{"assessments":[],"deployments":[],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"c34adc89-117f-4b3b-b96d-63a1fd08b780","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"3b32a680a25b93a8ed2ac6161054ad3382103a200e5faf4b8490d8d3ffd53813","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_economics","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"94370ed3fbbbfdab2c48e976a237c45565ba1a757eb35e059787becaed15d9a3","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_flow","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"ccece8a96ad3fd08f94f816d3dfaf91d6168f1a12b84a0bf9b9483399bd454df","dependsOn":["build_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest","audit_math","audit_permissions","audit_economics","audit_flow"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"af3aa01159bbf354f621cafa5c0006f6169e0938a8b015be508b7377dbf165bc","skillId":"audit-judge","tools":[]},"key":"audit_judge","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"af3aa01159bbf354f621cafa5c0006f6169e0938a8b015be508b7377dbf165bc","skillId":"audit-judge","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"db74e2ae6c699cedd3c88aa44d438b8a23be3f28f905cdda8e14a7725e1b3ecd","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_math","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"d5e4d19ec4fa1f87e2dc78e30b4ce41f2155e930825eba037678e74da03bbcfd","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_permissions","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"122c76dff04aa31fd81eb95a78810d2dd2a5b9a9f6de401b6d8b8de25760f745","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"6b8d2c2ebd3301cff2be8edb1e1cc6ba65c858c02fe7247be81722b969842265","skillId":"build-contract-project","tools":[]},"key":"build_contract_project","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"6b8d2c2ebd3301cff2be8edb1e1cc6ba65c858c02fe7247be81722b969842265","skillId":"build-contract-project","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"0ae1ce7008ff0163e55cbac5b0964fdbae82a7a730d2f06a89da265647f1470a","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"tools":[]},"key":"manifest","kind":"code","role":"integrate","skillHash":null,"skillId":null,"state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"b64e77fa213d9d9f9793e39d2aa47e374905bf9ac1c5b0cc7522ba8edccca06a","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"4c76766b00591dfe982fe85d3de589fdb2f810e5137c301155d1c5e36a1d3b23","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","tools":[]},"key":"write_foundry_tests","kind":"code","role":"tests","skillHash":"4c76766b00591dfe982fe85d3de589fdb2f810e5137c301155d1c5e36a1d3b23","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"Launch DEF (name \"DEF\", symbol \"DEF\") on a DEF/ETH Uniswap v4 pool whose hook is a reflection fee hook.\nThe hook has one job: keep 2.25% of the DEF side of every swap and hand it, on request, to one address called the sink.\nIt never takes ETH, never swaps, never touches liquidity, has no pause, no rate change, no blocklist, no upgrade.\n\nFEE RULE (constant, 225 bps, immutable)\n- Buy (ETH in, DEF out): in afterSwap, fee = 2.25% of the DEF the swap produced. Mint the fee to the hook as a\n  PoolManager claim (ERC-6909) on the DEF currency and return it as the hook's int128 delta, so the swapper\n  receives 97.75% and the hook keeps 2.25%.\n- Sell (DEF in, ETH out): in beforeSwap, fee = 2.25% of the DEF specified. Mint it to the hook as a claim and\n  return toBeforeSwapDelta(fee, 0) so only 97.75% enters the pool.\n- Exact-output swaps revert with ExactOutputUnsupported(). Only exact-input is supported, in both directions.\n- Emit ReflectionFee(address indexed swapper, bool buy, uint256 defAmount) on every fee.\n- Nothing else is ever charged. The hook's ETH balance and ETH claim balance are always zero.\n\nCOLLECTION AND THE SINK\n- sink() view returns address. setSink(address) is owner-only, refuses the zero address, emits\n  SinkSet(address indexed sink), and may be called again later (the sink can be moved by the owner only).\n- collected() view: the hook's DEF claim balance in the PoolManager, i.e. the fee waiting to be flushed.\n- flush() callable by anyone: burns the hook's whole DEF claim and takes the DEF to sink inside\n  poolManager.unlock, emits Flushed(address indexed sink, uint256 amount), reverts SinkNotSet() while sink is\n  zero and NothingToFlush() when collected() is zero. Returns the amount.\n- Fee-source face, so the sink can pull without a keeper calling flush first. These two functions must exist with\n  these exact signatures and semantics:\n  - function claimable(address account, address currency) external view returns (uint256): returns\n    collected() when account == sink and currency == address(DEF), otherwise 0.\n  - function claim(address currency, address to) external returns (uint256 amount): callable only by the sink\n    (revert NotSink()), to must equal the sink, currency must be the DEF token (revert WrongCurrency());\n    performs the same transfer as flush() and returns the amount.\n\nPOOL AND LAUNCH CONSTRAINTS\n- The pool is DEF against native ETH (currency0 = address(0), currency1 = DEF), LP fee 0, tick spacing 60, this hook.\n- beforeInitialize and beforeAddLiquidity accept only the launch (the factory / the hook itself), so the pool is\n  the one launched and its liquidity is the launch liquidity; any later initialize with this hook reverts, and any\n  later add-liquidity reverts LiquidityLocked(). Remove-liquidity and donate hooks are no-ops.\n- Hook permissions: BEFORE_INITIALIZE, BEFORE_ADD_LIQUIDITY, BEFORE_SWAP, AFTER_SWAP, BEFORE_SWAP_RETURNS_DELTA,\n  AFTER_SWAP_RETURNS_DELTA. Nothing else.\n- Views: poolKey() returns the PoolKey, poolId() returns bytes32, def() the token, owner(), FEE_BPS() = 225.\n- Custom errors: NotPoolManager, NotOwner, LiquidityLocked, ExactOutputUnsupported, ZeroAddress,\n  SinkNotSet, NothingToFlush, WrongCurrency, NotSink.\n\nOWNER'S POWERS, EXHAUSTIVELY\nsetSink only. No withdrawal path exists except flush() / claim() to the sink. No admin can take DEF or ETH.\n\nOUTSIDE SERVICES AND VALUES\nNone. No oracle, no price feed, no signer, no backend, no external contract beyond the Uniswap v4 PoolManager and\nthe DEF token. The only value set after launch is the sink address, by the owner, through setSink.\n\nTESTS THE BUILD MUST INCLUDE\n1. A buy of X ETH delivers 97.75% of the swap's DEF output to the buyer and collected() rises by 2.25% (within 1 wei).\n2. A sell of Y DEF charges 2.25% of Y into the hook before the swap; the pool receives 97.75%.\n3. An exact-output swap in either direction reverts ExactOutputUnsupported.\n4. The hook's ETH balance and ETH claim balance stay zero after buys, sells and flushes.\n5. flush() reverts SinkNotSet before setSink, moves exactly collected() to the sink after it, then reverts\n   NothingToFlush.\n6. claimable(sink, DEF) equals collected(); claimable(other, DEF) and claimable(sink, other) are 0;\n   claim from a non-sink reverts NotSink; claim(DEF, sink) from the sink moves the amount and zeroes collected().\n7. A non-owner calling setSink reverts NotOwner; setSink(address(0)) reverts ZeroAddress.\n8. Adding liquidity after the launch reverts LiquidityLocked.\n\nToken name: DEF\nToken symbol: DEF","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"0a1e24503d876db40d046e1edec3644cb90d6b262feae0293ed22ba7c4f2e59f","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"c34adc89-117f-4b3b-b96d-63a1fd08b780","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-1816-def"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"52150","feedbackHash":"cd9e975d5136d5b46a0a2d2fd26148cc81687d98fae7e12a1e4aaa25982fa194","nodeKey":"audit_economics","submissionHash":"3b32a680a25b93a8ed2ac6161054ad3382103a200e5faf4b8490d8d3ffd53813","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52169","feedbackHash":"58a1d76d1a6db7644f5da32fa241f2bd76c6541c0fe96cb83390c37bf3d14976","nodeKey":"audit_flow","submissionHash":"94370ed3fbbbfdab2c48e976a237c45565ba1a757eb35e059787becaed15d9a3","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52191","feedbackHash":"451381465c07076f99eba77cd69a793352b137a150dbe46b3f0a80a731a5563d","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"ccece8a96ad3fd08f94f816d3dfaf91d6168f1a12b84a0bf9b9483399bd454df","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51420","feedbackHash":"017c0db88fcb48f7d9b38f9d3b54ea5fb4f1655ce536491a61c2153856e7ccfc","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"3b67fa9e2ecfc466306ab0ab1676f7b8a598d6feca6ec83c08af48b225424c73","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51447","feedbackHash":"8b4eee1b0782920f18ca42d1fe52b779b1899ac5ab48be6866ae633600df2150","nodeKey":"audit_math","submissionHash":"db74e2ae6c699cedd3c88aa44d438b8a23be3f28f905cdda8e14a7725e1b3ecd","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52604","feedbackHash":"ee2d5d8bef49234608651af9d1c681010874e873f78162d679be53a89b858af4","nodeKey":"audit_permissions","submissionHash":"d5e4d19ec4fa1f87e2dc78e30b4ce41f2155e930825eba037678e74da03bbcfd","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52022","feedbackHash":"0bf6de16d54cfd6b4e2de62e9962c0de4187d5fa07e27e8fabea7f5c8dd47fbd","nodeKey":"build_contract_project","submissionHash":"de6830fe5e7cba4217b6bd910cb87e344f2f5d2bd3839511ee4aed50895db53c","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52289","feedbackHash":"c12a1fb3cfce5df9b4b425ff41f18aba2c7f20e1a93b1ed132d46c127d086097","nodeKey":"build_contract_project","submissionHash":"122c76dff04aa31fd81eb95a78810d2dd2a5b9a9f6de401b6d8b8de25760f745","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52274","feedbackHash":"7f0d304f344bf01bd7cff4e97aaf14aba7d187e1b6cfa721de7a27c8cafb8433","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"8157297cbd19956c6baaa03c87307bc87fc1cfbbb0f141c23780c43ca27e462b","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51343","feedbackHash":"46c48d47caabc42aa8668a626fe83387ac34f503aa10a41172431827457d978b","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"0ae1ce7008ff0163e55cbac5b0964fdbae82a7a730d2f06a89da265647f1470a","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52278","feedbackHash":"c9b773da4958e6d820fd821aa545ad8bdc0d8399abab2636d8341087ba85acc1","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"f7ac307373c0e0db537e56e2051c183ca5f7226eea9c446f44540c8161852d33","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52482","feedbackHash":"2b299449b386e1b4daf74dcbfd8fe82e04b32c4aff11066c34e769414bad27bc","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"b64e77fa213d9d9f9793e39d2aa47e374905bf9ac1c5b0cc7522ba8edccca06a","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"3dbec8118a941b56bc3533239e7f3bf0d9ce9fba9f12000f366437121e8cf7a1","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"c292303612385f66c27b1e67ea1f64b7a62d8500e19d75d9c75904af8151a3ce","device":"feba2a869621cab2","findings":[],"hash":"0ae1ce7008ff0163e55cbac5b0964fdbae82a7a730d2f06a89da265647f1470a","nodeId":"669b5389-0106-492b-99ce-b8492df63a51","outcome":"completed","summary":"Done. The only changed file is launch.json.\n\n**What I found.** The existing manifest carried a \"BLOCKING\" note saying the hook hardcoded LP fee 0 and would reject the policy's 12500 tier. That is no longer true of the accepted code. ReflectionHook now takes the LP fee from the key the factory initializes with, refuses only the dynamic-fee flag, and records that pool once. The note also said only one liquidity addition was permitted, but the hook lets the factory add again later and locks out everyone else.\n\n**What I changed.** I rewrote the notes field so it describes the accepted implementation. The structural fields were already correct and stayed as they were:\n\n- Hook contract ReflectionHook with constructor arguments `$poolManager`, `$token`, `$owner`, `$factory` in declaration order.\n- Permissions beforeInitialize, beforeAddLiquidity, beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta, afterSwapReturnDelta, exactly what getHookPermissions returns.\n- Token contract DEF, name DEF, symbol DEF, 18 decimals.\n- Pool paired with native ETH, fee 12500, tick spacing 60, the reference's initialPrice.\n\nThe new notes cover the 225 bps DEF-only fee rule in both directions, exact-output rejection, the collection path through flush and the claim/claimable fee-source face, the owner's single power setSink, the launch-only initialize and add-liquidity gating, the disabled callbacks, and why pool.fee is 12500 despite the brief's 0. Notes are 2812 characters, under the 4000 cap.\n\n**Verification.**\n\n| Check | Result |\n| --- | --- |\n| forge build | ok |\n| forge test with the verifier's fuzz seed | 44 passed, 0 failed |\n| Manifest parses, first key is kind univ4_hook | ok |\n| Scratch test: declared permissions equal getHookPermissions on a mined hook | passed |\n\nNo source, config, or lib file was touched, and no placeholder address was replaced with a stand-in.","treeHash":"fdaeb5a9254cff006011c0be304dfd36c64f312e","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":686646,"inputTokens":386,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":7776,"runtime":"claude","turns":17,"wallClockMs":180436}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"22846e426a519076966e8f8a5622d86dea9ed66b2a2efe6318f59e93e19c6ac5","device":"ee9fbaf2480d1034","findings":[],"hash":"122c76dff04aa31fd81eb95a78810d2dd2a5b9a9f6de401b6d8b8de25760f745","nodeId":"6f2cb09d-89a3-4d6f-b91b-563e3ee9ed7c","outcome":"completed","summary":"All findings are answered and the work verifies from a clean build.\n\n**Outcome**\n\n| Check | Result |\n| --- | --- |\n| Reviewer's proof (fee 12500 initialize) | failed on the starting tree, passes now |\n| `forge build` from clean | ok |\n| `forge test` with the verifier's fuzz seed | 46 passed, 0 failed |\n| `forge fmt --check` | ok |\n\n**What I changed in the hook** (`src/ReflectionHook.sol`)\n\n- **Fee tier (high, fixed).** The LP fee is no longer part of the hook's identity. `beforeInitialize` accepts the ETH/DEF, spacing-60 key on this hook at any static LP fee, refuses the dynamic flag, and records the fee and pool id in storage. The views `poolKey()`, `poolId()`, `lpFee()` and `initialized()` read that record, and every other callback checks against it. Both the brief's 0 and the policy's 12500 now open.\n- **One-shot liquidity flag (low, fixed).** Removed. Adding liquidity is gated on the sender being the factory or the hook, so a factory seeding several ranges no longer bricks the launch, and everyone else still gets `LiquidityLocked`.\n- **Sell fee on specified input (low, disputed).** Left alone. The brief mandates charging 2.25% of the DEF specified in `beforeSwap`, and refunding through the ETH delta would break the zero-ETH rule. The dispute is explained in the responses file.\n- **claimable for the zero address (info, fixed).** `claimable` returns zero and `claim` reverts `NotSink` while no sink is set.\n\n**Tests and docs.** The fixture now opens the pool at 12500. New tests open fresh hooks at 12500, 0, 3000 and fuzzed static fees, refuse every other pool shape and a second pool, accept a second factory position, and cover the unset-sink claim rules. README and docs/SECURITY.md describe the factory-set LP fee, the liquidity gate and the sink rules. Answers to all four findings are in `.imd-responses.json`.\n\nOne note for the reviewer: forge's incremental build served a stale script artifact once during this session, which made the deployment test fail spuriously until a forced rebuild. The verifier builds from scratch, so it is not affected.","treeHash":"d1318cfdc2123deeb43fc32eaf300995134be049","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2176014,"inputTokens":578,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":43542,"runtime":"claude","turns":68,"wallClockMs":635450}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"e764f15311426447","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"poolKey() is a constant (ETH, DEF, fee 0, spacing 60, this hook) and beforeInitialize calls _checkPool(key), which reverts WrongPool for every key whose hash differs. The assignment text fixes the LP fee at 0, so the code follows its spec. However the launch reference states that admission holds pool.fee to the hook launch policy's tier (12500 on every chain today, never 0) and that a hook whose beforeInitialize refuses every listed fee cannot launch. If the manifest step writes pool.fee = 12500 (or anything but 0), PoolManager.initialize from $factory reverts inside beforeInitialize, the protected test test_initializesFromTheLaunchFactory fails, and the launch stops. This is not a bug in the fee accounting; it is a hard policy/spec conflict that the hook cannot absorb because the key is immutable and there is no tolerance for the LP fee field. The requester must confirm the policy tier is 0 for this launch, or the hook must read the LP fee (and tick spacing) from the key it is initialized with instead of hard-coding 0, while still pinning currencies and hook. Both fixes preserve the 2.25% DEF fee economics.","line":92,"path":"src/ReflectionHook.sol","reproduction":"State: hook deployed, pool not yet initialized. Call (as factory) manager.initialize(PoolKey(address(0), DEF, 12500, 60, hook), 79228162514264337593543950336). Expected (if policy fee is 12500): initialize succeeds. Actual: reverts WrappedError(hook, beforeInitialize.selector, WrongPool(), HookCallFailed()). Reproduced in a scratch test against the fixture (factory.initialize with fee 12500 -> revert). With fee 0 the same call succeeds.","severity":"medium","snippet":"        return PoolKey(Currency.wrap(address(0)), Currency.wrap(address(def)), 0, 60, IHooks(address(this)));","title":"Pool key hard-codes LP fee 0; any other manifest/policy fee (e.g. the 12500 tier) makes the factory's initialize revert WrongPool and blocks the launch"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"beforeSwap computes the sell fee from params.amountSpecified before the pool runs. v4 exact-input swaps stop at sqrtPriceLimitX96 or when in-range liquidity is exhausted, and the unconsumed input is simply not charged by the pool. The hook's fee is still minted and credited through toBeforeSwapDelta(fee, 0), so the swapper's DEF delta is -(consumed + fee) where consumed can be 0. The buy side does not have this asymmetry (it charges on actual output). Economically the swapper can lose 2.25% of a large nominal input for a trade that moved 1 wei, and nothing is refunded. A router with a minimum-output check converts this into a revert; a router without one (or a direct unlock caller) loses the fee. The assignment literally says 'fee = 2.25% of the DEF specified', so this follows the written rule; it is reported because the Economic Security guide asks for fee-formula edges that extract value without a corresponding trade, and the README itself documents the behaviour. If the requester wants the fee to track executed input instead, the fix is to charge the sell fee in afterSwap on -delta.amount1() (the consumed DEF), which keeps 2.25% of the DEF side on every executed swap and removes the asymmetry with buys; otherwise leave as is and keep the README warning.","line":176,"path":"src/ReflectionHook.sol","reproduction":"State: fixture pool at sqrtPrice Q96 with 1e24 full-range liquidity; trader holds 10,000,000 DEF. Call trader.swap(key, SwapParams(zeroForOne=false, amountSpecified=-1_000_000e18, sqrtPriceLimitX96=currentSqrtPrice+1)). Observed in a scratch test: swap delta0 (ETH) = 0, delta1 (DEF) = -22500000000000000000001 (22,500 DEF fee + 1 wei consumed), collected() rose by 22500000000000000000000, trader received 0 ETH. Same with the LP position fully removed: sell(1000e18) -> delta0 = 0, delta1 = -22.5e18, collected() +22.5e18. Expected under 'keep 2.25% of the DEF side of every swap': fee proportional to the DEF that actually traded (here ~0).","severity":"low","snippet":"        uint256 specified = uint256(-(params.amountSpecified + 1)) + 1;\n        uint256 fee = FullMath.mulDiv(specified, FEE_BPS, BPS_DENOMINATOR);","title":"Sell fee is charged on the full specified input even when the pool executes none of it: a price-limited or liquidity-starved sell pays 2.25% for zero output"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The fee-source view compares account to the storage variable sink with plain equality. Before setSink is called sink is address(0), so claimable(address(0), address(def)) == collected() (non-zero as soon as the first swap happens, since fees accrue before the sink is set). No actor can call claim as address(0) and flush() reverts SinkNotSet in that state, so the view promises an amount the write path can never honour (Invariant guide: 'view functions promise values that state-changing functions fail to honor'). An off-chain fee-source indexer or a sink registry that enumerates accounts and sums claimable will count the zero account as owed. Minimal fix: return 0 when sink == address(0) (one extra condition), which keeps the exact-signature semantics for every real account.","line":107,"path":"src/ReflectionHook.sol","reproduction":"State: fresh launch, no setSink yet. Call buy(1 ether) then read hook.claimable(address(0), address(def)). Observed in a scratch test: collected() = 22499977500022499, claimable(address(0), DEF) = 22499977500022499, claimable(sinkCandidate, DEF) = 0. Then hook.flush() reverts SinkNotSet() and no claim(DEF, address(0)) can succeed (msg.sender would have to be address(0)). Expected: claimable for a non-existent sink is 0.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (account != sink || currency != address(def)) return 0;","title":"claimable(address(0), DEF) returns the whole pending balance while the sink is unset, a value no caller can ever claim"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"beforeAddLiquidity flips liquiditySeeded on the first positive addition and refuses every later positive addition, including from the factory. The assignment says 'beforeAddLiquidity accept[s] only the launch (the factory / the hook itself)' and that 'any later add-liquidity reverts LiquidityLocked()'; the implementation is stricter: 'later' means 'second call', not 'after the launch transaction'. The protected Owners harness seeds one full-range position in one call, which passes, and a zero-liquidity collect is routed to the disabled remove callbacks, which is fine. The gap is a launch factory that seeds in more than one modifyLiquidity call (for example a full-range position plus a one-sided range, or separate calls for each currency), or that removes and re-seeds: the second add reverts and, because the factory's launch is atomic, the whole launch reverts. There is no owner or factory override. If the real factory seeds in one call this is a documented constraint; if it does not, it is launch-blocking. A fix that preserves the stated intent is to gate additions on sender == factory only (the lock then means 'no one but the launch factory may add'), or to allow additions while the launch transaction is still in progress; both keep the LiquidityLocked guarantee for every non-launch actor.","line":157,"path":"src/ReflectionHook.sol","reproduction":"State: fixture after setUp (factory initialized and seeded one full-range position). Call factory.modify(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(-60, 60, 1e18, 0)). Expected (reading the spec as 'only the launch may add'): succeeds for the factory. Actual: reverts WrappedError(hook, beforeAddLiquidity.selector, LiquidityLocked(), HookCallFailed()). Then factory.modify(key, (LOWER, UPPER, -1e24, 0)) succeeds (full removal) and factory.modify(key, (LOWER, UPPER, +1e24, 0)) reverts LiquidityLocked again. Reproduced in a scratch test.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (!initialized || liquiditySeeded || (sender != factory && sender != address(this))) {","title":"Liquidity can be seeded exactly once, by one modifyLiquidity call; a factory that seeds two ranges or re-adds after a full withdrawal is locked out"}],"hash":"3b32a680a25b93a8ed2ac6161054ad3382103a200e5faf4b8490d8d3ffd53813","nodeId":"60e7c544-791f-4f15-b5a2-e310f125f58f","outcome":"completed","summary":"Findings file is written and validated. Every snippet matches the tree, the scratch tests are removed, and the working tree has no other changes. Here is the recap.\n\n**Outcome:** No critical or high defects in the fee economics. The swap delta accounting is sound in both directions: the mint debit is cancelled exactly by the returned hook delta, the swapper pays or receives the right amounts, and the hook never acquires an ETH delta or claim. The redemption path burns the entire claim before taking the same amount, so the hook ends every unlock with zero outstanding delta. The existing suite (41 tests plus three stateful invariants over 4096 calls) passes. Four findings were reproduced and recorded in `.imd-findings.json`, ranked by severity:\n\n- **Medium, launch compatibility.** The pool key hard-codes LP fee 0 and `beforeInitialize` rejects any other key with `WrongPool`. The assignment specifies fee 0, so the code follows its spec, but the launch reference says admission holds the fee to the policy tier (12500). If the manifest carries anything but 0, the factory's initialize reverts and the launch is blocked. The requester needs to confirm the tier for this launch.\n- **Low, fee on untraded input.** A sell charges 2.25% of the full specified DEF in `beforeSwap`. A sell of 1,000,000 DEF with a price limit one tick above spot traded 1 wei, returned 0 ETH, and still paid 22,500 DEF. Spec-mandated and documented in the README, but it is the one place the fee formula extracts value without a corresponding trade.\n- **Low, view/write divergence.** Before `setSink`, `claimable(address(0), DEF)` returns the whole pending balance, which no caller can ever redeem.\n- **Low, one-shot liquidity gate.** The factory can add liquidity exactly once. A second seed call, or a re-add after a full withdrawal, reverts `LiquidityLocked`. The protected harness seeds once so it passes, but a factory that seeds two ranges would fail its atomic launch.\n\n**Coverage:** all 11 listed entry points have rows (8 hold, 3 carry findings), plus three invariant rows. Nothing was left unreached. Areas I covered from the three guides: value flows and fee formula edges, token behaviour assumptions, dependency failure on the PoolManager, conservation and delta-sum invariants, view/write equivalence, ordering races on `setSink` versus `flush` (spec-mandated public flush, no unprivileged amplifier beyond design), and the execution-by-periphery seams around partial fills and the launch factory's seeding pattern. Not covered: Uniswap governance protocol fees on the pool, which are outside the hook's control, and a chain-specific rehearsal against the real factory.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":874188,"inputTokens":290,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":29464,"runtime":"claude","turns":23,"wallClockMs":431141}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"e382bd4d2b3e471f","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"poolId is fixed in the constructor as the hash of poolKey(), whose fee field is the literal 0, and beforeInitialize (line 143) calls _checkPool(key) (line 214), which reverts WrongPool for any key hashing differently. The only pool the hook ever accepts is (ETH, DEF, fee 0, spacing 60, this hook). The accepted launch.json in this tree declares pool.fee = 12500 (launch.json line 28) and its notes already flag the mismatch as BLOCKING. The launch factory opens the pool with the manifest's fee, so PoolManager.initialize from $factory reverts inside beforeInitialize, the protected test test_initializesFromTheLaunchFactory fails with IMD_POOL_FEE=12500, and the launch transaction fails. The brief says 'LP fee 0' while the launch policy holds hook launches to the 12500 tier and never 0, so this is a brief-versus-policy conflict the hook cannot absorb: the key is immutable and the fee field has no tolerance. Merged from audit_permissions, audit_economics and audit_flow (same root cause). Raised to high because the consequence is a fully blocked launch, which the launch reference treats as blocking in every round until a code change fixes it. Minimal fix preserving the brief's 2.25%-of-DEF economics: in beforeInitialize accept the key the factory opens when currency0 == ETH, currency1 == def, tickSpacing == 60, hooks == this and the fee is static (not the dynamic flag), store that key/poolId on first initialization, and have poolKey()/poolId()/_checkPool read the stored value; then update README line 7 and the launch.json notes. Alternatively the requester must have the manifest/policy admit fee 0, which the reference says admission does not.","line":92,"path":"src/ReflectionHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {DEF} from \"src/DEF.sol\";\nimport {ReflectionHook} from \"src/ReflectionHook.sol\";\nimport {HookFlags} from \"src/HookFlags.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\n\n/// @dev The launch factory opens the pool at the hook launch policy's LP fee tier (12500) and at the\n/// brief's zero tier. The hook must accept the pool the factory opens; today it hardcodes fee 0 in\n/// poolKey() and beforeInitialize reverts WrongPool for every other tier.\ncontract FeeTierProofTest is Test {\n    uint160 constant Q96 = 79228162514264337593543950336;\n\n    PoolManager manager;\n    DEF token;\n    ReflectionHook hook;\n    address owner = makeAddr(\"owner\");\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        manager = new PoolManager(address(this));\n        token = new DEF();\n        // This test contract plays the launch factory: it CREATE2-deploys the hook and initializes.\n        bytes memory code =\n            abi.encodePacked(type(ReflectionHook).creationCode, abi.encode(manager, token, owner, address(this)));\n        bytes32 h = keccak256(code);\n        for (uint256 i; i < 300_000; ++i) {\n            address p = address(uint160(uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0xff), address(this), bytes32(i), h)))));\n            if (!HookFlags.matches(p, HookFlags.REFLECTION)) continue;\n            bytes32 salt = bytes32(i);\n            address at;\n            assembly (\"memory-safe\") {\n                at := create2(0, add(code, 0x20), mload(code), salt)\n            }\n            require(at != address(0), \"hook deployment reverted\");\n            hook = ReflectionHook(at);\n            break;\n        }\n        require(address(hook) != address(0), \"no salt\");\n    }\n\n    function test_factoryCanOpenThePoolAtThePolicyFeeTier() public {\n        PoolKey memory key = PoolKey({\n            currency0: Currency.wrap(address(0)),\n            currency1: Currency.wrap(address(token)),\n            fee: 12500,\n            tickSpacing: 60,\n            hooks: IHooks(address(hook))\n        });\n        bool opened;\n        try manager.initialize(key, Q96) {\n            opened = true;\n        } catch {}\n        assertTrue(\n            opened,\n            \"the hook refused PoolManager.initialize from the launch factory at LP fee 12500 (the launch policy's tier)\"\n        );\n    }\n}","reproduction":"State: hook deployed by the factory with (manager, DEF, owner, factory). Input: factory calls manager.initialize(PoolKey(Currency(0), Currency(DEF), 12500, 60, hook), 79228162514264337593543950336). Expected (manifest pool.fee 12500): pool opens. Actual: revert WrappedError(hook, IHooks.beforeInitialize.selector, WrongPool(), HookCallFailed()). The same call with fee 0 succeeds. Reproduced: test/scratch/JudgeLeads.t.sol::test_manifestFeeTierRefused (expects the wrapped WrongPool, passes) and the attached proof test/scratch/Proof_FeeTier.t.sol::test_factoryCanOpenThePoolAtThePolicyFeeTier, which fails on this code with 'the hook refused PoolManager.initialize from the launch factory at LP fee 12500'.","severity":"high","snippet":"        return PoolKey(Currency.wrap(address(0)), Currency.wrap(address(def)), 0, 60, IHooks(address(this)));","title":"poolKey() hardcodes LP fee 0 so beforeInitialize refuses the manifest's pool (fee 12500): the launch factory's initialize reverts WrongPool and the launch cannot open its pool"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The brief says beforeAddLiquidity must 'accept only the launch (the factory / the hook itself)' and that 'any later add-liquidity reverts LiquidityLocked()'. The implementation adds a one-use flag on top of the sender gate: liquiditySeeded is set on the first accepted positive add and never cleared, so the factory itself is refused on every later positive liquidityDelta, including a second position in the same launch transaction or a re-seed after a full removal. There is no owner or factory override. If the real launch factory seeds in one modifyLiquidity call (as the protected LaunchFactoryProbe does) this is harmless; if it seeds two ranges the atomic launch reverts. Merged from audit_permissions, audit_economics and audit_flow. Kept at low because the factory's seeding shape is not in front of me; the author should confirm it or drop the liquiditySeeded flag and rely on sender == factory, which still makes test 8 (non-factory adds revert LiquidityLocked) hold.","line":157,"path":"src/ReflectionHook.sol","reproduction":"State: pool initialized by the factory, which has added liquidity once (ticks -887220..887220, +1e24). Input: factory calls modifyLiquidity(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(-60, 60, +1e18, 0), '') through its own unlockCallback. Expected per the brief's wording ('accept only the launch (the factory)'): accepted. Actual: revert WrappedError(hook, IHooks.beforeAddLiquidity.selector, LiquidityLocked(), HookCallFailed()). Reproduced: test/scratch/JudgeLeads.t.sol::test_secondFactoryAddReverts (passes with that exact expected revert).","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (!initialized || liquiditySeeded || (sender != factory && sender != address(this))) {","title":"beforeAddLiquidity is one-shot: the launch factory's second positive add (even inside the launch transaction) reverts LiquidityLocked"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"beforeSwap computes the sell fee from params.amountSpecified before the pool runs, mints the claim and returns it as the specified delta, so the seller owes the fee regardless of how much input the pool consumes. v4 exact-input swaps stop at sqrtPriceLimitX96 or when in-range liquidity runs out; the unconsumed input is not charged by the pool but the hook's fee is not refunded. A buy, by contrast, is charged in afterSwap on actual output, so the two directions are asymmetric: a price-bounded sell can pay 2.25% of the nominal input for a trade that moved almost nothing, and a sell whose limit is already reached pays the fee for zero output. The brief literally says 'fee = 2.25% of the DEF specified' and the README 'Partial fills' section documents the behaviour, so this follows the written rule and is not a code defect; it is reported (merged from audit_math, audit_economics and audit_flow) so the requester can decide whether the 'keep 2.25% of the DEF side of every swap' intent should instead track executed input. v4 does not let afterSwap adjust the specified currency, so charging on executed DEF would need a design change (e.g. refund fee - floor(executed*225/10000) through the unspecified delta, or charge sells in afterSwap on -delta.amount1()). Routers with a minimum-output check turn the worst case into a revert.","line":176,"path":"src/ReflectionHook.sol","reproduction":"State: pool at sqrtPrice 2^96 with full-range liquidity 1e24; trader holds 10,000,000 DEF. Input A: trader swaps SwapParams(zeroForOne=false, amountSpecified=-1_000_000e18, sqrtPriceLimitX96=2^96 + 2^96/10000). Observed: delta0 = +99.99e18 ETH, delta1 = -22_600e18 DEF (100e18 consumed by the pool + 22_500e18 fee), collected() rose by 22_500e18 = 2.25% of the specified 1,000,000e18. Input B: SwapParams(false, -1000e18, 2^96 + 1). Observed: delta0 = 0 ETH out, delta1 = -22.5e18 - 1 wei, collected() +22.5e18: the seller pays the full fee for no output. Expected under 'fee on the DEF that trades': ~2.25e18 and ~0 respectively. Reproduced: test/scratch/JudgeLeads.t.sol::test_partialSellPaysFullFee and test_zeroFillSellStillPaysFee (logged values).","severity":"low","snippet":"        uint256 specified = uint256(-(params.amountSpecified + 1)) + 1;","title":"Sell fee is charged on the full specified DEF input even when a price limit or exhausted liquidity leaves most or all of it untraded (spec-mandated, so a design hazard to confirm)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"claimable compares account to the storage sink with plain equality. Before setSink is ever called sink == address(0), and fees accrue from the first swap, so claimable(address(0), address(def)) returns collected() even though flush() reverts SinkNotSet and claim() reverts NotSink for every real caller. The brief's wording ('returns collected() when account == sink') is satisfied literally and the README notes the quirk, but a fee-source indexer that enumerates accounts sees a non-zero entitlement owed to the zero address. Merged from audit_permissions, audit_economics and audit_flow. One-line hardening: also return 0 when sink == address(0).","line":107,"path":"src/ReflectionHook.sol","reproduction":"State: fresh launch, setSink never called. Input: trader buys with 1 ETH exact input, then read hook.claimable(address(0), address(def)). Observed: collected() = 22499977500022499 and claimable(address(0), DEF) = 22499977500022499; hook.flush() then reverts SinkNotSet(). Expected by an integrator: 0. Reproduced: test/scratch/JudgeLeads.t.sol::test_claimableZeroAddress.","severity":"info","snippet":"        if (account != sink || currency != address(def)) return 0;","title":"claimable(address(0), DEF) reports the whole pending balance while no sink is set, an amount no caller can redeem"}],"hash":"3b67fa9e2ecfc466306ab0ab1676f7b8a598d6feca6ec83c08af48b225424c73","nodeId":"d03af8d2-2a38-448b-b2f3-8d3ed7d6f53c","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. No tracked file was changed; the output is in `.imd-findings.json` (ignored by git, as are my scratch tests).\n\n**Outcome.** The hook's fee, claim and redemption accounting is sound. The full suite of 48 tests passes, and I traced every one of the 11 entry points. One launch-blocking defect survives, plus three lower-severity items the author should confirm or harden. Fifteen specialist findings collapsed into four, all reproduced in `test/scratch/JudgeLeads.t.sol`.\n\n**Findings kept**\n\n1. **High. The hook can only open a pool with LP fee 0.** `poolKey()` hardcodes fee 0 and `beforeInitialize` reverts `WrongPool` on any other key. The accepted `launch.json` declares pool fee 12500 and already labels this blocking. The factory's initialize at 12500 reverts, so the launch cannot open its pool. The attached proof (the specialist's, re-run under test/scratch) fails on this code for exactly that reason. The brief says fee 0 while policy says 12500, so a scope decision is needed, but as the tree stands the launch fails. Suggested fix: accept the static fee the factory opens with, pin currencies, spacing and hook, and store the key.\n2. **Low. Liquidity seeding is one-shot.** A second factory add, even inside the launch transaction, reverts `LiquidityLocked`. Harmless if the factory seeds once, launch-breaking if it seeds two ranges.\n3. **Low. Sell fee is on specified input, not executed input.** A price-bounded sell of 1,000,000 DEF that moved 100 DEF paid 22,500 DEF; a sell at an already-reached limit paid the full fee for zero ETH. The brief mandates this rule and the README documents it, so I report it as a design hazard, not a code bug.\n4. **Info. `claimable(address(0), DEF)` returns the pending balance before the sink is set.** Nobody can redeem it.\n\n**Dropped.** The hookless-pool bypass and the setSink retroactive redirect are inherent to the brief's design and documented, so they are not defects. Slither and aderyn leads were all stylistic.\n\n**Coverage.** 11 entry points answered plus 4 invariant and manifest rows: 8 hold, 3 carry findings. Constructor arguments and permissions in the manifest match the code; only the fee field conflicts.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1182325,"inputTokens":354,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":28964,"runtime":"claude","turns":28,"wallClockMs":444792}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"4537dd883c903237c8651e1be040fe34554e272f9717346c7408ac37b73d97fc","device":"7d2db8d9021f8063","findings":[],"hash":"8157297cbd19956c6baaa03c87307bc87fc1cfbbb0f141c23780c43ca27e462b","nodeId":"669b5389-0106-492b-99ce-b8492df63a51","outcome":"completed","summary":"Created [launch.json](/home/imd3/.identitymd/work/c34adc89-117f-4b3b-b96d-63a1fd08b780/669b5389-0106-492b-99ce-b8492df63a51/launch.json) with matching permissions and constructor placeholders. Only this file changed.\n\nBlocking issue documented first in notes: the hook hardcodes LP fee `0`, so it rejects the required `12500`.\n\n`forge build` succeeded; all 41 tests passed with the supplied fuzz seed. Manifest fields and constructor ABIs checked.\n","treeHash":"0870b4b8b31401a5b72ad059e397ca42fa3eac6c","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":236916,"inputTokens":46700,"model":"gpt-6.1-sol","outputTokens":2642,"runtime":"codex","turns":3,"wallClockMs":56447}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"e8816d4386532a66","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"The pool identity is fixed in the constructor: poolId is the hash of poolKey(), whose fee field is the literal 0, and every callback calls _checkPool(key) (line 214) which reverts WrongPool when the manager's key hashes differently. beforeInitialize therefore accepts exactly one key: (ETH, DEF, fee 0, spacing 60, this hook). The brief states 'LP fee 0', and the README records that choice, but the launch reference states that admission holds the manifest's pool.fee to the hook launch policy's tier, 12500 on every chain today, 'never 0', and that a hook whose beforeInitialize refuses the listed fee cannot launch. The protected floor test test_initializesFromTheLaunchFactory opens the pool with IMD_POOL_FEE from the manifest; with 12500 it fails on this hook. This is a brief-versus-policy conflict that needs a scope decision, not a silent code change: either the policy admits fee 0 for this launch, or the hook must accept the fee the factory opens with. A minimal fix that keeps the brief's intent is to take the key from the beforeInitialize call instead of hardcoding it: accept any static (non-dynamic) fee in {0, 12500} (or any static fee) with currency0 == ETH, currency1 == def and tickSpacing == 60, store the accepted key/poolId on first initialization, and have poolKey()/poolId()/_checkPool read the stored value. The attached proof asserts the factory can open the pool at 12500; it fails today and passes once beforeInitialize accepts that tier.","line":92,"path":"src/ReflectionHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {DEF} from \"src/DEF.sol\";\nimport {ReflectionHook} from \"src/ReflectionHook.sol\";\nimport {HookFlags} from \"src/HookFlags.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\n\n/// @dev The launch factory opens the pool at the hook launch policy's LP fee tier (12500) and at the\n/// brief's zero tier. The hook must accept the pool the factory opens; today it hardcodes fee 0 in\n/// poolKey() and beforeInitialize reverts WrongPool for every other tier.\ncontract FeeTierProofTest is Test {\n    uint160 constant Q96 = 79228162514264337593543950336;\n\n    PoolManager manager;\n    DEF token;\n    ReflectionHook hook;\n    address owner = makeAddr(\"owner\");\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        manager = new PoolManager(address(this));\n        token = new DEF();\n        // This test contract plays the launch factory: it CREATE2-deploys the hook and initializes.\n        bytes memory code =\n            abi.encodePacked(type(ReflectionHook).creationCode, abi.encode(manager, token, owner, address(this)));\n        bytes32 h = keccak256(code);\n        for (uint256 i; i < 300_000; ++i) {\n            address p = address(uint160(uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0xff), address(this), bytes32(i), h)))));\n            if (!HookFlags.matches(p, HookFlags.REFLECTION)) continue;\n            bytes32 salt = bytes32(i);\n            address at;\n            assembly (\"memory-safe\") {\n                at := create2(0, add(code, 0x20), mload(code), salt)\n            }\n            require(at != address(0), \"hook deployment reverted\");\n            hook = ReflectionHook(at);\n            break;\n        }\n        require(address(hook) != address(0), \"no salt\");\n    }\n\n    function test_factoryCanOpenThePoolAtThePolicyFeeTier() public {\n        PoolKey memory key = PoolKey({\n            currency0: Currency.wrap(address(0)),\n            currency1: Currency.wrap(address(token)),\n            fee: 12500,\n            tickSpacing: 60,\n            hooks: IHooks(address(hook))\n        });\n        bool opened;\n        try manager.initialize(key, Q96) {\n            opened = true;\n        } catch {}\n        assertTrue(\n            opened,\n            \"the hook refused PoolManager.initialize from the launch factory at LP fee 12500 (the launch policy's tier)\"\n        );\n    }\n}","reproduction":"State: hook deployed with (manager, DEF, owner, factory). Input: factory calls manager.initialize(PoolKey(ETH, DEF, 12500, 60, hook), 2^96). Expected (launch policy): pool opens. Actual: reverts WrappedError(hook, beforeInitialize.selector, WrongPool(), HookCallFailed()). Reproduced in test/scratch/Leads.t.sol test_leadA_policyFeeTierRefused and in the attached proof.","severity":"medium","snippet":"        return PoolKey(Currency.wrap(address(0)), Currency.wrap(address(def)), 0, 60, IHooks(address(this)));","title":"poolKey() hardcodes LP fee 0, so beforeInitialize refuses the launch policy's 12500 fee tier (WrongPool) and the pool cannot be opened at any other tier"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"beforeSwap computes the sell fee from params.amountSpecified before the pool runs, mints it to the hook and returns it as the specified delta, so the swapper owes the fee regardless of how much of the input the pool actually consumes. When the swap stops early at sqrtPriceLimitX96 (or when liquidity runs out), the pool consumes only part of (specified - fee) and refunds nothing of the fee. The brief's fee rule literally says 'fee = 2.25% of the DEF specified', and the README documents this, so the behaviour matches the letter of the rule; but it contradicts the stated job 'keep 2.25% of the DEF side of every swap' and it is a concrete loss for any seller who sets a price limit, which is the normal way routers bound slippage on v4. In the reproduction the trader pays 22,500 DEF of fee on a trade in which only 100 DEF reached the pool: a 225x effective fee. A buy, by contrast, is charged only on actual output (afterSwap, line 195), so the two directions are asymmetric. v4 does not let afterSwap adjust the specified currency, so charging the sell fee on the executed amount requires a design decision: either (a) charge sells on the executed DEF in afterSwap and settle the fee as an ETH-side unspecified delta (changes the 'DEF only' rule), or (b) keep the rule and make the hazard explicit for integrators (README already does), or (c) in beforeSwap compute the fee on specified but in afterSwap refund fee - floor(executed*225/10000) to the swapper via the unspecified (ETH) delta valued at the swap's realised price. This needs the requester's scope decision; reported so the judge can weigh it rather than silently accepted.","line":176,"path":"src/ReflectionHook.sol","reproduction":"State: pool opened at sqrtPrice 2^96 with full-range liquidity 1e24. Input: trader sells with SwapParams(zeroForOne=false, amountSpecified=-1_000_000e18, sqrtPriceLimitX96 = 2^96 + 2^96/10000) (a 0.01% price bound). Observed: trader's DEF balance falls by 22,600e18; the pool consumed 100e18; hook.collected() == 22,500e18 == 2.25% of the specified 1,000,000e18. Expected under 'fee on the DEF side of the swap': fee 2.25e18 on the 100e18 that traded. Reproduced in test/scratch/Leads.t.sol test_leadE_partialSellFee (logged values).","severity":"medium","snippet":"        uint256 specified = uint256(-(params.amountSpecified + 1)) + 1;\n        uint256 fee = FullMath.mulDiv(specified, FEE_BPS, BPS_DENOMINATOR);","title":"Sell fee is charged on the full specified input even when a price limit fills only a fraction, so a price-limited sell loses up to 2.25% of the untraded amount"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The brief says beforeAddLiquidity 'accept[s] only the launch (the factory / the hook itself)'. The implementation adds a one-use flag on top of the sender check, so the factory may call modifyLiquidity with a positive delta exactly once for the pool's lifetime. A launch factory that seeds in two modifyLiquidity calls (for example a full-range position plus a concentrated one, or a retry after a partial seed) reverts on the second call and the launch transaction fails. The protected Owners probe seeds with one call so the floor passes, but the restriction is stricter than the brief and is not recoverable: there is no owner or factory path to re-open. If a single-shot seed is the intended reading, keep it and state it in the manifest notes; otherwise drop the liquiditySeeded flag and rely on the factory sender check, which still satisfies test 8 (non-factory adds revert LiquidityLocked).","line":157,"path":"src/ReflectionHook.sol","reproduction":"State: factory initialized the pool and added liquidity 1e21 over [-887220, 887220]. Input: factory calls modifyLiquidity again with liquidityDelta 1e21 over [-600, 600]. Expected per brief wording: accepted (sender is the factory). Actual: WrappedError(hook, beforeAddLiquidity.selector, LiquidityLocked(), HookCallFailed()). Reproduced in test/scratch/Leads.t.sol test_leadB_secondFactorySeedReverts.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (!initialized || liquiditySeeded || (sender != factory && sender != address(this))) {\n            revert LiquidityLocked();\n        }\n        liquiditySeeded = true;","title":"beforeAddLiquidity grants the factory a single add; a second seed position or any later factory top-up reverts LiquidityLocked"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Before setSink, sink is address(0), so the equality test makes claimable(address(0), address(def)) return collected(). Nobody can act as address(0), and claim() from any caller reverts NotSink, so no funds move; but a fee-source consumer that enumerates accounts (or a UI) sees a non-zero claim owed to the zero address. The README notes it. Returning 0 while sink == address(0) is a one-line hardening.","line":107,"path":"src/ReflectionHook.sol","reproduction":"State: fresh pool, no setSink. Input: trader buys with 1 ETH exact input; then call hook.claimable(address(0), address(token)). Actual: equals hook.collected() (> 0). Expected: 0. Reproduced in test/scratch/Leads.t.sol test_leadD_claimableZeroAddress.","severity":"info","snippet":"        if (account != sink || currency != address(def)) return 0;","title":"claimable(address(0), DEF) reports the full claim balance while no sink is set"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"DEF is a plain ERC-20 with no transfer tax, so the 2.25% is enforced only inside swaps routed through this pool key. Anyone may initialize PoolKey(ETH, DEF, 3000, 60, IHooks(address(0))) on the same PoolManager and provide liquidity there; swaps on that pool never touch the hook. This is inherent to the brief's design ('the hook has one job ... on a DEF/ETH pool') and not a defect in the hook, but it bounds what 'every swap' means and should be stated in the manifest notes.","line":214,"path":"src/ReflectionHook.sol","reproduction":"Input: any address calls manager.initialize(PoolKey(Currency(0), Currency(DEF), 3000, 60, IHooks(address(0))), 2^96), adds liquidity, and swaps. Actual: no ReflectionFee is emitted and hook.collected() is unchanged. Expected by the hook's design: same (no hook involvement); noted for completeness.","severity":"info","snippet":"        if (PoolId.unwrap(key.toId()) != poolId) revert WrongPool();","title":"The reflection fee applies only to the hook's own pool; a hookless DEF/ETH pool on the same manager trades fee-free"}],"hash":"94370ed3fbbbfdab2c48e976a237c45565ba1a757eb35e059787becaed15d9a3","nodeId":"6bfc8d22-ab0b-4f3a-b6a0-89b89c6ef6ad","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and `.imd-findings.json` is written with 5 findings and 14 coverage rows (all 11 listed entry points plus three invariants). No source files were changed; the only writes are the findings file and scratch tests under the gitignored `test/scratch/`.\n\n**What I checked.** I applied the Senior Auditor's Mindset and the Execution Trace, Periphery and First Principles guides to the hook, the token, the CREATE2 helpers and the mining script, tracing every fee path against the vendored v4-core `Hooks.beforeSwap`/`afterSwap` delta placement and the manager's `mint`/`burn`/`take` accounting. The core fee mechanics hold: both directions land the fee on currency1 (DEF), the mint debit is cancelled by the returned delta, flush nets to zero, every callback is manager-gated, the permission bits match v4-core exactly, and the build plus all 41 existing tests pass.\n\n**Findings, most severe first:**\n\n1. **Medium, launch compatibility.** The pool key hardcodes LP fee 0, so `beforeInitialize` reverts `WrongPool` for any other tier. The brief mandates fee 0, but the launch reference says admission holds `pool.fee` to the policy tier of 12500 and calls a hook that refuses it launch-blocking. This needs a scope decision rather than a quiet code change. Attached a Foundry proof that fails today (initialize at 12500 from the factory) and passes once the hook accepts the tier it is opened with.\n2. **Medium, economic.** Sell fees are charged on the full specified input before the pool runs, so a price-limited sell pays the fee on DEF that never traded. Reproduced: a seller paid 22,500 DEF of fee on a trade where only 100 DEF reached the pool. This matches the brief's literal \"2.25% of the DEF specified\" wording, so I flagged the tension and the v4 constraint (afterSwap cannot adjust the specified currency) for the judge.\n3. **Low.** The factory may add liquidity exactly once. A second seed position reverts `LiquidityLocked`, which is stricter than the brief's \"accept the factory\" rule and is unrecoverable.\n4. **Info.** `claimable(address(0), DEF)` reports the full balance before a sink is set.\n5. **Info.** The fee applies only to this pool key. A hookless DEF/ETH pool on the same manager trades fee-free, which is inherent to the design.\n\n**Not reached.** I did not run the protected floor tests themselves, since they need the verifier's environment and the `Swapper`/`OwnerChecks` mocks that were not supplied. I reasoned about them from source instead.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1454413,"inputTokens":450,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":33638,"runtime":"claude","turns":30,"wallClockMs":471102}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"af40f1332451a0febe5826c20101883a0bbe188676c67f0a69be73014452ad1d","device":"e8e860c7f2306473","findings":[],"hash":"b64e77fa213d9d9f9793e39d2aa47e374905bf9ac1c5b0cc7522ba8edccca06a","nodeId":"8c64199e-1cf3-4624-8986-6e38c42b7b76","outcome":"completed","summary":"The lint note is in the implementer's source, not my files, and it is not a build failure. The work is complete.\n\n**Outcome:** the revised hook changed three things my prior-round suite assumed, and the suite no longer compiled. I updated only what those changes required. The full suite now passes with the verifier's fuzz seed.\n\n| Check | Result |\n| --- | --- |\n| `forge build --offline` | ok |\n| `forge test --offline` with the pinned seed | 51 passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped |\n| `forge fmt --check` on my files | clean |\n| Paths changed | `test/README.md`, `test/ReflectionDifferential.t.sol`, `test/ReflectionLifecycleInvariant.t.sol`, `test/helpers/ReflectionSequenceHandler.sol` |\n\n**What the revision changed and how the tests follow it:**\n\n- **The one-shot seed flag is gone.** The hook no longer exposes `liquiditySeeded`, and the factory may add liquidity again after launch. The invariant now checks `lpFee()` and `poolId()` instead, and the handler no longer expects a factory addition to revert.\n- **Factory liquidity is now a tracked action.** A new `launchLiquidity` handler action has the factory add to its full-range position, remove part of what it added, or collect LP fees with a zero change. It asserts no reflection fee is emitted, claims do not move, and a collect never makes the factory pay. A ghost tracks additions, so the liquidity invariant now checks seed plus tracked additions rather than a constant.\n- **Outsiders stay locked out.** `rejectLiquidity` now tries both a full-range and a concentrated addition from a non-factory actor and requires `LiquidityLocked` with no state change.\n- **The pool opens at the 12500 LP fee tier.** The lifecycle invariant checks that tier instead of zero. The differential test compares LP fee growth between the hooked pool and the hookless oracle pool instead of asserting zero, which also proves the hook adds nothing to the LP fee.\n\n**No findings file written.** I re-read the revised hook adversarially. The only deviations from the brief's literal text are deliberate and documented in the project README: the LP fee is the factory's manifest value rather than a hardcoded 0, and `claimable` returns 0 for every account while no sink is set rather than crediting the zero address. Neither is exploitable and both are already covered by the implementer's own tests, so I did not report them as defects.","treeHash":"ad7f8aa695de6c5661b096d398b2df20ea43ccf7","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1047141,"inputTokens":354,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":17302,"runtime":"claude","turns":34,"wallClockMs":327252}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"1f9cb1750ebf47ed","findings":[],"hash":"ccece8a96ad3fd08f94f816d3dfaf91d6168f1a12b84a0bf9b9483399bd454df","nodeId":"d03af8d2-2a38-448b-b2f3-8d3ed7d6f53c","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file reports no outstanding defects, and the only working-tree change is the untracked findings file itself.\n\n**Settlement of the earlier findings**\n\n- **Fee tier (high): fixed.** The attached proof now passes. The hook stores the fee and pool id in beforeInitialize instead of hardcoding fee 0, and the factory opens the pool at 12500. I also confirmed on a fresh hook that a non-factory initialize reverts NotLaunch, a dynamic-fee key reverts WrongPool, and a second pool at fee 0 after opening reverts AlreadyInitialized. The manifest's pool fee, constructor argument order and permissions list all match the code.\n- **One-shot liquidity (low): fixed.** The flag is gone. A second factory position, a full removal and a factory re-seed all succeed, while a trader add still reverts LiquidityLocked.\n- **Sell fee on specified input (low): dropped.** The author's dispute holds. The brief fixes the sell fee as 2.25% of the specified DEF in beforeSwap, and any refund of untraded input would need an ETH-side delta that breaks the always-zero ETH rule. It is documented in the README and is a design property of the requested rule, not a defect.\n- **claimable for the zero address (info): fixed.** With no sink set, claimable returns 0 for every account, claim from the zero address reverts NotSink, and after setSink the sink's claimable equals the collected balance.\n\n**Second pass on the changed code**\n\nNothing new reproduced. The full suite of 51 tests passes, including the differential fuzz and lifecycle invariants. The slither and aderyn leads are a missing event in beforeInitialize, which the PoolManager's own Initialize event covers, and a false-positive \"unprotected initializer\" on the initialized() view. Creation code is 8,524 bytes and runtime 7,510 bytes, well inside the limits, and the manifest notes are under 4,000 characters.\n\nThe coverage record answers all ten listed entry points as holding, plus a manifest consistency row and the zero-ETH invariant.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":654064,"inputTokens":226,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":14069,"runtime":"claude","turns":20,"wallClockMs":231773}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"9e17b97b8ac7c97a","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"poolKey() hardcodes fee = 0 and beforeInitialize/_checkPool (line 214) reverts WrongPool for any key whose hash differs, so the only pool this hook will ever accept is (ETH, DEF, 0, 60, hook). The brief for this launch says 'LP fee 0, tick spacing 60', and the code follows it; the README (line 7) records that choice deliberately. The launch pipeline reference, however, states that admission holds pool.fee to the hook launch policy's tier (12500 on every chain today, 'never 0'), that beforeInitialize 'must accept the listed fee', and that a hook refusing every listed tier 'cannot launch and is a blocking finding'. If the policy tier list for this launch does not include 0, the factory's PoolManager.initialize reverts inside beforeInitialize and the launch transaction fails; the protected test test_initializesFromTheLaunchFactory would fail with IMD_POOL_FEE=12500. This is not a code bug against the brief, it is a brief-vs-policy conflict that needs a scope decision before deployment: either the manifest/policy admits fee 0 for this launch, or the key's fee must be changed to the policy tier (a one-line change at line 92 plus the README table). Reported at medium because the failure mode is a fully blocked launch, not loss of funds.","line":92,"path":"src/ReflectionHook.sol","reproduction":"State: hook deployed with factory F. Call (from F): manager.initialize(PoolKey(Currency(0), Currency(DEF), 12500, 60, hook), 79228162514264337593543950336). Expected (if policy tier is 12500): pool opens. Actual: revert WrappedError(hook, IHooks.beforeInitialize.selector, WrongPool(), HookCallFailed()). Confirmed by test/scratch/AccessReview.t.sol::test_factoryCannotOpenPoolAtPolicyFeeTier (passes, i.e. the revert happens). The same call with fee 0 succeeds.","severity":"medium","snippet":"        return PoolKey(Currency.wrap(address(0)), Currency.wrap(address(def)), 0, 60, IHooks(address(this)));","title":"Hook's fixed pool key accepts only LP fee 0; the launch factory cannot open the pool at any policy fee tier (e.g. 12500)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The brief says beforeAddLiquidity must 'accept only the launch (the factory / the hook itself)' and that 'any later add-liquidity reverts LiquidityLocked()'. The implementation is stricter than a sender gate: liquiditySeeded is set on the first accepted add and never cleared, so the factory itself is refused on every subsequent positive liquidityDelta, including a second position in the same launch transaction (e.g. a concentrated range beside a full-range one) or a later re-seed from collected fees. There is no owner or factory override. If the real launch factory seeds in more than one modifyLiquidity call, the whole launch transaction reverts; if it seeds once (as the protected LaunchFactoryProbe does), this is harmless. The repo's own test test_allFurtherLiquidityAddsRevertIncludingFactoryAndOwner pins the one-shot behaviour, so the author chose it knowingly; the judge should confirm the factory's seeding shape. A sender-only gate (sender == factory) would satisfy the brief's wording and remove the risk while still locking everyone else out.","line":157,"path":"src/ReflectionHook.sol","reproduction":"State: pool initialized by factory F; F has added liquidity once (LOWER=-887220, UPPER=887220, +1000e18). Call (from F, through its own unlockCallback): manager.modifyLiquidity(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(-60, 60, +1000e18, 0), ''). Expected per 'accept only the launch (the factory)': accepted. Actual: revert WrappedError(hook, IHooks.beforeAddLiquidity.selector, LiquidityLocked(), HookCallFailed()). Confirmed by test/scratch/AccessReview.t.sol::test_factorySecondSeedPositionIsRefused.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (!initialized || liquiditySeeded || (sender != factory && sender != address(this))) {\n            revert LiquidityLocked();\n        }\n        liquiditySeeded = true;","title":"beforeAddLiquidity is one-shot: the launch factory's second positive add (even inside the launch) reverts LiquidityLocked"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Trust-gap (access x asymmetry): fees are not attributed to a sink when they accrue; claimable()/flush()/claim() all read the live sink at redemption time. So the moment the owner calls setSink(new), everything the old sink could have claimed (claimable(old, DEF) == collected()) becomes 0 and the full balance becomes claimable by the new sink. This is the brief's design ('the sink can be moved by the owner only') and the README documents it, so it is recorded here as a trust assumption with its concrete consequences rather than a permission bypass: (1) the owner can at any time take every pending fee for themselves by setSink(owner) followed by flush(); (2) because flush() is permissionless and setSink is not atomic with it, whoever controls the current sink can front-run a pending setSink transaction with flush() and receive the whole pending balance the owner intended to redirect (the unprivileged amplifier is the mempool race on flush()). The second point matters if the owner is moving the sink because the old sink is compromised; the owner should flush through a private relay or accept that the pending balance goes to the old sink. No code change is required by the brief; if the author wants the pending balance to follow the owner's decision atomically, setSink could flush to the old sink (or to the new one) in the same call.","line":95,"path":"src/ReflectionHook.sol","reproduction":"State: sink = S, one buy of 10 ETH done, pending = collected() > 0, claimable(S, DEF) == pending. Call (owner): setSink(owner). Then anyone: flush(). Actual: claimable(S, DEF) == 0 immediately after setSink; token.balanceOf(owner) == pending and token.balanceOf(S) == 0 after flush. Race variant: with setSink(new) pending in the mempool, S (or anyone) calls flush() first; S receives pending, new sink receives 0. Confirmed by test/scratch/AccessReview.t.sol::test_setSinkMovesPendingClaimsAwayFromOldSink.","severity":"low","snippet":"    function setSink(address newSink) external {\n        if (msg.sender != owner) revert NotOwner();\n        if (newSink == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();\n        sink = newSink;\n        emit SinkSet(newSink);\n    }","title":"setSink retroactively redirects all pending claims; no checkpoint for the outgoing sink and an unprivileged flush() can race the change"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"claimable compares account to the storage sink with plain equality. Before setSink is ever called sink == address(0), so claimable(address(0), DEF) returns collected() even though nothing can be claimed (flush reverts SinkNotSet and claim reverts NotSink for every real caller). The brief's wording ('returns collected() when account == sink') is satisfied literally, and the README notes the quirk, but a fee-source indexer that treats a nonzero claimable() as an entitlement will show address(0) as owed the balance. Adding `sink == address(0)` to the zero-return condition keeps the brief's semantics for every real account.","line":107,"path":"src/ReflectionHook.sol","reproduction":"State: fresh launch, setSink never called, one buy of 10 ETH so collected() > 0. Call: claimable(address(0), address(DEF)). Expected by an integrator: 0 (nobody can claim). Actual: == collected(). Confirmed by test/scratch/AccessReview.t.sol::test_claimableReportsZeroAddressAsEntitledBeforeSinkSet.","severity":"info","snippet":"        if (account != sink || currency != address(def)) return 0;","title":"claimable(address(0), DEF) reports the full pending balance while no sink is set"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"DEF is a plain ERC-20 with no transfer tax, and the hook only sees swaps on the one pool whose key names it. Anyone can initialize another DEF/ETH (or DEF/anything) pool on the same PoolManager with hooks = address(0) (or on v3/v2), provide liquidity there, and trade without the 2.25% charge; arbitrage will keep its price aligned with the launch pool. The brief asks exactly for a pool hook ('The hook has one job'), so this is inherent to the chosen design and not a defect of the implementation, but neither the README nor SECURITY.md says it, and holders reading 'reflection fee' may expect it on every DEF trade. Recommend a one-line statement in the README's scope section.","line":18,"path":"src/ReflectionHook.sol","reproduction":"State: launch pool live. Call (any trader T): manager.initialize(PoolKey(Currency(0), Currency(DEF), 3000, 60, IHooks(0)), Q96); T adds liquidity to that pool; T swaps 10 ETH for DEF on it. Actual: swap succeeds, hook.collected() unchanged, T receives 100% of the pool output. Confirmed by test/scratch/AccessReview.t.sol::test_hooklessPoolBypassesReflectionFee.","severity":"info","snippet":"/// @notice Charges exactly 225 bps of DEF on exact-input swaps in one native ETH/DEF pool.","title":"The 2.25% reflection fee is pool-scoped, not token-scoped: any hookless DEF/ETH pool trades DEF fee-free"}],"hash":"d5e4d19ec4fa1f87e2dc78e30b4ce41f2155e930825eba037678e74da03bbcfd","nodeId":"b37f588f-f110-452e-a0c5-cd9741d9134e","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is in place, no tracked file was changed, and the only additions are the git-ignored findings file and my scratch test.\n\n**Outcome.** The permission model of `ReflectionHook` holds. Every callback and the unlock callback accept only the PoolManager, `setSink` is the sole owner power, redemption cannot choose a recipient or amount, and the claim mint/burn/take accounting nets to zero. The existing 41 tests pass. I found no loss-of-funds or permission-bypass defect, so no finding carries a proof file.\n\n**Findings written to `.imd-findings.json`** (each with a reproduction confirmed by `test/scratch/AccessReview.t.sol`):\n\n1. **Medium.** The pool key hardcodes LP fee 0 and `beforeInitialize` reverts `WrongPool` on anything else. The brief mandates fee 0, so the code follows it, but the launch pipeline reference says admission holds the fee to the policy tier of 12500. If the policy does not admit 0, the factory's initialize reverts and the launch is blocked. This needs a scope decision, not a code fix on its own.\n2. **Low.** `beforeAddLiquidity` is one-shot. The factory's own second positive add reverts `LiquidityLocked`, which is stricter than the brief's \"accept only the launch (the factory)\". Harmless if the factory seeds once, launch-breaking if it seeds two positions.\n3. **Low.** `setSink` retroactively redirects all pending claims with no checkpoint for the outgoing sink. Documented trust assumption, recorded with its unprivileged amplifier: anyone can front-run a pending `setSink` with `flush()` so the old sink receives the balance.\n4. **Info.** `claimable(address(0), DEF)` returns the full balance before any sink is set.\n5. **Info.** The fee is pool-scoped. A hookless DEF/ETH pool trades fee-free, and the README does not say so.\n\n**Coverage.** All 11 listed entry points have a row, plus three invariant rows. Verdicts: `beforeInitialize`, `beforeAddLiquidity`, `setSink` and `flush` are marked `finding`, the rest `holds`. Nothing is `unreached`.\n\n**Not covered.** I could not verify the real launch factory's seeding shape or the launch policy's fee tiers, which decide whether findings 1 and 2 are blocking. The judge should confirm both against the manifest assignment.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1615986,"inputTokens":418,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":35681,"runtime":"claude","turns":34,"wallClockMs":496937}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"e0f64c10e30e33e2","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"This is a precision × invariant seam. The brief says 'fee = 2.25% of the DEF specified', and the code does exactly that. Because the charge is fixed in beforeSwap, the effective rate on the DEF that actually trades is above 2.25% whenever the swap fills only partly. The README ('Partial fills') states this deliberately. It is recorded here so the judge knows the 2.25%-of-traded-DEF property only holds for full fills. It is not a defect against the brief as written.","line":176,"path":"src/ReflectionHook.sol","reproduction":"Existing test test_partialSellChargesTheSpecifiedAmountAndRefundsUnusedInput: sell exact-input 100_000e18 DEF with sqrtPriceLimit = getSqrtPriceAtTick(60). Fee = 2_250e18 is minted. The pool uses usedByPool < 97_750e18, so the trader pays usedByPool + 2_250e18 and the effective fee is above 2.25% of the DEF traded. In the extreme case of a sell with no executable liquidity before the limit, usedByPool = 0 and the trader pays 2_250e18 DEF for 0 ETH. Expected per brief: fee = 2.25% of the specified amount (met). Expected if the fee were meant to be on traded DEF: fee = 2.25% of usedByPool + fee.","severity":"info","snippet":"        uint256 specified = uint256(-(params.amountSpecified + 1)) + 1;\n        uint256 fee = FullMath.mulDiv(specified, FEE_BPS, BPS_DENOMINATOR);","title":"Sell fee is charged on the full specified input even when a price limit or exhausted liquidity leaves part of it untraded (spec-mandated, documented)"}],"hash":"db74e2ae6c699cedd3c88aa44d438b8a23be3f28f905cdda8e14a7725e1b3ecd","nodeId":"8ed26126-6a66-4a5f-b83d-b2d44ca975ad","outcome":"completed","summary":"I found no math defects in my area. `.imd-findings.json` holds one info-level note and a coverage row for all 11 entry points, plus two invariant rows. Nothing else in the tree was changed.\n\n**What I checked** (the Math Precision, Boundary and Numerical Gap guides, against `src/ReflectionHook.sol`):\n- **Buy fee (`afterSwap`):** it is 2.25%, rounded down, of the DEF the pool actually produced. On a buy that amount can't be negative, so the conversion is safe. The fee is always less than the output, so the buyer never gets less than 97.75%. The fee minted to the hook and the amount returned to the PoolManager cancel out exactly.\n- **Sell fee (`beforeSwap`):** turning the negative input into a positive amount is safe even at the largest possible negative value. Since the fee is always smaller than the input, the amount that goes into the pool can't flip sign and make the PoolManager reject the swap. The fee only overflows its type above about 7.5e39 DEF, far beyond the 1e27 supply, and in that case the swap just reverts. Exact-output swaps and zero amounts revert.\n- **Rounding:** fees round down, so a swap whose DEF amount is 44 wei or less pays no fee. The trader gains less than 1 wei per swap, which the brief's \"within 1 wei\" allows and gas makes pointless to exploit. The existing test `test_dustRoundingDoesNotOvercharge` already covers it, so I didn't report it.\n- **`flush` / `claim` / `unlockCallback`:** the amount sent is the hook's current DEF claim balance, read inside the unlock. It is burned and then taken to the sink in the same amount, so nothing is left over or double-counted. No ETH claim is ever created.\n- **Supply:** the fixed 1e27 DEF supply rules out overflow on every path.\n\n**The info note (not a defect):** a sell is charged 2.25% of the full amount specified, even if a price limit or thin liquidity means only part of it trades. Selling 100,000 DEF with a price limit at tick 60 still costs a 2,250 DEF fee, though less than 97,750 DEF reaches the pool. A sell that hits no usable liquidity pays the 2,250 DEF fee and gets 0 ETH. This is exactly what the brief asks for, and the README says so. I recorded it so the judge knows the \"2.25%\" holds only when a swap fills completely.\n\n**Tests:**\n- The existing suite passes: 41 tests, including the stateful invariant run of about 4,000 random buys, sells, flushes and sink changes.\n- The three protected test files (`Hook`, `Owners`, `Token`) don't compile here, because they import helper files (`mocks/MockERC20.sol`, `mocks/Swapper.sol`, `floor/OwnerChecks.sol`) that aren't in this tree. I couldn't confirm them locally.\n\nWith no high or critical findings, there were no proof tests to write. The temporary copy I made under `test/scratch/` has been removed.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":457648,"inputTokens":16,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":9252,"runtime":"claude","turns":9,"wallClockMs":128462}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"c0cbb7adb20ec92c4daea788637b73ab2e9595b5ed5944d2a01c1bd592342f64","device":"30739b66307c87c9","findings":[],"hash":"de6830fe5e7cba4217b6bd910cb87e344f2f5d2bd3839511ee4aed50895db53c","nodeId":"6f2cb09d-89a3-4d6f-b91b-563e3ee9ed7c","outcome":"completed","summary":"Implemented the fixed-supply DEF token, 2.25% DEF-only reflection hook, sink redemption, launch restrictions, and vendored dependencies.\n\nVerified with Solidity 0.8.26:\n\n- `forge build --offline` passed.\n- `forge test --offline`: 41 passed, including 4,096 invariant actions.\n- `forge fmt --check` passed.\n\nDeployment parameters, assumptions, and responsibilities are documented in [README.md](/root/.identitymd/work/c34adc89-117f-4b3b-b96d-63a1fd08b780/6f2cb09d-89a3-4d6f-b91b-563e3ee9ed7c/README.md).","treeHash":"5f31749c70f98ac410fdbf1cb0748364ebdda27e","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1295360,"inputTokens":88200,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":32509,"runtime":"codex","turns":6,"wallClockMs":1174722}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"8b52294cc3e0ce1e62de7c8050fbc0883f94648ee8a619143eef49bb6fbed8fb","device":"990f3cfeaa0e6c9a","findings":[],"hash":"f7ac307373c0e0db537e56e2051c183ca5f7226eea9c446f44540c8161852d33","nodeId":"8c64199e-1cf3-4624-8986-6e38c42b7b76","outcome":"completed","summary":"Added tests under `test/` covering independent pool comparisons, rounding boundaries, failed-settlement rollback, and random sequences across multiple traders and sinks.\n\nValidation passed: `forge build` and all 48 tests using the required seed. The new invariant campaign completed 16,384 calls with no unexpected reverts.","treeHash":"ab2408ac1fc0f71bee35d3e3ead06ad3016e4e72","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1834612,"inputTokens":116642,"model":"gpt-6.1-sol","outputTokens":16184,"runtime":"codex","turns":6,"wallClockMs":342559}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":2804,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 82 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 2.70s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":1328,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 4 tests for test/Deployment.t.sol:DeploymentTest\n[PASS] test_boundedMiningFailureIsExplicit() (gas: 2094539)\n[PASS] test_eachZeroConstructorArgumentReverts() (gas: 10496)\n[PASS] test_miningScriptAndConstructorWorkOnEmptyChainWithExplicitOwner() (gas: 73175082)\n[PASS] test_wrongAddressPermissionBitsCannotDeploy() (gas: 22810)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 107.13ms (67.01ms CPU time)\n\nRan 5 tests for test/DEF.t.sol:DEFTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupplyAndTakesNoFee(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 111921, ~: 112319)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 16602063734\n\n[PASS] test_allowanceAndTransferFrom() (gas: 185093)\n[PASS] test_invalidTransfersRevert() (gas: 61746)\n[PASS] test_nameSupplyAndEntireAllocationToDeployer() (gas: 72707)\n[PASS] test_noMintAdminUpgradeOrBurnEntryPoints() (gas: 594278)\nSuite result: ok. 5 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 107.20ms (5.27ms CPU time)\n\nRan 34 tests for test/ReflectionHook.t.sol:ReflectionHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_buyChargesActualDefOutput(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 369495, ~: 373073)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_factoryOpensThePoolAtAnyStaticFee(uint24) (runs: 256, μ: 3895981, ~: 3897138)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 93\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_sellChargesSpecifiedDefBeforeTheSwap(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 366730, ~: 369779)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 617776221\n\n[PASS] test_allCallbacksRejectNonManager() (gas: 314603)\n[PASS] test_anyoneCanFlushAllDefClaimsOnlyToSink() (gas: 639390)\n[PASS] test_buyChargesActualDefOutput() (gas: 369607)\n[PASS] test_buyOnFreshManagerSeededOnlyWithDef() (gas: 25493361)\n[PASS] test_claimRefusesNonSinkWrongRecipientAndWrongCurrency() (gas: 405236)\n[PASS] test_directDefTransfersAreNotFeesAndCannotBeSwept() (gas: 423415)\n[PASS] test_dustRoundingDoesNotOvercharge() (gas: 711832)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputBuyRevertsWithExactErrorAndNoFees() (gas: 74477)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputSellRevertsWithExactErrorAndNoFees() (gas: 74665)\n[PASS] test_factoryOpensThePoolAtThePolicyFeeTierAndTheBriefsZeroTier() (gas: 165303740)\n[PASS] test_failedSwapDoesNotLeaveMintedClaims() (gas: 196409)\n[PASS] test_feeCallbacksRejectWrongCurrencyKey() (gas: 80718)\n[PASS] test_flushInsideExistingUnlockRevertsWithoutLosingClaims() (gas: 379772)\n[PASS] test_flushRequiresSinkEvenWhenThereAreNoFees() (gas: 277845)\n[PASS] test_hugeSellCannotTruncateFeeDelta() (gas: 58434)\n[PASS] test_initializationCannotBeRepeatedOrUseAnotherPool() (gas: 185137)\n[PASS] test_initializationRefusesEveryOtherPoolShape() (gas: 3503941)\n[PASS] test_launchAuthorizationAndFailedSeedRollBack() (gas: 16286474)\n[PASS] test_launchConfigurationAndExactPermissions() (gas: 185593)\n[PASS] test_liquidityAddsAfterLaunchRevertForEveryoneButTheLaunch() (gas: 402292)\n[PASS] test_movingSinkMovesAllPendingClaimsAndRevokesOldSink() (gas: 666562)\n[PASS] test_noAdminOrEtherEntryPoint() (gas: 256032)\n[PASS] test_nothingIsClaimableByAnyoneUntilASinkIsSet() (gas: 353691)\n[PASS] test_onlyOwnerSetsNonzeroSinkAndEmits() (gas: 124280)\n[PASS] test_partialBuyChargesOnlyActualOutput() (gas: 242145)\n[PASS] test_partialSellChargesTheSpecifiedAmountAndRefundsUnusedInput() (gas: 274925)\n[PASS] test_removalZeroLiquidityCollectAndDonationHaveNoHookFee() (gas: 672867)\n[PASS] test_runtimeIsSmallAndHasNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 3110037)\n[PASS] test_sellChargesSpecifiedDefBeforeTheSwap() (gas: 366291)\n[PASS] test_sinkCanPullDirectlyAndOnlyItsDefIsClaimable() (gas: 476464)\n[PASS] test_unlockCallbackRequiresAPendingFlush() (gas: 39762)\nSuite result: ok. 34 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 107.23ms (304.79ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/ReflectionInvariant.t.sol:ReflectionInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nReflectionInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_claimsEqualFeesEarnedMinusRedeemed\n[PASS] invariant_defAndEthAreConserved\n[PASS] invariant_everyUnlockSettlesAllDeltas\n ReflectionInvariantTest invariants (runs: 128, calls: 4096, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract          | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+===========================================================+\n| ReflectionHandler | buy      | 983   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReflectionHandler | moveSink | 1086  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReflectionHandler | redeem   | 1058  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReflectionHandler | sell     | 969   | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 11681\n  Bound result 14264337593543950335\n  Bound result 10270\n  Bound result 57864093\n  Bound result 4128\n  Bound result 5491\n  Bound result 1894\n  Bound result 3776\n  Bound result 12858\n  Bound result 238\n  Bound result 13600\n  Bound result 13640\n  Bound result 4873\n  Bound result 11310\n  Bound result 36627654344792755538\n  Bound result 35864366\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.21s (1.19s CPU time)\n\nRan 4 test suites in 1.21s (1.53s CPU time): 44 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (44 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":45,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"DEF.approve(address,uint256)\",\"DEF.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"DEF.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"ReflectionHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"ReflectionHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"ReflectionHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"ReflectionHook.claim(address,address)\",\"ReflectionHook.flush()\",\"ReflectionHook.setSink(address)\",\"ReflectionHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"DEPENDENCIES.json\":26,\"LICENSE\":23,\"README.md\":96,\"docs/SECURITY.md\":42,\"foundry.toml\":23,\"launch.json\":33,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/MineReflectionHook.s.sol\":25,\"src/DEF.sol\":13,\"src/HookAddress.sol\":28,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":32,\"src/ReflectionHook.sol\":291,\"test/DEF.t.sol\":84,\"test/Deployment.t.sol\":69,\"test/ReflectionHook.t.sol\":615,\"test/ReflectionInvariant.t.sol\":131,\"test/helpers/PoolActor.sol\":90,\"test/helpers/ReflectionFixture.sol\":144},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"0ae1ce7008ff0163e55cbac5b0964fdbae82a7a730d2f06a89da265647f1470a","verifiedTreeHash":"fdaeb5a9254cff006011c0be304dfd36c64f312e","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+8fbf00a5"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":2441,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 82 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 2.35s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":1238,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 5 tests for test/DEF.t.sol:DEFTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupplyAndTakesNoFee(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 111921, ~: 112319)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 0\n\n[PASS] test_allowanceAndTransferFrom() (gas: 185093)\n[PASS] test_invalidTransfersRevert() (gas: 61746)\n[PASS] test_nameSupplyAndEntireAllocationToDeployer() (gas: 72707)\n[PASS] test_noMintAdminUpgradeOrBurnEntryPoints() (gas: 594278)\nSuite result: ok. 5 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 4.92ms (4.98ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/Deployment.t.sol:DeploymentTest\n[PASS] test_boundedMiningFailureIsExplicit() (gas: 2094539)\n[PASS] test_eachZeroConstructorArgumentReverts() (gas: 10496)\n[PASS] test_miningScriptAndConstructorWorkOnEmptyChainWithExplicitOwner() (gas: 73175082)\n[PASS] test_wrongAddressPermissionBitsCannotDeploy() (gas: 22810)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 48.29ms (47.69ms CPU time)\n\nRan 34 tests for test/ReflectionHook.t.sol:ReflectionHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_buyChargesActualDefOutput(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 369495, ~: 373073)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 617776221\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_factoryOpensThePoolAtAnyStaticFee(uint24) (runs: 256, μ: 3895981, ~: 3897138)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 374\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_sellChargesSpecifiedDefBeforeTheSwap(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 366730, ~: 369779)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1\n\n[PASS] test_allCallbacksRejectNonManager() (gas: 314603)\n[PASS] test_anyoneCanFlushAllDefClaimsOnlyToSink() (gas: 639390)\n[PASS] test_buyChargesActualDefOutput() (gas: 369607)\n[PASS] test_buyOnFreshManagerSeededOnlyWithDef() (gas: 25493361)\n[PASS] test_claimRefusesNonSinkWrongRecipientAndWrongCurrency() (gas: 405236)\n[PASS] test_directDefTransfersAreNotFeesAndCannotBeSwept() (gas: 423415)\n[PASS] test_dustRoundingDoesNotOvercharge() (gas: 711832)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputBuyRevertsWithExactErrorAndNoFees() (gas: 74477)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputSellRevertsWithExactErrorAndNoFees() (gas: 74665)\n[PASS] test_factoryOpensThePoolAtThePolicyFeeTierAndTheBriefsZeroTier() (gas: 165303740)\n[PASS] test_failedSwapDoesNotLeaveMintedClaims() (gas: 196409)\n[PASS] test_feeCallbacksRejectWrongCurrencyKey() (gas: 80718)\n[PASS] test_flushInsideExistingUnlockRevertsWithoutLosingClaims() (gas: 379772)\n[PASS] test_flushRequiresSinkEvenWhenThereAreNoFees() (gas: 277845)\n[PASS] test_hugeSellCannotTruncateFeeDelta() (gas: 58434)\n[PASS] test_initializationCannotBeRepeatedOrUseAnotherPool() (gas: 185137)\n[PASS] test_initializationRefusesEveryOtherPoolShape() (gas: 3503941)\n[PASS] test_launchAuthorizationAndFailedSeedRollBack() (gas: 16286474)\n[PASS] test_launchConfigurationAndExactPermissions() (gas: 185593)\n[PASS] test_liquidityAddsAfterLaunchRevertForEveryoneButTheLaunch() (gas: 402292)\n[PASS] test_movingSinkMovesAllPendingClaimsAndRevokesOldSink() (gas: 666562)\n[PASS] test_noAdminOrEtherEntryPoint() (gas: 256032)\n[PASS] test_nothingIsClaimableByAnyoneUntilASinkIsSet() (gas: 353691)\n[PASS] test_onlyOwnerSetsNonzeroSinkAndEmits() (gas: 124280)\n[PASS] test_partialBuyChargesOnlyActualOutput() (gas: 242145)\n[PASS] test_partialSellChargesTheSpecifiedAmountAndRefundsUnusedInput() (gas: 274925)\n[PASS] test_removalZeroLiquidityCollectAndDonationHaveNoHookFee() (gas: 672867)\n[PASS] test_runtimeIsSmallAndHasNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 3110037)\n[PASS] test_sellChargesSpecifiedDefBeforeTheSwap() (gas: 366291)\n[PASS] test_sinkCanPullDirectlyAndOnlyItsDefIsClaimable() (gas: 476464)\n[PASS] test_unlockCallbackRequiresAPendingFlush() (gas: 39762)\nSuite result: ok. 34 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 103.33ms (308.92ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/ReflectionInvariant.t.sol:ReflectionInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nReflectionInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_claimsEqualFeesEarnedMinusRedeemed\n[PASS] invariant_defAndEthAreConserved\n[PASS] invariant_everyUnlockSettlesAllDeltas\n ReflectionInvariantTest invariants (runs: 128, calls: 4096, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract          | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+===========================================================+\n| ReflectionHandler | buy      | 983   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReflectionHandler | moveSink | 1086  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReflectionHandler | redeem   | 1058  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReflectionHandler | sell     | 969   | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 11681\n  Bound result 14264337593543950335\n  Bound result 10270\n  Bound result 57864093\n  Bound result 4128\n  Bound result 5491\n  Bound result 1894\n  Bound result 3776\n  Bound result 12858\n  Bound result 238\n  Bound result 13600\n  Bound result 13640\n  Bound result 4873\n  Bound result 11310\n  Bound result 36627654344792755538\n  Bound result 35864366\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.13s (1.12s CPU time)\n\nRan 4 test suites in 1.14s (1.29s CPU time): 44 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (44 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":40,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"DEF.approve(address,uint256)\",\"DEF.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"DEF.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"ReflectionHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"ReflectionHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"ReflectionHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"ReflectionHook.claim(address,address)\",\"ReflectionHook.flush()\",\"ReflectionHook.setSink(address)\",\"ReflectionHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"DEPENDENCIES.json\":26,\"LICENSE\":23,\"README.md\":96,\"docs/SECURITY.md\":42,\"foundry.toml\":23,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/MineReflectionHook.s.sol\":25,\"src/DEF.sol\":13,\"src/HookAddress.sol\":28,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":32,\"src/ReflectionHook.sol\":291,\"test/DEF.t.sol\":84,\"test/Deployment.t.sol\":69,\"test/ReflectionHook.t.sol\":615,\"test/ReflectionInvariant.t.sol\":131,\"test/helpers/PoolActor.sol\":90,\"test/helpers/ReflectionFixture.sol\":144},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":1114,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[low/medium] events-maths at src/ReflectionHook.sol:158: ReflectionHook.beforeInitialize(address,PoolKey,uint160) (src/ReflectionHook.sol#158-170) should emit an event for: ","passed":true},{"durationMs":405,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[high] unprotected-initializer at src/ReflectionHook.sol:101: Unprotected initializer\n[low] internal-function-used-once at src/HookAddress.sol:10: Internal Function Used Only Once (2 places)\n[low] large-numeric-literal at src/DEF.sol:8: Large Numeric Literal (2 places)\n[low] state-change-without-event at src/ReflectionHook.sol:122: State Change Without Event (3 places)\n[low] uninitialized-local-variable at src/HookAddress.sol:21: Uninitialized Local Variable\n[low] unused-public-function at src/ReflectionHook.sol:96: Public Function Not Used Internally","passed":true},{"durationMs":1683,"exitCode":0,"name":"proof 89dd96407fdd","output":"Compiling 76 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 1.13s\nCompiler run successful!\n\nRan 1 test for test/imd-proof-0aedd01e/Proof_89dd96407fdd.t.sol:FeeTierProofTest\n[PASS] test_factoryCanOpenThePoolAtThePolicyFeeTier() (gas: 115959)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 13.76ms (124.77µs CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test suite in 14.21ms (13.76ms CPU time): 1 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (1 total tests)\n","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"122c76dff04aa31fd81eb95a78810d2dd2a5b9a9f6de401b6d8b8de25760f745","verifiedTreeHash":"d1318cfdc2123deeb43fc32eaf300995134be049","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+8fbf00a5"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":2596,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 82 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 2.49s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":1229,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 4 tests for test/Deployment.t.sol:DeploymentTest\n[PASS] test_boundedMiningFailureIsExplicit() (gas: 2048543)\n[PASS] test_eachZeroConstructorArgumentReverts() (gas: 10496)\n[PASS] test_miningScriptAndConstructorWorkOnEmptyChainWithExplicitOwner() (gas: 4974885)\n[PASS] test_wrongAddressPermissionBitsCannotDeploy() (gas: 22574)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 9.81ms (9.87ms CPU time)\n\nRan 5 tests for test/DEF.t.sol:DEFTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupplyAndTakesNoFee(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 111921, ~: 112319)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 617776221\n\n[PASS] test_allowanceAndTransferFrom() (gas: 185093)\n[PASS] test_invalidTransfersRevert() (gas: 61746)\n[PASS] test_nameSupplyAndEntireAllocationToDeployer() (gas: 72707)\n[PASS] test_noMintAdminUpgradeOrBurnEntryPoints() (gas: 594278)\nSuite result: ok. 5 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 124.16ms (124.61ms CPU time)\n\nRan 31 tests for test/ReflectionHook.t.sol:ReflectionHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_buyChargesActualDefOutput(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 345637, ~: 348824)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 617776221\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_sellChargesSpecifiedDefBeforeTheSwap(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 342739, ~: 345530)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 617776221\n\n[PASS] test_allCallbacksRejectNonManager() (gas: 314540)\n[PASS] test_allFurtherLiquidityAddsRevertIncludingFactoryAndOwner() (gas: 183093)\n[PASS] test_anyoneCanFlushAllDefClaimsOnlyToSink() (gas: 594970)\n[PASS] test_buyChargesActualDefOutput() (gas: 345336)\n[PASS] test_buyOnFreshManagerSeededOnlyWithDef() (gas: 27913241)\n[PASS] test_claimRefusesNonSinkWrongRecipientAndWrongCurrency() (gas: 382006)\n[PASS] test_directDefTransfersAreNotFeesAndCannotBeSwept() (gas: 401167)\n[PASS] test_dustRoundingDoesNotOvercharge() (gas: 680434)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputBuyRevertsWithExactErrorAndNoFees() (gas: 72252)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputSellRevertsWithExactErrorAndNoFees() (gas: 72484)\n[PASS] test_failedSwapDoesNotLeaveMintedClaims() (gas: 194272)\n[PASS] test_feeCallbacksRejectWrongCurrencyKey() (gas: 76511)\n[PASS] test_flushInsideExistingUnlockRevertsWithoutLosingClaims() (gas: 357522)\n[PASS] test_flushRequiresSinkEvenWhenThereAreNoFees() (gas: 255651)\n[PASS] test_hugeSellCannotTruncateFeeDelta() (gas: 56254)\n[PASS] test_initializationCannotBeRepeatedOrUseAnotherPool() (gas: 121335)\n[PASS] test_launchAuthorizationAndFailedSeedRollBack() (gas: 363691997)\n[PASS] test_launchConfigurationAndExactPermissions() (gas: 156908)\n[PASS] test_movingSinkMovesAllPendingClaimsAndRevokesOldSink() (gas: 621506)\n[PASS] test_noAdminOrEtherEntryPoint() (gas: 256054)\n[PASS] test_onlyOwnerSetsNonzeroSinkAndEmits() (gas: 124204)\n[PASS] test_partialBuyChargesOnlyActualOutput() (gas: 217983)\n[PASS] test_partialSellChargesTheSpecifiedAmountAndRefundsUnusedInput() (gas: 250653)\n[PASS] test_removalZeroLiquidityCollectAndDonationHaveNoHookFee() (gas: 654392)\n[PASS] test_runtimeIsSmallAndHasNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 2954344)\n[PASS] test_sellChargesSpecifiedDefBeforeTheSwap() (gas: 342020)\n[PASS] test_sinkCanPullDirectlyAndOnlyItsDefIsClaimable() (gas: 453097)\n[PASS] test_unlockCallbackRequiresAPendingFlush() (gas: 39740)\n[PASS] test_unsetClaimCannotBeCalledAndClaimableFollowsExactAccountRule() (gas: 222006)\nSuite result: ok. 31 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 124.27ms (216.65ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/ReflectionInvariant.t.sol:ReflectionInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nReflectionInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_claimsEqualFeesEarnedMinusRedeemed\n[PASS] invariant_defAndEthAreConserved\n[PASS] invariant_everyUnlockSettlesAllDeltas\n ReflectionInvariantTest invariants (runs: 128, calls: 4096, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract          | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+===========================================================+\n| ReflectionHandler | buy      | 983   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReflectionHandler | moveSink | 1086  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReflectionHandler | redeem   | 1058  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReflectionHandler | sell     | 969   | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 11229\n  Bound result 14264337593543950335\n  Bound result 9864\n  Bound result 57864093\n  Bound result 3603\n  Bound result 4726\n  Bound result 162\n  Bound result 3468\n  Bound result 12144\n  Bound result 238\n  Bound result 13600\n  Bound result 14561\n  Bound result 3127\n  Bound result 10930\n  Bound result 36627654344792755538\n  Bound result 35864366\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.13s (1.12s CPU time)\n\nRan 4 test suites in 1.13s (1.38s CPU time): 41 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (41 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":46,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"DEF.approve(address,uint256)\",\"DEF.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"DEF.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"ReflectionHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"ReflectionHook.beforeAddLiquidity(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(int24,int24,int256,bytes32),bytes)\",\"ReflectionHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"ReflectionHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"ReflectionHook.claim(address,address)\",\"ReflectionHook.flush()\",\"ReflectionHook.setSink(address)\",\"ReflectionHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"DEPENDENCIES.json\":26,\"LICENSE\":23,\"README.md\":96,\"docs/SECURITY.md\":42,\"foundry.toml\":23,\"launch.json\":33,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/MineReflectionHook.s.sol\":25,\"src/DEF.sol\":13,\"src/HookAddress.sol\":28,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":32,\"src/ReflectionHook.sol\":270,\"test/DEF.t.sol\":84,\"test/Deployment.t.sol\":69,\"test/ReflectionHook.t.sol\":513,\"test/ReflectionInvariant.t.sol\":130,\"test/helpers/PoolActor.sol\":90,\"test/helpers/ReflectionFixture.sol\":125},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"8157297cbd19956c6baaa03c87307bc87fc1cfbbb0f141c23780c43ca27e462b","verifiedTreeHash":"0870b4b8b31401a5b72ad059e397ca42fa3eac6c","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+8fbf00a5"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":3777,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 85 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 3.68s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":7843,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 5 tests for test/DEF.t.sol:DEFTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupplyAndTakesNoFee(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 111928, ~: 112343)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 0\n\n[PASS] test_allowanceAndTransferFrom() (gas: 185093)\n[PASS] test_invalidTransfersRevert() (gas: 61746)\n[PASS] test_nameSupplyAndEntireAllocationToDeployer() (gas: 72707)\n[PASS] test_noMintAdminUpgradeOrBurnEntryPoints() (gas: 594278)\nSuite result: ok. 5 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 3.99ms (4.38ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/Deployment.t.sol:DeploymentTest\n[PASS] test_boundedMiningFailureIsExplicit() (gas: 2094539)\n[PASS] test_eachZeroConstructorArgumentReverts() (gas: 10496)\n[PASS] test_miningScriptAndConstructorWorkOnEmptyChainWithExplicitOwner() (gas: 73175082)\n[PASS] test_wrongAddressPermissionBitsCannotDeploy() (gas: 22810)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 151.84ms (95.95ms CPU time)\n\nRan 5 tests for test/ReflectionDifferential.t.sol:ReflectionDifferentialTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_buyMatchesPlainPoolBeforeDefFee(uint96,bool,uint8) (runs: 1000, μ: 477388, ~: 479806)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 9204\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_sellMatchesPlainPoolWithNetInput(uint96,bool,uint8) (runs: 1000, μ: 471898, ~: 475295)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 9204\n\n[PASS] test_buyOneWeiAndSellEntireTraderBalance() (gas: 928111)\n[PASS] test_insufficientDefSettlementRollsBackSellFeeAndPoolState() (gas: 541833)\n[PASS] test_sellFeeRoundingBoundariesMatchPlainPool() (gas: 3748783)\nSuite result: ok. 5 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 151.91ms (243.95ms CPU time)\n\nRan 34 tests for test/ReflectionHook.t.sol:ReflectionHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_buyChargesActualDefOutput(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 369489, ~: 373073)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_factoryOpensThePoolAtAnyStaticFee(uint24) (runs: 256, μ: 3895981, ~: 3897138)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 374\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_sellChargesSpecifiedDefBeforeTheSwap(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 366757, ~: 369779)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1\n\n[PASS] test_allCallbacksRejectNonManager() (gas: 314603)\n[PASS] test_anyoneCanFlushAllDefClaimsOnlyToSink() (gas: 639390)\n[PASS] test_buyChargesActualDefOutput() (gas: 369607)\n[PASS] test_buyOnFreshManagerSeededOnlyWithDef() (gas: 25493361)\n[PASS] test_claimRefusesNonSinkWrongRecipientAndWrongCurrency() (gas: 405236)\n[PASS] test_directDefTransfersAreNotFeesAndCannotBeSwept() (gas: 423415)\n[PASS] test_dustRoundingDoesNotOvercharge() (gas: 711832)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputBuyRevertsWithExactErrorAndNoFees() (gas: 74477)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputSellRevertsWithExactErrorAndNoFees() (gas: 74665)\n[PASS] test_factoryOpensThePoolAtThePolicyFeeTierAndTheBriefsZeroTier() (gas: 165303740)\n[PASS] test_failedSwapDoesNotLeaveMintedClaims() (gas: 196409)\n[PASS] test_feeCallbacksRejectWrongCurrencyKey() (gas: 80718)\n[PASS] test_flushInsideExistingUnlockRevertsWithoutLosingClaims() (gas: 379772)\n[PASS] test_flushRequiresSinkEvenWhenThereAreNoFees() (gas: 277845)\n[PASS] test_hugeSellCannotTruncateFeeDelta() (gas: 58434)\n[PASS] test_initializationCannotBeRepeatedOrUseAnotherPool() (gas: 185137)\n[PASS] test_initializationRefusesEveryOtherPoolShape() (gas: 3503941)\n[PASS] test_launchAuthorizationAndFailedSeedRollBack() (gas: 16286474)\n[PASS] test_launchConfigurationAndExactPermissions() (gas: 185593)\n[PASS] test_liquidityAddsAfterLaunchRevertForEveryoneButTheLaunch() (gas: 402292)\n[PASS] test_movingSinkMovesAllPendingClaimsAndRevokesOldSink() (gas: 666562)\n[PASS] test_noAdminOrEtherEntryPoint() (gas: 256032)\n[PASS] test_nothingIsClaimableByAnyoneUntilASinkIsSet() (gas: 353691)\n[PASS] test_onlyOwnerSetsNonzeroSinkAndEmits() (gas: 124280)\n[PASS] test_partialBuyChargesOnlyActualOutput() (gas: 242145)\n[PASS] test_partialSellChargesTheSpecifiedAmountAndRefundsUnusedInput() (gas: 274925)\n[PASS] test_removalZeroLiquidityCollectAndDonationHaveNoHookFee() (gas: 672867)\n[PASS] test_runtimeIsSmallAndHasNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 3110037)\n[PASS] test_sellChargesSpecifiedDefBeforeTheSwap() (gas: 366291)\n[PASS] test_sinkCanPullDirectlyAndOnlyItsDefIsClaimable() (gas: 476464)\n[PASS] test_unlockCallbackRequiresAPendingFlush() (gas: 39762)\nSuite result: ok. 34 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 154.58ms (565.06ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/ReflectionInvariant.t.sol:ReflectionInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nReflectionInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_claimsEqualFeesEarnedMinusRedeemed\n[PASS] invariant_defAndEthAreConserved\n[PASS] invariant_everyUnlockSettlesAllDeltas\n ReflectionInvariantTest invariants (runs: 128, calls: 4096, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract          | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+===========================================================+\n| ReflectionHandler | buy      | 983   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReflectionHandler | moveSink | 1086  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReflectionHandler | redeem   | 1058  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReflectionHandler | sell     | 969   | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 11681\n  Bound result 14264337593543950335\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 57864093\n  Bound result 4164\n  Bound result 5395\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 3602\n  Bound result 12825\n  Bound result 238\n  Bound result 13600\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 4787\n  Bound result 99000000000000000001\n  Bound result 36627654344792755538\n  Bound result 35864366\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.37s (1.35s CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/ReflectionLifecycleInvariant.t.sol:ReflectionLifecycleInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nReflectionLifecycleInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_allDefAndEthStayWithTrackedParticipants\n[PASS] invariant_pendingFeesAndEachSinkPayoutMatchIndependentGhosts\n[PASS] invariant_poolAndHookRemainLockedAndSettled\n ReflectionLifecycleInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭---------------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract                  | Selector                    | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+======================================================================================+\n| ReflectionSequenceHandler | donate                      | 2086  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReflectionSequenceHandler | launchLiquidity             | 2065  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReflectionSequenceHandler | moveSink                    | 2078  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReflectionSequenceHandler | redeem                      | 2016  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReflectionSequenceHandler | rejectAdministrationOrClaim | 2041  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReflectionSequenceHandler | rejectLiquidity             | 2043  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReflectionSequenceHandler | rejectSwap                  | 2008  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReflectionSequenceHandler | trade                       | 2047  | 0       | 0        |\n╰---------------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 453901797189635\n  Bound result 999000000000000000001\n  Bound result 242186837717235943421\n  Bound result 907710299599097559\n  Bound result 946609565629631732\n  Bound result 17177\n  Bound result 999999999999999501\n  Bound result 4062066666842159598\n  Bound result 10000\n  Bound result 48\n  Bound result 14771\n  Bound result 2322\n  Bound result 11906\n  Bound result 148\n  Bound result 14382\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 800246184884364310\n  Bound result 971\n  Bound result 810046864\n  Bound result 226\n  Bound result 6871\n  Bound result 999999999999999902\n  Bound result 7194\n  Bound result 10000\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 100000000000000000001\n  Bound result 999000000000000000001\n  Bound result 16\n  Bound result 13314\n  Bound result 10000\n  Bound result 999999999999999003\n  Bound result 999999999999999801\n  Bound result 999999999999999501\n  Bound result 999999999999999501\n  Bound result 3981\n  Bound result 999999999999999902\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 4517\n  Bound result 33740732981930846\n  Bound result 548\n  Bound result 89\n  Bound result 4378\n\n[PASS] test_lifecycleReplayIncludesUnsetMovedEmptyAndRefilledClaims() (gas: 4433933)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 100000000000000000001\n  Bound result 999000000000000000001\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 500000000000000000000\n  Bound result 200000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 999999999999999999\n  Bound result 999000000000000000001\n  Bound result 1\n\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 7.73s (7.73s CPU time)\n\nRan 6 test suites in 7.74s (9.56s CPU time): 51 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (51 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":59,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"DEF.approve(address,uint256)\",\"DEF.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"DEF.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"ReflectionHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"ReflectionHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"ReflectionHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"ReflectionHook.claim(address,address)\",\"ReflectionHook.flush()\",\"ReflectionHook.setSink(address)\",\"ReflectionHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"DEPENDENCIES.json\":26,\"LICENSE\":23,\"README.md\":96,\"docs/SECURITY.md\":42,\"foundry.toml\":23,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/MineReflectionHook.s.sol\":25,\"src/DEF.sol\":13,\"src/HookAddress.sol\":28,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":32,\"src/ReflectionHook.sol\":291,\"test/DEF.t.sol\":84,\"test/Deployment.t.sol\":69,\"test/README.md\":39,\"test/ReflectionDifferential.t.sol\":147,\"test/ReflectionHook.t.sol\":615,\"test/ReflectionInvariant.t.sol\":131,\"test/ReflectionLifecycleInvariant.t.sol\":159,\"test/helpers/PoolActor.sol\":90,\"test/helpers/ReflectionFixture.sol\":144,\"test/helpers/ReflectionSequenceHandler.sol\":334},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"b64e77fa213d9d9f9793e39d2aa47e374905bf9ac1c5b0cc7522ba8edccca06a","verifiedTreeHash":"ad7f8aa695de6c5661b096d398b2df20ea43ccf7","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+8fbf00a5"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":2583,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 82 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 2.48s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":1276,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 5 tests for test/DEF.t.sol:DEFTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupplyAndTakesNoFee(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 111921, ~: 112319)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 0\n\n[PASS] test_allowanceAndTransferFrom() (gas: 185093)\n[PASS] test_invalidTransfersRevert() (gas: 61746)\n[PASS] test_nameSupplyAndEntireAllocationToDeployer() (gas: 72707)\n[PASS] test_noMintAdminUpgradeOrBurnEntryPoints() (gas: 594278)\nSuite result: ok. 5 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 3.95ms (4.38ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/Deployment.t.sol:DeploymentTest\n[PASS] test_boundedMiningFailureIsExplicit() (gas: 2048543)\n[PASS] test_eachZeroConstructorArgumentReverts() (gas: 10496)\n[PASS] test_miningScriptAndConstructorWorkOnEmptyChainWithExplicitOwner() (gas: 4974885)\n[PASS] test_wrongAddressPermissionBitsCannotDeploy() (gas: 22574)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 124.36ms (5.84ms CPU time)\n\nRan 31 tests for test/ReflectionHook.t.sol:ReflectionHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_buyChargesActualDefOutput(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 345637, ~: 348824)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 617776221\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_sellChargesSpecifiedDefBeforeTheSwap(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 342739, ~: 345530)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 617776221\n\n[PASS] test_allCallbacksRejectNonManager() (gas: 314540)\n[PASS] test_allFurtherLiquidityAddsRevertIncludingFactoryAndOwner() (gas: 183093)\n[PASS] test_anyoneCanFlushAllDefClaimsOnlyToSink() (gas: 594970)\n[PASS] test_buyChargesActualDefOutput() (gas: 345336)\n[PASS] test_buyOnFreshManagerSeededOnlyWithDef() (gas: 27913241)\n[PASS] test_claimRefusesNonSinkWrongRecipientAndWrongCurrency() (gas: 382006)\n[PASS] test_directDefTransfersAreNotFeesAndCannotBeSwept() (gas: 401167)\n[PASS] test_dustRoundingDoesNotOvercharge() (gas: 680434)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputBuyRevertsWithExactErrorAndNoFees() (gas: 72252)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputSellRevertsWithExactErrorAndNoFees() (gas: 72484)\n[PASS] test_failedSwapDoesNotLeaveMintedClaims() (gas: 194272)\n[PASS] test_feeCallbacksRejectWrongCurrencyKey() (gas: 76511)\n[PASS] test_flushInsideExistingUnlockRevertsWithoutLosingClaims() (gas: 357522)\n[PASS] test_flushRequiresSinkEvenWhenThereAreNoFees() (gas: 255651)\n[PASS] test_hugeSellCannotTruncateFeeDelta() (gas: 56254)\n[PASS] test_initializationCannotBeRepeatedOrUseAnotherPool() (gas: 121335)\n[PASS] test_launchAuthorizationAndFailedSeedRollBack() (gas: 363691997)\n[PASS] test_launchConfigurationAndExactPermissions() (gas: 156908)\n[PASS] test_movingSinkMovesAllPendingClaimsAndRevokesOldSink() (gas: 621506)\n[PASS] test_noAdminOrEtherEntryPoint() (gas: 256054)\n[PASS] test_onlyOwnerSetsNonzeroSinkAndEmits() (gas: 124204)\n[PASS] test_partialBuyChargesOnlyActualOutput() (gas: 217983)\n[PASS] test_partialSellChargesTheSpecifiedAmountAndRefundsUnusedInput() (gas: 250653)\n[PASS] test_removalZeroLiquidityCollectAndDonationHaveNoHookFee() (gas: 654392)\n[PASS] test_runtimeIsSmallAndHasNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 2954344)\n[PASS] test_sellChargesSpecifiedDefBeforeTheSwap() (gas: 342020)\n[PASS] test_sinkCanPullDirectlyAndOnlyItsDefIsClaimable() (gas: 453097)\n[PASS] test_unlockCallbackRequiresAPendingFlush() (gas: 39740)\n[PASS] test_unsetClaimCannotBeCalledAndClaimableFollowsExactAccountRule() (gas: 222006)\nSuite result: ok. 31 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 124.42ms (212.57ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/ReflectionInvariant.t.sol:ReflectionInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nReflectionInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_claimsEqualFeesEarnedMinusRedeemed\n[PASS] invariant_defAndEthAreConserved\n[PASS] invariant_everyUnlockSettlesAllDeltas\n ReflectionInvariantTest invariants (runs: 128, calls: 4096, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract          | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+===========================================================+\n| ReflectionHandler | buy      | 983   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReflectionHandler | moveSink | 1086  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReflectionHandler | redeem   | 1058  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReflectionHandler | sell     | 969   | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 11229\n  Bound result 14264337593543950335\n  Bound result 9864\n  Bound result 57864093\n  Bound result 3603\n  Bound result 4726\n  Bound result 162\n  Bound result 3468\n  Bound result 12144\n  Bound result 238\n  Bound result 13600\n  Bound result 14561\n  Bound result 3127\n  Bound result 10930\n  Bound result 36627654344792755538\n  Bound result 35864366\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.17s (1.16s CPU time)\n\nRan 4 test suites in 1.17s (1.42s CPU time): 41 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (41 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":38,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"DEF.approve(address,uint256)\",\"DEF.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"DEF.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"ReflectionHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"ReflectionHook.beforeAddLiquidity(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(int24,int24,int256,bytes32),bytes)\",\"ReflectionHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"ReflectionHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"ReflectionHook.claim(address,address)\",\"ReflectionHook.flush()\",\"ReflectionHook.setSink(address)\",\"ReflectionHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"DEPENDENCIES.json\":26,\"LICENSE\":23,\"README.md\":96,\"docs/SECURITY.md\":42,\"foundry.toml\":23,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/MineReflectionHook.s.sol\":25,\"src/DEF.sol\":13,\"src/HookAddress.sol\":28,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":32,\"src/ReflectionHook.sol\":270,\"test/DEF.t.sol\":84,\"test/Deployment.t.sol\":69,\"test/ReflectionHook.t.sol\":513,\"test/ReflectionInvariant.t.sol\":130,\"test/helpers/PoolActor.sol\":90,\"test/helpers/ReflectionFixture.sol\":125},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":1323,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"slither: no results at low impact or above","passed":true},{"durationMs":573,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[low] internal-function-used-once at src/HookAddress.sol:10: Internal Function Used Only Once (2 places)\n[low] large-numeric-literal at src/DEF.sol:8: Large Numeric Literal (2 places)\n[low] state-change-without-event at src/ReflectionHook.sol:111: State Change Without Event (4 places)\n[low] uninitialized-local-variable at src/HookAddress.sol:21: Uninitialized Local Variable","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"de6830fe5e7cba4217b6bd910cb87e344f2f5d2bd3839511ee4aed50895db53c","verifiedTreeHash":"5f31749c70f98ac410fdbf1cb0748364ebdda27e","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+8fbf00a5"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":3304,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 85 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 3.21s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":6771,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 5 tests for test/DEF.t.sol:DEFTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupplyAndTakesNoFee(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 111928, ~: 112343)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 0\n\n[PASS] test_allowanceAndTransferFrom() (gas: 185093)\n[PASS] test_invalidTransfersRevert() (gas: 61746)\n[PASS] test_nameSupplyAndEntireAllocationToDeployer() (gas: 72707)\n[PASS] test_noMintAdminUpgradeOrBurnEntryPoints() (gas: 594278)\nSuite result: ok. 5 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 6.29ms (5.51ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/Deployment.t.sol:DeploymentTest\n[PASS] test_boundedMiningFailureIsExplicit() (gas: 2048543)\n[PASS] test_eachZeroConstructorArgumentReverts() (gas: 10496)\n[PASS] test_miningScriptAndConstructorWorkOnEmptyChainWithExplicitOwner() (gas: 4974885)\n[PASS] test_wrongAddressPermissionBitsCannotDeploy() (gas: 22574)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 82.17ms (7.18ms CPU time)\n\nRan 5 tests for test/ReflectionDifferential.t.sol:ReflectionDifferentialTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_buyMatchesPlainPoolBeforeDefFee(uint96,bool,uint8) (runs: 1000, μ: 419969, ~: 421970)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 816734572271189\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_sellMatchesPlainPoolWithNetInput(uint96,bool,uint8) (runs: 1000, μ: 414507, ~: 417434)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 9509694474587940197418117\n  Bound result 2\n\n[PASS] test_buyOneWeiAndSellEntireTraderBalance() (gas: 818071)\n[PASS] test_insufficientDefSettlementRollsBackSellFeeAndPoolState() (gas: 514471)\n[PASS] test_sellFeeRoundingBoundariesMatchPlainPool() (gas: 3510913)\nSuite result: ok. 5 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 84.92ms (155.26ms CPU time)\n\nRan 31 tests for test/ReflectionHook.t.sol:ReflectionHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_buyChargesActualDefOutput(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 345633, ~: 348824)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_sellChargesSpecifiedDefBeforeTheSwap(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 342766, ~: 345530)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1\n\n[PASS] test_allCallbacksRejectNonManager() (gas: 314540)\n[PASS] test_allFurtherLiquidityAddsRevertIncludingFactoryAndOwner() (gas: 183093)\n[PASS] test_anyoneCanFlushAllDefClaimsOnlyToSink() (gas: 594970)\n[PASS] test_buyChargesActualDefOutput() (gas: 345336)\n[PASS] test_buyOnFreshManagerSeededOnlyWithDef() (gas: 27913241)\n[PASS] test_claimRefusesNonSinkWrongRecipientAndWrongCurrency() (gas: 382006)\n[PASS] test_directDefTransfersAreNotFeesAndCannotBeSwept() (gas: 401167)\n[PASS] test_dustRoundingDoesNotOvercharge() (gas: 680434)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputBuyRevertsWithExactErrorAndNoFees() (gas: 72252)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputSellRevertsWithExactErrorAndNoFees() (gas: 72484)\n[PASS] test_failedSwapDoesNotLeaveMintedClaims() (gas: 194272)\n[PASS] test_feeCallbacksRejectWrongCurrencyKey() (gas: 76511)\n[PASS] test_flushInsideExistingUnlockRevertsWithoutLosingClaims() (gas: 357522)\n[PASS] test_flushRequiresSinkEvenWhenThereAreNoFees() (gas: 255651)\n[PASS] test_hugeSellCannotTruncateFeeDelta() (gas: 56254)\n[PASS] test_initializationCannotBeRepeatedOrUseAnotherPool() (gas: 121335)\n[PASS] test_launchAuthorizationAndFailedSeedRollBack() (gas: 363691997)\n[PASS] test_launchConfigurationAndExactPermissions() (gas: 156908)\n[PASS] test_movingSinkMovesAllPendingClaimsAndRevokesOldSink() (gas: 621506)\n[PASS] test_noAdminOrEtherEntryPoint() (gas: 256054)\n[PASS] test_onlyOwnerSetsNonzeroSinkAndEmits() (gas: 124204)\n[PASS] test_partialBuyChargesOnlyActualOutput() (gas: 217983)\n[PASS] test_partialSellChargesTheSpecifiedAmountAndRefundsUnusedInput() (gas: 250653)\n[PASS] test_removalZeroLiquidityCollectAndDonationHaveNoHookFee() (gas: 654392)\n[PASS] test_runtimeIsSmallAndHasNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 2954344)\n[PASS] test_sellChargesSpecifiedDefBeforeTheSwap() (gas: 342020)\n[PASS] test_sinkCanPullDirectlyAndOnlyItsDefIsClaimable() (gas: 453097)\n[PASS] test_unlockCallbackRequiresAPendingFlush() (gas: 39740)\n[PASS] test_unsetClaimCannotBeCalledAndClaimableFollowsExactAccountRule() (gas: 222006)\nSuite result: ok. 31 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 119.06ms (321.09ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/ReflectionInvariant.t.sol:ReflectionInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nReflectionInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_claimsEqualFeesEarnedMinusRedeemed\n[PASS] invariant_defAndEthAreConserved\n[PASS] invariant_everyUnlockSettlesAllDeltas\n ReflectionInvariantTest invariants (runs: 128, calls: 4096, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract          | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+===========================================================+\n| ReflectionHandler | buy      | 983   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReflectionHandler | moveSink | 1086  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReflectionHandler | redeem   | 1058  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReflectionHandler | sell     | 969   | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 11229\n  Bound result 14264337593543950335\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 57864093\n  Bound result 3603\n  Bound result 4728\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 3424\n  Bound result 12040\n  Bound result 238\n  Bound result 13600\n  Bound result 99000000000000000001\n  Bound result 2875\n  Bound result 99000000000000000001\n  Bound result 36627654344792755538\n  Bound result 35864366\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.21s (1.20s CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/ReflectionLifecycleInvariant.t.sol:ReflectionLifecycleInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nReflectionLifecycleInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_allDefAndEthStayWithTrackedParticipants\n[PASS] invariant_pendingFeesAndEachSinkPayoutMatchIndependentGhosts\n[PASS] invariant_poolAndHookRemainLockedAndSettled\n ReflectionLifecycleInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭---------------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract                  | Selector                    | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+======================================================================================+\n| ReflectionSequenceHandler | donate                      | 2310  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReflectionSequenceHandler | moveSink                    | 2297  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReflectionSequenceHandler | redeem                      | 2387  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReflectionSequenceHandler | rejectAdministrationOrClaim | 2328  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReflectionSequenceHandler | rejectLiquidity             | 2392  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReflectionSequenceHandler | rejectSwap                  | 2334  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReflectionSequenceHandler | trade                       | 2336  | 0       | 0        |\n╰---------------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 653034164901311507\n  Bound result 146731778802297060\n  Bound result 999999999999999003\n  Bound result 999999999999999902\n  Bound result 100000000000000000001\n  Bound result 33\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 999999999999999999\n  Bound result 19397\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 1086150\n  Bound result 443523618898959904155\n  Bound result 676\n  Bound result 999999999999999902\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 999000000000000000001\n  Bound result 14702465423\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 481\n  Bound result 999000000000000000001\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 265271295642493\n  Bound result 11095954693688947486\n  Bound result 14700\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 5685\n  Bound result 18287\n  Bound result 529\n  Bound result 100000000000000000001\n  Bound result 9\n  Bound result 332\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 896731778800175110\n  Bound result 2702\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 74000077004805\n  Bound result 441006510878\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 748682731380870308\n  Bound result 999000000000000000001\n  Bound result 11\n  Bound result 157011381\n  Bound result 999999999999999003\n  Bound result 10000\n  Bound result 64\n\n[PASS] test_lifecycleReplayIncludesUnsetMovedEmptyAndRefilledClaims() (gas: 3693958)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 100000000000000000001\n  Bound result 999000000000000000001\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 999999999999999999\n  Bound result 999000000000000000001\n  Bound result 1\n\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 6.66s (6.66s CPU time)\n\nRan 6 test suites in 6.67s (8.17s CPU time): 48 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (48 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":45,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"DEF.approve(address,uint256)\",\"DEF.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"DEF.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"ReflectionHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"ReflectionHook.beforeAddLiquidity(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(int24,int24,int256,bytes32),bytes)\",\"ReflectionHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"ReflectionHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"ReflectionHook.claim(address,address)\",\"ReflectionHook.flush()\",\"ReflectionHook.setSink(address)\",\"ReflectionHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"DEPENDENCIES.json\":26,\"LICENSE\":23,\"README.md\":96,\"docs/SECURITY.md\":42,\"foundry.toml\":23,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/MineReflectionHook.s.sol\":25,\"src/DEF.sol\":13,\"src/HookAddress.sol\":28,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":32,\"src/ReflectionHook.sol\":270,\"test/DEF.t.sol\":84,\"test/Deployment.t.sol\":69,\"test/README.md\":34,\"test/ReflectionDifferential.t.sol\":145,\"test/ReflectionHook.t.sol\":513,\"test/ReflectionInvariant.t.sol\":130,\"test/ReflectionLifecycleInvariant.t.sol\":148,\"test/helpers/PoolActor.sol\":90,\"test/helpers/ReflectionFixture.sol\":125,\"test/helpers/ReflectionSequenceHandler.sol\":299},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"f7ac307373c0e0db537e56e2051c183ca5f7226eea9c446f44540c8161852d33","verifiedTreeHash":"ab2408ac1fc0f71bee35d3e3ead06ad3016e4e72","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+8fbf00a5"}]}