)\n[PASS] test_realExhaustedIntermediateHopIsDetected() (gas: 8097201)\n[PASS] test_realExhaustedLiquidityQuoteRevertsInsteadOfPhantomOutput() (gas: 8449008)\n[PASS] test_realMissingPoolRevertsWithoutFees() (gas: 395832)\n[PASS] test_realMultihopQuoteAndPurchase() (gas: 935639)\n[PASS] test_realRouterAndQuoterRejectedAsCreator() (gas: 154036)\n[PASS] test_realSingleHopQuoteAndPurchase() (gas: 510371)\n[PASS] test_realSlippageFailureRollsBack() (gas: 519719)\n[PASS] test_secondQuoteReflectsPoolMovement() (gas: 808461)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 53.91ms (58.57ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/AccountingInvariant.t.sol:AccountingInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nAccountingInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_noResidualRouterApprovalOrStockCustody\n[PASS] invariant_supplyAndDistributionConserveEveryIMDUnit\n AccountingInvariantTest invariants (runs: 128, calls: 4096, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract          | Selector        | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+==================================================================+\n| AccountingHandler | buy             | 666   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AccountingHandler | changeSplit     | 668   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AccountingHandler | donate          | 710   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AccountingHandler | recoverDonation | 696   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AccountingHandler | toggleMarket    | 671   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AccountingHandler | togglePause     | 685   | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 199\n  Bound result 3798\n  Bound result 5393\n  Bound result 242\n  Bound result 167\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 17\n  Bound result 5000\n  Bound result 999999999999999998004576\n  Bound result 4848\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 5541\n  Bound result 1320\n  Bound result 1990000000000000000001\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 2000000000000000000\n  Bound result 20\n  Bound result 888\n  Bound result 4\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 712.02ms (710.02ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 test suites in 713.23ms (869.36ms CPU time): 71 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (71 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":43,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"IMDStockDex.acceptOwnership()\",\"IMDStockDex.buyStock(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256)\",\"IMDStockDex.disableMarket(address)\",\"IMDStockDex.pause()\",\"IMDStockDex.quoteBuy(address,uint256)\",\"IMDStockDex.recoverToken(address,address,uint256)\",\"IMDStockDex.setFeeDistribution(address,uint16)\",\"IMDStockDex.setIMD(address)\",\"IMDStockDex.setMarket(address,bytes)\",\"IMDStockDex.setQuoter(address)\",\"IMDStockDex.setRouter(address)\",\"IMDStockDex.transferOwnership(address)\",\"IMDStockDex.unpause()\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"LICENSE\":339,\"README.md\":119,\"THIRD_PARTY.md\":16,\"docs/SECURITY.md\":44,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"launch.json\":10,\"remappings.txt\":2,\"src/IMDStockDex.sol\":397,\"src/interfaces/IBurnableIMD.sol\":7,\"src/interfaces/IUniswapV3.sol\":29,\"test/AccountingInvariant.t.sol\":163,\"test/Configuration.t.sol\":392,\"test/IMDStockDex.t.sol\":423,\"test/UniswapV3Integration.t.sol\":280,\"test/fixtures/PROVENANCE.json\":47,\"test/fixtures/QuoterV2Bytecode.sol\":10,\"test/fixtures/SwapRouterBytecode.sol\":10,\"test/fixtures/UniswapV3FactoryBytecode.sol\":10,\"test/fixtures/upstream/v3-core-sources.tar.gz\":712,\"test/fixtures/upstream/v3-periphery-sources.tar.gz\":530,\"test/fixtures/v3-core-LICENSE\":100,\"test/fixtures/v3-core-LICENSE_GPL\":339,\"test/fixtures/v3-core-LICENSE_MIT\":20,\"test/fixtures/v3-periphery-LICENSE\":339,\"test/helpers/DexTestBase.sol\":77,\"test/mocks/MockTokens.sol\":128,\"test/mocks/MockVenue.sol\":88},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"ffb1f48336e2d8f98aa08e05a8d4d3984f82389d960677c9ba4a8758d746d522","verifiedTreeHash":"1119bbee20960c45738676a23e2ea61efa4b7481","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+327e1e9f"}]}