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Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"1d47e02c-32b6-44ec-a8e1-ac913d9d2ad0","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"f364efd4a1348e168718eb921cbf122d82523c45f0215bb5ed7d27cfadfd368c","dependsOn":["audit_imported_code"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"2d7d84a1a9972f1497e5bc68a704cbf42294d08c62d2868f102ffe3b909b9b51","skillId":"adapt-contract-project","tools":[]},"key":"adapt_contract_project","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"2d7d84a1a9972f1497e5bc68a704cbf42294d08c62d2868f102ffe3b909b9b51","skillId":"adapt-contract-project","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"0c6d3eebef69e3526affc4cb25fadb54feb2f9277d872ad81cad557fe70b4424","dependsOn":["adapt_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_economics","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"e7cd340666403df9eb28eb0db5dd564b818899d1c3924e60df6a5781a9fed6f5","dependsOn":["adapt_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_flow","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"02719a798af60d28956e4d6b529900706d19a6b5eb7eb989983a9234d33da27f","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"9897597976b0e72440db7ca402d225aea20f3d37205ba53e7df2400ff80f29cc","skillId":"audit-imported-code","tools":[]},"key":"audit_imported_code","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"9897597976b0e72440db7ca402d225aea20f3d37205ba53e7df2400ff80f29cc","skillId":"audit-imported-code","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"69ccb3803a36dd9f9070ab1af224f3bca6cc24f54ba0c29ee35a77ad2738e695","dependsOn":["adapt_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest","audit_math","audit_permissions","audit_economics","audit_flow"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"af3aa01159bbf354f621cafa5c0006f6169e0938a8b015be508b7377dbf165bc","skillId":"audit-judge","tools":[]},"key":"audit_judge","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"af3aa01159bbf354f621cafa5c0006f6169e0938a8b015be508b7377dbf165bc","skillId":"audit-judge","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"05077adc6df12b9a395270a437ea4985d7f302b6e2c9ac02bc49f27f33d5b0bc","dependsOn":["adapt_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_math","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"6cb030c956d1ee1971a895485dde6b4e5dff38d77618abec22df5e550c4c8427","dependsOn":["adapt_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_permissions","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"acfc1e5eb9f9fc86051229024e98f76e19e7533b2c26e9dc3774b3ff31622ad1","dependsOn":["adapt_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"tools":[]},"key":"manifest","kind":"code","role":"integrate","skillHash":null,"skillId":null,"state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"c1d0f9937cfae395d39e3e8536e8f19fc07331ab67e3cd2cfdf40495738b5f76","dependsOn":["adapt_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"4c76766b00591dfe982fe85d3de589fdb2f810e5137c301155d1c5e36a1d3b23","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","tools":[]},"key":"write_foundry_tests","kind":"code","role":"tests","skillHash":"4c76766b00591dfe982fe85d3de589fdb2f810e5137c301155d1c5e36a1d3b23","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"Audit and deploy AskSwarmRegistry (contracts/src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol, Foundry project in contracts/) on Ethereum mainnet, unchanged if it passes review.\n\nWhat it is: a public, verified memory of what the IMD swarm has attested. Anyone calls ask(bytes body) with an oracle.request JSON body; the contract pulls exactly Intake's price in IMD from the caller, forwards it in the same call to Intake v2 (0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82) via requestWithFailure with itself as callback, and holds nothing between calls. When the panel reaches quorum, Intake delivers (bytes32 requestId, OracleAttestation a, bytes signature) to onOracleResult; the contract recomputes the EIP-712 digest under domain {\"IdentityMD Oracle\", \"2\", chainId, address(this)}, recovers the attester 0x5598aa9146215bc13eb26f2c692ad1461fd32982, requires agreed >= quorum and not expired, and stores the answer in three storage slots indexed by questionHash. Refusals and split panels land in onFailure and are recorded by status. Reads are free: answerOf(questionHash), get(requestId), latestFor.\n\nConstructor: (address intake, address imd, address signer) = (0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82, 0xd34a99bc0f67ae1bbd63c660e6d0b0dd03e263b7, 0x5598aa9146215bc13eb26f2c692ad1461fd32982). No owner, no admin, no upgrade path, no ETH handling, no loops. The callback is measured at ~105k gas, under the 200k stipend. Fork tests in contracts/test cover delivery, tampering, wrong domain, quorum/expiry gating, failure hooks, access control, long answers and gas.\n\nIt is the onchain half of AskSwarm (github.com/ChromiaAgents/askswarm): a Telegram bot where people pay in CHR through Chromia Pay or in IMD from their own wallet, and every paid answer becomes public verifiable memory through this contract.","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"9f7792ca6dd3f47ec2234226e45dfa3e61700fb7885a9a7fc8ed935e116b8938","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"1d47e02c-32b6-44ec-a8e1-ac913d9d2ad0","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-2099-src-askswarmregistry-sol"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"51293","feedbackHash":"898b0bbbc24a613c387253d1aa8fcea29b806b87e41a60afe4facfce119eee11","nodeKey":"adapt_contract_project","submissionHash":"14ee3c54e24911c77b0ad8022b7d029fd8878a11a86e2a4c0af2bb687b7ba202","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":0},{"agentId":"51437","feedbackHash":"94636e665030aa41e2031b8fc69a5397b2d23867ec244a541003fc291df246d3","nodeKey":"adapt_contract_project","submissionHash":"51f90f86cb3c3724c91f0ae6977cfdc004ac5d683b423deb3943692038642d26","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":0},{"agentId":"51891","feedbackHash":"ed86d430d610bf6d3cbaf6f0c7471da4c1c7cec89960733af9e3f2fb58f4de9c","nodeKey":"adapt_contract_project","submissionHash":"d8f5e83e5f7ea311bb340ccd820fc9c703d4f512af2ba53b03453e91d25cdf3d","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51039","feedbackHash":"a1d7104fe0e0e8f4b8f574fea7e38721c566a020f80caf1b4cff64557c3e9e0f","nodeKey":"adapt_contract_project","submissionHash":"f364efd4a1348e168718eb921cbf122d82523c45f0215bb5ed7d27cfadfd368c","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52666","feedbackHash":"bd4de2efaef6be57018d5a5e4aa474be7e6712cbbacce5ea047569c79f992d85","nodeKey":"audit_economics","submissionHash":"0c6d3eebef69e3526affc4cb25fadb54feb2f9277d872ad81cad557fe70b4424","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52682","feedbackHash":"70d047ee3b49898632bf217f528450d351ed2a6b79447dd49be684a5dd65b7e6","nodeKey":"audit_flow","submissionHash":"e7cd340666403df9eb28eb0db5dd564b818899d1c3924e60df6a5781a9fed6f5","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52681","feedbackHash":"673cf6e98c9d126e7c266a321f4edd032db2333cbcc4219bf8a247e4c0df7e4e","nodeKey":"audit_imported_code","submissionHash":"02719a798af60d28956e4d6b529900706d19a6b5eb7eb989983a9234d33da27f","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51450","feedbackHash":"11daf9101343eaa90b3c85d9c6ff7f4182136463804e854cbf514234835b973c","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"69ccb3803a36dd9f9070ab1af224f3bca6cc24f54ba0c29ee35a77ad2738e695","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52250","feedbackHash":"b9ef7516134a96531aad8e9b902c1954b38b103d00736c1f267951006ba9d194","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"dca54bbae6723e6a42885802be2608763b8364cbd5b4d06e50c3683e6960366a","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52114","feedbackHash":"7c5bffe43329acded9ed3b131d4ced143731ab4d7787a0fc40c3e2574452937a","nodeKey":"audit_math","submissionHash":"05077adc6df12b9a395270a437ea4985d7f302b6e2c9ac02bc49f27f33d5b0bc","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52292","feedbackHash":"01d043eaa4b5e7810152324e6105cc704d0976adb797937d756d06d5c4386a32","nodeKey":"audit_permissions","submissionHash":"6cb030c956d1ee1971a895485dde6b4e5dff38d77618abec22df5e550c4c8427","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52157","feedbackHash":"3adc1ce97ce82aa17ab9c3f96081029db0a5e6431c00c5f0aaca0b29ad95f95d","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"acfc1e5eb9f9fc86051229024e98f76e19e7533b2c26e9dc3774b3ff31622ad1","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51360","feedbackHash":"79c65cdc036a27725223f6c43886dacfedc189855f73af56e54d75db69fb85bc","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"a71ca1f0bbe689d40a0ca615acc84e517c77e9f135b37f78f96407e24e03f44e","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51168","feedbackHash":"d7e7bdc77c16062eea1c8b444a10bc00ff370d1a74877a10703fdc5414b26ae2","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"c1d0f9937cfae395d39e3e8536e8f19fc07331ab67e3cd2cfdf40495738b5f76","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52706","feedbackHash":"1d74c0fa06fd2e6f22cbc015bb79b8f31a9d569d3b9cef3119d01ba580310cb2","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"d950c867334ef77df59a0b29991284a89eae017a1af72030afb4134d113c296b","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"9bcbd4e8dc0915f4586e8d1cc301f04912b554cee3a5740fcbc40832ce5a2c88","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":nu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hooks only check that `asks[requestId].asker != 0`; they never require `k.status == Status.Pending`. The header invariant (line 21) says Intake enforces delivery 'only once per request', but the live Intake v2 (0xa43e…de82, verified source, `complete`) binds the writer's `args` to the request id only for status 1/2 (`FailureArgsMismatch`). On status 0 it forwards whatever `args` the writer supplies to the registered selector, checking only that *its own* request id is not yet completed. So any still-open Intake request whose callback target is this registry (every pending `ask`, including one a third party opens by paying Intake directly with the registry as target) is a channel through which `onOracleResult(<already settled id>, …)` reaches the registry once more. The second delivery overwrites `_answers[id]` and `k.status`, can flip a verified indexed answer to `Unverified` while `latestFor[q]` keeps pointing at it (so `answerOf(q,0,0)` and `isCurrent` then return an unverified record), and leaves the request that was actually completed stuck in `Pending` forever. Precondition: a writer that emits args whose first word is not the id it completes, i.e. a bug or key compromise in the plane's writer, which is trusted; no funds move, so this is low. The fix is one cheap check in each hook (the status is already loaded): `if (k.status != Status.Pending) revert AlreadySettled(requestId);`, which also makes the invariant on line 21 true regardless of what the writer sends.","line":184,"path":"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity ^0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {AskSwarmRegistry} from \"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol\";\nimport {IIntake, OracleAttestation} from \"src/IIntake.sol\";\n\ncontract ReviewToken {\n    mapping(address => uint256) public balanceOf;\n    mapping(address => mapping(address => uint256)) public allowance;\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n    }\n\n    function approve(address spender, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[msg.sender][spender] = amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[from][msg.sender] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[from] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n}\n\n/// Mirrors the live Intake v2 `complete`: writer-only, once per id, and on status 0 the args are\n/// forwarded to the registered selector without being checked against the request id.\ncontract ReviewIntake {\n    struct Req {\n        address payer;\n        address target;\n        bytes4 selector;\n        bytes4 onFailure;\n        bool completed;\n    }\n\n    address public immutable writer;\n    address public immutable asset;\n    uint256 public nonce;\n    mapping(bytes32 => Req) public reqs;\n\n    constructor(address writer_, address asset_) {\n        writer = writer_;\n        asset = asset_;\n    }\n\n    function priceOf(bytes32, address) external pure returns (uint256) {\n        return 0.5 ether;\n    }\n\n    function requestWithFailure(\n        bytes32,\n        bytes calldata,\n        IIntake.Callback calldata cb,\n        bytes4 onFailure,\n        address token,\n        uint256 amount\n    ) external payable returns (bytes32 id) {\n        id = keccak256(abi.encode(block.chainid, address(this), ++nonce));\n        reqs[id] = Req(msg.sender, cb.target, cb.selector, onFailure, false);\n        require(ReviewToken(token).transferFrom(msg.sender, address(0xBEEF), amount));\n    }\n\n    function complete(bytes32 id, uint8 status, bytes calldata args) external returns (bool delivered) {\n        require(msg.sender == writer, \"writer\");\n        Req storage r = reqs[id];\n        require(r.payer != address(0) && !r.completed, \"bad\");\n        r.completed = true;\n        bytes4 sel = status == 0 ? r.selector : r.onFailure;\n        if (status != 0) {\n            require(bytes32(args[0:32]) == id && uint256(bytes32(args[32:64])) == status, \"args\");\n        }\n        (delivered,) = r.target.call{gas: 200_000}(abi.encodePacked(sel, args));\n    }\n}\n\ncontract ProofSettledOverwriteTest is Test {\n    uint256 constant KEY = 0xA11CE;\n    ReviewToken token;\n    ReviewIntake intake;\n    AskSwarmRegistry reg;\n    address writer = makeAddr(\"writer\");\n    address alice = makeAddr(\"alice\");\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        vm.chainId(1);\n        vm.warp(1_800_000_000);\n        token = new ReviewToken();\n        intake = new ReviewIntake(writer, address(token));\n        reg = new AskSwarmRegistry(address(intake), address(token), vm.addr(KEY));\n        token.mint(alice, 100 ether);\n        vm.prank(alice);\n        token.approve(address(reg), type(uint256).max);\n    }\n\n    function _ask() internal returns (bytes32 id) {\n        vm.prank(alice);\n        id = reg.ask(\"{}\");\n    }\n\n    function _att(bytes32 id, bytes memory answer, bytes32 q) internal view returns (OracleAttestation memory a) {\n        a = OracleAttestation({\n            requestId: id,\n            chainId: 1,\n            questionHash: q,\n            answerType: 2,\n            answer: answer,\n            figure: 0,\n            fromBlock: 1,\n            toBlock: 2,\n            blockHash: bytes32(uint256(3)),\n            panelJobId: bytes32(uint256(4)),\n            panelSize: 15,\n            quorum: 11,\n            agreed: 11,\n            issuedAt: uint64(block.timestamp),\n            expiresAt: uint64(block.timestamp + 1 days)\n        });\n    }\n\n    function _sign(OracleAttestation memory a) internal view returns (bytes memory) {\n        (uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s) = vm.sign(KEY, reg.digest(a));\n        return abi.encodePacked(r, s, v);\n    }\n\n    /// A settled ask is rewritten by the status-0 completion of a different, still open ask whose\n    /// args name the settled id. The live Intake binds args to the request id only on status 1/2.\n    function test_settledAskIsNotRewrittenByAnotherRequestsCompletion() public {\n        bytes32 q = keccak256(\"q\");\n        bytes32 first = _ask();\n        OracleAttestation memory a = _att(first, \"CHF\", q);\n        bytes memory sa = _sign(a);\n        vm.prank(writer);\n        assertTrue(intake.complete(first, 0, abi.encode(first, a, sa)));\n        assertEq(reg.latestFor(q), first);\n\n        bytes32 second = _ask();\n        OracleAttestation memory b = _att(first, \"EUR\", q);\n        bytes memory sb = _sign(b);\n        vm.prank(writer);\n        intake.complete(second, 0, abi.encode(first, b, sb));\n\n        (AskSwarmRegistry.Ask memory k, AskSwarmRegistry.Answer memory ans) = reg.get(first);\n        assertEq(ans.answer, bytes(\"CHF\"), \"settled answer was rewritten\");\n        assertEq(uint8(k.status), uint8(AskSwarmRegistry.Status.Answered));\n    }\n\n    /// The same path turns an indexed, verified answer into an unverified one that latestFor still\n    /// points at, so answerOf(q, 0, 0) returns an unverified record.\n    function test_indexedAnswerCannotBecomeUnverifiedInPlace() public {\n        bytes32 q = keccak256(\"q\");\n        bytes32 first = _ask();\n        OracleAttestation memory a = _att(first, \"CHF\", q);\n        bytes memory sa = _sign(a);\n        vm.prank(writer);\n        assertTrue(intake.complete(first, 0, abi.encode(first, a, sa)));\n\n        bytes32 second = _ask();\n        OracleAttestation memory b = _att(first, \"EUR\", q);\n        vm.prank(writer);\n        intake.complete(second, 0, abi.encode(first, b, new bytes(65)));\n\n        (bytes32 id, AskSwarmRegistry.Answer memory held) = reg.answerOf(q, 0, 0);\n        assertEq(id, first);\n        assertTrue(held.verified, \"answerOf returns an unverified record\");\n        assertTrue(reg.isCurrent(q));\n    }\n}","reproduction":"1) alice calls ask(body) -> id A. Writer calls Intake.complete(A, 0, _, _, abi.encode(A, attestation{answer:\"CHF\", q}, sig)) -> get(A).status == Answered, answer == \"CHF\", latestFor[q] == A. 2) alice (or anyone) calls ask(body) -> id B. Writer calls Intake.complete(B, 0, _, _, abi.encode(A, attestation{answer:\"EUR\", q}, sig2)). Intake accepts it (B is open, status 0 args are not checked) and calls registry.onOracleResult(A, …). Expected: the registry refuses because A is settled. Actual: get(A).answer == \"EUR\", B stays Pending. Variant: send a 65-byte zero signature in step 2 -> _answers[A].verified becomes false while latestFor[q] == A, so answerOf(q,0,0) returns (A, verified=false) and isCurrent(q) is false. test/scratch/ProofSettledOverwrite.t.sol reproduces both.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (k.asker == address(0)) revert UnknownAsk(requestId);","title":"onOracleResult/onFailure accept a settled ask again: a status-0 completion of any other open request can rewrite an Answered record and its latestFor index"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"`ok` checks the signer, `agreed >= quorum` and `block.timestamp <= a.expiresAt`, but not `a.issuedAt`. The canonical `OracleAttestationConsumer._verifyAttestation` in the oracle-consumer reference also reverts `AttestationNotYetValid` when `a.issuedAt > block.timestamp + ISSUED_AT_TOLERANCE` (5 minutes). The registry therefore stores and indexes as `verified` an attestation that claims to have been issued a year from now, with a `expiresAt` that keeps it canonical for up to the full `uint64` range rather than the plane's 30-day cap. Only the oracle signer can produce such an attestation, so the impact is limited to a misbehaving or compromised plane pre-signing answers that lock a question for longer than the protocol allows. Fix: add `&& a.issuedAt <= block.timestamp + 5 minutes` to `ok`.","line":205,"path":"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity ^0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {AskSwarmRegistry} from \"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol\";\nimport {IIntake, OracleAttestation} from \"src/IIntake.sol\";\n\ncontract ReviewToken {\n    mapping(address => uint256) public balanceOf;\n    mapping(address => mapping(address => uint256)) public allowance;\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n    }\n\n    function approve(address spender, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[msg.sender][spender] = amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[from][msg.sender] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[from] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n}\n\n/// Mirrors the live Intake v2 `complete`: writer-only, once per id, and on status 0 the args are\n/// forwarded to the registered selector without being checked against the request id.\ncontract ReviewIntake {\n    struct Req {\n        address payer;\n        address target;\n        bytes4 selector;\n        bytes4 onFailure;\n        bool completed;\n    }\n\n    address public immutable writer;\n    address public immutable asset;\n    uint256 public nonce;\n    mapping(bytes32 => Req) public reqs;\n\n    constructor(address writer_, address asset_) {\n        writer = writer_;\n        asset = asset_;\n    }\n\n    function priceOf(bytes32, address) external pure returns (uint256) {\n        return 0.5 ether;\n    }\n\n    function requestWithFailure(\n        bytes32,\n        bytes calldata,\n        IIntake.Callback calldata cb,\n        bytes4 onFailure,\n        address token,\n        uint256 amount\n    ) external payable returns (bytes32 id) {\n        id = keccak256(abi.encode(block.chainid, address(this), ++nonce));\n        reqs[id] = Req(msg.sender, cb.target, cb.selector, onFailure, false);\n        require(ReviewToken(token).transferFrom(msg.sender, address(0xBEEF), amount));\n    }\n\n    function complete(bytes32 id, uint8 status, bytes calldata args) external returns (bool delivered) {\n        require(msg.sender == writer, \"writer\");\n        Req storage r = reqs[id];\n        require(r.payer != address(0) && !r.completed, \"bad\");\n        r.completed = true;\n        bytes4 sel = status == 0 ? r.selector : r.onFailure;\n        if (status != 0) {\n            require(bytes32(args[0:32]) == id && uint256(bytes32(args[32:64])) == status, \"args\");\n        }\n        (delivered,) = r.target.call{gas: 200_000}(abi.encodePacked(sel, args));\n    }\n}\n\ncontract ProofFutureIssuedAtTest is Test {\n    uint256 constant KEY = 0xA11CE;\n    ReviewToken token;\n    ReviewIntake intake;\n    AskSwarmRegistry reg;\n    address writer = makeAddr(\"writer\");\n    address alice = makeAddr(\"alice\");\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        vm.chainId(1);\n        vm.warp(1_800_000_000);\n        token = new ReviewToken();\n        intake = new ReviewIntake(writer, address(token));\n        reg = new AskSwarmRegistry(address(intake), address(token), vm.addr(KEY));\n        token.mint(alice, 100 ether);\n        vm.prank(alice);\n        token.approve(address(reg), type(uint256).max);\n    }\n\n    function _ask() internal returns (bytes32 id) {\n        vm.prank(alice);\n        id = reg.ask(\"{}\");\n    }\n\n    function _att(bytes32 id, bytes memory answer, bytes32 q) internal view returns (OracleAttestation memory a) {\n        a = OracleAttestation({\n            requestId: id,\n            chainId: 1,\n            questionHash: q,\n            answerType: 2,\n            answer: answer,\n            figure: 0,\n            fromBlock: 1,\n            toBlock: 2,\n            blockHash: bytes32(uint256(3)),\n            panelJobId: bytes32(uint256(4)),\n            panelSize: 15,\n            quorum: 11,\n            agreed: 11,\n            issuedAt: uint64(block.timestamp),\n            expiresAt: uint64(block.timestamp + 1 days)\n        });\n    }\n\n    function _sign(OracleAttestation memory a) internal view returns (bytes memory) {\n        (uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s) = vm.sign(KEY, reg.digest(a));\n        return abi.encodePacked(r, s, v);\n    }\n\n    /// An attestation whose issuedAt is a year ahead of the chain clock is verified and indexed.\n    /// The protocol's OracleAttestationConsumer refuses issuedAt beyond block.timestamp + 5 minutes.\n    function test_futureIssuedAtIsNotVerified() public {\n        bytes32 id = _ask();\n        OracleAttestation memory a = _att(id, \"CHF\", keccak256(\"q2\"));\n        a.issuedAt = uint64(block.timestamp + 365 days);\n        a.expiresAt = uint64(block.timestamp + 366 days);\n        bytes memory sig = _sign(a);\n        vm.prank(writer);\n        assertTrue(intake.complete(id, 0, abi.encode(id, a, sig)));\n        (, AskSwarmRegistry.Answer memory ans) = reg.get(id);\n        assertFalse(ans.verified, \"future-issued attestation accepted as verified\");\n        assertEq(reg.latestFor(keccak256(\"q2\")), bytes32(0), \"future-issued attestation indexed\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"ask() -> id. Build attestation with issuedAt = now + 365 days, expiresAt = now + 366 days, panel 15/11/11, signed by SIGNER under the registry's domain. Writer completes id with status 0. Expected (per the protocol consumer): not verified, not indexed. Actual: get(id).verified == true, status Answered, latestFor[questionHash] == id. test/scratch/ProofFutureIssuedAt.t.sol reproduces it.","severity":"low","snippet":"        bool ok = rec != address(0) && rec == SIGNER && a.agreed >= a.quorum && block.timestamp <= a.expiresAt;","title":"Attestations issued in the future are verified and indexed; the protocol's consumer refuses issuedAt beyond block.timestamp + 5 minutes"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"`_read` reconstructs an inline answer from `answerLen` and hashes it unconditionally. When nothing was stored, `answerLen == 0` and `long == false`, so `answerHash` is `0xc5d2460186f7233c927e7db2dcc703c0e500b653ca82273b7bfad8045d85a470` (the hash of the empty byte string) instead of zero. A reader that keys on `answerHash` cannot tell 'never answered' from 'answered with empty bytes', and the existing `test_unknownReadsDoNotLookAnswered` does not assert on `answerHash`. No funds or indexing are affected because `verified` is false in every such case. Fix: in `_read`, return `h = bytes32(0)` when the slot holds no answer (e.g. when `!s.long && s.answerLen == 0 && s.expiresAt == 0`), or gate on `asks[requestId].status` being Answered/Unverified-with-storage.","line":305,"path":"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity ^0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {AskSwarmRegistry} from \"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol\";\nimport {IIntake, OracleAttestation} from \"src/IIntake.sol\";\n\ncontract ReviewToken {\n    mapping(address => uint256) public balanceOf;\n    mapping(address => mapping(address => uint256)) public allowance;\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n    }\n\n    function approve(address spender, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[msg.sender][spender] = amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[from][msg.sender] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[from] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n}\n\n/// Mirrors the live Intake v2 `complete`: writer-only, once per id, and on status 0 the args are\n/// forwarded to the registered selector without being checked against the request id.\ncontract ReviewIntake {\n    struct Req {\n        address payer;\n        address target;\n        bytes4 selector;\n        bytes4 onFailure;\n        bool completed;\n    }\n\n    address public immutable writer;\n    address public immutable asset;\n    uint256 public nonce;\n    mapping(bytes32 => Req) public reqs;\n\n    constructor(address writer_, address asset_) {\n        writer = writer_;\n        asset = asset_;\n    }\n\n    function priceOf(bytes32, address) external pure returns (uint256) {\n        return 0.5 ether;\n    }\n\n    function requestWithFailure(\n        bytes32,\n        bytes calldata,\n        IIntake.Callback calldata cb,\n        bytes4 onFailure,\n        address token,\n        uint256 amount\n    ) external payable returns (bytes32 id) {\n        id = keccak256(abi.encode(block.chainid, address(this), ++nonce));\n        reqs[id] = Req(msg.sender, cb.target, cb.selector, onFailure, false);\n        require(ReviewToken(token).transferFrom(msg.sender, address(0xBEEF), amount));\n    }\n\n    function complete(bytes32 id, uint8 status, bytes calldata args) external returns (bool delivered) {\n        require(msg.sender == writer, \"writer\");\n        Req storage r = reqs[id];\n        require(r.payer != address(0) && !r.completed, \"bad\");\n        r.completed = true;\n        bytes4 sel = status == 0 ? r.selector : r.onFailure;\n        if (status != 0) {\n            require(bytes32(args[0:32]) == id && uint256(bytes32(args[32:64])) == status, \"args\");\n        }\n        (delivered,) = r.target.call{gas: 200_000}(abi.encodePacked(sel, args));\n    }\n}\n\ncontract ProofUnansweredHashTest is Test {\n    uint256 constant KEY = 0xA11CE;\n    ReviewToken token;\n    ReviewIntake intake;\n    AskSwarmRegistry reg;\n    address writer = makeAddr(\"writer\");\n    address alice = makeAddr(\"alice\");\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        vm.chainId(1);\n        vm.warp(1_800_000_000);\n        token = new ReviewToken();\n        intake = new ReviewIntake(writer, address(token));\n        reg = new AskSwarmRegistry(address(intake), address(token), vm.addr(KEY));\n        token.mint(alice, 100 ether);\n        vm.prank(alice);\n        token.approve(address(reg), type(uint256).max);\n    }\n\n    function _ask() internal returns (bytes32 id) {\n        vm.prank(alice);\n        id = reg.ask(\"{}\");\n    }\n\n    function _att(bytes32 id, bytes memory answer, bytes32 q) internal view returns (OracleAttestation memory a) {\n        a = OracleAttestation({\n            requestId: id,\n            chainId: 1,\n            questionHash: q,\n            answerType: 2,\n            answer: answer,\n            figure: 0,\n            fromBlock: 1,\n            toBlock: 2,\n            blockHash: bytes32(uint256(3)),\n            panelJobId: bytes32(uint256(4)),\n            panelSize: 15,\n            quorum: 11,\n            agreed: 11,\n            issuedAt: uint64(block.timestamp),\n            expiresAt: uint64(block.timestamp + 1 days)\n        });\n    }\n\n    function _sign(OracleAttestation memory a) internal view returns (bytes memory) {\n        (uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s) = vm.sign(KEY, reg.digest(a));\n        return abi.encodePacked(r, s, v);\n    }\n\n    /// A request that was never answered reads back with answerHash == keccak256(\"\").\n    function test_unansweredRequestReportsZeroAnswerHash() public {\n        bytes32 id = _ask();\n        (AskSwarmRegistry.Ask memory k, AskSwarmRegistry.Answer memory ans) = reg.get(id);\n        assertEq(uint8(k.status), uint8(AskSwarmRegistry.Status.Pending));\n        assertEq(ans.answerHash, bytes32(0), \"pending ask reports a non-zero answerHash\");\n\n        bytes32 id2 = _ask();\n        vm.prank(writer);\n        intake.complete(id2, 1, abi.encode(id2, uint8(1), bytes32(\"body_invalid\"), uint16(0), uint16(0), bytes(\"\")));\n        (, AskSwarmRegistry.Answer memory ans2) = reg.get(id2);\n        assertEq(ans2.answerHash, bytes32(0), \"refused ask reports a non-zero answerHash\");\n\n        (, AskSwarmRegistry.Answer memory ans3) = reg.get(keccak256(\"never asked\"));\n        assertEq(ans3.answerHash, bytes32(0), \"unknown id reports a non-zero answerHash\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"ask() -> id; get(id) returns status Pending and answerHash == 0xc5d2…a470. Same after Intake completes id with status 1 (Refused), and for get(keccak256(\"never asked\")). Expected: bytes32(0). test/scratch/ProofUnansweredHash.t.sol reproduces it.","severity":"info","snippet":"            h = keccak256(ans);","title":"get()/answerOf report answerHash = keccak256(\"\") for requests that have no stored answer (Pending, Refused, NoResult, over-cap Unverified, unknown id)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Documented for the adapter and the panel; none of these is a defect in the registry's own logic. (1) Intake's owner can `setPrice(ACTION, IMD, 0)` which makes `ask` revert `NotSold`, `setCallbackGas` below what the callback needs (the suite measures ~146k from the test frame for a bytes32 answer, ~190k worst case under a cold 4096-byte answer; the brief's '~105k' figure is lower than what the tests measure), which makes every delivery land as `delivered == false` and leaves asks `Pending`, and `setWriter`/`setSigner`. (2) `SIGNER` is a bare EOA compared by `ecrecover`; if the plane rotates its attester to an ERC-1271 registry (the reference's rotation path) every new answer is stored `Unverified` and a new registry must be deployed. The contract header states this. (3) `DOMAIN_SEPARATOR` is cached at construction with `block.chainid`; after a chain-id-changing fork answers fail to verify rather than being accepted (reviewed in ADAPTATION.md). (4) Readers: `answerOf(questionHash)` returns an expired or weaker-than-needed answer without filtering; use the three-argument overload or check `expiresAt`, `panelSize`, `agreed`. A canonical answer can stay in `latestFor` for up to 30 days (the asker's `validForSeconds`) and a later equal-panel answer with fewer agreeing seats does not displace it; this is the stated design. (5) The brief names `contracts/src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol` and a Foundry project in `contracts/`; the tree actually has `src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol` with `foundry.toml` at the repository root and `contracts/` holding only `lib/`, `out/`, `cache/`, `broadcast/`, `launch.json`, `LAUNCH.md`, `ADAPTATION.md`. `contracts/launch.json` is schema-valid for an evm_contracts launch: one contract, three string constructor arguments in declaration order matching the brief, notes of 899 characters. (6) Launch-forbidden features: none found. No owner, no mint, no pause/blacklist, no DELEGATECALL/CALLCODE/SELFDESTRUCT, no proxy or initializer, no ETH path (no receive/fallback), constructor makes no external call. (7) IMD (0xd34a…3b7) is a verified LayerZero OFT built on OpenZeppelin ERC20 with no transfer hooks, so `ask`'s transferFrom/approve/pull sequence is not reentrant and leaves zero allowance and zero balance.","line":155,"path":"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol","reproduction":"State, not an input: Intake.setCallbackGas(100_000) by Intake's owner, then any delivery -> Intake emits Completed(delivered=false), registry ask stays Pending. Intake.setPrice(ACTION, IMD, 0) -> registry.ask reverts NotSold. Both are Intake-owner actions outside this contract.","severity":"info","snippet":"        return INTAKE.priceOf(ACTION, IMD);","title":"Trust assumptions the registry inherits from Intake v2 and the signer, and the brief's stale path/gas figures (no code change required)"}],"hash":"02719a798af60d28956e4d6b529900706d19a6b5eb7eb989983a9234d33da27f","nodeId":"c9bcf50e-d571-42e6-a8f5-3ac3563b9c16","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is written and the tree is unchanged apart from my scratch tests and `.imd-findings.json`.\n\n**Verdict.** AskSwarmRegistry is fit to launch unchanged. I found no loss-of-funds, access-control, reentrancy, arithmetic or launch-policy defect. The two substantive findings are low severity and both need a misbehaving trusted party to trigger.\n\n**What I read.** The registry and its interface in `src/`, all five test files, the helpers and mocks, `contracts/launch.json`, ADAPTATION.md, the deploy script, and the three pinned skills plus the oracle-consumer reference. Over the network I pulled the verified mainnet source of Intake v2 and of the IMD token from Blockscout. Intake confirms a writer-only, once-per-id `complete`, an exact pull of `amount`, and a matching `requestWithFailure` selector. IMD is a plain OpenZeppelin ERC20 OFT with no transfer hooks. Nothing I needed was unreachable. The existing suite passes offline (64 tests, invariants included).\n\n**Findings, in `.imd-findings.json`:**\n- **Low, line 184.** Neither hook requires the ask to be `Pending`. The live Intake binds the writer's arguments to the request id only on failure statuses, so a status-0 completion of any open request can re-deliver `onOracleResult` for an already settled id. That rewrites the stored answer, can flip an indexed answer to unverified while `latestFor` still points at it, and strands the completed request as `Pending`. It needs a buggy or compromised writer. One status check fixes it. Proof attached.\n- **Low, line 205.** `issuedAt` is never checked, so an attestation dated a year ahead verifies and is indexed. The protocol's own consumer refuses anything more than five minutes ahead. Only the signer can produce one. Proof attached.\n- **Info, line 305.** `get` and `answerOf` report the hash of the empty string as `answerHash` for requests with no stored answer, so \"never answered\" and \"answered with empty bytes\" are indistinguishable by hash. Proof attached.\n- **Info, line 155.** Trust assumptions for the adapter and panel: Intake's owner can zero the price or lower `callbackGas` below what delivery needs, the signer is a bare EOA so an ERC-1271 rotation strands the registry, and `answerOf` returns expired answers unless the filtered overload is used. Also notes that the brief's path (`contracts/src/`) and gas figure (~105k) differ from the tree (`src/` at root) and the measured ~146k. The manifest is schema-valid.\n\n**Launch checklist.** No owner, no mint, no pause or blacklist, no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT, no proxy, no ETH path, and the constructor makes no external call.\n\n**Scratch proofs** live in `test/scratch/` and each fails on the current code for the stated reason. Tracked build artifacts that forge touched were restored from git.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1829217,"inputTokens":514,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":36306,"runtime":"claude","turns":29,"wallClockMs":551470}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"918f8261a6fd589c","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Seam: boundary (expiresAt) x invariant (latestFor holds the current canonical answer). The displacement rule orders answers by panelSize and agreed only; expiresAt never enters the comparison, and the index is never re-evaluated after the held answer expires. Two consequences for the same questionHash (reachable by anyone re-asking an identical body with an absolute window, which the plane hashes deterministically):\n(1) A strong answer A with a short validForSeconds is indexed. A verified strict-majority answer B with a smaller panel and a long validForSeconds is delivered while A is still current, so `held` is true and B is refused as weaker. When A expires, latestFor still points at A: isCurrent(q) is false and answerOf(q,0,0) returns a zero id for the rest of B's 30-day validity, although B is verified, unexpired and a majority of its own panel. The payer of B bought an answer that can never become canonical, and the bot's free tier (answerOf before charging) tells everyone to pay again.\n(2) The mirror image: an answer of equal strength with validForSeconds=60 (the plane's minimum) displaces one valid for 30 days (`a.panelSize >= cur.panelSize && a.agreed >= cur.agreed` passes on equality). 61 s later the index is dark while the evicted answer is still current. Anyone can trigger this for 0.5 IMD against any question with an absolute window.\nNo funds move, so severity is low; the broken property is the registry's stated purpose (a free, current, canonical read per question). A fix needs a scope decision: either include expiry in the ordering (e.g. among answers of equal strength keep the one that expires later, and let an unexpired answer displace a held one whose expiresAt is earlier once the held one lapses), or have isCurrent/answerOf fall back when the indexed answer is expired, or keep a second per-question slot for the longest-lived verified majority answer.","line":241,"path":"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity ^0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {AskSwarmRegistry} from \"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol\";\nimport {IIntake, OracleAttestation} from \"src/IIntake.sol\";\n\ncontract GapToken {\n    mapping(address => uint256) public balanceOf;\n    mapping(address => mapping(address => uint256)) public allowance;\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n    }\n\n    function approve(address spender, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[msg.sender][spender] = amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[from][msg.sender] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[from] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n}\n\n/// Minimal Intake v2 model: pulls exactly the price, hands out keccak ids, and `complete` calls the\n/// registered callback once with a 200k stipend, as the live contract does for status 0.\ncontract GapIntake {\n    struct Req {\n        address target;\n        bytes4 selector;\n        bool completed;\n    }\n\n    address public immutable asset;\n    address public immutable writer;\n    uint256 public nonce;\n    mapping(bytes32 => Req) public reqs;\n\n    constructor(address asset_, address writer_) {\n        asset = asset_;\n        writer = writer_;\n    }\n\n    function priceOf(bytes32, address token) external view returns (uint256) {\n        return token == asset ? 0.5 ether : 0;\n    }\n\n    function requestWithFailure(bytes32, bytes calldata, IIntake.Callback calldata cb, bytes4, address, uint256 amount)\n        external\n        payable\n        returns (bytes32 id)\n    {\n        require(GapToken(asset).transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount));\n        id = keccak256(abi.encode(block.chainid, address(this), ++nonce));\n        reqs[id] = Req(cb.target, cb.selector, false);\n    }\n\n    function complete(bytes32 id, bytes calldata args) external returns (bool delivered) {\n        require(msg.sender == writer);\n        Req storage r = reqs[id];\n        require(!r.completed);\n        r.completed = true;\n        (delivered,) = r.target.call{gas: 200_000}(abi.encodePacked(r.selector, args));\n    }\n}\n\ncontract IndexExpiryGapTest is Test {\n    uint256 constant KEY = 0xA11CE;\n    uint64 constant START = 1_800_000_000;\n    bytes32 constant Q = keccak256(\"same absolute-window question\");\n\n    GapToken token;\n    GapIntake intake;\n    AskSwarmRegistry registry;\n    address alice = makeAddr(\"alice\");\n    address bob = makeAddr(\"bob\");\n    address writer = makeAddr(\"writer\");\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        vm.chainId(1);\n        vm.warp(START);\n        token = new GapToken();\n        intake = new GapIntake(address(token), writer);\n        registry = new AskSwarmRegistry(address(intake), address(token), vm.addr(KEY));\n        token.mint(alice, 10 ether);\n        token.mint(bob, 10 ether);\n        vm.prank(alice);\n        token.approve(address(registry), type(uint256).max);\n        vm.prank(bob);\n        token.approve(address(registry), type(uint256).max);\n    }\n\n    function _deliver(address asker, bytes memory answer, uint16 panel, uint16 agreed, uint64 expiresAt)\n        internal\n        returns (bytes32 id)\n    {\n        vm.prank(asker);\n        id = registry.ask(bytes(\"{}\"));\n        OracleAttestation memory a = OracleAttestation({\n            requestId: keccak256(abi.encode(\"uuid\", id)),\n            chainId: 1,\n            questionHash: Q,\n            answerType: 2,\n            answer: answer,\n            figure: 0,\n            fromBlock: 100,\n            toBlock: 200,\n            blockHash: keccak256(\"b\"),\n            panelJobId: keccak256(abi.encode(\"job\", id)),\n            panelSize: panel,\n            quorum: agreed,\n            agreed: agreed,\n            issuedAt: uint64(block.timestamp),\n            expiresAt: expiresAt\n        });\n        (uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s) = vm.sign(KEY, registry.digest(a));\n        vm.prank(writer);\n        assertTrue(intake.complete(id, abi.encode(id, a, abi.encodePacked(r, s, v))), \"not delivered\");\n    }\n\n    /// A strong answer valid for one hour is indexed. A verified majority answer valid for 30 days\n    /// arrives while it is current and is refused as weaker. After the hour, the index still points\n    /// at the expired answer: `isCurrent` is false and the filtered read returns nothing, although a\n    /// verified, unexpired majority answer for the same question is in storage.\n    function test_indexGoesDarkWhileAVerifiedUnexpiredAnswerExists() public {\n        bytes32 strongShort = _deliver(alice, \"yes\", 30, 25, START + 1 hours);\n        bytes32 weakerLong = _deliver(bob, \"yes\", 10, 8, START + 30 days);\n        assertEq(registry.latestFor(Q), strongShort);\n\n        vm.warp(START + 1 hours + 1);\n        (, AskSwarmRegistry.Answer memory b) = registry.get(weakerLong);\n        assertTrue(b.verified && block.timestamp <= b.expiresAt, \"bob's answer is verified and current\");\n\n        // Expected: the question has a current answer (bob's). Actual: the index is dark.\n        assertTrue(registry.isCurrent(Q), \"isCurrent is false although a current verified answer exists\");\n        (bytes32 id,) = registry.answerOf(Q, 0, 0);\n        assertEq(id, weakerLong, \"filtered answerOf returns nothing although bob's answer is current\");\n    }\n\n    /// Mirror image: an equal-strength answer with a 60 s validity evicts one valid for 30 days;\n    /// 61 s later the index is dark while the evicted answer is still current for 30 days.\n    function test_equalStrengthShortExpiryEvictsLongLivedAnswer() public {\n        bytes32 longLived = _deliver(alice, \"yes\", 15, 11, START + 30 days);\n        bytes32 shortLived = _deliver(bob, \"yes\", 15, 11, START + 60);\n        assertEq(registry.latestFor(Q), shortLived);\n\n        vm.warp(START + 61);\n        (, AskSwarmRegistry.Answer memory a) = registry.get(longLived);\n        assertTrue(a.verified && block.timestamp <= a.expiresAt, \"alice's answer is verified and current\");\n        assertTrue(registry.isCurrent(Q), \"index is dark although alice's answer is current for 30 days\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Mock Intake (keccak ids, 200k stipend) and a signer key; registry deployed with that signer; chain id 1; T=START.\nVariant 1: alice asks; writer delivers A = {questionHash Q, panelSize 30, quorum 25, agreed 25, issuedAt T, expiresAt T+1h}, signed -> latestFor[Q]=A. bob asks the same question; writer delivers B = {Q, panelSize 10, quorum 8, agreed 8, issuedAt T, expiresAt T+30d}, signed -> B stored verified (status Answered) but latestFor[Q] stays A because held==true and 10<30. warp to T+1h+1: get(B).verified==true and B.expiresAt > now, yet isCurrent(Q)==false and answerOf(Q,0,0) returns requestId 0. Expected: a current verified answer for Q is readable.\nVariant 2: A = {15,11,11, expiresAt T+30d} indexed; B = {15,11,11, expiresAt T+60} delivered -> latestFor[Q]=B (equal strength). warp T+61: isCurrent(Q)==false while A is verified and valid for 30 days. Expected: the index keeps the longer-lived answer of equal strength.\nRun: forge test --match-path test/scratch/IndexExpiryGap.t.sol (both tests fail on this tree).","severity":"low","snippet":"            bool held = cur.verified && block.timestamp <= cur.expiresAt;\n            if (!held || (a.panelSize >= cur.panelSize && a.agreed >= cur.agreed)) {","title":"latestFor ignores expiry ordering: index points at an expired answer while a verified, unexpired majority answer for the same question sits un-indexed"}],"hash":"05077adc6df12b9a395270a437ea4985d7f302b6e2c9ac02bc49f27f33d5b0bc","nodeId":"cf15d997-8d9a-43b5-a8e8-1cb4ae877d6a","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and `.imd-findings.json` holds one finding with a proof plus six coverage rows.\n\n**Outcome.** The math in AskSwarmRegistry is sound. Every arithmetic and boundary item from the Math Precision, Boundary and Numerical Gap guides was checked against the code and probed with scratch tests, and all held except one seam between the expiry boundary and the index invariant.\n\n**Finding 1, low, `src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol:241`.** The displacement rule for `latestFor` orders answers by panel size and agreement only and never by `expiresAt`, and the index is never re-evaluated after the held answer lapses. Two concrete consequences for one question hash:\n- A strong answer valid for one hour is indexed. A verified majority answer with a smaller panel and 30-day validity arrives inside that hour and is refused as weaker. After the hour, `isCurrent` is false and the filtered `answerOf` returns nothing for 30 days, although a verified unexpired answer sits in storage.\n- An equal-strength answer with the plane's 60-second minimum validity evicts one valid for 30 days. Anyone can do this for 0.5 IMD on any absolute-window question.\n\nNo funds move, so the severity is low, but the broken property is the registry's purpose: a free, current canonical read. The proof test under `test/scratch/IndexExpiryGap.t.sol` fails on this tree in both variants. The fix needs a design decision, which the finding spells out.\n\n**What held, with probes run.** Answer lengths 0, 1, 31, 32, 33, 4096 and 4097 round-trip correctly, including the 256-bit shift mask at length zero. Panel values 0 and 65535, agreed above panel, and the strict-majority gate behave as specified. Expiry at equality and the five-minute issued-at tolerance at equality match the protocol consumer exactly. Price of 1 wei and 0 are handled. Signature v values 0, 1, 2, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 255 and the high-s rejection behave as intended. The verified Intake v2 source confirms a 200k stipend, keccak-derived request ids, and unchecked status-0 arguments, so the Pending guard is what bounds re-delivery.\n\n**Static analysis leads.** The slither reentrancy lines on `ask` are benign, since the state written after the Intake call is keyed on the id Intake returns and IMD has no transfer hooks. The aderyn ecrecover malleability line is already handled by the high-s rejection. The timestamp lines are the documented expiry checks.\n\n**Not reached.** No live fork run was made in this session. The project's own fork results in the adaptation notes were not independently reproduced, so the gas figures there rest on the offline 200k-stipend tests.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1368521,"inputTokens":418,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":33931,"runtime":"claude","turns":34,"wallClockMs":527853}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"30bcdea6dcb9ee40","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"The header invariant says latestFor \"only moves to one at least as strong as the one it holds (panel size and agreement), unless the held one has expired. A weak panel cannot overwrite a strong one.\" The displacement rule compares only panelSize and agreed; it never looks at a.expiresAt or a.issuedAt against the held record. The asker chooses validForSeconds (60 s to 30 days per the oracle-consumer reference) at the same flat price, so a second asker can buy an answer of equal panel shape with the shortest validity. It displaces the long-lived answer (>= on both counts), and 60 s later isCurrent(questionHash) is false although the displaced attestation is still signed-valid for ~30 days. With nothing 'held', line 242's `!held` branch admits any strict-majority verified answer, including a 2-of-2 panel (the smallest the plane sells, and the one the reference warns is 'cheap to fill with seats one holder controls'). The 2-of-2 answer is then canonical for up to 30 days. Cost: two asks, 1 IMD. The protection the previous audit fix (ddc3dd9c) added is therefore only as strong as the shortest validity anyone is willing to buy. The same comparison also lets an older attestation displace a newer one of equal strength when two asks of one question are delivered out of order (second repro), so `latestFor` can point at the older of two valid answers. The bot's free tier (packages/imd/src/intake.ts registryAnswer) reads the one-argument answerOf and returns any `verified` record, so whatever sits in the index is what users are shown. Minimal fix that keeps the design: when a current answer is held, also require `a.expiresAt >= cur.expiresAt` (and, if recency is wanted, `a.issuedAt >= cur.issuedAt`) before displacing; the proof passes with the expiresAt clause alone.","line":242,"path":"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity ^0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {AskSwarmRegistry} from \"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol\";\nimport {IIntake, OracleAttestation} from \"src/IIntake.sol\";\n\n/// Minimal ERC-20 for the IMD stand-in.\ncontract ScratchToken {\n    mapping(address => uint256) public balanceOf;\n    mapping(address => mapping(address => uint256)) public allowance;\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n    }\n\n    function approve(address spender, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[msg.sender][spender] = amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        uint256 a = allowance[from][msg.sender];\n        require(a >= amount, \"allowance\");\n        if (a != type(uint256).max) allowance[from][msg.sender] = a - amount;\n        require(balanceOf[from] >= amount, \"balance\");\n        balanceOf[from] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n}\n\n/// Mirrors Intake v2's `_request` (amount >= price, pulled whole to payTo) and `complete`\n/// (writer-only, once, callback under a 200k stipend, status-0 args forwarded unchecked).\ncontract ScratchIntake {\n    struct Req {\n        address payer;\n        address target;\n        bytes4 selector;\n        bytes4 onFailure;\n        bool completed;\n    }\n\n    address public immutable writer;\n    address public immutable payTo;\n    address public immutable asset;\n    uint256 public price = 0.5 ether;\n    uint256 public nonce;\n    mapping(bytes32 => Req) public reqs;\n\n    constructor(address writer_, address payTo_, address asset_) {\n        writer = writer_;\n        payTo = payTo_;\n        asset = asset_;\n    }\n\n    function priceOf(bytes32, address token) external view returns (uint256) {\n        return token == asset ? price : 0;\n    }\n\n    function requestWithFailure(\n        bytes32,\n        bytes calldata body,\n        IIntake.Callback calldata cb,\n        bytes4 onFailure,\n        address token,\n        uint256 amount\n    ) external payable returns (bytes32 id) {\n        require(token == asset && amount >= price && body.length != 0, \"not sold\");\n        id = keccak256(abi.encode(block.chainid, address(this), ++nonce));\n        reqs[id] = Req(msg.sender, cb.target, cb.selector, onFailure, false);\n        require(ScratchToken(token).transferFrom(msg.sender, payTo, amount), \"pull\");\n    }\n\n    function complete(bytes32 id, uint8 status, bytes calldata args) external returns (bool delivered) {\n        require(msg.sender == writer, \"writer\");\n        Req storage r = reqs[id];\n        require(r.payer != address(0) && !r.completed, \"bad request\");\n        r.completed = true;\n        bytes4 sel = status == 0 ? r.selector : r.onFailure;\n        (delivered,) = r.target.call{gas: 200_000}(bytes.concat(sel, args));\n    }\n}\n\n/// Finding: the \"strength\" comparison in onOracleResult ignores the attestation's own time\n/// fields. An equal-strength answer with the shortest allowed validity displaces a strong,\n/// long-lived held answer and expires 60 s later; the question is then open to any 2-of-2\n/// majority for up to 30 days. Cost to the attacker: two asks (1 IMD).\ncontract IndexCaptureTest is Test {\n    uint256 constant KEY = 0xA11CE;\n    bytes32 constant Q = keccak256(\"Is contract X paused?\");\n\n    ScratchToken token;\n    ScratchIntake intake;\n    AskSwarmRegistry reg;\n    address honest = makeAddr(\"honest asker\");\n    address attacker = makeAddr(\"attacker\");\n    address writer = makeAddr(\"writer\");\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        vm.chainId(1);\n        vm.warp(1_800_000_000);\n        token = new ScratchToken();\n        intake = new ScratchIntake(writer, makeAddr(\"payTo\"), address(token));\n        reg = new AskSwarmRegistry(address(intake), address(token), vm.addr(KEY));\n        token.mint(honest, 10 ether);\n        token.mint(attacker, 10 ether);\n        vm.prank(honest);\n        token.approve(address(reg), type(uint256).max);\n        vm.prank(attacker);\n        token.approve(address(reg), type(uint256).max);\n    }\n\n    function _ask(address who) internal returns (bytes32 id) {\n        vm.prank(who);\n        id = reg.ask(bytes('{\"v\":1,\"question\":\"Is contract X paused?\"}'));\n    }\n\n    function _att(bytes32 id, bytes memory answer, uint16 panel, uint16 quorum, uint16 agreed, uint64 ttl)\n        internal\n        returns (OracleAttestation memory a)\n    {\n        uint64 nowTs = uint64(vm.getBlockTimestamp());\n        a = OracleAttestation({\n            requestId: keccak256(abi.encode(\"uuid\", id)),\n            chainId: 1,\n            questionHash: Q,\n            answerType: 0,\n            answer: answer,\n            figure: 0,\n            fromBlock: 100,\n            toBlock: 200,\n            blockHash: keccak256(\"b\"),\n            panelJobId: keccak256(abi.encode(\"job\", id)),\n            panelSize: panel,\n            quorum: quorum,\n            agreed: agreed,\n            issuedAt: nowTs,\n            expiresAt: nowTs + ttl\n        });\n    }\n\n    function _deliver(bytes32 id, OracleAttestation memory a) internal {\n        (uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s) = vm.sign(KEY, reg.digest(a));\n        vm.prank(writer);\n        assertTrue(intake.complete(id, 0, abi.encode(id, a, abi.encodePacked(r, s, v))), \"not delivered\");\n    }\n\n    function test_equalStrengthShortLivedAnswerCollapsesValidityThenWeakPanelCaptures() public {\n        // 1. Honest asker: 11 of 15 say \"no\" (0x00), valid 30 days (the plane's maximum).\n        bytes32 strong = _ask(honest);\n        _deliver(strong, _att(strong, hex\"00\", 15, 11, 11, 30 days));\n        assertEq(reg.latestFor(Q), strong);\n        assertTrue(reg.isCurrent(Q));\n\n        // 2. Attacker asks the same question with the same panel shape and validForSeconds = 60\n        //    (the plane's minimum). The panel again says \"no\": same strength, so it displaces.\n        bytes32 shortLived = _ask(attacker);\n        _deliver(shortLived, _att(shortLived, hex\"00\", 15, 11, 11, 60));\n        // (On the current code latestFor(Q) is now `shortLived`; a fixed contract keeps `strong`.)\n\n        // 3. Sixty-one seconds later. On the current code nothing is current, although the\n        //    30-day answer has 29+ days left.\n        vm.warp(vm.getBlockTimestamp() + 61);\n\n        // 4. A 2-of-2 panel (the smallest the plane sells) now takes the index for 30 days\n        //    with the opposite answer. The strong answer should have blocked this until its own expiry.\n        bytes32 weak = _ask(attacker);\n        _deliver(weak, _att(weak, hex\"01\", 2, 2, 2, 30 days));\n        (bytes32 heldId, AskSwarmRegistry.Answer memory held) = reg.answerOf(Q);\n\n        // Expected: the 11-of-15 answer, still within its signed validity, is what readers get.\n        // Actual: a 2-of-2 \"yes\" is the canonical answer and isCurrent(Q) is true.\n        assertTrue(heldId != weak, \"a 2-of-2 panel captured the index while an 11-of-15 answer was still valid\");\n        assertGe(held.panelSize, 15);\n    }\n}","reproduction":"State: fresh registry, signer = test key. 1) honest.ask(Q); writer delivers attestation {panelSize 15, quorum 11, agreed 11, answer 0x00, issuedAt t, expiresAt t+30d} -> latestFor[Q]=strong, isCurrent true. 2) attacker.ask(Q) with validForSeconds 60; writer delivers {15, 11, 11, answer 0x00, expiresAt t+60} -> latestFor[Q] moves to the 60 s answer (expected: strong stays, it is current and at least as strong). 3) warp t+61: isCurrent(Q) == false although strong.expiresAt = t+30d. 4) attacker.ask(Q) with panelSize 2, quorum 2; writer delivers {2, 2, 2, answer 0x01, expiresAt +30d} -> latestFor[Q] = the 2-of-2 answer, isCurrent true, answerOf(Q).answer == 0x01 for 30 days. Expected per the header invariant: the 11-of-15 answer remains canonical until t+30d. Second repro (ordering): ask twice for Q; deliver attestation B (issuedAt t+120, answer 0x01) then attestation A (issuedAt t, answer 0x00), both 11/15; latestFor[Q] ends on A, the older one (test/scratch/Leads.t.sol test_latestForRegressesToOlderAttestation).","severity":"medium","snippet":"            if (!held || (a.panelSize >= cur.panelSize && a.agreed >= cur.agreed)) {","title":"Index 'strength' ignores the attestation's validity window: an equal-strength 60-second answer collapses a 30-day held answer, after which a 2-of-2 panel captures the question"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"`ask(bytes body)` reads Intake.priceOf at execution and pulls that amount from msg.sender with no caller-supplied maximum. The live Intake's `setPrice` is owner-only and takes effect immediately (verified source, 0xa43e...de82 lines 280-283), so the only bound on what a caller pays is their ERC-20 allowance. The project's own tooling sets standing allowances (packages/imd/src/intake.ts approves a `cap`, test suite approves type(uint256).max), and the bot and docs promise '0.5 IMD'. A price change that lands between a user's approve and their ask, or a standing max approval, charges the new quote in full to Intake's payTo. Who profits: Intake's treasury (a trusted party), so this is a trust assumption on IMD rather than a theft path, but the contract gives the payer no way to express 'at most X'. Minimal fix preserving the design: an `ask(bytes body, uint256 maxPrice)` overload (or a documented constant ceiling) that reverts when `p > maxPrice`; the existing `ask(bytes)` can keep its ABI by forwarding type(uint256).max.","line":171,"path":"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol","reproduction":"alice approves the registry for type(uint256).max (or any amount above the new price) while price() == 0.5 IMD. Intake owner calls setPrice(ACTION, IMD, 200e18). alice calls ask(body): transferFrom pulls 200 IMD from alice and forwards it to payTo; the ask succeeds. Expected by the payer: at most 0.5 IMD, or a revert. test/scratch/Leads.t.sol test_askChargesCurrentQuoteWithoutCeiling reproduces it (price slot stored directly in the mock).","severity":"low","snippet":"        uint256 p = price();\n        if (p == 0) revert NotSold();\n        _call(IMD, abi.encodeWithSelector(0x23b872dd, msg.sender, address(this), p));","title":"ask has no price ceiling: a caller with a standing allowance pays whatever Intake quotes at execution time"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Trust assumption to document, not a code defect the author can fully remove. The registry depends on the live Intake's `callbackGas` (owner-settable via setCallbackGas, verified source lines 121 and 303-306; 200_000 today) and on the writer supplying non-empty failure args (Intake.complete skips the failure hook when `args.length == 0`, lines 247-253). The callback measures ~145k gas on the fork per ADAPTATION.md, so a stipend of 140k makes every delivery `delivered == false`; Intake marks the request completed and never retries. The registry has no deadline-based clearing of Pending asks (ADAPTATION.md 'Reviewed, not changed'), and no owner to point at a successor, so an asker cannot distinguish 'never answered' from 'answer lost', and the fee is gone. No funds are held by the registry, so impact is limited to the 0.5 IMD per ask and a permanently Pending record. Suggested, optional: a `clear(requestId)` callable by the asker after a deadline that moves Pending to a terminal 'Lost' status, as the oracle-consumer reference asks every pending request to have.","line":179,"path":"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol","reproduction":"State: Intake owner calls setCallbackGas(140_000). alice.ask(body) pulls 0.5 IMD and registers Pending. Writer calls complete(id, 0, ..., abi.encode(id, a, sig)): the registry callback runs out of gas, Intake emits Completed(..., delivered=false) and sets requests[id].completed = true. get(id).k.status == Pending forever; latestFor is not updated; alice has paid and cannot ask Intake again under the same id. Expected: a terminal status or a way for the asker to close the record.","severity":"info","snippet":"        asks[requestId] = Ask({asker: msg.sender, askedAt: uint64(block.timestamp), status: Status.Pending});","title":"A Pending ask has no exit: if Intake's owner-settable callbackGas drops below the callback's ~145k need, or a failure completion arrives with empty args, every affected ask stays Pending forever with "},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Not verified on chain within this budget; recorded as a design note. The oracle-consumer reference states that questionHash 'covers the question, the resolved block window and the definitions, so a contract cannot compute it in advance when the window is relative'. The registry's own fixture BODY uses {\"hours\":24}, and the real mainnet attestation in test/AskSwarmRegistry.t.sol carries a resolved fromBlock/toBlock. If the plane's hash includes the resolved window, two asks of the same text at different times land under different questionHash keys: answerOf(questionHash) for a text-derived hash never finds them, 'memory' lookups work only by hashes read back from Answered events, and the strength/majority displacement economics (finding 1 and audit fix ddc3dd9c) can only be exercised by askers who pin an absolute {fromBlock,toBlock} window. The brief and README describe the registry as 'indexed by questionHash' and say the bot's free tier reads answerOf before charging; whether that free tier can ever hit depends on how the bot obtains the hash. Worth confirming with the plane's oracleQuestionHash before relying on the index for dedup.","line":121,"path":"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol","reproduction":"ask(BODY) with window {\"hours\":24} at block N and again at block N+300. If the plane resolves the window to [N-7200, N] and [N-6900, N+300], the two Answered events carry different questionHash values and answerOf(hash1) returns only the first answer; latestFor never compares the two. Expected by the 'memory' design: one key per question text.","severity":"info","snippet":"    mapping(bytes32 questionHash => bytes32 requestId) public latestFor;","title":"Relative-window questions get a different questionHash on every ask, so the latestFor index and the displacement rule only ever apply to absolute-window questions"}],"hash":"0c6d3eebef69e3526affc4cb25fadb54feb2f9277d872ad81cad557fe70b4424","nodeId":"9ff5767b-b2cd-48fb-a481-f33d702248df","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is written, all four snippets match the tree, and no tracked file changed. The contract's hash is identical to the original after my temporary patch-and-restore.\n\n**Outcome.** I audited AskSwarmRegistry against the Economic Security, Invariant and Flow Gap guides, with the live Intake v2 and IMD sources pulled from the explorer to confirm periphery assumptions. One medium finding, one low, two informational notes. The full existing suite passes (70 tests), and my reproductions live in test/scratch/.\n\n**Finding 1, medium, with proof.** The displacement rule at `src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol:242` compares only panel size and agreement, never the attestation's validity window. A second asker buys an equal-strength answer with the 60-second minimum validity. It displaces a 30-day answer, expires a minute later, and the question is then open to any strict-majority panel. A 2-of-2 panel takes the index for 30 days at a total cost of 1 IMD, defeating the header invariant that a weak panel cannot overwrite a strong current one. The same comparison lets an older attestation displace a newer equal-strength one when deliveries arrive out of order. The proof test fails on the current code and passes with one added clause (`a.expiresAt >= cur.expiresAt`), which I verified and then reverted.\n\n**Finding 2, low.** The ask function has no price ceiling. A caller holding a standing allowance pays whatever Intake quotes at execution. The live Intake's owner can change price immediately, so this is a trust assumption on IMD rather than a theft path, but the payer has no way to say \"at most X\".\n\n**Informational.** Pending asks have no exit if Intake's owner-settable callback stipend drops below the callback's need or a failure completion arrives with empty args. Separately, if the plane's questionHash includes the resolved block window as the reference states, relative-window questions never share a key, so the index and displacement economics only apply to absolute-window asks. I could not verify that second point on chain within the budget and marked it as unverified.\n\n**Coverage.** All three entry points have rows: ask and onOracleResult carry findings, onFailure holds. Four invariant and dependency rows are included. What held: exact-price forwarding with zero residual allowance, settle-once and immutable settled records, the strict-majority gate, signature and domain checks, and the unique Intake request ids.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1693681,"inputTokens":450,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":36339,"runtime":"claude","turns":35,"wallClockMs":601036}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":2,"bundleHash":"208126bbc0bb0604e2dd3e13abf13d4ef0bf91610bab4703c9639bfc201781ab","device":"0db9dd6ea32a69f2","findings":[],"hash":"14ee3c54e24911c77b0ad8022b7d029fd8878a11a86e2a4c0af2bb687b7ba202","nodeId":"d440ae52-ba2b-4084-9a8e-7619d6a8e3bf","outcome":"completed","summary":"Implemented all three reproduced audit fixes and added regression tests.\n\n- `forge build` passed.\n- `forge test` passed: 76 tests with the required seed.\n- Removed 41 tracked build/cache artifacts; configuration and dependencies remain unchanged.\n\nChanges and trust assumptions are documented in [ADAPTATION.md](/home/imdworker/.identitymd/work/1d47e02c-32b6-44ec-a8e1-ac913d9d2ad0/d440ae52-ba2b-4084-9a8e-7619d6a8e3bf/ADAPTATION.md).\n\nReady for the IMD deployment pipeline; no transaction was broadcast.","treeHash":"f581b4f4d6dc63cf0415075f4eddf2ebe7b8c1a4","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2180352,"inputTokens":129095,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":17212,"runtime":"codex","turns":7,"wallClockMs":519556}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"49a7b01f9145e6e9373b3d2d90751ac3f1c8b8d8ffb8bd7f037b3a24dd8e6376","device":"810692103659803b","findings":[],"hash":"51f90f86cb3c3724c91f0ae6977cfdc004ac5d683b423deb3943692038642d26","nodeId":"d440ae52-ba2b-4084-9a8e-7619d6a8e3bf","outcome":"completed","summary":"Fixed all three reproduced findings: repeated settlement, future-issued attestations, and misleading missing-answer hashes.\n\n`forge build` and all 77 seeded checks pass, plus 19 mainnet-fork tests. Changes and remaining trust assumptions are documented in [ADAPTATION.md](/home/imd-worker/.identitymd/work/1d47e02c-32b6-44ec-a8e1-ac913d9d2ad0/d440ae52-ba2b-4084-9a8e-7619d6a8e3bf/ADAPTATION.md).\n\nPrepared for factory deployment; no transactions broadcast.","treeHash":"e76ac037ca2aba27714174a0641b55b5da03842b","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2658048,"inputTokens":116301,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":21076,"runtime":"codex","turns":8,"wallClockMs":639609}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"f2101c240e0b52a9","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Carried from write_foundry_tests (0469e91fb05f), reproduced with its proof on this tree. This is residual to my prior medium a97feadf (whose proof now passes): the revised _mayDisplace requires a candidate to be at least as strong, as fresh (issuedAt) and as long-lived (expiresAt) on every count before it may replace a current index, and reindex adds strictness on ties. Once the held answer expires, the first eligible record that anyone reindexes (or the next delivery) takes the index, and from then on a stronger verified answer already on record can only take it back if its issuedAt and expiresAt are also >= the weak one's. An answer issued earlier never can. The author's own test test_reindexReplacesAFallbackOnlyByStrictDominance ('a weak fallback cannot block a stronger one') only exercises records sharing issuedAt and expiresAt, so it does not catch this. Actor: anyone, free (reindex) or 0.5 IMD (a 2-seat ask of the same absolute-window question delivered after the stronger one); the honest party needs a new paid ask with a later issuedAt and max validity to recover the index. No funds move; filtered readers (answerOf(q, minPanel, minAgreed), the bot's free tier) see nothing for up to 30 days although a qualifying verified answer is on record. Design-preserving fix: in _mayDisplace, let strictly greater panel strength (panelSize and agreed both >=, at least one >) override the issuedAt/expiresAt legs when cur was itself taken as a fallback, or simply order by (panelSize, agreed) first and use issuedAt/expiresAt only to break ties, which keeps the header invariant (a weak panel never overwrites a strong one, a short-lived answer never cuts a long-lived one short among equals) and makes the stated 'stronger fallback takes over' property hold for any issuedAt ordering.","line":363,"path":"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity ^0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {AskSwarmRegistry} from \"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol\";\nimport {IIntake, OracleAttestation} from \"src/IIntake.sol\";\n\ncontract ProofToken {\n    mapping(address => uint256) public balanceOf;\n    mapping(address => mapping(address => uint256)) public allowance;\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n    }\n\n    function approve(address spender, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[msg.sender][spender] = amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[from][msg.sender] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[from] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n}\n\n/// Intake v2 as the registry uses it: pulls the price, records the callback, and calls it once\n/// from its own address with a 200k stipend.\ncontract ProofIntake {\n    struct Req {\n        address target;\n        bytes4 selector;\n        bool completed;\n    }\n\n    ProofToken public immutable token;\n    uint256 public nonce;\n    mapping(bytes32 => Req) public reqs;\n\n    constructor(ProofToken token_) {\n        token = token_;\n    }\n\n    function priceOf(bytes32, address) external pure returns (uint256) {\n        return 0.5 ether;\n    }\n\n    function requestWithFailure(bytes32, bytes calldata, IIntake.Callback calldata cb, bytes4, address, uint256 amount)\n        external\n        returns (bytes32 id)\n    {\n        token.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);\n        id = keccak256(abi.encode(++nonce));\n        reqs[id] = Req(cb.target, cb.selector, false);\n    }\n\n    function requests(bytes32 id) external view returns (address, address, bytes4, bool) {\n        Req storage r = reqs[id];\n        return (address(this), r.target, r.selector, r.completed);\n    }\n\n    function deliver(bytes32 id, bytes calldata args) external returns (bool ok) {\n        Req storage r = reqs[id];\n        r.completed = true;\n        (ok,) = r.target.call{gas: 200_000}(abi.encodePacked(r.selector, args));\n    }\n}\n\n/// Once the held answer expires, `reindex` (or the next delivery) lets any eligible answer take the\n/// index, and the `issuedAt`/`expiresAt` legs of `_mayDisplace` then stop a stronger answer already\n/// on record from ever taking it back: a 2-of-3 panel issued a few seconds later holds the index\n/// for its whole validity while a verified 25-of-30 answer to the same question stays dark.\ncontract WeakFallbackBlocksStrongerTest is Test {\n    uint256 internal constant KEY = 0xA11CE;\n    bytes32 internal constant Q = keccak256(\"absolute-window question\");\n    uint64 internal constant T = 1_800_000_000;\n\n    ProofToken internal token;\n    ProofIntake internal intake;\n    AskSwarmRegistry internal registry;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        vm.chainId(1);\n        vm.warp(T);\n        token = new ProofToken();\n        intake = new ProofIntake(token);\n        registry = new AskSwarmRegistry(address(intake), address(token), vm.addr(KEY));\n        token.mint(address(this), 100 ether);\n        token.approve(address(registry), type(uint256).max);\n    }\n\n    function test_strongerValidAnswerRegainsTheIndexFromAWeakerFallback() public {\n        // H: 40 of 50, valid one hour. Indexed.\n        bytes32 held = _answer(50, 40, T, T + 1 hours);\n        assertEq(registry.latestFor(Q), held);\n        // X: 25 of 30, valid 30 days, issued 10 s later. Smaller panel: not indexed while H is current.\n        vm.warp(T + 10);\n        bytes32 strong = _answer(30, 25, T + 10, T + 30 days);\n        // Y: 2 of 3, valid 30 days, issued 10 s after X. Not indexed while H is current.\n        vm.warp(T + 20);\n        bytes32 weak = _answer(3, 2, T + 20, T + 30 days);\n        assertEq(registry.latestFor(Q), held);\n\n        // H expires. Anyone points the index at the weakest answer first, then anyone tries the strong one.\n        vm.warp(T + 1 hours + 1);\n        vm.prank(makeAddr(\"anyone\"));\n        try registry.reindex(weak) {} catch {}\n        try registry.reindex(strong) {} catch {}\n\n        // Expected: the verified 25-of-30 answer, valid as long as the 2-of-3 one, holds the index.\n        // Actual: reindex(strong) reverts NotEligible (strong.issuedAt < weak.issuedAt) and the\n        // index holds the 2-of-3 answer for 30 days.\n        assertEq(registry.latestFor(Q), strong, \"a 2-of-3 fallback blocks a verified 25-of-30 answer\");\n        (bytes32 id,) = registry.answerOf(Q, 30, 25);\n        assertEq(id, strong, \"filtered readers see no answer although one is on record\");\n    }\n\n    function _answer(uint16 panel, uint16 agreed, uint64 issuedAt, uint64 expiresAt) internal returns (bytes32 id) {\n        id = registry.ask(\"{}\");\n        OracleAttestation memory a;\n        a.requestId = keccak256(abi.encode(\"uuid\", id));\n        a.chainId = 1;\n        a.questionHash = Q;\n        a.answerType = 0;\n        a.answer = abi.encode(true);\n        a.panelSize = panel;\n        a.quorum = agreed;\n        a.agreed = agreed;\n        a.issuedAt = issuedAt;\n        a.expiresAt = expiresAt;\n        (uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s) = vm.sign(KEY, registry.digest(a));\n        assertTrue(intake.deliver(id, abi.encode(id, a, abi.encodePacked(r, s, v))));\n        (AskSwarmRegistry.Ask memory k,) = registry.get(id);\n        assertEq(uint8(k.status), uint8(AskSwarmRegistry.Status.Answered));\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Fresh registry, signer = test key 0xA11CE, chainId 1, T = 1_800_000_000, all records for one questionHash Q. 1) ask; deliver H = {panelSize 50, quorum 40, agreed 40, issuedAt T, expiresAt T+1h} -> latestFor[Q] = H. 2) warp T+10; ask; deliver X = {30, 25, 25, issuedAt T+10, expiresAt T+30d} -> Answered, verified, not indexed (30 < 50 while H is current). 3) warp T+20; ask; deliver Y = {3, 2, 2, issuedAt T+20, expiresAt T+30d} -> Answered, not indexed. 4) warp T+1h+1; anyone calls reindex(Y): H is expired so _mayDisplace returns true, latestFor[Q] = Y. 5) reindex(X): line 363 evaluates issuedAt (T+10) < cur.issuedAt (T+20) -> false -> revert NotEligible(X). Expected: X (verified, 25-of-30, same expiresAt) holds the index and answerOf(Q, 30, 25) returns X. Actual: latestFor[Q] stays Y for 30 days and answerOf(Q, 30, 25) returns bytes32(0). Ran: forge test --match-path test/scratch/Proof_0469e91fb05f.t.sol fails on this tree with 'a 2-of-3 fallback blocks a verified 25-of-30 answer'.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (panelSize < cur.panelSize || agreed < cur.agreed || issuedAt < cur.issuedAt || expiresAt < cur.expiresAt) {","title":"reindex: once the held answer expires, a weaker answer issued a few seconds later blocks a stronger verified answer already on record for its whole validity"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Carried from write_foundry_tests (7fe83c42). Documentation only, no code defect: both figures stay under Intake's 200k stipend and the suite asserts limits of 130k and 180k (test_callbackGasAtTheStipendBoundary) and 150k from the test frame. The extra cold read of the held record for _mayDisplace added about 2k this round. ADAPTATION.md line 93 and test/TESTING.md line 66 already say the brief's figure is stale; contracts/LAUNCH.md line 5 still restates it.","line":5,"path":"contracts/LAUNCH.md","reproduction":"forge test --match-test test_callbackGasAtTheStipendBoundary -vv on this tree logs 'onOracleResult gas, one-word answer, cold: 118568' and '4096-byte answer, cold: 156201'. Expected per contracts/LAUNCH.md: ~105k. Actual: 118,568 (one word) and 156,201 (cap).","severity":"info","snippet":"The callback is measured at ~105k gas, under the 200k stipend.","title":"Launch notes quote the callback at ~105k gas; the revised callback measures about 118.6k cold for a one-word answer and 156.2k at the 4,096-byte cap"}],"hash":"69ccb3803a36dd9f9070ab1af224f3bca6cc24f54ba0c29ee35a77ad2738e695","nodeId":"c74b7d17-2232-40b8-9285-553564f0be1f","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and `.imd-findings.json` is written at the repository root.\n\n**Prior findings, settled**\n\n- **Medium, index ignored validity window** is fixed. My proof `Proof_a97feadf8000` now passes, as do the audit_economics and audit_permissions proofs. The displacement rule now requires at least equal panel size, agreement, `issuedAt` and `expiresAt` while the held answer is current, which also closes the out-of-order regression. Consequence (a), the index going dark behind an expired stronger answer, is handled by the new `reindex` path. The audit_math proof still fails, but not for a defect: one test asserts the old eviction as a precondition and the other never calls `reindex`. Dropped.\n- **Low, no price ceiling** is fixed by `askAtMost`, which reverts before any transfer when the live price exceeds the cap. The bot now calls it with its quoted price.\n- **Low, permanent Pending** is fixed by `markLost`. I confirmed on Blockscout that the live Intake's `requests` getter returns `(payer, callbackTarget, callbackSelector, completed)`, matching the interface the contract decodes.\n- **Info, questionHash NatSpec** corrected in the docs.\n\n**Reported this round**\n\n- **Low, `reindex` ordering** at `src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol:363`. After the held answer expires, a later-issued weak fallback (2 of 3) can be reindexed first, and a stronger verified record issued seconds earlier is then refused as `NotEligible` for 30 days. The test step's proof fails on this tree for exactly that reason, and I attached it. No funds move. A paid re-ask recovers the index.\n- **Info**: `contracts/LAUNCH.md` still quotes the callback at ~105k gas. Measured cold cost is 118.6k for one word and 156.2k at the cap, both under the 200k stipend.\n\n**Coverage**: all six entry points answered. Five hold. `reindex` carries the low finding. The full suite of 95 tests passes. The static analysis lines on `markLost` are false positives (the return value is used, and the external call is a view on the immutable trusted Intake). Nothing blocks the launch; the manifest is unchanged and matches the brief's constructor arguments.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2317955,"inputTokens":834,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":20276,"runtime":"claude","turns":29,"wallClockMs":450765}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"ddcecd7483f623f7","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Area: Asymmetry (writer vs reader of latestFor) and Trust Gap seam access x economics x asymmetry. The displacement rule in onOracleResult compares only panelSize and agreed between the newcomer and the held answer; it never compares expiresAt. Both panel parameters and validForSeconds (60 s to 30 days) are chosen by the asker in the body at a flat 0.5 IMD, and ask() is open to anyone. So an unprivileged asker can re-ask a question that currently holds a verified, majority, 30-day answer with the same (or larger) panel and the minimum validity. The panel returns the same answer (same questionHash means same question, same resolved window, same definitions), it is verified and a majority, it is 'at least as strong', and it takes latestFor. Once its short validity lapses, isCurrent(q) is false and answerOf(q, minPanel, minAgreed) returns a zero request id, although the displaced record is still verified and valid for weeks. Nothing can re-index it: a settled record is never revisited and the only writer of latestFor is this branch. The invariant the header promises ('a weak panel cannot overwrite a strong one') holds for panel counts but not for the validity dimension the same asker controls, so the registry's free read, which the Telegram bot consults before charging, is denied for 0.5 IMD per repetition. Actor: any address holding 0.5 IMD. Pair compared: the index write at lines 239-244 (strength only) versus the reads at lines 295 and 302 (expiry only). Minimal fix preserving the accepted strength rule: when an answer is held, also require a.expiresAt >= cur.expiresAt before replacing it (the existing 'unless the held one has expired' path is unchanged). With that one-line change the proof test passes and all 70 existing tests still pass (checked locally on a temporary copy).","line":242,"path":"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity ^0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {AskSwarmRegistry} from \"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol\";\nimport {IIntake, OracleAttestation} from \"src/IIntake.sol\";\n\ncontract ProofToken {\n    mapping(address => uint256) public balanceOf;\n    mapping(address => mapping(address => uint256)) public allowance;\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n    }\n\n    function approve(address spender, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[msg.sender][spender] = amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        uint256 a = allowance[from][msg.sender];\n        require(a >= amount, \"allowance\");\n        if (a != type(uint256).max) allowance[from][msg.sender] = a - amount;\n        require(balanceOf[from] >= amount, \"balance\");\n        balanceOf[from] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n}\n\n/// Minimal Intake v2 transport: pulls exactly the price, hands out unique ids, and lets the\n/// writer complete each request once with the callback under the 200k stipend.\ncontract ProofIntake {\n    struct Req {\n        address payer;\n        address target;\n        bytes4 selector;\n        bool completed;\n    }\n\n    address public immutable asset;\n    address public immutable writer;\n    uint256 public nonce;\n    mapping(bytes32 => Req) public reqs;\n\n    constructor(address asset_, address writer_) {\n        asset = asset_;\n        writer = writer_;\n    }\n\n    function priceOf(bytes32 action, address token) external view returns (uint256) {\n        return action == bytes32(\"oracle.request@oracle-1\") && token == asset ? 0.5 ether : 0;\n    }\n\n    function requestWithFailure(\n        bytes32,\n        bytes calldata,\n        IIntake.Callback calldata callback,\n        bytes4,\n        address token,\n        uint256 amount\n    ) external payable returns (bytes32 id) {\n        require(ProofToken(token).transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount), \"pull\");\n        id = keccak256(abi.encode(address(this), ++nonce));\n        reqs[id] = Req(msg.sender, callback.target, callback.selector, false);\n    }\n\n    function complete(bytes32 id, bytes calldata args) external returns (bool delivered) {\n        require(msg.sender == writer, \"writer\");\n        Req storage r = reqs[id];\n        require(r.payer != address(0) && !r.completed, \"bad request\");\n        r.completed = true;\n        (delivered,) = r.target.call{gas: 200_000}(abi.encodePacked(r.selector, args));\n    }\n}\n\n/// Finding: `onOracleResult` lets an answer of equal panel strength displace the held answer\n/// regardless of how soon the newcomer expires. The asker picks `validForSeconds` (60 s minimum)\n/// at a flat price, so anyone can replace a question's 30-day answer with a 60-second one for\n/// 0.5 IMD; one minute later the question reads as having no current answer while the displaced,\n/// still-valid record can never be re-indexed.\ncontract ShortLivedDisplacementTest is Test {\n    uint256 internal constant KEY = 0xA11CE;\n    uint64 internal constant START = 1_800_000_000;\n    bytes32 internal constant QUESTION = keccak256(\"same question, same window, same definitions\");\n\n    ProofToken internal token;\n    ProofIntake internal intake;\n    AskSwarmRegistry internal registry;\n    address internal honest = makeAddr(\"honest asker\");\n    address internal griefer = makeAddr(\"griefer\");\n    address internal writer = makeAddr(\"writer\");\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        vm.chainId(1);\n        vm.warp(START);\n        token = new ProofToken();\n        intake = new ProofIntake(address(token), writer);\n        registry = new AskSwarmRegistry(address(intake), address(token), vm.addr(KEY));\n        token.mint(honest, 10 ether);\n        token.mint(griefer, 10 ether);\n        vm.prank(honest);\n        token.approve(address(registry), type(uint256).max);\n        vm.prank(griefer);\n        token.approve(address(registry), type(uint256).max);\n    }\n\n    function _attestation(bytes32 id, uint64 expiresAt) internal view returns (OracleAttestation memory a) {\n        a = OracleAttestation({\n            requestId: keccak256(abi.encode(\"oracle uuid\", id)),\n            chainId: 1,\n            questionHash: QUESTION,\n            answerType: 2,\n            answer: abi.encode(bytes32(\"CHF\")),\n            figure: 0,\n            fromBlock: 100,\n            toBlock: 200,\n            blockHash: keccak256(\"closing block\"),\n            panelJobId: keccak256(abi.encode(\"panel\", id)),\n            panelSize: 15,\n            quorum: 11,\n            agreed: 11,\n            issuedAt: uint64(block.timestamp),\n            expiresAt: expiresAt\n        });\n    }\n\n    function _deliver(bytes32 id, OracleAttestation memory a) internal {\n        (uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s) = vm.sign(KEY, registry.digest(a));\n        vm.prank(writer);\n        assertTrue(intake.complete(id, abi.encode(id, a, abi.encodePacked(r, s, v))), \"callback failed\");\n    }\n\n    function test_equalStrengthShortLivedAnswerDoesNotBlankALongLivedOne() public {\n        // Honest asker buys a 30-day answer (validForSeconds = 30 days, the plane's maximum).\n        vm.prank(honest);\n        bytes32 longLived = registry.ask(bytes(\"{}\"));\n        _deliver(longLived, _attestation(longLived, START + 30 days));\n        assertEq(registry.latestFor(QUESTION), longLived);\n        assertTrue(registry.isCurrent(QUESTION));\n\n        // Griefer asks the same question with the same panel and the minimum validity (60 s).\n        vm.prank(griefer);\n        bytes32 shortLived = registry.ask(bytes(\"{}\"));\n        _deliver(shortLived, _attestation(shortLived, START + 60));\n\n        // One minute later the honest answer is still valid for 30 days, yet the registry reports\n        // no current answer for the question and the filtered read returns nothing.\n        vm.warp(START + 61);\n        (, AskSwarmRegistry.Answer memory kept) = registry.get(longLived);\n        assertTrue(kept.verified && block.timestamp <= kept.expiresAt, \"displaced record is still valid\");\n\n        assertTrue(registry.isCurrent(QUESTION), \"a still-valid 11/15 answer must remain current\");\n        (bytes32 id,) = registry.answerOf(QUESTION, 15, 11);\n        assertEq(id, longLived, \"filtered read must return the still-valid answer\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"State: registry deployed; alice and bob each hold 1 IMD and approved the registry. 1) alice.ask(body for question Q, panelSize 15, quorum 11, validForSeconds 30 days). Writer delivers attestation A (questionHash Q, 15/11/11, expiresAt = now + 30 days) through Intake.complete. latestFor[Q] = A's id, isCurrent(Q) = true. 2) bob.ask(same body, validForSeconds 600). Writer delivers attestation B (questionHash Q, 15/11/11, expiresAt = now + 600). Line 242: held = true, 15 >= 15 and 11 >= 11, so latestFor[Q] = B's id. 3) warp 601 seconds. Expected: isCurrent(Q) true and answerOf(Q, 15, 11) returns A, which is still verified and valid for 30 days. Actual: isCurrent(Q) = false and answerOf(Q, 15, 11) returns requestId 0; A can never be re-indexed. Run: forge test --match-path test/scratch/ShortLivedDisplacement.t.sol (fails on this code at 'a still-valid 11/15 answer must remain current'; passes with the one-line fix).","severity":"medium","snippet":"            if (!held || (a.panelSize >= cur.panelSize && a.agreed >= cur.agreed)) {","title":"Equal-strength answer with a shorter validity displaces a long-lived held answer and blanks the question's canonical record when it expires"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Area: Trust Gap seam access x economics. ask(bytes) is callable by anyone and charges msg.sender exactly p = INTAKE.priceOf(ACTION, IMD), read at execution. The Intake is Ownable2Step (live owner 0x047F606fD5b2BaA5f5C6c4aB8958E45CB6B054B7) with setPrice(bytes32,address,uint256) (selector 0xcab57414 present in the live bytecode), so the amount the registry pulls is set by a third party and can change between a caller's approval and the inclusion of their ask. The protocol's own OracleIntakeConsumer treats its stored price as 'the owner's ceiling'; this registry has no ceiling at all. The unprivileged amplifier is the mempool race: a caller who approved more than one price (the project's house wallet approves PRICE * 20 = 10 IMD in packages/imd/src/intake.ts ensureAllowance) has a pending ask that is included after a setPrice, and pays the new price without consenting to it. This is a trust assumption on the Intake owner that the brief accepts ('pulls exactly Intake's price'), so it is reported as low; the fix is design-preserving: take a maxPrice argument (or expose an overload) and revert when p > maxPrice.","line":173,"path":"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol","reproduction":"State: house wallet H approved the registry for 10 IMD (as ensureAllowance does). 1) Intake owner calls setPrice(ACTION, IMD, 10e18) (any value up to the allowance). 2) H's already-signed ask(body) lands next. Line 171 reads p = 10e18, line 173 pulls 10 IMD from H, line 176 forwards it. Expected: a caller who quoted 0.5 IMD cannot be charged more than they accepted. Actual: ask succeeds and H pays 10 IMD for one question. Existing test test_priceChangesAreReadOnEveryAsk in test/AskSwarmRegistryPayments.t.sol shows the pull tracking the price with no bound.","severity":"low","snippet":"        _call(IMD, abi.encodeWithSelector(0x23b872dd, msg.sender, address(this), p));","title":"ask() pulls whatever Intake.priceOf returns at execution time with no caller-supplied ceiling, so a standing allowance pays any price the Intake owner sets"}],"hash":"6cb030c956d1ee1971a895485dde6b4e5dff38d77618abec22df5e550c4c8427","nodeId":"e10cb449-eff4-4a65-87f9-b56f02c806c5","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is written, the source tree is unchanged (`git diff` is empty), and the proof test fails on the current code as reported.\n\n**Result: two findings, one medium and one low, in the Access Control / Trust Gap / Asymmetry area.**\n\n**Finding 1 (medium), `src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol:242`.** The rule that decides whether a new verified answer may replace the one `latestFor` holds compares only panel size and agreement. It never compares expiry. The asker chooses panel size, quorum and validity (60 seconds to 30 days) in the body at a flat 0.5 IMD, and `ask` is open to anyone. So anyone can re-ask a question that holds a 30-day answer with the same panel and a short validity. The panel returns the same answer, it counts as \"at least as strong\", and it takes the index. Once it expires, `isCurrent` reports false and the filtered `answerOf` returns nothing, even though the displaced answer is still valid for weeks and can never be re-indexed. The bot's free read tier is denied for 0.5 IMD per repetition. The proof test under `test/scratch/` fails on this code. The one-line fix is to also require the newcomer's expiry to be no earlier than the held answer's when one is held. I confirmed on a temporary copy that this keeps all 70 existing tests green, then restored the file.\n\n**Finding 2 (low), `src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol:173`.** `ask` pulls whatever the Intake's `priceOf` returns at execution with no caller ceiling. The live Intake is owned and has `setPrice`, and the project's house wallet approves the registry for twenty times the price. A pending ask included after a price change pays the new price. The protocol's own reference consumer treats its price as a ceiling. This is an accepted trust assumption on the Intake owner, so it is reported low, with a `maxPrice` argument as the design-preserving fix.\n\n**What holds.** Both hooks are Intake-only and Pending-only, and refuse foreign and settled ids. I ran the project's fork suite against the real mainnet Intake and IMD through a public RPC, which confirmed the real `complete` forwards arguments unchecked and the Pending guard still blocks redelivery. Request ids come from the live Intake's own nonce, so a direct request naming the registry as callback can never match an entry in `asks`. The EIP-712 domain, low-s check, quorum, expiry and issuedAt gates match the protocol's canonical consumer. The constructor makes no external calls, has no owner, and the manifest's three arguments match the brief and the live addresses.\n\n**Coverage.** All three entry points have rows, plus six invariant rows. Writer and Intake-owner powers (repricing, pairing any signed answer with any pending ask, leaving an ask Pending forever) are documented as trust assumptions rather than findings, since no unprivileged amplifier exists beyond finding 2. Blockscout and Sourcify were blocked by the network filter, so the Intake's behaviour was verified from its live bytecode and the fork run rather than its source.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1543128,"inputTokens":482,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":42643,"runtime":"claude","turns":41,"wallClockMs":813886}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"c8ce3d6b0a71b89c7e9c0cbad4bcd64cd5002900d3b0902707ff7dfb87ca4fab","device":"5f74c0ba32743d88","findings":[],"hash":"a71ca1f0bbe689d40a0ca615acc84e517c77e9f135b37f78f96407e24e03f44e","nodeId":"83a6a79b-7ca3-468f-ac86-624ca55ac096","outcome":"completed","summary":"Created [launch.json](/home/seat/.identitymd/work/1d47e02c-32b6-44ec-a8e1-ac913d9d2ad0/83a6a79b-7ca3-468f-ac86-624ca55ac096/launch.json) with AskSwarmRegistry and the exact approved constructor addresses. No other repository files changed.\n\nChecks passed: manifest/ABI validation, `forge build`, all 70 offline tests with the required fuzz seed, and 20 mainnet fork tests.","treeHash":"d11c2ddbb097eaf676238a98bf9185ab6b41a327","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":399872,"inputTokens":71481,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":5383,"runtime":"codex","turns":4,"wallClockMs":176881}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"a38a48b44ae71062a2eb1fd9191e2730ec8b0374657c715f573b9fb57e1f5295","device":"37eed9f56188ea8b","findings":[],"hash":"acfc1e5eb9f9fc86051229024e98f76e19e7533b2c26e9dc3774b3ff31622ad1","nodeId":"83a6a79b-7ca3-468f-ac86-624ca55ac096","outcome":"completed","summary":"The existing launch.json is correct and needs no change. This revision round listed no findings, and every check I ran against the accepted tree passed.\n\n**What the manifest says**\n\n- One contract, AskSwarmRegistry, with kind evm_contracts and exactly three constructor words in declaration order: Intake v2, the IMD token, and the attester signer. These match the constructor at `src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol:169` and the addresses in the brief.\n- No $owner appears because the contract has no owner, admin or upgrade path. The signer is an outside value from the brief, not a privileged role.\n- Notes are one string under the 4000-character limit and describe the accepted behavior without inventing deployment authority.\n\n**What I verified**\n\n- The schema check passed: only the keys kind, contracts and notes, a unique identifier under 32 characters, and string arguments that are all 20-byte hex words.\n- A scratch rehearsal of the protected floor deployed the registry on an empty chain id 1 with the manifest's words. The constructor made no external calls, the runtime fit under the EIP-170 limit, and no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT opcode appeared. The immutables read back as the three manifest addresses.\n- The full accepted suite ran with the verifier's fuzz seed.\n\n| Suite | Result |\n|---|---|\n| Accepted tests in test/ | 84 passed, 0 failed |\n| Scratch manifest rehearsal | 1 passed |\n\nThe working tree is unchanged apart from test/scratch, which is discarded before submission. The older copy at contracts/launch.json is another contributor's file outside my allowed path and was left alone. The root launch.json is the deliverable.","treeHash":"1ba59c91734bd6fbdd1529e99cd67c1b72caaf70","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":446424,"inputTokens":354,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":6402,"runtime":"claude","turns":12,"wallClockMs":194404}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"426c79e91faff4f60d2f15867be0492d68a668cf1bb7ec55bfd369cc75aed722","device":"6208734cdf5317a1","findings":[{"description":"Once the held answer expires, `_mayDisplace` returns true for any eligible candidate, so `reindex` (or the next delivery) can index a 2-of-3 panel. From then on, a stronger verified answer already on record can take the index only if it also has an `issuedAt` and `expiresAt` at least as large as the weak one's. An answer issued a few seconds earlier never can. The weak answer then holds `latestFor` for its whole validity, and `answerOf(q, minPanel, minAgreed)` returns nothing to a reader who needs the stronger panel, although a qualifying answer is on record. This contradicts the stated goal in AskSwarmRegistryReview.t.sol (`test_reindexReplacesAFallbackOnlyByStrictDominance`: 'a weak fallback cannot block a stronger one'), which only holds when the fallbacks share issuedAt and expiresAt. Anyone can win the race: the first `reindex` caller after expiry picks the fallback, and a 2-seat ask of the same absolute-window question costs 0.5 IMD.","line":363,"path":"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity ^0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {AskSwarmRegistry} from \"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol\";\nimport {IIntake, OracleAttestation} from \"src/IIntake.sol\";\n\ncontract ProofToken {\n    mapping(address => uint256) public balanceOf;\n    mapping(address => mapping(address => uint256)) public allowance;\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n    }\n\n    function approve(address spender, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[msg.sender][spender] = amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[from][msg.sender] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[from] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n}\n\n/// Intake v2 as the registry uses it: pulls the price, records the callback, and calls it once\n/// from its own address with a 200k stipend.\ncontract ProofIntake {\n    struct Req {\n        address target;\n        bytes4 selector;\n        bool completed;\n    }\n\n    ProofToken public immutable token;\n    uint256 public nonce;\n    mapping(bytes32 => Req) public reqs;\n\n    constructor(ProofToken token_) {\n        token = token_;\n    }\n\n    function priceOf(bytes32, address) external pure returns (uint256) {\n        return 0.5 ether;\n    }\n\n    function requestWithFailure(bytes32, bytes calldata, IIntake.Callback calldata cb, bytes4, address, uint256 amount)\n        external\n        returns (bytes32 id)\n    {\n        token.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);\n        id = keccak256(abi.encode(++nonce));\n        reqs[id] = Req(cb.target, cb.selector, false);\n    }\n\n    function requests(bytes32 id) external view returns (address, address, bytes4, bool) {\n        Req storage r = reqs[id];\n        return (address(this), r.target, r.selector, r.completed);\n    }\n\n    function deliver(bytes32 id, bytes calldata args) external returns (bool ok) {\n        Req storage r = reqs[id];\n        r.completed = true;\n        (ok,) = r.target.call{gas: 200_000}(abi.encodePacked(r.selector, args));\n    }\n}\n\n/// Once the held answer expires, `reindex` (or the next delivery) lets any eligible answer take the\n/// index, and the `issuedAt`/`expiresAt` legs of `_mayDisplace` then stop a stronger answer already\n/// on record from ever taking it back: a 2-of-3 panel issued a few seconds later holds the index\n/// for its whole validity while a verified 25-of-30 answer to the same question stays dark.\ncontract WeakFallbackBlocksStrongerTest is Test {\n    uint256 internal constant KEY = 0xA11CE;\n    bytes32 internal constant Q = keccak256(\"absolute-window question\");\n    uint64 internal constant T = 1_800_000_000;\n\n    ProofToken internal token;\n    ProofIntake internal intake;\n    AskSwarmRegistry internal registry;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        vm.chainId(1);\n        vm.warp(T);\n        token = new ProofToken();\n        intake = new ProofIntake(token);\n        registry = new AskSwarmRegistry(address(intake), address(token), vm.addr(KEY));\n        token.mint(address(this), 100 ether);\n        token.approve(address(registry), type(uint256).max);\n    }\n\n    function test_strongerValidAnswerRegainsTheIndexFromAWeakerFallback() public {\n        // H: 40 of 50, valid one hour. Indexed.\n        bytes32 held = _answer(50, 40, T, T + 1 hours);\n        assertEq(registry.latestFor(Q), held);\n        // X: 25 of 30, valid 30 days, issued 10 s later. Smaller panel: not indexed while H is current.\n        vm.warp(T + 10);\n        bytes32 strong = _answer(30, 25, T + 10, T + 30 days);\n        // Y: 2 of 3, valid 30 days, issued 10 s after X. Not indexed while H is current.\n        vm.warp(T + 20);\n        bytes32 weak = _answer(3, 2, T + 20, T + 30 days);\n        assertEq(registry.latestFor(Q), held);\n\n        // H expires. Anyone points the index at the weakest answer first, then anyone tries the strong one.\n        vm.warp(T + 1 hours + 1);\n        vm.prank(makeAddr(\"anyone\"));\n        try registry.reindex(weak) {} catch {}\n        try registry.reindex(strong) {} catch {}\n\n        // Expected: the verified 25-of-30 answer, valid as long as the 2-of-3 one, holds the index.\n        // Actual: reindex(strong) reverts NotEligible (strong.issuedAt < weak.issuedAt) and the\n        // index holds the 2-of-3 answer for 30 days.\n        assertEq(registry.latestFor(Q), strong, \"a 2-of-3 fallback blocks a verified 25-of-30 answer\");\n        (bytes32 id,) = registry.answerOf(Q, 30, 25);\n        assertEq(id, strong, \"filtered readers see no answer although one is on record\");\n    }\n\n    function _answer(uint16 panel, uint16 agreed, uint64 issuedAt, uint64 expiresAt) internal returns (bytes32 id) {\n        id = registry.ask(\"{}\");\n        OracleAttestation memory a;\n        a.requestId = keccak256(abi.encode(\"uuid\", id));\n        a.chainId = 1;\n        a.questionHash = Q;\n        a.answerType = 0;\n        a.answer = abi.encode(true);\n        a.panelSize = panel;\n        a.quorum = agreed;\n        a.agreed = agreed;\n        a.issuedAt = issuedAt;\n        a.expiresAt = expiresAt;\n        (uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s) = vm.sign(KEY, registry.digest(a));\n        assertTrue(intake.deliver(id, abi.encode(id, a, abi.encodePacked(r, s, v))));\n        (AskSwarmRegistry.Ask memory k,) = registry.get(id);\n        assertEq(uint8(k.status), uint8(AskSwarmRegistry.Status.Answered));\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Held H: 40 of 50, issued T, expires T+1h (indexed). X: 25 of 30, issued T+10, expires T+30d (delivered at T+10, not indexed). Y: 2 of 3, issued T+20, expires T+30d (delivered at T+20, not indexed). At T+1h+1, anyone calls reindex(Y), which succeeds, then reindex(X). Expected: X, verified and strictly stronger on panel and agreement with the same validity, holds latestFor, and answerOf(q,30,25) returns X. Actual: reindex(X) reverts NotEligible because X.issuedAt < Y.issuedAt. latestFor stays at Y for 30 days and answerOf(q,30,25) returns 0.","severity":"low","title":"A later-issued weak fallback blocks a stronger valid answer from the index until it expires"},{"description":"Measured with a probe at the Intake address that makes the 200,000-gas call itself, with every registry slot cold and a fresh question hash. A one-word answer uses 118,568 gas and the largest accepted answer (4,096 bytes) uses 156,201. Both fit under the 200k stipend, and test_callbackGasAtTheStipendBoundary asserts limits of 130k and 180k. Only the figure in the brief and the deploy notes is stale. The revised contract's extra cold read for `_mayDisplace` added about 2k.","line":226,"path":"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol","reproduction":"forge test --match-test test_callbackGasAtTheStipendBoundary -vv logs 'onOracleResult gas, one-word answer, cold: 118568' and '4096-byte answer, cold: 156201'. Expected per brief: ~105k.","severity":"info","title":"Callback gas is about 118.6k for the common case, not the ~105k the brief quotes"}],"hash":"c1d0f9937cfae395d39e3e8536e8f19fc07331ab67e3cd2cfdf40495738b5f76","nodeId":"09efe491-1f9e-4995-8470-5f0b2a4bf0d6","outcome":"completed","summary":"I updated my tests for the revised contract and found one new defect, which I've reported rather than written a test that accepts it. `forge build` passes, and `forge test` passes with the verifier's seed: 95 tests across 8 suites. I didn't commit; only `test/` files changed, and the contract is untouched.\n\n**What changed** (only `test/AskSwarmRegistryIndexInvariant.t.sol` and my section of `test/TESTING.md`):\n- **Stricter index check.** After every random call, the test now checks the contract's full replacement rule. While the indexed answer is still valid, a new one must have a panel at least as large, at least as much agreement, be at least as recent and stay valid at least as long. When `reindex` makes the move, the new answer must also be strictly better on at least one of those.\n- **New random actions:**\n  - Intake finishes a pending ask without ever calling back (empty failure arguments).\n  - Anyone calls `markLost` on any ask. It must mark exactly the asks Intake finished without delivering as `Lost`, with no answer stored. It must refuse open asks with `StillOpen` and already-settled ones with `AlreadySettled`.\n  - Anyone calls `reindex` on any record. A refusal must be `NotEligible`.\n  - Some answers are now dated up to a day before delivery, so the \"at least as recent\" rule actually gets tested.\n- **New checks:** an ask is `Lost` only if Intake finished it without delivering, and every settled ask was actually finished by Intake.\n- **New fixed test:** `test_handlersReachLostAndReindexMoves` proves the random runs really reach a `Lost` ask and a `reindex` move, so the new checks aren't empty.\n- **Sanity check:** I temporarily deleted the \"stays valid at least as long\" condition from the contract. The invariant run failed straight away with \"shorter-lived answer displaced a current answer\". I then restored the contract.\n\n**Earlier reports now fixed.** The other contributor's revision fixed three things I reported last round: short-lived answers knocking out longer-lived ones, asks stuck `Pending` forever, and `ask` having no price cap. Their `AskSwarmRegistryReview.t.sol` tests cover those fixes, and `TESTING.md` now says so.\n\n**Reported in `.imd-findings.json`:**\n- **Low, with a failing proof test.** Once the indexed answer expires, whoever calls `reindex` first can choose a weak answer. A stronger valid answer that was issued slightly earlier then can never take the index back. Example:\n  1. A 40-of-50 answer is indexed and expires after an hour.\n  2. A 25-of-30 answer valid for 30 days arrives 10 seconds after it, and a 2-of-3 answer valid for 30 days arrives 10 seconds after that. Neither replaces the 40-of-50 while it is still valid.\n  3. After the hour, anyone calls `reindex` on the 2-of-3 answer, and it succeeds.\n  4. `reindex` on the 25-of-30 answer then reverts `NotEligible`, because it was issued earlier. The 2-of-3 answer holds the index for 30 days, and `answerOf(q, 30, 25)` returns nothing even though a qualifying answer is on record.\n\n  This contradicts the stated aim in the Review suite that \"a weak fallback cannot block a stronger one\". That only holds when both answers were issued and expire at the same time. The proof test fails on the current code and passes under either sensible fix.\n- **Info.** The callback costs about 118.6k gas for a one-word answer and 156.2k at the 4,096-byte maximum, against the brief's ~105k. Both are still under the 200k limit. Only the figure in the brief and deploy notes is out of date.\n\n**Still to do:** none of this has been run against the live Intake v2 and IMD on a mainnet fork. Everything here runs offline against a local stand-in for Intake.","treeHash":"b3965493d77c7c1033d8fbd82e7cabb5a8b339a0","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1153592,"inputTokens":32,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":20127,"runtime":"claude","turns":16,"wallClockMs":400219}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":3,"bundleHash":"5317d32c151b2952b55cbf8849d0a9a1cd176b606c39ae733f759a646c7d51e3","device":"934ef01306a3cc89","findings":[],"hash":"d8f5e83e5f7ea311bb340ccd820fc9c703d4f512af2ba53b03453e91d25cdf3d","nodeId":"d440ae52-ba2b-4084-9a8e-7619d6a8e3bf","outcome":"completed","summary":"Committed as d24df6a. The working tree is clean, no forge output is tracked, and nothing remains outstanding.\n\n**Outcome.** The previous rejection is resolved and all three reproducible audit findings are fixed with tests. The build and the full suite pass offline with the verifier's fuzz seed, and the mainnet-address suite also passed on a live fork.\n\n| Check | Result |\n|---|---|\n| `forge build` | clean (style lints only, pre-existing lines) |\n| `forge test`, seed `0xd094…5c41` | 70 passed, 0 failed |\n| Audit proofs vs. arrived contract | 4 fail (findings reproduce) |\n| Audit proofs vs. fixed contract | 4 pass |\n| Fork run, `test/AskSwarmRegistry.t.sol` | 20 passed against live Intake v2 and IMD |\n| Tracked files under `contracts/out`, `cache`, `broadcast` | 0 (was 46) |\n\n**What changed, in `src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol`:**\n- Both hooks revert `AlreadySettled` unless the ask is Pending. This closes the replay where a status-0 completion of another open request rewrote a settled record. The fork run confirmed the live Intake forwards such arguments and now reports the call as not delivered.\n- `verified` also requires `issuedAt` at most 5 minutes ahead of the chain clock, matching the protocol consumer's tolerance.\n- A `stored` flag in the free bytes of the third slot lets reads return a zero answer hash for Pending, Refused, NoResult, over-cap and unknown ids. Layout stays three slots and callback gas is unchanged.\n\n**Tests added:** five unit tests in the callbacks suite, one unit test plus an extended fuzz in the mainnet-address suite, and a replay handler in the invariant campaign that tracks asks the writer strands. `ADAPTATION.md` at the repository root lists each change with its finding or rule, and records the info finding that needed no code change. README and `test/TESTING.md` were updated to match.\n\n**Left as it arrived:** `contracts/launch.json`, the previous launch's accepted manifest, and the project's own deploy script. The brief's path `contracts/src/…` and its \"~105k gas\" figure are stale; the tree's root-level Foundry layout and the measured gas are noted in `ADAPTATION.md`.","treeHash":"0bf6fdb24a3568f05e83854a3551ae8e49e8adc9","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2228272,"inputTokens":546,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":46786,"runtime":"claude","turns":58,"wallClockMs":736682}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"370bc711418491f5534cd2358c10a877366b0ee4a0067bf36dd765dfc305f0de","device":"f3b611cf8afb513f","findings":[{"description":"While the held answer is current, onOracleResult replaces latestFor[questionHash] with any verified majority whose panelSize and agreed are at least the held ones. Expiry is not part of the strength comparison, and neither is issuedAt. validForSeconds is chosen per ask (60 s to 30 days) and is not part of questionHash. So one paid ask of the same absolute-window question, with the same panel size and quorum and validForSeconds=60, replaces a 30-day answer. A minute later isCurrent() is false and answerOf(q, minPanel, minAgreed) returns zero, although a verified, unexpired answer of equal strength is still stored. The bot's free tier reads answerOf before charging, so users are charged again for a question that already has a current answer. An answer issued earlier but delivered later also displaces a fresher one. No funds are at risk. Suggested fix, which keeps the no-owner design: when the held answer is current, also require a.expiresAt >= cur.expiresAt (and optionally a.issuedAt >= cur.issuedAt).","line":242,"path":"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity ^0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {AskSwarmRegistry} from \"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol\";\nimport {IIntake, OracleAttestation} from \"src/IIntake.sol\";\n\ncontract ProofToken {\n    mapping(address => uint256) public balanceOf;\n    mapping(address => mapping(address => uint256)) public allowance;\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n    }\n\n    function approve(address spender, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[msg.sender][spender] = amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[from][msg.sender] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[from] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n}\n\n/// Minimal Intake v2: takes the exact price and calls the registered callback once at 200k gas.\ncontract ProofIntake {\n    struct Request {\n        address target;\n        bytes4 selector;\n        bool completed;\n    }\n\n    address public immutable token;\n    uint256 public nonce;\n    mapping(bytes32 => Request) public requests;\n\n    constructor(address token_) {\n        token = token_;\n    }\n\n    function priceOf(bytes32, address) external pure returns (uint256) {\n        return 0.5 ether;\n    }\n\n    function requestWithFailure(bytes32, bytes calldata, IIntake.Callback calldata cb, bytes4, address, uint256 amount)\n        external\n        payable\n        returns (bytes32 id)\n    {\n        id = keccak256(abi.encode(address(this), ++nonce));\n        requests[id] = Request(cb.target, cb.selector, false);\n        ProofToken(token).transferFrom(msg.sender, address(0xFEE), amount);\n    }\n\n    function complete(bytes32 id, bytes calldata args) external returns (bool delivered) {\n        Request storage r = requests[id];\n        require(!r.completed);\n        r.completed = true;\n        (delivered,) = r.target.call{gas: 200_000}(abi.encodePacked(r.selector, args));\n    }\n}\n\n/// Finding: an equal-strength answer that expires sooner displaces a held answer that is still\n/// current, so once the newcomer expires the question reads \"not current\" although a verified,\n/// unexpired answer of the same strength exists. Expected: the index keeps serving a current answer.\ncontract IndexDisplacementProof is Test {\n    uint256 internal constant KEY = 0xA11CE;\n    bytes32 internal constant QUESTION = keccak256(\"absolute-window question\");\n    ProofToken internal token;\n    ProofIntake internal intake;\n    AskSwarmRegistry internal registry;\n    address internal asker = address(0xA5);\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        vm.warp(1_800_000_000);\n        token = new ProofToken();\n        intake = new ProofIntake(address(token));\n        registry = new AskSwarmRegistry(address(intake), address(token), vm.addr(KEY));\n        token.mint(asker, 10 ether);\n        vm.prank(asker);\n        token.approve(address(registry), type(uint256).max);\n    }\n\n    function _answer(uint64 validFor) internal returns (bytes32 id) {\n        vm.prank(asker);\n        id = registry.ask(\"{}\");\n        OracleAttestation memory a = OracleAttestation({\n            requestId: keccak256(abi.encode(id)),\n            chainId: 1,\n            questionHash: QUESTION,\n            answerType: 0,\n            answer: abi.encode(true),\n            figure: 0,\n            fromBlock: 100,\n            toBlock: 200,\n            blockHash: bytes32(uint256(1)),\n            panelJobId: keccak256(abi.encode(\"job\", id)),\n            panelSize: 15,\n            quorum: 11,\n            agreed: 11,\n            issuedAt: uint64(block.timestamp),\n            expiresAt: uint64(block.timestamp) + validFor\n        });\n        (uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s) = vm.sign(KEY, registry.digest(a));\n        assertTrue(intake.complete(id, abi.encode(id, a, abi.encodePacked(r, s, v))));\n    }\n\n    function test_shortLivedEqualAnswerMustNotEvictCurrentAnswer() public {\n        bytes32 longLived = _answer(30 days);\n        assertTrue(registry.isCurrent(QUESTION));\n        _answer(60); // same question, same panel strength, validForSeconds = 60, one paid ask\n        vm.warp(block.timestamp + 61);\n\n        (, AskSwarmRegistry.Answer memory held) = registry.get(longLived);\n        assertTrue(held.verified && block.timestamp <= held.expiresAt, \"a current verified answer exists\");\n        assertTrue(registry.isCurrent(QUESTION), \"index dropped a current answer for a shorter-lived one\");\n        (bytes32 served,) = registry.answerOf(QUESTION, 15, 11);\n        assertEq(served, longLived, \"filtered read serves nothing for 30 days\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Ask Q and deliver a verified answer: panel 15, quorum 11, agreed 11, expiresAt = now + 30 days. Ask Q again and deliver a verified answer with the same panel, quorum and agreed and expiresAt = now + 60. Warp 61 s. Expected: isCurrent(Q) == true and answerOf(Q, 15, 11) returns the 30-day request id. Actual: isCurrent(Q) == false and answerOf(Q, 15, 11) returns bytes32(0). The proof fails on the current code with 'index dropped a current answer for a shorter-lived one'.","severity":"low","title":"An equal-strength answer that expires sooner evicts a still-current answer from latestFor"},{"description":"Measured where Intake spends it: a probe at the Intake address makes the 200k call, every registry slot is cold and the question is fresh. A one-word answer used 116,628 gas and a 4,096-byte answer used 154,261 gas, call overhead included. Both fit the 200,000 stipend, with about 46k left at the cap. This is not a defect, but the brief's ~105k understates the cost. Any future gas repricing of SSTORE or LOG data shrinks the margin at the cap first. Measuring from the test contract also counts the caller's ABI encoding and reads about 30k high: test_callbackGasMargin in AskSwarmRegistry.t.sol logs 146k for that reason.","line":192,"path":"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol","reproduction":"test/AskSwarmRegistryAdversarial.t.sol::test_callbackGasAtTheStipendBoundary logs both figures and asserts < 130k and < 180k.","severity":"info","title":"Callback gas is about 114k, not the ~105k the brief quotes; the 4096-byte cap uses about 152k"},{"description":"Intake attempts each callback once. If the writer never completes the request, or completes it with arguments the registry refuses (for example a replay naming a settled id, which the registry correctly rejects), the ask stays Pending. Nothing can move it to a terminal status, and a reader cannot tell a lost ask from one in flight except by askedAt. The oracle-consumer guidance asks for a deadline after which the requester can clear a pending request. Here no value is held per ask, so this only affects record keeping.","line":179,"path":"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol","reproduction":"Ask A and ask B, then deliver A. Call intake.complete(B, 0, abi.encode(A, attestation, sig)): the registry reverts AlreadySettled(A), Intake marks B completed, and get(B).status stays Pending permanently. Expected: a terminal status, or a way to expire B after a deadline.","severity":"info","title":"An ask whose callback is lost stays Pending forever, with no deadline"},{"description":"ask() charges whatever Intake.priceOf returns at call time. A caller with a standing unlimited approval (the pattern the brief's Pay-with-IMD page may use) pays a raised price without consenting to it. The brief asks for exactly Intake's price, so this is by design. Clients should approve exactly price() per ask. A maxPrice parameter would remove the risk.","line":170,"path":"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol","reproduction":"Approve type(uint256).max, then intake.setPrice(2 ether) and ask(): 2 IMD is taken (test_priceChangesAreReadOnEveryAsk in AskSwarmRegistryPayments.t.sol).","severity":"info","title":"ask() has no maximum-price argument"}],"hash":"d950c867334ef77df59a0b29991284a89eae017a1af72030afb4134d113c296b","nodeId":"09efe491-1f9e-4995-8470-5f0b2a4bf0d6","outcome":"completed","summary":"I added two test files and updated `test/TESTING.md`. With the verifier's fuzz seed, `forge build` succeeds and `forge test` passes: 80 tests, none failing. That's the 70 earlier tests plus 10 new ones. I also found one low-severity defect and three informational points, written to `.imd-findings.json` in the repo root rather than tested around. Nothing is committed yet.\n\n**New tests**\n- **`test/AskSwarmRegistryAdversarial.t.sol`**:\n  - Answers from 4,097 bytes up to 64 KiB are recorded unverified inside the 200k gas stipend and never move the question index.\n  - The costliest accepted delivery still goes through: a 4,096-byte verified answer that replaces a held one, with all storage cold.\n  - Any failure status from 1 to 255 settles an ask once, and both hooks refuse it afterwards.\n  - One fuzz test drives each verification condition (signer, domain, quorum, expiry, how far ahead `issuedAt` is) on both sides.\n  - A signature's high-s twin is refused, and both forms of the recovery byte (0/1 and 27/28) are accepted.\n  - A contract that asks is recorded as the asker, not `tx.origin`. Two asks with the same body are two separate paid asks.\n  - Looking up keys nothing ever touched returns empty results.\n- **`test/AskSwarmRegistryIndexInvariant.t.sol`**: 192 random sequences of 64 calls. Honest deliveries mix with hostile ones: wrong key, another registry's domain, high-s, a 64-byte signature, an oversized answer, a field changed after signing, `issuedAt` set ahead. Failures, replays of settled ids, direct hook calls and time jumps are mixed in too. After every call it checks:\n  - The index only ever moves to a verified strict-majority answer to the same question.\n  - It never moves to a weaker panel while the held answer is still valid.\n  - Settled records never change.\n  - The registry holds no IMD, ETH or Intake allowance, and every fee reaches Intake.\n\n**Gas:** I measured the callback from the Intake address making the 200k call. A one-word answer to a fresh question costs about 116.6k, not the ~105k the brief states. The 4,096-byte maximum costs about 154.3k, so it fits with about 46k to spare. The older `test_callbackGasMargin` reads about 30k high because it also counts the test's own encoding of the call.\n\n**Findings**\n1. **Low: a short-lived answer can push a valid one out of the index** (`src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol:242`). The contract compares only panel size and agreement, not expiry. So one paid ask of the same question with a 60-second validity replaces a 30-day answer. A minute later `isCurrent` is false and `answerOf(q, 15, 11)` returns nothing, although an equally strong, unexpired answer is still stored. Users of the bot's free tier would then be charged again. The proof test fails on the current code. Suggested fix: when the held answer is still valid, also require `a.expiresAt >= cur.expiresAt`.\n2. **Info: callback gas.** The brief's ~105k figure understates it (see the gas paragraph above).\n3. **Info: a lost callback leaves an ask Pending forever.** Nothing can clear it, though no money is at risk.\n4. **Info: `ask` has no maximum price.** A caller who approved an unlimited amount pays whatever Intake's price becomes. Clients should approve exactly `price()` for each ask.\n\nEverything runs offline against a stand-in for Intake. A run against the live Intake v2 and IMD on a mainnet fork is still owed for these new tests.","treeHash":"68f58f0e066baf25204c061ce1496f3fd00ea76f","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2598719,"inputTokens":54,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":43911,"runtime":"claude","turns":29,"wallClockMs":709489}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"fc87c05048aca47d","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_economics, audit_permissions, audit_math and write_foundry_tests (same root cause). The header invariant (lines 29-32) promises that latestFor only moves to an answer at least as strong as the held one unless the held one has expired, so a weak panel cannot overwrite a strong one. The displacement rule compares only panelSize and agreed; expiresAt and issuedAt never enter it. validForSeconds (60 s to 30 days per the oracle-consumer reference) and the panel shape are chosen per ask by any caller at the same flat price, and the plane hashes an absolute-window question deterministically, so an unprivileged asker can re-ask a question holding a verified 11-of-15 answer valid for 30 days with the same panel shape and validForSeconds=60. Equality passes (>= on both counts), the index moves to the 60 s answer, and 61 s later `held` is false: isCurrent is false and answerOf(q, 15, 11) returns a zero id although the evicted record is verified and valid for weeks, and nothing can ever re-index it. With nothing held, line 242's `!held` branch then admits any strict-majority verified answer, including a 2-of-2 panel (the smallest the plane sells and the one the reference warns is cheap to fill), which becomes canonical for up to 30 days. Cost: two asks, 1 IMD. Same root cause, two further consequences: (a) a stronger short-lived answer blocks a weaker long-lived majority answer while current and leaves the index dark on an expired record after it lapses while the weaker verified answer is unexpired (audit_math variant 1); (b) when two answers of equal strength are delivered out of order, the older issuedAt displaces the newer. No funds move; the broken property is the registry's stated canonical-read guarantee that the bot's free tier (packages/imd/src/intake.ts registryAnswer -> answerOf) relies on. Minimal design-preserving fix: when an answer is held, also require a.expiresAt >= cur.expiresAt (and a.issuedAt >= cur.issuedAt if recency is wanted) before replacing it; the attached proof and the other three specialist proofs pass with the expiresAt clause alone. Whether the index should fall back to a still-valid weaker answer once the held one expires (consequence a) is a scope decision for the author.","line":242,"path":"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity ^0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {AskSwarmRegistry} from \"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol\";\nimport {IIntake, OracleAttestation} from \"src/IIntake.sol\";\n\n/// Minimal ERC-20 for the IMD stand-in.\ncontract ScratchToken {\n    mapping(address => uint256) public balanceOf;\n    mapping(address => mapping(address => uint256)) public allowance;\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n    }\n\n    function approve(address spender, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        allowance[msg.sender][spender] = amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        uint256 a = allowance[from][msg.sender];\n        require(a >= amount, \"allowance\");\n        if (a != type(uint256).max) allowance[from][msg.sender] = a - amount;\n        require(balanceOf[from] >= amount, \"balance\");\n        balanceOf[from] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n}\n\n/// Mirrors Intake v2's `_request` (amount >= price, pulled whole to payTo) and `complete`\n/// (writer-only, once, callback under a 200k stipend, status-0 args forwarded unchecked).\ncontract ScratchIntake {\n    struct Req {\n        address payer;\n        address target;\n        bytes4 selector;\n        bytes4 onFailure;\n        bool completed;\n    }\n\n    address public immutable writer;\n    address public immutable payTo;\n    address public immutable asset;\n    uint256 public price = 0.5 ether;\n    uint256 public nonce;\n    mapping(bytes32 => Req) public reqs;\n\n    constructor(address writer_, address payTo_, address asset_) {\n        writer = writer_;\n        payTo = payTo_;\n        asset = asset_;\n    }\n\n    function priceOf(bytes32, address token) external view returns (uint256) {\n        return token == asset ? price : 0;\n    }\n\n    function requestWithFailure(\n        bytes32,\n        bytes calldata body,\n        IIntake.Callback calldata cb,\n        bytes4 onFailure,\n        address token,\n        uint256 amount\n    ) external payable returns (bytes32 id) {\n        require(token == asset && amount >= price && body.length != 0, \"not sold\");\n        id = keccak256(abi.encode(block.chainid, address(this), ++nonce));\n        reqs[id] = Req(msg.sender, cb.target, cb.selector, onFailure, false);\n        require(ScratchToken(token).transferFrom(msg.sender, payTo, amount), \"pull\");\n    }\n\n    function complete(bytes32 id, uint8 status, bytes calldata args) external returns (bool delivered) {\n        require(msg.sender == writer, \"writer\");\n        Req storage r = reqs[id];\n        require(r.payer != address(0) && !r.completed, \"bad request\");\n        r.completed = true;\n        bytes4 sel = status == 0 ? r.selector : r.onFailure;\n        (delivered,) = r.target.call{gas: 200_000}(bytes.concat(sel, args));\n    }\n}\n\n/// Finding: the \"strength\" comparison in onOracleResult ignores the attestation's own time\n/// fields. An equal-strength answer with the shortest allowed validity displaces a strong,\n/// long-lived held answer and expires 60 s later; the question is then open to any 2-of-2\n/// majority for up to 30 days. Cost to the attacker: two asks (1 IMD).\ncontract IndexCaptureTest is Test {\n    uint256 constant KEY = 0xA11CE;\n    bytes32 constant Q = keccak256(\"Is contract X paused?\");\n\n    ScratchToken token;\n    ScratchIntake intake;\n    AskSwarmRegistry reg;\n    address honest = makeAddr(\"honest asker\");\n    address attacker = makeAddr(\"attacker\");\n    address writer = makeAddr(\"writer\");\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        vm.chainId(1);\n        vm.warp(1_800_000_000);\n        token = new ScratchToken();\n        intake = new ScratchIntake(writer, makeAddr(\"payTo\"), address(token));\n        reg = new AskSwarmRegistry(address(intake), address(token), vm.addr(KEY));\n        token.mint(honest, 10 ether);\n        token.mint(attacker, 10 ether);\n        vm.prank(honest);\n        token.approve(address(reg), type(uint256).max);\n        vm.prank(attacker);\n        token.approve(address(reg), type(uint256).max);\n    }\n\n    function _ask(address who) internal returns (bytes32 id) {\n        vm.prank(who);\n        id = reg.ask(bytes('{\"v\":1,\"question\":\"Is contract X paused?\"}'));\n    }\n\n    function _att(bytes32 id, bytes memory answer, uint16 panel, uint16 quorum, uint16 agreed, uint64 ttl)\n        internal\n        returns (OracleAttestation memory a)\n    {\n        uint64 nowTs = uint64(vm.getBlockTimestamp());\n        a = OracleAttestation({\n            requestId: keccak256(abi.encode(\"uuid\", id)),\n            chainId: 1,\n            questionHash: Q,\n            answerType: 0,\n            answer: answer,\n            figure: 0,\n            fromBlock: 100,\n            toBlock: 200,\n            blockHash: keccak256(\"b\"),\n            panelJobId: keccak256(abi.encode(\"job\", id)),\n            panelSize: panel,\n            quorum: quorum,\n            agreed: agreed,\n            issuedAt: nowTs,\n            expiresAt: nowTs + ttl\n        });\n    }\n\n    function _deliver(bytes32 id, OracleAttestation memory a) internal {\n        (uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s) = vm.sign(KEY, reg.digest(a));\n        vm.prank(writer);\n        assertTrue(intake.complete(id, 0, abi.encode(id, a, abi.encodePacked(r, s, v))), \"not delivered\");\n    }\n\n    function test_equalStrengthShortLivedAnswerCollapsesValidityThenWeakPanelCaptures() public {\n        // 1. Honest asker: 11 of 15 say \"no\" (0x00), valid 30 days (the plane's maximum).\n        bytes32 strong = _ask(honest);\n        _deliver(strong, _att(strong, hex\"00\", 15, 11, 11, 30 days));\n        assertEq(reg.latestFor(Q), strong);\n        assertTrue(reg.isCurrent(Q));\n\n        // 2. Attacker asks the same question with the same panel shape and validForSeconds = 60\n        //    (the plane's minimum). The panel again says \"no\": same strength, so it displaces.\n        bytes32 shortLived = _ask(attacker);\n        _deliver(shortLived, _att(shortLived, hex\"00\", 15, 11, 11, 60));\n        // (On the current code latestFor(Q) is now `shortLived`; a fixed contract keeps `strong`.)\n\n        // 3. Sixty-one seconds later. On the current code nothing is current, although the\n        //    30-day answer has 29+ days left.\n        vm.warp(vm.getBlockTimestamp() + 61);\n\n        // 4. A 2-of-2 panel (the smallest the plane sells) now takes the index for 30 days\n        //    with the opposite answer. The strong answer should have blocked this until its own expiry.\n        bytes32 weak = _ask(attacker);\n        _deliver(weak, _att(weak, hex\"01\", 2, 2, 2, 30 days));\n        (bytes32 heldId, AskSwarmRegistry.Answer memory held) = reg.answerOf(Q);\n\n        // Expected: the 11-of-15 answer, still within its signed validity, is what readers get.\n        // Actual: a 2-of-2 \"yes\" is the canonical answer and isCurrent(Q) is true.\n        assertTrue(heldId != weak, \"a 2-of-2 panel captured the index while an 11-of-15 answer was still valid\");\n        assertGe(held.panelSize, 15);\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Fresh registry, signer = test key 0xA11CE, chain id 1, T = 1_800_000_000. 1) honest.ask(Q); writer completes with attestation {questionHash Q, panelSize 15, quorum 11, agreed 11, answer 0x00, issuedAt T, expiresAt T+30 days}, signed -> latestFor[Q] = that id, isCurrent(Q) = true. 2) attacker.ask(Q); writer completes with {15, 11, 11, answer 0x00, issuedAt T, expiresAt T+60} -> line 242: held = true, 15 >= 15 && 11 >= 11, latestFor[Q] moves to the 60 s answer. Expected: the current 30-day answer stays. 3) warp T+61: isCurrent(Q) == false and answerOf(Q,15,11) returns bytes32(0) while get(strong).verified == true and strong.expiresAt == T+30d. 4) attacker.ask(Q); writer completes {panelSize 2, quorum 2, agreed 2, answer 0x01, expiresAt +30d} -> held is false, latestFor[Q] = the 2-of-2 answer, answerOf(Q).answer == 0x01 and isCurrent true for 30 days. Expected per the header invariant: the 11-of-15 answer remains canonical until T+30d. Ran: forge test --match-path test/scratch/Proof_04cbdc3fe296.t.sol fails on this tree with 'a 2-of-2 panel captured the index while an 11-of-15 answer was still valid'; the other three specialist proofs (Proof_0e3b124d2add, Proof_a2c52fa2fcfb, Proof_c522f7be2937) also fail on this tree for the same cause.","severity":"medium","snippet":"            if (!held || (a.panelSize >= cur.panelSize && a.agreed >= cur.agreed)) {","title":"latestFor displacement ignores the attestation's validity window: an equal-strength 60 s answer evicts a current 30-day answer, after which any 2-of-2 majority captures the question"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_flow, audit_economics, audit_permissions and write_foundry_tests. ask(bytes) reads INTAKE.priceOf(ACTION, IMD) at execution and pulls exactly that amount from msg.sender; the caller cannot express a maximum. On the live Intake v2 (verified source, 0xa43e...de82) setPrice(bytes32,address,uint256) is onlyOwner and takes effect immediately, and _collect forwards the whole amount to payTo. A caller whose allowance exceeds the quoted price (the project's own client approves PRICE*20 = 10 IMD in packages/imd/src/intake.ts ensureAllowance, and the test suite approves type(uint256).max) pays the new price silently if a setPrice lands between their approval and their ask. The brief states the contract 'pulls exactly Intake's price', so this is a trust assumption on the Intake owner rather than a theft path; the protocol's own OracleIntakeConsumer treats its stored price as a ceiling for this reason. Design-preserving fix: an ask(bytes body, uint256 maxPrice) overload that reverts when p > maxPrice (ask(bytes) can forward type(uint256).max), or document that clients must approve exactly price() per ask.","line":171,"path":"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol","reproduction":"test/scratch/ReviewLeads.t.sol test_askChargesLivePriceNotQuotedPrice, on the repository's RecordingIntake fixture (same pull-to-payee semantics as the live Intake): alice holds a type(uint256).max allowance to the registry; registry.price() == 0.5e18 (the quote alice saw); intake.setPrice(10 ether) lands first; alice calls registry.ask('{}'). Expected by the payer: at most 0.5 IMD or a revert. Actual: alice's balance drops by exactly 10e18 (logged quoted=500000000000000000, charged=10000000000000000000) and the ask is registered Pending. The existing test test_priceChangesAreReadOnEveryAsk in test/AskSwarmRegistryPayments.t.sol shows the same unbounded tracking of the quote.","severity":"low","snippet":"        uint256 p = price();\n        if (p == 0) revert NotSold();\n        _call(IMD, abi.encodeWithSelector(0x23b872dd, msg.sender, address(this), p));","title":"ask() pulls whatever Intake.priceOf returns at execution time with no caller-supplied ceiling, so a standing allowance pays any price set before the ask is mined"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_flow, audit_economics and write_foundry_tests. The only writers of an ask's status are the two Intake hooks, and the live Intake v2 complete() marks a request completed before attempting the callback and refuses a second completion (AlreadyCompleted). Any attempt that does not land in a terminal branch here is therefore final: a status-0 completion whose first word names another id (which the AlreadySettled guard correctly rejects), calldata the ABI decoder rejects, a callback that runs out of an owner-lowered callbackGas (setCallbackGas on the live Intake; 200_000 today, the one-word callback needs about 117k), or a failure completion with empty args (Intake then skips the failure hook). In each case the ask is completed on Intake, delivered == false, the 0.5 IMD is spent, and get(id) reports Pending indefinitely, indistinguishable from a request in flight. The oracle-consumer reference requires every pending request to have a deadline after which its requester can clear it. No IMD is held by the registry, so nothing is locked; the impact is a record that can never say 'lost' and a stated promise ('refusals and split panels are recorded by status') that cannot hold for these paths. Design-preserving fix: let anyone, or the recorded asker, move a Pending ask to a terminal Lost status once INTAKE.requests(id).completed is true (readable through the IIntake interface already declared) or after a fixed age, without touching answers or latestFor.","line":179,"path":"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol","reproduction":"test/scratch/ReviewLeads.t.sol test_undeliveredCallbackLeavesAskPendingForever, on the RecordingIntake fixture: alice asks A and B; writer delivers A (Answered). Writer calls intake.complete(B, 0, abi.encode(A, attestation, signature)): the registry callback reverts AlreadySettled(A), complete returns delivered == false and requestInfo(B).completed == true. A later intake.complete(B, 2, ...) reverts AlreadyCompleted. vm.warp(+365 days); registry.get(B).k.status == Pending. Expected: a terminal or clearable state. Actual: permanent Pending, and no function on the registry can change it.","severity":"low","snippet":"        asks[requestId] = Ask({asker: msg.sender, askedAt: uint64(block.timestamp), status: Status.Pending});","title":"An ask whose single completion attempt does not reach a terminal branch stays Pending forever: no deadline, no clear path"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_flow and audit_economics. Not a code defect: the contract behaves exactly as coded, and this is a correction to the premise its documentation and the bot's free tier rely on. The pinned oracle-consumer reference states that questionHash 'covers the question, the resolved block window and the definitions, so a contract cannot compute it in advance when the window is relative'. The bot's bodies and the test fixture BODY use a relative window ({\"hours\":24}), so two asks of identical text at different times carry different questionHash values: the displacement rule at lines 239-245 never engages between them, and no reader can derive the key for answerOf(bytes32) from question text without the plane's resolved window. Only absolute-window bodies ({fromBlock,toBlock}) yield a stable key, and those are the only ones finding 1 applies to. The two live requests the specialist cited (46165fda, 43a20eb4) are different questions, so they do not demonstrate the claim; the evidence is the pinned reference text. If text-addressable memory is wanted, index additionally by a hash the asker can compute (e.g. keccak256 of the question string, emitted in Asked) or ask with absolute windows.","line":119,"path":"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol","reproduction":"Documentary, not reproducible against the contract alone: .imd/reads/skills/oracle-consumer.md, section 'The callback', versus src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol lines 119-120 and the header's free-tier promise at lines 15-16. Live request documents at api.imd.fun/oracle/requests/<id> show each ask carrying its own resolved window.fromBlock/toBlock beside its questionHash. Expected by the NatSpec: a key repeat asks of one question share. Actual per the protocol reference: a per-window key for relative-window bodies.","severity":"info","snippet":"    /// @notice Latest verified answer for a question hash (keccak256 of the normalized question,\n    /// as the plane computes it and puts in the attestation).\n    mapping(bytes32 questionHash => bytes32 requestId) public latestFor;","title":"latestFor NatSpec describes questionHash as the hash of the normalized question; the plane's hash also covers the resolved block window and definitions, so relative-window asks never share an index ke"}],"hash":"dca54bbae6723e6a42885802be2608763b8364cbd5b4d06e50c3683e6960366a","nodeId":"c74b7d17-2232-40b8-9285-553564f0be1f","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and `.imd-findings.json` holds four findings plus a seven-row coverage record. Nothing in `src/`, tests, or configuration was changed; only `test/scratch/` carries my reproductions.\n\n**What I verified before keeping anything**\n\n- All five specialist proof tests fail on this tree for the stated reason, and the existing 80-test suite passes.\n- The live Intake v2 source on Blockscout confirms the premises the findings rest on: status-0 callback arguments are forwarded unchecked, a request completes once, and `setPrice` and `setCallbackGas` are owner-only.\n- IMD is a LayerZero OFT on the OpenZeppelin ERC20 base with no transfer hook, so `ask` has no reentrancy path.\n- The registry's struct, type string and selector match the oracle-consumer reference, the suite pins the protocol's vector digest, and the real mainnet attestation recovers the oracle signer.\n\n**Findings kept, duplicates merged**\n\n1. **Medium.** The `latestFor` displacement rule at line 242 compares panel size and agreement only. An equal-strength answer bought with the minimum validity evicts a current 30-day answer, and after it lapses any 2-of-2 majority captures the question. Four specialists reported this under one root cause; the attached proof fails here and passes with an `expiresAt >= cur.expiresAt` clause.\n2. **Low.** `ask` pulls whatever Intake quotes at execution with no caller ceiling. My scratch test shows a quoted 0.5 IMD ask charging 10 IMD under the bot's own standing allowance pattern.\n3. **Low.** An ask whose single completion attempt the registry refuses, or that runs out of a lowered stipend, stays Pending forever with no clear path. Reproduced through the repository's Intake model.\n4. **Info.** The NatSpec calls `questionHash` the hash of the normalized question, but the pinned protocol reference says it includes the resolved window, so relative-window asks never share an index key. Documentary only, and I noted that the two live requests a specialist cited are different questions and do not demonstrate it.\n\n**Dropped.** The callback-gas figure is stale documentation, not a defect, and is noted in a coverage row instead.\n\n**Coverage.** `ask` and `onOracleResult` carry findings; `onFailure` holds. I added rows for the EIP-712 conformance, factory deployability, the no-custody invariant and the stipend margin, all holding.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2232881,"inputTokens":674,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":24389,"runtime":"claude","turns":22,"wallClockMs":401464}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"a0f4c3f900dedd4a","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Execution-trace / mid-operation config mutation. `ask(bytes body)` reads `INTAKE.priceOf(ACTION, IMD)` at execution time and pulls exactly that amount from `msg.sender`, with no caller-supplied maximum. The price is an Intake owner setting (`setPrice`, live Intake v2 source at 0xa43e...de82) and may change between the moment a caller is quoted and the moment its `ask` is mined. Any caller holding a standing allowance to the registry pays the new price silently. This is not hypothetical for this project: the bot's own client (`packages/imd/src/intake.ts`, `ensureAllowance`) leaves a PRICE*20 = 10 IMD standing allowance from the house wallet to the registry and then calls `ask` without re-checking the price in the same transaction. The protocol's reference consumer (`OracleIntakeConsumer.ask`, oracle-consumer REFERENCE.md) treats `price` as the owner's ceiling for exactly this reason. Trigger requires the Intake owner to move the price (trusted party), so impact is bounded to callers with allowances above the quoted price and severity is low; it is reported because the brief states the contract 'pulls exactly Intake's price' and the bot's wallet is configured in a way that exposes it. Minimal fix that preserves the design: add an overload `ask(bytes body, uint256 maxPrice)` that reverts when `p > maxPrice` (keep `ask(bytes)` for ABI compatibility, or have the bot approve exactly the price per ask).","line":171,"path":"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol","reproduction":"Offline, against test/helpers/RegistryTestSupport.sol fixtures (RecordingIntake mock, same pull semantics as live Intake): (1) alice approves the registry for 10 ether of the payment token, as the bot does; (2) `registry.price()` returns 0.5e18 (the quote alice saw); (3) `intake.setPrice(10 ether)` lands first (Intake owner action); (4) alice calls `registry.ask(\"{}\")`. Expected: revert or charge at most the quoted 0.5 IMD. Actual: alice's balance drops by exactly 10e18 and the ask is registered as Pending. Verified with test/scratch/ReviewRepro.t.sol `test_askChargesLivePriceNotQuotedPrice` (logs quoted=500000000000000000, charged=10000000000000000000).","severity":"low","snippet":"        uint256 p = price();\n        if (p == 0) revert NotSold();\n        _call(IMD, abi.encodeWithSelector(0x23b872dd, msg.sender, address(this), p));","title":"ask() has no price ceiling: a standing allowance is spent at whatever Intake quotes when the transaction executes"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"First-principles / state-machine completeness. The registry's lifecycle for an ask is Pending -> {Answered, Unverified, Refused, NoResult}, and the only writers are the two Intake hooks. The live Intake v2 `complete` marks a request `completed` before attempting the callback and refuses a second `complete` (`AlreadyCompleted`), so any delivery that does not reach a terminal branch here is final: a status-0 completion whose first word names another id (the exact relay the Pending guard was added for), calldata the ABI decoder rejects, or a callback that runs out of a lowered `callbackGas` (owner-settable on Intake, currently 200000). In every such case the ask is `completed` in Intake, `delivered == false`, and `get(id)` reports Pending indefinitely, indistinguishable from an in-flight request. No IMD is at stake in the registry (the fee is already with Intake's payTo), so this is informational, but the brief promises that refusals and split panels are 'recorded by status' and the oracle-consumer reference requires every pending request to have a deadline after which it can be cleared. The record also cannot tell a reader 'lost' from 'waiting'. A design-preserving fix: let anyone (or the recorded `asker`) mark an ask `Lost` after Intake reports it `completed` (readable via `INTAKE.requests(id).completed`) or after a fixed age, without touching answers or `latestFor`.","line":196,"path":"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol","reproduction":"Offline, with the RecordingIntake fixture: (1) alice asks, id = A; (2) the writer calls `intake.complete(A, 0, abi.encode(keccak256(\"other\"), attestation, signature))` -> the callback reverts `UnknownAsk`, `complete` returns delivered=false and `requestInfo(A).completed == true`; (3) `registry.get(A)` -> status Pending; (4) writer tries `intake.complete(A, 2, ...)` -> reverts AlreadyCompleted; (5) `vm.warp(+365 days)`, `registry.get(A)` -> still Pending, and no function on the registry can change it. Expected: a terminal or clearable state. Actual: permanent Pending. Verified with test/scratch/ReviewRepro.t.sol `test_undeliveredCallbackLeavesAskPendingForever`.","severity":"info","snippet":"        if (k.status != Status.Pending) revert AlreadySettled(requestId);","title":"An ask whose callback is attempted and not delivered stays Pending forever: no terminal state and no clear path"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Periphery / assumption check on the index key. The NatSpec describes `questionHash` as the keccak256 of the normalized question, and the header promises the bot's free tier reads `answerOf` before charging. Per the pinned oracle-consumer reference, the plane's `questionHash` 'covers the question, the resolved block window and the definitions, so a contract cannot compute it in advance when the window is relative'. The bot's bodies use a relative window (`{\"hours\":24}` in `packages/imd` and the test BODY fixture), and the live request documents confirm each ask resolves its own `window.fromBlock/toBlock` (e.g. request 46165fda: 26206335..26213512; request 43a20eb4: 26206347..26213524). Consequence: two asks of identical text minutes apart carry different `questionHash` values, the strength-based displacement rule in `onOracleResult` (lines 239-245) effectively never engages for bot traffic, and no reader can derive the key for `answerOf(bytes32)` from a question text without the plane's resolved window. The contract behaves exactly as coded; this is a correction to its stated premise so the author and integrators do not rely on `answerOf` as a text-addressable cache. No code in `lib/` or `api/` reads `answerOf`/`latestFor`; the free tier is served from `lib/answers.json`. If text-addressable memory is wanted, index additionally by a hash the asker can compute (e.g. keccak256 of the question string carried in the body, emitted in `Asked`) or ask with absolute windows.","line":119,"path":"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol","reproduction":"Documentary, from pinned inputs and live data: (1) .imd/reads/skills/oracle-consumer.md, section 'The callback': questionHash covers question + resolved window + definitions, not computable in advance for relative windows; (2) GET https://api.imd.fun/oracle/requests/46165fda-3b55-4dad-8d27-4197dc85b8b6 and .../43a20eb4-f9ce-4751-8a62-9c8851b12565 show per-ask resolved windows and distinct questionHash values for asks made minutes apart through the earlier registry 0x3fc72adf...14ea; (3) `grep -rn answerOf lib api functions packages` returns nothing. Expected (per NatSpec lines 119-120 and header lines 15-16): a key derivable from the normalized question that repeat asks share. Actual: a per-window key. Not reproducible offline without paying two live asks; recorded as info.","severity":"info","snippet":"    /// @notice Latest verified answer for a question hash (keccak256 of the normalized question,\n    /// as the plane computes it and puts in the attestation).\n    mapping(bytes32 questionHash => bytes32 requestId) public latestFor;","title":"latestFor is keyed by a questionHash that includes the resolved block window, so repeated asks of the same question text with a relative window never share an index entry"}],"hash":"e7cd340666403df9eb28eb0db5dd564b818899d1c3924e60df6a5781a9fed6f5","nodeId":"6d8fec01-fcca-4bce-8cd8-f5c067ad3e53","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and recorded. The findings file parses, all three snippets match the tree at their cited lines, and no tracked file was changed (only the ignored `.imd-findings.json` and `test/scratch/`).\n\n**Outcome: no critical, high or medium defect in the control flow.** The registry's execution paths hold against the live Intake v2 source I pulled from Blockscout. Both hooks are Intake-only and Pending-only, the EIP-712 digest reproduces the plane's live attestations, the strength and majority gating on `latestFor` behaves as documented, and the worst-case cold callback stays well under the live 200k stipend.\n\n**What I reported in `.imd-findings.json`:**\n\n- **Low, `ask` has no price ceiling.** The price is read at execution and pulled in full, and the bot's own client leaves a 10 IMD standing allowance to the registry. A price change landing before the ask takes the whole allowance for one question. Reproduced offline with the project's fixtures.\n- **Info, no terminal state for an undelivered callback.** When Intake attempts a callback that does not land, the ask stays Pending forever with no clear path, indistinguishable from in-flight. No funds are at stake in the registry. Reproduced offline.\n- **Info, the index key includes the resolved block window.** Per the pinned oracle reference and the live request documents, same-text asks with relative windows never share a `questionHash`, so the displacement rule rarely engages for bot traffic and the NatSpec's \"normalized question\" description is inaccurate. Documentary, not reproducible offline.\n\n**Coverage:** all three verifier-listed entry points have rows, plus six invariant and periphery rows. The interface file, the launch manifest, the signature and encoding helpers were each checked against the live contracts or the protocol library. Nothing in my area was left unreached.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1693096,"inputTokens":450,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":38417,"runtime":"claude","turns":43,"wallClockMs":605493}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"7bb1e01ccd6c5a39ba9e5e792b0a6a353b8691b20e03cd068719f3458c1045a8","device":"9ab27edcfd62be02","findings":[],"hash":"f364efd4a1348e168718eb921cbf122d82523c45f0215bb5ed7d27cfadfd368c","nodeId":"d440ae52-ba2b-4084-9a8e-7619d6a8e3bf","outcome":"completed","summary":"Done. The revision is complete, tested, and the tree carries only source changes.\n\n**What the review reported and what I did**\n\n- **a97feadf (medium, index ignores validity window): fixed.** The proof failed on the starting tree exactly as described. While the held answer is verified and unexpired, a delivery now takes the index only if it is at least as strong, at least as fresh, and valid at least as long. Ties on all four still go to the later delivery. For the reviewer's consequence (a), a permissionless `reindex` points the index at a recorded answer under the same rule, strict on ties, so a valid answer is never left dark behind an expired one. An `Indexed` event marks every move. The proof passes.\n- **7b194c37 (price ceiling): fixed.** Added `askAtMost(body, maxPrice)`, which reverts above the ceiling. The plain `ask` keeps its specified behaviour. The bot client now calls the capped version with its quoted price.\n- **8f2c2abc (Pending forever): fixed.** Added a terminal `Lost` status and `markLost`, callable by anyone once Intake's own record says the request is completed. I confirmed the live Intake's verified ABI returns that record in the shape the project's interface declares, and read a real mainnet ask back as completed. No age-based deadline, for reasons stated in ADAPTATION.md.\n- **4b501391 (NatSpec on questionHash): fixed in docs.** The key covers question, resolved window and definitions, so relative-window asks never share one.\n- **Three earlier audit findings** remain fixed and their proofs pass. The informational one is answered as not reproducible with the documented trust assumptions.\n\n**Verification**\n\n| Check | Result |\n|---|---|\n| `forge test` with the verifier's fuzz seed | 89 passed, 0 failed |\n| `forge test` with default seed | 89 passed, 0 failed |\n| Four proofs under test/scratch | all pass |\n| Callback gas, bytes32 answer | 148,282 (under the 150k assertion and 200k stipend) |\n| Runtime size | 10,226 bytes |\n\n**Path violation from the rejected attempt**: forge's output under contracts/out, cache and broadcast is deleted from disk and nothing under those paths is tracked. Responses for all eight findings are in `.imd-responses.json`, and ADAPTATION.md sections 6 to 9 list each change with its reason.","treeHash":"8665273113e0d8467ed2c3d2a291181106cd832c","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2572628,"inputTokens":578,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":61845,"runtime":"claude","turns":60,"wallClockMs":1092898}}],"verification":[{"checks":[],"detail":"the tree tracks forge build output (contracts/cache/solidity-files-cache.json, contracts/out/AskSwarmRegistry.sol/AskSwarmRegistry.json, contracts/out/AskSwarmRegistry.t.sol/AskSwarmRegistryTest.json, contracts/out/AskSwarmRegistry.t.sol/Harness.json, contracts/out/AskSwarmRegistry.t.sol/IERC20Like.json and 26 more). Contracts are compiled here from their source, and a tree may not carry what forge would read in its place: remove these files from the commit and leave forge's output untracked.","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"rejected","submissionHash":"14ee3c54e24911c77b0ad8022b7d029fd8878a11a86e2a4c0af2bb687b7ba202","verifiedTreeHash":"f581b4f4d6dc63cf0415075f4eddf2ebe7b8c1a4","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+c3fba9eb"},{"checks":[],"detail":"the tree tracks forge build output (contracts/cache/solidity-files-cache.json, contracts/out/AskSwarmRegistry.sol/AskSwarmRegistry.json, contracts/out/AskSwarmRegistry.t.sol/AskSwarmRegistryTest.json, contracts/out/AskSwarmRegistry.t.sol/Harness.json, contracts/out/AskSwarmRegistry.t.sol/IERC20Like.json and 30 more). Contracts are compiled here from their source, and a tree may not carry what forge would read in its place: remove these files from the commit and leave forge's output untracked.","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"rejected","submissionHash":"51f90f86cb3c3724c91f0ae6977cfdc004ac5d683b423deb3943692038642d26","verifiedTreeHash":"e76ac037ca2aba27714174a0641b55b5da03842b","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+c3fba9eb"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":22672,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 30 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 22.59s\nCompiler run successful with warnings:\nWarning (2018): Function state mutability can be restricted to view\n   --> test/AskSwarmRegistry.t.sol:542:5:\n    |\n542 |     function _delivered() internal returns (bool d) {\n    |     ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":13547,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 4 tests for test/OracleConsumerConformance.t.sol:OracleConsumerConformanceTest\n[PASS] test_acceptsAFreshSignatureFromTheVectorKey() (gas: 414429)\n[PASS] test_acceptsTheProtocolSignatureAsDelivered() (gas: 426872)\n[PASS] test_callbackSelectorIsCanonical() (gas: 691)\n[PASS] test_digestMatchesTheProtocol() (gas: 10377)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 129.75ms (1.10ms CPU time)\n\nRan 26 tests for test/AskSwarmRegistryCallbacks.t.sol:AskSwarmRegistryCallbacksTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_longAnswerHashAndEventPreserveEveryByte(uint16,bytes32) (runs: 1000, μ: 824731, ~: 670815)\n[PASS] testFuzz_non65ByteSignaturesNeverVerify(uint16,bytes32) (runs: 1000, μ: 503408, ~: 491415)\n[PASS] testFuzz_shortAnswerRoundTripsIncludingZeros(bytes32,uint8) (runs: 1000, μ: 514989, ~: 521152)\n[PASS] testFuzz_verifiedRequiresIssuedAtWithinTolerance(uint32,uint32) (runs: 1000, μ: 504322, ~: 515241)\n[PASS] test_bothFailureStatusesPreserveFeeAndEmitReasonAndCounts() (gas: 1038352)\n[PASS] test_bothHooksRefuseEverySettledStatus() (gas: 2310816)\n[PASS] test_bothPanelSizeAndAgreementMustBeAtLeastAsStrong() (gas: 1879254)\n[PASS] test_eachOfTheFifteenFieldsIsBoundByTheSignature() (gas: 5581510)\n[PASS] test_falseIsAVerifiedAnswerAndNotAFailure() (gas: 502263)\n[PASS] test_firstByteOverCapIsUnverifiedAndDoesNotDisplaceHeldAnswer() (gas: 798549)\n[PASS] test_intakeAndOracleRequestIdsMayDiffer() (gas: 521883)\n[PASS] test_invalidVAndZeroRecoveryAreRejected() (gas: 2236818)\n[PASS] test_issuedAtToleranceBoundary() (gas: 1276870)\n[PASS] test_maximumAcceptedAnswerFitsColdCallbackStipend() (gas: 1150305)\n[PASS] test_nonzeroAbiPaddingCannotLeakIntoShortAnswer() (gas: 507375)\n[PASS] test_recordsWithoutAStoredAnswerReportZeroAnswerHash() (gas: 1854973)\n[PASS] test_registeredCallbackWithForeignRequestIdCannotCreateAnAsk() (gas: 93158)\n[PASS] test_settledAskIsNotRewrittenByAnotherRequestsCompletion() (gas: 1115937)\n[PASS] test_signatureForAnotherConsumerIsNotReusable() (gas: 499858)\n[PASS] test_thirdPartyCannotCompleteOrCallEitherHook() (gas: 448206)\n[PASS] test_timeAndMinimumFiltersDoNotDeleteHistoricalRecord() (gas: 601997)\n[PASS] test_transportWillNotRetrySuccessOrFailure() (gas: 865030)\n[PASS] test_unknownReadsDoNotLookAnswered() (gas: 48078)\n[PASS] test_weakerMajorityCanReplaceOnlyAfterHeldAnswerExpires() (gas: 1211164)\n[PASS] test_wrongDomainChainNameAndVersionAreRejected() (gas: 1163883)\n[PASS] test_wrongSignerCannotReplaceHeldAnswer() (gas: 850142)\nSuite result: ok. 26 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 129.84ms (506.63ms CPU time)\n\nRan 19 tests for test/AskSwarmRegistryPayments.t.sol:AskSwarmRegistryPaymentsTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_badTokenReturnRollsBackBothPaymentLegs(uint8,bool) (runs: 1000, μ: 210375, ~: 210370)\n[PASS] testFuzz_exactPriceIsForwardedAndBodyIsUnchanged(uint128,bytes) (runs: 1000, μ: 568601, ~: 574051)\n[PASS] test_askDoesNotSpendPreexistingDonation() (gas: 399189)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsEveryZeroDependency() (gas: 7544)\n[PASS] test_donationCannotSubsidizeAnUnfundedAsk() (gas: 154553)\n[PASS] test_fullCallerBalanceAndMaximumBody() (gas: 2954356)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceRollsBackConsumedAllowance() (gas: 192767)\n[PASS] test_intakeBodyBoundsRollBackThePayment() (gas: 434055)\n[PASS] test_noApprovalAndOneWeiShortApprovalBothRevert() (gas: 322581)\n[PASS] test_noReturnTokenIsSupportedOnTransferAndApproval() (gas: 394404)\n[PASS] test_notSoldDoesNotChargeOrRegister() (gas: 143166)\n[PASS] test_oneWeiPrice() (gas: 384389)\n[PASS] test_plainEthAndPayableAskAreRejectedWithoutTakingFunds() (gas: 145250)\n[PASS] test_priceChangesAreReadOnEveryAsk() (gas: 561397)\n[PASS] test_priceIncreaseBeyondApprovalCannotChargeOldQuote() (gas: 186939)\n[PASS] test_priceLookupFailureDoesNotChargeOrRegister() (gas: 163029)\n[PASS] test_rejectionAfterIntakePullRollsBackRecipientPayment() (gas: 342856)\n[PASS] test_rejectionBeforeIntakePullRollsBackCallerPayment() (gas: 227414)\n[PASS] test_tokenRejectsOnlyIntakePullAndEntireAskRollsBack() (gas: 316876)\nSuite result: ok. 19 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 130.05ms (210.41ms CPU time)\n\nRan 20 tests for test/AskSwarmRegistry.t.sol:AskSwarmRegistryTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_indexedAnswersAreMajorities(uint16,uint16,uint16,uint32,uint32,uint32) (runs: 256, μ: 428565, ~: 425480)\n[PASS] test_answerDeliveredWithinStipendAndVerified() (gas: 476609)\n[PASS] test_askPullsPriceAndRegisters() (gas: 289598)\n[PASS] test_badSignatureStoredUnverifiedAndNotIndexed() (gas: 433300)\n[PASS] test_callbackGasMargin() (gas: 726338)\nLogs:\n  onOracleResult gas, bytes32 answer: 146342\n  onOracleResult gas, 352-byte answer: 133966\n\n[PASS] test_constructorMakesNoCallsAndAskLeavesNoAllowance() (gas: 2207284)\n[PASS] test_digestMatchesPlaneSignature() (gas: 14996)\n[PASS] test_domainIsTheCallbackContract() (gas: 397743)\n[PASS] test_expiredAtDeliveryAndAnswerBoundaries() (gas: 2939509)\n[PASS] test_expiryBoundaryAtDelivery() (gas: 447180)\n[PASS] test_failureHookStatusesAndUnknownIds() (gas: 383895)\n[PASS] test_failureRecorded() (gas: 316574)\n[PASS] test_largeAnswerStillWithinStipend() (gas: 512764)\n[PASS] test_minorityAnswerNotIndexedEvenWhenNothingHeld() (gas: 777277)\n[PASS] test_minorityOfLargePanelCannotDisplaceSupermajority() (gas: 1151191)\n[PASS] test_onlyIntakeCanDeliver() (gas: 301646)\n[PASS] test_quorumAndExpiryGateVerified() (gas: 392872)\n[PASS] test_settledAskRefusesRedeliveryThroughAnotherOpenAsk() (gas: 787036)\n[PASS] test_signatureEdges() (gas: 1281748)\n[PASS] test_weakPanelCannotOverwriteStrongAnswer() (gas: 1123940)\nSuite result: ok. 20 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 131.49ms (69.40ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/AskSwarmRegistryInvariant.t.sol:AskSwarmRegistryInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nAskSwarmRegistryInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_paymentsAreConservedAndNoFeeIsRetained\n[PASS] invariant_requestsAndCanonicalAnswersStayConsistent\n AskSwarmRegistryInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 24576, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract                | Selector                        | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+========================================================================================+\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | advanceTime                     | 2703  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | answer                          | 2806  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | ask                             | 2686  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | donate                          | 2713  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | failingAsk                      | 2758  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | refuse                          | 2699  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | replaySettledThroughOpenRequest | 2689  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | retryCompletedRequest           | 2796  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | unauthorizedCallback            | 2726  | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 13.43s (13.42s CPU time)\n\nRan 5 test suites in 13.43s (13.95s CPU time): 70 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (70 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":131,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"AskSwarmRegistry.ask(bytes)\",\"AskSwarmRegistry.onFailure(bytes32,uint8,bytes32,uint16,uint16,bytes)\",\"AskSwarmRegistry.onOracleResult(bytes32,(bytes32,uint256,bytes32,uint8,bytes,uint256,uint64,uint64,bytes32,bytes32,uint16,uint16,uint16,uint64,uint64),bytes)\"],\"files\":{\".DS_Store\":4,\".env.example\":12,\".gitignore\":9,\"ADAPTATION.md\":116,\"README.md\":243,\"api/cpay-webhook.mjs\":1,\"api/imd.mjs\":1,\"api/telegram.mjs\":1,\"bun.lock\":458,\"contracts/ADAPTATION.md\":98,\"contracts/LAUNCH.md\":7,\"contracts/launch.json\":14,\"docs/EVIDENCE.md\":15,\"docs/SUBMISSION.md\":45,\"docs/askswarm.png\":1383,\"docs/brand/.gitignore\":1,\"docs/brand/Battlefin-Black.otf\":864,\"docs/brand/NB_International_Bold_Webfont.ttf\":2797,\"docs/brand/NB_International_Mono_Webfont.ttf\":2749,\"docs/brand/NB_International_Regular_Webfont.ttf\":2728,\"docs/brand/ai.svg\":6,\"docs/brand/data.svg\":5,\"docs/brand/hand.svg\":3,\"docs/brand/infographic.html\":121,\"docs/brand/lock.svg\":3,\"docs/brand/logo-symbol-light.svg\":4,\"docs/brand/logo-symbol.svg\":4,\"docs/brand/logo-wordmark-dark.svg\":12,\"docs/brand/logo-wordmark-light.svg\":12,\"docs/brand/message.svg\":3,\"docs/brand/miniapp.html\":22,\"docs/brand/star5.svg\":3,\"docs/logo-1024.png\":292,\"docs/logo-512.png\":122,\"docs/logo.svg\":7,\"docs/miniapp-640x360.png\":161,\"foundry.toml\":16,\"functions/cpay-webhook.ts\":28,\"functions/imd.ts\":58,\"functions/telegram.ts\":24,\"launch.json\":14,\"lib/answers.json\":1,\"lib/bot.ts\":268,\"lib/quick.ts\":21,\"lib/recall.ts\":21,\"lib/risk-model.json\":1,\"lib/risk.ts\":56,\"package.json\":31,\"packages/cpay/src/index.ts\":481,\"packages/imd/src/index.ts\":235,\"packages/imd/src/intake.ts\":133,\"public/ai.svg\":6,\"public/apple-touch-icon.png\":53,\"public/data.svg\":5,\"public/favicon-32.png\":8,\"public/favicon.svg\":7,\"public/fonts/Battlefin-Black.otf\":864,\"public/fonts/NB_International_Bold_Webfont.ttf\":2797,\"public/fonts/NB_International_Mono_Webfont.ttf\":2749,\"public/fonts/NB_International_Regular_Webfont.ttf\":2728,\"public/imd.html\":107,\"public/index.html\":172,\"public/lock.svg\":3,\"public/logo-wordmark-dark.svg\":12,\"public/logo.svg\":7,\"public/message.svg\":3,\"public/og.png\":1364,\"public/pay.html\":40,\"public/star5.svg\":3,\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":23,\"scripts/approve-permit2.ts\":25,\"scripts/balance.ts\":6,\"scripts/build-answers.ts\":24,\"scripts/dry-run.ts\":13,\"scripts/evidence.ts\":45,\"scripts/launch.ts\":65,\"scripts/spike-sepolia.ts\":50,\"scripts/spike.ts\":58,\"scripts/train-risk.ts\":41,\"scripts/vercel-env.sh\":13,\"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol\":401,\"src/IIntake.sol\":55,\"test/AskSwarmRegistry.t.sol\":572,\"test/AskSwarmRegistryCallbacks.t.sol\":610,\"test/AskSwarmRegistryInvariant.t.sol\":424,\"test/AskSwarmRegistryPayments.t.sol\":261,\"test/OracleConsumerConformance.t.sol\":104,\"test/TESTING.md\":51,\"test/helpers/RegistryTestSupport.sol\":283,\"test/mocks/IntakeMocks.sol\":100,\"tsconfig.json\":8,\"vercel.json\":5},\"excluded\":[\"contracts/lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"a71ca1f0bbe689d40a0ca615acc84e517c77e9f135b37f78f96407e24e03f44e","verifiedTreeHash":"d11c2ddbb097eaf676238a98bf9185ab6b41a327","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+c3fba9eb"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":57680,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 31 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 57.51s\nCompiler run successful with warnings:\nWarning (2018): Function state mutability can be restricted to view\n   --> test/AskSwarmRegistry.t.sol:613:5:\n    |\n613 |     function _delivered() internal returns (bool d) {\n    |     ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":23488,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 4 tests for test/OracleConsumerConformance.t.sol:OracleConsumerConformanceTest\n[PASS] test_acceptsAFreshSignatureFromTheVectorKey() (gas: 416566)\n[PASS] test_acceptsTheProtocolSignatureAsDelivered() (gas: 429075)\n[PASS] test_callbackSelectorIsCanonical() (gas: 691)\n[PASS] test_digestMatchesTheProtocol() (gas: 10377)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 6.80ms (2.85ms CPU time)\n\nRan 11 tests for test/AskSwarmRegistryReview.t.sol:AskSwarmRegistryReviewTest\n[PASS] test_askAtMostRefusesAPriceAboveTheCeiling() (gas: 764549)\n[PASS] test_askWithoutCeilingStillPaysTheLivePrice() (gas: 363602)\n[PASS] test_deliveryEmitsIndexedOnlyWhenTheIndexMoves() (gas: 831136)\n[PASS] test_markLostAfterAFailureCompletionWithEmptyArguments() (gas: 413455)\n[PASS] test_markLostSettlesAnAskIntakeCompletedWithoutDelivering() (gas: 1024141)\n[PASS] test_reindexFallsBackToAValidAnswerAfterTheHeldOneExpires() (gas: 1047052)\n[PASS] test_reindexRefusesEveryIneligibleRecord() (gas: 2185211)\n[PASS] test_reindexReplacesAFallbackOnlyByStrictDominance() (gas: 1703927)\n[PASS] test_shortLivedEqualAnswerCannotCutHeldValidityShort() (gas: 1618364)\n[PASS] test_staleOrShorterLivedEqualAnswerDoesNotDisplaceOnDelivery() (gas: 3309315)\n[PASS] test_statusCodesAreAppendedNotRenumbered() (gas: 580)\nSuite result: ok. 11 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 229.86ms (26.27ms CPU time)\n\nRan 23 tests for test/AskSwarmRegistry.t.sol:AskSwarmRegistryTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_indexedAnswersAreMajorities(uint16,uint16,uint16,uint32,uint32,uint32) (runs: 256, μ: 429722, ~: 425862)\n[PASS] test_answerDeliveredWithinStipendAndVerified() (gas: 480527)\n[PASS] test_askAtMostAgainstTheQuotedPrice() (gas: 307456)\n[PASS] test_askPullsPriceAndRegisters() (gas: 289885)\n[PASS] test_badSignatureStoredUnverifiedAndNotIndexed() (gas: 433697)\n[PASS] test_callbackGasMargin() (gas: 730555)\nLogs:\n  onOracleResult gas, bytes32 answer: 148282\n  onOracleResult gas, 352-byte answer: 135951\n\n[PASS] test_constructorMakesNoCallsAndAskLeavesNoAllowance() (gas: 2566003)\n[PASS] test_digestMatchesPlaneSignature() (gas: 15161)\n[PASS] test_domainIsTheCallbackContract() (gas: 398151)\n[PASS] test_expiredAtDeliveryAndAnswerBoundaries() (gas: 2957963)\n[PASS] test_expiryBoundaryAtDelivery() (gas: 449389)\n[PASS] test_failureHookStatusesAndUnknownIds() (gas: 384242)\n[PASS] test_failureRecorded() (gas: 316821)\n[PASS] test_indexRespectsValidityWindowAndReindexRecovers() (gas: 1493990)\n[PASS] test_largeAnswerStillWithinStipend() (gas: 516572)\n[PASS] test_markLostReadsIntakeCompletionRecord() (gas: 801557)\n[PASS] test_minorityAnswerNotIndexedEvenWhenNothingHeld() (gas: 779775)\n[PASS] test_minorityOfLargePanelCannotDisplaceSupermajority() (gas: 1155889)\n[PASS] test_onlyIntakeCanDeliver() (gas: 301915)\n[PASS] test_quorumAndExpiryGateVerified() (gas: 393137)\n[PASS] test_settledAskRefusesRedeliveryThroughAnotherOpenAsk() (gas: 789628)\n[PASS] test_signatureEdges() (gas: 1310064)\n[PASS] test_weakPanelCannotOverwriteStrongAnswer() (gas: 1129046)\nSuite result: ok. 23 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 283.32ms (306.72ms CPU time)\n\nRan 19 tests for test/AskSwarmRegistryPayments.t.sol:AskSwarmRegistryPaymentsTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_badTokenReturnRollsBackBothPaymentLegs(uint8,bool) (runs: 1000, μ: 210324, ~: 210327)\n[PASS] testFuzz_exactPriceIsForwardedAndBodyIsUnchanged(uint128,bytes) (runs: 1000, μ: 568722, ~: 574310)\n[PASS] test_askDoesNotSpendPreexistingDonation() (gas: 399320)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsEveryZeroDependency() (gas: 7544)\n[PASS] test_donationCannotSubsidizeAnUnfundedAsk() (gas: 154696)\n[PASS] test_fullCallerBalanceAndMaximumBody() (gas: 2954509)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceRollsBackConsumedAllowance() (gas: 192998)\n[PASS] test_intakeBodyBoundsRollBackThePayment() (gas: 434697)\n[PASS] test_noApprovalAndOneWeiShortApprovalBothRevert() (gas: 323043)\n[PASS] test_noReturnTokenIsSupportedOnTransferAndApproval() (gas: 394401)\n[PASS] test_notSoldDoesNotChargeOrRegister() (gas: 143386)\n[PASS] test_oneWeiPrice() (gas: 384542)\n[PASS] test_plainEthAndPayableAskAreRejectedWithoutTakingFunds() (gas: 145470)\n[PASS] test_priceChangesAreReadOnEveryAsk() (gas: 561725)\n[PASS] test_priceIncreaseBeyondApprovalCannotChargeOldQuote() (gas: 187170)\n[PASS] test_priceLookupFailureDoesNotChargeOrRegister() (gas: 163271)\n[PASS] test_rejectionAfterIntakePullRollsBackRecipientPayment() (gas: 343199)\n[PASS] test_rejectionBeforeIntakePullRollsBackCallerPayment() (gas: 227757)\n[PASS] test_tokenRejectsOnlyIntakePullAndEntireAskRollsBack() (gas: 317064)\nSuite result: ok. 19 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 283.38ms (398.03ms CPU time)\n\nRan 26 tests for test/AskSwarmRegistryCallbacks.t.sol:AskSwarmRegistryCallbacksTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_longAnswerHashAndEventPreserveEveryByte(uint16,bytes32) (runs: 1000, μ: 811418, ~: 655144)\n[PASS] testFuzz_non65ByteSignaturesNeverVerify(uint16,bytes32) (runs: 1000, μ: 504480, ~: 491743)\n[PASS] testFuzz_shortAnswerRoundTripsIncludingZeros(bytes32,uint8) (runs: 1000, μ: 517342, ~: 523377)\n[PASS] testFuzz_verifiedRequiresIssuedAtWithinTolerance(uint32,uint32) (runs: 1000, μ: 505877, ~: 517466)\n[PASS] test_bothFailureStatusesPreserveFeeAndEmitReasonAndCounts() (gas: 1041103)\n[PASS] test_bothHooksRefuseEverySettledStatus() (gas: 2315241)\n[PASS] test_bothPanelSizeAndAgreementMustBeAtLeastAsStrong() (gas: 1886869)\n[PASS] test_eachOfTheFifteenFieldsIsBoundByTheSignature() (gas: 5586715)\n[PASS] test_falseIsAVerifiedAnswerAndNotAFailure() (gas: 504554)\n[PASS] test_firstByteOverCapIsUnverifiedAndDoesNotDisplaceHeldAnswer() (gas: 800971)\n[PASS] test_intakeAndOracleRequestIdsMayDiffer() (gas: 524108)\n[PASS] test_invalidVAndZeroRecoveryAreRejected() (gas: 2238504)\n[PASS] test_issuedAtToleranceBoundary() (gas: 1279965)\n[PASS] test_maximumAcceptedAnswerFitsColdCallbackStipend() (gas: 1152530)\n[PASS] test_nonzeroAbiPaddingCannotLeakIntoShortAnswer() (gas: 509578)\n[PASS] test_recordsWithoutAStoredAnswerReportZeroAnswerHash() (gas: 1858663)\n[PASS] test_registeredCallbackWithForeignRequestIdCannotCreateAnAsk() (gas: 93390)\n[PASS] test_settledAskIsNotRewrittenByAnotherRequestsCompletion() (gas: 1119030)\n[PASS] test_signatureForAnotherConsumerIsNotReusable() (gas: 500205)\n[PASS] test_thirdPartyCannotCompleteOrCallEitherHook() (gas: 448513)\n[PASS] test_timeAndMinimumFiltersDoNotDeleteHistoricalRecord() (gas: 604618)\n[PASS] test_transportWillNotRetrySuccessOrFailure() (gas: 867496)\n[PASS] test_unknownReadsDoNotLookAnswered() (gas: 48342)\n[PASS] test_weakerMajorityCanReplaceOnlyAfterHeldAnswerExpires() (gas: 1216157)\n[PASS] test_wrongDomainChainNameAndVersionAreRejected() (gas: 1164726)\n[PASS] test_wrongSignerCannotReplaceHeldAnswer() (gas: 852582)\nSuite result: ok. 26 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 283.39ms (999.09ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/AskSwarmRegistryInvariant.t.sol:AskSwarmRegistryInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nAskSwarmRegistryInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_paymentsAreConservedAndNoFeeIsRetained\n[PASS] invariant_requestsAndCanonicalAnswersStayConsistent\n AskSwarmRegistryInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 24576, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract                | Selector                        | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+========================================================================================+\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | advanceTime                     | 2259  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | answer                          | 2193  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | ask                             | 2259  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | donate                          | 2236  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | failingAsk                      | 2181  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | markLost                        | 2327  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | refuse                          | 2172  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | reindex                         | 2301  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | replaySettledThroughOpenRequest | 2120  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | retryCompletedRequest           | 2259  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | unauthorizedCallback            | 2269  | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 23.31s (23.30s CPU time)\n\nRan 6 test suites in 23.31s (24.39s CPU time): 84 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (84 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":172,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"AskSwarmRegistry.ask(bytes)\",\"AskSwarmRegistry.askAtMost(bytes,uint256)\",\"AskSwarmRegistry.markLost(bytes32)\",\"AskSwarmRegistry.onFailure(bytes32,uint8,bytes32,uint16,uint16,bytes)\",\"AskSwarmRegistry.onOracleResult(bytes32,(bytes32,uint256,bytes32,uint8,bytes,uint256,uint64,uint64,bytes32,bytes32,uint16,uint16,uint16,uint64,uint64),bytes)\",\"AskSwarmRegistry.reindex(bytes32)\"],\"files\":{\".DS_Store\":4,\".env.example\":12,\".gitignore\":9,\"ADAPTATION.md\":211,\"README.md\":251,\"api/cpay-webhook.mjs\":1,\"api/imd.mjs\":1,\"api/telegram.mjs\":1,\"bun.lock\":458,\"contracts/ADAPTATION.md\":98,\"contracts/LAUNCH.md\":7,\"contracts/launch.json\":14,\"docs/EVIDENCE.md\":15,\"docs/SUBMISSION.md\":45,\"docs/askswarm.png\":1383,\"docs/brand/.gitignore\":1,\"docs/brand/Battlefin-Black.otf\":864,\"docs/brand/NB_International_Bold_Webfont.ttf\":2797,\"docs/brand/NB_International_Mono_Webfont.ttf\":2749,\"docs/brand/NB_International_Regular_Webfont.ttf\":2728,\"docs/brand/ai.svg\":6,\"docs/brand/data.svg\":5,\"docs/brand/hand.svg\":3,\"docs/brand/infographic.html\":121,\"docs/brand/lock.svg\":3,\"docs/brand/logo-symbol-light.svg\":4,\"docs/brand/logo-symbol.svg\":4,\"docs/brand/logo-wordmark-dark.svg\":12,\"docs/brand/logo-wordmark-light.svg\":12,\"docs/brand/message.svg\":3,\"docs/brand/miniapp.html\":22,\"docs/brand/star5.svg\":3,\"docs/logo-1024.png\":292,\"docs/logo-512.png\":122,\"docs/logo.svg\":7,\"docs/miniapp-640x360.png\":161,\"foundry.toml\":16,\"functions/cpay-webhook.ts\":28,\"functions/imd.ts\":58,\"functions/telegram.ts\":24,\"launch.json\":14,\"lib/answers.json\":1,\"lib/bot.ts\":268,\"lib/quick.ts\":21,\"lib/recall.ts\":21,\"lib/risk-model.json\":1,\"lib/risk.ts\":56,\"package.json\":31,\"packages/cpay/src/index.ts\":481,\"packages/imd/src/index.ts\":235,\"packages/imd/src/intake.ts\":136,\"public/ai.svg\":6,\"public/apple-touch-icon.png\":53,\"public/data.svg\":5,\"public/favicon-32.png\":8,\"public/favicon.svg\":7,\"public/fonts/Battlefin-Black.otf\":864,\"public/fonts/NB_International_Bold_Webfont.ttf\":2797,\"public/fonts/NB_International_Mono_Webfont.ttf\":2749,\"public/fonts/NB_International_Regular_Webfont.ttf\":2728,\"public/imd.html\":107,\"public/index.html\":172,\"public/lock.svg\":3,\"public/logo-wordmark-dark.svg\":12,\"public/logo.svg\":7,\"public/message.svg\":3,\"public/og.png\":1364,\"public/pay.html\":40,\"public/star5.svg\":3,\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":23,\"scripts/approve-permit2.ts\":25,\"scripts/balance.ts\":6,\"scripts/build-answers.ts\":24,\"scripts/dry-run.ts\":13,\"scripts/evidence.ts\":45,\"scripts/launch.ts\":65,\"scripts/spike-sepolia.ts\":50,\"scripts/spike.ts\":58,\"scripts/train-risk.ts\":41,\"scripts/vercel-env.sh\":13,\"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol\":493,\"src/IIntake.sol\":55,\"test/AskSwarmRegistry.t.sol\":643,\"test/AskSwarmRegistryCallbacks.t.sol\":610,\"test/AskSwarmRegistryInvariant.t.sol\":488,\"test/AskSwarmRegistryPayments.t.sol\":261,\"test/AskSwarmRegistryReview.t.sol\":319,\"test/OracleConsumerConformance.t.sol\":104,\"test/TESTING.md\":59,\"test/helpers/RegistryTestSupport.sol\":289,\"test/mocks/IntakeMocks.sol\":100,\"tsconfig.json\":8,\"vercel.json\":5},\"excluded\":[\"contracts/lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"acfc1e5eb9f9fc86051229024e98f76e19e7533b2c26e9dc3774b3ff31622ad1","verifiedTreeHash":"1ba59c91734bd6fbdd1529e99cd67c1b72caaf70","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+c3fba9eb"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":41011,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 33 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 40.91s\nCompiler run successful with warnings:\nWarning (2018): Function state mutability can be restricted to view\n   --> test/AskSwarmRegistry.t.sol:613:5:\n    |\n613 |     function _delivered() internal returns (bool d) {\n    |     ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":14388,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 4 tests for test/OracleConsumerConformance.t.sol:OracleConsumerConformanceTest\n[PASS] test_acceptsAFreshSignatureFromTheVectorKey() (gas: 416566)\n[PASS] test_acceptsTheProtocolSignatureAsDelivered() (gas: 429075)\n[PASS] test_callbackSelectorIsCanonical() (gas: 691)\n[PASS] test_digestMatchesTheProtocol() (gas: 10377)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 133.47ms (1.78ms CPU time)\n\nRan 19 tests for test/AskSwarmRegistryPayments.t.sol:AskSwarmRegistryPaymentsTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_badTokenReturnRollsBackBothPaymentLegs(uint8,bool) (runs: 1000, μ: 210325, ~: 210327)\n[PASS] testFuzz_exactPriceIsForwardedAndBodyIsUnchanged(uint128,bytes) (runs: 1000, μ: 568901, ~: 574322)\n[PASS] test_askDoesNotSpendPreexistingDonation() (gas: 399320)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsEveryZeroDependency() (gas: 7544)\n[PASS] test_donationCannotSubsidizeAnUnfundedAsk() (gas: 154696)\n[PASS] test_fullCallerBalanceAndMaximumBody() (gas: 2954509)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceRollsBackConsumedAllowance() (gas: 192998)\n[PASS] test_intakeBodyBoundsRollBackThePayment() (gas: 434697)\n[PASS] test_noApprovalAndOneWeiShortApprovalBothRevert() (gas: 323043)\n[PASS] test_noReturnTokenIsSupportedOnTransferAndApproval() (gas: 394401)\n[PASS] test_notSoldDoesNotChargeOrRegister() (gas: 143386)\n[PASS] test_oneWeiPrice() (gas: 384542)\n[PASS] test_plainEthAndPayableAskAreRejectedWithoutTakingFunds() (gas: 145470)\n[PASS] test_priceChangesAreReadOnEveryAsk() (gas: 561725)\n[PASS] test_priceIncreaseBeyondApprovalCannotChargeOldQuote() (gas: 187170)\n[PASS] test_priceLookupFailureDoesNotChargeOrRegister() (gas: 163271)\n[PASS] test_rejectionAfterIntakePullRollsBackRecipientPayment() (gas: 343199)\n[PASS] test_rejectionBeforeIntakePullRollsBackCallerPayment() (gas: 227757)\n[PASS] test_tokenRejectsOnlyIntakePullAndEntireAskRollsBack() (gas: 317064)\nSuite result: ok. 19 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 134.31ms (239.88ms CPU time)\n\nRan 11 tests for test/AskSwarmRegistryReview.t.sol:AskSwarmRegistryReviewTest\n[PASS] test_askAtMostRefusesAPriceAboveTheCeiling() (gas: 764549)\n[PASS] test_askWithoutCeilingStillPaysTheLivePrice() (gas: 363602)\n[PASS] test_deliveryEmitsIndexedOnlyWhenTheIndexMoves() (gas: 831136)\n[PASS] test_markLostAfterAFailureCompletionWithEmptyArguments() (gas: 413455)\n[PASS] test_markLostSettlesAnAskIntakeCompletedWithoutDelivering() (gas: 1024141)\n[PASS] test_reindexFallsBackToAValidAnswerAfterTheHeldOneExpires() (gas: 1047052)\n[PASS] test_reindexRefusesEveryIneligibleRecord() (gas: 2185211)\n[PASS] test_reindexReplacesAFallbackOnlyByStrictDominance() (gas: 1703927)\n[PASS] test_shortLivedEqualAnswerCannotCutHeldValidityShort() (gas: 1618364)\n[PASS] test_staleOrShorterLivedEqualAnswerDoesNotDisplaceOnDelivery() (gas: 3309315)\n[PASS] test_statusCodesAreAppendedNotRenumbered() (gas: 580)\nSuite result: ok. 11 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 134.76ms (12.72ms CPU time)\n\nRan 9 tests for test/AskSwarmRegistryAdversarial.t.sol:AskSwarmRegistryAdversarialTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_oversizedAnswersOfAnySizeSettleInsideStipend(uint24) (runs: 300, μ: 995612, ~: 944598)\n[PASS] testFuzz_readsOfUntouchedKeysAreEmpty(bytes32,uint16,uint16) (runs: 256, μ: 47590, ~: 47590)\n[PASS] testFuzz_unexpectedFailureStatusesSettleAsNoResult(uint8,bytes32,uint16) (runs: 512, μ: 839253, ~: 839429)\n[PASS] testFuzz_verifiedExactlyWhenEveryConditionHolds(uint16,uint16,uint16,uint32,uint32,uint8) (runs: 1000, μ: 500060, ~: 497939)\n[PASS] test_callbackGasAtTheStipendBoundary() (gas: 1848958)\nLogs:\n  onOracleResult gas, one-word answer, cold: 118568\n  onOracleResult gas, 4096-byte answer, cold: 156201\n\n[PASS] test_contractAskerIsRecordedNotTxOrigin() (gas: 639024)\n[PASS] test_highSTwinIsUnverifiedWhileZeroOneVAreNormalised() (gas: 857211)\n[PASS] test_identicalBodiesAreDistinctPaidAsks() (gas: 524043)\n[PASS] test_maximumAnswerDisplacingAHeldAnswerFitsColdStipend() (gas: 1592155)\nSuite result: ok. 9 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 147.49ms (385.03ms CPU time)\n\nRan 26 tests for test/AskSwarmRegistryCallbacks.t.sol:AskSwarmRegistryCallbacksTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_longAnswerHashAndEventPreserveEveryByte(uint16,bytes32) (runs: 1000, μ: 819176, ~: 662502)\n[PASS] testFuzz_non65ByteSignaturesNeverVerify(uint16,bytes32) (runs: 1000, μ: 504226, ~: 490807)\n[PASS] testFuzz_shortAnswerRoundTripsIncludingZeros(bytes32,uint8) (runs: 1000, μ: 517469, ~: 523377)\n[PASS] testFuzz_verifiedRequiresIssuedAtWithinTolerance(uint32,uint32) (runs: 1000, μ: 505745, ~: 517466)\n[PASS] test_bothFailureStatusesPreserveFeeAndEmitReasonAndCounts() (gas: 1041103)\n[PASS] test_bothHooksRefuseEverySettledStatus() (gas: 2315241)\n[PASS] test_bothPanelSizeAndAgreementMustBeAtLeastAsStrong() (gas: 1886869)\n[PASS] test_eachOfTheFifteenFieldsIsBoundByTheSignature() (gas: 5586715)\n[PASS] test_falseIsAVerifiedAnswerAndNotAFailure() (gas: 504554)\n[PASS] test_firstByteOverCapIsUnverifiedAndDoesNotDisplaceHeldAnswer() (gas: 800971)\n[PASS] test_intakeAndOracleRequestIdsMayDiffer() (gas: 524108)\n[PASS] test_invalidVAndZeroRecoveryAreRejected() (gas: 2238504)\n[PASS] test_issuedAtToleranceBoundary() (gas: 1279965)\n[PASS] test_maximumAcceptedAnswerFitsColdCallbackStipend() (gas: 1152530)\n[PASS] test_nonzeroAbiPaddingCannotLeakIntoShortAnswer() (gas: 509578)\n[PASS] test_recordsWithoutAStoredAnswerReportZeroAnswerHash() (gas: 1858663)\n[PASS] test_registeredCallbackWithForeignRequestIdCannotCreateAnAsk() (gas: 93390)\n[PASS] test_settledAskIsNotRewrittenByAnotherRequestsCompletion() (gas: 1119030)\n[PASS] test_signatureForAnotherConsumerIsNotReusable() (gas: 500205)\n[PASS] test_thirdPartyCannotCompleteOrCallEitherHook() (gas: 448513)\n[PASS] test_timeAndMinimumFiltersDoNotDeleteHistoricalRecord() (gas: 604618)\n[PASS] test_transportWillNotRetrySuccessOrFailure() (gas: 867496)\n[PASS] test_unknownReadsDoNotLookAnswered() (gas: 48342)\n[PASS] test_weakerMajorityCanReplaceOnlyAfterHeldAnswerExpires() (gas: 1216157)\n[PASS] test_wrongDomainChainNameAndVersionAreRejected() (gas: 1164726)\n[PASS] test_wrongSignerCannotReplaceHeldAnswer() (gas: 852582)\nSuite result: ok. 26 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 147.49ms (574.09ms CPU time)\n\nRan 23 tests for test/AskSwarmRegistry.t.sol:AskSwarmRegistryTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_indexedAnswersAreMajorities(uint16,uint16,uint16,uint32,uint32,uint32) (runs: 256, μ: 429830, ~: 425862)\n[PASS] test_answerDeliveredWithinStipendAndVerified() (gas: 480527)\n[PASS] test_askAtMostAgainstTheQuotedPrice() (gas: 307456)\n[PASS] test_askPullsPriceAndRegisters() (gas: 289885)\n[PASS] test_badSignatureStoredUnverifiedAndNotIndexed() (gas: 433697)\n[PASS] test_callbackGasMargin() (gas: 730555)\nLogs:\n  onOracleResult gas, bytes32 answer: 148282\n  onOracleResult gas, 352-byte answer: 135951\n\n[PASS] test_constructorMakesNoCallsAndAskLeavesNoAllowance() (gas: 2566003)\n[PASS] test_digestMatchesPlaneSignature() (gas: 15161)\n[PASS] test_domainIsTheCallbackContract() (gas: 398151)\n[PASS] test_expiredAtDeliveryAndAnswerBoundaries() (gas: 2957963)\n[PASS] test_expiryBoundaryAtDelivery() (gas: 449389)\n[PASS] test_failureHookStatusesAndUnknownIds() (gas: 384242)\n[PASS] test_failureRecorded() (gas: 316821)\n[PASS] test_indexRespectsValidityWindowAndReindexRecovers() (gas: 1493990)\n[PASS] test_largeAnswerStillWithinStipend() (gas: 516572)\n[PASS] test_markLostReadsIntakeCompletionRecord() (gas: 801557)\n[PASS] test_minorityAnswerNotIndexedEvenWhenNothingHeld() (gas: 779775)\n[PASS] test_minorityOfLargePanelCannotDisplaceSupermajority() (gas: 1155889)\n[PASS] test_onlyIntakeCanDeliver() (gas: 301915)\n[PASS] test_quorumAndExpiryGateVerified() (gas: 393137)\n[PASS] test_settledAskRefusesRedeliveryThroughAnotherOpenAsk() (gas: 789628)\n[PASS] test_signatureEdges() (gas: 1310064)\n[PASS] test_weakPanelCannotOverwriteStrongAnswer() (gas: 1129046)\nSuite result: ok. 23 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 147.54ms (90.67ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/AskSwarmRegistryIndexInvariant.t.sol:AskSwarmRegistryIndexInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nAskSwarmRegistryIndexInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_everyAskIsPendingOrSettledOnce\n[PASS] invariant_indexOnlyHoldsVerifiedMajoritiesOfTheirOwnQuestion\n[PASS] invariant_registryHoldsNothingAndForwardsEveryFee\n AskSwarmRegistryIndexInvariantTest invariants (runs: 192, calls: 12288, reverts: 0)\n\n╭------------------------+------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract               | Selector   | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+==================================================================+\n| IndexTransitionHandler | ask        | 1386  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------------+------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| IndexTransitionHandler | deliver    | 1296  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------------+------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| IndexTransitionHandler | directHook | 1368  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------------+------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| IndexTransitionHandler | fail       | 1380  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------------+------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| IndexTransitionHandler | markLost   | 1300  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------------+------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| IndexTransitionHandler | reindex    | 1442  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------------+------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| IndexTransitionHandler | replay     | 1384  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------------+------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| IndexTransitionHandler | strand     | 1342  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------------+------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| IndexTransitionHandler | warp       | 1390  | 0       | 0        |\n╰------------------------+------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\n[PASS] test_handlersReachLostAndReindexMoves() (gas: 1787105)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 8.27s (8.26s CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/AskSwarmRegistryInvariant.t.sol:AskSwarmRegistryInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nAskSwarmRegistryInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_paymentsAreConservedAndNoFeeIsRetained\n[PASS] invariant_requestsAndCanonicalAnswersStayConsistent\n AskSwarmRegistryInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 24576, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract                | Selector                        | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+========================================================================================+\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | advanceTime                     | 2259  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | answer                          | 2193  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | ask                             | 2259  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | donate                          | 2236  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | failingAsk                      | 2181  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | markLost                        | 2327  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | refuse                          | 2172  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | reindex                         | 2301  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | replaySettledThroughOpenRequest | 2120  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | retryCompletedRequest           | 2259  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | unauthorizedCallback            | 2269  | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 14.26s (14.26s CPU time)\n\nRan 8 test suites in 14.26s (23.37s CPU time): 95 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (95 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":107,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"AskSwarmRegistry.ask(bytes)\",\"AskSwarmRegistry.askAtMost(bytes,uint256)\",\"AskSwarmRegistry.markLost(bytes32)\",\"AskSwarmRegistry.onFailure(bytes32,uint8,bytes32,uint16,uint16,bytes)\",\"AskSwarmRegistry.onOracleResult(bytes32,(bytes32,uint256,bytes32,uint8,bytes,uint256,uint64,uint64,bytes32,bytes32,uint16,uint16,uint16,uint64,uint64),bytes)\",\"AskSwarmRegistry.reindex(bytes32)\"],\"files\":{\".DS_Store\":4,\".env.example\":12,\".gitignore\":9,\"ADAPTATION.md\":211,\"README.md\":251,\"api/cpay-webhook.mjs\":1,\"api/imd.mjs\":1,\"api/telegram.mjs\":1,\"bun.lock\":458,\"contracts/ADAPTATION.md\":98,\"contracts/LAUNCH.md\":7,\"contracts/launch.json\":14,\"docs/EVIDENCE.md\":15,\"docs/SUBMISSION.md\":45,\"docs/askswarm.png\":1383,\"docs/brand/.gitignore\":1,\"docs/brand/Battlefin-Black.otf\":864,\"docs/brand/NB_International_Bold_Webfont.ttf\":2797,\"docs/brand/NB_International_Mono_Webfont.ttf\":2749,\"docs/brand/NB_International_Regular_Webfont.ttf\":2728,\"docs/brand/ai.svg\":6,\"docs/brand/data.svg\":5,\"docs/brand/hand.svg\":3,\"docs/brand/infographic.html\":121,\"docs/brand/lock.svg\":3,\"docs/brand/logo-symbol-light.svg\":4,\"docs/brand/logo-symbol.svg\":4,\"docs/brand/logo-wordmark-dark.svg\":12,\"docs/brand/logo-wordmark-light.svg\":12,\"docs/brand/message.svg\":3,\"docs/brand/miniapp.html\":22,\"docs/brand/star5.svg\":3,\"docs/logo-1024.png\":292,\"docs/logo-512.png\":122,\"docs/logo.svg\":7,\"docs/miniapp-640x360.png\":161,\"foundry.toml\":16,\"functions/cpay-webhook.ts\":28,\"functions/imd.ts\":58,\"functions/telegram.ts\":24,\"lib/answers.json\":1,\"lib/bot.ts\":268,\"lib/quick.ts\":21,\"lib/recall.ts\":21,\"lib/risk-model.json\":1,\"lib/risk.ts\":56,\"package.json\":31,\"packages/cpay/src/index.ts\":481,\"packages/imd/src/index.ts\":235,\"packages/imd/src/intake.ts\":136,\"public/ai.svg\":6,\"public/apple-touch-icon.png\":53,\"public/data.svg\":5,\"public/favicon-32.png\":8,\"public/favicon.svg\":7,\"public/fonts/Battlefin-Black.otf\":864,\"public/fonts/NB_International_Bold_Webfont.ttf\":2797,\"public/fonts/NB_International_Mono_Webfont.ttf\":2749,\"public/fonts/NB_International_Regular_Webfont.ttf\":2728,\"public/imd.html\":107,\"public/index.html\":172,\"public/lock.svg\":3,\"public/logo-wordmark-dark.svg\":12,\"public/logo.svg\":7,\"public/message.svg\":3,\"public/og.png\":1364,\"public/pay.html\":40,\"public/star5.svg\":3,\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":23,\"scripts/approve-permit2.ts\":25,\"scripts/balance.ts\":6,\"scripts/build-answers.ts\":24,\"scripts/dry-run.ts\":13,\"scripts/evidence.ts\":45,\"scripts/launch.ts\":65,\"scripts/spike-sepolia.ts\":50,\"scripts/spike.ts\":58,\"scripts/train-risk.ts\":41,\"scripts/vercel-env.sh\":13,\"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol\":493,\"src/IIntake.sol\":55,\"test/AskSwarmRegistry.t.sol\":643,\"test/AskSwarmRegistryAdversarial.t.sol\":269,\"test/AskSwarmRegistryCallbacks.t.sol\":610,\"test/AskSwarmRegistryIndexInvariant.t.sol\":396,\"test/AskSwarmRegistryInvariant.t.sol\":488,\"test/AskSwarmRegistryPayments.t.sol\":261,\"test/AskSwarmRegistryReview.t.sol\":319,\"test/OracleConsumerConformance.t.sol\":104,\"test/TESTING.md\":83,\"test/helpers/RegistryTestSupport.sol\":289,\"test/mocks/IntakeMocks.sol\":100,\"tsconfig.json\":8,\"vercel.json\":5},\"excluded\":[\"contracts/lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"c1d0f9937cfae395d39e3e8536e8f19fc07331ab67e3cd2cfdf40495738b5f76","verifiedTreeHash":"b3965493d77c7c1033d8fbd82e7cabb5a8b339a0","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+c3fba9eb"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":23615,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 30 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 23.53s\nCompiler run successful with warnings:\nWarning (2018): Function state mutability can be restricted to view\n   --> test/AskSwarmRegistry.t.sol:542:5:\n    |\n542 |     function _delivered() internal returns (bool d) {\n    |     ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":13826,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 4 tests for test/OracleConsumerConformance.t.sol:OracleConsumerConformanceTest\n[PASS] test_acceptsAFreshSignatureFromTheVectorKey() (gas: 414429)\n[PASS] test_acceptsTheProtocolSignatureAsDelivered() (gas: 426872)\n[PASS] test_callbackSelectorIsCanonical() (gas: 691)\n[PASS] test_digestMatchesTheProtocol() (gas: 10377)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 100.69ms (2.04ms CPU time)\n\nRan 19 tests for test/AskSwarmRegistryPayments.t.sol:AskSwarmRegistryPaymentsTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_badTokenReturnRollsBackBothPaymentLegs(uint8,bool) (runs: 1000, μ: 210375, ~: 210370)\n[PASS] testFuzz_exactPriceIsForwardedAndBodyIsUnchanged(uint128,bytes) (runs: 1000, μ: 568601, ~: 574051)\n[PASS] test_askDoesNotSpendPreexistingDonation() (gas: 399189)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsEveryZeroDependency() (gas: 7544)\n[PASS] test_donationCannotSubsidizeAnUnfundedAsk() (gas: 154553)\n[PASS] test_fullCallerBalanceAndMaximumBody() (gas: 2954356)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceRollsBackConsumedAllowance() (gas: 192767)\n[PASS] test_intakeBodyBoundsRollBackThePayment() (gas: 434055)\n[PASS] test_noApprovalAndOneWeiShortApprovalBothRevert() (gas: 322581)\n[PASS] test_noReturnTokenIsSupportedOnTransferAndApproval() (gas: 394404)\n[PASS] test_notSoldDoesNotChargeOrRegister() (gas: 143166)\n[PASS] test_oneWeiPrice() (gas: 384389)\n[PASS] test_plainEthAndPayableAskAreRejectedWithoutTakingFunds() (gas: 145250)\n[PASS] test_priceChangesAreReadOnEveryAsk() (gas: 561397)\n[PASS] test_priceIncreaseBeyondApprovalCannotChargeOldQuote() (gas: 186939)\n[PASS] test_priceLookupFailureDoesNotChargeOrRegister() (gas: 163029)\n[PASS] test_rejectionAfterIntakePullRollsBackRecipientPayment() (gas: 342856)\n[PASS] test_rejectionBeforeIntakePullRollsBackCallerPayment() (gas: 227414)\n[PASS] test_tokenRejectsOnlyIntakePullAndEntireAskRollsBack() (gas: 316876)\nSuite result: ok. 19 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 111.82ms (213.37ms CPU time)\n\nRan 20 tests for test/AskSwarmRegistry.t.sol:AskSwarmRegistryTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_indexedAnswersAreMajorities(uint16,uint16,uint16,uint32,uint32,uint32) (runs: 256, μ: 428565, ~: 425480)\n[PASS] test_answerDeliveredWithinStipendAndVerified() (gas: 476609)\n[PASS] test_askPullsPriceAndRegisters() (gas: 289598)\n[PASS] test_badSignatureStoredUnverifiedAndNotIndexed() (gas: 433300)\n[PASS] test_callbackGasMargin() (gas: 726338)\nLogs:\n  onOracleResult gas, bytes32 answer: 146342\n  onOracleResult gas, 352-byte answer: 133966\n\n[PASS] test_constructorMakesNoCallsAndAskLeavesNoAllowance() (gas: 2207284)\n[PASS] test_digestMatchesPlaneSignature() (gas: 14996)\n[PASS] test_domainIsTheCallbackContract() (gas: 397743)\n[PASS] test_expiredAtDeliveryAndAnswerBoundaries() (gas: 2939509)\n[PASS] test_expiryBoundaryAtDelivery() (gas: 447180)\n[PASS] test_failureHookStatusesAndUnknownIds() (gas: 383895)\n[PASS] test_failureRecorded() (gas: 316574)\n[PASS] test_largeAnswerStillWithinStipend() (gas: 512764)\n[PASS] test_minorityAnswerNotIndexedEvenWhenNothingHeld() (gas: 777277)\n[PASS] test_minorityOfLargePanelCannotDisplaceSupermajority() (gas: 1151191)\n[PASS] test_onlyIntakeCanDeliver() (gas: 301646)\n[PASS] test_quorumAndExpiryGateVerified() (gas: 392872)\n[PASS] test_settledAskRefusesRedeliveryThroughAnotherOpenAsk() (gas: 787036)\n[PASS] test_signatureEdges() (gas: 1281748)\n[PASS] test_weakPanelCannotOverwriteStrongAnswer() (gas: 1123940)\nSuite result: ok. 20 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 117.12ms (127.39ms CPU time)\n\nRan 26 tests for test/AskSwarmRegistryCallbacks.t.sol:AskSwarmRegistryCallbacksTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_longAnswerHashAndEventPreserveEveryByte(uint16,bytes32) (runs: 1000, μ: 824731, ~: 670815)\n[PASS] testFuzz_non65ByteSignaturesNeverVerify(uint16,bytes32) (runs: 1000, μ: 503408, ~: 491415)\n[PASS] testFuzz_shortAnswerRoundTripsIncludingZeros(bytes32,uint8) (runs: 1000, μ: 514989, ~: 521152)\n[PASS] testFuzz_verifiedRequiresIssuedAtWithinTolerance(uint32,uint32) (runs: 1000, μ: 504322, ~: 515241)\n[PASS] test_bothFailureStatusesPreserveFeeAndEmitReasonAndCounts() (gas: 1038352)\n[PASS] test_bothHooksRefuseEverySettledStatus() (gas: 2310816)\n[PASS] test_bothPanelSizeAndAgreementMustBeAtLeastAsStrong() (gas: 1879254)\n[PASS] test_eachOfTheFifteenFieldsIsBoundByTheSignature() (gas: 5581510)\n[PASS] test_falseIsAVerifiedAnswerAndNotAFailure() (gas: 502263)\n[PASS] test_firstByteOverCapIsUnverifiedAndDoesNotDisplaceHeldAnswer() (gas: 798549)\n[PASS] test_intakeAndOracleRequestIdsMayDiffer() (gas: 521883)\n[PASS] test_invalidVAndZeroRecoveryAreRejected() (gas: 2236818)\n[PASS] test_issuedAtToleranceBoundary() (gas: 1276870)\n[PASS] test_maximumAcceptedAnswerFitsColdCallbackStipend() (gas: 1150305)\n[PASS] test_nonzeroAbiPaddingCannotLeakIntoShortAnswer() (gas: 507375)\n[PASS] test_recordsWithoutAStoredAnswerReportZeroAnswerHash() (gas: 1854973)\n[PASS] test_registeredCallbackWithForeignRequestIdCannotCreateAnAsk() (gas: 93158)\n[PASS] test_settledAskIsNotRewrittenByAnotherRequestsCompletion() (gas: 1115937)\n[PASS] test_signatureForAnotherConsumerIsNotReusable() (gas: 499858)\n[PASS] test_thirdPartyCannotCompleteOrCallEitherHook() (gas: 448206)\n[PASS] test_timeAndMinimumFiltersDoNotDeleteHistoricalRecord() (gas: 601997)\n[PASS] test_transportWillNotRetrySuccessOrFailure() (gas: 865030)\n[PASS] test_unknownReadsDoNotLookAnswered() (gas: 48078)\n[PASS] test_weakerMajorityCanReplaceOnlyAfterHeldAnswerExpires() (gas: 1211164)\n[PASS] test_wrongDomainChainNameAndVersionAreRejected() (gas: 1163883)\n[PASS] test_wrongSignerCannotReplaceHeldAnswer() (gas: 850142)\nSuite result: ok. 26 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 117.18ms (497.83ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/AskSwarmRegistryInvariant.t.sol:AskSwarmRegistryInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nAskSwarmRegistryInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_paymentsAreConservedAndNoFeeIsRetained\n[PASS] invariant_requestsAndCanonicalAnswersStayConsistent\n AskSwarmRegistryInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 24576, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract                | Selector                        | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+========================================================================================+\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | advanceTime                     | 2703  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | answer                          | 2806  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | ask                             | 2686  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | donate                          | 2713  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | failingAsk                      | 2758  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | refuse                          | 2699  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | replaySettledThroughOpenRequest | 2689  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | retryCompletedRequest           | 2796  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | unauthorizedCallback            | 2726  | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 13.73s (13.70s CPU time)\n\nRan 5 test suites in 13.74s (14.18s CPU time): 70 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (70 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":98,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"AskSwarmRegistry.ask(bytes)\",\"AskSwarmRegistry.onFailure(bytes32,uint8,bytes32,uint16,uint16,bytes)\",\"AskSwarmRegistry.onOracleResult(bytes32,(bytes32,uint256,bytes32,uint8,bytes,uint256,uint64,uint64,bytes32,bytes32,uint16,uint16,uint16,uint64,uint64),bytes)\"],\"files\":{\".DS_Store\":4,\".env.example\":12,\".gitignore\":9,\"ADAPTATION.md\":116,\"README.md\":243,\"api/cpay-webhook.mjs\":1,\"api/imd.mjs\":1,\"api/telegram.mjs\":1,\"bun.lock\":458,\"contracts/ADAPTATION.md\":98,\"contracts/LAUNCH.md\":7,\"contracts/launch.json\":14,\"docs/EVIDENCE.md\":15,\"docs/SUBMISSION.md\":45,\"docs/askswarm.png\":1383,\"docs/brand/.gitignore\":1,\"docs/brand/Battlefin-Black.otf\":864,\"docs/brand/NB_International_Bold_Webfont.ttf\":2797,\"docs/brand/NB_International_Mono_Webfont.ttf\":2749,\"docs/brand/NB_International_Regular_Webfont.ttf\":2728,\"docs/brand/ai.svg\":6,\"docs/brand/data.svg\":5,\"docs/brand/hand.svg\":3,\"docs/brand/infographic.html\":121,\"docs/brand/lock.svg\":3,\"docs/brand/logo-symbol-light.svg\":4,\"docs/brand/logo-symbol.svg\":4,\"docs/brand/logo-wordmark-dark.svg\":12,\"docs/brand/logo-wordmark-light.svg\":12,\"docs/brand/message.svg\":3,\"docs/brand/miniapp.html\":22,\"docs/brand/star5.svg\":3,\"docs/logo-1024.png\":292,\"docs/logo-512.png\":122,\"docs/logo.svg\":7,\"docs/miniapp-640x360.png\":161,\"foundry.toml\":16,\"functions/cpay-webhook.ts\":28,\"functions/imd.ts\":58,\"functions/telegram.ts\":24,\"lib/answers.json\":1,\"lib/bot.ts\":268,\"lib/quick.ts\":21,\"lib/recall.ts\":21,\"lib/risk-model.json\":1,\"lib/risk.ts\":56,\"package.json\":31,\"packages/cpay/src/index.ts\":481,\"packages/imd/src/index.ts\":235,\"packages/imd/src/intake.ts\":133,\"public/ai.svg\":6,\"public/apple-touch-icon.png\":53,\"public/data.svg\":5,\"public/favicon-32.png\":8,\"public/favicon.svg\":7,\"public/fonts/Battlefin-Black.otf\":864,\"public/fonts/NB_International_Bold_Webfont.ttf\":2797,\"public/fonts/NB_International_Mono_Webfont.ttf\":2749,\"public/fonts/NB_International_Regular_Webfont.ttf\":2728,\"public/imd.html\":107,\"public/index.html\":172,\"public/lock.svg\":3,\"public/logo-wordmark-dark.svg\":12,\"public/logo.svg\":7,\"public/message.svg\":3,\"public/og.png\":1364,\"public/pay.html\":40,\"public/star5.svg\":3,\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":23,\"scripts/approve-permit2.ts\":25,\"scripts/balance.ts\":6,\"scripts/build-answers.ts\":24,\"scripts/dry-run.ts\":13,\"scripts/evidence.ts\":45,\"scripts/launch.ts\":65,\"scripts/spike-sepolia.ts\":50,\"scripts/spike.ts\":58,\"scripts/train-risk.ts\":41,\"scripts/vercel-env.sh\":13,\"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol\":401,\"src/IIntake.sol\":55,\"test/AskSwarmRegistry.t.sol\":572,\"test/AskSwarmRegistryCallbacks.t.sol\":610,\"test/AskSwarmRegistryInvariant.t.sol\":424,\"test/AskSwarmRegistryPayments.t.sol\":261,\"test/OracleConsumerConformance.t.sol\":104,\"test/TESTING.md\":51,\"test/helpers/RegistryTestSupport.sol\":283,\"test/mocks/IntakeMocks.sol\":100,\"tsconfig.json\":8,\"vercel.json\":5},\"excluded\":[\"contracts/lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":943,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol:170: Reentrancy in AskSwarmRegistry.ask(bytes) (src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol#170-182):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol:170: Reentrancy in AskSwarmRegistry.ask(bytes) (src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol#170-182):\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol:300: AskSwarmRegistry.isCurrent(bytes32) (src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol#300-303) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol:192: AskSwarmRegistry.onOracleResult(bytes32,OracleAttestation,bytes) (src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol#192-258) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol:288: AskSwarmRegistry.answerOf(bytes32,uint16,uint16) (src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol#288-297) uses timestamp for comparisons","passed":true},{"durationMs":265,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[high] reentrancy-state-change at src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol:176: Reentrancy: State change after external call\n[low] ecrecover at src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol:385: `ecrecover` Signature Malleability\n[low] literal-instead-of-constant at src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol:221: Literal Instead of Constant (7 places)\n[low] push-zero-opcode at src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol:2: PUSH0 Opcode (2 places)\n[low] unspecific-solidity-pragma at src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol:2: Unspecific Solidity Pragma (2 places)","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"d8f5e83e5f7ea311bb340ccd820fc9c703d4f512af2ba53b03453e91d25cdf3d","verifiedTreeHash":"0bf6fdb24a3568f05e83854a3551ae8e49e8adc9","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+c3fba9eb"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":32279,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 32 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 32.18s\nCompiler run successful with warnings:\nWarning (2018): Function state mutability can be restricted to view\n   --> test/AskSwarmRegistry.t.sol:542:5:\n    |\n542 |     function _delivered() internal returns (bool d) {\n    |     ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":13393,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 4 tests for test/OracleConsumerConformance.t.sol:OracleConsumerConformanceTest\n[PASS] test_acceptsAFreshSignatureFromTheVectorKey() (gas: 414429)\n[PASS] test_acceptsTheProtocolSignatureAsDelivered() (gas: 426872)\n[PASS] test_callbackSelectorIsCanonical() (gas: 691)\n[PASS] test_digestMatchesTheProtocol() (gas: 10377)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.92ms (1.13ms CPU time)\n\nRan 20 tests for test/AskSwarmRegistry.t.sol:AskSwarmRegistryTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_indexedAnswersAreMajorities(uint16,uint16,uint16,uint32,uint32,uint32) (runs: 256, μ: 428461, ~: 425422)\n[PASS] test_answerDeliveredWithinStipendAndVerified() (gas: 476609)\n[PASS] test_askPullsPriceAndRegisters() (gas: 289598)\n[PASS] test_badSignatureStoredUnverifiedAndNotIndexed() (gas: 433300)\n[PASS] test_callbackGasMargin() (gas: 726338)\nLogs:\n  onOracleResult gas, bytes32 answer: 146342\n  onOracleResult gas, 352-byte answer: 133966\n\n[PASS] test_constructorMakesNoCallsAndAskLeavesNoAllowance() (gas: 2207284)\n[PASS] test_digestMatchesPlaneSignature() (gas: 14996)\n[PASS] test_domainIsTheCallbackContract() (gas: 397743)\n[PASS] test_expiredAtDeliveryAndAnswerBoundaries() (gas: 2939509)\n[PASS] test_expiryBoundaryAtDelivery() (gas: 447180)\n[PASS] test_failureHookStatusesAndUnknownIds() (gas: 383895)\n[PASS] test_failureRecorded() (gas: 316574)\n[PASS] test_largeAnswerStillWithinStipend() (gas: 512764)\n[PASS] test_minorityAnswerNotIndexedEvenWhenNothingHeld() (gas: 777277)\n[PASS] test_minorityOfLargePanelCannotDisplaceSupermajority() (gas: 1151191)\n[PASS] test_onlyIntakeCanDeliver() (gas: 301646)\n[PASS] test_quorumAndExpiryGateVerified() (gas: 392872)\n[PASS] test_settledAskRefusesRedeliveryThroughAnotherOpenAsk() (gas: 787036)\n[PASS] test_signatureEdges() (gas: 1281748)\n[PASS] test_weakPanelCannotOverwriteStrongAnswer() (gas: 1123940)\nSuite result: ok. 20 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 105.35ms (112.01ms CPU time)\n\nRan 9 tests for test/AskSwarmRegistryAdversarial.t.sol:AskSwarmRegistryAdversarialTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_oversizedAnswersOfAnySizeSettleInsideStipend(uint24) (runs: 300, μ: 993178, ~: 930539)\n[PASS] testFuzz_readsOfUntouchedKeysAreEmpty(bytes32,uint16,uint16) (runs: 256, μ: 47326, ~: 47326)\n[PASS] testFuzz_unexpectedFailureStatusesSettleAsNoResult(uint8,bytes32,uint16) (runs: 512, μ: 836655, ~: 836841)\n[PASS] testFuzz_verifiedExactlyWhenEveryConditionHolds(uint16,uint16,uint16,uint32,uint32,uint8) (runs: 1000, μ: 499725, ~: 497508)\n[PASS] test_callbackGasAtTheStipendBoundary() (gas: 1844584)\nLogs:\n  onOracleResult gas, one-word answer, cold: 116628\n  onOracleResult gas, 4096-byte answer, cold: 154261\n\n[PASS] test_contractAskerIsRecordedNotTxOrigin() (gas: 638827)\n[PASS] test_highSTwinIsUnverifiedWhileZeroOneVAreNormalised() (gas: 854771)\n[PASS] test_identicalBodiesAreDistinctPaidAsks() (gas: 523715)\n[PASS] test_maximumAnswerDisplacingAHeldAnswerFitsColdStipend() (gas: 1587726)\nSuite result: ok. 9 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 159.09ms (474.09ms CPU time)\n\nRan 26 tests for test/AskSwarmRegistryCallbacks.t.sol:AskSwarmRegistryCallbacksTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_longAnswerHashAndEventPreserveEveryByte(uint16,bytes32) (runs: 1000, μ: 830192, ~: 689614)\n[PASS] testFuzz_non65ByteSignaturesNeverVerify(uint16,bytes32) (runs: 1000, μ: 503237, ~: 490869)\n[PASS] testFuzz_shortAnswerRoundTripsIncludingZeros(bytes32,uint8) (runs: 1000, μ: 515268, ~: 521152)\n[PASS] testFuzz_verifiedRequiresIssuedAtWithinTolerance(uint32,uint32) (runs: 1000, μ: 504278, ~: 515241)\n[PASS] test_bothFailureStatusesPreserveFeeAndEmitReasonAndCounts() (gas: 1038352)\n[PASS] test_bothHooksRefuseEverySettledStatus() (gas: 2310816)\n[PASS] test_bothPanelSizeAndAgreementMustBeAtLeastAsStrong() (gas: 1879254)\n[PASS] test_eachOfTheFifteenFieldsIsBoundByTheSignature() (gas: 5581510)\n[PASS] test_falseIsAVerifiedAnswerAndNotAFailure() (gas: 502263)\n[PASS] test_firstByteOverCapIsUnverifiedAndDoesNotDisplaceHeldAnswer() (gas: 798549)\n[PASS] test_intakeAndOracleRequestIdsMayDiffer() (gas: 521883)\n[PASS] test_invalidVAndZeroRecoveryAreRejected() (gas: 2236818)\n[PASS] test_issuedAtToleranceBoundary() (gas: 1276870)\n[PASS] test_maximumAcceptedAnswerFitsColdCallbackStipend() (gas: 1150305)\n[PASS] test_nonzeroAbiPaddingCannotLeakIntoShortAnswer() (gas: 507375)\n[PASS] test_recordsWithoutAStoredAnswerReportZeroAnswerHash() (gas: 1854973)\n[PASS] test_registeredCallbackWithForeignRequestIdCannotCreateAnAsk() (gas: 93158)\n[PASS] test_settledAskIsNotRewrittenByAnotherRequestsCompletion() (gas: 1115937)\n[PASS] test_signatureForAnotherConsumerIsNotReusable() (gas: 499858)\n[PASS] test_thirdPartyCannotCompleteOrCallEitherHook() (gas: 448206)\n[PASS] test_timeAndMinimumFiltersDoNotDeleteHistoricalRecord() (gas: 601997)\n[PASS] test_transportWillNotRetrySuccessOrFailure() (gas: 865030)\n[PASS] test_unknownReadsDoNotLookAnswered() (gas: 48078)\n[PASS] test_weakerMajorityCanReplaceOnlyAfterHeldAnswerExpires() (gas: 1211164)\n[PASS] test_wrongDomainChainNameAndVersionAreRejected() (gas: 1163883)\n[PASS] test_wrongSignerCannotReplaceHeldAnswer() (gas: 850142)\nSuite result: ok. 26 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 164.72ms (670.43ms CPU time)\n\nRan 19 tests for test/AskSwarmRegistryPayments.t.sol:AskSwarmRegistryPaymentsTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_badTokenReturnRollsBackBothPaymentLegs(uint8,bool) (runs: 1000, μ: 210376, ~: 210370)\n[PASS] testFuzz_exactPriceIsForwardedAndBodyIsUnchanged(uint128,bytes) (runs: 1000, μ: 568490, ~: 574015)\n[PASS] test_askDoesNotSpendPreexistingDonation() (gas: 399189)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsEveryZeroDependency() (gas: 7544)\n[PASS] test_donationCannotSubsidizeAnUnfundedAsk() (gas: 154553)\n[PASS] test_fullCallerBalanceAndMaximumBody() (gas: 2954356)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceRollsBackConsumedAllowance() (gas: 192767)\n[PASS] test_intakeBodyBoundsRollBackThePayment() (gas: 434055)\n[PASS] test_noApprovalAndOneWeiShortApprovalBothRevert() (gas: 322581)\n[PASS] test_noReturnTokenIsSupportedOnTransferAndApproval() (gas: 394404)\n[PASS] test_notSoldDoesNotChargeOrRegister() (gas: 143166)\n[PASS] test_oneWeiPrice() (gas: 384389)\n[PASS] test_plainEthAndPayableAskAreRejectedWithoutTakingFunds() (gas: 145250)\n[PASS] test_priceChangesAreReadOnEveryAsk() (gas: 561397)\n[PASS] test_priceIncreaseBeyondApprovalCannotChargeOldQuote() (gas: 186939)\n[PASS] test_priceLookupFailureDoesNotChargeOrRegister() (gas: 163029)\n[PASS] test_rejectionAfterIntakePullRollsBackRecipientPayment() (gas: 342856)\n[PASS] test_rejectionBeforeIntakePullRollsBackCallerPayment() (gas: 227414)\n[PASS] test_tokenRejectsOnlyIntakePullAndEntireAskRollsBack() (gas: 316876)\nSuite result: ok. 19 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 166.10ms (333.84ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/AskSwarmRegistryIndexInvariant.t.sol:AskSwarmRegistryIndexInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nAskSwarmRegistryIndexInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_everyAskIsPendingOrSettledOnce\n[PASS] invariant_indexOnlyHoldsVerifiedMajoritiesOfTheirOwnQuestion\n[PASS] invariant_registryHoldsNothingAndForwardsEveryFee\n AskSwarmRegistryIndexInvariantTest invariants (runs: 192, calls: 12288, reverts: 0)\n\n╭------------------------+------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract               | Selector   | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+==================================================================+\n| IndexTransitionHandler | ask        | 2052  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------------+------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| IndexTransitionHandler | deliver    | 1963  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------------+------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| IndexTransitionHandler | directHook | 2069  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------------+------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| IndexTransitionHandler | fail       | 2020  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------------+------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| IndexTransitionHandler | replay     | 2098  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------------+------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| IndexTransitionHandler | warp       | 2086  | 0       | 0        |\n╰------------------------+------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 8.20s (8.19s CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/AskSwarmRegistryInvariant.t.sol:AskSwarmRegistryInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nAskSwarmRegistryInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_paymentsAreConservedAndNoFeeIsRetained\n[PASS] invariant_requestsAndCanonicalAnswersStayConsistent\n AskSwarmRegistryInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 24576, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract                | Selector                        | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+========================================================================================+\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | advanceTime                     | 2703  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | answer                          | 2806  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | ask                             | 2686  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | donate                          | 2713  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | failingAsk                      | 2758  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | refuse                          | 2699  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | replaySettledThroughOpenRequest | 2689  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | retryCompletedRequest           | 2796  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | unauthorizedCallback            | 2726  | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 13.29s (13.29s CPU time)\n\nRan 7 test suites in 13.29s (22.09s CPU time): 80 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (80 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":113,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"AskSwarmRegistry.ask(bytes)\",\"AskSwarmRegistry.onFailure(bytes32,uint8,bytes32,uint16,uint16,bytes)\",\"AskSwarmRegistry.onOracleResult(bytes32,(bytes32,uint256,bytes32,uint8,bytes,uint256,uint64,uint64,bytes32,bytes32,uint16,uint16,uint16,uint64,uint64),bytes)\"],\"files\":{\".DS_Store\":4,\".env.example\":12,\".gitignore\":9,\"ADAPTATION.md\":116,\"README.md\":243,\"api/cpay-webhook.mjs\":1,\"api/imd.mjs\":1,\"api/telegram.mjs\":1,\"bun.lock\":458,\"contracts/ADAPTATION.md\":98,\"contracts/LAUNCH.md\":7,\"contracts/launch.json\":14,\"docs/EVIDENCE.md\":15,\"docs/SUBMISSION.md\":45,\"docs/askswarm.png\":1383,\"docs/brand/.gitignore\":1,\"docs/brand/Battlefin-Black.otf\":864,\"docs/brand/NB_International_Bold_Webfont.ttf\":2797,\"docs/brand/NB_International_Mono_Webfont.ttf\":2749,\"docs/brand/NB_International_Regular_Webfont.ttf\":2728,\"docs/brand/ai.svg\":6,\"docs/brand/data.svg\":5,\"docs/brand/hand.svg\":3,\"docs/brand/infographic.html\":121,\"docs/brand/lock.svg\":3,\"docs/brand/logo-symbol-light.svg\":4,\"docs/brand/logo-symbol.svg\":4,\"docs/brand/logo-wordmark-dark.svg\":12,\"docs/brand/logo-wordmark-light.svg\":12,\"docs/brand/message.svg\":3,\"docs/brand/miniapp.html\":22,\"docs/brand/star5.svg\":3,\"docs/logo-1024.png\":292,\"docs/logo-512.png\":122,\"docs/logo.svg\":7,\"docs/miniapp-640x360.png\":161,\"foundry.toml\":16,\"functions/cpay-webhook.ts\":28,\"functions/imd.ts\":58,\"functions/telegram.ts\":24,\"lib/answers.json\":1,\"lib/bot.ts\":268,\"lib/quick.ts\":21,\"lib/recall.ts\":21,\"lib/risk-model.json\":1,\"lib/risk.ts\":56,\"package.json\":31,\"packages/cpay/src/index.ts\":481,\"packages/imd/src/index.ts\":235,\"packages/imd/src/intake.ts\":133,\"public/ai.svg\":6,\"public/apple-touch-icon.png\":53,\"public/data.svg\":5,\"public/favicon-32.png\":8,\"public/favicon.svg\":7,\"public/fonts/Battlefin-Black.otf\":864,\"public/fonts/NB_International_Bold_Webfont.ttf\":2797,\"public/fonts/NB_International_Mono_Webfont.ttf\":2749,\"public/fonts/NB_International_Regular_Webfont.ttf\":2728,\"public/imd.html\":107,\"public/index.html\":172,\"public/lock.svg\":3,\"public/logo-wordmark-dark.svg\":12,\"public/logo.svg\":7,\"public/message.svg\":3,\"public/og.png\":1364,\"public/pay.html\":40,\"public/star5.svg\":3,\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":23,\"scripts/approve-permit2.ts\":25,\"scripts/balance.ts\":6,\"scripts/build-answers.ts\":24,\"scripts/dry-run.ts\":13,\"scripts/evidence.ts\":45,\"scripts/launch.ts\":65,\"scripts/spike-sepolia.ts\":50,\"scripts/spike.ts\":58,\"scripts/train-risk.ts\":41,\"scripts/vercel-env.sh\":13,\"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol\":401,\"src/IIntake.sol\":55,\"test/AskSwarmRegistry.t.sol\":572,\"test/AskSwarmRegistryAdversarial.t.sol\":269,\"test/AskSwarmRegistryCallbacks.t.sol\":610,\"test/AskSwarmRegistryIndexInvariant.t.sol\":293,\"test/AskSwarmRegistryInvariant.t.sol\":424,\"test/AskSwarmRegistryPayments.t.sol\":261,\"test/OracleConsumerConformance.t.sol\":104,\"test/TESTING.md\":73,\"test/helpers/RegistryTestSupport.sol\":283,\"test/mocks/IntakeMocks.sol\":100,\"tsconfig.json\":8,\"vercel.json\":5},\"excluded\":[\"contracts/lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"d950c867334ef77df59a0b29991284a89eae017a1af72030afb4134d113c296b","verifiedTreeHash":"68f58f0e066baf25204c061ce1496f3fd00ea76f","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+c3fba9eb"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":28296,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 31 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 28.20s\nCompiler run successful with warnings:\nWarning (2018): Function state mutability can be restricted to view\n   --> test/AskSwarmRegistry.t.sol:613:5:\n    |\n613 |     function _delivered() internal returns (bool d) {\n    |     ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":12978,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 4 tests for test/OracleConsumerConformance.t.sol:OracleConsumerConformanceTest\n[PASS] test_acceptsAFreshSignatureFromTheVectorKey() (gas: 416566)\n[PASS] test_acceptsTheProtocolSignatureAsDelivered() (gas: 429075)\n[PASS] test_callbackSelectorIsCanonical() (gas: 691)\n[PASS] test_digestMatchesTheProtocol() (gas: 10377)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 2.04ms (1.08ms CPU time)\n\nRan 11 tests for test/AskSwarmRegistryReview.t.sol:AskSwarmRegistryReviewTest\n[PASS] test_askAtMostRefusesAPriceAboveTheCeiling() (gas: 764549)\n[PASS] test_askWithoutCeilingStillPaysTheLivePrice() (gas: 363602)\n[PASS] test_deliveryEmitsIndexedOnlyWhenTheIndexMoves() (gas: 831136)\n[PASS] test_markLostAfterAFailureCompletionWithEmptyArguments() (gas: 413455)\n[PASS] test_markLostSettlesAnAskIntakeCompletedWithoutDelivering() (gas: 1024141)\n[PASS] test_reindexFallsBackToAValidAnswerAfterTheHeldOneExpires() (gas: 1047052)\n[PASS] test_reindexRefusesEveryIneligibleRecord() (gas: 2185211)\n[PASS] test_reindexReplacesAFallbackOnlyByStrictDominance() (gas: 1703927)\n[PASS] test_shortLivedEqualAnswerCannotCutHeldValidityShort() (gas: 1618364)\n[PASS] test_staleOrShorterLivedEqualAnswerDoesNotDisplaceOnDelivery() (gas: 3309315)\n[PASS] test_statusCodesAreAppendedNotRenumbered() (gas: 580)\nSuite result: ok. 11 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 107.88ms (10.94ms CPU time)\n\nRan 23 tests for test/AskSwarmRegistry.t.sol:AskSwarmRegistryTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_indexedAnswersAreMajorities(uint16,uint16,uint16,uint32,uint32,uint32) (runs: 256, μ: 429722, ~: 425862)\n[PASS] test_answerDeliveredWithinStipendAndVerified() (gas: 480527)\n[PASS] test_askAtMostAgainstTheQuotedPrice() (gas: 307456)\n[PASS] test_askPullsPriceAndRegisters() (gas: 289885)\n[PASS] test_badSignatureStoredUnverifiedAndNotIndexed() (gas: 433697)\n[PASS] test_callbackGasMargin() (gas: 730555)\nLogs:\n  onOracleResult gas, bytes32 answer: 148282\n  onOracleResult gas, 352-byte answer: 135951\n\n[PASS] test_constructorMakesNoCallsAndAskLeavesNoAllowance() (gas: 2566003)\n[PASS] test_digestMatchesPlaneSignature() (gas: 15161)\n[PASS] test_domainIsTheCallbackContract() (gas: 398151)\n[PASS] test_expiredAtDeliveryAndAnswerBoundaries() (gas: 2957963)\n[PASS] test_expiryBoundaryAtDelivery() (gas: 449389)\n[PASS] test_failureHookStatusesAndUnknownIds() (gas: 384242)\n[PASS] test_failureRecorded() (gas: 316821)\n[PASS] test_indexRespectsValidityWindowAndReindexRecovers() (gas: 1493990)\n[PASS] test_largeAnswerStillWithinStipend() (gas: 516572)\n[PASS] test_markLostReadsIntakeCompletionRecord() (gas: 801557)\n[PASS] test_minorityAnswerNotIndexedEvenWhenNothingHeld() (gas: 779775)\n[PASS] test_minorityOfLargePanelCannotDisplaceSupermajority() (gas: 1155889)\n[PASS] test_onlyIntakeCanDeliver() (gas: 301915)\n[PASS] test_quorumAndExpiryGateVerified() (gas: 393137)\n[PASS] test_settledAskRefusesRedeliveryThroughAnotherOpenAsk() (gas: 789628)\n[PASS] test_signatureEdges() (gas: 1310064)\n[PASS] test_weakPanelCannotOverwriteStrongAnswer() (gas: 1129046)\nSuite result: ok. 23 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 118.40ms (68.48ms CPU time)\n\nRan 26 tests for test/AskSwarmRegistryCallbacks.t.sol:AskSwarmRegistryCallbacksTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_longAnswerHashAndEventPreserveEveryByte(uint16,bytes32) (runs: 1000, μ: 811418, ~: 655144)\n[PASS] testFuzz_non65ByteSignaturesNeverVerify(uint16,bytes32) (runs: 1000, μ: 504480, ~: 491743)\n[PASS] testFuzz_shortAnswerRoundTripsIncludingZeros(bytes32,uint8) (runs: 1000, μ: 517342, ~: 523377)\n[PASS] testFuzz_verifiedRequiresIssuedAtWithinTolerance(uint32,uint32) (runs: 1000, μ: 505877, ~: 517466)\n[PASS] test_bothFailureStatusesPreserveFeeAndEmitReasonAndCounts() (gas: 1041103)\n[PASS] test_bothHooksRefuseEverySettledStatus() (gas: 2315241)\n[PASS] test_bothPanelSizeAndAgreementMustBeAtLeastAsStrong() (gas: 1886869)\n[PASS] test_eachOfTheFifteenFieldsIsBoundByTheSignature() (gas: 5586715)\n[PASS] test_falseIsAVerifiedAnswerAndNotAFailure() (gas: 504554)\n[PASS] test_firstByteOverCapIsUnverifiedAndDoesNotDisplaceHeldAnswer() (gas: 800971)\n[PASS] test_intakeAndOracleRequestIdsMayDiffer() (gas: 524108)\n[PASS] test_invalidVAndZeroRecoveryAreRejected() (gas: 2238504)\n[PASS] test_issuedAtToleranceBoundary() (gas: 1279965)\n[PASS] test_maximumAcceptedAnswerFitsColdCallbackStipend() (gas: 1152530)\n[PASS] test_nonzeroAbiPaddingCannotLeakIntoShortAnswer() (gas: 509578)\n[PASS] test_recordsWithoutAStoredAnswerReportZeroAnswerHash() (gas: 1858663)\n[PASS] test_registeredCallbackWithForeignRequestIdCannotCreateAnAsk() (gas: 93390)\n[PASS] test_settledAskIsNotRewrittenByAnotherRequestsCompletion() (gas: 1119030)\n[PASS] test_signatureForAnotherConsumerIsNotReusable() (gas: 500205)\n[PASS] test_thirdPartyCannotCompleteOrCallEitherHook() (gas: 448513)\n[PASS] test_timeAndMinimumFiltersDoNotDeleteHistoricalRecord() (gas: 604618)\n[PASS] test_transportWillNotRetrySuccessOrFailure() (gas: 867496)\n[PASS] test_unknownReadsDoNotLookAnswered() (gas: 48342)\n[PASS] test_weakerMajorityCanReplaceOnlyAfterHeldAnswerExpires() (gas: 1216157)\n[PASS] test_wrongDomainChainNameAndVersionAreRejected() (gas: 1164726)\n[PASS] test_wrongSignerCannotReplaceHeldAnswer() (gas: 852582)\nSuite result: ok. 26 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 118.47ms (470.09ms CPU time)\n\nRan 19 tests for test/AskSwarmRegistryPayments.t.sol:AskSwarmRegistryPaymentsTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_badTokenReturnRollsBackBothPaymentLegs(uint8,bool) (runs: 1000, μ: 210324, ~: 210327)\n[PASS] testFuzz_exactPriceIsForwardedAndBodyIsUnchanged(uint128,bytes) (runs: 1000, μ: 568722, ~: 574310)\n[PASS] test_askDoesNotSpendPreexistingDonation() (gas: 399320)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsEveryZeroDependency() (gas: 7544)\n[PASS] test_donationCannotSubsidizeAnUnfundedAsk() (gas: 154696)\n[PASS] test_fullCallerBalanceAndMaximumBody() (gas: 2954509)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceRollsBackConsumedAllowance() (gas: 192998)\n[PASS] test_intakeBodyBoundsRollBackThePayment() (gas: 434697)\n[PASS] test_noApprovalAndOneWeiShortApprovalBothRevert() (gas: 323043)\n[PASS] test_noReturnTokenIsSupportedOnTransferAndApproval() (gas: 394401)\n[PASS] test_notSoldDoesNotChargeOrRegister() (gas: 143386)\n[PASS] test_oneWeiPrice() (gas: 384542)\n[PASS] test_plainEthAndPayableAskAreRejectedWithoutTakingFunds() (gas: 145470)\n[PASS] test_priceChangesAreReadOnEveryAsk() (gas: 561725)\n[PASS] test_priceIncreaseBeyondApprovalCannotChargeOldQuote() (gas: 187170)\n[PASS] test_priceLookupFailureDoesNotChargeOrRegister() (gas: 163271)\n[PASS] test_rejectionAfterIntakePullRollsBackRecipientPayment() (gas: 343199)\n[PASS] test_rejectionBeforeIntakePullRollsBackCallerPayment() (gas: 227757)\n[PASS] test_tokenRejectsOnlyIntakePullAndEntireAskRollsBack() (gas: 317064)\nSuite result: ok. 19 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 118.53ms (233.52ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/AskSwarmRegistryInvariant.t.sol:AskSwarmRegistryInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nAskSwarmRegistryInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_paymentsAreConservedAndNoFeeIsRetained\n[PASS] invariant_requestsAndCanonicalAnswersStayConsistent\n AskSwarmRegistryInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 24576, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract                | Selector                        | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+========================================================================================+\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | advanceTime                     | 2259  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | answer                          | 2193  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | ask                             | 2259  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | donate                          | 2236  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | failingAsk                      | 2181  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | markLost                        | 2327  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | refuse                          | 2172  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | reindex                         | 2301  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | replaySettledThroughOpenRequest | 2120  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | retryCompletedRequest           | 2259  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RegistrySequenceHandler | unauthorizedCallback            | 2269  | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------------------+---------------------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 12.88s (12.87s CPU time)\n\nRan 6 test suites in 12.88s (13.34s CPU time): 84 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (84 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":90,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"AskSwarmRegistry.ask(bytes)\",\"AskSwarmRegistry.askAtMost(bytes,uint256)\",\"AskSwarmRegistry.markLost(bytes32)\",\"AskSwarmRegistry.onFailure(bytes32,uint8,bytes32,uint16,uint16,bytes)\",\"AskSwarmRegistry.onOracleResult(bytes32,(bytes32,uint256,bytes32,uint8,bytes,uint256,uint64,uint64,bytes32,bytes32,uint16,uint16,uint16,uint64,uint64),bytes)\",\"AskSwarmRegistry.reindex(bytes32)\"],\"files\":{\".DS_Store\":4,\".env.example\":12,\".gitignore\":9,\"ADAPTATION.md\":211,\"README.md\":251,\"api/cpay-webhook.mjs\":1,\"api/imd.mjs\":1,\"api/telegram.mjs\":1,\"bun.lock\":458,\"contracts/ADAPTATION.md\":98,\"contracts/LAUNCH.md\":7,\"contracts/launch.json\":14,\"docs/EVIDENCE.md\":15,\"docs/SUBMISSION.md\":45,\"docs/askswarm.png\":1383,\"docs/brand/.gitignore\":1,\"docs/brand/Battlefin-Black.otf\":864,\"docs/brand/NB_International_Bold_Webfont.ttf\":2797,\"docs/brand/NB_International_Mono_Webfont.ttf\":2749,\"docs/brand/NB_International_Regular_Webfont.ttf\":2728,\"docs/brand/ai.svg\":6,\"docs/brand/data.svg\":5,\"docs/brand/hand.svg\":3,\"docs/brand/infographic.html\":121,\"docs/brand/lock.svg\":3,\"docs/brand/logo-symbol-light.svg\":4,\"docs/brand/logo-symbol.svg\":4,\"docs/brand/logo-wordmark-dark.svg\":12,\"docs/brand/logo-wordmark-light.svg\":12,\"docs/brand/message.svg\":3,\"docs/brand/miniapp.html\":22,\"docs/brand/star5.svg\":3,\"docs/logo-1024.png\":292,\"docs/logo-512.png\":122,\"docs/logo.svg\":7,\"docs/miniapp-640x360.png\":161,\"foundry.toml\":16,\"functions/cpay-webhook.ts\":28,\"functions/imd.ts\":58,\"functions/telegram.ts\":24,\"lib/answers.json\":1,\"lib/bot.ts\":268,\"lib/quick.ts\":21,\"lib/recall.ts\":21,\"lib/risk-model.json\":1,\"lib/risk.ts\":56,\"package.json\":31,\"packages/cpay/src/index.ts\":481,\"packages/imd/src/index.ts\":235,\"packages/imd/src/intake.ts\":136,\"public/ai.svg\":6,\"public/apple-touch-icon.png\":53,\"public/data.svg\":5,\"public/favicon-32.png\":8,\"public/favicon.svg\":7,\"public/fonts/Battlefin-Black.otf\":864,\"public/fonts/NB_International_Bold_Webfont.ttf\":2797,\"public/fonts/NB_International_Mono_Webfont.ttf\":2749,\"public/fonts/NB_International_Regular_Webfont.ttf\":2728,\"public/imd.html\":107,\"public/index.html\":172,\"public/lock.svg\":3,\"public/logo-wordmark-dark.svg\":12,\"public/logo.svg\":7,\"public/message.svg\":3,\"public/og.png\":1364,\"public/pay.html\":40,\"public/star5.svg\":3,\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":23,\"scripts/approve-permit2.ts\":25,\"scripts/balance.ts\":6,\"scripts/build-answers.ts\":24,\"scripts/dry-run.ts\":13,\"scripts/evidence.ts\":45,\"scripts/launch.ts\":65,\"scripts/spike-sepolia.ts\":50,\"scripts/spike.ts\":58,\"scripts/train-risk.ts\":41,\"scripts/vercel-env.sh\":13,\"src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol\":493,\"src/IIntake.sol\":55,\"test/AskSwarmRegistry.t.sol\":643,\"test/AskSwarmRegistryCallbacks.t.sol\":610,\"test/AskSwarmRegistryInvariant.t.sol\":488,\"test/AskSwarmRegistryPayments.t.sol\":261,\"test/AskSwarmRegistryReview.t.sol\":319,\"test/OracleConsumerConformance.t.sol\":104,\"test/TESTING.md\":59,\"test/helpers/RegistryTestSupport.sol\":289,\"test/mocks/IntakeMocks.sol\":100,\"tsconfig.json\":8,\"vercel.json\":5},\"excluded\":[\"contracts/lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":1131,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[medium/medium] unused-return at src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol:322: AskSwarmRegistry.markLost(bytes32) (src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol#322-330) ignores return value by (None,None,None,completed) = INTAKE.requests(requestId) (src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol#326)\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol:203: Reentrancy in AskSwarmRegistry._ask(bytes,uint256) (src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol#203-216):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol:203: Reentrancy in AskSwarmRegistry._ask(bytes,uint256) (src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol#203-216):\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol:226: AskSwarmRegistry.onOracleResult(bytes32,OracleAttestation,bytes) (src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol#226-295) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol:354: AskSwarmRegistry._mayDisplace(AskSwarmRegistry.Stored,uint16,uint16,uint64,uint64,bool) (src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol#354-368) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol:339: AskSwarmRegistry.reindex(bytes32) (src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol#339-348) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol:392: AskSwarmRegistry.isCurrent(bytes32) (src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol#392-395) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol:380: AskSwarmRegistry.answerOf(bytes32,uint16,uint16) (src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol#380-389) uses timestamp for comparisons","passed":true},{"durationMs":257,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[high] reentrancy-state-change at src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol:326: Reentrancy: State change after external call\n[low] ecrecover at src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol:477: `ecrecover` Signature Malleability\n[low] literal-instead-of-constant at src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol:255: Literal Instead of Constant (7 places)\n[low] push-zero-opcode at src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol:2: PUSH0 Opcode (2 places)\n[low] unspecific-solidity-pragma at src/AskSwarmRegistry.sol:2: Unspecific Solidity Pragma (2 places)","passed":true},{"durationMs":3587,"exitCode":0,"name":"proof a97feadf8000","output":"Compiling 24 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 2.99s\nCompiler run successful with warnings:\nWarning (2018): Function state mutability can be restricted to view\n   --> test/imd-proof-9774d5e8/Proof_a97feadf8000.t.sol:119:5:\n    |\n119 |     function _att(bytes32 id, bytes memory answer, uint16 panel, uint16 quorum, uint16 agreed, uint64 ttl)\n    |     ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\n\n\nRan 1 test for test/imd-proof-9774d5e8/Proof_a97feadf8000.t.sol:IndexCaptureTest\n[PASS] test_equalStrengthShortLivedAnswerCollapsesValidityThenWeakPanelCaptures() (gas: 965972)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.69ms (917.21µs CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test suite in 3.12ms (1.69ms CPU time): 1 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (1 total tests)\n","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"f364efd4a1348e168718eb921cbf122d82523c45f0215bb5ed7d27cfadfd368c","verifiedTreeHash":"8665273113e0d8467ed2c3d2a291181106cd832c","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+c3fba9eb"}]}