{"assessments":[],"deployments":[],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"b08c1443-fbd5-4fe1-adde-c7d909d0eaba","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"b0ff3460a4e8336cecf0eeec9ca97274131c3b364f7d7507fdf6a75a6f8258d1","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_economics","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"556acbf5a3476484a9628f0d0cccee92eaef71a7df7270733db7474c72c7d210","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_flow","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"9a0d8dc034ccdea9f5c4e35ce765c889e7bb26a0b63e521fccde61b6bd583b27","dependsOn":["build_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest","audit_math","audit_permissions","audit_economics","audit_flow"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"af3aa01159bbf354f621cafa5c0006f6169e0938a8b015be508b7377dbf165bc","skillId":"audit-judge","tools":[]},"key":"audit_judge","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"af3aa01159bbf354f621cafa5c0006f6169e0938a8b015be508b7377dbf165bc","skillId":"audit-judge","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"23b6e5e57ee4fb9449c292c94e59a1c4a1b369711aa7ae813eeda5cfd483a5db","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_math","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"5f720ca33b1f702c64b17d313c9e5fa88567ed1949385132bf0dfabfc4db1925","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_permissions","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"6013bf71a2afe4cad5644167128ff84708ca05f429cca80aafa9d3c6a7c413c2","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"d59561da3b378461b7c749f6bd5084477d44993aa94972ddea90f542535751df","skillId":"build-contract-project","tools":[]},"key":"build_contract_project","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"d59561da3b378461b7c749f6bd5084477d44993aa94972ddea90f542535751df","skillId":"build-contract-project","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"c17f9343354d9c03685d0eac8be1b00180c2196d036fa0d07897ed531c4dceda","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"tools":[]},"key":"manifest","kind":"code","role":"integrate","skillHash":null,"skillId":null,"state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"e15d445794518aeb0b94cb027ef7384bd1711385101f6969e94f82c58a7f429e","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"4c76766b00591dfe982fe85d3de589fdb2f810e5137c301155d1c5e36a1d3b23","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","tools":[]},"key":"write_foundry_tests","kind":"code","role":"tests","skillHash":"4c76766b00591dfe982fe85d3de589fdb2f810e5137c301155d1c5e36a1d3b23","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"A custom token: Squeekchain (SQK).\nToken name: Squeekchain\nToken symbol: SQK\nToken supply: 1,000,000,000 with 18 decimals, all minted once to the deployer in the constructor.","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"97ad6b0e3a8e42c9a8564c88a89e3034d14b38a32ea18afe73f9c893b0c9f694","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"b08c1443-fbd5-4fe1-adde-c7d909d0eaba","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-1987-squeekchain"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"52192","feedbackHash":"26815d985eea3d955ad07d15a6175cbe712063b05aa519a6ab34066c7b435e4b","nodeKey":"audit_economics","submissionHash":"b0ff3460a4e8336cecf0eeec9ca97274131c3b364f7d7507fdf6a75a6f8258d1","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52642","feedbackHash":"919a541583a6fecbecab6af82b83564a8eb675d30ec37c1cd08463d3bc73f196","nodeKey":"audit_flow","submissionHash":"556acbf5a3476484a9628f0d0cccee92eaef71a7df7270733db7474c72c7d210","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51874","feedbackHash":"12966f935a825fdc90842c554ec9f3904ee75c3162a69a5be2f30e9fd740624b","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"9a0d8dc034ccdea9f5c4e35ce765c889e7bb26a0b63e521fccde61b6bd583b27","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52207","feedbackHash":"02766a540268f6919c753ea996f8c8697efe257780e435eb2bb51ef75f352b02","nodeKey":"audit_math","submissionHash":"23b6e5e57ee4fb9449c292c94e59a1c4a1b369711aa7ae813eeda5cfd483a5db","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52210","feedbackHash":"31fe34edbbc51d78fb702870d34bba56c7405a424c9a16ac6b1cb139dc67dbec","nodeKey":"audit_permissions","submissionHash":"5f720ca33b1f702c64b17d313c9e5fa88567ed1949385132bf0dfabfc4db1925","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52680","feedbackHash":"de08f934f2681f6a6d9711794f558b849a7403abc23e582a0787ad0b647fbdce","nodeKey":"build_contract_project","submissionHash":"6013bf71a2afe4cad5644167128ff84708ca05f429cca80aafa9d3c6a7c413c2","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51428","feedbackHash":"bf95e770668233e677c34bd2c8ebdb5903b185267d473f9bcc8896bc1cdf0fee","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"c17f9343354d9c03685d0eac8be1b00180c2196d036fa0d07897ed531c4dceda","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51566","feedbackHash":"3bac34b876b1d2c0e134df72492aac4e9615223fdc393b5600de334dd256402c","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"e15d445794518aeb0b94cb027ef7384bd1711385101f6969e94f82c58a7f429e","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"51b277a80e18125ac12aee020419bab1b4c2da6df9b169f67b93267eb219e3b9","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"f009de0ce52c7b3a","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Boundary x invariant seam (zero-value fast path x 'the only mint event is the constructor's'). `_transfer` guards the receiver against the zero address but never guards the sender. `_spendAllowance(address(0), msg.sender, 0)` passes because `0 < 0` is false, and `_transfer(address(0), to, 0)` passes because `0 < 0` is false, so the call succeeds and emits `Transfer(address(0), to, 0)`. EIP-20 reserves `from == address(0)` in Transfer for token creation, and the contract's own documentation (IERC20.sol line 8: 'A mint has `from == address(0)`'; README: the constructor's event 'is the only mint') makes the same promise. The balance and supply invariants hold (the nonzero case reverts with ERC20InsufficientAllowance because the zero address can never approve), so the impact is limited to indexers, explorers and wallets that classify Transfer-from-zero as a mint: anyone can produce unbounded fake zero-value 'mint' rows against any address, and a supply tracker that sums mint events rather than reading totalSupply() sees spurious events. OpenZeppelin's ERC20 rejects this path with ERC20InvalidSender; this implementation mirrors its error set but omits that check. Minimal fix that preserves intended behaviour: add `error ERC20InvalidSender(address sender);` and `if (from == address(0)) revert ERC20InvalidSender(address(0));` at the top of `_transfer`.","line":104,"path":"src/SqueekchainToken.sol","reproduction":"State: fresh deployment, any caller ALICE (0xA11CE) with no balance and no allowance. Call: vm.prank(ALICE); token.transferFrom(address(0), BOB, 0). Expected: revert (no mint may be signalled after construction; OZ semantics revert with ERC20InvalidSender). Actual: returns true and emits exactly one log Transfer(from=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000, to=0xB0B, value=0); totalSupply() stays 1e27 and balances are unchanged. Verified with a scratch test under test/scratch/ using the repo's own TestBase/Vm: recordLogs, prank ALICE, transferFrom(address(0), BOB, 0), then logs.length == 1, topics[1] == bytes32(0), topics[2] == BOB, data == 0. Contrast: transferFrom(address(0), BOB, 1) reverts with ERC20InsufficientAllowance(ALICE, 0, 1), confirming only the zero-value path leaks.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (to == address(0)) revert ERC20InvalidReceiver(address(0));","title":"transferFrom(address(0), to, 0) succeeds and emits a mint-shaped Transfer(address(0), to, 0) from any caller"}],"hash":"23b6e5e57ee4fb9449c292c94e59a1c4a1b369711aa7ae813eeda5cfd483a5db","nodeId":"ac346098-5dbb-4f93-83aa-5a84229e6247","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is written, the scratch test is removed, and no tracked file changed.\n\n**Outcome:** one low-severity finding, no critical, high or medium defects. The token has no division, casts, decimal mixing, external calls, payable paths or decoded bytes, so most of the Math Precision, Boundary and Numerical Gap checklists have nothing to bite on. The existing 30-test suite passes.\n\n**Finding 1 (low), `src/SqueekchainToken.sol:104`.** The internal transfer guards the receiver against the zero address but never guards the sender. Any caller with no balance and no allowance can run a zero-value `transferFrom` from the zero address, which succeeds and emits a mint-shaped event.\n\n```\nvm.prank(ALICE); token.transferFrom(address(0), BOB, 0);\n// returns true, emits Transfer(0x0, BOB, 0); totalSupply unchanged\n```\n\nNonzero amounts revert with an insufficient-allowance error, so the supply and balance invariants hold. The impact is limited to indexers and explorers that classify transfers from the zero address as mints. The minimal fix is a zero-sender revert at the top of the internal transfer, matching the OpenZeppelin error set the contract already mirrors.\n\n**Coverage.** All three entry points have rows: `approve` and `transfer` hold, `transferFrom` carries finding 1. Four extra rows record the checked invariants: the balance-sum conservation law, the supply literal from the aderyn lead equals exactly 1e27 with 18 decimals, the constructor mint, and the empty boundary enumeration.\n\n**Not reached.** Nothing in my area was left unexamined. The Uniswap v4 seed and swap flows exercised by the protected floor test depend on the factory's math, not the token's, and were out of scope.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":560327,"inputTokens":226,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":11103,"runtime":"claude","turns":23,"wallClockMs":198362}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"ca080fd306399669","findings":[],"hash":"2ded68e93ebb20d2d9714811d6d8a44da64289d082d45a883470031a1dcd5a6d","nodeId":"86595d2d-638d-43be-a149-872bd78900ed","outcome":"failed","summary":"could not start claude: spawn claude ENOENT","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":0,"inputTokens":0,"model":null,"outputTokens":0,"runtime":"claude","turns":0,"wallClockMs":20}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"e6de8d4c6cf97551","findings":[],"hash":"469f291a2cc6d404f4a0243600a8fffd7f8b8b615144702ba094e8d7fb8289eb","nodeId":"e2b26996-37e0-4af3-ab60-dec3c54699ba","outcome":"failed","summary":"could not start claude: spawn claude ENOENT","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":0,"inputTokens":0,"model":null,"outputTokens":0,"runtime":"claude","turns":0,"wallClockMs":29}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"d73af718d55ba788","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"_transfer validates `to` but never validates `from`. transferFrom(from, to, value) first calls _spendAllowance(from, msg.sender, value); with value == 0 the check `current < value` is 0 < 0 == false, so no allowance is needed, and in _transfer the check `fromBalance < value` is 0 < 0 == false. The call therefore succeeds for from == address(0) and emits Transfer(address(0), to, 0). The project's own interface (src/IERC20.sol:8) defines 'A mint has from == address(0)', and the README states the constructor's Transfer is 'the only mint'. After launch any account can emit an unlimited number of events that indexers, explorers and supply monitors classify as mints of SQK. The OpenZeppelin v5 reference, whose error names this contract copies, rejects this path with ERC20InvalidSender(address(0)) in _transfer. The same zero-value path also lets anyone emit Transfer(anyHolder, attacker, 0) without an allowance from that holder; that part is standard ERC-20 behaviour (zero-value transfers must succeed) and is noted for completeness, not as a defect. No balance or totalSupply changes: on-chain accounting is unaffected, so impact is limited to event-level spoofing and off-chain confusion. Minimal fix preserving all intended behaviour: add `if (from == address(0)) revert ERC20InvalidSender(address(0));` at the top of _transfer (new error), which the constructor does not go through since it writes _balances directly.","line":104,"path":"src/SqueekchainToken.sol","reproduction":"State: fresh deployment, attacker = 0xBAD holds 0 SQK and has no allowance from anyone. Call, as 0xBAD: token.transferFrom(address(0), 0xBAD, 0). Expected (per the interface's mint definition and the OZ reference): revert. Actual: returns true and emits Transfer(from=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000, to=0xBAD, value=0); totalSupply() stays 1e27 and balanceOf(0xBAD) stays 0. Verified with a scratch Foundry test (test/scratch/ZeroFrom.t.sol, since removed): vm.prank(0xBAD); token.transferFrom(address(0), 0xBAD, 0) returned true, vm.getRecordedLogs() held exactly one Transfer log with topics[1] == bytes32(0) and topics[2] == 0xBAD and data == 0. Second variant: after DEPLOYER transfers 100 to 0xA11CE, 0xBAD calls transferFrom(0xA11CE, 0xBAD, 0) with allowance(0xA11CE, 0xBAD) == 0; it returns true and emits Transfer(0xA11CE, 0xBAD, 0) while 0xA11CE still holds 100.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (to == address(0)) revert ERC20InvalidReceiver(address(0));\n        uint256 fromBalance = _balances[from];\n        if (fromBalance < value) revert ERC20InsufficientBalance(from, fromBalance, value);","title":"Anyone can emit a mint-shaped Transfer(address(0), x, 0) event via zero-value transferFrom with from == address(0)"}],"hash":"556acbf5a3476484a9628f0d0cccee92eaef71a7df7270733db7474c72c7d210","nodeId":"769743b5-f337-4a7e-9900-b07cf613fe81","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is written and the tree is otherwise untouched. The untracked entries in git status are sandbox environment files, not changes of mine. The scratch test directory was removed.\n\n**Result: one low-severity finding, no critical, high or medium defects.**\n\nThe Squeekchain token is a 131-line fixed-supply ERC-20 with no owner, no external calls and no fee. I traced all three state-changing entry points through the Execution Trace, Periphery and First Principles guides, plus the Senior Auditor's Mindset. The build, the 30 project tests, and `forge fmt --check` all pass. A disassembly of the runtime shows no CALL-family, CREATE, DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT opcodes.\n\n**Finding 1 (low), `src/SqueekchainToken.sol:104`.** The internal transfer validates the receiver but never the sender. A zero-value `transferFrom` passes both the allowance and the balance checks trivially, so anyone can call it with `from == address(0)` and emit a `Transfer(address(0), x, 0)` event. The project's own interface defines that shape as a mint, and the README says the constructor's event is the only mint. OpenZeppelin v5, whose error names this contract copies, rejects this path. No balance or supply changes, so the impact is event spoofing of post-launch \"mints\" to explorers and supply monitors. I confirmed it with a Foundry test: the call returned true and produced exactly one Transfer log with a zero `from` topic. The one-line fix is a sender check at the top of the internal transfer.\n\n**Coverage recorded for every listed entry point:**\n- `approve` holds. Zero spender reverts, otherwise overwrites and emits.\n- `transfer` holds. The unchecked arithmetic is safe because balances always sum to the constant supply, including the self-transfer case.\n- `transferFrom` carries finding 1. For non-zero values the allowance and balance logic is correct, including the unlimited-allowance sentinel.\n- Four extra rows cover the supply conservation invariant, the absence of privileged surface, the constructor and manifest values in the README, and the periphery files.\n\nNothing in my area was left unreached. Not within my area and not reported: the standard ERC-20 approve front-running race, which is a property of the specification rather than this code.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":521111,"inputTokens":226,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":12005,"runtime":"claude","turns":20,"wallClockMs":185261}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"dff6c0d3de4aa913","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Asymmetry guide, branch-symmetry diff: `_transfer` rejects `to == address(0)` (ERC20InvalidReceiver) but has no mirror check for `from == address(0)`, and the contract defines no ERC20InvalidSender error at all. The zero-sender path is reachable by any unprivileged caller through `transferFrom`: `_spendAllowance(address(0), msg.sender, 0)` passes because `0 < 0` is false, and `_transfer(address(0), to, 0)` passes because `_balances[address(0)] == 0` is not `< 0`. The call succeeds, returns true, and emits `Transfer(address(0), to, 0)`, the exact shape the constructor's one-time mint has (README: 'That is the only mint'). The event is a mint of zero, so neither totalSupply() nor any balance changes and no funds are at risk; the defect is that the contract's own documented invariant 'exactly one Transfer from the zero address, in the constructor' is false, and off-chain tooling that classifies `Transfer(from == 0)` as a mint (explorers' mint counters, supply-by-events indexers, launch monitors that alert on any post-launch mint event) will record mints that the author says cannot happen. Trust-gap and access-control lenses find nothing further here: the path moves no value and grants nothing. Minimal fix that preserves intended behaviour: add `error ERC20InvalidSender(address sender);` and `if (from == address(0)) revert ERC20InvalidSender(address(0));` at the top of `_transfer` (OpenZeppelin v5's `_transfer` does both checks). Non-zero amounts from the zero address already revert with ERC20InsufficientAllowance, so only the zero-value case needs closing.","line":103,"path":"src/SqueekchainToken.sol","reproduction":"State: token deployed by any address (e.g. 0xFAC7), supply 1e27 at the deployer. Input: from any EOA ALICE (0xA11CE) call `token.transferFrom(address(0), BOB, 0)`. Expected (ERC-20 implementations such as OpenZeppelin, and the README's 'only mint' claim): revert, no event. Actual: returns true and emits exactly one log `Transfer(address(0), 0xB0B, 0)` with topics[1] == bytes32(0); totalSupply() still 1e27, balanceOf(BOB) still 0. Verified with a Foundry test under test/scratch/ZeroSender.t.sol: `vm.recordLogs(); vm.prank(ALICE); bool ok = token.transferFrom(address(0), BOB, 0);` then `logs.length == 1`, `logs[0].topics[1] == bytes32(0)`, `ok == true`. The non-zero case `transferFrom(address(0), BOB, 1)` reverts with ERC20InsufficientAllowance(ALICE, 0, 1) as expected, so the gap is the zero-value branch only.","severity":"low","snippet":"    function _transfer(address from, address to, uint256 value) private {\n        if (to == address(0)) revert ERC20InvalidReceiver(address(0));\n        uint256 fromBalance = _balances[from];\n        if (fromBalance < value) revert ERC20InsufficientBalance(from, fromBalance, value);","title":"_transfer validates the receiver but not the sender: anyone can emit a mint-shaped Transfer(address(0), x, 0) after launch via transferFrom(address(0), x, 0)"}],"hash":"5f720ca33b1f702c64b17d313c9e5fa88567ed1949385132bf0dfabfc4db1925","nodeId":"86595d2d-638d-43be-a149-872bd78900ed","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and the findings file is written and validated. The working tree shows no tracked changes; the findings file and the scratch test are the only additions, and `test/scratch/` is gitignored.\n\n**Result: one low finding, no critical, high or medium defects.** The Squeekchain token is a plain fixed-supply ERC-20 with no roles, so the Access Control and Trust Gap passes confirm an absence of privileged surface rather than defects in one.\n\n**Finding 1 (low):** `_transfer` in `src/SqueekchainToken.sol` checks the receiver for the zero address but not the sender. Any caller can run `transferFrom(address(0), x, 0)`, which succeeds and emits a mint-shaped `Transfer(address(0), x, 0)` event. No balance or supply changes, but the README's claim that the constructor emits the only mint is false, and explorers or launch monitors that classify zero-sender transfers as mints will see post-launch mints. Reproduced with a Foundry probe under `test/scratch/`. The fix is a one-line sender check matching OpenZeppelin v5.\n\n**What held, with coverage rows written for each:**\n- `approve`: single writer of allowances besides the spend path, zero spender reverts, no inconsistent guard.\n- `transfer`: sender is always the caller, so the zero-sender gap is unreachable; conservation holds under self-transfer and whole-balance moves.\n- `transferFrom`: allowance accounting correct, unlimited allowance still bounded by balance; carries finding 1.\n- Constructor mints exactly 1e27 to the caller once, with no arguments or initializer. The aderyn large-literal lead is the correct supply, not a defect.\n- No mint, burn, pause, blocklist, owner, upgrade, receive or fallback exists. Runtime opcode scan for DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE and SELFDESTRUCT passes.\n- Launch flows move exactly the stated amount, since there is no fee, tax, exemption list or external call anywhere in the transfer path.\n\n**Not covered:** nothing in the assigned area was left unreached. Passes outside the three assigned guides, such as the pool and manifest, were not in scope and no `launch.json` exists in the tree yet.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":670323,"inputTokens":258,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":13260,"runtime":"claude","turns":24,"wallClockMs":200147}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"4cceca42214ab3f531dc9ec94f695c3b0c644a88305413b48f7eee7e98524d6f","device":"d7e6877fd9e388bb","findings":[],"hash":"6013bf71a2afe4cad5644167128ff84708ca05f429cca80aafa9d3c6a7c413c2","nodeId":"83fc705a-b52e-4341-b56a-99a907498414","outcome":"completed","summary":"The shell sandbox stays broken, so I cannot execute forge here. The deliverable is complete as files; here is the recap.\n\n**What I built**\n\n- `src/SqueekchainToken.sol` is the token, named `SqueekchainToken` as its Solidity identifier. It returns name `Squeekchain`, symbol `SQK`, 18 decimals, and a constant supply of 1e27 minor units. The constructor credits the whole supply to `msg.sender` once and emits the mint `Transfer`. There is no owner, mint, burn, pause, blocklist, fee, fallback or receive, and no library or delegatecall, so every launch flow moves exactly what it says.\n- `src/IERC20.sol` is the interface the token implements.\n- `test/SqueekchainToken.t.sol` holds 26 tests. They cover metadata, the one-time mint and its event, every success and failure path of transfer, approve and transferFrom including unlimited allowances and self transfers, the same mint and freeze selector lists the launch floor probes, the runtime opcode scan, and five fuzz tests for supply conservation and allowance accounting that bound their inputs rather than rely on the seed.\n- `test/support/Vm.sol` and `test/support/TestBase.sol` declare the cheatcode subset the tests use. The project therefore has no `lib/` and builds offline.\n- `foundry.toml` pins `solc = \"0.8.26\"`, `evm_version = \"cancun\"`, optimizer on, and `bytecode_hash = \"none\"`. No ffi, no fs permissions.\n- `README.md` documents behaviour, the manifest values for the manifest step, the launch terms, assumptions, the empty \"After launch\" section, operational responsibilities and the security checklist walk-through.\n\n**What I could not do**\n\nEvery Bash call in this session failed inside the sandbox wrapper before running anything, including a bare `echo`:\n\n```\napply-seccomp: write /proc/self/setgroups (nested userns is capability-restricted; caller must provide CAP_SYS_ADMIN): Permission denied\n```\n\nSo `forge build`, `forge test` with the given fuzz seed, and `forge fmt --check` did not run on this machine, and nothing is committed by me. I reviewed the Solidity by hand against 0.8.26 rules and against the pinned protected test, and designed the tests so the verifier's run needs no network or vendored dependency, but the check results from my side are absent rather than passing.\n\n**Next**\n\nThe verifier's build and test run is the first real compile of this code. If it reports a problem, the most likely spots are the cheatcode interface in `test/support/Vm.sol` and NatSpec tags, both of which are isolated from the token itself.","treeHash":"5ea3f5a3d45be932495b777f590fd6d23cd5a9bc","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":713080,"inputTokens":354,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":44220,"runtime":"claude","turns":22,"wallClockMs":540420}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"fb26479062458645","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from the audit_flow, audit_permissions and audit_math reports, which describe one root cause. `_transfer` (src/SqueekchainToken.sol:103-114) rejects `to == address(0)` but has no mirror check for `from == address(0)`, and the contract defines no `ERC20InvalidSender` error. The zero-sender path is reachable by any unprivileged caller through `transferFrom(from, to, value)` (line 97-101): `_spendAllowance(address(0), msg.sender, 0)` passes because `0 < 0` is false (line 125), and `_transfer(address(0), to, 0)` passes because `_balances[address(0)] == 0` is not `< 0` (line 106). The call returns true and emits `Transfer(address(0), to, 0)`, the exact shape of the constructor's one-time mint (line 45). The project's own interface says 'A mint has `from == address(0)`' (src/IERC20.sol:8) and the README says the constructor's event 'is the only mint'; both are false after launch. Reproduced: the specialists' scratch tests and my own (recordLogs, prank an EOA with no balance and no allowance, transferFrom(address(0), BOB, 0)) all show exactly one Transfer log with topics[1] == bytes32(0). On-chain accounting is unaffected: totalSupply() is a constant, no balance changes, and the non-zero case transferFrom(address(0), BOB, 1) reverts with ERC20InsufficientAllowance(caller, 0, 1) because the zero address can never approve. Impact is limited to off-chain tooling (explorer mint counters, supply-by-events indexers, launch monitors alerting on post-launch mints) which can be fed unbounded spurious zero-value 'mint' rows against any address by anyone. Severity low: no loss of funds, no broken on-chain guarantee. The same zero-value path also lets anyone emit Transfer(anyHolder, caller, 0) without an allowance; that is standard ERC-20 behaviour (zero-value transfers must succeed, as the README states) and OpenZeppelin behaves identically, so it is not a defect. Minimal fix preserving intended behaviour: declare `error ERC20InvalidSender(address sender);` and add `if (from == address(0)) revert ERC20InvalidSender(address(0));` at the top of `_transfer`, as OpenZeppelin v5's `_transfer` does. The constructor writes `_balances` directly and does not go through `_transfer`, so the launch mint is unaffected.","line":104,"path":"src/SqueekchainToken.sol","reproduction":"State: fresh deployment by FACTORY (0xFAC7), supply 1e27 at FACTORY; ALICE (0xA11CE) holds 0 SQK and has no allowance from anyone. Input: vm.recordLogs(); vm.prank(ALICE); bool ok = token.transferFrom(address(0), BOB, 0); Vm.Log[] memory logs = vm.getRecordedLogs(). Expected (per src/IERC20.sol:8, the README's 'only mint' claim and OpenZeppelin v5 semantics): revert with ERC20InvalidSender(address(0)), no event. Actual: ok == true; logs.length == 1; logs[0].topics[0] == keccak256('Transfer(address,address,uint256)'); logs[0].topics[1] == bytes32(0); logs[0].topics[2] == bytes32(uint256(uint160(BOB))); abi.decode(logs[0].data,(uint256)) == 0; token.totalSupply() == 1e27 and token.balanceOf(BOB) == 0 (unchanged). Contrast: vm.prank(ALICE); token.transferFrom(address(0), BOB, 1) reverts with ERC20InsufficientAllowance(ALICE, 0, 1), so only the zero-value branch leaks. Verified with test/scratch/Review.t.sol (test_zeroSenderZeroValueEmitsMintShapedTransfer, test_zeroSenderNonZeroValueReverts) using the repo's own test/support/Vm.sol; both passed on the current code, i.e. the mint-shaped event was emitted.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (to == address(0)) revert ERC20InvalidReceiver(address(0));","title":"_transfer validates the receiver but not the sender: anyone can emit a mint-shaped Transfer(address(0), to, 0) after launch via transferFrom(address(0), to, 0)"}],"hash":"9a0d8dc034ccdea9f5c4e35ce765c889e7bb26a0b63e521fccde61b6bd583b27","nodeId":"e2b26996-37e0-4af3-ab60-dec3c54699ba","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. The findings file is written and validated, the scratch tests are removed, and no tracked file was changed.\n\n**Outcome:** one low finding, the three specialist reports merged into it. The token is otherwise sound and deployable as the launch requires.\n\n**What I reproduced**\n\n- **Merged finding (low):** `_transfer` at `src/SqueekchainToken.sol:104` checks the receiver but not the sender, so any account can call `transferFrom(address(0), to, 0)` and get a `Transfer(address(0), to, 0)` event. The allowance check and the balance check both pass on zero. My scratch test confirmed exactly one mint-shaped log with the zero address as sender, with supply and balances unchanged. The non-zero variant reverts on allowance. Impact is confined to off-chain tooling that counts mint events, so low severity, and no proof file is required at that level. Fix is a one-line `ERC20InvalidSender` check, as OpenZeppelin v5 does.\n- **Specialists with no findings:** write_foundry_tests and audit_economics reported nothing, and I found nothing they missed.\n\n**Independent pass**\n\n- The existing 62 tests pass, including the project's own CREATE2 factory probe.\n- Launch flows move exact amounts: factory to distributor, distributor to claimant, and a spender pulling through an unlimited allowance without decrement.\n- Self-transfer with the unchecked block preserves the balance. No receive or fallback. Runtime about 1.3 KB with no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT.\n- The manifest matches the code: no constructor arguments, 18 decimals, supply of 1e27 minted to the deployer.\n- The aderyn large-numeric-literal line is the supply constant and is not a defect.\n\n**Coverage record:** approve holds, transfer holds, transferFrom carries finding 1, plus two invariant rows for constant supply and factory deployability.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":375805,"inputTokens":194,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":9020,"runtime":"claude","turns":17,"wallClockMs":159918}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"a7b8747ac077deb9","findings":[],"hash":"b0ff3460a4e8336cecf0eeec9ca97274131c3b364f7d7507fdf6a75a6f8258d1","nodeId":"98b2eb56-5f4c-4455-8c66-66693df2f7df","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and the findings file is written. The working tree shows no tracked changes.\n\n**Result: no defects found** in the Economic Security, Invariant and Flow Gap areas for `src/SqueekchainToken.sol`. The file `.imd-findings.json` holds an empty findings list and nine coverage rows, one for each of the three state-changing entry points plus the invariants and flows I checked.\n\n**What I checked, and how**\n\n- **Conservation law.** The only balance writers are the constructor and the private transfer helper. A scratch stateful fuzz ran random 40-step sequences of transfer, transferFrom, approve, self-transfers and transfers into the token contract across six actors, asserting after every step that balances sum to the supply and the zero address holds nothing. All 256 runs passed.\n- **Supply fixedness.** The compiled ABI has exactly approve, transfer and transferFrom as state-changing functions. There is no mint, burn, owner, initializer, fallback or receive, and transfers to the zero address revert.\n- **Launch flow exactness.** No fee, exemption list or hook exists, so the swarm share, the pool seed and trader buys and sells move exactly what they say. I replicated the 10/80/10 split and a buy-then-sell round trip and every leg arrived whole.\n- **External dependencies and reentrancy.** The runtime bytecode contains no call, create, selfdestruct or transient-storage opcodes, so nothing can re-enter or derail a transfer.\n- **Sentinels and boundaries.** Zero receiver, zero spender, exact-balance moves, unlimited allowance and zero-value transferFrom from the zero address all behave as ERC-20 requires.\n- **Static analysis leads.** Slither reported nothing. Aderyn's large-numeric-literal note on line 25 is the supply constant written as `1_000_000_000 * 10 ** 18`, which equals the manifest's 1e27 exactly, so it is not a defect.\n\n**Not a finding, noted for the judge.** The approve front-running race is inherent to the ERC-20 approve design and is documented in the README. The absence of permit and of increase/decrease allowance helpers matches the brief, which asked for a plain token.\n\n**Coverage limits.** I did not run the protected floor test itself, since it needs the v4-core and forge-std libraries that this repository deliberately does not vendor. Its behaviour was instead reasoned from the token's exact-transfer semantics and the floor's source.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":587831,"inputTokens":258,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":12663,"runtime":"claude","turns":21,"wallClockMs":178398}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"6979eb039cb1abfbfd40c4837ac09e515d570fb9a17211c7f0e2530a2c1597a4","device":"bc1e515ca5c78ac4","findings":[],"hash":"c17f9343354d9c03685d0eac8be1b00180c2196d036fa0d07897ed531c4dceda","nodeId":"33996dcb-50d7-4bb1-a574-11a1357f3fc9","outcome":"completed","summary":"I wrote `launch.json` for the Squeekchain (SQK) launch. It's the only file changed. The JSON parses, `forge build` succeeds, and `forge test` passed all 30 tests with the verifier's fuzz seed. Nothing here runs the manifest schema validator, so I checked the manifest against the schema rules by reading it.\n\n- **Token:** the contract is `SqueekchainToken` (name Squeekchain, symbol SQK, 18 decimals).\n  - **No constructor arguments:** the accepted contract's constructor takes none, so `constructorArgs` is `[]`.\n  - **Total supply:** `\"1000000000000000000000000000\"`. That is exactly the 1,000,000,000 × 10¹⁸ the constructor mints to the deployer.\n- **Application contracts:** none. The accepted tree has only the token, so `contracts` is `[]`.\n- **Pool:** paired with IMD at `0xd34a99bc0f67ae1bbd63c660e6d0b0dd03e263b7`, fee 12500, tick spacing 60, and the one-to-one starting price from the brief.\n- **Economics:** copied verbatim from the brief.\n- **Notes:** these describe the token as written: a plain fixed-supply ERC-20 with no mint after launch, no burn, no owner, no pause, no blocklist and no transfer fee.","treeHash":"cea800de4d012eca8eaca56094a550ff3631c27e","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":126233,"inputTokens":10,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":1621,"runtime":"claude","turns":5,"wallClockMs":20437}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"9be5e8df698a3f9df77d6a7bffffbdfc4754c0ea6206d63f38b05f77605126de","device":"d0653dc91b6e2259","findings":[],"hash":"e15d445794518aeb0b94cb027ef7384bd1711385101f6969e94f82c58a7f429e","nodeId":"8a0645d7-a83c-4d72-9cbb-042243e0f4d5","outcome":"completed","summary":"The suite is complete and green. All 62 tests pass with the verifier's fuzz seed and with a random seed, `forge build` is clean, and `forge fmt --check` passes on the test tree. Only paths under test/ were touched.\n\n**What was added** (the existing 30-test unit file was kept as is):\n\n- `test/support/SqueekchainHandler.sol`: an invariant handler with seven actors, bounded inputs, ghost balance and allowance ledgers, and negative handlers that build calls which must revert and assert both the exact typed error and that no state changed. Senders exclude the token itself, so tokens sent to the contract address are a true sink.\n- `test/SqueekchainToken.invariant.t.sol`: ten invariants over random call sequences with fail-on-revert enabled. They cover fixed supply, actor balances summing to the supply, balances and allowances matching the independent ledger, unlimited allowances never decrementing, zero-address balance staying zero, code hash unchanged, no ether held, constant metadata, and the stuck-balance sink growing only.\n- `test/SqueekchainToken.launch.t.sol`: a factory stand-in that deploys the token through CREATE2 inside one call and checks the supply landed there before the call returns. It then walks the swarm share, the pool pull through an allowance, the remainder forward, a buy and sell leg, and the factory's lack of any hand over a holder.\n- `test/SqueekchainToken.edges.t.sol`: pinned edge cases and bounded fuzz tests. One minor unit, the maximum value, max-minus-one allowance, zero-value pulls without allowance, the same call twice, owner as its own spender, allowance surviving the balance, and round-trip and split-merge exactness.\n- `test/support/Vm.sol`: five cheatcode declarations added to the local subset.\n\n**Grounding the harness.** I ran the invariant campaign against two mutated copies of the token in scratch. A one-unit skim on transfer was caught by the balance ledger, and a missing allowance decrement by the allowance ledger. The real token passes both.\n\n**No defects found.** The token is a plain fixed-supply ERC-20 with typed reverts, guarded unchecked arithmetic, no admin surface, and no fallback. Zero-value pulls without an allowance and tokens sent to the contract address being unrecoverable are standard ERC-20 behaviour and are pinned with comments rather than reported. No findings file was written.\n\nOne invariant campaign takes about 37 seconds on this two-core machine at 256 runs and depth 50, set by inline config.","treeHash":"44eae76a7ede463e485b117b7f1e7f02295c9885","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1885962,"inputTokens":738,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":39595,"runtime":"claude","turns":31,"wallClockMs":727540}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":577,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 5 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 530.59ms\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":59,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 30 tests for test/SqueekchainToken.t.sol:SqueekchainTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_approveOverwrites(address,uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 102127, ~: 102366)\n[PASS] testFuzz_chainedTransfersConserveTheSupply(uint256,uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 230587, ~: 235085)\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferAboveTheBalanceReverts(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 33769, ~: 33735)\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesTheSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 103325, ~: 103618)\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFromRespectsTheAllowance(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 125614, ~: 107041)\n[PASS] test_approveDoesNotNeedABalance() (gas: 61020)\n[PASS] test_approveSetsTheAllowanceAndEmits() (gas: 139595)\n[PASS] test_approveTheZeroSpenderReverts() (gas: 30652)\n[PASS] test_constructorEmitsASingleMintTransfer() (gas: 16307)\n[PASS] test_constructorMintsTheWholeSupplyToTheDeployer() (gas: 48039)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 26504)\n[PASS] test_noEntryPointIncreasesTheSupply() (gas: 663361)\n[PASS] test_noPrivilegedCallMovesOrFreezesAHolder() (gas: 469741)\n[PASS] test_plainEtherAndUnknownCallsRevert() (gas: 51088)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoDelegatecallCallcodeOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 1196806)\n[PASS] test_selfTransferKeepsTheBalance() (gas: 93117)\n[PASS] test_transferFromAnEmptyAccountReverts() (gas: 33231)\n[PASS] test_transferFromCanSpendTheExactAllowance() (gas: 144273)\n[PASS] test_transferFromOfOwnTokensStillNeedsSelfAllowance() (gas: 33567)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRevertsAboveTheAllowance() (gas: 87676)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRevertsWhenTheOwnerBalanceIsInsufficientDespiteAllowance() (gas: 145214)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRevertsWithoutAnAllowance() (gas: 40461)\n[PASS] test_transferFromSpendsTheAllowanceAndEmits() (gas: 160677)\n[PASS] test_transferFromToTheZeroAddressReverts() (gas: 83401)\n[PASS] test_transferMovesTheBalanceAndEmits() (gas: 86826)\n[PASS] test_transferOfTheWholeBalanceSucceeds() (gas: 139391)\n[PASS] test_transferRevertsWhenTheBalanceIsInsufficient() (gas: 102629)\n[PASS] test_transferToTheZeroAddressReverts() (gas: 45805)\n[PASS] test_unlimitedAllowanceIsNotDecremented() (gas: 126007)\n[PASS] test_zeroValueTransferSucceedsAndEmits() (gas: 45347)\nSuite result: ok. 30 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 10.29ms (49.53ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test suite in 11.02ms (10.29ms CPU time): 30 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (30 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":22,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"SqueekchainToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"SqueekchainToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"SqueekchainToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"README.md\":140,\"foundry.toml\":12,\"src/IERC20.sol\":23,\"src/SqueekchainToken.sol\":131,\"test/SqueekchainToken.t.sol\":454,\"test/support/TestBase.sol\":14,\"test/support/Vm.sol\":31},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":329,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"slither: no results at low impact or above","passed":true},{"durationMs":209,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[low] large-numeric-literal at src/SqueekchainToken.sol:25: Large Numeric Literal","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"6013bf71a2afe4cad5644167128ff84708ca05f429cca80aafa9d3c6a7c413c2","verifiedTreeHash":"5ea3f5a3d45be932495b777f590fd6d23cd5a9bc","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+d952fceb"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":534,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 5 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 492.88ms\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":53,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 30 tests for test/SqueekchainToken.t.sol:SqueekchainTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_approveOverwrites(address,uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 102127, ~: 102366)\n[PASS] testFuzz_chainedTransfersConserveTheSupply(uint256,uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 230587, ~: 235085)\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferAboveTheBalanceReverts(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 33769, ~: 33735)\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesTheSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 103325, ~: 103618)\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFromRespectsTheAllowance(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 125614, ~: 107041)\n[PASS] test_approveDoesNotNeedABalance() (gas: 61020)\n[PASS] test_approveSetsTheAllowanceAndEmits() (gas: 139595)\n[PASS] test_approveTheZeroSpenderReverts() (gas: 30652)\n[PASS] test_constructorEmitsASingleMintTransfer() (gas: 16307)\n[PASS] test_constructorMintsTheWholeSupplyToTheDeployer() (gas: 48039)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 26504)\n[PASS] test_noEntryPointIncreasesTheSupply() (gas: 663361)\n[PASS] test_noPrivilegedCallMovesOrFreezesAHolder() (gas: 469741)\n[PASS] test_plainEtherAndUnknownCallsRevert() (gas: 51088)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoDelegatecallCallcodeOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 1196806)\n[PASS] test_selfTransferKeepsTheBalance() (gas: 93117)\n[PASS] test_transferFromAnEmptyAccountReverts() (gas: 33231)\n[PASS] test_transferFromCanSpendTheExactAllowance() (gas: 144273)\n[PASS] test_transferFromOfOwnTokensStillNeedsSelfAllowance() (gas: 33567)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRevertsAboveTheAllowance() (gas: 87676)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRevertsWhenTheOwnerBalanceIsInsufficientDespiteAllowance() (gas: 145214)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRevertsWithoutAnAllowance() (gas: 40461)\n[PASS] test_transferFromSpendsTheAllowanceAndEmits() (gas: 160677)\n[PASS] test_transferFromToTheZeroAddressReverts() (gas: 83401)\n[PASS] test_transferMovesTheBalanceAndEmits() (gas: 86826)\n[PASS] test_transferOfTheWholeBalanceSucceeds() (gas: 139391)\n[PASS] test_transferRevertsWhenTheBalanceIsInsufficient() (gas: 102629)\n[PASS] test_transferToTheZeroAddressReverts() (gas: 45805)\n[PASS] test_unlimitedAllowanceIsNotDecremented() (gas: 126007)\n[PASS] test_zeroValueTransferSucceedsAndEmits() (gas: 45347)\nSuite result: ok. 30 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 11.30ms (75.76ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test suite in 11.80ms (11.30ms CPU time): 30 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (30 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":19,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"SqueekchainToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"SqueekchainToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"SqueekchainToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"README.md\":140,\"foundry.toml\":12,\"launch.json\":24,\"src/IERC20.sol\":23,\"src/SqueekchainToken.sol\":131,\"test/SqueekchainToken.t.sol\":454,\"test/support/TestBase.sol\":14,\"test/support/Vm.sol\":31},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"c17f9343354d9c03685d0eac8be1b00180c2196d036fa0d07897ed531c4dceda","verifiedTreeHash":"cea800de4d012eca8eaca56094a550ff3631c27e","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+d952fceb"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":1284,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 9 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 1.24s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":12542,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 30 tests for test/SqueekchainToken.t.sol:SqueekchainTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_approveOverwrites(address,uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 102095, ~: 102366)\n[PASS] testFuzz_chainedTransfersConserveTheSupply(uint256,uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 231508, ~: 235073)\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferAboveTheBalanceReverts(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 33771, ~: 33735)\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesTheSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 103260, ~: 103606)\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFromRespectsTheAllowance(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 125062, ~: 107029)\n[PASS] test_approveDoesNotNeedABalance() (gas: 61020)\n[PASS] test_approveSetsTheAllowanceAndEmits() (gas: 139595)\n[PASS] test_approveTheZeroSpenderReverts() (gas: 30652)\n[PASS] test_constructorEmitsASingleMintTransfer() (gas: 16307)\n[PASS] test_constructorMintsTheWholeSupplyToTheDeployer() (gas: 48039)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 26504)\n[PASS] test_noEntryPointIncreasesTheSupply() (gas: 663361)\n[PASS] test_noPrivilegedCallMovesOrFreezesAHolder() (gas: 469741)\n[PASS] test_plainEtherAndUnknownCallsRevert() (gas: 51088)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoDelegatecallCallcodeOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 1196806)\n[PASS] test_selfTransferKeepsTheBalance() (gas: 93117)\n[PASS] test_transferFromAnEmptyAccountReverts() (gas: 33231)\n[PASS] test_transferFromCanSpendTheExactAllowance() (gas: 144273)\n[PASS] test_transferFromOfOwnTokensStillNeedsSelfAllowance() (gas: 33567)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRevertsAboveTheAllowance() (gas: 87676)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRevertsWhenTheOwnerBalanceIsInsufficientDespiteAllowance() (gas: 145214)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRevertsWithoutAnAllowance() (gas: 40461)\n[PASS] test_transferFromSpendsTheAllowanceAndEmits() (gas: 160677)\n[PASS] test_transferFromToTheZeroAddressReverts() (gas: 83401)\n[PASS] test_transferMovesTheBalanceAndEmits() (gas: 86826)\n[PASS] test_transferOfTheWholeBalanceSucceeds() (gas: 139391)\n[PASS] test_transferRevertsWhenTheBalanceIsInsufficient() (gas: 102629)\n[PASS] test_transferToTheZeroAddressReverts() (gas: 45805)\n[PASS] test_unlimitedAllowanceIsNotDecremented() (gas: 126007)\n[PASS] test_zeroValueTransferSucceedsAndEmits() (gas: 45347)\nSuite result: ok. 30 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 34.56ms (162.92ms CPU time)\n\nRan 10 tests for test/SqueekchainToken.launch.t.sol:SqueekchainTokenLaunchTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_anySplitOfTheSupplyIsExact(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 216755, ~: 217627)\n[PASS] test_constructorTakesNoArgumentsAndMintsToTheDeployingContract() (gas: 41909)\n[PASS] test_creationCodeHasNoConstructorArguments() (gas: 770061)\n[PASS] test_deployerThatExpectsADifferentSupplyIsRefused() (gas: 379908)\n[PASS] test_deployingWithCreateAlsoMintsToTheDeployingContract() (gas: 56844)\n[PASS] test_onlyTheHarnessDrivesTheProbe() (gas: 33039)\n[PASS] test_theFactoryHasNoHandOverAHolderAfterLaunch() (gas: 161887)\n[PASS] test_thePoolCanSellBackToATraderAndBuyAgain() (gas: 223836)\n[PASS] test_thePoolShareCanBePulledThroughAnAllowanceWhole() (gas: 306389)\n[PASS] test_theSwarmShareArrivesWholeAndIsClaimableWhole() (gas: 161143)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 35.05ms (35.60ms CPU time)\n\nRan 21 tests for test/SqueekchainToken.edges.t.sol:SqueekchainTokenEdgeTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_anyAllowanceBelowMaxIsDecrementedExactly(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 126067, ~: 129228)\n[PASS] testFuzz_anyAmountAboveTheBalanceIsRefusedAndRollsBack(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 113518, ~: 113914)\n[PASS] testFuzz_anyReceiverButZeroIsAccepted(address,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 75828, ~: 76926)\n[PASS] testFuzz_roundTripReturnsExactlyWhatWasSent(uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 105916, ~: 106233)\n[PASS] testFuzz_splitAndMergeIsExact(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 205614, ~: 206286)\n[PASS] test_allowanceOutlivesTheOwnerBalance() (gas: 151237)\n[PASS] test_allowancesAreIndependentPerSpenderAndPerOwner() (gas: 272262)\n[PASS] test_approvingTheSameValueTwiceEmitsTwice() (gas: 89705)\n[PASS] test_maximumAllowanceLessOneIsNotUnlimited() (gas: 118828)\n[PASS] test_oneMinorUnitMoves() (gas: 144006)\n[PASS] test_ownerCanBeItsOwnSpender() (gas: 124334)\n[PASS] test_receiverCannotOverflowBecauseTheSupplyIsBounded() (gas: 117476)\n[PASS] test_theSameExactPullTwiceFailsTheSecondTime() (gas: 140274)\n[PASS] test_theSameTransferTwiceMovesTwice() (gas: 100239)\n[PASS] test_transferFromEmitsOnlyTransfer() (gas: 115057)\n[PASS] test_transferFromWhereOwnerIsAlsoReceiverSpendsTheAllowance() (gas: 100275)\n[PASS] test_transferOfOneMoreThanTheBalanceReverts() (gas: 33473)\n[PASS] test_transferOfTheMaximumValueRevertsRatherThanWrapping() (gas: 40455)\n[PASS] test_transferToTheTokenItselfSucceedsAndIsStuck() (gas: 129643)\n[PASS] test_unlimitedAllowanceSurvivesSpendingTheWholeBalance() (gas: 154361)\n[PASS] test_zeroValueTransferFromNeedsNoAllowance() (gas: 59945)\nSuite result: ok. 21 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 35.18ms (171.34ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/SqueekchainToken.invariant.t.sol:SqueekchainTokenInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nSqueekchainTokenInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_actorBalancesSumToTheSupply\n[PASS] invariant_allowancesMatchTheGhostLedger\n[PASS] invariant_balancesMatchTheGhostLedger\n[PASS] invariant_codeIsUnchanged\n[PASS] invariant_metadataIsConstant\n[PASS] invariant_noBalanceExceedsTheSupply\n[PASS] invariant_tokenHoldsNoEther\n[PASS] invariant_tokensSentToTheContractAreStuck\n[PASS] invariant_totalSupplyIsFixed\n[PASS] invariant_zeroAddressHoldsNothing\n SqueekchainTokenInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 12800, reverts: 0)\n\n╭--------------------+------------------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract           | Selector                     | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+================================================================================+\n| SqueekchainHandler | approve                      | 786   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------+------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SqueekchainHandler | approveMax                   | 822   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------+------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SqueekchainHandler | approveThenTransferFromExact | 831   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------+------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SqueekchainHandler | approveZeroSpender           | 797   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------+------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SqueekchainHandler | callUnknownSelector          | 791   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------+------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SqueekchainHandler | sendEther                    | 812   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------+------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SqueekchainHandler | strangerPulls                | 771   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------+------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SqueekchainHandler | strangerTransfers            | 785   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------+------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SqueekchainHandler | transfer                     | 755   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------+------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SqueekchainHandler | transferAboveBalance         | 766   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------+------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SqueekchainHandler | transferAll                  | 833   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------+------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SqueekchainHandler | transferDust                 | 822   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------+------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SqueekchainHandler | transferFrom                 | 795   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------+------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SqueekchainHandler | transferFromAboveAllowance   | 813   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------+------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SqueekchainHandler | transferFromAboveBalance     | 815   | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------+------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SqueekchainHandler | transferToZero               | 806   | 0       | 0        |\n╰--------------------+------------------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 12.49s (12.49s CPU time)\n\nRan 4 test suites in 12.49s (12.59s CPU time): 62 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (62 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":31,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"SqueekchainToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"SqueekchainToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"SqueekchainToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"README.md\":140,\"foundry.toml\":12,\"src/IERC20.sol\":23,\"src/SqueekchainToken.sol\":131,\"test/SqueekchainToken.edges.t.sol\":306,\"test/SqueekchainToken.invariant.t.sol\":184,\"test/SqueekchainToken.launch.t.sol\":226,\"test/SqueekchainToken.t.sol\":454,\"test/support/SqueekchainHandler.sol\":344,\"test/support/TestBase.sol\":14,\"test/support/Vm.sol\":36},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"e15d445794518aeb0b94cb027ef7384bd1711385101f6969e94f82c58a7f429e","verifiedTreeHash":"44eae76a7ede463e485b117b7f1e7f02295c9885","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+d952fceb"}]}