{"assessments":[],"deployments":[],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"432eeaaf-f721-4b29-8681-892e4acf2608","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"0d4e32d654adf566278fbd9e7a8448f1cc8ad53f63d73338910d3a98952736e1","dependsOn":["audit_imported_code"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"2d7d84a1a9972f1497e5bc68a704cbf42294d08c62d2868f102ffe3b909b9b51","skillId":"adapt-contract-project","tools":[]},"key":"adapt_contract_project","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"2d7d84a1a9972f1497e5bc68a704cbf42294d08c62d2868f102ffe3b909b9b51","skillId":"adapt-contract-project","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"8d4975355f17f8ff2bc6778fe2fef791c742c3d44fe9643b87ed3adca71837d5","dependsOn":["adapt_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_economics","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"29aa71de22343d5c79fbef4ccf3dd36580ea97d9ab64bf09232757d053f88fca","dependsOn":["adapt_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_flow","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"9e3763d274fdf922975c9bd2ae6d2a4ba4fc09caf1091caf59b3a12db323401c","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"9897597976b0e72440db7ca402d225aea20f3d37205ba53e7df2400ff80f29cc","skillId":"audit-imported-code","tools":[]},"key":"audit_imported_code","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"9897597976b0e72440db7ca402d225aea20f3d37205ba53e7df2400ff80f29cc","skillId":"audit-imported-code","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"6457284245cb44832ecd904eb709bf5a02fb58bc03f66ccafd6e410de0ebf5b4","dependsOn":["adapt_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest","audit_math","audit_permissions","audit_economics","audit_flow"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"af3aa01159bbf354f621cafa5c0006f6169e0938a8b015be508b7377dbf165bc","skillId":"audit-judge","tools":[]},"key":"audit_judge","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"af3aa01159bbf354f621cafa5c0006f6169e0938a8b015be508b7377dbf165bc","skillId":"audit-judge","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"89b0b81072aac47b063c345177064092a45e847e73d9bf0a1be21926070d2605","dependsOn":["adapt_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_math","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"3017b79302a411162e0b18276988a46381020354070c9da1a6cfe37ba59b22f1","dependsOn":["adapt_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_permissions","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"b276041f6f4162e48097389df6a16975e502e27c6469eb9de95e38d75c4634eb","dependsOn":["audit_imported_code","adapt_contract_project","write_foundry_tests"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"tools":[]},"key":"manifest","kind":"code","role":"integrate","skillHash":null,"skillId":null,"state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"5967b34a542d9a0091b49e63b8c7737c8938e2fe466a21784fb7a0630ccc6311","dependsOn":["adapt_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"4c76766b00591dfe982fe85d3de589fdb2f810e5137c301155d1c5e36a1d3b23","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","tools":[]},"key":"write_foundry_tests","kind":"code","role":"tests","skillHash":"4c76766b00591dfe982fe85d3de589fdb2f810e5137c301155d1c5e36a1d3b23","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"Review, test, audit and launch the corrected IMDirector / Director (case-sensitive) on Robinhood Chain mainnet 4663, paired with IMD, using the pinned self-contained Foundry repository and launch.json. Use the updated SPEC.md in this commit: beforeInitialize plus afterSwap, flags 0x2040, constructor arguments [$owner,$factory] in that order. This supersedes the obsolete afterSwap-only restriction that blocked job 582906e4-3ecf-48b2-ab13-e3a2c52743e8 before deployment. That earlier job created no launch ID or deployed token/hook. Audit findings and the blocked history are public at https://api.imd.fun/jobs/582906e4-3ecf-48b2-ab13-e3a2c52743e8/submissions .\n\nThe nonzero immutable launchFactory comes from $factory. beforeInitialize must accept only the canonical PoolManager with sender == launchFactory, return its selector and never bind or enable. Counterfactual initialization must revert. Preserve the gateway ABI, relay semantics and activation protocol: initially poolBound=false and enabled=false; only the explicit owner manually binds the exact initialized Director/IMD PoolKey once, operator connects the gateway, then owner separately enables. No automatic binding or activation.\n\nFixed token: name IMDirector, symbol Director, 18 decimals, exactly 1e27 units minted once and whole to the factory, no owner, external mint or transfer tax. Factory economics explicitly 80% pool, 10% remainderTo, 10% swarm. Hook fee rate 0%; no backend signer; standard pool LP fee 1.25%. Opening cap follows the Robinhood IMD-pair policy (2500 IMD), not an additional user payment.\n\nOnly relay 4 commands from actual signed BalanceDelta: IMD-input buys ON, sells OFF; minimum actual IMD amount 0.05 inclusive, global cooldown 10s, TTL 120s. Owner may change buy/sell states, positive threshold, cooldown and enabled and transfer ownership in two steps. Device, relay and protocol constants are fixed by SPEC.md. Preserve exact RelayTriggered event and imdToken/deviceId/poolId getters. Return zero hook delta, handle no funds, and do not change swap accounting. Foreign, disabled, unbound, small and cooldown swaps succeed without commands. Relays 1-3 are controlled by an external gateway from ordinary IMD transfers; hardware delivery is outside this contract job.\n\nAll old behavioral assertions are preserved except the explicitly corrected initialization permissions, constructor and public-initialization expectation. Add regressions for real issues. The pinned source passed 34 offline tests (512 fuzz runs), 8 canonical-fork integration tests, both real-LaunchFactory fork launches including 80/10/10 and buys/sells, and all 13 published IMD admission-floor checks in each token order without skips. Reproduce and run current protected admission. Routine manifest/factory compatibility fixes are authorized when backed by concrete findings, tests and documentation; do not weaken relay ABI or owner activation controls. Deliver final source/commit, ABI, audit/judge findings, verified deployment receipts, token/hook/PoolManager addresses, full PoolKey and poolId. Keep relay reactions disabled until owner acceptance.","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"c8e13d81167b4ee0468f6f05a0e27c4c5a5ea3d9694dd4ba0a72eb6e55877cb7","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"432eeaaf-f721-4b29-8681-892e4acf2608","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-2418-review-test-audit-launch"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"52262","feedbackHash":"2a9e3fe8c11cb48607576429cce986e89bb606781c132aaaef4d430a752f73a4","nodeKey":"adapt_contract_project","submissionHash":"0d4e32d654adf566278fbd9e7a8448f1cc8ad53f63d73338910d3a98952736e1","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52169","feedbackHash":"bcdd872d45478e3a0cb5d99c9d4076d0906113d3b2a11af1e5b00ce652d8a4ce","nodeKey":"audit_economics","submissionHash":"8d4975355f17f8ff2bc6778fe2fef791c742c3d44fe9643b87ed3adca71837d5","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51026","feedbackHash":"6c4d3ee7e5df20aa126defde745c64810620fe4277c01782be9d024f8cb0cbb8","nodeKey":"audit_flow","submissionHash":"29aa71de22343d5c79fbef4ccf3dd36580ea97d9ab64bf09232757d053f88fca","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"54231","feedbackHash":"06c06e3e00ce2d971b6b9ce58fbb7af82e2197bad3e20bd3ea54a5a0621a76ac","nodeKey":"audit_imported_code","submissionHash":"9e3763d274fdf922975c9bd2ae6d2a4ba4fc09caf1091caf59b3a12db323401c","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51883","feedbackHash":"72a11fb948ca36efec30f32bd6f7787a6bd6750e0bb97211275611d74bfaf1f0","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"6457284245cb44832ecd904eb709bf5a02fb58bc03f66ccafd6e410de0ebf5b4","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52672","feedbackHash":"edcfec4141e052ce396eda73ae6cb42b5fa9818ca50491a82b5c68e80c18256d","nodeKey":"audit_math","submissionHash":"89b0b81072aac47b063c345177064092a45e847e73d9bf0a1be21926070d2605","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52673","feedbackHash":"aa8d57893b39aadcf8dd491ea55f89b3225dd2554740f7d6162a8f5e94141d9e","nodeKey":"audit_permissions","submissionHash":"3017b79302a411162e0b18276988a46381020354070c9da1a6cfe37ba59b22f1","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52605","feedbackHash":"70fc476704acf91a414d5fe5ec8ddc4836839b24ecceaf9cc4a2f875af232cfc","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"b276041f6f4162e48097389df6a16975e502e27c6469eb9de95e38d75c4634eb","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"53907","feedbackHash":"6f77ffcaa7299ac2059eab29ca98d19b7627b17c564e80c1cf7bcbf95a8ce923","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"5967b34a542d9a0091b49e63b8c7737c8938e2fe466a21784fb7a0630ccc6311","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"6158c4c8f13a3b37d1f361fe32eec713d9f70998095fe37a8aef4ca64ccf8684","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"1373105579ee547bf30a7a0856f73d1c834e370bab76bdbb82674958b4d4a7ad","device":"28e346843ec15530","findings":[],"hash":"0d4e32d654adf566278fbd9e7a8448f1cc8ad53f63d73338910d3a98952736e1","nodeId":"28b41d47-45c0-40ea-b270-78f9f02078c1","outcome":"completed","summary":"The work is committed as `8b893ef` on `codex/imdirector-launch`, with a clean tree.\n\n## Outcome\n\nThe IMDirector / Director hook and token are adapted for the Robinhood Chain `univ4_hook` launch, and every check the brief names passes. Three audit findings reproduced and are fixed with tests. Nothing was deployed, by design: IMD's deployer launches the attested source through the LaunchFactory, so the token, hook and pool addresses, PoolKey and poolId exist only after that launch.\n\n**Source changes in `src/IMDPhysicalHook.sol`**\n\n- **PoolManager is now a constructor argument.** The constructor is `(IPoolManager $poolManager, address $owner, address $factory)`. Audit finding a152f7ee reproduced: with the compiled constant, the pinned admission floor only passed when the verifier happened to build its manager at that exact address. The launch reference also forbids hardcoding it. The constructor stores the address and refuses zero, making no call. `launch.json` constructorArgs is updated to match.\n- **bindPool requires an initialized pool.** Audit finding 16ef6c00 reproduced: a mistyped key consumed the one-shot bind forever. The hook now reads slot0 through StateLibrary and reverts with `PoolNotInitialized` unless the price is set. Since only the factory can open pools on this hook, this also enforces binding to the pool the factory actually opened.\n- **renounceOwnership is disabled.** Audit finding cf32bd75 reproduced: a one-step renounce after enabling left no owner able to turn the relay off. Two-step transfer is unchanged.\n\nThe two info findings (cooldown griefing by dust sells, scope statement) changed no code. The griefing property follows SPEC items 5 and 6 and is owner-tunable through `setRule`.\n\n**Unchanged:** RelayTriggered ABI, relay semantics (buys ON, sells OFF, 0.05 IMD minimum inclusive, 10 s cooldown, 120 s TTL), manual owner bind then enable, zero hook delta, no funds handled, token (1e27 minted once to the factory, no owner or mint), flags 0x2040.\n\n**Verification**\n\n| Check | Result |\n|---|---|\n| `forge build` + `forge test` with the verifier's fuzz seed | 38 passed, 0 failed, 2 skipped (need RH_RPC), 512 fuzz runs |\n| Real-LaunchFactory fork rehearsal on chain 4663 | 2 passed, both token orders, 80/10/10, buy and sell commands |\n| Canonical-fork integration suite | 8 passed |\n| Reproduced protected admission floor, token below IMD | 16 passed, 0 skipped |\n| Same, token above IMD | 16 passed |\n| Same, non-canonical manager address | 16 passed (the previous build failed here) |\n\nThe admission reproduction lives in `test/scratch/` with the four pinned tests and stand-ins for the verifier's helpers; it is not submitted. `ADAPTATION.md` lists each change, file, and the rule or finding behind it. `VALIDATION.md` records the runs. ABIs are exported under `abi/`.\n\n**Open items for the requester and IMD**\n\n- One judgment call to be aware of: the brief fixed constructor arguments as `[$owner,$factory]`. I added `$poolManager` ahead of them, as the audit finding and launch reference require. The brief authorizes exactly this kind of compatibility fix when backed by a concrete finding, and the two named arguments keep their relative order.\n- After launch, the owner reads the real `Initialize` event, calls `bindPool` once, the operator connects the gateway, and the owner calls `setEnabled(true)`. Relay reactions stay disabled until then.","treeHash":"97a53d53373a5868d6a488a34788f99c88d713f6","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2016561,"inputTokens":482,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":44368,"runtime":"claude","turns":53,"wallClockMs":791156}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"56b13350bba65fd7","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"First-principles / assumption-chain observation (Execution Trace + First Principles guides). The hook has two gates on the pool it will serve: beforeInitialize (who may open a pool on this hook) and bindPool (which opened pool the owner may bind). beforeInitialize checks only the caller and sender and ignores the key entirely; bindPool additionally requires exactly one side to be imdToken (line 90). The acceptance set of the first gate is therefore strictly wider than the second. The verified LaunchFactory (Sourcify, 0xA25B…4645, _poolKey) builds the key from params.pairedCurrency, params.fee and params.tickSpacing supplied by IMD's deployer; nothing on chain ties those to this manifest. If the deployer launches with a pairedCurrency other than IMD (e.g. native ETH, or any ERC-20), the hook's beforeInitialize returns its selector, the factory seeds 80% of the supply into that pool, trading starts, and bindPool reverts InvalidPool for that key forever (the one-shot bind is not consumed, but no bindable pool exists on this hook and the factory cannot open another launch on the same hook address). Relay 4 is dead for the life of the launch; the only remedy is a new launch. A fee or tickSpacing other than the manifest's (e.g. fee 3000) is likewise accepted by beforeInitialize and is bindable, which matches SPEC item 2 (bind the exact initialized key), so only the pair-currency case is irrecoverable. SPEC item 1 is satisfied as written; this is a gap between what the hook can verify at launch time (it already compiles the IMD address) and what it chooses to verify, so it is reported as informational, not as a defect against the spec. Trade-off the author/judge must weigh before changing anything: the pinned Hook floor's test_initializesFromTheLaunchFactory builds its launch key from IMD_PAIRED_CURRENCY; if the verifier ever runs that floor without the pair currency, currency0 becomes address(0) and a stricter beforeInitialize would fail admission. With the manifest's pairedCurrency = IMD and the floor etching a stand-in at that address, a check that exactly one side equals imdToken passes the floor. Minimal fix if adopted: in beforeInitialize add `if ((Currency.unwrap(key.currency0) == imdToken) == (Currency.unwrap(key.currency1) == imdToken)) revert InvalidPool();` so a wrong pairing reverts the launch transaction (safe failure: nothing deployed, fees refundable) instead of producing a live pool with a dead relay. Alternatively keep the code and record in README/launch notes that `pairWith: imd` is a launch-request invariant the hook does not enforce.","line":168,"path":"src/IMDPhysicalHook.sol","reproduction":"State: hook deployed with (MANAGER, owner, FACTORY); a real PoolManager at MANAGER. Call 1: vm.prank(FACTORY); PoolManager.initialize(PoolKey{currency0: Director(0x9000…0000), currency1: WETH-like(0x1000), fee 12500, tickSpacing 60, hooks: hook}, 2^96) → succeeds (beforeInitialize returns selector). Call 2: owner.bindPool(sameKey) → reverts InvalidPool; poolBound stays false. No key exists that both the factory opened on this hook and bindPool accepts, so setEnabled(true) reverts PoolNotBound forever. Expected (if the hook enforced its own pairing rule): call 1 reverts inside the launch transaction. Reproduced in a scratch test (test_factoryCanOpenAPoolBindPoolCanNeverAccept, test/scratch, not kept) on this tree; the same scratch test also shows a factory-opened fee-3000 Director/IMD key is accepted and bindable.","severity":"info","snippet":"    function beforeInitialize(address sender, PoolKey calldata, uint160) external view returns (bytes4) {\n        if (msg.sender != address(poolManager)) revert OnlyPoolManager();\n        if (sender != launchFactory) revert OnlyLaunchFactory();\n        return IHooks.beforeInitialize.selector;\n    }","title":"beforeInitialize accepts any factory-opened PoolKey, including one bindPool can never accept (non-IMD pair), so a mis-parameterised launch leaves relay 4 permanently unbindable on a live pool"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Documentation accuracy. The tree now carries test/admission (the in-repo reproduction of the four protected floors) and the accounting/invariant suites, and `FOUNDRY_FUZZ_SEED=0xc593…0917 forge test` on this commit reports 19 suites, 98 passed, 0 failed, 2 skipped (100 total). launch.json notes already say 98. VALIDATION.md line 19 and ADAPTATION.md line 80 still state 38 passed, which describes an earlier tree. The verified results themselves are not wrong (I reproduced 98/0/2 offline, both real-LaunchFactory fork rehearsals passing on chain 4663 at the current head, and the committed abi/*.json matching `forge inspect` on this build); only the count is stale. A reader comparing the record against a run on this commit would conclude the record was produced from different code.","line":19,"path":"VALIDATION.md","reproduction":"Run `FOUNDRY_FUZZ_SEED=0xc59360b1fc5918340b5f23d218d10f16c1da967703989519e5bf5e02e9020917 forge test` at HEAD 41e3e33: output ends `Ran 19 test suites … 98 tests passed, 0 failed, 2 skipped (100 total tests)`. VALIDATION.md line 19 and ADAPTATION.md line 80 say 38 passed. Expected: the validation record states the count of the suite it ships with (98 passed, 2 skipped) or names which subset the 38 refers to.","severity":"info","snippet":"- Offline suite with the verifier's fuzz seed: **38 passed, 0 failed, 2 skipped** (the two skipped need `RH_RPC` and ran","title":"VALIDATION.md and ADAPTATION.md record the offline suite as 38 tests while the committed tree runs 100 (98 passed, 2 skipped)"}],"hash":"29aa71de22343d5c79fbef4ccf3dd36580ea97d9ab64bf09232757d053f88fca","nodeId":"0c387937-fafb-4cb4-ac1e-6c6b69181b35","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. The findings file is written and validated against the tree, the scratch tests are removed, and the working tree is clean apart from `.imd-findings.json`.\n\n**Outcome: no defect found in the assigned area.** The corrected hook holds across the Execution Trace, Periphery and First Principles checks, and I reproduced every claim in the validation record that I could reach:\n\n- Offline suite at this commit with the verifier's fuzz seed: 98 passed, 0 failed, 2 skipped, including the in-repo reproduction of the four protected admission floors in both token orders.\n- Both real-LaunchFactory fork rehearsals against Robinhood Chain 4663 pass live. The real factory deploys the token and hook, initializes with `sender == launchFactory`, seeds 80/10/10, and the hook binds, enables and emits buy and sell commands 1 and 2 on the canonical PoolManager.\n- The verified LaunchFactory source from Sourcify confirms the hook's trust assumption: `launch()` calls `poolManager.initialize` directly from the factory and uses raw CREATE2, so the sender check is exact and the hook address cannot be reused by another launch.\n- Committed ABI files equal `forge inspect` on this build. Manifest constructor order, permissions, fee, lowercase pair address and notes length all check out. IMD on chain has 18 decimals, so the 0.05 threshold is in the intended unit.\n- Two extra execution-trace scenarios behaved as specified: a buy-then-sell inside one unlock emits only the buy under the default cooldown and both legs with cooldown zero, and a transaction that reverts after the swap rolls back the command and timer.\n\n**Two informational findings were recorded**, neither a spec violation:\n\n1. `beforeInitialize` validates sender only, not the key. If IMD's deployer ever launched this hook with a pair currency other than IMD, the launch would succeed and `bindPool` would refuse that key forever, leaving relay 4 dead on a live pool. A one-line pairing check in `beforeInitialize` would turn that into a safe launch-time revert. I flagged the admission trade-off the judge should weigh: the pinned Hook floor builds its launch key from the verifier's pair-currency input.\n2. VALIDATION.md and ADAPTATION.md still say the offline suite is 38 tests. The committed tree runs 100, and launch.json already says 98.\n\nStatic-analysis leads were checked and dismissed with reasons in the coverage record. All nine listed entry points are marked `holds`, with additional rows for `beforeInitialize`, the constructor and manifest, `renounceOwnership`, the factory fee-collect path, the accounting invariant and the static-analysis leads.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2658560,"inputTokens":548,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":36546,"runtime":"claude","turns":48,"wallClockMs":703232}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"476778ae63dff113","findings":[],"hash":"3017b79302a411162e0b18276988a46381020354070c9da1a6cfe37ba59b22f1","nodeId":"9f81251c-393a-4c97-8800-27099ef36773","outcome":"completed","summary":"I found no permission defects, so `.imd-findings.json` has an empty findings list plus a coverage row for all 9 listed entry points, each marked `holds`. This came from reading the source and `launch.json` only. I did not run `forge test` or write any test under `test/scratch/`, and no other files were changed.\n\n**Access control**\n- **`afterSwap`:** only the PoolManager can call it. Swaps on another pool, or while the hook is unbound or disabled, return the selector with a zero delta and move no funds.\n- **`beforeInitialize`:** it accepts only the PoolManager with `sender == launchFactory` (`src/IMDPhysicalHook.sol:168-172`). It is a `view` function, so it can never bind or enable. Anyone else trying to initialize the predicted pool first gets `OnlyLaunchFactory`.\n- **`bindPool`:** owner only, and it works once. The key must point at this hook, have its two currencies in sorted order with IMD on exactly one side, and already be initialized in the PoolManager. Since only the factory can initialize, a mistyped key can't use up the one bind.\n- **`setEnabled`:** owner only. Turning it on requires a bound pool; turning it off is always allowed.\n- **`setRule`:** owner only, and a zero threshold is rejected.\n- **Ownership:** it moves only in two steps (`transferOwnership`, then `acceptOwnership` by the new owner). `renounceOwnership` is overridden to always revert. The factory and `tx.origin` never get owner rights.\n\n**Trust gap and asymmetry**\n- **Owner powers:** the owner can change the buy and sell states, the threshold and the cooldown, including setting the cooldown to 0. SPEC.md allows this, so I count it as a trust assumption, not a defect.\n- **Initialization checks:** `beforeInitialize` does not check the fee or tick spacing. The factory is the only caller allowed, and the brief doesn't ask for those checks.\n\n**Token:** `IMDirectorToken` is a plain OpenZeppelin ERC20. It mints 1e27 once to its deployer (the factory) and has no owner, extra mint function or transfer tax.\n\n**Manifest:** the constructor arguments are `[$poolManager, $owner, $factory]`, which matches the constructor's parameter order. The brief said `[$owner,$factory]`, but the PoolManager has to be a constructor argument written `\"$poolManager\"` under the manifest rules, so this is correct. The permissions match `getHookPermissions`, and the pool fee is 12500 (1.25%).\n\n**Static analysis leads, none turned into findings:**\n- **Unused return at `bindPool`:** only `sqrtPriceX96` is needed from `getSlot0`, so ignoring the rest is fine.\n- **Timestamp comparison in `afterSwap`:** it is used only for the 10-second cooldown, as the spec intends.\n- **Centralization risk:** this is the owner role the spec asks for.\n\n**Not covered:** I didn't reproduce the deployment receipts, the PoolKey or poolId, or the fork and admission test runs; the brief says these come after deployment.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":136023,"inputTokens":6,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":2446,"runtime":"claude","turns":3,"wallClockMs":29265}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"7fd26d3df7d30994473bac04fc27137c15c9fa48714332aba8cb6c07bfb449b9","device":"1d91ef3b034fced4","findings":[],"hash":"5967b34a542d9a0091b49e63b8c7737c8938e2fe466a21784fb7a0630ccc6311","nodeId":"9c06a0f4-2a50-476f-9c67-dd7d8262e150","outcome":"completed","summary":"Repaired the build failure by loading fixture bytecode from build artifacts, preserving all assertions and run counts.\n\n- Fresh `forge build`: passed.\n- Required-seed offline tests: **98 passed, 0 failed, 2 RPC skips**.\n- Admission checks: **38 passed**.\n- Separate fork runs: **8 integration tests and both factory rehearsals passed**.\n\nChanges stay within `test/`. Results are documented in [TESTING.md](/home/seat/.identitymd/work/432eeaaf-f721-4b29-8681-892e4acf2608/9c06a0f4-2a50-476f-9c67-dd7d8262e150/test/TESTING.md). No mainnet transaction was broadcast.","treeHash":"0bfde7652ecd612051a1d917a773446aef27658e","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":8104704,"inputTokens":245176,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":54781,"runtime":"codex","turns":23,"wallClockMs":2081529}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"707624586655cf74","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_economics finding 0931eaf1 and the earlier info finding 1f36301726ed that ADAPTATION.md records as accepted design. The cooldown is global to the bound pool and the first eligible swap in each window decides the command. A sell whose actual IMD output is >= minImdAmount (0.05 IMD) emits desiredState = sellState (false by default); every buy for the next cooldownSeconds is skipped at this line without advancing lastTriggerAt. The cost is two 1.25% LP fees on 0.05 IMD plus gas per window. No funds move, no swap reverts, and LP fee accounting is untouched; only the physical relay is affected. This is exactly what SPEC.md items 5 and 6 require (global cooldown, skips never advance the timer) and the owner can tune it with setRule (threshold, states, cooldown) or stop it with setEnabled(false). Reported as a trust/design note for the judge record; no code change is proposed because changing it would alter the requested relay semantics.","line":151,"path":"src/IMDPhysicalHook.sol","reproduction":"State: pool bound and enabled, default rule (buy ON, sell OFF, 0.05 IMD, 10 s). t=1000 afterSwap from the PoolManager with delta IMD=+0.05e18, Director=-1 (a sell) -> RelayTriggered(commandId=1, desiredState=false). t=1005 afterSwap with IMD=-1e18, Director=+1 (a 1 IMD buy) -> no event, lastCommandId stays 1, lastTriggerAt stays 1000. t=1010 the same sell again -> commandId=2, desiredState=false. Reproduced with test_sellEveryCooldownHoldsRelayOff in test/scratch/JudgeRepro.t.sol (3 passed) and by the existing testCooldownBoundaryAndSkippedEventsDoNotMoveTimer in test/IMDPhysicalHook.t.sol. Expected per SPEC: exactly this.","severity":"info","snippet":"        if (amount < minImdAmount || (lastCommandId != 0 && block.timestamp - lastTriggerAt < cooldownSeconds)) {","title":"Relay 4 can be held OFF by any trader for about 0.00125 IMD per 10 s window (global first-eligible-wins cooldown; documented SPEC design, not a defect)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"From audit_flow finding 7cd9b582, reproduced. beforeInitialize (lines 168-172) checks only msg.sender == poolManager and sender == launchFactory and returns its selector for any key. bindPool (line 90) additionally requires exactly one side to equal imdToken. If the deployer ever launched this hook with a pairedCurrency other than IMD, the factory would open and seed that pool, trading would start, and bindPool would revert InvalidPool for it forever; the one-shot bind is not consumed, but no bindable pool exists on this hook address, so setEnabled(true) reverts PoolNotBound for the life of the launch. A factory-opened Director/IMD key with a non-manifest fee (e.g. 3000) is accepted and bindable, which matches SPEC item 2 (bind the exact initialized key), so only the pair-currency case is irrecoverable. The manifest's pool.pairedCurrency is IMD (0x5f7b...7127, equal to the compiled imdToken constant) and the real-LaunchFactory fork rehearsal passes with that pairing in both token orders, so this is a gap between what the hook could verify at launch time and what it chooses to verify, not a deviation from SPEC item 1 as written. Trade-off if adopted: the pinned Hook floor's test_initializesFromTheLaunchFactory builds the launch key from IMD_PAIRED_CURRENCY; with the manifest's pairing (and the floor's stand-in etched at the IMD address) a check that exactly one side equals imdToken would pass. Optional minimal change: revert InvalidPool in beforeInitialize when (currency0 == imdToken) == (currency1 == imdToken), so a wrong pairing fails inside the launch transaction instead of producing a live pool with a dead relay; or record in README/launch notes that pairWith: imd is a launch-request invariant the hook does not enforce.","line":170,"path":"src/IMDPhysicalHook.sol","reproduction":"Hook built with (PoolManager, owner, FACTORY=0xA25B...4645); real PoolManager. vm.prank(FACTORY); PoolManager.initialize(PoolKey{currency0: 0x1000 (WETH-like), currency1: 0x9000...0000 (Director), fee 12500, tickSpacing 60, hooks: hook}, 2^96) -> succeeds. owner.bindPool(sameKey) -> reverts InvalidPool; poolBound stays false; setEnabled(true) -> reverts PoolNotBound. Same test: vm.prank(FACTORY); initialize(IMD/Director, fee 3000) succeeds and bindPool accepts it. Reproduced with test_factoryCanOpenNonImdPoolThatBindPoolNeverAccepts in test/scratch/JudgeRepro.t.sol (passes on this tree, i.e. the behaviour is as described). Expected if the hook enforced its own pairing rule: the first initialize reverts inside the launch transaction.","severity":"info","snippet":"        if (sender != launchFactory) revert OnlyLaunchFactory();","title":"beforeInitialize ignores the PoolKey, so a mis-parameterised factory launch (non-IMD pair) would open a live pool that bindPool can never bind"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"From audit_flow finding 28e7e405, reproduced. The tree now carries test/admission (the in-repo reproduction of the four pinned protected floors, 16 cases in both token orders plus the alternate-manager Hook/Owners cases), the accounting suite and two invariant suites. The offline run on this commit reports 19 suites, 98 passed, 0 failed, 2 skipped (100 total). launch.json notes already say 98; VALIDATION.md line 19 and ADAPTATION.md line 80 still say 38 passed, which describes an earlier tree. The verified results themselves hold (I reproduced 98/0/2 offline, 2/2 real-LaunchFactory fork rehearsals on chain 4663, 8/8 canonical-fork integration tests, and the committed abi/*.json equal forge inspect on this build); only the count is stale. A reader comparing the record against a run on this commit would conclude the record was produced from different code. Documentation only; no code change.","line":19,"path":"VALIDATION.md","reproduction":"Run `FOUNDRY_FUZZ_SEED=0xc59360b1fc5918340b5f23d218d10f16c1da967703989519e5bf5e02e9020917 forge test` at HEAD 41e3e33: output ends `Ran 19 test suites ... 98 tests passed, 0 failed, 2 skipped (100 total tests)`. VALIDATION.md line 19 and ADAPTATION.md line 80 state 38 passed. Expected: the record states 98 passed, 2 skipped, or names the subset the 38 refers to.","severity":"info","snippet":"- Offline suite with the verifier's fuzz seed: **38 passed, 0 failed, 2 skipped** (the two skipped need `RH_RPC` and ran","title":"VALIDATION.md and ADAPTATION.md record the offline suite as 38 passed while the committed tree runs 98 passed, 2 skipped"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"From audit_economics finding 437d2db4, reproduced. The brief names constructor arguments [$owner,$factory]; the tree's constructor is (IPoolManager poolManager_, address initialOwner, address initialFactory) at src/IMDPhysicalHook.sol:73 and launch.json hook.constructorArgs is [\"$poolManager\",\"$owner\",\"$factory\"], one entry per parameter in declaration order with $owner and $factory keeping their relative order. The launch reference requires the PoolManager as a constructor argument written $poolManager and forbids a hardcoded manager, and ADAPTATION.md change 1 cites the reproduced finding a152f7ee (a compiled PoolManager constant failed the protected floor whenever the verifier built its manager elsewhere). This is the routine manifest/factory compatibility fix the brief authorizes when backed by a finding, tests and documentation. Verified: the real-LaunchFactory fork rehearsal on chain 4663 passes with the hook constructed as (MANAGER 0x8366...0951, OWNER, FACTORY), hook.owner() == $owner, launchFactory == factory, poolManager == canonical manager, 80/10/10 allocation, bind, enable, buy and sell commands 1 and 2. Recorded so the three-entry list is not read as a manifest/constructor mismatch. No defect.","line":6,"path":"launch.json","reproduction":"Read launch.json lines 5-9 and src/IMDPhysicalHook.sol line 73. A manifest written as the brief's literal two entries would ABI-decode $owner as the IPoolManager and fail to decode the third word, so the three-entry form is the only one that deploys this source. `RH_RPC=https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com forge test --match-contract IMDirectorLaunchForkTest`: 2 passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped on this tree.","severity":"info","snippet":"      \"$poolManager\",","title":"Constructor and manifest carry [$poolManager,$owner,$factory], not the brief's literal [$owner,$factory] (authorized, documented compatibility fix; not a mismatch)"}],"hash":"6457284245cb44832ecd904eb709bf5a02fb58bc03f66ccafd6e410de0ebf5b4","nodeId":"d1fa4424-3ba1-4455-867d-3e02a0638c09","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. The findings file is written and validated against the tree, and the working tree is clean apart from `.imd-findings.json`.\n\n**Outcome: no defects that block admission.** All four specialist findings reproduced, all four stay at info, and nothing I found myself rises above them.\n\nWhat I verified on this commit (41e3e33):\n\n- **Offline suite** with the verifier's fuzz seed: 98 passed, 0 failed, 2 skipped (the two need RH_RPC).\n- **Real-LaunchFactory fork rehearsal** on Robinhood Chain 4663 over the network: 2 passed, both token orders, with 80/10/10, bind, enable, buy and sell commands.\n- **Canonical-fork integration suite** on chain 4663: 8 passed.\n- **Committed ABIs** equal `forge inspect` output for both contracts.\n- **Manifest**: schema keys only, three constructor entries in declaration order, permissions match `getHookPermissions`, lowercase IMD pair, fee 12500, notes under 4,000 characters.\n- **Protected floors**: the pinned files cannot compile verbatim against the vendored libraries (newer v4-core layout, missing forge-std overload), so I checked the in-repo port in `test/admission` line by line against the pinned sources. It passes in both token orders and with an alternate manager address.\n\nFindings kept, all info:\n\n1. **Relay griefing via global cooldown.** A 0.05 IMD sell every 10 seconds holds relay 4 OFF while buys in the window are skipped. Merged from audit_economics and the earlier accepted-design note. It is exactly what SPEC items 5 and 6 require and is owner-tunable. Reproduced in a scratch test and the existing cooldown test.\n2. **beforeInitialize ignores the PoolKey.** The factory could open a non-IMD pool on the hook that `bindPool` can never accept, leaving relay 4 dead for that launch. Reproduced in a scratch test. The manifest pairs with IMD and the real-factory rehearsal passes, so this is a hardening option, not a spec deviation.\n3. **Stale test count** in VALIDATION.md and ADAPTATION.md (38 versus 98 passed). Documentation only.\n4. **Three constructor entries** versus the brief's literal two. This is the authorized, documented compatibility fix the reference requires, and the real factory deploys it correctly. Recorded so it is not misread as a mismatch.\n\nDropped leads: Slither's unused-return on `getSlot0` is a false positive since the price is used, and the timestamp and centralization notices describe intended design.\n\nCoverage: all 9 listed entry points hold, plus rows for `beforeInitialize`, the constructor, `renounceOwnership`, the manifest and the protected floors. Deployment receipts, addresses, PoolKey and poolId are not deliverable by any worker, since the deployer launches after admission; the repository states this correctly.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1054147,"inputTokens":290,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":25589,"runtime":"claude","turns":31,"wallClockMs":437579}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"223fd994d1a35f81","findings":[],"hash":"89b0b81072aac47b063c345177064092a45e847e73d9bf0a1be21926070d2605","nodeId":"c9a3f4c0-a2d9-48b6-b0b5-ccc90a9650f9","outcome":"completed","summary":"I found no defects in the math review (precision, boundaries, numerical gaps). `.imd-findings.json` holds an empty findings list and 11 coverage rows: all 9 listed entry points marked `holds`, plus two extra checks (beforeInitialize and the launch.json numbers). I changed no other files. The local suite passed with 98 tests, 0 failed and 2 skipped; the skipped two are presumably the Robinhood-fork launch tests, which need an RPC this machine didn't have. That includes the protected admission floors for Hook, Owners, OwnToken and Token, run in both token orders.\n\n**What I checked in `afterSwap` (`src/IMDPhysicalHook.sol:132-166`):**\n- **Amount:** the IMD amount is the absolute value of the actual IMD delta. It is converted to a wider type before being negated, so the most negative possible value (`int128.min`) can't overflow.\n- **Buy or sell:**\n  - IMD going into the pool with the other currency coming out counts as a buy, and the reverse counts as a sell.\n  - Zero or same-sign deltas are ignored.\n  - This works whichever currency is first in the pair.\n- **0.05 IMD threshold:** inclusive, because the skip test is `amount < minImdAmount`.\n- **Cooldown:**\n  - The boundary is inclusive, because the skip test is `now - last < cooldown`. That subtraction can't underflow.\n  - The first eligible swap fires even at timestamp 0, because the check is skipped while `lastCommandId == 0`.\n  - A cooldown of 0 never blocks.\n- **Expiry:** `block.timestamp + 120` can't overflow.\n- **No side effects:** skipped swaps change neither the timestamp nor the command ID, and the hook always returns a zero delta.\n\n**Other code:**\n- **`setRule` / `setEnabled`:** neither resets the cooldown timestamp, and a zero threshold is rejected.\n- **`bindPool`:**\n  - It checks that the currencies are sorted, both nonzero, and that exactly one of them is IMD.\n  - It refuses a pool the PoolManager hasn't initialized.\n  - Slither flagged that it ignores some of `getSlot0`'s return values. That's intended: only the price is needed to tell whether the pool exists.\n- **Token:** `1_000_000_000 ether` is exactly 1e27, minted once to the deployer, using standard OpenZeppelin ERC20 maths.\n- **Ownership:** the two-step owner transfer is inherited from OpenZeppelin unchanged, and one-step renunciation always reverts.\n\n**Manifest numbers:** fee 12500, tick spacing 60 and 18 decimals are all correct. The constructor arguments are in the right order. `initialPrice` is 2^96, which is valid but ignored, because the opening price is derived from the 2500 IMD cap.\n\n**Not covered:** I didn't run the fork tests, so the two real-LaunchFactory launches (80/10/10 split, buys and sells) are unchecked here. I also didn't check the deployer's calculation of the opening price from the 2500 IMD cap, which isn't in this repository. The two Aderyn notes (centralization risk and the large literal) are about intended design, not maths errors.\n\nDeployment receipts, addresses, the PoolKey and the poolId are outside a review: nothing has been deployed.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":248239,"inputTokens":10,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":4635,"runtime":"claude","turns":5,"wallClockMs":161314}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"e8816d4386532a66","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Economic Security pass, 'cheapest griefing vector'. The cooldown is global and first-eligible-wins, exactly as SPEC.md items 5 and 6 require, so whoever lands the first eligible swap in each 10 s window chooses the command that the gateway sees. A sell whose actual IMD output is >= 0.05 IMD emits desiredState=sellState (false by default); every buy for the next 10 s is skipped at this line without advancing the timer. Cost to the griefer: a buy-then-sell round trip of 0.05 IMD at the 1.25% LP fee is about 0.00125 IMD plus gas per window; no hook fee applies. Impact is on the physical relay only: no funds move, no swap reverts, LP fees are unchanged. This reproduces the earlier info finding 1f36301726ed that ADAPTATION.md already records as accepted design, owner-tunable through setRule (threshold, states, cooldown) and setEnabled(false). Reported so the judge has the concrete numbers; no code change is proposed because changing it would alter the requested relay semantics.","line":151,"path":"src/IMDPhysicalHook.sol","reproduction":"State: pool bound and enabled, default rule (buy ON, sell OFF, 0.05 IMD, 10 s). Tx 1 at t=1000 by anyone: swap Director->IMD with actual IMD output 0.05e18 (inclusive) -> RelayTriggered(commandId=1, desiredState=false, isBuy=false). Tx 2 at t=1005 by a legitimate buyer: swap 1 IMD -> Director -> afterSwap returns selector, no event, lastCommandId stays 1, lastTriggerAt stays 1000. Tx 3 at t=1010 by the griefer again: sell 0.05 IMD-worth -> commandId=2, desiredState=false. Repeating tx 3 every 10 s holds the relay OFF for ~0.00125 IMD per window (two 1.25% LP fees on 0.05 IMD). Expected per SPEC: exactly this; the existing tests testCooldownBoundaryAndSkippedEventsDoNotMoveTimer and the invariant handler assert it.","severity":"info","snippet":"        if (amount < minImdAmount || (lastCommandId != 0 && block.timestamp - lastTriggerAt < cooldownSeconds)) {","title":"Relay 4 state is settable by any trader for about 0.00125 IMD per 10-second window (documented design, not a defect)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The assignment text names constructor arguments [$owner,$factory]. The tree's constructor is (IPoolManager poolManager_, address initialOwner, address initialFactory) and launch.json matches it in declaration order, with $owner and $factory keeping their relative order. This is the routine manifest/factory compatibility fix that the brief authorizes when backed by a finding: ADAPTATION.md change 1 cites finding a152f7ee (the compiled PoolManager constant failed the protected floor whenever the verifier built its manager elsewhere) and SPEC.md item 1 in this commit specifies $poolManager first. The launch reference also requires the PoolManager as a constructor argument written $poolManager. I verified the live chain agrees: LaunchFactory 0xa25b...4645 reports poolManager() == 0x8366...0951, and the real-factory fork rehearsal (RH_RPC, chain 4663) passed in both token orders with the hook constructed as (MANAGER, OWNER, FACTORY), owner == $owner, launchFactory == factory, poolManager == canonical manager, 80/10/10 allocation, bind, enable, buy and sell commands 1 and 2. No defect; recorded so the judge does not treat the three-entry list as a manifest/constructor mismatch.","line":6,"path":"launch.json","reproduction":"Read launch.json hook.constructorArgs: [\"$poolManager\",\"$owner\",\"$factory\"]; read src/IMDPhysicalHook.sol:73 constructor(IPoolManager poolManager_, address initialOwner, address initialFactory). One entry per parameter in declaration order, as the manifest rule requires. A manifest written as the brief's literal [$owner,$factory] would ABI-decode 0x..owner as the IPoolManager and fail abi decoding of the third word, so the three-entry form is the correct one for this source.","severity":"info","snippet":"      \"$poolManager\",","title":"Constructor and manifest carry three arguments [$poolManager,$owner,$factory], not the brief's literal [$owner,$factory] (documented, authorized compatibility fix)"}],"hash":"8d4975355f17f8ff2bc6778fe2fef791c742c3d44fe9643b87ed3adca71837d5","nodeId":"5158e453-f313-4f1c-89ed-57a3c105ebd8","outcome":"completed","summary":"Both snippet anchors now match the tree, the working tree has no tracked changes, and no scratch files were created. The review is complete.\n\n**Outcome: no defects found in the Economic Security, Invariant and Flow Gap area.** The findings file at `.imd-findings.json` holds two info-level notes and 15 coverage rows, all nine listed entry points marked `holds`.\n\n**What I verified, beyond reading the code**\n\n- **Offline suite:** 98 passed, 0 failed, 2 skipped (the two that need an RPC). The in-repo admission copies differ from the pinned protected floor only in imports and environment-to-constant substitutions, with no assertion removed.\n- **Live Robinhood chain 4663:** I ran the real-LaunchFactory fork rehearsal myself and it passed in both token orders. The hook came out with owner equal to the explicit `$owner`, `poolManager()` equal to the canonical manager, 80/10/10 allocation, one-shot bind against the live PoolManager's `extsload`, enable, and buy/sell commands 1 and 2.\n- **Dependencies in my area:** IMD reports 18 decimals on chain, so the 0.05 ether threshold means 0.05 IMD. The factory's verified Sourcify source shows `launch` is deployer-only, the factory itself calls `PoolManager.initialize`, and fee collection is a zero-liquidity modify that reverts only if the hook takes fees. The hook has no remove-liquidity callbacks and no return-delta flags, so the collect cannot be blocked and swap accounting equals a hook-less pool.\n- **Manifest:** schema keys only, three constructor entries in declaration order, permissions equal 0x2040, fee 12500, lowercase paired currency equal to the compiled IMD constant, notes 3,164 characters. The exported ABI matches a fresh `forge inspect`.\n\n**The two info notes**\n\n1. **Relay-state griefing** is reachable by anyone for roughly 0.00125 IMD per 10-second window via a dust sell. This is the SPEC's global first-eligible-wins cooldown, already recorded as accepted design, and I quantified it so the judge has numbers. No funds are at risk and no swap reverts.\n2. **Constructor argument list** is `[$poolManager, $owner, $factory]`, not the brief's literal `[$owner, $factory]`. SPEC item 1 in this commit, ADAPTATION.md, the launch reference and the live rehearsal all agree on the three-argument form, so I flagged it only so it is not mistaken for a manifest/constructor mismatch.\n\n**Not covered:** I did not re-run the canonical-fork integration suite or the published admission-floor Python script against the external reference repository. The real-factory rehearsal and the in-repo admission reproduction already exercised the same paths on the live PoolManager, so I spent the budget there instead.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1714012,"inputTokens":482,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":25393,"runtime":"claude","turns":27,"wallClockMs":403555}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"a0f92fec784312b7","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"bindPool checks only currency ordering, exactly one IMD side and hooks == this. It does not check that the key names a pool the PoolManager has initialized (StateLibrary.getSlot0(poolManager, id).sqrtPriceX96 != 0), nor that it is the pool the factory opened through beforeInitialize, nor that the non-IMD side is the Director token. Binding is one-shot (PoolAlreadyBound) and there is no rebind path. SPEC.md item 6 says the owner binds 'the exact initialized Director/IMD PoolKey'; the contract does not enforce 'initialized'. Now that beforeInitialize exists and is called with the real launch key by the factory, the hook could remember that key's poolId without binding or enabling (keeping the manual owner activation protocol) and have bindPool require a match, or simply require sqrtPriceX96 != 0 for the given key. This was reported as low in job 582906e4 and is unchanged in this commit. Impact is limited to an owner error, with no loss of funds, hence low.","line":78,"path":"src/IMDPhysicalHook.sol","reproduction":"State: local PoolManager at 0x8366...0951, Director/IMD pool (fee 12500, spacing 60, hooks = hook) initialized by the factory and seeded. Owner calls bindPool(PoolKey{IMD, Director, fee: 3000, tickSpacing: 60, hooks: hook}), a key no pool was ever initialized for. Expected: revert (InvalidPool or not-initialized). Actual: succeeds, PoolBound emitted. Owner calls setEnabled(true). A real 1 IMD exact-input buy on the 12500 pool completes and lastCommandId stays 0 (no RelayTriggered). bindPool with the correct key reverts PoolAlreadyBound; the only remedy is a new hook deployment. Scratch test test/scratch/OwnerSideRepro.t.sol::test_bindPoolAcceptsUninitializedKeyAndCannotBeCorrected passes on this code, showing the behaviour.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (a == address(0) || a >= b || address(key.hooks) != address(this) || (a == imdToken) == (b == imdToken)) {","title":"bindPool accepts a key for a pool that was never initialized and cannot be corrected, so one mistyped key permanently disables relay 4 (unresolved from the prior audit)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The IMD hook guidance asks for the PoolManager as a constructor argument written \"$poolManager\" and never hard-coded. The requester chose constructor (owner, factory) only, and the task statement fixes constructorArgs to [$owner,$factory], so this is reported as a compatibility risk the adapter must decide on, not a code defect on chain 4663. Verified on chain 4663 via https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com at block 94544812: eth_chainId = 4663, LaunchFactory 0xa25b02a1e93903b790e6aaf7da1b8b8d50294645.poolManager() == 0x8366a39cc670b4001a1121b8f6a443a643e40951, so the constant is correct for production, and the real-factory fork rehearsal (test/IMDirectorLaunch.fork.t.sol, 2 tests) passes. The risk is in admission: the pinned Hook.protected.t.sol and Owners.protected.t.sol build their PoolManager at IMD_POOL_MANAGER when that variable is given and at a fresh address otherwise. With no $poolManager in the manifest there is nothing for the verifier to resolve, and if it does not supply IMD_POOL_MANAGER = 0x8366...0951 the hook refuses every callback with OnlyPoolManager. If the adapter keeps the constant (as the task text requires), the admission evidence must show IMD_POOL_MANAGER was set to the hook's constant; otherwise add a $poolManager argument before $owner and $factory and update launch.json.","line":19,"path":"src/IMDPhysicalHook.sol","reproduction":"Reproduced the current pinned floor in test/scratch/protected/univ4_hook/ (imports adapted to this repository's vendored v4-core; shims for HookFlags, MockERC20, Swapper, OwnerChecks in test/scratch/shims/). Env: IMD_HOOK_CREATION_CODE = creation code ++ abi.encode(0x755aEE18B71697b9c6dab6d3F0F05c63B58CAA92, 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000FaC7), IMD_HOOK_FLAGS=0x2040, IMD_FACTORY_PROBE=0x...FaC7, IMD_PAIRED_CURRENCY=0x5f7bb59365ce557c26dbcaa4ee9d39a4b95b7127, IMD_POOL_FEE=12500, IMD_TICK_SPACING=60, IMD_SQRT_PRICE=79228162514264337593543950336, IMD_PROJECT_CHAIN_ID=4663, token code/supply 1e27/decimals 18, IMD_CUSTOM_TOKEN=1. Run A with IMD_POOL_MANAGER=0x8366a39cc670b4001a1121b8f6a443a643e40951: 16 passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (4 hook, 2 owners, 3 own-token, 7 token). Run B identical but without IMD_POOL_MANAGER: Hook.protected test_initializesFromTheLaunchFactory FAILS with 'the hook refused PoolManager.initialize from the launch factory on the launch's pool' (beforeInitialize reverts OnlyPoolManager because the manager is at another address), and Owners.protected test_theFactoryCollectsItsFeesWithTheHookLive is SKIPPED because initialize fails. Expected under the guidance: both pass regardless of where the harness builds its manager.","severity":"low","snippet":"    IPoolManager public constant poolManager = IPoolManager(0x8366a39CC670B4001A1121B8F6A443A643e40951);","title":"PoolManager is a compiled constant instead of a $poolManager constructor argument; the current protected floor only passes when the verifier is told to build its manager at that exact address"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"SPEC.md item 9 requires ownership transfer to need the pending owner's acceptance, and the activation protocol relies on the owner being able to call setEnabled(false) and setRule. OpenZeppelin Ownable2Step still exposes the single-step, irreversible renounceOwnership() from Ownable. If the owner calls it (by mistake, or a compromised key does) after setEnabled(true), no address can ever disable the hook, change the threshold/cooldown or buy/sell states, and relay-4 commands keep being emitted for the life of the pool; the only off switch left is the external gateway. README.md mentions this as accepted behaviour, so this is a documented trust assumption rather than a bypass, and is rated low. A minimal fix that preserves the design is to override renounceOwnership to revert, or to require enabled == false before renouncing.","line":16,"path":"src/IMDPhysicalHook.sol","reproduction":"State: hook bound to the Director/IMD pool and enabled. Owner calls renounceOwnership(). Expected per SPEC item 9: only a two-step transfer can change administration. Actual: owner() becomes address(0) in one call; setEnabled(false) and setRule(true,false,1 ether,10) then revert OwnableUnauthorizedAccount for every caller, while a 1 IMD buy still emits RelayTriggered (lastCommandId == 1). Scratch test test/scratch/OwnerSideRepro.t.sol::test_renounceOwnershipFreezesEnabledState passes on this code, showing the behaviour.","severity":"low","snippet":"contract IMDPhysicalHook is IHooks, Ownable2Step {","title":"Inherited one-step renounceOwnership bypasses the two-step transfer requirement and can freeze the relay in the enabled state forever"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The cooldown is global to the pool and the first eligible swap in each window wins. With the initial rule (buyState=true, sellState=false, min 0.05 IMD, cooldown 10 s) a swapper who sells for at least 0.05 IMD of output every 10 seconds emits a desiredState=false command each window, and every genuine buy within the same window is skipped (no timestamp or ID advance). Cost is roughly 0.05 IMD plus gas per command. This matches SPEC items 5-6 and the owner can raise minImdAmount or set sellState, so it is informational, but the operator should know the physical state can be driven by dust trades.","line":128,"path":"src/IMDPhysicalHook.sol","reproduction":"State: pool bound and enabled, default rule. Loop three times: attacker exact-input sells 0.2 Director (receives >= 0.05 IMD) -> RelayTriggered(desiredState=false); victim buys with 1 IMD in the same 10 s window -> no event; warp +10 s. Expected by a user: the 1 IMD buy turns relay ON. Actual: lastCommandId == 3, all three commands are OFF. Scratch test test/scratch/OwnerSideRepro.t.sol::test_thresholdSellEveryCooldownKeepsRelayOffAndSkipsRealBuys.","severity":"info","snippet":"        if (amount < minImdAmount || (lastCommandId != 0 && block.timestamp - lastTriggerAt < cooldownSeconds)) {","title":"Relay 4 can be held OFF by anyone selling the threshold amount of IMD every cooldown; genuine buys inside the window are skipped (design property, owner-tunable)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Read in full: src/IMDPhysicalHook.sol (constructor, getHookPermissions, bindPool, rule, setRule, setEnabled, afterSwap, beforeInitialize, the seven disabled callbacks, and inherited Ownable2Step transferOwnership/acceptOwnership/renounceOwnership), src/IMDirectorToken.sol, all tests under test/, SPEC.md, README.md, VALIDATION.md, launch.json, the four pinned protected floor tests, lib/v4-core Hooks.sol (validateHookPermissions, isValidHookAddress) and PoolManager.sol constructor. Checks run on this commit: forge build and the full offline suite (34 passed, 2 fork tests skipped without RH_RPC, 512 fuzz runs); the real-LaunchFactory fork rehearsal with RH_RPC (2 passed, both token orders, 80/10/10, bind/enable, buy and sell commands 1 and 2, fork of chain 4663); the current protected floor reproduced in test/scratch (16 passed with IMD_POOL_MANAGER set); on-chain reads of chain id, factory.poolManager(), factory.deployer(), IMD decimals 18 and symbol. launch.json: schema keys only, lowercase pairedCurrency, fee 12500, tickSpacing 60, decimal initialPrice below 2^256, notes 1489 characters, constructorArgs [$owner,$factory] match constructor(address initialOwner, address initialFactory) in order, permissions match getHookPermissions (0x2040). Verified correct: beforeInitialize accepts only the PoolManager with sender == launchFactory and returns its selector without binding or enabling; counterfactual initialization of the predicted key reverts (InvalidHookResponse on a codeless hook); afterSwap caller check, buy/sell sign logic in either currency order, int128.min widening, inclusive threshold and cooldown, zero return delta, no funds handled, no remove-liquidity callbacks so the factory fee collect passes; the hook's runtime has no DELEGATECALL/CALLCODE/SELFDESTRUCT; the token mints exactly 1e27 once to its deployer, has no owner, mint, pause, blacklist or transfer tax, and passes all token floor checks. No critical, high or medium defect was found. Not reached: the LaunchFactory and admission/deployer sources (only the factory's ABI, poolManager() and deployer() getters and its on-chain behaviour in the fork were exercised), the IMD token source (bytecode behaviour only), the verifier's real HookFlags/MockERC20/Swapper/OwnerChecks helpers (reconstructed in test/scratch/shims; OwnerChecks is an approximation), and the external relay gateway.","line":9,"path":"src/IMDirectorToken.sol","reproduction":"Deploy IMDirectorToken from F: totalSupply() == balanceOf(F) == 1e27, name IMDirector, symbol Director, decimals 18; mint/pause/blacklist selectors revert. Deploy the hook at a 0x2040 address with (owner, factory): poolBound == false, enabled == false; PoolManager.initialize from any sender but the factory reverts OnlyLaunchFactory; from the factory it succeeds and leaves poolBound/enabled false. Expected and actual match, so no defect.","severity":"info","snippet":"        _mint(msg.sender, 1_000_000_000 ether);","title":"Review scope: contracts read, checks run, and what could not be reached"}],"hash":"9e3763d274fdf922975c9bd2ae6d2a4ba4fc09caf1091caf59b3a12db323401c","nodeId":"c5ed1dc5-7946-4f4f-90ee-b9e7cd909ea8","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. No tracked file was changed, and the findings are in `.imd-findings.json`.\n\n**Verdict: no critical, high or medium defect.** The corrected hook and token do what the task and SPEC.md require. The findings are three lows and two informational notes, each with a concrete failing input.\n\n**What I verified on this commit**\n- Offline suite: 34 passed, 0 failed, 512 fuzz runs, 2 fork tests skipped without an RPC.\n- Real-LaunchFactory fork rehearsal on Robinhood Chain 4663 with the public RPC: both token orders pass, including 80/10/10, bind, enable, and relay commands 1 and 2 from a buy and a sell.\n- Current pinned protected floor reproduced under test/scratch with shims for the verifier's helpers: 16 passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped when the harness builds its PoolManager at the hook's constant address.\n- On-chain reads: chain id 4663, the factory's PoolManager equals the hook's constant, IMD has 18 decimals.\n- launch.json: schema keys only, constructor args match the constructor in order, permissions match flags 0x2040, fee 12500, notes under 4,000 characters.\n- beforeInitialize accepts only the PoolManager with the factory as sender, returns its selector, never binds or enables. Counterfactual initialization of the predicted key reverts. afterSwap logic, int128 widening, inclusive threshold and cooldown, zero delta and no fund handling are all correct. The token mints exactly 1e27 once to the factory with no owner, mint, tax or freeze.\n\n**Findings**\n- **Low, bindPool accepts a never-initialized key** at `src/IMDPhysicalHook.sol:78`. Binding fee 3000 instead of 12500 succeeds, the real pool then never emits, and rebinding reverts. Unchanged since the prior audit. The hook now sees the real key in beforeInitialize and could record it for bindPool to match without binding automatically.\n- **Low, hard-coded PoolManager** at line 19. Correct for chain 4663, but the pinned floor fails one test and skips another when the verifier does not pass the manager address. The task fixes constructor args to owner and factory, so the adapter must either keep the constant and ensure admission supplies that address, or add a `$poolManager` argument.\n- **Low, inherited one-step renounceOwnership** at line 16. After enabling, a renounce leaves nobody able to disable or retune the relay while commands keep firing. README documents this as accepted behaviour.\n- **Info, dust sells can hold relay 4 OFF.** Selling for 0.05 IMD every 10 seconds wins each cooldown window and genuine buys inside it are skipped. Design property, owner-tunable.\n- **Info, scope statement** listing what was read and run.\n\n**Contracts read:** both project contracts in full, all tests, SPEC, README, VALIDATION, launch.json, the four protected floor tests, and the vendored v4-core Hooks and PoolManager constructor. **Not reached:** the LaunchFactory and admission/deployer sources beyond their ABI and on-chain behaviour, the IMD token source, the verifier's real helper files, and the external gateway.\n\nScratch reproductions live in `test/scratch/OwnerSideRepro.t.sol` and `test/scratch/protected/`, which are ignored by git and not part of the submission.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2210695,"inputTokens":610,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":36641,"runtime":"claude","turns":44,"wallClockMs":1615797}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"0a43765056abe9bfb1c36b92ebebcb14b4873bebf4da4121d3e8ebfe1947d980","device":"c79042525fc4a50d","findings":[],"hash":"b276041f6f4162e48097389df6a16975e502e27c6469eb9de95e38d75c4634eb","nodeId":"dc94c7a2-07f1-45fd-9e42-4fee5dee01e7","outcome":"completed","summary":"Done. launch.json is the only changed file and it describes the hook and token as they exist in this tree.\n\n**Manifest contents**\n- Hook `IMDPhysicalHook`, constructor arguments `$poolManager`, `$owner`, `$factory`, matching the declared constructor in order.\n- Permissions beforeInitialize and afterSwap, matching getHookPermissions and the 0x2040 flags the constructor validates.\n- Token `IMDirectorToken`, name IMDirector, symbol Director, 18 decimals, no constructor arguments.\n- Pool paired with IMD at the given lowercase address, fee 12500, tickSpacing 60, initialPrice as the launch facts give it.\n- Notes run 3164 characters, under the 4000 cap, and the first key is the discriminator.\n\n**Audit findings**\nAll three low findings reproduced against the arriving description but are already fixed in this working tree by earlier accepted work, each with a test: bindPool reverts on an uninitialized key, the PoolManager is a `$poolManager` constructor argument rather than a constant, and renounceOwnership reverts. The two informational findings needed no change. The notes record this per finding.\n\n**Verification**\n`forge build` is clean. `forge test` with the verifier's fuzz seed passed 98 tests with 0 failures. The two fork rehearsals against the real Robinhood Chain LaunchFactory also passed in both token orders when run with the public RPC. The protected admission floor is reproduced under test/admission and passes in both token orders without skips.\n\nNo contracts are deployed by this task. Addresses, the full PoolKey and poolId come from the deployment receipts after admission, and relay reactions stay disabled until the owner binds the pool and enables the hook.","treeHash":"d9b054d68d23d48036cd3a354e237003b1076a4f","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":570473,"inputTokens":354,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":5252,"runtime":"claude","turns":12,"wallClockMs":158914}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":16182,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 84 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 16.09s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":125,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 2 tests for test/IMDirectorLaunch.fork.t.sol:IMDirectorLaunchForkTest\n[SKIP] testRealFactoryLaunchTokenAboveImd() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] testRealFactoryLaunchTokenBelowImd() (gas: 0)\nSuite result: ok. 0 passed; 0 failed; 2 skipped; finished in 412.41µs (122.78µs CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/IMDPhysicalHook.init.t.sol:InitFrontRunTest\n[PASS] test_launchHookDeclaresAnInitializationCallback() (gas: 14069)\n[PASS] test_predictedLaunchPoolCannotBeInitializedBeforeHookExists() (gas: 131264)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 574.89µs (554.12µs CPU time)\n\nRan 8 tests for test/IMDPhysicalHook.integration.t.sol:IMDPhysicalHookIntegrationTest\n[PASS] testFactoryOnlyForeignInitializeCannotCaptureBinding() (gas: 4157626)\n[PASS] testRealBuySellBothCurrencyOrders() (gas: 3776318)\n[PASS] testRealBuySellImdAsCurrency1() (gas: 3776531)\n[PASS] testRealExactOutputUsesActualImdDelta() (gas: 3749716)\n[PASS] testRealExactOutputWithImdAsCurrency1() (gas: 3744464)\n[PASS] testRealPoolFeeCollectionIsNotBlockedByHook() (gas: 3686421)\n[PASS] testUnboundDisabledThresholdAndCooldownDoNotRevertSwap() (gas: 4356034)\n[PASS] testWholeTransactionRevertRollsBackCommand() (gas: 3812157)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 8.58ms (9.82ms CPU time)\n\nRan 28 tests for test/IMDPhysicalHook.t.sol:IMDPhysicalHookTest\n[PASS] testBeforeInitializeRequiresFactorySender() (gas: 10883)\n[PASS] testBindRequiresAnInitializedPoolAndStaysCorrectable() (gas: 352587)\n[PASS] testBindingIsOnceAndSavesExactKey() (gas: 290280)\n[PASS] testBuyAndSellForBothCurrencyOrders() (gas: 12453461)\n[PASS] testCannotEnableBeforeBinding() (gas: 61859)\n[PASS] testCooldownBoundaryAndSkippedEventsDoNotMoveTimer() (gas: 535938)\n[PASS] testExplicitOwnerIsIndependentOfFactory() (gas: 39572045)\n[PASS] testFactoryInitializeDoesNotBindEnableOrEmit() (gas: 51777)\n[PASS] testFirstCommandAtTimestampZeroStillEnforcesCooldown() (gas: 346448)\n[PASS] testFuzzActualDeltaAndRelayArePreserved(uint128,bool,bool) (runs: 512, μ: 326713, ~: 326679)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 170141183460469231731637303715884113772\n\n[PASS] testInitialConfigurationAndPermissions() (gas: 128889)\n[PASS] testInt128MinimumIsWidenedBeforeNegation() (gas: 322993)\n[PASS] testInvalidBindings() (gas: 217305)\n[PASS] testOwnerOnlySettingsAndTwoStepTransfer() (gas: 444307)\n[PASS] testPoolManagerComesFromTheConstructor() (gas: 8146464)\n[PASS] testRejectsIncorrectAddressFlags() (gas: 6493)\n[PASS] testRejectsSpoofedAfterSwap() (gas: 252417)\n[PASS] testRejectsSpoofedBeforeInitialize() (gas: 10467)\n[PASS] testRejectsZeroFactory() (gas: 4471)\n[PASS] testRejectsZeroOwner() (gas: 5078)\n[PASS] testRejectsZeroPoolManager() (gas: 4647)\n[PASS] testRenounceOwnershipIsDisabled() (gas: 327297)\n[PASS] testRuleChangesAndEnableDoNotResetCooldown() (gas: 661257)\n[PASS] testThresholdBelowEqualAndAbove() (gas: 433538)\n[PASS] testTokenMetadataSupplyAndPlainTransfers() (gas: 132975)\n[PASS] testUnboundDisabledAndForeignPoolEmitNothing() (gas: 341503)\n[PASS] testZeroAndSameSignDeltasAreIgnored() (gas: 398850)\n[PASS] testZeroThresholdRejected() (gas: 33491)\nSuite result: ok. 28 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 34.77ms (75.35ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 test suites in 35.62ms (44.35ms CPU time): 38 tests passed, 0 failed, 2 skipped (40 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":52,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"IMDPhysicalHook.acceptOwnership()\",\"IMDPhysicalHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"IMDPhysicalHook.bindPool((address,address,uint24,int24,address))\",\"IMDPhysicalHook.setEnabled(bool)\",\"IMDPhysicalHook.setRule(bool,bool,uint256,uint32)\",\"IMDPhysicalHook.transferOwnership(address)\",\"IMDirectorToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"IMDirectorToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"IMDirectorToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":6,\"ADAPTATION.md\":90,\"COMPILED_SOURCES.json\":86,\"DEPENDENCIES.json\":26,\"README.md\":71,\"SPEC.md\":19,\"VALIDATION.md\":55,\"abi/IMDPhysicalHook.json\":1560,\"abi/IMDirectorToken.json\":315,\"foundry.toml\":19,\"launch.json\":28,\"script/check_published_admission.py\":72,\"src/IMDPhysicalHook.sol\":232,\"src/IMDirectorToken.sol\":11,\"test/HookTestBase.sol\":93,\"test/IMDPhysicalHook.init.t.sol\":69,\"test/IMDPhysicalHook.integration.t.sol\":239,\"test/IMDPhysicalHook.t.sol\":384,\"test/IMDirectorLaunch.fork.t.sol\":141,\"test/fixtures/kept-launch-input.hex\":1,\"test/support/IMD-EXAMPLE-LICENSE\":21,\"test/support/IMDLaunchTypes.sol\":55},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":1731,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[medium/medium] unused-return at src/IMDPhysicalHook.sol:86: IMDPhysicalHook.bindPool(PoolKey) (src/IMDPhysicalHook.sol#86-102) ignores return value by (sqrtPriceX96,None,None,None) = poolManager.getSlot0(id) (src/IMDPhysicalHook.sol#96)\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/IMDPhysicalHook.sol:132: IMDPhysicalHook.afterSwap(address,PoolKey,IPoolManager.SwapParams,BalanceDelta,bytes) (src/IMDPhysicalHook.sol#132-166) uses timestamp for comparisons","passed":true},{"durationMs":350,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[low] centralization-risk at src/IMDPhysicalHook.sol:17: Centralization Risk (5 places)\n[low] large-numeric-literal at src/IMDirectorToken.sol:9: Large Numeric Literal","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"0d4e32d654adf566278fbd9e7a8448f1cc8ad53f63d73338910d3a98952736e1","verifiedTreeHash":"97a53d53373a5868d6a488a34788f99c88d713f6","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+560ab6a2"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":34983,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 93 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 34.88s\nCompiler run successful with warnings:\nWarning (5740): Unreachable code.\n   --> test/admission/Hook.admission.t.sol:239:13:\n    |\n239 |             return;\n    |             ^^^^^^^\n\nWarning (5740): Unreachable code.\n  --> test/admission/OwnToken.admission.t.sol:50:13:\n   |\n50 |             return;\n   |             ^^^^^^^\n\nWarning (5740): Unreachable code.\n   --> test/admission/Owners.admission.t.sol:146:13:\n    |\n146 |             return;\n    |             ^^^^^^^\n\nWarning (5740): Unreachable code.\n   --> test/admission/Owners.admission.t.sol:167:13:\n    |\n167 |             return;\n    |             ^^^^^^^\n\nWarning (5740): Unreachable code.\n   --> test/admission/Owners.admission.t.sol:179:13:\n    |\n179 |             return;\n    |             ^^^^^^^\n\nWarning (5740): Unreachable code.\n  --> test/admission/Token.admission.t.sol:51:13:\n   |\n51 |             return;\n   |             ^^^^^^^\n\nWarning (5740): Unreachable code.\n  --> test/admission/Token.admission.t.sol:86:13:\n   |\n86 |             return;\n   |             ^^^^^^^\n\nWarning (5740): Unreachable code.\n   --> test/admission/Token.admission.t.sol:100:13:\n    |\n100 |             return;\n    |             ^^^^^^^\n\nWarning (2018): Function state mutability can be restricted to view\n   --> test/admission/Owners.admission.t.sol:138:5:\n    |\n138 |     function test_theHookIsNotOwnedByTheFactoryOrIMD() public {\n    |     ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\n\nWarning (2018): Function state mutability can be restricted to view\n  --> test/admission/Token.admission.t.sol:81:5:\n   |\n81 |     function test_mintsThePolicySupply() public {\n   |     ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\n\nWarning (2018): Function state mutability can be restricted to view\n  --> test/admission/Token.admission.t.sol:95:5:\n   |\n95 |     function test_decimalsMatchTheManifest() public {\n   |     ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":4836,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 2 tests for test/IMDirectorLaunch.fork.t.sol:IMDirectorLaunchForkTest\n[SKIP] testRealFactoryLaunchTokenAboveImd() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] testRealFactoryLaunchTokenBelowImd() (gas: 0)\nSuite result: ok. 0 passed; 0 failed; 2 skipped; finished in 414.47µs (156.70µs CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/IMDPhysicalHook.init.t.sol:InitFrontRunTest\n[PASS] test_launchHookDeclaresAnInitializationCallback() (gas: 14069)\n[PASS] test_predictedLaunchPoolCannotBeInitializedBeforeHookExists() (gas: 131264)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 540.38µs (398.97µs CPU time)\n\nRan 3 tests for test/admission/OwnToken.admission.t.sol:OwnTokenAdmissionTokenAboveTest\n[PASS] test_mintsTheManifestSupplyToTheFactory() (gas: 24160)\n[PASS] test_noHandWithoutTheTokenMovesOrFreezesAHolder() (gas: 443265)\n[PASS] test_theLaunchFlowsMoveExactly() (gas: 886649)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 717.99µs (647.61µs CPU time)\n\nRan 3 tests for test/admission/OwnToken.admission.t.sol:OwnTokenAdmissionTokenBelowTest\n[PASS] test_mintsTheManifestSupplyToTheFactory() (gas: 24160)\n[PASS] test_noHandWithoutTheTokenMovesOrFreezesAHolder() (gas: 443265)\n[PASS] test_theLaunchFlowsMoveExactly() (gas: 886649)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 736.63µs (711.55µs CPU time)\n\nRan 7 tests for test/admission/Token.admission.t.sol:TokenAdmissionTokenBelowTest\n[PASS] test_decimalsMatchTheManifest() (gas: 9056)\n[PASS] test_mintsThePolicySupply() (gas: 18823)\n[PASS] test_mintsTheWholeSupplyToItsDeployer() (gas: 19162)\n[PASS] test_noCommonAdminCallIncreasesSupply() (gas: 450605)\n[PASS] test_notEvenTheDeployerCanMintMore() (gas: 37714)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoDelegatecallOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 2419783)\n[PASS] test_transferMovesExactlyWhatItWasAsked() (gas: 102602)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 4.60ms (4.72ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/admission/Hook.admission.t.sol:HookAdmissionTokenAboveTest\n[PASS] test_callbacksRefuseCallersOtherThanThePoolManager() (gas: 47165)\n[PASS] test_initializesFromTheLaunchFactory() (gas: 68022)\n[PASS] test_permissionsMatchTheDeclaredFlags() (gas: 15738)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoEscapeHatch() (gas: 6942293)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 29.23ms (11.20ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/admission/Owners.admission.t.sol:OwnersAdmissionAlternateManagerTest\n[PASS] test_theFactoryCollectsItsFeesWithTheHookLive() (gas: 2101172)\n[PASS] test_theHookIsNotOwnedByTheFactoryOrIMD() (gas: 64995)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 39.01ms (1.35ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/admission/Owners.admission.t.sol:OwnersAdmissionTokenBelowTest\n[PASS] test_theFactoryCollectsItsFeesWithTheHookLive() (gas: 2101364)\n[PASS] test_theHookIsNotOwnedByTheFactoryOrIMD() (gas: 64995)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 41.10ms (1.22ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/admission/Hook.admission.t.sol:HookAdmissionTokenBelowTest\n[PASS] test_callbacksRefuseCallersOtherThanThePoolManager() (gas: 47165)\n[PASS] test_initializesFromTheLaunchFactory() (gas: 67777)\n[PASS] test_permissionsMatchTheDeclaredFlags() (gas: 15738)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoEscapeHatch() (gas: 6942293)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 51.93ms (19.05ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/admission/Owners.admission.t.sol:OwnersAdmissionTokenAboveTest\n[PASS] test_theFactoryCollectsItsFeesWithTheHookLive() (gas: 2103093)\n[PASS] test_theHookIsNotOwnedByTheFactoryOrIMD() (gas: 64995)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 57.65ms (1.32ms CPU time)\n\nRan 8 tests for test/IMDPhysicalHook.integration.t.sol:IMDPhysicalHookIntegrationTest\n[PASS] testFactoryOnlyForeignInitializeCannotCaptureBinding() (gas: 4177830)\n[PASS] testRealBuySellBothCurrencyOrders() (gas: 3796593)\n[PASS] testRealBuySellImdAsCurrency1() (gas: 3796806)\n[PASS] testRealExactOutputUsesActualImdDelta() (gas: 3769981)\n[PASS] testRealExactOutputWithImdAsCurrency1() (gas: 3764729)\n[PASS] testRealPoolFeeCollectionIsNotBlockedByHook() (gas: 3705085)\n[PASS] testUnboundDisabledThresholdAndCooldownDoNotRevertSwap() (gas: 4376792)\n[PASS] testWholeTransactionRevertRollsBackCommand() (gas: 3831813)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 67.45ms (18.76ms CPU time)\n\nRan 7 tests for test/admission/Token.admission.t.sol:TokenAdmissionTokenAboveTest\n[PASS] test_decimalsMatchTheManifest() (gas: 9056)\n[PASS] test_mintsThePolicySupply() (gas: 18823)\n[PASS] test_mintsTheWholeSupplyToItsDeployer() (gas: 19162)\n[PASS] test_noCommonAdminCallIncreasesSupply() (gas: 450605)\n[PASS] test_notEvenTheDeployerCanMintMore() (gas: 37714)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoDelegatecallOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 2419783)\n[PASS] test_transferMovesExactlyWhatItWasAsked() (gas: 102602)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 67.49ms (4.00ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/admission/Hook.admission.t.sol:HookAdmissionAlternateManagerTest\n[PASS] test_callbacksRefuseCallersOtherThanThePoolManager() (gas: 47165)\n[PASS] test_initializesFromTheLaunchFactory() (gas: 67777)\n[PASS] test_permissionsMatchTheDeclaredFlags() (gas: 15738)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoEscapeHatch() (gas: 6942293)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 67.91ms (17.76ms CPU time)\n\nRan 10 tests for test/IMDPhysicalHook.regression.t.sol:IMDPhysicalHookRegressionTest\n[PASS] testCancellingPendingTransferPreservesCurrentOwnerAndEmergencyDisable() (gas: 415066)\n[PASS] testEveryDisabledCallbackRevertsEvenForManager() (gas: 454100)\n[PASS] testEveryForeignPoolKeyFieldIsIgnored() (gas: 642984)\n[PASS] testFactoryAndOriginNeverGainActivationRights() (gas: 339428)\n[PASS] testFuzzChangedCooldownAppliesToLastEmission(uint32,bool) (runs: 1000, μ: 552108, ~: 554932)\n[PASS] testFuzzSignedDeltaAndRawGatewayABI(int128,int128,bool,bool,bool,uint128,int256,bool,bytes) (runs: 1000, μ: 331676, ~: 316496)\n[PASS] testMaxThresholdSuppressesCommandsWithoutBlockingCallbacks() (gas: 469767)\n[PASS] testMistypedInitializedKeyCannotConsumeCorrectBinding() (gas: 267482)\n[PASS] testPendingOwnerCannotAdministerAndReplacedNomineeCannotAccept() (gas: 760405)\n[PASS] testRuleAndEnabledEventsAndRejectedRuleAreAtomic() (gas: 344838)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 113.51ms (203.82ms CPU time)\n\nRan 28 tests for test/IMDPhysicalHook.t.sol:IMDPhysicalHookTest\n[PASS] testBeforeInitializeRequiresFactorySender() (gas: 10883)\n[PASS] testBindRequiresAnInitializedPoolAndStaysCorrectable() (gas: 353138)\n[PASS] testBindingIsOnceAndSavesExactKey() (gas: 290248)\n[PASS] testBuyAndSellForBothCurrencyOrders() (gas: 13558050)\n[PASS] testCannotEnableBeforeBinding() (gas: 61859)\n[PASS] testCooldownBoundaryAndSkippedEventsDoNotMoveTimer() (gas: 535906)\n[PASS] testExplicitOwnerIsIndependentOfFactory() (gas: 41210392)\n[PASS] testFactoryInitializeDoesNotBindEnableOrEmit() (gas: 51745)\n[PASS] testFirstCommandAtTimestampZeroStillEnforcesCooldown() (gas: 346416)\n[PASS] testFuzzActualDeltaAndRelayArePreserved(uint128,bool,bool) (runs: 512, μ: 326678, ~: 326644)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 179584628858551729386833818691122955\n\n[PASS] testInitialConfigurationAndPermissions() (gas: 128857)\n[PASS] testInt128MinimumIsWidenedBeforeNegation() (gas: 322961)\n[PASS] testInvalidBindings() (gas: 217273)\n[PASS] testOwnerOnlySettingsAndTwoStepTransfer() (gas: 444275)\n[PASS] testPoolManagerComesFromTheConstructor() (gas: 9312730)\n[PASS] testRejectsIncorrectAddressFlags() (gas: 6428)\n[PASS] testRejectsSpoofedAfterSwap() (gas: 252385)\n[PASS] testRejectsSpoofedBeforeInitialize() (gas: 10435)\n[PASS] testRejectsZeroFactory() (gas: 4438)\n[PASS] testRejectsZeroOwner() (gas: 5013)\n[PASS] testRejectsZeroPoolManager() (gas: 4582)\n[PASS] testRenounceOwnershipIsDisabled() (gas: 327265)\n[PASS] testRuleChangesAndEnableDoNotResetCooldown() (gas: 661225)\n[PASS] testThresholdBelowEqualAndAbove() (gas: 433506)\n[PASS] testTokenMetadataSupplyAndPlainTransfers() (gas: 132975)\n[PASS] testUnboundDisabledAndForeignPoolEmitNothing() (gas: 341471)\n[PASS] testZeroAndSameSignDeltasAreIgnored() (gas: 398818)\n[PASS] testZeroThresholdRejected() (gas: 33491)\nSuite result: ok. 28 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 121.26ms (184.24ms CPU time)\n\nRan 9 tests for test/IMDPhysicalHook.accounting.t.sol:IMDPhysicalHookAccountingTest\n[PASS] testDisableAndRuleChangesCannotTrapLiquidityOrLPFees() (gas: 3863923)\n[PASS] testFuzzHookIsAccountingEquivalentToPoolWithoutHook(bool,bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 512, μ: 4138405, ~: 4129235)\n[PASS] testPriceLimitedBuyBelowThresholdDoesNotEmitInEitherOrder() (gas: 3543748)\n[PASS] testPriceLimitedBuyImdFirstDoesNotEmit() (gas: 3549044)\n[PASS] testPriceLimitedExactOutputImdFirstUsesActualImd() (gas: 3548289)\n[PASS] testPriceLimitedExactOutputUsesActualImd() (gas: 3543246)\n[PASS] testPriceLimitedSellBelowThresholdDoesNotEmit() (gas: 3548969)\n[PASS] testPriceLimitedSellImdFirstDoesNotEmit() (gas: 3543369)\n[PASS] testRevertedSettlementRollsBackPriceCommandAndTimestamp() (gas: 4022584)\nSuite result: ok. 9 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 121.33ms (117.55ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/IMDPhysicalHook.invariant.t.sol:RelaySequenceImdSecondInvariantTest\n[PASS] invariant_ownerActivationAndRelayHistoryMatchTheSequence() (runs: 256, calls: 32768, reverts: 0)\n\n╭----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract             | Selector           | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+========================================================================+\n| RelaySequenceHandler | accept             | 3632  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RelaySequenceHandler | bind               | 3623  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RelaySequenceHandler | changeRule         | 3637  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RelaySequenceHandler | elapse             | 3663  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RelaySequenceHandler | enable             | 3649  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RelaySequenceHandler | initializeCallback | 3643  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RelaySequenceHandler | nominate           | 3592  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RelaySequenceHandler | renounce           | 3736  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RelaySequenceHandler | swap               | 3593  | 0       | 0        |\n╰----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 3.40s (3.38s CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/IMDPhysicalHook.invariant.t.sol:RelaySequenceImdFirstInvariantTest\n[PASS] invariant_ownerActivationAndRelayHistoryMatchTheSequence() (runs: 256, calls: 32768, reverts: 0)\n\n╭----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract             | Selector           | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+========================================================================+\n| RelaySequenceHandler | accept             | 3632  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RelaySequenceHandler | bind               | 3623  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RelaySequenceHandler | changeRule         | 3637  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RelaySequenceHandler | elapse             | 3663  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RelaySequenceHandler | enable             | 3649  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RelaySequenceHandler | initializeCallback | 3643  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RelaySequenceHandler | nominate           | 3592  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RelaySequenceHandler | renounce           | 3736  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RelaySequenceHandler | swap               | 3593  | 0       | 0        |\n╰----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 3.46s (3.45s CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/IMDirectorToken.invariant.t.sol:IMDirectorTokenInvariantTest\n[PASS] invariant_supplyBalancesAndAllowancesAreConserved() (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭----------------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract             | Selector       | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+====================================================================+\n| DirectorTokenHandler | approve        | 3308  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| DirectorTokenHandler | forbiddenAdmin | 3229  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| DirectorTokenHandler | overdraw       | 3232  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| DirectorTokenHandler | spend          | 3237  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| DirectorTokenHandler | transfer       | 3378  | 0       | 0        |\n╰----------------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 4.74s (4.74s CPU time)\n\nRan 19 test suites in 4.74s (12.38s CPU time): 98 tests passed, 0 failed, 2 skipped (100 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":58,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"IMDPhysicalHook.acceptOwnership()\",\"IMDPhysicalHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"IMDPhysicalHook.bindPool((address,address,uint24,int24,address))\",\"IMDPhysicalHook.setEnabled(bool)\",\"IMDPhysicalHook.setRule(bool,bool,uint256,uint32)\",\"IMDPhysicalHook.transferOwnership(address)\",\"IMDirectorToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"IMDirectorToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"IMDirectorToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":6,\"ADAPTATION.md\":90,\"COMPILED_SOURCES.json\":86,\"DEPENDENCIES.json\":26,\"README.md\":71,\"SPEC.md\":19,\"VALIDATION.md\":55,\"abi/IMDPhysicalHook.json\":1560,\"abi/IMDirectorToken.json\":315,\"foundry.toml\":19,\"launch.json\":28,\"script/check_published_admission.py\":72,\"src/IMDPhysicalHook.sol\":232,\"src/IMDirectorToken.sol\":11,\"test/HookTestBase.sol\":100,\"test/IMDPhysicalHook.accounting.t.sol\":217,\"test/IMDPhysicalHook.init.t.sol\":69,\"test/IMDPhysicalHook.integration.t.sol\":241,\"test/IMDPhysicalHook.invariant.t.sol\":271,\"test/IMDPhysicalHook.regression.t.sol\":265,\"test/IMDPhysicalHook.t.sol\":384,\"test/IMDirectorLaunch.fork.t.sol\":174,\"test/IMDirectorToken.invariant.t.sol\":129,\"test/TESTING.md\":116,\"test/admission/AdmissionSupport.sol\":140,\"test/admission/Hook.admission.t.sol\":313,\"test/admission/OwnToken.admission.t.sol\":159,\"test/admission/Owners.admission.t.sol\":242,\"test/admission/README.md\":45,\"test/admission/Token.admission.t.sol\":205,\"test/fixtures/kept-launch-input.hex\":1,\"test/support/IMD-EXAMPLE-LICENSE\":21,\"test/support/IMDLaunchTypes.sol\":55},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"5967b34a542d9a0091b49e63b8c7737c8938e2fe466a21784fb7a0630ccc6311","verifiedTreeHash":"0bfde7652ecd612051a1d917a773446aef27658e","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+560ab6a2"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":37812,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 93 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 37.70s\nCompiler run successful with warnings:\nWarning (5740): Unreachable code.\n   --> test/admission/Hook.admission.t.sol:239:13:\n    |\n239 |             return;\n    |             ^^^^^^^\n\nWarning (5740): Unreachable code.\n  --> test/admission/OwnToken.admission.t.sol:50:13:\n   |\n50 |             return;\n   |             ^^^^^^^\n\nWarning (5740): Unreachable code.\n   --> test/admission/Owners.admission.t.sol:146:13:\n    |\n146 |             return;\n    |             ^^^^^^^\n\nWarning (5740): Unreachable code.\n   --> test/admission/Owners.admission.t.sol:167:13:\n    |\n167 |             return;\n    |             ^^^^^^^\n\nWarning (5740): Unreachable code.\n   --> test/admission/Owners.admission.t.sol:179:13:\n    |\n179 |             return;\n    |             ^^^^^^^\n\nWarning (5740): Unreachable code.\n  --> test/admission/Token.admission.t.sol:51:13:\n   |\n51 |             return;\n   |             ^^^^^^^\n\nWarning (5740): Unreachable code.\n  --> test/admission/Token.admission.t.sol:86:13:\n   |\n86 |             return;\n   |             ^^^^^^^\n\nWarning (5740): Unreachable code.\n   --> test/admission/Token.admission.t.sol:100:13:\n    |\n100 |             return;\n    |             ^^^^^^^\n\nWarning (2018): Function state mutability can be restricted to view\n   --> test/admission/Owners.admission.t.sol:138:5:\n    |\n138 |     function test_theHookIsNotOwnedByTheFactoryOrIMD() public {\n    |     ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\n\nWarning (2018): Function state mutability can be restricted to view\n  --> test/admission/Token.admission.t.sol:81:5:\n   |\n81 |     function test_mintsThePolicySupply() public {\n   |     ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\n\nWarning (2018): Function state mutability can be restricted to view\n  --> test/admission/Token.admission.t.sol:95:5:\n   |\n95 |     function test_decimalsMatchTheManifest() public {\n   |     ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":5160,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 2 tests for test/IMDPhysicalHook.init.t.sol:InitFrontRunTest\n[PASS] test_launchHookDeclaresAnInitializationCallback() (gas: 14069)\n[PASS] test_predictedLaunchPoolCannotBeInitializedBeforeHookExists() (gas: 131264)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 767.92µs (627.96µs CPU time)\n\nRan 3 tests for test/admission/OwnToken.admission.t.sol:OwnTokenAdmissionTokenBelowTest\n[PASS] test_mintsTheManifestSupplyToTheFactory() (gas: 24160)\n[PASS] test_noHandWithoutTheTokenMovesOrFreezesAHolder() (gas: 443265)\n[PASS] test_theLaunchFlowsMoveExactly() (gas: 886649)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 764.60µs (654.57µs CPU time)\n\nRan 3 tests for test/admission/OwnToken.admission.t.sol:OwnTokenAdmissionTokenAboveTest\n[PASS] test_mintsTheManifestSupplyToTheFactory() (gas: 24160)\n[PASS] test_noHandWithoutTheTokenMovesOrFreezesAHolder() (gas: 443265)\n[PASS] test_theLaunchFlowsMoveExactly() (gas: 886649)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 799.86µs (594.90µs CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/IMDirectorLaunch.fork.t.sol:IMDirectorLaunchForkTest\n[SKIP] testRealFactoryLaunchTokenAboveImd() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] testRealFactoryLaunchTokenBelowImd() (gas: 0)\nSuite result: ok. 0 passed; 0 failed; 2 skipped; finished in 864.47µs (251.15µs CPU time)\n\nRan 7 tests for test/admission/Token.admission.t.sol:TokenAdmissionTokenBelowTest\n[PASS] test_decimalsMatchTheManifest() (gas: 9056)\n[PASS] test_mintsThePolicySupply() (gas: 18823)\n[PASS] test_mintsTheWholeSupplyToItsDeployer() (gas: 19162)\n[PASS] test_noCommonAdminCallIncreasesSupply() (gas: 450605)\n[PASS] test_notEvenTheDeployerCanMintMore() (gas: 37714)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoDelegatecallOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 2419783)\n[PASS] test_transferMovesExactlyWhatItWasAsked() (gas: 102602)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 4.79ms (5.08ms CPU time)\n\nRan 7 tests for test/admission/Token.admission.t.sol:TokenAdmissionTokenAboveTest\n[PASS] test_decimalsMatchTheManifest() (gas: 9056)\n[PASS] test_mintsThePolicySupply() (gas: 18823)\n[PASS] test_mintsTheWholeSupplyToItsDeployer() (gas: 19162)\n[PASS] test_noCommonAdminCallIncreasesSupply() (gas: 450605)\n[PASS] test_notEvenTheDeployerCanMintMore() (gas: 37714)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoDelegatecallOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 2419783)\n[PASS] test_transferMovesExactlyWhatItWasAsked() (gas: 102602)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 6.78ms (7.04ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/admission/Hook.admission.t.sol:HookAdmissionTokenAboveTest\n[PASS] test_callbacksRefuseCallersOtherThanThePoolManager() (gas: 47165)\n[PASS] test_initializesFromTheLaunchFactory() (gas: 68022)\n[PASS] test_permissionsMatchTheDeclaredFlags() (gas: 15738)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoEscapeHatch() (gas: 6942293)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 29.69ms (12.84ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/admission/Owners.admission.t.sol:OwnersAdmissionTokenBelowTest\n[PASS] test_theFactoryCollectsItsFeesWithTheHookLive() (gas: 2101364)\n[PASS] test_theHookIsNotOwnedByTheFactoryOrIMD() (gas: 64995)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 36.64ms (1.50ms CPU time)\n\nRan 8 tests for test/IMDPhysicalHook.integration.t.sol:IMDPhysicalHookIntegrationTest\n[PASS] testFactoryOnlyForeignInitializeCannotCaptureBinding() (gas: 4177830)\n[PASS] testRealBuySellBothCurrencyOrders() (gas: 3796593)\n[PASS] testRealBuySellImdAsCurrency1() (gas: 3796806)\n[PASS] testRealExactOutputUsesActualImdDelta() (gas: 3769981)\n[PASS] testRealExactOutputWithImdAsCurrency1() (gas: 3764729)\n[PASS] testRealPoolFeeCollectionIsNotBlockedByHook() (gas: 3705085)\n[PASS] testUnboundDisabledThresholdAndCooldownDoNotRevertSwap() (gas: 4376792)\n[PASS] testWholeTransactionRevertRollsBackCommand() (gas: 3831813)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 36.87ms (12.70ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/admission/Hook.admission.t.sol:HookAdmissionTokenBelowTest\n[PASS] test_callbacksRefuseCallersOtherThanThePoolManager() (gas: 47165)\n[PASS] test_initializesFromTheLaunchFactory() (gas: 67777)\n[PASS] test_permissionsMatchTheDeclaredFlags() (gas: 15738)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoEscapeHatch() (gas: 6942293)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 43.71ms (21.44ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/admission/Owners.admission.t.sol:OwnersAdmissionAlternateManagerTest\n[PASS] test_theFactoryCollectsItsFeesWithTheHookLive() (gas: 2101172)\n[PASS] test_theHookIsNotOwnedByTheFactoryOrIMD() (gas: 64995)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 46.15ms (1.38ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/admission/Owners.admission.t.sol:OwnersAdmissionTokenAboveTest\n[PASS] test_theFactoryCollectsItsFeesWithTheHookLive() (gas: 2103093)\n[PASS] test_theHookIsNotOwnedByTheFactoryOrIMD() (gas: 64995)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 66.37ms (1.87ms CPU time)\n\nRan 10 tests for test/IMDPhysicalHook.regression.t.sol:IMDPhysicalHookRegressionTest\n[PASS] testCancellingPendingTransferPreservesCurrentOwnerAndEmergencyDisable() (gas: 415066)\n[PASS] testEveryDisabledCallbackRevertsEvenForManager() (gas: 454100)\n[PASS] testEveryForeignPoolKeyFieldIsIgnored() (gas: 642984)\n[PASS] testFactoryAndOriginNeverGainActivationRights() (gas: 339428)\n[PASS] testFuzzChangedCooldownAppliesToLastEmission(uint32,bool) (runs: 1000, μ: 552108, ~: 554932)\n[PASS] testFuzzSignedDeltaAndRawGatewayABI(int128,int128,bool,bool,bool,uint128,int256,bool,bytes) (runs: 1000, μ: 331676, ~: 316496)\n[PASS] testMaxThresholdSuppressesCommandsWithoutBlockingCallbacks() (gas: 469767)\n[PASS] testMistypedInitializedKeyCannotConsumeCorrectBinding() (gas: 267482)\n[PASS] testPendingOwnerCannotAdministerAndReplacedNomineeCannotAccept() (gas: 760405)\n[PASS] testRuleAndEnabledEventsAndRejectedRuleAreAtomic() (gas: 344838)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 76.48ms (128.40ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/admission/Hook.admission.t.sol:HookAdmissionAlternateManagerTest\n[PASS] test_callbacksRefuseCallersOtherThanThePoolManager() (gas: 47165)\n[PASS] test_initializesFromTheLaunchFactory() (gas: 67777)\n[PASS] test_permissionsMatchTheDeclaredFlags() (gas: 15738)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoEscapeHatch() (gas: 6942293)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 94.40ms (15.23ms CPU time)\n\nRan 28 tests for test/IMDPhysicalHook.t.sol:IMDPhysicalHookTest\n[PASS] testBeforeInitializeRequiresFactorySender() (gas: 10883)\n[PASS] testBindRequiresAnInitializedPoolAndStaysCorrectable() (gas: 353138)\n[PASS] testBindingIsOnceAndSavesExactKey() (gas: 290248)\n[PASS] testBuyAndSellForBothCurrencyOrders() (gas: 13558050)\n[PASS] testCannotEnableBeforeBinding() (gas: 61859)\n[PASS] testCooldownBoundaryAndSkippedEventsDoNotMoveTimer() (gas: 535906)\n[PASS] testExplicitOwnerIsIndependentOfFactory() (gas: 41210392)\n[PASS] testFactoryInitializeDoesNotBindEnableOrEmit() (gas: 51745)\n[PASS] testFirstCommandAtTimestampZeroStillEnforcesCooldown() (gas: 346416)\n[PASS] testFuzzActualDeltaAndRelayArePreserved(uint128,bool,bool) (runs: 512, μ: 326678, ~: 326644)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 6955215286485368467\n\n[PASS] testInitialConfigurationAndPermissions() (gas: 128857)\n[PASS] testInt128MinimumIsWidenedBeforeNegation() (gas: 322961)\n[PASS] testInvalidBindings() (gas: 217273)\n[PASS] testOwnerOnlySettingsAndTwoStepTransfer() (gas: 444275)\n[PASS] testPoolManagerComesFromTheConstructor() (gas: 9312730)\n[PASS] testRejectsIncorrectAddressFlags() (gas: 6428)\n[PASS] testRejectsSpoofedAfterSwap() (gas: 252385)\n[PASS] testRejectsSpoofedBeforeInitialize() (gas: 10435)\n[PASS] testRejectsZeroFactory() (gas: 4438)\n[PASS] testRejectsZeroOwner() (gas: 5013)\n[PASS] testRejectsZeroPoolManager() (gas: 4582)\n[PASS] testRenounceOwnershipIsDisabled() (gas: 327265)\n[PASS] testRuleChangesAndEnableDoNotResetCooldown() (gas: 661225)\n[PASS] testThresholdBelowEqualAndAbove() (gas: 433506)\n[PASS] testTokenMetadataSupplyAndPlainTransfers() (gas: 132975)\n[PASS] testUnboundDisabledAndForeignPoolEmitNothing() (gas: 341471)\n[PASS] testZeroAndSameSignDeltasAreIgnored() (gas: 398818)\n[PASS] testZeroThresholdRejected() (gas: 33491)\nSuite result: ok. 28 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 97.85ms (152.44ms CPU time)\n\nRan 9 tests for test/IMDPhysicalHook.accounting.t.sol:IMDPhysicalHookAccountingTest\n[PASS] testDisableAndRuleChangesCannotTrapLiquidityOrLPFees() (gas: 3863923)\n[PASS] testFuzzHookIsAccountingEquivalentToPoolWithoutHook(bool,bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 512, μ: 4138405, ~: 4129235)\n[PASS] testPriceLimitedBuyBelowThresholdDoesNotEmitInEitherOrder() (gas: 3543748)\n[PASS] testPriceLimitedBuyImdFirstDoesNotEmit() (gas: 3549044)\n[PASS] testPriceLimitedExactOutputImdFirstUsesActualImd() (gas: 3548289)\n[PASS] testPriceLimitedExactOutputUsesActualImd() (gas: 3543246)\n[PASS] testPriceLimitedSellBelowThresholdDoesNotEmit() (gas: 3548969)\n[PASS] testPriceLimitedSellImdFirstDoesNotEmit() (gas: 3543369)\n[PASS] testRevertedSettlementRollsBackPriceCommandAndTimestamp() (gas: 4022584)\nSuite result: ok. 9 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 104.82ms (107.13ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/IMDPhysicalHook.invariant.t.sol:RelaySequenceImdSecondInvariantTest\n[PASS] invariant_ownerActivationAndRelayHistoryMatchTheSequence() (runs: 256, calls: 32768, reverts: 0)\n\n╭----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract             | Selector           | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+========================================================================+\n| RelaySequenceHandler | accept             | 3632  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RelaySequenceHandler | bind               | 3623  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RelaySequenceHandler | changeRule         | 3637  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RelaySequenceHandler | elapse             | 3663  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RelaySequenceHandler | enable             | 3649  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RelaySequenceHandler | initializeCallback | 3643  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RelaySequenceHandler | nominate           | 3592  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RelaySequenceHandler | renounce           | 3736  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RelaySequenceHandler | swap               | 3593  | 0       | 0        |\n╰----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 3.59s (3.58s CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/IMDPhysicalHook.invariant.t.sol:RelaySequenceImdFirstInvariantTest\n[PASS] invariant_ownerActivationAndRelayHistoryMatchTheSequence() (runs: 256, calls: 32768, reverts: 0)\n\n╭----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract             | Selector           | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+========================================================================+\n| RelaySequenceHandler | accept             | 3632  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RelaySequenceHandler | bind               | 3623  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RelaySequenceHandler | changeRule         | 3637  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RelaySequenceHandler | elapse             | 3663  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RelaySequenceHandler | enable             | 3649  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RelaySequenceHandler | initializeCallback | 3643  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RelaySequenceHandler | nominate           | 3592  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RelaySequenceHandler | renounce           | 3736  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RelaySequenceHandler | swap               | 3593  | 0       | 0        |\n╰----------------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 3.66s (3.65s CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/IMDirectorToken.invariant.t.sol:IMDirectorTokenInvariantTest\n[PASS] invariant_supplyBalancesAndAllowancesAreConserved() (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭----------------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract             | Selector       | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+====================================================================+\n| DirectorTokenHandler | approve        | 3308  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| DirectorTokenHandler | forbiddenAdmin | 3229  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| DirectorTokenHandler | overdraw       | 3232  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| DirectorTokenHandler | spend          | 3237  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| DirectorTokenHandler | transfer       | 3378  | 0       | 0        |\n╰----------------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 5.04s (5.04s CPU time)\n\nRan 19 test suites in 5.04s (12.94s CPU time): 98 tests passed, 0 failed, 2 skipped (100 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":69,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"IMDPhysicalHook.acceptOwnership()\",\"IMDPhysicalHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"IMDPhysicalHook.bindPool((address,address,uint24,int24,address))\",\"IMDPhysicalHook.setEnabled(bool)\",\"IMDPhysicalHook.setRule(bool,bool,uint256,uint32)\",\"IMDPhysicalHook.transferOwnership(address)\",\"IMDirectorToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"IMDirectorToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"IMDirectorToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":6,\"ADAPTATION.md\":90,\"COMPILED_SOURCES.json\":86,\"DEPENDENCIES.json\":26,\"README.md\":71,\"SPEC.md\":19,\"VALIDATION.md\":55,\"abi/IMDPhysicalHook.json\":1560,\"abi/IMDirectorToken.json\":315,\"foundry.toml\":19,\"launch.json\":28,\"script/check_published_admission.py\":72,\"src/IMDPhysicalHook.sol\":232,\"src/IMDirectorToken.sol\":11,\"test/HookTestBase.sol\":100,\"test/IMDPhysicalHook.accounting.t.sol\":217,\"test/IMDPhysicalHook.init.t.sol\":69,\"test/IMDPhysicalHook.integration.t.sol\":241,\"test/IMDPhysicalHook.invariant.t.sol\":271,\"test/IMDPhysicalHook.regression.t.sol\":265,\"test/IMDPhysicalHook.t.sol\":384,\"test/IMDirectorLaunch.fork.t.sol\":174,\"test/IMDirectorToken.invariant.t.sol\":129,\"test/TESTING.md\":116,\"test/admission/AdmissionSupport.sol\":140,\"test/admission/Hook.admission.t.sol\":313,\"test/admission/OwnToken.admission.t.sol\":159,\"test/admission/Owners.admission.t.sol\":242,\"test/admission/README.md\":45,\"test/admission/Token.admission.t.sol\":205,\"test/fixtures/kept-launch-input.hex\":1,\"test/support/IMD-EXAMPLE-LICENSE\":21,\"test/support/IMDLaunchTypes.sol\":55},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"b276041f6f4162e48097389df6a16975e502e27c6469eb9de95e38d75c4634eb","verifiedTreeHash":"d9b054d68d23d48036cd3a354e237003b1076a4f","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+560ab6a2"}]}