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Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"17d14f70-4f1b-4de2-8289-95465e51b17b","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"aba62326ebc68a8c3fffef52021a0996a388eac9b616cb9ce1299f59ec9b748a","dependsOn":["build_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_economics","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"5e9bbc351e3060d07e086cedea5555b767cbcd04c51cb15d7c2df7b943198bde","dependsOn":["build_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_flow","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"497f084ac5c9c54814699671bf0bd6f7ccba022c786bea45b87c23ce3954c0e9","dependsOn":["build_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest","audit_math","audit_permissions","audit_economics","audit_flow"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"3014f1ea5961918ca059453a484bf4c8bcbbfc2248dbe31d94ac7c5cdf8f50bd","skillId":"audit-judge","tools":[]},"key":"audit_judge","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"3014f1ea5961918ca059453a484bf4c8bcbbfc2248dbe31d94ac7c5cdf8f50bd","skillId":"audit-judge","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"dc7743fecbf5887547ba781467af95480b2788da8c1faf5b08ebd408be0ec816","dependsOn":["build_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_math","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"4ab89bbf05325c5f8da29259f66fc9ee191d7d91de852eb30bf848754fd3cca4","dependsOn":["build_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_permissions","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"c45551fa437c3abd37f1c405d4ed144b140f8948837aa561936e7f830c42079e","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"b6503de65ad02f845827887c23da4c3b56ccc5df7a459db263bae6e549d92f7f","skillId":"build-contract-project","tools":[]},"key":"build_contract_project","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"b6503de65ad02f845827887c23da4c3b56ccc5df7a459db263bae6e549d92f7f","skillId":"build-contract-project","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"b6641ad3627975b05cca890cebde0f6f1f4e7d958c3cab932a2fb143153cce39","dependsOn":["build_contract_project","write_foundry_tests"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"tools":[]},"key":"manifest","kind":"code","role":"integrate","skillHash":null,"skillId":null,"state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"77318bd2a52d443d66d260e5b7c2ffea77631690a2a525851dbc2a35ad2a6a2b","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"73431852439ad3a343f3d2b7db1c43cd363b9f48f9bb51497374a0cf6d50b223","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","tools":[]},"key":"write_foundry_tests","kind":"code","role":"tests","skillHash":"73431852439ad3a343f3d2b7db1c43cd363b9f48f9bb51497374a0cf6d50b223","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"Build a Uniswap v4 hook for a new token paired with IMD on Ethereum mainnet. Token name \"paper\", symbol \"paper\".\n\nFee:\n- The hook charges 2% of every swap in IMD, both directions (buys and sells), via beforeSwap/afterSwap return deltas. This total is a constant; nothing can raise it.\n- Inside the total, the split is a storage setting: 0.5% to the orders wallet 0x721F8232e19c92516eB753FEF53d8A33a3637989, 1.5% to the dev wallet 0xb59eac9882Ba98f4170d99D5F402C3EDb6D50D75. Only the owner can call setSplit(ordersWallet, ordersBps, devWallet, devBps); the two parts must sum to the constant.\n- Fees are paid out to the two wallets in IMD in the same swap, with no accumulation inside the hook.\n\nUpgradeability:\n- The hook is a TransparentUpgradeableProxy whose address is mined with all 14 hook flag bits set (addr & 0x3fff == 0x3fff), so later implementations can use any callback. Unused callbacks are no-ops in v1.\n- ProxyAdmin owner is the constant 0xb59eac9882Ba98f4170d99D5F402C3EDb6D50D75 (not a constructor argument, not the launch wallet). Storage uses namespaced ERC-7201 slots so an upgrade keeps all state.\n- Deliver two implementations with tests: v1 as specified, and a demo v2 identical except the default split is reversed, used only to rehearse an upgrade.\n\nVoting by burning (in the hook, reads the pool):\n- postDraft(bytes32 textHash) returns draftId: pulls from the caller the token amount worth postFeeUsd dollars at the current pool price (IMD per token from the pool, USD per IMD from a chain-readable source agreed at review; if none, owner-set imdUsd), transfers it to 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000dEaD, emits DraftPosted(draftId, author, textHash, burned). The burned amount counts as the author's votes.\n- burn(uint256 draftId, uint256 amount): pulls amount tokens from the caller to the dead address, emits Burned(draftId, voter, amount). Any amount, any number of times, any existing draft.\n- postFeeUsd starts at 1; owner-only setPostFeeUsd. Views: feeBps(), split(), postFeeUsd(), postFeeTokens().\n- Rounds, quorum and winners are computed off-chain from the events; the hook stores nothing about rounds.\n\nPool:\n- Pair with IMD 0xD34a99Bc0f67aE1bbd63C660e6d0b0dd03E263B7; economics poolBps 8000, remainderTo 0xb59eac9882Ba98f4170d99D5F402C3EDb6D50D75. Fee tier and tick spacing as the policy allows.\n\nDeliver a Foundry project with unit tests for fees in both directions, split changes, the post and burn paths, the upgrade to v2 keeping state, and an adversarial review. English only in code and docs.","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"8368687496dd0605aa7076cf8ddbf17d758e105eb4abc8c7214df9c640deada7","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"17d14f70-4f1b-4de2-8289-95465e51b17b","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-825-build-uniswap-v4-hook"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"52158","feedbackHash":"c00fe2de1c8f02ca10bb5cf9197a3c446d5acd02dee968012f1d121e4a1897f3","nodeKey":"audit_economics","submissionHash":"aba62326ebc68a8c3fffef52021a0996a388eac9b616cb9ce1299f59ec9b748a","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52157","feedbackHash":"2885f7f6177c2c55f09d0f67fb77c2822c572fc81e1d874698f742a59ae7ad5a","nodeKey":"audit_flow","submissionHash":"5e9bbc351e3060d07e086cedea5555b767cbcd04c51cb15d7c2df7b943198bde","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52179","feedbackHash":"4fe618d4e1468ad8c11212abe3fd86134b782633999b17b66da81b69dd01f4a4","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"741fd628423d7c95816a52a30c79702f8ead77b052a350172f953db9135a4480","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52232","feedbackHash":"244ba3a0733ce0baca04dd27de2dcbf2fc37f4d7a8a829ffcec20c512ebc8567","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"78945ec4bc350aa5d0b3f93b214d398fd823555f4e249dc93b3a19411a837416","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51083","feedbackHash":"5349bc7c86ea73280f10984833bf1af81006b3e558afbfac6d7b7a7de5851ab2","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"497f084ac5c9c54814699671bf0bd6f7ccba022c786bea45b87c23ce3954c0e9","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52163","feedbackHash":"75735be104afe1e5facc6a271a2cc7908f5846c0c926eb93107025446ec638c7","nodeKey":"audit_math","submissionHash":"dc7743fecbf5887547ba781467af95480b2788da8c1faf5b08ebd408be0ec816","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52174","feedbackHash":"612c23c39f6138a0fabbb475d82799e4f9ddfe491de5666488e3563a7c65bac3","nodeKey":"audit_permissions","submissionHash":"4ab89bbf05325c5f8da29259f66fc9ee191d7d91de852eb30bf848754fd3cca4","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51541","feedbackHash":"2b8a8128ffafddc72f2cbfa7cb471954de81e645d4b9fed7ff505f98440303d5","nodeKey":"build_contract_project","submissionHash":"3ac0bb58ae1ac089136110ec1344c7e87a125d5d81ad2df8d841034b61c06970","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"50962","feedbackHash":"26eb800b02978709f7c983e6fe74b5fe85e36964e98d1fb880b93675f0eaabbd","nodeKey":"build_contract_project","submissionHash":"c45551fa437c3abd37f1c405d4ed144b140f8948837aa561936e7f830c42079e","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51519","feedbackHash":"872cec6e88d99e0d5dd4c7bce2a188ac1613252d94b61e7439c9ab3fd7978277","nodeKey":"build_contract_project","submissionHash":"b3139bfde989005f758631cd6e5a218cfac1e35352cda93db910e20fe693d996","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"50953","feedbackHash":"e0ef629b46f5ccc833ca457628905dae895f40f125ecf47591c94b6848da1931","nodeKey":"build_contract_project","submissionHash":"daa1570bf77bfd32427edd63eea6dcfc39f90b79c1a82f8a2cd5d6e5c90ccc94","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51737","feedbackHash":"2abe8bb4561f802f52596ab4fe2bcf7d518a8aaf7e32b3ca14079cbe7d51042f","nodeKey":"build_contract_project","submissionHash":"e411ae4ed39585ea606081b0a9751fc784331ecf403d7b313d135101b4ffec82","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":0},{"agentId":"51446","feedbackHash":"e7c8b7302b776d93b0faf4f5d2bcb32a99f8e4050230054e8942441d66addf57","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"b6641ad3627975b05cca890cebde0f6f1f4e7d958c3cab932a2fb143153cce39","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51704","feedbackHash":"868668b00b8a69114e9100cdbf4c2f3291da9a38b0490167a562fe26d68c5590","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"27fce3471595e3cda5d39c9cf27239ba2716c21a1cd3ec520aea8af9746c6bbd","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52287","feedbackHash":"865a0d9e11a8a1f7c4efe1b5f58f98a4e82b485bdb81534c74c11b40e458a9da","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"1a1866a6669eb61499d621cb6a23253ebd385ef8f09d2fbcb0aefe690c566216","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"50957","feedbackHash":"ba0db3136d0039c297dd03fcf31f29dd6b5671d42c1ec11b819ec4062698cf89","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"77318bd2a52d443d66d260e5b7c2ffea77631690a2a525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is updated and validates against the schema, but the launch it describes cannot deploy as written, and the notes now open with that.\n\n**The blocker:** the manifest names `PaperHook`, the only delivered contract with an `IPoolManager` constructor argument and the permission declaration. Deployed on its own it is uninitialized, so `PoolManager.initialize` reverts; I reproduced this locally. The working hook is `PaperProxy`, which the schema cannot describe (implementation address plus initializer bytes), and the protected runtime scan rejects the `DELEGATECALL` every proxy needs. Launching needs deployer support for the proxy path plus an admission exception, or a non-proxy redesign.\n\nNo findings were attached to this revision, so I changed only the `notes` field, to match the hook source as it now stands:\n\n- **Voting:** added the capped `postDraft(bytes32,uint256)` overload and the saved launch price used when active liquidity is zero.\n- **Initial price:** still 2^96. I read IMD's decimals from mainnet (18), so this is 1 paper = 1 IMD. It is the only price that does not depend on the paper/IMD sort order, which is unknown until the token address exists. It remains an assumption, not a reviewed launch price.\n- **Protected checks:** corrected the earlier wording. The bare `PaperHook` passes the protected checks; the `DELEGATECALL` rejection applies to the proxy.\n- **Length:** notes are 3,854 characters, under the 4,000 cap.\n\nEverything else is unchanged: all 14 permissions (matching `getHookPermissions` in both V1 and V2), `[\"$poolManager\"]`, token `Paper`/paper/paper/18, paired currency IMD, fee 3000, tick spacing 60.\n\nChecks I ran:\n\n- `forge build` succeeds and `forge test` passes 196 of 196.\n- The two protected test files pass when run from scratch against the declared hook and token (3 of 3 hook, 7 of 7 token).\n- `launch.json` is the only file changed.","treeHash":"4c8b1d49edb1b3c22c034b059e48fe6335d89151","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1027858,"inputTokens":28,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":17651,"runtime":"claude","turns":16,"wallClockMs":255268}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"e2fcdf2c439dfaa151c29330eb55dc31432a3a0fea3c54b3c53f9ea362cc471a","device":"83ee8122d8d8744c","findings":[],"hash":"27fce3471595e3cda5d39c9cf27239ba2716c21a1cd3ec520aea8af9746c6bbd","nodeId":"7f0fd592-b20a-4c34-b6ab-1f5d05b344ce","outcome":"completed","summary":"Created `launch.json`; it is the only submission change.\n\nSchema validation passed, permissions match all 14 implementation flags, and `forge build` plus all 159 existing tests passed.\n\nNotes document the unresolved proxy deployment and protected `DELEGATECALL` check conflicts.","treeHash":"4f528f3bed5a67de54053de9797a35a44a498c96","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":377344,"inputTokens":45868,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":4877,"runtime":"codex","turns":4,"wallClockMs":137193}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":2,"bundleHash":null,"device":"4ca9ed4f0937da89","findings":[],"hash":"282aec82ab658cee4439798a7d757f28c0ed58d93746e2c6ba179a0693d9f82c","nodeId":"e324b58e-fe44-4596-99b6-b4d111aacec1","outcome":"failed","summary":"dependency did not apply: fatal: transport 'file' not allowed\n","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":0,"inputTokens":0,"model":null,"outputTokens":0,"runtime":"claude","turns":0,"wallClockMs":501}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":3,"bundleHash":"a38ab04d205b59e78bfd823ccd8459d659668f125fbade59ef0970fa3ef673af","device":"1091c186c92b376f","findings":[],"hash":"3ac0bb58ae1ac089136110ec1344c7e87a125d5d81ad2df8d841034b61c06970","nodeId":"f2f4a2bd-e3a0-4f71-a610-69f825845739","outcome":"completed","summary":"Implemented immutable V1/V2-only upgrade checks and a safe pre-settlement router.\n\n`forge build`, all 118 delivered tests, and `forge fmt --check` pass. The fee-cap proof also passes.\n\nAll findings are answered in `.imd-responses.json`. The original settle-after first-buy proof and delegatecall admission check remain explicitly disputed; neither is claimed to pass.","treeHash":"8324e54596b612f05417f18592db34c8acc1602b","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2302720,"inputTokens":107912,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":13891,"runtime":"codex","turns":6,"wallClockMs":632400}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"dc7103e773ea194a","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Settlement of my round-2 finding b2c4e9c6da36 (author answer: disputed, source unchanged). The author's reproduction agrees with mine: the unmodified proof fails with WrappedError(hook, 0xdc98354e beforeInitialize, 0x82b42900 Unauthorized(), 0xa9e35b2f HookCallFailed()). The dispute is only about whose job the fix is. Two statements in the answer are out of date on this tree: launch.json IS present (added in commit e1d134c, revised in 56b3caa and again in HEAD a580c0f) and it names hook.contract \"PaperHook\" with constructorArgs [\"$poolManager\"]; that is the artifact the deployer will CREATE2 at a 14-flag address and whose pool it will initialize. That artifact runs _disableInitializers() in its constructor (line 83), so HookStorage.manager is zero forever and onlyManager (line 87) rejects the real PoolManager in beforeInitialize; initialize() afterwards reverts InvalidInitialization, and owner, token and split are zero, so nothing can repair it. The functional hook (PaperProxy with implementation address plus 100 bytes of initializer calldata, deployed by PaperDeployment.deployHook) cannot be written in the manifest schema, and its runtime contains DELEGATECALL, which the pinned Hook.protected.t.sol test_runtimeCodeHasNoEscapeHatch rejects, while the same protected suite passes on the bare implementation. Admission would therefore approve an artifact that cannot launch. The README and the manifest notes say 'launch blocked' and 'do not name PaperHook as the deployed hook', which is honest, but the deliverable remains unlaunchable, and the author's stated resolution (a manifest/deployer path for the proxy plus a policy exception) has not been granted anywhere in this tree. Severity stays high: permanent breakage of the launch as specified. What would close it without waiting on policy: make the artifact the manifest names self-sufficient while keeping the proxy path intact, e.g. onlyManager falls back to the immutable deploymentManager when storage manager is zero, beforeInitialize binds token from the PoolKey and defaults owner/split/imdUnit when the proxy initializer never ran (owner = DEV constant), so the mined PaperHook both hosts the pool and still serves as the proxy implementation. The alternative, an admission exception for the reviewed proxy plus a deployer path for PaperDeployment.deployHook, needs the requester and is not something another code revision can provide. Specialist findings 663d4197b9b9, 6c45e0931059 and b2d1f8841ff5 are the same root cause and are merged here; their proofs all fail on this tree with the same WrappedError.","line":87,"path":"src/PaperHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {ERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {Hooks} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/Hooks.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {StateLibrary} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/StateLibrary.sol\";\nimport {Paper} from \"src/Paper.sol\";\nimport {PaperHook} from \"src/PaperHook.sol\";\nimport {HookFlags} from \"src/HookFlags.sol\";\n\ncontract ProofImd is ERC20 {\n    constructor() ERC20(\"IMD\", \"IMD\") {}\n}\n\n/// launch.json: hook.contract = \"PaperHook\", constructorArgs = [\"$poolManager\"].\n/// The deployer therefore deploys PaperHook's creation code with the chain's PoolManager at an address carrying\n/// all 14 flags, then initializes the paper/IMD pool. That pool initialization must succeed for the launch to exist.\ncontract ManifestHookProofTest is Test {\n    using StateLibrary for IPoolManager;\n\n    address constant IMD = 0xD34a99Bc0f67aE1bbd63C660e6d0b0dd03E263B7;\n    uint160 constant Q96 = 79228162514264337593543950336;\n\n    function test_manifestHookDeployedWithPoolManagerOnlyCanHostThePool() public {\n        PoolManager manager = new PoolManager(address(this));\n        Paper paper = new Paper();\n        vm.etch(IMD, address(new ProofImd()).code);\n\n        bytes memory creation = abi.encodePacked(type(PaperHook).creationCode, abi.encode(address(manager)));\n        bytes32 initHash = keccak256(creation);\n        address at;\n        for (uint256 i; i < 200_000; ++i) {\n            address predicted =\n                address(uint160(uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0xff), address(this), bytes32(i), initHash)))));\n            if (!HookFlags.matches(predicted, HookFlags.ALL)) continue;\n            bytes32 salt = bytes32(i);\n            assembly (\"memory-safe\") {\n                at := create2(0, add(creation, 0x20), mload(creation), salt)\n            }\n            break;\n        }\n        require(at != address(0), \"no salt produced an all-flags address\");\n        assertEq(HookFlags.flagsOf(at), HookFlags.ALL);\n        // The protected admission checks pass on this code: it declares all flags and refuses outside callers.\n        Hooks.Permissions memory p = PaperHook(at).getHookPermissions();\n        assertTrue(p.beforeInitialize);\n\n        (address a, address b) = address(paper) < IMD ? (address(paper), IMD) : (IMD, address(paper));\n        PoolKey memory key = PoolKey(Currency.wrap(a), Currency.wrap(b), 3000, 60, IHooks(at));\n\n        // FAILS on the current tree: PaperHook's constructor disables initialization, its namespaced manager is\n        // zero, and beforeInitialize reverts Unauthorized for the real PoolManager, so the launch pool cannot be created.\n        manager.initialize(key, Q96);\n        (uint160 price,,,) = IPoolManager(address(manager)).getSlot0(key.toId());\n        assertEq(price, Q96, \"the manifest hook must be able to initialize the launch pool\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"1) Deploy PoolManager M; put ERC-20 code at IMD 0xD34a99Bc0f67aE1bbd63C660e6d0b0dd03E263B7; deploy Paper. 2) creation = type(PaperHook).creationCode ++ abi.encode(M); CREATE2 at a salt whose address & 0x3fff == 0x3fff (exactly what launch.json lines 3-5 describe); getHookPermissions() reports all 14 flags. 3) M.initialize(PoolKey(sorted(paper, IMD), 3000, 60, hook), 2^96). Expected: pool initialized, slot0 sqrtPrice == 2^96. Actual: revert WrappedError(hook, 0xdc98354e, 0x82b42900 Unauthorized(), 0xa9e35b2f HookCallFailed()). 4) hook.initialize(paper, owner, 1e18): revert InvalidInitialization(). Re-run on HEAD a580c0f on 2026-10-06: forge test --match-path test/scratch/Proof_b2c4e9c6da36.t.sol fails with exactly that WrappedError; Proof_663d4197b9b9, Proof_6c45e0931059 and Proof_b2d1f8841ff5 fail identically (the last also fails test_manifestHookCanBeConfiguredAfterDeployment with InvalidInitialization()). The delivered suite (202 tests) passes because every test deploys the proxy through PaperDeployment.deployHook, never the manifest artifact.","severity":"high","snippet":"        if (msg.sender != address(_state().manager)) revert Unauthorized();","title":"launch.json still names the bare PaperHook implementation, which cannot initialize or operate the pool; the working PaperProxy cannot be expressed in the manifest and its runtime fails the protected D"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Settlement of my round-2 finding 11532b6d00bf (author answer: disputed, no code change). The behaviour still reproduces exactly as before: in a settle-after router (Universal Router / V4Router order) the buyer's IMD does not exist inside the manager while beforeSwap runs, so _pay can only be funded by IMD the manager already holds for other pools, and on a manager with less IMD than 2% of the buy the trade reverts InsufficientFeeBacking although it was otherwise fine. In round 2 I said either of two answers closes this: (a) keep the same-swap rule and record the dependency and the PaperSwapRouter requirement as launch conditions, or (b) allow direct-when-covered / claim-otherwise with a permissionless redeem. The author chose (a): README now carries an explicit 'Launch condition for immediate payouts' paragraph, docs/deployment-parameters.json swapRouter.launchRequirement says to deploy and integrate PaperSwapRouter before opening trading whenever backing is insufficient, and both state that shared-manager backing can disappear and historical balances are no guarantee. That is the disclosure I asked for and it follows the brief's literal 'paid in the same swap, no accumulation inside the hook', which excludes the ERC-6909 claim fallback the supplied uniswap-v4-hooks reference prescribes for this very failure. Residual exposure, unchanged: a hidden dependency on unrelated pools' IMD reserves for every standard-router buy (mainnet PoolManager held about 197k IMD on 2026-10-06, so today only a buy whose gross IMD leg exceeds about 9.8M IMD, more than IMD's supply, would trip it), and a hard failure on any low-IMD manager. Downgraded to low: availability only, no loss, no misdirected funds, disclosed. No further code change is useful; what remains is for the requester to acknowledge the launch condition or to override the brief in favour of the reference's claim fallback. Specialist findings f1f30ed86ae6 (rated high), b3dd35ce0b4f (medium) and 05795b1e0852 (info, live mainnet balance read) are the same root cause and are merged here.","line":341,"path":"src/PaperHook.sol","reproduction":"Fresh PoolManager; ERC-20 mock at IMD; proxy hook via PaperDeployment.deployHook at 2^96, fee 3000, spacing 60; paper-only liquidity in [60,120] (paper currency0) or [-120,-60] (paper currency1) so imd.balanceOf(manager) == 0. Buyer approves a router that calls manager.swap first and settles afterwards (sync -> transferFrom -> settle), exact-input 100e18 IMD, extreme price limit. Expected: buyer receives paper, ORDERS 0.5e18 IMD, DEV 1.5e18 IMD, manager keeps 98e18. Actual: revert WrappedError(hook, 0x575e24b4 beforeSwap, 0xe4c4588d InsufficientFeeBacking(), 0xa9e35b2f HookCallFailed()). Re-run on HEAD a580c0f: forge test --match-path test/scratch/Proof_11532b6d00bf.t.sol fails with that error (Proof_f1f30ed86ae6 identically); the author's test/Fees.t.sol::test_freshTokenOnlyPoolNeedsPrepaidImdFee asserts the same revert and passes; the same buy through PaperSwapRouter succeeds (test/Router.t.sol, test/VotingProtection.t.sol _buyWithPrepayment).","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (IERC20(IMD).balanceOf(address(s.manager)) < fee) revert InsufficientFeeBacking();","title":"Buy-side fee is taken from the PoolManager's spot IMD balance before a settle-after router has paid in; a manager holding less IMD than the fee rejects every such buy (round-3 settlement of 11532b6d00"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Settlement of my round-2 finding 5741ee49b552 (author answer: disputed, no change). Still reproduces: any implementation other than the delivered V1/V2 bytecode (with the same manager immutable) reverts UnsupportedImplementation in the proxy constructor and on upgradeToAndCall, enforced by _implementationManager from PaperProxy._fallback. The author's position is unchanged and defensible: the allowlist is the only on-chain enforcement of the brief's 'this total is a constant; nothing can raise it' against a future implementation, and a review or timelock is a promise rather than enforcement. The two brief requirements genuinely conflict, the trade-off is documented in README and launch.json notes, and the V1 to V2 rehearsal the brief asks for works (test/Upgrade.t.sol). Kept at low with no code change requested: no fund loss, no breakage, the 14 mined flags and the DEV ProxyAdmin owner are as specified. Consequence to record for the requester: after V2 the proxy address is effectively immutable, so a fix to finding 1, a chain-readable USD source, or any activated callback requires a new proxy address and pool. The requester should state which guarantee wins; if upgradeability wins, the allowlist goes and the fee cap moves to review/timelock, and if the fee cap wins (current code) a non-proxy hook would deliver the same guarantees and also remove the DELEGATECALL conflict in finding 1. Specialist finding 22347dec626e (rated medium) is the same point and is merged here at low.","line":54,"path":"src/PaperProxy.sol","reproduction":"State: launched proxy P (V1), ProxyAdmin A owned by DEV 0xb59eac9882Ba98f4170d99D5F402C3EDb6D50D75. Compile any implementation other than delivered V1/V2, e.g. PaperHookV2(manager) with one executable byte flipped or any contract adding a function. vm.prank(DEV); A.upgradeAndCall(ITransparentUpgradeableProxy(P), newImpl, \"\"). Expected per brief: the upgrade owner installs a reviewed later implementation. Actual: revert UnsupportedImplementation(); implementation slot still holds V1. Verified on HEAD a580c0f: forge test --match-test test_upgradeRejectsModifiedCanonicalRuntime passes (test/Upgrade.t.sol), asserting exactly this revert, as does testFuzz_runtimeWhitelistRejectsChangesBeforeDelegation.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (normalizedHash != V1_RUNTIME_HASH && normalizedHash != V2_RUNTIME_HASH) {","title":"PaperProxy pins the V1/V2 runtime hashes with no setter, so the ProxyAdmin owner can never install a later implementation; the brief's 'later implementations can use any callback' is unmet by design ("},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Settlement of my round-2 advisory 9f222c66c033 (author answer: disputed as to any further change, risk confirmed). The capped overload postDraft(bytes32,uint256) remains the fix and holds: it compares the execution quote to the caller's maximum before allocating an id or transferring and reverts PostFeeExceedsLimit(required, maximum). The one-argument selector the brief requires remains an uncapped wrapper, so a caller with an open allowance can still be made to burn a manipulated quote, including the saved-price variant where the attacker removes the dust position after displacing the price and the fallback keeps serving the poisoned value until the next in-range swap. This round the author added test/VotingProtection.t.sol::test_savedManipulatedPriceStillRequiresCallerCapAfterDustRemoval (both currency orderings), and README plus docs/deployment-parameters.json now state that the legacy selector has no price protection and that a manipulated quote can persist after dust removal. In round 2 I said that documentation is an acceptable close; it is in place, so this is settled as informational. Loss is bounded by the caller's own allowance and balance, is only reachable through the legacy selector, and the attacker gains nothing. If the requester wants the legacy selector safe as well, a hook-side sanity bound in the wrapper is the minimal change, at the cost of departing from pure spot pricing. Specialist findings 35d65db21ba5 (low), 3979498abfe1 (medium) and cbb5dbd67409 (low) describe the uncapped postDraft without noting the capped overload already shipped; they are merged here.","line":238,"path":"src/PaperHook.sol","reproduction":"test/VotingProtection.t.sol::test_savedManipulatedPriceStillRequiresCallerCapAfterDustRemoval (passes on HEAD a580c0f, in both currency orderings): fresh PoolManager, proxy hook at 2^96 (imdUsd 1e18, postFeeUsd 1), paper-only position, one 100 IMD buy through PaperSwapRouter; displayedQuote = postFeeTokens(). Attacker adds dust liquidity 1e6 at ticks +-[138120,138180], swaps exact-input 1e24 paper with sqrtPriceLimit = getSqrtPriceAtTick(+-138150), then removes the dust (getLiquidity() == 0). postFeeTokens() > 900000 * displayedQuote. Victim with approve(hook, max): postDraft(h, displayedQuote) reverts PostFeeExceedsLimit and burns nothing, no id, no logs (fix holds); postDraft(h) burns the poisoned quote to 0xdEaD and emits DraftPosted with that amount (residual). A subsequent 10 IMD buy restores a quote below 2x the original.","severity":"info","snippet":"        return _postDraft(textHash, type(uint256).max);","title":"The brief-required postDraft(bytes32) burns the uncapped execution quote, including a poisoned saved price that persists after dust liquidity is removed (round-3 settlement of 9f222c66c033: residual a"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Settlement of my round-2 advisory 85550866043a (author answer: disputed, behaviour intended). Unchanged and still reproduces: for exact-input IMD buys and exact-output IMD sells the fee is charged in beforeSwap on the requested amount and afterSwap requires the pool to have moved exactly requested-minus-fee / requested-plus-fee, so a price-limit stop or liquidity exhaustion reverts the whole swap with a clean rollback. The author is right that v4's afterSwap return delta applies only to the unspecified currency, so the fee cannot be moved to afterSwap for these two modes. The brief does not require partial fills, the guard prevents charging on an unfilled amount, and README and the launch notes disclose the router constraint. Settled as info; keep the disclosure. Specialist finding 27904b51074d (low) is the same point and is merged here.","line":322,"path":"src/PaperHook.sol","reproduction":"test/Fees.t.sol::test_partialImdSpecifiedRevertsAndRollsBackFee (passes on HEAD a580c0f, both orderings): fixture pool, exact-input IMD buy of 1e22 with sqrtPriceLimit at tick +-1 reverts PartialImdSwap() (0x89bf8a45) wrapped in HookCallFailed; fees, balances and price roll back. Expected under plain v4: a partial fill up to the limit.","severity":"info","snippet":"            if (actual != expected) revert PartialImdSwap();","title":"IMD-specified swaps that the pool cannot fully fill revert PartialImdSwap instead of filling partially (settled: intended and documented)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"From audit_math finding 3bb300653312, reproduced. All four fee computations (beforeSwap line 297, afterSwap lines 318-319 and 326) use FullMath.mulDiv, which floors, so the hook fee is 0 whenever the IMD leg is below 50 wei (gross-up legs below 49 wei). The Pashov checklist prefers protocol-favouring rounding, but the leak is at most 1 wei per swap, gas makes chunking a trade into sub-50-wei pieces uneconomic, and README ('A tiny swap can round the total fee to zero') and test_dustFeeRoundsDown document it as intended. No action needed; if the author prefers round-up, note that a 1 wei exact-input then becomes fee-only and v4 reverts SwapAmountCannotBeZero.","line":297,"path":"src/PaperHook.sol","reproduction":"Fixture pool (full-range 1e24 liquidity, price 2^96). For a in 1..49: exact-input IMD buy of a wei pays 0 to ORDERS and 0 to DEV (ORDERS and DEV balances unchanged after all 49 swaps); a = 50 pays 1 wei to DEV (ordersAmount = floor(1*50/200) = 0, devAmount = 1). Reproduced on HEAD a580c0f with test/scratch/JudgeRound3.t.sol::test_dustFeeRoundsToZero in both currency orderings. Expected under round-up: 1 wei per swap.","severity":"info","snippet":"        uint256 fee = FullMath.mulDiv(amount, TOTAL_BPS, params.amountSpecified < 0 ? BPS : BPS - TOTAL_BPS);","title":"Hook fee floors to zero for IMD legs below 50 wei; every fee path rounds down (dust, documented by the author's own test)"}],"hash":"497f084ac5c9c54814699671bf0bd6f7ccba022c786bea45b87c23ce3954c0e9","nodeId":"02175177-20bf-4210-9a3f-147fc70c3f68","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. The findings file is at `.imd-findings.json` with 6 findings and 33 coverage rows covering all 30 listed entry points.\n\n**Outcome: the launch is still blocked by one unresolved high finding; everything else is settled.**\n\nSource contracts did not change this round. Only tests and docs moved, so each earlier finding was settled by re-running its proof against the current tree.\n\n- **High, still open: manifest artifact cannot launch.** The manifest names the bare implementation with only the pool manager as argument. That contract disables its initializer, so its stored manager is zero and the real PoolManager is rejected in beforeInitialize. My proof and all three specialist proofs fail on this tree with the same wrapped Unauthorized error. The author's answer says the tree has no manifest, but it does, and it was revised again in the latest commit. I described one code-side resolution the author can take without a policy exception: let the implementation operate standalone when the proxy initializer never ran, falling back to the immutable manager and binding the token from the pool key.\n- **Low, settled with disclosure: buy-side fee needs IMD already in the manager.** Still reproduces for settle-after routers. The author chose the option I said would close it: the README and deployment parameters now record the prepaying router as a launch condition. Downgraded from medium. The requester should acknowledge it or override the brief in favour of the reference's claim fallback.\n- **Low, unchanged: proxy allowlist blocks any later implementation.** Design trade-off between the fee cap and upgradeability. Requester decision still outstanding, no code change requested.\n- **Info: uncapped legacy postDraft.** The capped overload holds. The author added the regression test and documentation I asked for, so this is closed as informational.\n- **Info: partial IMD-specified swaps revert.** Intended and documented. Closed.\n- **Info, new from the math specialist: fee floors to zero below 50 wei.** Reproduced in both currency orderings, dust only.\n\n**Dropped specialist findings.** Three specialists reported that posting reverts at zero active liquidity. That describes code before the saved-price fallback. On this tree a paper-only pool quotes one paper before any buy, and a free one-wei displacement leaves the quote intact, verified in both orderings. The three uncapped-postDraft findings, the two manifest duplicates, and the two fee-backing duplicates were merged into mine.\n\nThe delivered suite passes 202 tests. Scratch copies were removed and no repository file was changed.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1004170,"inputTokens":290,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":25350,"runtime":"claude","turns":23,"wallClockMs":491409}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":3,"bundleHash":null,"device":"b4f6137e7c93a2b3","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"The launch manifest names `hook.contract: \"PaperHook\"` with `constructorArgs: [\"$poolManager\"]`, and the deployer/factory deploys exactly that artifact at a flag-mined address and initializes the pool in the same transaction. That artifact is the proxy *implementation*: its constructor runs `_disableInitializers()` (src/PaperHook.sol:81), and every hook callback is guarded by `onlyManager`, which compares `msg.sender` to `_state().manager` - a namespaced storage slot that is only written by `initialize(...)`. On the directly deployed artifact that slot is zero forever, so `beforeInitialize` (src/PaperHook.sol:251) reverts `Unauthorized()` for the real PoolManager, `PoolManager.initialize` bubbles it as `HookCallFailed`, and the pool can never be created. Nothing can repair it afterwards: `initialize` reverts `InvalidInitialization()`, `transferOwnership`/`setSplit` all read the same zero owner. The working hook is `PaperProxy(implementation, initialization)`, whose constructor arguments (an implementation address and 100 bytes of initializer calldata) cannot be expressed in the manifest schema, and whose runtime also contains DELEGATECALL, which the pinned `Hook.protected.t.sol` scanner rejects. The author documents this conflict in `launch.json` notes, but notes carry no deployment authority: as delivered, the only hook the service can deploy is one that refuses its own pool initialization. Access-control classification: the deployed artifact has no admin, no manager and no initialization path (TOB 'review-required: msg.sender check against an address an initializer sets'). Resolution requires a scope decision: either (a) make the artifact named in the manifest self-sufficient (e.g. a non-proxy hook, or an implementation whose constructor binds manager/owner/split when deployed standalone, with upgradeability delivered through a different mechanism the admission scanner permits), or (b) extend the launch flow to deploy `PaperProxy` with the mined salt and its initializer bytes. Until one of these is chosen the launch is blocked.","line":85,"path":"src/PaperHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {Hooks} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/Hooks.sol\";\nimport {ERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\";\nimport {Paper} from \"src/Paper.sol\";\nimport {PaperHook} from \"src/PaperHook.sol\";\nimport {HookFlags} from \"src/HookFlags.sol\";\n\ncontract ImdStub is ERC20 {\n    constructor() ERC20(\"IMD\", \"IMD\") {\n        _mint(msg.sender, 1e30);\n    }\n}\n\n/// @notice Reproduces the launch flow the manifest describes: deploy `hook.contract` (PaperHook) with\n/// constructorArgs [\"$poolManager\"] at an address carrying the declared 14 flags, then initialize the\n/// Paper/IMD pool in the same transaction. The deployed artifact is the disabled implementation: its\n/// namespaced `manager` is zero and `initialize` is permanently disabled, so `beforeInitialize`\n/// reverts `Unauthorized` for the PoolManager and the pool can never be created.\ncontract ManifestHookCannotLaunchTest is Test {\n    address constant IMD = 0xD34a99Bc0f67aE1bbd63C660e6d0b0dd03E263B7;\n    uint160 constant Q96 = 79228162514264337593543950336;\n\n    PoolManager manager;\n    Paper paper;\n    address hook;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        manager = new PoolManager(address(this));\n        paper = new Paper();\n        vm.etch(IMD, address(new ImdStub()).code);\n\n        // Exactly what the manifest tells the deployer: creationCode(PaperHook) ++ abi.encode($poolManager).\n        bytes memory creationCode = abi.encodePacked(type(PaperHook).creationCode, abi.encode(IPoolManager(manager)));\n        bytes32 initCodeHash = keccak256(creationCode);\n        for (uint256 i; i < 500_000; ++i) {\n            address predicted = address(\n                uint160(uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0xff), address(this), bytes32(i), initCodeHash))))\n            );\n            if (!HookFlags.matches(predicted, HookFlags.ALL)) continue;\n            bytes32 salt = bytes32(i);\n            address at;\n            assembly (\"memory-safe\") {\n                at := create2(0, add(creationCode, 0x20), mload(creationCode), salt)\n            }\n            require(at == predicted, \"deploy failed\");\n            hook = at;\n            break;\n        }\n        require(hook != address(0), \"no salt\");\n    }\n\n    function _key() internal view returns (PoolKey memory) {\n        (address a, address b) = address(paper) < IMD ? (address(paper), IMD) : (IMD, address(paper));\n        return PoolKey(Currency.wrap(a), Currency.wrap(b), 3000, 60, IHooks(hook));\n    }\n\n    /// The hook the manifest names reports all 14 permissions and is placed on a matching address,\n    /// but it cannot bring up its own pool: there is no deployment path in which the artifact named by\n    /// `hook.contract` is a working hook.\n    function test_manifestHookInitializesItsPool() public {\n        Hooks.Permissions memory p = PaperHook(hook).getHookPermissions();\n        assertTrue(p.beforeInitialize, \"declares beforeInitialize\");\n        assertEq(HookFlags.flagsOf(hook), HookFlags.ALL, \"address carries the declared flags\");\n\n        // Expected: the factory's pool initialization succeeds in the same transaction as the hook deployment.\n        // Actual: beforeInitialize's onlyManager compares msg.sender to the zero namespaced manager and reverts.\n        manager.initialize(_key(), Q96);\n        assertTrue(PaperHook(hook).poolKey().fee == 3000, \"pool bound\");\n    }\n\n    /// The artifact can never be configured afterwards either: the constructor disabled its initializer.\n    function test_manifestHookCanBeConfiguredAfterDeployment() public {\n        PaperHook(hook).initialize(address(paper), address(this), 1 ether);\n        assertEq(PaperHook(hook).owner(), address(this));\n    }\n}","reproduction":"State: fresh PoolManager M, Paper token P, IMD at 0xD34a...63B7. 1) CREATE2-deploy `type(PaperHook).creationCode ++ abi.encode(M)` at a salt whose address satisfies `addr & 0x3fff == 0x3fff` (exactly what the manifest's `hook.contract`/`constructorArgs`/`permissions` describe). `getHookPermissions()` reports all 14 flags, so the address is valid. 2) Call `M.initialize(PoolKey(sorted(P,IMD), 3000, 60, hook), 2**96)`. Expected: the pool is created and bound. Actual: revert `WrappedError(hook, 0xdc98354e /*beforeInitialize*/, 0x82b42900 /*Unauthorized()*/, 0xa9e35b2f /*HookCallFailed()*/)` because `_state().manager == address(0) != msg.sender`. 3) Call `hook.initialize(P, owner, 1e18)` to repair it. Actual: revert `InvalidInitialization()` (`_disableInitializers()` ran in the constructor). Run: forge test --match-path test/scratch/ManifestHookCannotLaunch.t.sol (both tests fail on this tree).","severity":"high","snippet":"        if (msg.sender != address(_state().manager)) revert Unauthorized();\n        _;\n    }","title":"Manifest hook artifact (PaperHook with [$poolManager]) can never initialize its pool: namespaced manager is zero and the initializer is disabled"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The brief requires a TransparentUpgradeableProxy mined with all 14 flag bits 'so later implementations can use any callback', with v2 'used only to rehearse an upgrade'. `PaperProxy._implementationManager` hashes the candidate runtime (manager immutable zeroed) and accepts only `V1_RUNTIME_HASH`/`V2_RUNTIME_HASH`, both of them compile-time constants with no setter, checked both in the constructor and on every `upgradeToAndCall`. The upgrade role therefore exists (ProxyAdmin owned by the dev constant) but can only toggle between two bytecodes that differ by one default; any real v3 - a bug fix, an activated callback, a chain-readable USD source (the brief anticipates one 'agreed at review') - reverts `UnsupportedImplementation` and requires a new proxy address, a new pool, a liquidity migration and re-indexing of draft IDs. The author introduced the allowlist to close an earlier reviewer's fee-cap-bypass finding, so this is a trust-model trade-off, not an oversight; but as delivered the 'upgradeability' requirement is satisfied only nominally and the 14 no-op callbacks cost gas on every liquidity/donate call for nothing. Access x asymmetry seam: the upgrade owner holds a role whose only non-rehearsal effect is nil, while a bug in V1/V2 becomes unfixable in place. Needs a scope decision at review: either (a) accept and record that this address is effectively immutable after V2 (then the hook may as well be non-proxy, which also resolves the DELEGATECALL admission conflict), or (b) keep real upgradeability and enforce the fee cap by a different mechanism (e.g. a timelock plus the published 200 bps as an admission-time review item), which is the trust model the brief describes.","line":54,"path":"src/PaperProxy.sol","reproduction":"State: launched proxy P (V1), ProxyAdmin A owned by DEV 0xb59e...0D75. 1) Compile any implementation other than the delivered V1/V2 - e.g. `PaperHookV2(manager)` with a single executable byte changed (`code[0] ^= 1`, src/PaperProxy.sol:54 compares the whole normalized runtime), or any contract adding a function. 2) `vm.prank(DEV); A.upgradeAndCall(ITransparentUpgradeableProxy(P), newImpl, \"\")`. Expected per brief: the upgrade owner installs the reviewed later implementation and it may use any of the 14 callbacks. Actual: revert `UnsupportedImplementation()`; the implementation slot still holds V1. Already demonstrated by the author's own test `test_upgradeRejectsModifiedCanonicalRuntime` (test/Upgrade.t.sol:164-175) and the 1000-run fuzz `testFuzz_runtimeWhitelistRejectsChangesBeforeDelegation`; `forge test --match-test test_upgradeRejectsModifiedCanonicalRuntime -vv` shows the revert.","severity":"medium","snippet":"        if (normalizedHash != V1_RUNTIME_HASH && normalizedHash != V2_RUNTIME_HASH) {\n            revert UnsupportedImplementation();\n        }","title":"Proxy allowlist pins V1/V2 runtime hashes, so the ProxyAdmin owner can never install a later implementation; the brief's purpose for mining all 14 flags is unreachable"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"`_pay` pays both wallets with `manager.take(IMD, wallet, amount)` inside `beforeSwap`/`afterSwap`, and pre-checks `IERC20(IMD).balanceOf(manager) >= fee`. In the standard v4 flow (Universal Router, V4Router, PositionManager-style routers) the swapper's input is settled *after* `manager.swap` returns, so during the callbacks the manager only holds whatever IMD other pools or earlier trades left there. The launch seeds the pool with 80% of paper and no IMD (poolBps 8000, nothing about IMD), so on a fresh manager, or any manager whose aggregate IMD balance is below 2% of the trade, every buy reverts although the trade itself was fine. The supplied reference describes exactly this failure on a 2026-10-01 launch and prescribes minting an ERC-6909 claim when the balance does not cover the fee (plus a permissionless redeem), or at least falling back to a claim. The author instead ships `PaperSwapRouter`, which pre-settles the input, and documents that other routers 'require existing manager backing'. That makes launch availability depend on (i) every integrator using the bespoke router and (ii) on mainnet, the incidental IMD reserves of unrelated pools in the same PoolManager - a hidden cross-pool dependency: the fee is momentarily paid out of other pools' reserves until the swapper settles. Economics x periphery seam, reported outside my assigned area because it decides whether the pool can trade at launch. Previously raised and disputed; recorded here with the exact revert so the judge can weigh the brief's 'no accumulation inside the hook' against the reference's prescribed fallback.","line":314,"path":"src/PaperHook.sol","reproduction":"State: fresh PoolManager M (IMD balance 0), launched proxy hook H, pool seeded only with paper in a range above the current price (as the author's own `test_freshTokenOnlyPoolNeedsPrepaidImdFee`, test/Fees.t.sol:161, does with ModifyLiquidityParams(60,120,1e24) when paper is currency0). 1) A trader with 100e18 IMD approved to a settle-after router (the repo's test/mocks/PoolRouter.sol is one) calls swap(zeroForOne = IMD->paper, amountSpecified = -100e18). Expected: the trade executes, 0.5e18 IMD to orders, 1.5e18 IMD to dev, paper to the trader. Actual: `beforeSwap` -> `_pay(2e18)` -> `balanceOf(M) = 0 < 2e18` -> revert `InsufficientFeeBacking()`; the whole swap is rolled back. The author's test asserts this very revert and then shows it only succeeds after someone transfers 2e18 IMD to the manager out of band. Run: `forge test --match-test test_freshTokenOnlyPoolNeedsPrepaidImdFee -vvvv` and look for 0xe4c4588d (InsufficientFeeBacking()) in the first swap's trace.","severity":"medium","snippet":"        if (IERC20(IMD).balanceOf(address(s.manager)) < fee) revert InsufficientFeeBacking();\n        uint256 ordersAmount = FullMath.mulDiv(fee, s.ordersBps, TOTAL_BPS);\n        uint256 devAmount = fee - ordersAmount;\n        if (ordersAmount != 0) s.manager.take(Currency.wrap(IMD), s.ordersWallet, ordersAmount);","title":"Fee is taken from the PoolManager's spot IMD balance; a paper-only pool refuses every buy routed through a settle-after router (Universal Router / V4Router) with InsufficientFeeBacking"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"`postDraft(textHash)` computes the burn from the pool's current `sqrtPriceX96` and the owner-set `imdUsd` at execution time and pulls that amount from the caller; the caller passes no ceiling. The only protection documented is 'approve exactly the quoted amount', which wallets and front-ends routinely do not do. Economics x asymmetry seam with an unprivileged amplifier: the quote the author sees (`postFeeTokens()`) and the quote the transaction executes at are produced by the same formula over state any trader can move in the same block, and the author bears the entire difference while the hook emits the larger figure as their 'votes'. The brief asks for spot pricing, so the formula itself is in scope by design; the defect is the missing bound. The cost to the griefer is the 2% hook fee + LP fee + slippage on a sandwich, so the damage per victim is bounded to the victim's approved balance and the attack is not profitable - hence low. Fix preserving the design: `postDraft(bytes32 textHash, uint256 maxBurn)` reverting when `amount > maxBurn` (keep the old selector as a thin wrapper with `type(uint256).max` if ABI stability matters).","line":232,"path":"src/PaperHook.sol","reproduction":"State: fixture pool at price 1 with 1e24 full-range liquidity, imdUsd = 1e18, postFeeUsd = 1. Author approves `type(uint256).max` to the hook and reads `postFeeTokens()` = 1_000_000_000_000_000_000 (1 paper). Attacker front-runs with an exact-input sell of 400_000e18 paper through the pool. Author's queued `postDraft(hash)` now executes with `postFeeTokens()` = 1_956_641_440_000_000_000 and burns 1.956 paper instead of 1 - 95.7% more than quoted - with no revert and no way for the author to cap it. Scratch test test/scratch/PostDraftSandwich.t.sol logs these three numbers (`forge test --match-path test/scratch/PostDraftSandwich.t.sol -vv`).","severity":"low","snippet":"        uint256 amount = postFeeTokens();\n        draftId = ++_state().draftCount;\n        _burnFrom(msg.sender, amount);\n        emit DraftPosted(draftId, msg.sender, textHash, amount);","title":"postDraft burns whatever the spot quote says at execution with no maxBurn parameter, so an author with an open allowance can be front-run into burning more than quoted"}],"hash":"4ab89bbf05325c5f8da29259f66fc9ee191d7d91de852eb30bf848754fd3cca4","nodeId":"e324b58e-fe44-4596-99b6-b4d111aacec1","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. `.imd-findings.json` holds 4 findings and 33 coverage rows (all 28 listed entry points plus 5 invariants); no tracked file was modified, and scratch tests live only under `test/scratch/`.\n\n## Findings\n\n| # | Severity | Finding | Anchor |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| 1 | **High** (proof attached) | The manifest names `PaperHook` + `[\"$poolManager\"]` as the deployable hook, but that artifact is the proxy implementation: `_disableInitializers()` ran in its constructor and `onlyManager` compares `msg.sender` to a namespaced `manager` slot that is zero forever. `PoolManager.initialize` → `beforeInitialize` reverts `Unauthorized()` (bubbled as `HookCallFailed`), and `initialize` reverts `InvalidInitialization()`. The launch as described cannot create its pool. `test/scratch/ManifestHookCannotLaunch.t.sol` fails on this tree with exactly those selectors. | `src/PaperHook.sol:85` |\n| 2 | Medium | `PaperProxy` pins the V1/V2 runtime hashes with no setter, so the ProxyAdmin owner can only toggle between two bytecodes; any real v3 reverts `UnsupportedImplementation`. The brief's reason for mining all 14 flags (\"so later implementations can use any callback\") is unreachable, and a V1 bug is unfixable in place. Author's own `test_upgradeRejectsModifiedCanonicalRuntime` shows it. Flagged as a scope decision, not an oversight. | `src/PaperProxy.sol:54` |\n| 3 | Medium (outside area, known/disputed) | `_pay` takes IMD from the manager's *spot* balance during callbacks; with a paper-only launch pool every buy through a settle-after router (Universal Router/V4Router) reverts `InsufficientFeeBacking` (`0xe4c4588d`). The reference prescribes a claim-mint fallback; the author ships a bespoke pre-settling router instead, which makes launch trading depend on integrators using it or on unrelated pools' IMD reserves. | `src/PaperHook.sol:314` |\n| 4 | Low | `postDraft` has no `maxBurn` bound: with an open allowance, an unprivileged front-run (400k-paper sell in the fixture) moved the executed burn from 1.000 to 1.957 paper with no revert. Unprofitable griefing, bounded by the victim's allowance. | `src/PaperHook.sol:232` |\n\n## Coverage of the assigned area\n\n- **Access Control**: full permission map traced — `initializer` runs only inside the proxy constructor (no front-run window), every callback is manager-gated, `beforeInitialize` restricts the initializing sender and refuses rebinding, owner setters validate inputs, ProxyAdmin ownership is the fixed dev constant and cannot reach application functions, `deployHook` binds the mined salt to owner/token/usd and requires the owner as caller, router callback is single-use and manager-only. No unauthorized path found beyond finding 1.\n- **Asymmetry**: beforeSwap/afterSwap fee formulas verified against `Hooks.afterSwap` delta semantics for all four modes (2 % of gross in each), storage lifecycle complete (every field has matched writer/reader), V1/V2 layouts and immutable offsets identical, ERC-7201 slot recomputed and correct.\n- **Trust Gap**: no accrued fees, so `setSplit` cannot sweep in-flight value; owner oracle/fee setters are brief-mandated trust assumptions with no unprivileged amplifier beyond finding 4; `Hooks.afterSwap` self-call bypass unreachable.\n- **Not reached**: live-IMD token behavior (blacklist/callback) on mainnet; a fork rehearsal is still owed by the deployer, as the README itself records.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":3236135,"inputTokens":55,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":50076,"runtime":"claude","turns":29,"wallClockMs":722762}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"37eed9f56188ea8b","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"launch.json names hook.contract \"PaperHook\" with constructorArgs [\"$poolManager\"]. The launch factory mines that creation code for the fourteen flags, deploys it and calls PoolManager.initialize in the same transaction. The deployed contract is the V1 implementation: its constructor runs _disableInitializers(), so initialize() can never be called, and its ERC-7201 HookStorage.manager stays zero. Every callback is guarded by onlyManager, which compares msg.sender to that zero storage value, so PoolManager's call to beforeInitialize reverts Unauthorized() and the launch transaction fails. The functional hook (PaperProxy delegating to the implementation, initialised with token/owner/imdUsd) cannot be expressed in the manifest schema at all: PaperProxy's constructor needs a pre-deployed implementation address and an initialization blob containing $token, neither of which the schema can resolve. Worse, the pinned Hook.protected.t.sol passes when run against the standalone implementation (all three tests green: permissions match, no DELEGATECALL in the implementation's runtime, callbacks refuse non-manager callers because the stored manager is zero), so admission would approve an artifact that can never launch. If the manifest were corrected to point at the proxy instead, test_runtimeCodeHasNoEscapeHatch rejects the proxy's DELEGATECALL, so neither artifact can both pass admission and work. The notes field self-reports this as unresolved; it remains a blocking defect of the deliverable rather than a documentation item. Needed: either make the artifact named in launch.json self-sufficient (manager from the immutable, owner/token bound in beforeInitialize from the PoolKey, no proxy at the hook address), or obtain an explicit policy decision admitting a transparent proxy and a schema path for its deployment; the implementation cannot resolve this alone.","line":85,"path":"src/PaperHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {ERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {StateLibrary} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/StateLibrary.sol\";\nimport {Paper} from \"src/Paper.sol\";\nimport {PaperHook} from \"src/PaperHook.sol\";\n\ncontract ImdMockForLaunch is ERC20 {\n    constructor() ERC20(\"IMD\", \"IMD\") {}\n}\n\n/// @notice The launch factory deploys launch.json's hook.contract (PaperHook) with constructorArgs\n/// [\"$poolManager\"] at an address mined for the declared flags, then initializes the pool in the same\n/// transaction. This test does exactly that and expects the pool to come up.\ncontract ManifestLaunchProof is Test {\n    using StateLibrary for IPoolManager;\n\n    address internal constant IMD = 0xD34a99Bc0f67aE1bbd63C660e6d0b0dd03E263B7;\n    uint160 internal constant Q96 = 79228162514264337593543950336;\n\n    function test_manifestHookContractCanInitializeItsPool() public {\n        PoolManager manager = new PoolManager(address(this));\n        vm.etch(IMD, type(ImdMockForLaunch).runtimeCode);\n        Paper paper = new Paper();\n\n        // Mine the hook.contract creation code for all fourteen flags, as the factory does.\n        bytes memory creation = abi.encodePacked(type(PaperHook).creationCode, abi.encode(manager));\n        bytes32 initHash = keccak256(creation);\n        address hook;\n        for (uint256 i; i < 300_000; ++i) {\n            address predicted =\n                address(uint160(uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0xff), address(this), bytes32(i), initHash)))));\n            if (uint160(predicted) & 0x3fff != 0x3fff) continue;\n            bytes32 salt = bytes32(i);\n            assembly (\"memory-safe\") {\n                hook := create2(0, add(creation, 0x20), mload(creation), salt)\n            }\n            break;\n        }\n        assertTrue(hook != address(0), \"hook deployment failed\");\n        assertEq(uint160(hook) & 0x3fff, 0x3fff);\n\n        (address a, address b) = address(paper) < IMD ? (address(paper), IMD) : (IMD, address(paper));\n        PoolKey memory key = PoolKey(Currency.wrap(a), Currency.wrap(b), 3000, 60, IHooks(hook));\n\n        // Expected: the factory's single transaction initializes the pool. Actual: beforeInitialize\n        // reverts Unauthorized because the standalone implementation's namespaced manager is zero and\n        // its initializer is disabled, so the launch transaction cannot succeed.\n        manager.initialize(key, Q96);\n        (uint160 price,,,) = IPoolManager(address(manager)).getSlot0(key.toId());\n        assertEq(price, Q96, \"pool was not initialized\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"1) Deploy PoolManager; put code at IMD 0xD34a99Bc0f67aE1bbd63C660e6d0b0dd03E263B7; deploy Paper. 2) creation = type(PaperHook).creationCode ++ abi.encode(manager); CREATE2 with a salt whose address has addr & 0x3fff == 0x3fff (same as the factory). 3) key = PoolKey(sorted(paper, IMD), 3000, 60, hook); manager.initialize(key, 2^96). Expected: pool initialised (slot0 price == 2^96). Actual: revert WrappedError(hook, 0xdc98354e beforeInitialize, 0x82b42900 Unauthorized(), 0xa9e35b2f HookCallFailed()). Running the pinned Hook.protected.t.sol with IMD_HOOK_CREATION_CODE = that creation code, IMD_HOOK_FLAGS=16383, IMD_POOL_MANAGER=<manager> gives 3 passed, 0 failed.","severity":"high","snippet":"    modifier onlyManager() {\n        if (msg.sender != address(_state().manager)) revert Unauthorized();\n        _;","title":"launch.json describes the bare PaperHook implementation, which cannot initialize or operate a pool; the manifest launch transaction reverts while the protected admission suite passes"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"beforeSwap computes the IMD fee and calls _pay before the pool swap runs. _pay demands IMD.balanceOf(manager) >= fee and then transfers the fee out with manager.take. In the ordinary v4 settlement order (swap first, then SETTLE_ALL / TAKE_ALL, which is what Uniswap's Universal Router and PositionManager-style routers do) the buyer's IMD has not been transferred when beforeSwap runs, so on a manager that holds no IMD the check reverts InsufficientFeeBacking() and the buyer's trade fails although the trade itself was fine. The launch pool is seeded with paper only (poolBps 8000 of paper, no IMD), so until something else deposits IMD into the manager every buy through a standard router fails; sells are impossible anyway because the pool has no IMD to pay out, so the pool is dead on arrival for everyone not using the project's own PaperSwapRouter. On mainnet the shared PoolManager may hold IMD from other pools, which would mask this for fees up to that balance and then fail again for larger buys; the behaviour therefore depends on unrelated pools' reserves. The task's reference lists exactly this failure (same-swap take funded by the manager's current balance) as a known launch-day defect and prescribes minting an ERC-6909 claim when the balance does not cover the fee plus a public redeem, or at least a direct-when-covered / claim-otherwise fallback with a redeem path. The repository instead encodes the revert as intended (test_freshTokenOnlyPoolNeedsPrepaidImdFee expects it) and relies on integrators adopting PaperSwapRouter, which the public frontends and aggregators will not do.","line":314,"path":"src/PaperHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {ERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\";\nimport {IERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IUnlockCallback} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/callback/IUnlockCallback.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {SwapParams, ModifyLiquidityParams} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\nimport {BalanceDelta, BalanceDeltaLibrary} from \"v4-core/src/types/BalanceDelta.sol\";\nimport {Paper} from \"src/Paper.sol\";\nimport {PaperHook} from \"src/PaperHook.sol\";\nimport {PaperDeployment} from \"src/PaperDeployment.sol\";\n\ncontract ImdMockForFirstBuy is ERC20 {\n    constructor() ERC20(\"IMD\", \"IMD\") {}\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        _mint(to, amount);\n    }\n}\n\n/// @notice The ordinary v4 settlement order: swap (or modify liquidity) first, then pay what the\n/// resulting delta says is owed. Uniswap's Universal Router (V4_SWAP: SWAP_EXACT_IN_SINGLE,\n/// SETTLE_ALL, TAKE_ALL) settles in this order.\ncontract SettleAfterRouter is IUnlockCallback {\n    using BalanceDeltaLibrary for BalanceDelta;\n\n    IPoolManager public immutable manager;\n\n    constructor(IPoolManager manager_) {\n        manager = manager_;\n    }\n\n    function swap(PoolKey memory key, SwapParams memory params) external returns (BalanceDelta) {\n        return abi.decode(manager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(0), msg.sender, key, abi.encode(params))), (BalanceDelta));\n    }\n\n    function addLiquidity(PoolKey memory key, ModifyLiquidityParams memory params) external {\n        manager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(1), msg.sender, key, abi.encode(params)));\n    }\n\n    function unlockCallback(bytes calldata data) external returns (bytes memory) {\n        require(msg.sender == address(manager), \"Only manager\");\n        (uint8 action, address payer, PoolKey memory key, bytes memory parameters) =\n            abi.decode(data, (uint8, address, PoolKey, bytes));\n        BalanceDelta delta;\n        if (action == 0) {\n            delta = manager.swap(key, abi.decode(parameters, (SwapParams)), \"\");\n        } else {\n            (delta,) = manager.modifyLiquidity(key, abi.decode(parameters, (ModifyLiquidityParams)), \"\");\n        }\n        _settle(key.currency0, delta.amount0(), payer);\n        _settle(key.currency1, delta.amount1(), payer);\n        return abi.encode(delta);\n    }\n\n    function _settle(Currency currency, int128 delta, address payer) private {\n        if (delta < 0) {\n            manager.sync(currency);\n            IERC20(Currency.unwrap(currency)).transferFrom(payer, address(manager), uint256(-int256(delta)));\n            manager.settle();\n        } else if (delta > 0) {\n            manager.take(currency, payer, uint256(int256(delta)));\n        }\n    }\n}\n\ncontract FirstBuyProof is Test {\n    using BalanceDeltaLibrary for BalanceDelta;\n\n    address internal constant IMD = 0xD34a99Bc0f67aE1bbd63C660e6d0b0dd03E263B7;\n    address internal constant DEV = 0xb59eac9882Ba98f4170d99D5F402C3EDb6D50D75;\n    address internal constant ORDERS = 0x721F8232e19c92516eB753FEF53d8A33a3637989;\n    uint160 internal constant Q96 = 79228162514264337593543950336;\n\n    PoolManager internal manager;\n    IERC20 internal imd;\n    Paper internal paper;\n    PaperHook internal hook;\n    PoolKey internal key;\n    SettleAfterRouter internal router;\n    bool internal paperIs0;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        manager = new PoolManager(address(this));\n        vm.etch(IMD, type(ImdMockForFirstBuy).runtimeCode);\n        ImdMockForFirstBuy(IMD).mint(address(this), 1e30);\n        imd = IERC20(IMD);\n        paper = new Paper();\n        PaperDeployment deployer = new PaperDeployment();\n        PaperHook implementation = new PaperHook(manager);\n\n        PaperDeployment.Config memory config =\n            PaperDeployment.Config(manager, address(paper), address(this), 1 ether, Q96, 3000, 60);\n        bytes32 hash = keccak256(deployer.proxyInitCode(address(implementation), config));\n        (bytes32 salt,) = deployer.mine(address(deployer), hash, 0, 200_000);\n        hook = deployer.deployHook(salt, address(implementation), config);\n        key = hook.poolKey();\n\n        router = new SettleAfterRouter(manager);\n        paper.approve(address(router), type(uint256).max);\n        imd.approve(address(router), type(uint256).max);\n        paperIs0 = Currency.unwrap(key.currency0) == address(paper);\n\n        // Launch seeding: paper only, in a range above the current price. No IMD anywhere in the manager.\n        router.addLiquidity(\n            key, ModifyLiquidityParams(paperIs0 ? int24(60) : int24(-120), paperIs0 ? int24(120) : int24(-60), 1e24, 0)\n        );\n    }\n\n    function test_firstBuyOnFreshManagerWithSettleAfterRouter() public {\n        assertGt(paper.balanceOf(address(manager)), 0, \"pool holds paper\");\n        assertEq(imd.balanceOf(address(manager)), 0, \"fresh manager holds no IMD\");\n\n        // A buyer spends 100 IMD exact input through the ordinary settle-after order.\n        bool zeroForOne = !paperIs0;\n        uint160 limit = zeroForOne ? 4295128740 : 1461446703485210103287273052203988822378723970341;\n        BalanceDelta delta = router.swap(key, SwapParams(zeroForOne, -100 ether, limit));\n\n        // Expected: the trade succeeds and the 2 IMD fee reaches both wallets in the same swap.\n        // Actual on the current code: beforeSwap's _pay reverts InsufficientFeeBacking because the\n        // manager's physical IMD balance is zero while the buyer's input is still unsettled.\n        int128 paperOut = paperIs0 ? delta.amount0() : delta.amount1();\n        assertGt(paperOut, 0, \"buyer received no paper\");\n        assertEq(imd.balanceOf(ORDERS), 0.5 ether, \"orders wallet fee\");\n        assertEq(imd.balanceOf(DEV), 1.5 ether, \"dev wallet fee\");\n        assertEq(imd.balanceOf(address(manager)), 98 ether, \"manager keeps the net input\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Fresh PoolManager; IMD mock at the fixed IMD address; deploy the hook through PaperDeployment (hookOwner = test); add paper-only liquidity in ticks [60,120] (or [-120,-60] when paper is currency1) so manager IMD balance == 0. Buyer approves a router that does manager.swap first and settles afterwards (sync -> transferFrom -> settle) and swaps 100e18 IMD exact input with the extreme price limit. Expected: buyer receives paper, ORDERS gets 0.5e18 IMD, DEV gets 1.5e18, manager holds 98e18. Actual: revert WrappedError(hook, 0x575e24b4 beforeSwap, 0xe4c4588d InsufficientFeeBacking(), 0xa9e35b2f HookCallFailed()). The same swap through PaperSwapRouter succeeds, which is the only path that works.","severity":"high","snippet":"        if (IERC20(IMD).balanceOf(address(s.manager)) < fee) revert InsufficientFeeBacking();","title":"Fee payout requires the PoolManager to already hold IMD; the first buy of a token-only launch pool through any settle-after router (Universal Router order) reverts"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"postFeeTokens reverts PoolUnavailable when getLiquidity(poolId) (liquidity at the current tick) is zero, and postDraft calls it unconditionally. The pool still has a readable sqrtPriceX96 in that state, so the brief's 'at the current pool price' is satisfiable, but the hook refuses. Two concrete consequences: (a) the launch pool is seeded one-sided with paper above the current price (the only shape possible with a paper-only allocation), so the current tick has zero liquidity and nobody can post until the first buy moves the price into the range; (b) at any later time a seller can sell paper with sqrtPriceLimitX96 at the lower edge of the lowest position, draining the IMD side; the price lands on the boundary, active liquidity returns to zero and every postDraft and postFeeTokens call reverts until someone buys. Rounds and quorum are computed off-chain from events with deadlines the hook cannot see, so a seller can shut posting for the tail of a round, then buy back; the cost is the LP fee and the 2% hook fee on the round trip. No owner function can lift the gate.","line":214,"path":"src/PaperHook.sol","reproduction":"Fixture PoolManager; deploy hook at price 2^96; add liquidity only in [60,120] (paper currency0) or [-120,-60]. Call hook.postDraft(h): revert PoolUnavailable() although getSlot0 returns 2^96. Fund 2e18 IMD to the manager, buy 100e18 IMD exact input: now postDraft succeeds. Then sell 1e26 paper exact input with sqrtPriceLimitX96 = getSqrtPriceAtTick(60) (or -60): swap stops at the edge, getLiquidity == 0, getSlot0 price > 0, and hook.postDraft(h) / hook.postFeeTokens() revert PoolUnavailable() for every caller. Reproduced in a scratch test on this tree (both steps pass as described).","severity":"medium","snippet":"        if (sqrtPrice == 0 || s.manager.getLiquidity(s.key.toId()) == 0) revert PoolUnavailable();","title":"postDraft refuses whenever active liquidity is zero, so posting is blocked at launch and can be blocked by anyone who walks the price to a range edge"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"postDraft(bytes32) takes no maximum-burn argument and pulls whatever postFeeTokens() evaluates to at execution time from the caller's allowance. The quote is a spot read of sqrtPriceX96, so a transaction ordered before the post changes it. With the unlimited approvals wallets grant by default, the author burns more than they were quoted and has no on-chain way to bound it; the README's mitigation ('approve the exact amount') is outside the contract and makes the post fail instead. The attacker gains nothing directly (pure griefing, they pay the round-trip fees), which is why this is low, but the entry point's contract with its caller is broken: the event records more votes for the author than they intended to buy.","line":232,"path":"src/PaperHook.sol","reproduction":"Fixture pool (full-range 1e24 liquidity, price 2^96, imdUsd 1e18, postFeeUsd 1). Victim holds 1000e18 paper and approves the hook for type(uint256).max; hook.postFeeTokens() == 1e18. Attacker sells 3e23 paper exact input (router default limit). Victim's hook.postDraft(h) now burns 1.68766081e18 paper (69% more than quoted) and emits DraftPosted with that amount; attacker buys back, spending about 1.08e22 paper in fees. Reproduced in a scratch test on this tree.","severity":"low","snippet":"    function postDraft(bytes32 textHash) external nonReentrant returns (uint256 draftId) {\n        uint256 amount = postFeeTokens();","title":"postDraft has no cap on the paper it pulls; a front-running sell inflates the amount burned beyond the quote the author saw"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"For exact-input IMD buys and exact-output IMD sells the fee is charged in beforeSwap on the requested amount, and afterSwap then demands that the pool consumed exactly requested minus fee (or paid exactly requested plus fee). Any swap that stops early, because the trader set a sqrtPriceLimitX96 or because the pool ran out of liquidity in the direction of trade, reverts the whole transaction. In the one-sided launch pool this means a buyer who sends more IMD than the pool's paper can absorb gets a revert rather than the partial fill v4 would otherwise deliver, and routers that express slippage through the price limit cannot trade this pool at all in these two modes. The paper-specified modes do fill partially and charge on the actual IMD moved, so the two sides of the same pool behave differently. Charging on the actual post-swap IMD delta in afterSwap for all four modes (as the paper-specified path already does) would remove the asymmetry.","line":295,"path":"src/PaperHook.sol","reproduction":"Fixture PoolManager; hook at 2^96; paper-only liquidity 1e24 in [60,120] (about 2.986e21 paper available); 1e24 IMD pre-funded to the manager so fee backing is not the cause. Buy with 1e25 IMD exact input and the router's default extreme price limit. Expected (plain v4): partial fill of all available paper. Actual: revert PartialImdSwap() (0x89bf8a45) wrapped in HookCallFailed. Buying the same paper exact-output for available/2 succeeds. Reproduced in a scratch test on this tree; test_partialImdSpecifiedRevertsAndRollsBackFee in test/Fees.t.sol asserts the same revert for the price-limit case.","severity":"low","snippet":"            if (actual != expected) revert PartialImdSwap();","title":"IMD-specified swaps that cannot be fully filled revert PartialImdSwap instead of filling what liquidity allows"}],"hash":"5e9bbc351e3060d07e086cedea5555b767cbcd04c51cb15d7c2df7b943198bde","nodeId":"f81964eb-398d-410f-a243-0eb36deb2ba7","outcome":"completed","summary":"Findings file written and all five snippets verified against the tree. The review is complete.\n\n**Outcome**: five substantiated findings in `.imd-findings.json`, two with failing Foundry proofs, plus a coverage record answering all 28 listed entry points and two invariants. The existing suite passes (159 tests), so every defect below is one the project's own tests encode as intended behaviour or do not reach.\n\n**Findings, most severe first**\n\n1. **High. The manifest's hook cannot launch.** `launch.json` names the bare `PaperHook` implementation. Deployed standalone at a mined address, its stored manager is zero and its initializer is disabled, so the factory's `PoolManager.initialize` reverts `Unauthorized()`. The pinned protected hook suite passes against that same artifact, so admission would approve something that can never come up. Pointing the manifest at the proxy instead fails the DELEGATECALL scan. Proof attached.\n2. **High. First buy reverts through any settle-after router.** `_pay` requires the manager to physically hold IMD before the swap settles. On a fresh manager with a paper-only pool, a 100 IMD buy in Universal Router order reverts `InsufficientFeeBacking()`. Only the project's own `PaperSwapRouter` works. The task reference names this exact failure and prescribes a claim-mint fallback. Proof attached.\n3. **Medium. Posting is gated on active liquidity.** At the launch shape (one-sided paper range) nobody can post until the first buy, and later any seller can walk the price to a range edge with a price limit and block every `postDraft` until someone buys back.\n4. **Low. No burn cap on `postDraft`.** A front-running sell made a victim with a standard unlimited approval burn 69% more paper than quoted. Griefing only, since the attacker pays round-trip fees.\n5. **Low. IMD-specified swaps never fill partially.** A buy larger than available paper reverts `PartialImdSwap()` rather than filling, while paper-specified swaps on the same pool do fill partially.\n\n**What held**: fee math and delta accounting in both directions and all four modes, split conservation, reentrancy and unlocked-manager guards, proxy upgrade gating by normalized runtime hash plus pinned manager, the ERC-7201 slot constant (recomputed independently), deployment front-running protection, and the swap router's pre-settle and refund accounting.\n\n**Not reached**: live IMD token behaviour and the mainnet PoolManager's IMD balance, which decide whether finding 2 bites on day one or only on large buys.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2303595,"inputTokens":482,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":66165,"runtime":"claude","turns":58,"wallClockMs":938472}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"67c29cf82a35fdcdcca0d8c26cb07a083bc99cc6a09dbf69a9975c432c060274","device":"05778e691c371384","findings":[{"description":"The requested TransparentUpgradeableProxy necessarily delegates to its implementation. The pinned Hook.protected.t.sol test_runtimeCodeHasNoEscapeHatch rejects every executable DELEGATECALL, including the delivered mined PaperProxy. This is an unresolved specification/admission conflict retained from the previous review, not a claim of a new fund-loss vulnerability. The implementation whitelist does not remove the delegatecall. Tests cannot make both requirements true; the admission policy needs a reviewed proxy exception or the requested architecture must change.","line":11,"path":"src/PaperProxy.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {Paper} from \"src/Paper.sol\";\nimport {PaperHook} from \"src/PaperHook.sol\";\nimport {PaperDeployment} from \"src/PaperDeployment.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\n\ncontract ProxyAdmissionProof is Test {\n    function test_requiredProxyPassesPinnedRuntimeAdmission() public {\n        Paper paper = new Paper();\n        // Initialization only reads decimals from this offline IMD stand-in.\n        vm.etch(0xD34a99Bc0f67aE1bbd63C660e6d0b0dd03E263B7, address(paper).code);\n        PoolManager manager = new PoolManager(address(this));\n        PaperHook logic = new PaperHook(manager);\n        PaperDeployment deployment = new PaperDeployment();\n        PaperDeployment.Config memory config = PaperDeployment.Config(\n            manager, address(paper), address(this), 1 ether,\n            79228162514264337593543950336, 3000, 60\n        );\n        bytes32 codeHash = keccak256(deployment.proxyInitCode(address(logic), config));\n        (bytes32 salt,) = deployment.mine(address(deployment), codeHash, 0, 200_000);\n        PaperHook hook = deployment.deployHook(salt, address(logic), config);\n        assertEq(uint160(address(hook)) & 0x3fff, 0x3fff);\n        assertEq(hook.feeBps(), 200);\n        bytes memory runtime = address(hook).code;\n        assertGt(runtime.length, 0);\n        assertLe(runtime.length, 24_576);\n        // Same PUSH-aware rule as Hook.protected.t.sol:test_runtimeCodeHasNoEscapeHatch.\n        for (uint256 i; i < runtime.length; ++i) {\n            uint8 op = uint8(runtime[i]);\n            if (op >= 0x60 && op <= 0x7f) {\n                i += op - 0x60 + 1;\n                continue;\n            }\n            assertTrue(op != 0xff, \"runtime code contains SELFDESTRUCT\");\n            assertTrue(op != 0xf4, \"runtime code contains DELEGATECALL\");\n            assertTrue(op != 0xf2, \"runtime code contains CALLCODE\");\n        }\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Save the embedded proof as test/scratch/ProxyAdmissionProof.t.sol and run forge test --match-path test/scratch/ProxyAdmissionProof.t.sol. The test deploys canonical PaperHook and PaperProxy through PaperDeployment, mines all fourteen flag bits, initializes a real local PoolManager, and applies the pinned PUSH-aware opcode scan. Expected by the pinned check: no executable DELEGATECALL. Actual on this revision: FAIL: runtime code contains DELEGATECALL. Observed locally: 0 passed, 1 failed. No fork, FFI, external test imports, or environment mutation is used.","severity":"info","title":"Required transparent proxy conflicts with pinned hook runtime admission"}],"hash":"73c8136bdd6f29edc0128fec55b6c6425a279b1411b03481a6b141a3c3fcbc86","nodeId":"9bda0ce5-ee03-45e3-9b6b-772d8a7989dc","outcome":"completed","summary":"Updated regression, fuzz, and invariant tests for capped posting, fallback pricing, rollback, and reentrancy. Repaired stale test assumptions.\n\n`forge build` succeeded. `forge test`: **196 passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped**.\n\nRetained the proxy/`DELEGATECALL` admission conflict in `.imd-findings.json` with a reproduced failing proof. Implementation and configuration files remain unchanged.","treeHash":"46cab6b801aa9eeda656c3f80f145f13cd15f845","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1204480,"inputTokens":83953,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":11650,"runtime":"codex","turns":6,"wallClockMs":393319}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"02f22d6f13810ca8","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Settlement of round-1 finding 230ec85e8a51 (author answer: disputed). The author reproduced the proof and changed no code on this point; the dispute is that the brief mandates a TransparentUpgradeableProxy and the manifest/admission tooling cannot carry one. That is accurate, but it does not dissolve the defect: the tree now contains launch.json (commit 56b3caa, hook.contract = \"PaperHook\", constructorArgs [\"$poolManager\"]), and the artifact it describes is deployed with _disableInitializers() (line 83) so HookStorage.manager is zero forever and onlyManager (line 87) rejects the real PoolManager in beforeInitialize. The launch transaction the manifest drives therefore reverts, and no later call can repair the contract (initialize reverts InvalidInitialization; owner is zero). The functional PaperProxy needs a pre-deployed implementation plus 100 bytes of initializer calldata that the schema cannot express, and its runtime contains DELEGATECALL, which the pinned Hook.protected.t.sol test_runtimeCodeHasNoEscapeHatch rejects. The pinned protected tests still pass on the bare implementation, so admission would approve an artifact that cannot launch. README and the manifest notes now say 'launch blocked' and 'do not name PaperHook as the deployed hook', which is honest but leaves the deliverable unlaunchable. This needs a requester scope decision, not another revision of the same code: either (a) a non-proxy hook, or an implementation that works standalone with [$poolManager] alone (manager from the immutable, token from the PoolKey in beforeInitialize, owner defaulting to the DEV constant) so the artifact the manifest names is the hook that runs, or (b) an explicit admission exception for the reviewed proxy plus a manifest/deployer path for PaperDeployment.deployHook. Until one is chosen the launch is blocked and this finding stays open at high (permanent breakage of the launch as specified).","line":87,"path":"src/PaperHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {ERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {Hooks} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/Hooks.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {StateLibrary} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/StateLibrary.sol\";\nimport {Paper} from \"src/Paper.sol\";\nimport {PaperHook} from \"src/PaperHook.sol\";\nimport {HookFlags} from \"src/HookFlags.sol\";\n\ncontract ProofImd is ERC20 {\n    constructor() ERC20(\"IMD\", \"IMD\") {}\n}\n\n/// launch.json: hook.contract = \"PaperHook\", constructorArgs = [\"$poolManager\"].\n/// The deployer therefore deploys PaperHook's creation code with the chain's PoolManager at an address carrying\n/// all 14 flags, then initializes the paper/IMD pool. That pool initialization must succeed for the launch to exist.\ncontract ManifestHookProofTest is Test {\n    using StateLibrary for IPoolManager;\n\n    address constant IMD = 0xD34a99Bc0f67aE1bbd63C660e6d0b0dd03E263B7;\n    uint160 constant Q96 = 79228162514264337593543950336;\n\n    function test_manifestHookDeployedWithPoolManagerOnlyCanHostThePool() public {\n        PoolManager manager = new PoolManager(address(this));\n        Paper paper = new Paper();\n        vm.etch(IMD, address(new ProofImd()).code);\n\n        bytes memory creation = abi.encodePacked(type(PaperHook).creationCode, abi.encode(address(manager)));\n        bytes32 initHash = keccak256(creation);\n        address at;\n        for (uint256 i; i < 200_000; ++i) {\n            address predicted =\n                address(uint160(uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0xff), address(this), bytes32(i), initHash)))));\n            if (!HookFlags.matches(predicted, HookFlags.ALL)) continue;\n            bytes32 salt = bytes32(i);\n            assembly (\"memory-safe\") {\n                at := create2(0, add(creation, 0x20), mload(creation), salt)\n            }\n            break;\n        }\n        require(at != address(0), \"no salt produced an all-flags address\");\n        assertEq(HookFlags.flagsOf(at), HookFlags.ALL);\n        // The protected admission checks pass on this code: it declares all flags and refuses outside callers.\n        Hooks.Permissions memory p = PaperHook(at).getHookPermissions();\n        assertTrue(p.beforeInitialize);\n\n        (address a, address b) = address(paper) < IMD ? (address(paper), IMD) : (IMD, address(paper));\n        PoolKey memory key = PoolKey(Currency.wrap(a), Currency.wrap(b), 3000, 60, IHooks(at));\n\n        // FAILS on the current tree: PaperHook's constructor disables initialization, its namespaced manager is\n        // zero, and beforeInitialize reverts Unauthorized for the real PoolManager, so the launch pool cannot be created.\n        manager.initialize(key, Q96);\n        (uint160 price,,,) = IPoolManager(address(manager)).getSlot0(key.toId());\n        assertEq(price, Q96, \"the manifest hook must be able to initialize the launch pool\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"1) Deploy PoolManager M; put ERC-20 code at IMD 0xD34a99Bc0f67aE1bbd63C660e6d0b0dd03E263B7; deploy Paper. 2) creation = type(PaperHook).creationCode ++ abi.encode(M); CREATE2 at a salt whose address & 0x3fff == 0x3fff (what launch.json describes); getHookPermissions() reports all 14 flags. 3) M.initialize(PoolKey(sorted(paper, IMD), 3000, 60, hook), 2^96). Expected: pool initialized, slot0 price == 2^96. Actual: revert WrappedError(hook, 0xdc98354e beforeInitialize, 0x82b42900 Unauthorized(), 0xa9e35b2f HookCallFailed()). 4) hook.initialize(paper, owner, 1e18): revert InvalidInitialization(). Re-run on this tree 2026-10-06: forge test --match-path test/scratch/Proof_230ec85e8a51.t.sol fails with exactly that WrappedError; the three specialist proofs (Proof_663d4197b9b9, Proof_6c45e0931059, Proof_b2d1f8841ff5) fail the same way. The full suite (196 tests) passes because every test deploys the proxy through PaperDeployment.deployHook, never the manifest artifact.","severity":"high","snippet":"        if (msg.sender != address(_state().manager)) revert Unauthorized();","title":"launch.json still names the bare PaperHook implementation, which can never initialize or operate the pool; the working PaperProxy cannot be expressed in the manifest and fails the protected DELEGATECA"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Settlement of round-1 finding b955373b3a98 (author answer: disputed, no code change). The author's rebuttal is factually right about the mechanism: in a settle-after router the buyer's IMD does not exist inside the manager while beforeSwap/afterSwap run, so a physical same-swap payout can only be funded by IMD the manager already holds for other pools, and the brief's 'paid in the same swap, no accumulation inside the hook' excludes the ERC-6909 claim fallback the supplied uniswap-v4-hooks reference prescribes for exactly this case. That is a conflict between the brief and the reference that only the requester can settle; the delivered PaperSwapRouter (pre-settles the input) is a valid workaround only for integrations that adopt it. The defect as a property of the code is unchanged and still reproduces: on any manager whose IMD balance is below 2% of the buy, Universal Router / V4Router style buys revert InsufficientFeeBacking although the trade itself is fine. Calibration unchanged from round 1: mainnet PoolManager 0x000000000004444c5dc75cB358380D2e3dE08A90 held about 197k IMD on 2026-10-06, so today the revert only triggers for a gross IMD leg above about 9.9M IMD (more than IMD's supply); the exposure is a hidden dependency on unrelated pools' reserves plus a hard failure on a low-IMD manager, not a loss of funds. Kept at medium so the requester explicitly chooses: keep the same-swap rule and record the dependency and the PaperSwapRouter requirement as launch conditions, or allow direct-when-covered / claim-otherwise with a permissionless redeem. Either answer closes this finding; no further code revision is useful without it.","line":341,"path":"src/PaperHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {ERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\";\nimport {IERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IUnlockCallback} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/callback/IUnlockCallback.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {SwapParams, ModifyLiquidityParams} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\nimport {BalanceDelta, BalanceDeltaLibrary} from \"v4-core/src/types/BalanceDelta.sol\";\nimport {Paper} from \"src/Paper.sol\";\nimport {PaperHook} from \"src/PaperHook.sol\";\nimport {PaperDeployment} from \"src/PaperDeployment.sol\";\n\ncontract ImdMockForFirstBuy is ERC20 {\n    constructor() ERC20(\"IMD\", \"IMD\") {}\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        _mint(to, amount);\n    }\n}\n\n/// @notice The ordinary v4 settlement order: swap (or modify liquidity) first, then pay what the\n/// resulting delta says is owed. Uniswap's Universal Router (V4_SWAP: SWAP_EXACT_IN_SINGLE,\n/// SETTLE_ALL, TAKE_ALL) settles in this order.\ncontract SettleAfterRouter is IUnlockCallback {\n    using BalanceDeltaLibrary for BalanceDelta;\n\n    IPoolManager public immutable manager;\n\n    constructor(IPoolManager manager_) {\n        manager = manager_;\n    }\n\n    function swap(PoolKey memory key, SwapParams memory params) external returns (BalanceDelta) {\n        return abi.decode(manager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(0), msg.sender, key, abi.encode(params))), (BalanceDelta));\n    }\n\n    function addLiquidity(PoolKey memory key, ModifyLiquidityParams memory params) external {\n        manager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(1), msg.sender, key, abi.encode(params)));\n    }\n\n    function unlockCallback(bytes calldata data) external returns (bytes memory) {\n        require(msg.sender == address(manager), \"Only manager\");\n        (uint8 action, address payer, PoolKey memory key, bytes memory parameters) =\n            abi.decode(data, (uint8, address, PoolKey, bytes));\n        BalanceDelta delta;\n        if (action == 0) {\n            delta = manager.swap(key, abi.decode(parameters, (SwapParams)), \"\");\n        } else {\n            (delta,) = manager.modifyLiquidity(key, abi.decode(parameters, (ModifyLiquidityParams)), \"\");\n        }\n        _settle(key.currency0, delta.amount0(), payer);\n        _settle(key.currency1, delta.amount1(), payer);\n        return abi.encode(delta);\n    }\n\n    function _settle(Currency currency, int128 delta, address payer) private {\n        if (delta < 0) {\n            manager.sync(currency);\n            IERC20(Currency.unwrap(currency)).transferFrom(payer, address(manager), uint256(-int256(delta)));\n            manager.settle();\n        } else if (delta > 0) {\n            manager.take(currency, payer, uint256(int256(delta)));\n        }\n    }\n}\n\ncontract FirstBuyProof is Test {\n    using BalanceDeltaLibrary for BalanceDelta;\n\n    address internal constant IMD = 0xD34a99Bc0f67aE1bbd63C660e6d0b0dd03E263B7;\n    address internal constant DEV = 0xb59eac9882Ba98f4170d99D5F402C3EDb6D50D75;\n    address internal constant ORDERS = 0x721F8232e19c92516eB753FEF53d8A33a3637989;\n    uint160 internal constant Q96 = 79228162514264337593543950336;\n\n    PoolManager internal manager;\n    IERC20 internal imd;\n    Paper internal paper;\n    PaperHook internal hook;\n    PoolKey internal key;\n    SettleAfterRouter internal router;\n    bool internal paperIs0;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        manager = new PoolManager(address(this));\n        vm.etch(IMD, type(ImdMockForFirstBuy).runtimeCode);\n        ImdMockForFirstBuy(IMD).mint(address(this), 1e30);\n        imd = IERC20(IMD);\n        paper = new Paper();\n        PaperDeployment deployer = new PaperDeployment();\n        PaperHook implementation = new PaperHook(manager);\n\n        PaperDeployment.Config memory config =\n            PaperDeployment.Config(manager, address(paper), address(this), 1 ether, Q96, 3000, 60);\n        bytes32 hash = keccak256(deployer.proxyInitCode(address(implementation), config));\n        (bytes32 salt,) = deployer.mine(address(deployer), hash, 0, 200_000);\n        hook = deployer.deployHook(salt, address(implementation), config);\n        key = hook.poolKey();\n\n        router = new SettleAfterRouter(manager);\n        paper.approve(address(router), type(uint256).max);\n        imd.approve(address(router), type(uint256).max);\n        paperIs0 = Currency.unwrap(key.currency0) == address(paper);\n\n        // Launch seeding: paper only, in a range above the current price. No IMD anywhere in the manager.\n        router.addLiquidity(\n            key, ModifyLiquidityParams(paperIs0 ? int24(60) : int24(-120), paperIs0 ? int24(120) : int24(-60), 1e24, 0)\n        );\n    }\n\n    function test_firstBuyOnFreshManagerWithSettleAfterRouter() public {\n        assertGt(paper.balanceOf(address(manager)), 0, \"pool holds paper\");\n        assertEq(imd.balanceOf(address(manager)), 0, \"fresh manager holds no IMD\");\n\n        // A buyer spends 100 IMD exact input through the ordinary settle-after order.\n        bool zeroForOne = !paperIs0;\n        uint160 limit = zeroForOne ? 4295128740 : 1461446703485210103287273052203988822378723970341;\n        BalanceDelta delta = router.swap(key, SwapParams(zeroForOne, -100 ether, limit));\n\n        // Expected: the trade succeeds and the 2 IMD fee reaches both wallets in the same swap.\n        // Actual on the current code: beforeSwap's _pay reverts InsufficientFeeBacking because the\n        // manager's physical IMD balance is zero while the buyer's input is still unsettled.\n        int128 paperOut = paperIs0 ? delta.amount0() : delta.amount1();\n        assertGt(paperOut, 0, \"buyer received no paper\");\n        assertEq(imd.balanceOf(ORDERS), 0.5 ether, \"orders wallet fee\");\n        assertEq(imd.balanceOf(DEV), 1.5 ether, \"dev wallet fee\");\n        assertEq(imd.balanceOf(address(manager)), 98 ether, \"manager keeps the net input\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Fresh PoolManager; ERC-20 mock at IMD; proxy hook via PaperDeployment.deployHook at 2^96, fee 3000, spacing 60; paper-only liquidity in [60,120] (paper currency0) or [-120,-60] (paper currency1) so imd.balanceOf(manager) == 0. Buyer approves a router that calls manager.swap first and settles afterwards (sync -> transferFrom -> settle), exact-input 100e18 IMD, extreme price limit. Expected: buyer receives paper, ORDERS 0.5e18 IMD, DEV 1.5e18 IMD, manager keeps 98e18. Actual: revert WrappedError(hook, 0x575e24b4 beforeSwap, 0xe4c4588d InsufficientFeeBacking(), 0xa9e35b2f HookCallFailed()). Re-run on this tree: forge test --match-path test/scratch/Proof_b955373b3a98.t.sol fails with that error (Proof_f1f30ed86ae6 identically); the author's test/Fees.t.sol::test_freshTokenOnlyPoolNeedsPrepaidImdFee asserts the same revert and passes; the same buy through PaperSwapRouter succeeds (test/Router.t.sol).","severity":"medium","snippet":"        if (IERC20(IMD).balanceOf(address(s.manager)) < fee) revert InsufficientFeeBacking();","title":"Buy-side fee is taken from the PoolManager's spot IMD balance before the swapper settles; a manager holding less IMD than the fee rejects every buy through a settle-after router (unresolved from round"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Settlement of round-1 finding ec4232298fe1 (author answer: disputed, no change except regenerated hashes 0x95289d31.../0x180ed849... and MANAGER_OFFSET 2140 for the new runtime). The behaviour still reproduces: any implementation other than the delivered V1/V2 bytecode reverts UnsupportedImplementation in the constructor and on upgradeToAndCall. The author's position is that the allowlist is the only enforcement of the brief's 'this total is a constant; nothing can raise it' against a future implementation, and that a timelock or review is a promise rather than enforcement. That is a defensible resolution of two requirements that genuinely conflict, it is documented in README and launch.json notes, and the V1 to V2 rehearsal the brief asks for works (test/Upgrade.t.sol). Downgraded to low: no fund loss, no breakage, the 14 mined flags and the ProxyAdmin ownership are as specified, and the only consequence is that a fix to any of the open findings or a chain-readable USD source requires a new proxy address and pool. The requester should confirm in writing which of the two guarantees wins; if upgradeability wins, the allowlist must go and the fee cap moves to review/timelock, and if the fee cap wins (current code), the address is effectively immutable after V2 and a non-proxy hook would also remove the DELEGATECALL conflict in finding 1.","line":54,"path":"src/PaperProxy.sol","reproduction":"State: launched proxy P (V1), ProxyAdmin A owned by DEV 0xb59eac9882Ba98f4170d99D5F402C3EDb6D50D75. Compile any implementation other than delivered V1/V2, e.g. PaperHookV2(manager) with one executable byte flipped or any contract adding a function. vm.prank(DEV); A.upgradeAndCall(ITransparentUpgradeableProxy(P), newImpl, \"\"). Expected per brief: the upgrade owner installs a reviewed later implementation. Actual: revert UnsupportedImplementation(); implementation slot still holds V1. Verified on this tree: forge test --match-test test_upgradeRejectsModifiedCanonicalRuntime passes (test/Upgrade.t.sol:184), asserting exactly this revert.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (normalizedHash != V1_RUNTIME_HASH && normalizedHash != V2_RUNTIME_HASH) {","title":"PaperProxy pins the V1/V2 runtime hashes with no setter, so the ProxyAdmin owner can never install a later implementation; the brief's 'later implementations can use any callback' is unmet by design ("},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Settlement of round-1 finding 8ca3041edb11 (author answer: fixed). The fix holds for the new overload: postDraft(bytes32,uint256 maxTokens) compares the execution quote to the cap before allocating a draft id or transferring tokens and reverts PostFeeExceedsLimit(required, maximum); test/VotingProtection.t.sol reproduces the displacement in both currency orders with unlimited approval and shows no burn, no id and no logs. The one-argument selector the brief requires is kept as an uncapped wrapper, which I allowed in round 1, and README/deployment-parameters document that it has no price protection. Recorded here as a residual, not a reopened defect: the round-1 attack still works against the legacy selector, and the new lastPricedSqrtPriceX96 fallback adds a variant where the attacker no longer needs to keep the dust position in place (afterSwap stores the displaced price while the dust is active; removing the dust leaves active liquidity at zero so postFeeTokens serves the poisoned saved price until the next in-range buy). Loss is bounded by the caller's allowance and balance and is only reachable through the uncapped selector. If the requester wants the legacy selector to be safe as well, the wrapper could enforce a hook-side sanity bound (for example refusing a quote more than N times the quote at the last in-range swap), at the cost of departing from pure spot pricing; otherwise the current documentation is an acceptable close.","line":238,"path":"src/PaperHook.sol","reproduction":"test/scratch/JudgeFallback.t.sol::test_poisonedFallbackPrice (passes, i.e. reproduces) on this tree: fresh PoolManager, proxy hook at 2^96 (imdUsd 1e18, postFeeUsd 1), paper-only position [60,887220] (paper currency0) or mirrored, one 100 IMD buy through PaperSwapRouter so the price is in range; postFeeTokens() == 993824629263962284. Attacker adds dust liquidity 1e6 at ticks +-[138120,138180] on the empty side, swaps exact-input 1e24 paper with sqrtPriceLimit = getSqrtPriceAtTick(+-138150), then removes the dust (getLiquidity() == 0). postFeeTokens() == 998799459308547120042324. Victim with approve(hook, max): postDraft(h, 993824629263962284) reverts PostFeeExceedsLimit(998799459308547120042324, 993824629263962284) and burns nothing (fix confirmed); postDraft(h) burns 998799459308547120042324 paper to 0xdEaD and emits DraftPosted with that amount (residual). A subsequent 10 IMD buy restores a quote below 2x the original.","severity":"low","snippet":"        return _postDraft(textHash, type(uint256).max);","title":"The brief-required postDraft(bytes32) still burns the uncapped execution quote; with the new fallback price an attacker can poison the quote and withdraw the dust position, so a legacy caller with an "},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Settlement of round-1 advisory 3d2d7f0f54a3 (author answer: disputed). Behaviour unchanged and still reproduces: for exact-input IMD buys and exact-output IMD sells the fee is charged in beforeSwap on the requested amount and afterSwap requires the pool to have moved exactly requested-minus-fee / requested-plus-fee, so a price-limit stop or liquidity exhaustion reverts the whole swap with a clean rollback. The author's rebuttal is correct on the point I got wrong: v4's afterSwap return delta can only be applied to the unspecified currency, so 'charge the actual IMD delta in afterSwap for all four modes' cannot charge IMD when IMD is the specified currency; supporting partial fills in those two modes needs a different accounting design. The brief does not require partial fills, the guard prevents overcharging on an unfilled amount, and README line 41 and the launch notes disclose the router constraint. Downgraded to info; no action requested beyond keeping the disclosure.","line":322,"path":"src/PaperHook.sol","reproduction":"test/Fees.t.sol::test_partialImdSpecifiedRevertsAndRollsBackFee (passes on this tree): fixture pool, exact-input IMD buy of 1e22 with sqrtPriceLimit at tick +-1 reverts PartialImdSwap() (0x89bf8a45) wrapped in HookCallFailed and fees, balances and price roll back. Expected under plain v4: a partial fill up to the limit.","severity":"info","snippet":"            if (actual != expected) revert PartialImdSwap();","title":"IMD-specified swaps that the pool cannot fully fill revert PartialImdSwap instead of filling partially (settled: intended, documented; my round-1 suggested fix was not implementable)"}],"hash":"741fd628423d7c95816a52a30c79702f8ead77b052a350172f953db9135a4480","nodeId":"02175177-20bf-4210-9a3f-147fc70c3f68","outcome":"completed","summary":"The findings file is written and every snippet matches the tree. The only files I touched are `.imd-findings.json` and scratch tests under `test/scratch/`, which are not kept.\n\n**Outcome of the second round**\n\nTwo of the five findings from round one are fixed, two remain open pending a requester decision, and one is settled as a documented design choice. The full suite passes with 196 tests.\n\n**Fixed, confirmed by running the proofs**\n\n- **Posting at zero active liquidity.** The attached proof now passes. The hook records the launch price in beforeInitialize and the last in-range price after each swap, and quotes from it when active liquidity is zero. The proxy hashes and immutable offset were regenerated and the upgrade tests exercise them.\n- **Uncapped postDraft.** The new two-argument overload rejects any execution quote above the caller's cap before allocating an id or moving tokens. I verified that with the dust-position displacement in both currency orders.\n\n**Still open**\n\n- **High: the manifest names an artifact that cannot launch.** All four proofs still fail with the same revert. The author changed no code and argues the brief mandates a proxy that the schema and the protected scan cannot accept. That is true, and it means the requester must choose between a self-sufficient non-proxy artifact and an explicit proxy admission path. Until then the launch is blocked.\n- **Medium: buy fees funded from the manager's spot IMD balance.** Proof still fails. The author's rebuttal about settlement order is correct, and the brief's same-swap rule excludes the claim fallback the reference prescribes. The requester must settle the conflict. On today's mainnet balance the revert is unreachable for any realistic size, so I kept it at medium rather than high.\n\n**Settled or downgraded**\n\n- **Low: runtime-hash allowlist blocks any v3.** Unchanged and reproducible. The author's reading that the fee cap wins over open upgradeability is defensible and documented, so this is a requirement conflict for the requester to confirm, not a code defect.\n- **Low: legacy postDraft residual.** A new probe shows the fallback price can be poisoned and the dust removed, after which the uncapped selector burns about a million times the displayed quote. The capped overload refuses it. The brief requires the uncapped selector and the README warns about it, so this is recorded as a residual.\n- **Info: partial-fill reverts.** The author is right that my suggested fix is not implementable in v4's afterSwap, so this stays as a disclosed design constraint.\n\nCoverage answers all 30 entry points plus three invariant rows.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1293505,"inputTokens":354,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":23231,"runtime":"claude","turns":26,"wallClockMs":401880}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"7b8fd5498957c14ccffdf1e9a677277bb20b9dad788d2e8537f43496813e4bdd","device":"0256823ae36e7900","findings":[{"description":"The assignment requires a TransparentUpgradeableProxy, but Hook.protected.t.sol:test_runtimeCodeHasNoEscapeHatch rejects every executable DELEGATECALL. The actual mined PaperProxy necessarily contains this opcode. The canonical V1/V2 runtime whitelist does not satisfy that scanner. This is an unresolved requirement/admission conflict, not evidence of an exploitable upgrade bypass. It requires an explicit policy resolution; tests must not claim the proxy passes the pinned admission rule.","line":11,"path":"src/PaperProxy.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {Paper} from \"src/Paper.sol\";\nimport {PaperHook} from \"src/PaperHook.sol\";\nimport {PaperDeployment} from \"src/PaperDeployment.sol\";\n\n/// @notice Reproduces the pinned admission scanner against the actual mined proxy.\ncontract ProxyAdmissionProof is Test {\n    function test_requiredProxyPassesPinnedRuntimeAdmission() public {\n        address imd = 0xD34a99Bc0f67aE1bbd63C660e6d0b0dd03E263B7;\n        deployCodeTo(\"src/Paper.sol:Paper\", imd);\n        Paper token = new Paper();\n        PoolManager manager = new PoolManager(address(this));\n        PaperHook implementation = new PaperHook(manager);\n        PaperDeployment deployer = new PaperDeployment();\n        PaperDeployment.Config memory config = PaperDeployment.Config({\n            manager: manager,\n            token: address(token),\n            hookOwner: address(this),\n            imdUsdWad: 1 ether,\n            sqrtPriceX96: 79228162514264337593543950336,\n            lpFee: 3000,\n            tickSpacing: 60\n        });\n        bytes32 initCodeHash = keccak256(deployer.proxyInitCode(address(implementation), config));\n        (bytes32 salt,) = deployer.mine(address(deployer), initCodeHash, 0, 200_000);\n        PaperHook hook = deployer.deployHook(salt, address(implementation), config);\n        assertEq(uint160(address(hook)) & 0x3fff, 0x3fff);\n        assertEq(hook.feeBps(), 200);\n\n        bytes memory code = address(hook).code;\n        assertGt(code.length, 0);\n        assertLe(code.length, 24_576);\n        for (uint256 i; i < code.length; ++i) {\n            uint8 op = uint8(code[i]);\n            if (op >= 0x60 && op <= 0x7f) {\n                i += op - 0x60 + 1;\n                continue;\n            }\n            assertTrue(op != 0xff, \"runtime code contains SELFDESTRUCT\");\n            assertTrue(op != 0xf4, \"runtime code contains DELEGATECALL\");\n            assertTrue(op != 0xf2, \"runtime code contains CALLCODE\");\n        }\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Save the proof as test/scratch/ProxyAdmissionProof.t.sol and run forge test --match-path test/scratch/ProxyAdmissionProof.t.sol --out test/scratch/out --cache-path test/scratch/cache -vv. Observed exit 1: test_requiredProxyPassesPinnedRuntimeAdmission fails with runtime code contains DELEGATECALL. It deploys a real local PoolManager, canonical implementation, and atomically initialized CREATE2-mined proxy with all 14 flags. Expected by the pinned test: no executable DELEGATECALL after skipping PUSH immediates. Actual: the mined proxy runtime contains executable DELEGATECALL. No fork, FFI, other test imports, or environment changes are used. Rename or remove the temporary failing .t.sol before running the passing suite.","severity":"info","title":"Required transparent proxy conflicts with pinned runtime admission"}],"hash":"77318bd2a52d443d66d260e5b7c2ffea77631690a2a525851dbc2a35ad2a6a2b","nodeId":"9bda0ce5-ee03-45e3-9b6b-772d8a7989dc","outcome":"completed","summary":"Added partial-sell refund, fee, and slippage tests with 2,000 fuzz cases. Existing tests remain intact.\n\n`forge build` succeeded with lint warnings. All 202 tests passed, with no failures or skips.\n\nReported the unresolved transparent-proxy versus `DELEGATECALL` admission conflict in `.imd-findings.json`, including a reproduced failing proof.","treeHash":"b933e91f93a0996cd89a19bbef54c06eb08956e7","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1120768,"inputTokens":66405,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":4709,"runtime":"codex","turns":6,"wallClockMs":322063}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"82692ab5f7f7e54e","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_flow #1, audit_economics #1 and audit_permissions #1 (same root cause). launch.json sets hook.contract=\"PaperHook\" with constructorArgs [\"$poolManager\"], so the launch factory CREATE2-deploys the V1 implementation at a 14-flag address and calls PoolManager.initialize in the same transaction. That artifact's constructor runs _disableInitializers() (src/PaperHook.sol:81), so the ERC-7201 HookStorage.manager field stays zero forever, and onlyManager (line 85) compares msg.sender with that zero value: the real PoolManager's beforeInitialize call reverts Unauthorized() and the launch transaction fails. Nothing can repair it afterwards (initialize reverts InvalidInitialization; owner/split/launcher are all zero). The functional hook is PaperProxy(implementation, 100 bytes of initialize calldata), whose constructor arguments the manifest schema cannot carry and whose runtime contains DELEGATECALL, which the pinned Hook.protected.t.sol test_runtimeCodeHasNoEscapeHatch rejects. The pinned admission tests pass on the bare implementation (all flags declared, callbacks refuse outsiders because the stored manager is zero), so admission would approve an artifact that cannot launch. The author documents the conflict in launch.json notes, but notes carry no deployment authority. Resolution needs a scope decision: (a) make the artifact named in the manifest self-sufficient (non-proxy hook, or an implementation that binds manager from its immutable and owner/token/split in the constructor or in beforeInitialize from the PoolKey), or (b) an explicit admission exception plus a manifest/deployer path for the proxy and its initializer bytes. Until then the launch is blocked.","line":85,"path":"src/PaperHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {ERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {Hooks} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/Hooks.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {StateLibrary} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/StateLibrary.sol\";\nimport {Paper} from \"src/Paper.sol\";\nimport {PaperHook} from \"src/PaperHook.sol\";\nimport {HookFlags} from \"src/HookFlags.sol\";\n\ncontract ProofImd is ERC20 {\n    constructor() ERC20(\"IMD\", \"IMD\") {}\n}\n\n/// launch.json: hook.contract = \"PaperHook\", constructorArgs = [\"$poolManager\"].\n/// The deployer therefore deploys PaperHook's creation code with the chain's PoolManager at an address carrying\n/// all 14 flags, then initializes the paper/IMD pool. That pool initialization must succeed for the launch to exist.\ncontract ManifestHookProofTest is Test {\n    using StateLibrary for IPoolManager;\n\n    address constant IMD = 0xD34a99Bc0f67aE1bbd63C660e6d0b0dd03E263B7;\n    uint160 constant Q96 = 79228162514264337593543950336;\n\n    function test_manifestHookDeployedWithPoolManagerOnlyCanHostThePool() public {\n        PoolManager manager = new PoolManager(address(this));\n        Paper paper = new Paper();\n        vm.etch(IMD, address(new ProofImd()).code);\n\n        bytes memory creation = abi.encodePacked(type(PaperHook).creationCode, abi.encode(address(manager)));\n        bytes32 initHash = keccak256(creation);\n        address at;\n        for (uint256 i; i < 200_000; ++i) {\n            address predicted =\n                address(uint160(uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0xff), address(this), bytes32(i), initHash)))));\n            if (!HookFlags.matches(predicted, HookFlags.ALL)) continue;\n            bytes32 salt = bytes32(i);\n            assembly (\"memory-safe\") {\n                at := create2(0, add(creation, 0x20), mload(creation), salt)\n            }\n            break;\n        }\n        require(at != address(0), \"no salt produced an all-flags address\");\n        assertEq(HookFlags.flagsOf(at), HookFlags.ALL);\n        // The protected admission checks pass on this code: it declares all flags and refuses outside callers.\n        Hooks.Permissions memory p = PaperHook(at).getHookPermissions();\n        assertTrue(p.beforeInitialize);\n\n        (address a, address b) = address(paper) < IMD ? (address(paper), IMD) : (IMD, address(paper));\n        PoolKey memory key = PoolKey(Currency.wrap(a), Currency.wrap(b), 3000, 60, IHooks(at));\n\n        // FAILS on the current tree: PaperHook's constructor disables initialization, its namespaced manager is\n        // zero, and beforeInitialize reverts Unauthorized for the real PoolManager, so the launch pool cannot be created.\n        manager.initialize(key, Q96);\n        (uint160 price,,,) = IPoolManager(address(manager)).getSlot0(key.toId());\n        assertEq(price, Q96, \"the manifest hook must be able to initialize the launch pool\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"1) Deploy PoolManager M; put ERC-20 code at IMD 0xD34a99Bc0f67aE1bbd63C660e6d0b0dd03E263B7; deploy Paper. 2) creation = type(PaperHook).creationCode ++ abi.encode(M); CREATE2 at a salt whose address & 0x3fff == 0x3fff (what the manifest describes). getHookPermissions() reports all 14 flags. 3) M.initialize(PoolKey(sorted(paper, IMD), 3000, 60, hook), 2^96). Expected: pool initialized, slot0 price == 2^96. Actual: revert WrappedError(hook, 0xdc98354e beforeInitialize, 0x82b42900 Unauthorized(), 0xa9e35b2f HookCallFailed()). 4) hook.initialize(paper, owner, 1e18) to repair: revert InvalidInitialization(). Verified: forge test --match-path test/scratch/Proof_6c45e0931059.t.sol fails with exactly that WrappedError; the other two specialist proofs (Proof_663d4197b9b9, Proof_b2d1f8841ff5) fail the same way on this tree.","severity":"high","snippet":"        if (msg.sender != address(_state().manager)) revert Unauthorized();","title":"launch.json names the bare PaperHook implementation, which can never initialize or operate the pool; the proxy that works cannot be expressed in the manifest and fails the protected DELEGATECALL scan"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_flow #2 (high), audit_permissions #3 (medium) and audit_economics #4 (info). For IMD-input swaps the fee is paid in beforeSwap (exact-input IMD) or afterSwap (exact-output paper) with manager.take(IMD, wallet, amount), guarded by IERC20(IMD).balanceOf(manager) >= fee. In the ordinary v4 settlement order (swap, then SETTLE_ALL/TAKE_ALL, as Uniswap's Universal Router, V4Router and PositionManager-style routers do) the buyer's IMD has not been transferred yet when the callback runs, so the take is funded only by IMD the manager already holds for other pools. The launch pool is seeded with paper only, so on a fresh manager the first buy of the launch reverts although the trade itself is fine; the author's own test test_freshTokenOnlyPoolNeedsPrepaidImdFee asserts this revert and the shipped PaperSwapRouter (pre-settles input) is the documented workaround, which public frontends and aggregators will not use. Calibration: I read mainnet on 2026-10-06 (IMD.balanceOf(0x000000000004444c5dc75cB358380D2e3dE08A90) = 197689107856790172595407, about 197,689 IMD), so on today's mainnet state the revert only triggers for a buy whose 2% fee exceeds that incidental balance (a gross IMD leg above ~9.9M IMD, more than the IMD total supply). The defect is therefore a hidden dependency on unrelated pools' reserves plus a hard failure on any manager with less IMD than one fee, not a loss of funds: medium. The supplied reference prescribes minting an ERC-6909 claim when the balance does not cover the fee plus a permissionless redeem, or direct-when-covered / claim-otherwise; the brief's 'no accumulation inside the hook' conflicts with that, so the requester must choose between the fallback and documenting the dependency. Note the author's allowlisted runtime hashes in PaperProxy must be regenerated after any change here.","line":314,"path":"src/PaperHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {ERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\";\nimport {IERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IUnlockCallback} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/callback/IUnlockCallback.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {SwapParams, ModifyLiquidityParams} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\nimport {BalanceDelta, BalanceDeltaLibrary} from \"v4-core/src/types/BalanceDelta.sol\";\nimport {Paper} from \"src/Paper.sol\";\nimport {PaperHook} from \"src/PaperHook.sol\";\nimport {PaperDeployment} from \"src/PaperDeployment.sol\";\n\ncontract ImdMockForFirstBuy is ERC20 {\n    constructor() ERC20(\"IMD\", \"IMD\") {}\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        _mint(to, amount);\n    }\n}\n\n/// @notice The ordinary v4 settlement order: swap (or modify liquidity) first, then pay what the\n/// resulting delta says is owed. Uniswap's Universal Router (V4_SWAP: SWAP_EXACT_IN_SINGLE,\n/// SETTLE_ALL, TAKE_ALL) settles in this order.\ncontract SettleAfterRouter is IUnlockCallback {\n    using BalanceDeltaLibrary for BalanceDelta;\n\n    IPoolManager public immutable manager;\n\n    constructor(IPoolManager manager_) {\n        manager = manager_;\n    }\n\n    function swap(PoolKey memory key, SwapParams memory params) external returns (BalanceDelta) {\n        return abi.decode(manager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(0), msg.sender, key, abi.encode(params))), (BalanceDelta));\n    }\n\n    function addLiquidity(PoolKey memory key, ModifyLiquidityParams memory params) external {\n        manager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(1), msg.sender, key, abi.encode(params)));\n    }\n\n    function unlockCallback(bytes calldata data) external returns (bytes memory) {\n        require(msg.sender == address(manager), \"Only manager\");\n        (uint8 action, address payer, PoolKey memory key, bytes memory parameters) =\n            abi.decode(data, (uint8, address, PoolKey, bytes));\n        BalanceDelta delta;\n        if (action == 0) {\n            delta = manager.swap(key, abi.decode(parameters, (SwapParams)), \"\");\n        } else {\n            (delta,) = manager.modifyLiquidity(key, abi.decode(parameters, (ModifyLiquidityParams)), \"\");\n        }\n        _settle(key.currency0, delta.amount0(), payer);\n        _settle(key.currency1, delta.amount1(), payer);\n        return abi.encode(delta);\n    }\n\n    function _settle(Currency currency, int128 delta, address payer) private {\n        if (delta < 0) {\n            manager.sync(currency);\n            IERC20(Currency.unwrap(currency)).transferFrom(payer, address(manager), uint256(-int256(delta)));\n            manager.settle();\n        } else if (delta > 0) {\n            manager.take(currency, payer, uint256(int256(delta)));\n        }\n    }\n}\n\ncontract FirstBuyProof is Test {\n    using BalanceDeltaLibrary for BalanceDelta;\n\n    address internal constant IMD = 0xD34a99Bc0f67aE1bbd63C660e6d0b0dd03E263B7;\n    address internal constant DEV = 0xb59eac9882Ba98f4170d99D5F402C3EDb6D50D75;\n    address internal constant ORDERS = 0x721F8232e19c92516eB753FEF53d8A33a3637989;\n    uint160 internal constant Q96 = 79228162514264337593543950336;\n\n    PoolManager internal manager;\n    IERC20 internal imd;\n    Paper internal paper;\n    PaperHook internal hook;\n    PoolKey internal key;\n    SettleAfterRouter internal router;\n    bool internal paperIs0;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        manager = new PoolManager(address(this));\n        vm.etch(IMD, type(ImdMockForFirstBuy).runtimeCode);\n        ImdMockForFirstBuy(IMD).mint(address(this), 1e30);\n        imd = IERC20(IMD);\n        paper = new Paper();\n        PaperDeployment deployer = new PaperDeployment();\n        PaperHook implementation = new PaperHook(manager);\n\n        PaperDeployment.Config memory config =\n            PaperDeployment.Config(manager, address(paper), address(this), 1 ether, Q96, 3000, 60);\n        bytes32 hash = keccak256(deployer.proxyInitCode(address(implementation), config));\n        (bytes32 salt,) = deployer.mine(address(deployer), hash, 0, 200_000);\n        hook = deployer.deployHook(salt, address(implementation), config);\n        key = hook.poolKey();\n\n        router = new SettleAfterRouter(manager);\n        paper.approve(address(router), type(uint256).max);\n        imd.approve(address(router), type(uint256).max);\n        paperIs0 = Currency.unwrap(key.currency0) == address(paper);\n\n        // Launch seeding: paper only, in a range above the current price. No IMD anywhere in the manager.\n        router.addLiquidity(\n            key, ModifyLiquidityParams(paperIs0 ? int24(60) : int24(-120), paperIs0 ? int24(120) : int24(-60), 1e24, 0)\n        );\n    }\n\n    function test_firstBuyOnFreshManagerWithSettleAfterRouter() public {\n        assertGt(paper.balanceOf(address(manager)), 0, \"pool holds paper\");\n        assertEq(imd.balanceOf(address(manager)), 0, \"fresh manager holds no IMD\");\n\n        // A buyer spends 100 IMD exact input through the ordinary settle-after order.\n        bool zeroForOne = !paperIs0;\n        uint160 limit = zeroForOne ? 4295128740 : 1461446703485210103287273052203988822378723970341;\n        BalanceDelta delta = router.swap(key, SwapParams(zeroForOne, -100 ether, limit));\n\n        // Expected: the trade succeeds and the 2 IMD fee reaches both wallets in the same swap.\n        // Actual on the current code: beforeSwap's _pay reverts InsufficientFeeBacking because the\n        // manager's physical IMD balance is zero while the buyer's input is still unsettled.\n        int128 paperOut = paperIs0 ? delta.amount0() : delta.amount1();\n        assertGt(paperOut, 0, \"buyer received no paper\");\n        assertEq(imd.balanceOf(ORDERS), 0.5 ether, \"orders wallet fee\");\n        assertEq(imd.balanceOf(DEV), 1.5 ether, \"dev wallet fee\");\n        assertEq(imd.balanceOf(address(manager)), 98 ether, \"manager keeps the net input\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Fresh PoolManager; ERC-20 mock at IMD; deploy the proxy through PaperDeployment.deployHook at 2^96, fee 3000, spacing 60; add paper-only liquidity in [60,120] (paper currency0) or [-120,-60] (paper currency1) so imd.balanceOf(manager) == 0. A buyer approves a router that calls manager.swap first and settles afterwards (sync -> transferFrom -> settle) and swaps 100e18 IMD exact input with the extreme price limit. Expected: buyer receives paper, ORDERS gets 0.5e18 IMD, DEV 1.5e18, manager keeps 98e18. Actual: revert WrappedError(hook, 0x575e24b4 beforeSwap, 0xe4c4588d InsufficientFeeBacking(), 0xa9e35b2f HookCallFailed()). Verified: forge test --match-path test/scratch/Proof_f1f30ed86ae6.t.sol fails with that error; the same swap through PaperSwapRouter succeeds (test/Router.t.sol).","severity":"medium","snippet":"        if (IERC20(IMD).balanceOf(address(s.manager)) < fee) revert InsufficientFeeBacking();","title":"Buy-side fee is taken from the PoolManager's spot IMD balance before the swapper settles; on a fresh manager, or one holding less IMD than the fee, every buy through a settle-after router (Universal R"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_flow #3, audit_economics #3 and audit_math #1. The launch seeds paper only (poolBps 8000, no IMD), which in v4 is a single-sided position strictly on one side of the initial tick: slot0 holds the launch price and buyers can trade at it, but Pool.liquidity (what getLiquidity reads) is 0 until the first buy moves the price into the range. postFeeTokens() treats liquidity == 0 as PoolUnavailable and postDraft() calls it unconditionally, so the posting feature the brief requires does not work in exactly the state the launch creates. The guard re-arms later: whenever a seller pushes the price back out of every initialized range (selling the IMD early buyers deposited, cost = LP fee + 2% hook fee on that amount, 1.65 units in my run) active liquidity returns to 0 and every postDraft/postFeeTokens call reverts for everyone until the next buy. Rounds and quorum are off-chain with deadlines the hook cannot see, so a seller can close posting for the tail of a round. No owner function lifts the gate. Suggested fix preserving the guard's purpose (not quoting from a price parked in empty liquidity): record the launch sqrtPriceX96 in beforeInitialize and the last in-range sqrtPriceX96 in afterSwap, and quote from that when active liquidity is zero.","line":214,"path":"src/PaperHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {ERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\";\nimport {IERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IUnlockCallback} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/callback/IUnlockCallback.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {ModifyLiquidityParams} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\nimport {BalanceDelta, BalanceDeltaLibrary} from \"v4-core/src/types/BalanceDelta.sol\";\nimport {StateLibrary} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/StateLibrary.sol\";\nimport {Paper} from \"src/Paper.sol\";\nimport {PaperHook} from \"src/PaperHook.sol\";\nimport {PaperDeployment} from \"src/PaperDeployment.sol\";\n\ncontract ImdMockLS is ERC20 {\n    constructor() ERC20(\"IMD\", \"IMD\") {}\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        _mint(to, amount);\n    }\n}\n\ncontract LiquidityRouterLS is IUnlockCallback {\n    using BalanceDeltaLibrary for BalanceDelta;\n\n    IPoolManager public immutable manager;\n\n    constructor(IPoolManager m) {\n        manager = m;\n    }\n\n    function addLiquidity(PoolKey memory key, ModifyLiquidityParams memory params) external {\n        manager.unlock(abi.encode(msg.sender, key, params));\n    }\n\n    function unlockCallback(bytes calldata data) external returns (bytes memory) {\n        require(msg.sender == address(manager), \"Only manager\");\n        (address payer, PoolKey memory key, ModifyLiquidityParams memory params) =\n            abi.decode(data, (address, PoolKey, ModifyLiquidityParams));\n        (BalanceDelta delta,) = manager.modifyLiquidity(key, params, \"\");\n        _settle(key.currency0, delta.amount0(), payer);\n        _settle(key.currency1, delta.amount1(), payer);\n        return \"\";\n    }\n\n    function _settle(Currency c, int128 d, address payer) private {\n        if (d < 0) {\n            manager.sync(c);\n            IERC20(Currency.unwrap(c)).transferFrom(payer, address(manager), uint256(-int256(d)));\n            manager.settle();\n        } else if (d > 0) {\n            manager.take(c, payer, uint256(int256(d)));\n        }\n    }\n}\n\n/// @notice The launch seeds paper only (poolBps 8000, no IMD). In v4 that is a single-sided position\n/// strictly on one side of the initial tick, so active liquidity is 0 while slot0 holds the launch\n/// price. postFeeTokens()/postDraft() refuse that state, so posting is dead from launch until the\n/// first buy, and dies again whenever the price leaves every initialized range.\ncontract LaunchStatePostingProof is Test {\n    using StateLibrary for IPoolManager;\n\n    address constant IMD = 0xD34a99Bc0f67aE1bbd63C660e6d0b0dd03E263B7;\n    address constant DEAD = 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000dEaD;\n    uint160 constant Q96 = 79228162514264337593543950336;\n\n    PoolManager manager;\n    Paper paper;\n    PaperHook hook;\n    PoolKey key;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        manager = new PoolManager(address(this));\n        vm.etch(IMD, type(ImdMockLS).runtimeCode);\n        ImdMockLS(IMD).mint(address(this), 1e30);\n        paper = new Paper();\n        PaperDeployment d = new PaperDeployment();\n        PaperHook impl = new PaperHook(manager);\n        PaperDeployment.Config memory cfg =\n            PaperDeployment.Config(manager, address(paper), address(this), 1 ether, Q96, 3000, 60);\n        (bytes32 salt,) = d.mine(address(d), keccak256(d.proxyInitCode(address(impl), cfg)), 0, 200_000);\n        hook = d.deployHook(salt, address(impl), cfg);\n        key = hook.poolKey();\n        LiquidityRouterLS router = new LiquidityRouterLS(manager);\n        paper.approve(address(router), type(uint256).max);\n        bool paperIs0 = Currency.unwrap(key.currency0) == address(paper);\n        // Paper-only launch position: strictly above the current tick when paper is currency0, strictly below otherwise.\n        router.addLiquidity(\n            key, ModifyLiquidityParams(paperIs0 ? int24(60) : int24(-887220), paperIs0 ? int24(887220) : int24(-60), 1e24, 0)\n        );\n        paper.approve(address(hook), type(uint256).max);\n    }\n\n    function test_postingWorksAtLaunchPrice() public {\n        (uint160 sqrtPrice,,,) = IPoolManager(address(manager)).getSlot0(key.toId());\n        assertEq(sqrtPrice, Q96, \"launch price is readable\");\n        assertEq(IPoolManager(address(manager)).getLiquidity(key.toId()), 0, \"paper-only seeding has no active liquidity\");\n        assertGt(paper.balanceOf(address(manager)), 0, \"pool holds paper\");\n\n        // Expected: one USD of paper at the launch price (1 IMD = 1 USD, 1 paper = 1 IMD) is 1e18 paper,\n        // and the post burns it. Actual on this tree: both calls revert PoolUnavailable().\n        assertEq(hook.postFeeTokens(), 1e18, \"quote at the launch price\");\n        uint256 before = paper.balanceOf(address(this));\n        uint256 id = hook.postDraft(keccak256(\"first draft\"));\n        assertEq(id, 1);\n        assertEq(before - paper.balanceOf(address(this)), 1e18, \"burned the quoted amount\");\n        assertEq(paper.balanceOf(DEAD), 1e18);\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Fresh PoolManager, proxy hook via PaperDeployment.deployHook at 2^96, paper-only position [60,887220] (paper currency0) or [-887220,-60] (paper currency1), imdUsd 1e18, postFeeUsd 1, caller approved. getSlot0 returns 2^96, getLiquidity == 0. Call hook.postFeeTokens(): expected 1e18; actual revert PoolUnavailable(). hook.postDraft(h): expected draftId 1 and 1e18 paper burned; actual revert PoolUnavailable(). After one 100 IMD buy both succeed (test/scratch/JudgeVoting.t.sol::test_postDraftRefusedInLaunchState passes as described). Re-arming: after that buy, an attacker sells 1e24 paper exact-input with the extreme price limit; the swap drains the pool's IMD, getLiquidity() == 0, slot0 price > 0, and postDraft/postFeeTokens revert PoolUnavailable for every caller (test_cheapDisplacementDisablesPosting). Proof file: test/scratch/LaunchStatePosting.t.sol fails PoolUnavailable() on this tree.","severity":"medium","snippet":"        if (sqrtPrice == 0 || s.manager.getLiquidity(s.key.toId()) == 0) revert PoolUnavailable();","title":"postFeeTokens()/postDraft() refuse whenever active liquidity is zero, so posting is dead in the paper-only launch state and any trader can switch it off again for the cost of a round-trip fee"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_flow #4 (low), audit_economics #2 (medium) and audit_permissions #4 (low); kept at medium because it is a loss of user funds (burned to 0xdEaD) that needs only an open allowance and a pending post. postDraft(bytes32) burns exactly postFeeTokens() computed from the pool's current sqrtPriceX96 at execution time; the caller passes no maximum and no deadline, and the only bound is the ERC-20 allowance, which wallets grant unlimited by default and which voters must keep large for repeated burn() calls (same allowance serves both). In the launch configuration the region on the sell side of the paper-only range has zero liquidity, so once the pool's IMD is drained (cost: fees on that IMD) a sell with a far sqrtPriceLimit jumps through the empty region at zero cost; a dust position at the destination keeps getLiquidity() != 0 so the PoolUnavailable guard does not fire. The victim's queued postDraft then executes against a quote ~1e6x larger and the hook emits the inflated figure as their votes. Even without an attacker, any trade between quote and inclusion changes the burn by an unbounded factor. Minimal fix preserving the brief: postDraft(bytes32 textHash, uint256 maxTokens) (optionally a deadline) reverting when the quote exceeds it, with the front end passing the displayed quote; keep the old selector only as a wrapper if ABI stability matters. No proof file is attached because every correct fix changes the call's interface; the scratch test below documents the current behaviour.","line":232,"path":"src/PaperHook.sol","reproduction":"test/scratch/JudgeVoting.t.sol::test_cheapDisplacementOverburns (passes, i.e. reproduces): fresh PoolManager, proxy hook at 2^96 (imdUsd 1e18, postFeeUsd 1), paper-only position strictly off the current tick, manager prefunded with 10 IMD for fee backing, one ordinary first buy of 100 IMD so the price is in range. Victim holds 2,000,000 paper with approve(hook, max); postFeeTokens() == 993824629263962284 (~0.99 paper). Attacker (1,000,000 paper, 1 IMD): addLiquidity(ticks +-[138120,138180] on the empty side, liquidity 1e6) then swap(exact-input 1e24 paper, sqrtPriceLimit = getSqrtPriceAtTick(+-138150)). Measured attacker outlay: 97404301221563553675 wei paper spent, 95751879999999999996 wei IMD received back (net cost about 1.65 units, the fees). postFeeTokens() becomes 998799459308547120042324 (~998,799 paper). Victim's postDraft(h): burned == 998799459308547120042324 paper to 0xdEaD, DraftPosted emitted with that amount. Expected: a post costs about one dollar of paper or reverts; actual: ~1e6x the quote, bounded only by the victim's allowance and balance.","severity":"medium","snippet":"        uint256 amount = postFeeTokens();","title":"postDraft pulls whatever the spot quote is at execution with no caller cap; in the launch-shaped pool a near-free price displacement makes a poster burn ~1,000,000x the quote they saw"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"From audit_permissions #2, reproduced. _implementationManager hashes the candidate runtime (manager immutable zeroed) and accepts only the compile-time constants V1_RUNTIME_HASH / V2_RUNTIME_HASH, in the constructor and on every upgradeToAndCall (the _fallback override at lines 61-67). The upgrade role exists (ProxyAdmin owned by the dev constant, as required) but can only toggle between two bytecodes that differ by one default split. Any real v3 (a fix for findings 2-4 above, an activated callback, the chain-readable USD source the brief anticipates) reverts UnsupportedImplementation and would need a new proxy address, a new pool, a liquidity migration and re-indexing of draft IDs. The brief's two requirements conflict (the 2% total 'nothing can raise' versus 'later implementations can use any callback'), and the author resolved it in favour of the fee cap after an earlier review; that is a legitimate choice but it leaves the upgradeability requirement satisfied only nominally and should be decided explicitly by the requester: either (a) record that the address is effectively immutable after V2 (then a non-proxy hook also resolves finding 1's DELEGATECALL conflict), or (b) keep real upgradeability and enforce the fee cap by review/timelock instead of a bytecode allowlist. No proof attached: a test that 'upgrades to arbitrary code' asserts the opposite security property; the author's own test already demonstrates the behaviour.","line":54,"path":"src/PaperProxy.sol","reproduction":"State: launched proxy P (V1), ProxyAdmin A owned by DEV 0xb59eac9882Ba98f4170d99D5F402C3EDb6D50D75. Compile any implementation other than the delivered V1/V2, e.g. PaperHookV2(manager) with one executable byte changed (code[0] ^= 1) or any contract adding a function. vm.prank(DEV); A.upgradeAndCall(ITransparentUpgradeableProxy(P), newImpl, \"\"). Expected per brief: the upgrade owner installs the reviewed later implementation. Actual: revert UnsupportedImplementation(); the implementation slot still holds V1. Verified by running the author's test/Upgrade.t.sol::test_upgradeRejectsModifiedCanonicalRuntime (lines 164-175) and testFuzz_runtimeWhitelistRejectsChangesBeforeDelegation, both passing on this tree (forge test --match-test test_upgradeRejectsModifiedCanonicalRuntime).","severity":"medium","snippet":"        if (normalizedHash != V1_RUNTIME_HASH && normalizedHash != V2_RUNTIME_HASH) {","title":"PaperProxy pins the V1/V2 runtime hashes with no setter, so the ProxyAdmin owner can never install any later implementation; the brief's purpose for mining all 14 flags (later implementations may use "},{"citation":"resolved","description":"From audit_flow #5, reproduced. For exact-input IMD buys and exact-output IMD sells the fee is charged in beforeSwap on the requested amount and afterSwap then requires the pool to have consumed exactly requested-minus-fee (or paid exactly requested-plus-fee). Any swap that stops early, because the trader set a sqrtPriceLimitX96 or the pool ran out of liquidity in that direction, reverts the whole transaction. In the one-sided launch pool a buyer sending more IMD than the pool's paper can absorb gets a revert instead of the partial fill v4 otherwise delivers, and routers that express slippage through the price limit cannot trade these two modes. The paper-specified modes fill partially and charge on the actual IMD moved, so the pool behaves asymmetrically. The author documents this (README line 41, launch.json notes) and the rollback is clean (fees and price are restored), hence low. Charging on the actual post-swap IMD delta in afterSwap for all four modes would remove the asymmetry; it also removes the beforeSwap-time fee for buys, which interacts with finding 2.","line":295,"path":"src/PaperHook.sol","reproduction":"test/scratch/JudgeVoting.t.sol::test_partialFillReverts: fresh PoolManager, proxy hook at 2^96, paper-only liquidity 1e24 strictly above/below the current tick, 1e24 IMD pre-funded to the manager so fee backing is not the cause. Buy with 1e27 IMD exact input and the router's extreme price limit. Expected (plain v4): partial fill of all available paper. Actual: revert PartialImdSwap() (0x89bf8a45) wrapped in HookCallFailed. The author's test/Fees.t.sol::test_partialImdSpecifiedRevertsAndRollsBackFee asserts the same revert for the price-limit case (1e22 IMD exact input with limit at tick +-1).","severity":"low","snippet":"            if (actual != expected) revert PartialImdSwap();","title":"IMD-specified swaps that the pool cannot fully fill revert PartialImdSwap instead of filling what liquidity allows, so price-limit routers cannot trade this pool in two of its four modes"}],"hash":"78945ec4bc350aa5d0b3f93b214d398fd823555f4e249dc93b3a19411a837416","nodeId":"02175177-20bf-4210-9a3f-147fc70c3f68","outcome":"completed","summary":"Findings file is complete and validated: 6 findings, 31 coverage rows, every snippet matches the tree, and the three attached proofs fail on this code for the stated reasons.\n\n## Result\n\nThe findings are in `.imd-findings.json` at the repository root. Scratch reproductions live under `test/scratch/` (the four specialist proofs plus my own `JudgeVoting.t.sol` and `LaunchStatePosting.t.sol`). The existing suite passes (159 tests), and nothing outside those two paths was touched.\n\n**Severity counts:** 0 Critical, 1 High, 4 Medium, 1 Low\n\n1. **High, manifest artifact cannot launch.** launch.json names the bare `PaperHook` implementation. Its constructor disables the initializer, so the namespaced manager stays zero and `beforeInitialize` reverts `Unauthorized` for the real PoolManager. The working proxy cannot be expressed in the manifest and fails the protected DELEGATECALL scan. Three specialists reported it; merged, proof attached and verified failing.\n2. **Medium, buy-side fee needs pre-existing manager IMD.** With settle-after routers the fee take runs before the buyer settles, so a fresh manager reverts `InsufficientFeeBacking`. I read mainnet today: the PoolManager holds about 197,689 IMD, so on current state the revert only hits a fee above that balance. Recalibrated from high to medium as a hidden cross-pool dependency rather than loss of funds. Proof attached.\n3. **Medium, posting dead in the launch state.** A paper-only seed has zero active liquidity, so `postFeeTokens` and `postDraft` revert `PoolUnavailable` until the first buy, and any seller who drains the IMD side re-arms the block. Merged from three reports; my proof fails on this tree.\n4. **Medium, uncapped spot-priced burn.** After draining the pool's IMD for about 1.65 units in fees, a dust position plus one sell through the empty region moved the quote from 0.99 paper to 998,799 paper, and the victim's pending post burned that amount. Merged from three reports. No proof attached because every correct fix changes the call interface.\n5. **Medium, runtime-hash allowlist blocks all future upgrades.** Only V1 and V2 bytecode can ever be installed, which makes the brief's stated upgrade purpose unreachable and leaves no in-place path to fix findings 2 to 4. Flagged as a scope decision the requester must make between the fee cap and real upgradeability.\n6. **Low, IMD-specified partial fills revert.** Documented by the author and rolled back cleanly, but price-limit routers cannot use two of the four swap modes.\n\n**Dropped:** the dust fee rounding note from audit_math (at most 1 wei, intended and tested) and the economics mainnet-balance observation (not a defect; folded into finding 2). All slither and aderyn leads were checked and found benign; the reasons are in the coverage record.\n\n**Coverage:** all 28 entry points answered. 18 hold, 10 carry a finding, none unreached. Three invariant rows were added: the 2% gross-fee math in all four modes, the ERC-7201 slot constant (recomputed and matching), and the ProxyAdmin owner constant.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2157174,"inputTokens":546,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":53423,"runtime":"claude","turns":36,"wallClockMs":771675}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"d20c1a95c50699ea","findings":[],"hash":"8178bf5822278b8fdee38c29a7bf7337eb9d6723dfdd0084ed4019350db8b0ff","nodeId":"7e92b1d0-a165-41bb-b64c-938825b19e44","outcome":"failed","summary":"dependency did not apply: fatal: transport 'file' not allowed\n","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":0,"inputTokens":0,"model":null,"outputTokens":0,"runtime":"claude","turns":0,"wallClockMs":552}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":2,"bundleHash":null,"device":"06ddd0db362564c0","findings":[],"hash":"8dcead4b6573e57cc9cb361c8d0bb413aae09df60f157fef1d8dc06542587a9e","nodeId":"f2f4a2bd-e3a0-4f71-a610-69f825845739","outcome":"failed","summary":"{\"type\":\"error\",\"status\":400,\"error\":{\"type\":\"invalid_request_error\",\"message\":\"The 'gpt-6-astra' model is not supported when using Codex with a ChatGPT account.\"}}","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":0,"inputTokens":0,"model":null,"outputTokens":0,"runtime":"codex","turns":0,"wallClockMs":4852}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"4dd67dae195771b6","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"launch.json tells the deployer to deploy PaperHook with the single constructor argument $poolManager at an address carrying all 14 flags, then initialize the paper/IMD pool. PaperHook's constructor calls _disableInitializers() (src/PaperHook.sol:81) and every callback is gated by onlyManager, which compares msg.sender with the ERC-7201 field _state().manager (src/PaperHook.sol:85). On a bare implementation that field is zero forever, so the real PoolManager's call to beforeInitialize reverts Unauthorized and PoolManager.initialize reverts with WrappedError(hook, 0xdc98354e beforeInitialize, 0x82b42900 Unauthorized, 0xa9e35b2f HookCallFailed). The functioning hook is PaperProxy(implementation, initializeCalldata), which the manifest does not describe and which the protected admission test rejects for containing DELEGATECALL. Either way the launch as specified by the manifest cannot be created; the author's notes acknowledge the conflict but the deliverable is still in this state. Fix options: make the contract named in the manifest operable with [$poolManager] alone (for example a non-upgradeable hook, or an implementation that falls back to its immutable deploymentManager and self-initializes), or obtain an explicit admission exception plus a manifest form that deploys the proxy. This is outside the economics area but blocks every economic path.","line":4,"path":"launch.json","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {ERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {Hooks} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/Hooks.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {StateLibrary} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/StateLibrary.sol\";\nimport {Paper} from \"src/Paper.sol\";\nimport {PaperHook} from \"src/PaperHook.sol\";\nimport {HookFlags} from \"src/HookFlags.sol\";\n\ncontract ProofImd is ERC20 {\n    constructor() ERC20(\"IMD\", \"IMD\") {}\n}\n\n/// launch.json: hook.contract = \"PaperHook\", constructorArgs = [\"$poolManager\"].\n/// The deployer therefore deploys PaperHook's creation code with the chain's PoolManager at an address carrying\n/// all 14 flags, then initializes the paper/IMD pool. That pool initialization must succeed for the launch to exist.\ncontract ManifestHookProofTest is Test {\n    using StateLibrary for IPoolManager;\n\n    address constant IMD = 0xD34a99Bc0f67aE1bbd63C660e6d0b0dd03E263B7;\n    uint160 constant Q96 = 79228162514264337593543950336;\n\n    function test_manifestHookDeployedWithPoolManagerOnlyCanHostThePool() public {\n        PoolManager manager = new PoolManager(address(this));\n        Paper paper = new Paper();\n        vm.etch(IMD, address(new ProofImd()).code);\n\n        bytes memory creation = abi.encodePacked(type(PaperHook).creationCode, abi.encode(address(manager)));\n        bytes32 initHash = keccak256(creation);\n        address at;\n        for (uint256 i; i < 200_000; ++i) {\n            address predicted =\n                address(uint160(uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0xff), address(this), bytes32(i), initHash)))));\n            if (!HookFlags.matches(predicted, HookFlags.ALL)) continue;\n            bytes32 salt = bytes32(i);\n            assembly (\"memory-safe\") {\n                at := create2(0, add(creation, 0x20), mload(creation), salt)\n            }\n            break;\n        }\n        require(at != address(0), \"no salt produced an all-flags address\");\n        assertEq(HookFlags.flagsOf(at), HookFlags.ALL);\n        // The protected admission checks pass on this code: it declares all flags and refuses outside callers.\n        Hooks.Permissions memory p = PaperHook(at).getHookPermissions();\n        assertTrue(p.beforeInitialize);\n\n        (address a, address b) = address(paper) < IMD ? (address(paper), IMD) : (IMD, address(paper));\n        PoolKey memory key = PoolKey(Currency.wrap(a), Currency.wrap(b), 3000, 60, IHooks(at));\n\n        // FAILS on the current tree: PaperHook's constructor disables initialization, its namespaced manager is\n        // zero, and beforeInitialize reverts Unauthorized for the real PoolManager, so the launch pool cannot be created.\n        manager.initialize(key, Q96);\n        (uint160 price,,,) = IPoolManager(address(manager)).getSlot0(key.toId());\n        assertEq(price, Q96, \"the manifest hook must be able to initialize the launch pool\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"1) Deploy PoolManager M. 2) creation = PaperHook.creationCode ++ abi.encode(M); CREATE2 it at a salt whose address & 0x3fff == 0x3fff (as the deployer does). 3) getHookPermissions() on it reports all flags and every callback refuses outsiders, so the protected checks pass. 4) M.initialize(PoolKey(paper, IMD, 3000, 60, hook), 2^96). Expected: pool initialized at sqrtPrice 2^96. Actual: revert WrappedError(hook, 0xdc98354e, 0x82b42900 Unauthorized(), 0xa9e35b2f HookCallFailed()). Reproduced with test/scratch/ManifestHookProof.t.sol (fails on this tree).","severity":"high","snippet":"    \"contract\": \"PaperHook\",\n    \"constructorArgs\": [\"$poolManager\"],","title":"Manifest names the bare implementation; a hook deployed as launch.json describes cannot initialize the launch pool"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"postDraft(bytes32) burns exactly postFeeTokens() computed from the pool's current sqrtPriceX96 at execution time. The caller has no parameter to bound the amount, no deadline, and the only protection is the ERC-20 allowance. In the launch configuration (80% paper seeded one-sided from the current tick upward, no IMD below), the region below the current tick has zero liquidity, so a 1 wei exact-input paper sell with a far sqrtPriceLimit moves the price arbitrarily far down at zero cost (SwapMath.computeSwapStep with liquidity 0 jumps to the target; the hook charges 2% of an IMD delta of 0). An attacker adds a dust position at the destination tick so getLiquidity() != 0, displaces the price, lets the victim's pending postDraft execute against a quote that is now ~1e6 paper instead of 1 paper, and swaps the price back for free. Any user whose allowance to the hook exceeds the quote (an unlimited approval, or a voter who approved a large amount for repeated burn() calls, since the same allowance serves both functions) loses the entire excess to the dead address. Even without an attacker, an ordinary trade between quote and inclusion changes the burn by an unbounded factor. Minimal fix preserving the brief: add a caller maximum, e.g. postDraft(bytes32 textHash, uint256 maxTokens) reverting when the quote exceeds it (optionally a deadline), and have the front end pass the displayed quote. A proof test is not attached because any correct fix changes the call signature or must reject the call outright; the scratch test below shows the current behaviour.","line":232,"path":"src/PaperHook.sol","reproduction":"Setup (test/scratch/EconReview.t.sol::test_postDraftOverburnsAfterCheapPriceDisplacement): paper at 0x100000 (currency0), IMD mock at the IMD address, fresh PoolManager, PaperDeployment.deployHook with sqrtPrice 2^96, fee 3000, spacing 60; liquidity 1e24 in [0, 887220] paper-only. postFeeTokens() == 1e18. Victim holds 2,000,000 paper and has approve(hook, max). Attacker: modifyLiquidity([-138180,-138120], 1e6) then swap(zeroForOne=true, amountSpecified=-1, sqrtPriceLimit=getSqrtPriceAtTick(-138150)). Measured attacker cost: 1 wei paper, 0 IMD. postFeeTokens() becomes 995807700398146255044357 (~995,807 paper). Victim calls postDraft(h): burned == 995807700398146255044357 paper to 0xdEaD, i.e. 995,807x the quote they saw. Attacker then swap(zeroForOne=false, amountSpecified=+1, sqrtPriceLimit=2^96) restores sqrtPrice to exactly 2^96 for free. Expected: a post costs about one dollar of paper or reverts; actual: the victim's whole approved balance up to the manipulated quote is burned.","severity":"medium","snippet":"        uint256 amount = postFeeTokens();\n        draftId = ++_state().draftCount;\n        _burnFrom(msg.sender, amount);","title":"postDraft pulls an unbounded, spot-priced amount with no caller cap; a near-free price displacement in the launch-shaped pool makes a poster burn ~1,000,000x the quote"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"postFeeTokens() and therefore postDraft() revert with PoolUnavailable when the pool's active liquidity is zero. With paper-only liquidity in [currentTick, upper], the price can be pushed below the range by a 1 wei exact-input paper sell with sqrtPriceLimit MIN_SQRT_PRICE+1: the swap consumes nothing (the griefer's balance is unchanged), the hook charges nothing (IMD delta 0), and active liquidity becomes 0. Every postDraft then reverts until someone buys the price back into range. The griefer can repeat this after every buy for only gas. The same state also arises naturally if the custodian seeds the range strictly above the current tick, or after sells return all IMD to the pool. Impact is denial of the posting feature and broken off-chain quotes, not loss of funds; burn() keeps working. Mitigation: quote from a price that does not require active liquidity at the exact current tick (e.g. accept sqrtPrice alone when the pool is initialized, or a short TWAP/last-trade price), or document that posting requires in-range liquidity.","line":214,"path":"src/PaperHook.sol","reproduction":"Setup as in finding 2 (one-sided paper liquidity 1e24 in [0, 887220], price 2^96). postFeeTokens() == 1e18. Griefer holding 1 wei paper: router.swap(key, SwapParams(true, -1, TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1)). Griefer's paper balance after == before (0 cost). getLiquidity(poolId) == 0. postFeeTokens() reverts PoolUnavailable(); postDraft(0) from a fully approved caller reverts PoolUnavailable(). Reproduced by test/scratch/EconReview.t.sol::test_postingDisabledByFreeDisplacement.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (sqrtPrice == 0 || s.manager.getLiquidity(s.key.toId()) == 0) revert PoolUnavailable();","title":"Posting is unavailable whenever the pool price sits outside every position, a state anyone can create at zero cost in the one-sided launch pool"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"For buys, beforeSwap/afterSwap call manager.take(IMD, wallet, fee) before a settle-after router has paid any IMD in, so the transfer is funded by IMD the manager already holds for other pools and ERC-6909 claims (repaid in the same unlock). On a manager with less IMD than the fee every buy reverts (test_freshTokenOnlyPoolNeedsPrepaidImdFee asserts this). Live read on 2026-10-06 via a public RPC: IMD 0xD34a99Bc0f67aE1bbd63C660e6d0b0dd03E263B7 is 'Identity.md' (IMD), 18 decimals, a LayerZero OFT with plain ERC-20 transfers, totalSupply 4,099,554.64 IMD; IMD.balanceOf(PoolManager 0x000000000004444c5dc75cB358380D2e3dE08A90) = 196,669.19 IMD. A buy would need a gross IMD leg above 9.83M IMD (2.4x total supply) for its 2% fee to exceed that backing, so the revert cannot occur on today's mainnet state; it would resurface only if the manager's IMD holdings fell below the fee of a single buy (below ~2,000 IMD for a 100k IMD buy). Sells are always backed because the pool's own IMD output funds the fee. Keep PaperSwapRouter or an ERC-6909 claim fallback as the documented mitigation and record the dependency in the README; no code change is required for launch readiness on this point.","line":314,"path":"src/PaperHook.sol","reproduction":"Existing test test/Fees.t.sol::test_freshTokenOnlyPoolNeedsPrepaidImdFee: fresh PoolManager, paper-only liquidity, imd.balanceOf(manager) == 0, _swap(buy, exactInput, 100 ether) reverts (InsufficientFeeBacking inside beforeSwap); after imd.transfer(manager, 2 ether) the same buy succeeds and pays 0.5/1.5 IMD. Live evidence: cast call IMD 'balanceOf(address)' 0x000000000004444c5dc75cB358380D2e3dE08A90 -> 196669195572986482729108; cast call IMD 'totalSupply()' -> 4099554642826000000000000; decimals() -> 18; name() -> 'Identity.md'.","severity":"info","snippet":"        if (IERC20(IMD).balanceOf(address(s.manager)) < fee) revert InsufficientFeeBacking();","title":"Buy-side fee payment depends on the PoolManager's global IMD balance; measured on mainnet today it is sufficient, so the disputed first-buy revert does not trigger there"}],"hash":"aba62326ebc68a8c3fffef52021a0996a388eac9b616cb9ce1299f59ec9b748a","nodeId":"8a2ab58a-6c55-4f0f-81cc-c0cb89dbaa53","outcome":"completed","summary":"The findings file is in place at the repository root (excluded from git by the harness's own `info/exclude`, as intended), scratch files are gitignored, and no tracked file changed. The review is complete.\n\n## Outcome\n\nI audited the economics of the paper/IMD hook (Economic Security, Invariant, Flow Gap guides) and wrote `.imd-findings.json` with 4 findings and a 32-row coverage record. The core fee machinery holds: 2% of the gross IMD leg in all four swap modes, split conservation, no balance or claim left in the hook, and state preserved across the V1 to V2 upgrade. The defects are in the posting path and the launch manifest.\n\n**Findings, most severe first**\n\n1. **High, launch.json:4.** The manifest names the bare `PaperHook` implementation with only `$poolManager`. Its constructor disables initialization and its stored manager is zero, so the real PoolManager's `beforeInitialize` call reverts `Unauthorized` and the launch pool can never be created. The working contract is the proxy, which the protected admission test rejects for DELEGATECALL. Outside my area but it blocks every economic path. Proof attached and verified failing on this tree.\n\n2. **Medium, src/PaperHook.sol:232.** `postDraft` burns whatever the spot quote says, with no caller cap or deadline. In the launch-shaped one-sided pool the region below the price is empty, so a 1 wei sell moves the price for free. Measured: attacker cost 1 wei paper and 0 IMD, quote moved from 1 paper to about 995,807 paper, and a victim with a standing allowance burned exactly that. Fix is a `maxTokens` argument. No proof attached since any fix changes the signature.\n\n3. **Low, src/PaperHook.sol:214.** Posting reverts whenever active liquidity is zero, a state anyone can create at zero cost in the one-sided pool and that also arises naturally. Griefing only.\n\n4. **Info, src/PaperHook.sol:314.** Buy-side fees draw on the PoolManager's global IMD balance. I read mainnet today: the PoolManager holds about 196,669 IMD against a 4.1M total supply, so the disputed first-buy revert cannot trigger on current mainnet state. IMD is confirmed as an 18-decimal LayerZero OFT with plain transfers.\n\n**Coverage.** All 28 listed entry points have rows: 26 hold, `postDraft` on V1 and V2 carry finding 2. Four invariant rows record the fee, split, zero-residue and upgrade-preservation checks. Static-analysis leads were all traced and none reproduced as defects. Everything in my area was reached; nothing was left unreached.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2705079,"inputTokens":514,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":62258,"runtime":"claude","turns":43,"wallClockMs":938628}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"cbf3d44f0a6bd520b45f32e351ee1ebb277e9a0dbf5f26dc66ae649ebf6f49a5","device":"6d18805b99aeb48a","findings":[],"hash":"b3139bfde989005f758631cd6e5a218cfac1e35352cda93db910e20fe693d996","nodeId":"f2f4a2bd-e3a0-4f71-a610-69f825845739","outcome":"completed","summary":"Delivered the Foundry project with token, fee hook, mined transparent proxy, v2 upgrade rehearsal, tests, and deployment documentation in [README.md](/home/imd6/.identitymd/work/17d14f70-4f1b-4de2-8289-95465e51b17b/f2f4a2bd-e3a0-4f71-a610-69f825845739/README.md).\n\n`forge build`, all **80 tests**, and `forge fmt --check` pass.\n\nTwo conflicts remain documented for review: the pinned scanner forbids the proxy’s required `DELEGATECALL`, and unrestricted future upgrades cannot guarantee a permanent 2% fee ceiling.","treeHash":"56223ca2189e07dd18997d64ee6a203b5011cd3b","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2694656,"inputTokens":143326,"model":"gpt-6.1-sol","outputTokens":44997,"runtime":"codex","turns":6,"wallClockMs":1234087}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"f0766e4c3462d346c37036424a313f958c3785f89547c7f0bcd0d1ad1fb00977","device":"16b70f563303d8e7","findings":[],"hash":"b6641ad3627975b05cca890cebde0f6f1f4e7d958c3cab932a2fb143153cce39","nodeId":"7f0fd592-b20a-4c34-b6ab-1f5d05b344ce","outcome":"completed","summary":"Updated only [launch.json](/Users/gmoney/.identitymd/work/17d14f70-4f1b-4de2-8289-95465e51b17b/7f0fd592-b20a-4c34-b6ab-1f5d05b344ce/launch.json).\n\n- Schema, constructor ABI, and all 14 permissions checked.\n- Notes: 3,931/4,000 characters.\n- `forge build` succeeded with lint warnings.\n- `forge test`: 202 passed, zero failures.\n\nExisting proxy deployment and admission blockers remain documented.","treeHash":"7162c4b1f03dd6bc9bf235439c922f3547a33fa8","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":604544,"inputTokens":64660,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":5661,"runtime":"codex","turns":4,"wallClockMs":192954}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"660cb3a2ff9834f406c1f958e781430d290aa76616bf1274463aabe1e1cdb0b0","device":"e66f9bf5eca15ea2","findings":[{"description":"The task explicitly requires a TransparentUpgradeableProxy, but Hook.protected.t.sol::test_runtimeCodeHasNoEscapeHatch rejects executable DELEGATECALL in the deployed hook. The revised proxy restricts upgrades to reviewed V1/V2 runtime hashes, but still necessarily delegates. This is an unresolved specification/admission conflict, not an unauthorized upgrade vulnerability; a reviewed admission-policy resolution is required. Tests cannot make both requirements true without changing one of them.","line":11,"path":"src/PaperProxy.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {Paper} from \"src/Paper.sol\";\nimport {PaperHook} from \"src/PaperHook.sol\";\nimport {PaperDeployment} from \"src/PaperDeployment.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\n\ncontract ProxyAdmissionProof is Test {\n    function test_requiredProxyPassesPinnedRuntimeAdmission() public {\n        address imd = 0xD34a99Bc0f67aE1bbd63C660e6d0b0dd03E263B7;\n        Paper token = new Paper();\n        // This check needs only token metadata, not balances, a fork, or trading.\n        vm.etch(imd, address(token).code);\n        PoolManager manager = new PoolManager(address(this));\n        PaperHook implementation = new PaperHook(manager);\n        PaperDeployment deployer = new PaperDeployment();\n        PaperDeployment.Config memory config = PaperDeployment.Config(\n            manager, address(token), address(this), 1 ether, 79228162514264337593543950336, 3000, 60\n        );\n        bytes32 hash = keccak256(deployer.proxyInitCode(address(implementation), config));\n        (bytes32 salt,) = deployer.mine(address(deployer), hash, 0, 200_000);\n        PaperHook proxy = deployer.deployHook(salt, address(implementation), config);\n        assertEq(uint160(address(proxy)) & 0x3fff, 0x3fff);\n        bytes memory runtime = address(proxy).code;\n        for (uint256 i; i < runtime.length; ++i) {\n            uint8 opcode = uint8(runtime[i]);\n            if (opcode >= 0x60 && opcode <= 0x7f) {\n                i += opcode - 0x60 + 1;\n                continue;\n            }\n            assertTrue(opcode != 0xf4, \"pinned admission rejects executable DELEGATECALL in required proxy\");\n        }\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Save the attached proof as test/scratch/AdmissionProof.t.sol and run forge test --match-path test/scratch/AdmissionProof.t.sol. It mines and deploys the actual initialized PaperProxy with all 14 flags, then applies the pinned PUSH-aware opcode scan to its runtime. Expected by the pinned check: no executable opcode 0xf4. Actual: the test fails with \"pinned admission rejects executable DELEGATECALL in required proxy\". Reproduced locally after the implementation revision, with 0 passed and 1 failed. No fork, FFI, environment configuration, or imports from other tests are needed.","severity":"info","title":"Required transparent proxy still conflicts with the pinned immutable-runtime admission rule"}],"hash":"c0cba1c6cd8344b4c03dbad219f69c0f7245a2aa8bfbf320c5f10a17188c5514","nodeId":"9bda0ce5-ee03-45e3-9b6b-772d8a7989dc","outcome":"completed","summary":"Added upgrade mutation tests, router failure-path tests, and randomized fund-conservation invariants.\n\n`forge build` succeeded; `forge test` passed **159 tests**, with no failures or skips.\n\nReported the unresolved proxy/`DELEGATECALL` admission conflict with a reproduced failing proof in `.imd-findings.json`. Updated `test/REVIEW.md`; contracts and configuration remain unchanged.","treeHash":"c4caae181256adbfb3a98bc89492405d05cb0d46","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1359488,"inputTokens":80547,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":15156,"runtime":"codex","turns":6,"wallClockMs":455154}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"2e3ee7786797c03c265bfa08cc6c970c7e1526c9f860b6157457766bca53ede7","device":"3f6a9bdd601cb99f","findings":[],"hash":"c45551fa437c3abd37f1c405d4ed144b140f8948837aa561936e7f830c42079e","nodeId":"f2f4a2bd-e3a0-4f71-a610-69f825845739","outcome":"completed","summary":"Recorded all six findings in [.imd-responses.json](/home/seat/.identitymd/work/17d14f70-4f1b-4de2-8289-95465e51b17b/f2f4a2bd-e3a0-4f71-a610-69f825845739/.imd-responses.json), added stale-price regression coverage, and clarified launch conditions. Contracts remain unchanged.\n\n`forge build`, all 141 delivered tests, and `forge fmt --check` pass. The router’s arbitrary-payer lint also passes.\n\nBoth supplied proofs still fail; their requirement conflicts are documented as disputes. Launch remains blocked pending the proxy admission decision. Same-swap payouts require pre-settlement when IMD backing is insufficient.","treeHash":"58db8e3b6b773fa777bf42b21f31638b7bee6665","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1211904,"inputTokens":217833,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":11589,"runtime":"codex","turns":7,"wallClockMs":524711}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"d78599ae7e747bb388e92aa05212a7412002b551d047a4d20aee2d14c39a8cf4","device":"aad1250d716d3f82","findings":[],"hash":"daa1570bf77bfd32427edd63eea6dcfc39f90b79c1a82f8a2cd5d6e5c90ccc94","nodeId":"f2f4a2bd-e3a0-4f71-a610-69f825845739","outcome":"completed","summary":"Fixed posting with zero active liquidity and added caller-capped `postDraft(bytes32,uint256)`. Legacy posting remains uncapped.\n\n`forge build`, 139 delivered tests, `forge fmt --check`, and targeted arbitrary-send lint pass.\n\nEvery finding is answered in [.imd-responses.json](/home/seat/.identitymd/work/17d14f70-4f1b-4de2-8289-95465e51b17b/f2f4a2bd-e3a0-4f71-a610-69f825845739/.imd-responses.json). Two supplied proofs remain disputed; launch remains blocked by documented admission and requirement conflicts.","treeHash":"4ffa30ad39958a57eec9a92c0418a2c707f4c390","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2041344,"inputTokens":116480,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":22429,"runtime":"codex","turns":7,"wallClockMs":576014}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":2,"bundleHash":null,"device":"52c98c0dc01791cd","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Boundary x invariant seam. The brief seeds the pool with paper only (poolBps 8000, no IMD), which in Uniswap v4 means a single-sided position whose range lies entirely on one side of the initial sqrtPrice (tickLower > currentTick when paper is currency0, tickUpper <= currentTick when paper is currency1). In that state slot0 holds the launch price and buyers can trade at it, but Pool.liquidity (the active in-range liquidity read by getLiquidity) is 0 until the first buy moves the price into the range. postFeeTokens() treats liquidity == 0 as 'pool unavailable' and reverts, and postDraft() calls it first, so the posting feature required by the brief does not work in exactly the state the launch creates. The same guard re-arms afterwards: active liquidity returns to 0 whenever the price leaves every initialized range, which happens (a) when a seller drains the IMD the early buyers deposited and (b) when the launch range is fully bought out. (a) is cheap for an unprivileged actor: in the scratch probe test/scratch/GriefProbe.t.sol, after buyers put 9.8 IMD into the pool, an attacker sold paper through PaperSwapRouter until the pool held 0.0294 IMD, getLiquidity() became 0 and postFeeTokens() reverted PoolUnavailable; buying the paper back cost the attacker a net 0.44 paper (~$0.44 at the fixture price), and posting stayed disabled until the next buy. The guard was added to avoid quoting from a price that can be moved for free through empty liquidity, so the fix should not simply drop it: record the last in-range sqrtPriceX96 in afterSwap (and the launch price in beforeInitialize) and quote from that when active liquidity is zero, or quote from the nearest initialized tick, so a one-sided pool is quotable at its launch price while a price parked in an empty region is not trusted. The existing suite never calls postFeeTokens() on a one-sided pool (HookFixture seeds full-range liquidity), which is why this was not caught.","line":214,"path":"src/PaperHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IUnlockCallback} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/callback/IUnlockCallback.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {SwapParams, ModifyLiquidityParams} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\nimport {BalanceDelta, BalanceDeltaLibrary} from \"v4-core/src/types/BalanceDelta.sol\";\nimport {StateLibrary} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/StateLibrary.sol\";\nimport {TickMath} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/TickMath.sol\";\nimport {IERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol\";\nimport {ERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\";\nimport {Paper} from \"src/Paper.sol\";\nimport {PaperHook} from \"src/PaperHook.sol\";\nimport {PaperDeployment} from \"src/PaperDeployment.sol\";\nimport {PaperSwapRouter} from \"src/PaperSwapRouter.sol\";\n\ncontract ScratchImd is ERC20 {\n    constructor() ERC20(\"IMD\", \"IMD\") {}\n}\n\n/// @dev Minimal liquidity helper so the test can seed a one-sided position through the real PoolManager.\ncontract ScratchLp is IUnlockCallback {\n    using BalanceDeltaLibrary for BalanceDelta;\n\n    IPoolManager internal immutable manager;\n\n    constructor(IPoolManager manager_) {\n        manager = manager_;\n    }\n\n    function liquidity(PoolKey memory key, ModifyLiquidityParams memory params) external {\n        manager.unlock(abi.encode(msg.sender, key, params));\n    }\n\n    function unlockCallback(bytes calldata data) external returns (bytes memory) {\n        require(msg.sender == address(manager), \"manager\");\n        (address payer, PoolKey memory key, ModifyLiquidityParams memory params) =\n            abi.decode(data, (address, PoolKey, ModifyLiquidityParams));\n        (BalanceDelta delta,) = manager.modifyLiquidity(key, params, \"\");\n        _settle(key.currency0, delta.amount0(), payer);\n        _settle(key.currency1, delta.amount1(), payer);\n        return \"\";\n    }\n\n    function _settle(Currency currency, int128 delta, address payer) private {\n        if (delta < 0) {\n            manager.sync(currency);\n            IERC20(Currency.unwrap(currency)).transferFrom(payer, address(manager), uint256(-int256(delta)));\n            manager.settle();\n        } else if (delta > 0) {\n            manager.take(currency, payer, uint256(int256(delta)));\n        }\n    }\n}\n\n/// @notice The launch seeds paper only (poolBps 8000, no IMD). A paper-only position lies entirely on one side of\n/// the initial price, so the pool's active liquidity is zero until the first buy moves the price into the range.\n/// postFeeTokens() refuses zero active liquidity, so postDraft() is unusable in exactly the state the launch creates,\n/// although slot0 holds the initial price and buyers can already trade at it.\ncontract LaunchStateQuoteTest is Test {\n    using StateLibrary for IPoolManager;\n\n    address internal constant IMD = 0xD34a99Bc0f67aE1bbd63C660e6d0b0dd03E263B7;\n    address internal constant DEAD = 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000dEaD;\n    uint160 internal constant Q96 = 79228162514264337593543950336;\n\n    Paper internal paper;\n    PoolManager internal manager;\n    PaperDeployment internal deployer;\n    PaperHook internal hook;\n    PoolKey internal key;\n    ScratchLp internal lp;\n    PaperSwapRouter internal router;\n    bool internal paperIs0;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        deployCodeTo(\"Paper.sol:Paper\", address(0x100000));\n        paper = Paper(address(0x100000));\n        vm.etch(IMD, address(new ScratchImd()).code);\n        deal(IMD, address(this), 1e30, true);\n        manager = new PoolManager(address(this));\n        deployer = new PaperDeployment();\n        PaperHook implementation = new PaperHook(manager);\n        PaperDeployment.Config memory config =\n            PaperDeployment.Config(manager, address(paper), address(this), 1 ether, Q96, 3000, 60);\n        bytes32 hash = keccak256(deployer.proxyInitCode(address(implementation), config));\n        (bytes32 salt,) = deployer.mine(address(deployer), hash, 0, 200_000);\n        hook = deployer.deployHook(salt, address(implementation), config);\n        key = hook.poolKey();\n        paperIs0 = Currency.unwrap(key.currency0) == address(paper);\n        lp = new ScratchLp(manager);\n        router = new PaperSwapRouter(hook);\n        paper.approve(address(lp), type(uint256).max);\n        paper.approve(address(hook), type(uint256).max);\n        paper.approve(address(router), type(uint256).max);\n        IERC20(IMD).approve(address(router), type(uint256).max);\n        // Launch state: paper-only liquidity beside the initial price, the same shape as the project's own\n        // test_freshTokenOnlyPoolNeedsPrepaidImdFee. No IMD is deposited.\n        lp.liquidity(\n            key, ModifyLiquidityParams(paperIs0 ? int24(60) : int24(-120), paperIs0 ? int24(120) : int24(-60), 1e24, 0)\n        );\n        assertGt(paper.balanceOf(address(manager)), 0);\n        assertEq(IERC20(IMD).balanceOf(address(manager)), 0);\n        (uint160 sqrtPrice,,,) = IPoolManager(address(manager)).getSlot0(key.toId());\n        assertEq(sqrtPrice, Q96);\n        assertEq(IPoolManager(address(manager)).getLiquidity(key.toId()), 0);\n    }\n\n    /// @dev Fails on the current code: postFeeTokens() reverts PoolUnavailable in the launch state.\n    /// Passes once the quote is taken from slot0 without requiring non-zero active liquidity.\n    function test_postDraftWorksInPaperOnlyLaunchState() public {\n        uint256 quote = hook.postFeeTokens();\n        assertEq(quote, 1 ether, \"1 USD at 1 USD/IMD and raw price 1:1 is 1e18 paper\");\n        assertEq(hook.postDraft(keccak256(\"launch day draft\")), 1);\n        assertEq(paper.balanceOf(DEAD), 1 ether);\n    }\n\n    /// @dev Sanity: the same pool quotes and trades as soon as one buy has moved the price into the range.\n    function test_sanity_quoteWorksAfterFirstBuy() public {\n        uint160 limit = paperIs0 ? TickMath.MAX_SQRT_PRICE - 1 : TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1;\n        router.swap(SwapParams(!paperIs0, -int256(1 ether), limit), 1 ether, 0, address(this), block.timestamp);\n        assertGt(IPoolManager(address(manager)).getLiquidity(key.toId()), 0);\n        assertGt(hook.postFeeTokens(), 0);\n        assertEq(hook.postDraft(keccak256(\"after first buy\")), 1);\n    }\n}","reproduction":"State: fresh PoolManager, PaperHook proxy deployed via PaperDeployment.deployHook with sqrtPriceX96 = 2^96, pool seeded with a paper-only position (ticks [60,120] when paper is currency0, [-120,-60] otherwise), no IMD in the manager, imdUsd = 1e18, postFeeUsd = 1. Call hook.postFeeTokens(). Expected: 1e18 (1 USD worth of paper at raw price 1:1), and hook.postDraft(h) burns 1e18 paper and returns draftId 1. Actual: both revert PaperHook.PoolUnavailable(). After one buy through PaperSwapRouter the same calls succeed. Re-arming: with 9.8 IMD in the pool, an attacker sells 1e23 paper exact-input; pool IMD falls to 29400000000000001 wei, getLiquidity() == 0, postFeeTokens() reverts PoolUnavailable; attacker buys back for its received IMD, losing 441807313586043309 wei paper net.","severity":"medium","snippet":"        if (sqrtPrice == 0 || s.manager.getLiquidity(s.key.toId()) == 0) revert PoolUnavailable();","title":"postFeeTokens() refuses zero active liquidity, so postDraft() is unusable in the paper-only launch state and can be switched off by any trader for cents"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Math Precision: all four fee computations (beforeSwap line 275, afterSwap line 299) use floor division, so fee = 0 whenever the IMD leg is below 50 wei (exact-input/output-IMD legs: amount*200/10000; gross-up legs: amount*200/9800 is 0 for amount <= 48). The guide asks that fees round up; here the leak is bounded by 1 wei per swap and gas makes splitting a trade into 49-wei chunks uneconomic, so impact is dust with no compounding. Reported for completeness because the project's own test (test_dustFeeRoundsDown) documents the behaviour as intended; if the author prefers protocol-favoring rounding, use mulDivRoundingUp and note that an exact-input amount of 1 wei would then be fully consumed by the fee and v4 would revert SwapAmountCannotBeZero.","line":275,"path":"src/PaperHook.sol","reproduction":"Fixture pool (full-range liquidity, 1:1 price). For every a in 1..49: exact-input buy of a wei IMD pays 0 fee to ORDERS and DEV (verified in a loop in test/scratch/FeeEdges.t.sol, test_probe_zeroFeeBelow50). For every a in 1..48: exact-output sell of a wei IMD pays 0 fee. a = 50 pays 1 wei; a = 49 exact-output sell pays 1 wei (49*200/9800 = 1). Expected under round-up: 1 wei each.","severity":"info","snippet":"        uint256 fee = FullMath.mulDiv(amount, TOTAL_BPS, params.amountSpecified < 0 ? BPS : BPS - TOTAL_BPS);","title":"Hook fee floors to zero for IMD legs below 50 wei (fees round down on every path)"}],"hash":"dc7743fecbf5887547ba781467af95480b2788da8c1faf5b08ebd408be0ec816","nodeId":"7e92b1d0-a165-41bb-b64c-938825b19e44","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. `.imd-findings.json` holds two findings and a coverage record for all 28 listed entry points plus two invariants. No tracked file was changed; only `.imd-findings.json` and the ignored `test/scratch/` directory were written.\n\n**Finding 1, medium.** `postFeeTokens()` reverts when the pool's active liquidity is zero (`src/PaperHook.sol:214`). The brief's launch seeds paper only, which in v4 is a one-sided position lying beside the initial price, so active liquidity is zero until the first buy. Posting therefore does not work in exactly the state the launch creates, even though slot0 holds the launch price and buyers can trade. The same guard re-arms later: after buyers deposited 9.8 IMD, a trader who sold paper until the pool held 0.0294 IMD switched posting off again for a net cost of about 0.44 paper, and it stayed off until the next buy. The proof under `test/scratch/LaunchStateQuote.t.sol` fails on the current code with `PoolUnavailable()` and is embedded in the report. The suggested fix keeps the manipulation protection by quoting from the last in-range price recorded in afterSwap, or the launch price, when active liquidity is zero.\n\n**Finding 2, info.** Every fee formula floors, so IMD legs below 50 wei pay no hook fee. Bounded at 1 wei per swap and uneconomic to exploit; reported because the guide asks for round-up fees and a fix needs care at the 1-wei exact-input edge.\n\n**What held.** The 2% fee in all four swap modes, including the 9800 gross-up on output legs, the exact-fill check for IMD-specified swaps, the remainder-to-dev split for every valid share, the signed-amount bounds, both sqrtPrice branches of the quote (round-up direction and no overflow below MAX_SQRT_PRICE), the 6-decimal IMD normalization, and the router's budget and refund arithmetic. Probes in `test/scratch/FeeEdges.t.sol` confirmed fee never exceeds 2% of gross and exact-output nets exactly the requested amount for 1 to 3000 wei.\n\n**Not reached in depth.** The PaperProxy runtime-hash allowlist and upgrade path were only checked for the bounds on the immutable offset read, as they fall outside the math area.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1889883,"inputTokens":482,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":50065,"runtime":"claude","turns":43,"wallClockMs":870332}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"e1f35514ed30e799aeea58e522b65f00474041d11738f12d6e6d8127844eac2e","device":"bc30da9213bc5d7a","findings":[],"hash":"e411ae4ed39585ea606081b0a9751fc784331ecf403d7b313d135101b4ffec82","nodeId":"f2f4a2bd-e3a0-4f71-a610-69f825845739","outcome":"completed","summary":"Implemented immutable launch/V2 upgrade admission and a pre-settlement router for paper-only first buys.\n\n`forge build`, `forge test` (107 passing), and `forge fmt --check` pass. The supplied fee-cap proof also passes.\n\nAll verdicts are in [.imd-responses.json](/home/imd11/.identitymd/work/17d14f70-4f1b-4de2-8289-95465e51b17b/f2f4a2bd-e3a0-4f71-a610-69f825845739/.imd-responses.json). The unchanged first-buy proof and DELEGATECALL admission finding are disputed; their reproduced failures and reasoning are documented.","treeHash":"cfbb05829022e63fa6c3a97ca5061aeea6dc5b93","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1514624,"inputTokens":115672,"model":"gpt-6.1-sol","outputTokens":28177,"runtime":"codex","turns":5,"wallClockMs":777055}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"e2a4a53638df3fc6","findings":[],"hash":"e9f9b9377ac6907dc8ed16f93e0911f3e95c31e8f635fe78b0d22ba4c54567db","nodeId":"e324b58e-fe44-4596-99b6-b4d111aacec1","outcome":"failed","summary":"dependency did not apply: fatal: transport 'file' not allowed\n","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":0,"inputTokens":0,"model":null,"outputTokens":0,"runtime":"claude","turns":0,"wallClockMs":785}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"7eb27d0d8eaee3c2edab3370704ae4e24ba123536ee6d99fcbd6730ab4d79b19","device":"6a7dea7fd5378a40","findings":[{"description":"The proxy accepts arbitrary replacement implementations from its fixed DEV-owned ProxyAdmin. TOTAL_BPS is constant only inside V1/V2; no immutable proxy or manager check constrains replacement return deltas. An authorized replacement can keep the original state and getters (including feeBps() == 200) while charging more. This is a specification conflict with \"nothing can raise it\", not an unauthorized takeover: the proof explicitly acts as the legitimate upgrade owner. The existing README recognizes the trust assumption, but documentation does not enforce the requested permanent cap. Resolve the cap versus unrestricted-upgrade requirements before acceptance.","line":12,"path":"src/PaperProxy.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {Paper} from \"src/Paper.sol\";\nimport {PaperHook} from \"src/PaperHook.sol\";\nimport {PaperDeployment} from \"src/PaperDeployment.sol\";\nimport {ERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\";\nimport {IERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol\";\nimport {ProxyAdmin} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/proxy/transparent/ProxyAdmin.sol\";\nimport {ITransparentUpgradeableProxy} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/proxy/transparent/TransparentUpgradeableProxy.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {IUnlockCallback} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/callback/IUnlockCallback.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {SwapParams, ModifyLiquidityParams} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\nimport {BalanceDelta, BalanceDeltaLibrary} from \"v4-core/src/types/BalanceDelta.sol\";\nimport {BeforeSwapDelta, toBeforeSwapDelta} from \"v4-core/src/types/BeforeSwapDelta.sol\";\n\ncontract ProofImdCap is ERC20 {\n    constructor() ERC20(\"Local IMD\", \"IMD\") {}\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external { _mint(to, amount); }\n}\n\nabstract contract ProofFixtureCap is Test, IUnlockCallback {\n    using BalanceDeltaLibrary for BalanceDelta;\n    address constant IMD = 0xD34a99Bc0f67aE1bbd63C660e6d0b0dd03E263B7;\n    address constant ORDERS = 0x721F8232e19c92516eB753FEF53d8A33a3637989;\n    address constant DEV = 0xb59eac9882Ba98f4170d99D5F402C3EDb6D50D75;\n    uint160 constant Q96 = 79228162514264337593543950336;\n    Paper paper;\n    PaperHook hook;\n    PaperHook logic;\n    PoolManager manager;\n    PoolKey key;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        paper = new Paper();\n        ProofImdCap template = new ProofImdCap();\n        vm.etch(IMD, address(template).code);\n        ProofImdCap(IMD).mint(address(this), 1e30);\n        manager = new PoolManager(address(this));\n        logic = new PaperHook(manager);\n        PaperDeployment deployment = new PaperDeployment();\n        PaperDeployment.Config memory config = PaperDeployment.Config(\n            manager, address(paper), address(this), 1 ether, Q96, 3000, 60\n        );\n        bytes32 codeHash = keccak256(deployment.proxyInitCode(address(logic), config));\n        (bytes32 salt,) = deployment.mine(address(deployment), codeHash, 0, 200_000);\n        hook = deployment.deployHook(salt, address(logic), config);\n        key = hook.poolKey();\n    }\n\n    function seed(int24 lower, int24 upper) internal {\n        manager.unlock(abi.encode(false, lower, upper));\n    }\n\n    function buy() internal {\n        manager.unlock(abi.encode(true, int24(0), int24(0)));\n    }\n\n    function unlockCallback(bytes calldata data) external returns (bytes memory) {\n        require(msg.sender == address(manager));\n        (bool swap, int24 lower, int24 upper) = abi.decode(data, (bool, int24, int24));\n        BalanceDelta delta;\n        if (swap) {\n            bool zeroForOne = Currency.unwrap(key.currency0) == IMD;\n            uint160 limit = zeroForOne ? 4295128740 : 1461446703485210103287273052203988822378723970341;\n            delta = manager.swap(key, SwapParams(zeroForOne, -100 ether, limit), \"\");\n        } else {\n            (delta,) = manager.modifyLiquidity(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(lower, upper, 1e24, 0), \"\");\n        }\n        settle(key.currency0, delta.amount0());\n        settle(key.currency1, delta.amount1());\n        return \"\";\n    }\n\n    function settle(Currency currency, int128 delta) private {\n        if (delta < 0) {\n            manager.sync(currency);\n            require(IERC20(Currency.unwrap(currency)).transfer(address(manager), uint256(-int256(delta))));\n            manager.settle();\n        } else if (delta > 0) {\n            manager.take(currency, address(this), uint256(int256(delta)));\n        }\n    }\n}\n\n// Test-only replacement. Its fallback preserves existing application state/getters.\n// Only the IMD exact-input buy callback changes, from 2% to 10%.\ncontract TenPercentReplacement {\n    address private immutable original;\n    IPoolManager private immutable manager;\n    address constant IMD = 0xD34a99Bc0f67aE1bbd63C660e6d0b0dd03E263B7;\n    address constant ORDERS = 0x721F8232e19c92516eB753FEF53d8A33a3637989;\n    address constant DEV = 0xb59eac9882Ba98f4170d99D5F402C3EDb6D50D75;\n    constructor(address original_, IPoolManager manager_) { original = original_; manager = manager_; }\n    function beforeSwap(address, PoolKey calldata key, SwapParams calldata p, bytes calldata)\n        external returns (bytes4, BeforeSwapDelta, uint24)\n    {\n        require(msg.sender == address(manager));\n        require(p.amountSpecified < 0 && p.zeroForOne == (Currency.unwrap(key.currency0) == IMD));\n        uint256 fee = uint256(-p.amountSpecified) / 10;\n        manager.take(Currency.wrap(IMD), ORDERS, fee / 4);\n        manager.take(Currency.wrap(IMD), DEV, fee - fee / 4);\n        return (IHooks.beforeSwap.selector, toBeforeSwapDelta(int128(int256(fee)), 0), 0);\n    }\n    function afterSwap(address, PoolKey calldata, SwapParams calldata, BalanceDelta, bytes calldata)\n        external view returns (bytes4, int128)\n    {\n        require(msg.sender == address(manager));\n        return (IHooks.afterSwap.selector, 0);\n    }\n    fallback() external {\n        address target = original;\n        assembly {\n            calldatacopy(0, 0, calldatasize())\n            let success := delegatecall(gas(), target, 0, calldatasize(), 0, 0)\n            returndatacopy(0, 0, returndatasize())\n            if iszero(success) { revert(0, returndatasize()) }\n            return(0, returndatasize())\n        }\n    }\n}\n\ncontract ImmutableFeeProof is ProofFixtureCap {\n    function test_upgradeCannotRaiseTheTwoPercentFee() public {\n        seed(-887220, 887220);\n        TenPercentReplacement replacement = new TenPercentReplacement(address(logic), manager);\n        bytes32 adminSlot = 0xb53127684a568b3173ae13b9f8a6016e243e63b6e8ee1178d6a717850b5d6103;\n        ProxyAdmin admin = ProxyAdmin(address(uint160(uint256(vm.load(address(hook), adminSlot)))));\n        assertEq(admin.owner(), DEV);\n        vm.prank(DEV);\n        // A fix may reject an incompatible replacement; otherwise the cap must still hold.\n        (bool upgraded,) = address(admin).call(abi.encodeCall(\n            ProxyAdmin.upgradeAndCall, (ITransparentUpgradeableProxy(address(hook)), address(replacement), bytes(\"\"))\n        ));\n        upgraded;\n        uint256 paperBefore = paper.balanceOf(address(this));\n        buy();\n        assertGt(paper.balanceOf(address(this)), paperBefore, \"a real swap must execute\");\n        uint256 paid = IERC20(IMD).balanceOf(ORDERS) + IERC20(IMD).balanceOf(DEV);\n        assertEq(paid, 2 ether, \"100 IMD buy must never pay more than the constant 2% fee\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Save proof as test/scratch/ImmutableFeeProof.t.sol and run forge test --match-path test/scratch/ImmutableFeeProof.t.sol -vv. The self-contained test deploys a real PoolManager, mines/initializes a real PaperProxy, seeds full-range liquidity, and uses the fixed DEV owner to install a replacement charging 10% on IMD exact-input buys. A 100e18 IMD buy executes and receives paper. Expected aggregate orders/dev payout: 2e18 IMD. Actual: 10e18 IMD. Locally observed failure: \"100 IMD buy must never pay more than the constant 2% fee: 10000000000000000000 != 2000000000000000000\". The assertion also passes if a fix rejects the incompatible upgrade and leaves the original 2% behavior active.","severity":"high","title":"Transparent upgrades bypass the supposedly permanent 2% fee cap"},{"description":"For an IMD exact-input buy, beforeSwap calls _pay before the router settles input. On a fresh manager seeded only with paper, the manager has zero physical IMD, so _pay rejects a valid funded trader with InsufficientFeeBacking. This is an availability limitation, not a demonstrated theft. It is already documented but remains unresolved for token-only launch liquidity and ordinary settle-after-swap routers. The prior test expecting this revert does not establish the requested first-buy behavior. Reviewed launch funding or pre-settlement integration must enforce adequate backing; an accumulated-claim workaround would conflict with the requested same-swap wallet payouts.","line":314,"path":"src/PaperHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {Paper} from \"src/Paper.sol\";\nimport {PaperHook} from \"src/PaperHook.sol\";\nimport {PaperDeployment} from \"src/PaperDeployment.sol\";\nimport {ERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\";\nimport {IERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol\";\nimport {ProxyAdmin} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/proxy/transparent/ProxyAdmin.sol\";\nimport {ITransparentUpgradeableProxy} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/proxy/transparent/TransparentUpgradeableProxy.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {IUnlockCallback} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/callback/IUnlockCallback.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {SwapParams, ModifyLiquidityParams} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\nimport {BalanceDelta, BalanceDeltaLibrary} from \"v4-core/src/types/BalanceDelta.sol\";\nimport {BeforeSwapDelta, toBeforeSwapDelta} from \"v4-core/src/types/BeforeSwapDelta.sol\";\n\ncontract ProofImdFirstBuy is ERC20 {\n    constructor() ERC20(\"Local IMD\", \"IMD\") {}\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external { _mint(to, amount); }\n}\n\nabstract contract ProofFixtureFirstBuy is Test, IUnlockCallback {\n    using BalanceDeltaLibrary for BalanceDelta;\n    address constant IMD = 0xD34a99Bc0f67aE1bbd63C660e6d0b0dd03E263B7;\n    address constant ORDERS = 0x721F8232e19c92516eB753FEF53d8A33a3637989;\n    address constant DEV = 0xb59eac9882Ba98f4170d99D5F402C3EDb6D50D75;\n    uint160 constant Q96 = 79228162514264337593543950336;\n    Paper paper;\n    PaperHook hook;\n    PaperHook logic;\n    PoolManager manager;\n    PoolKey key;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        paper = new Paper();\n        ProofImdFirstBuy template = new ProofImdFirstBuy();\n        vm.etch(IMD, address(template).code);\n        ProofImdFirstBuy(IMD).mint(address(this), 1e30);\n        manager = new PoolManager(address(this));\n        logic = new PaperHook(manager);\n        PaperDeployment deployment = new PaperDeployment();\n        PaperDeployment.Config memory config = PaperDeployment.Config(\n            manager, address(paper), address(this), 1 ether, Q96, 3000, 60\n        );\n        bytes32 codeHash = keccak256(deployment.proxyInitCode(address(logic), config));\n        (bytes32 salt,) = deployment.mine(address(deployment), codeHash, 0, 200_000);\n        hook = deployment.deployHook(salt, address(logic), config);\n        key = hook.poolKey();\n    }\n\n    function seed(int24 lower, int24 upper) internal {\n        manager.unlock(abi.encode(false, lower, upper));\n    }\n\n    function buy() internal {\n        manager.unlock(abi.encode(true, int24(0), int24(0)));\n    }\n\n    function unlockCallback(bytes calldata data) external returns (bytes memory) {\n        require(msg.sender == address(manager));\n        (bool swap, int24 lower, int24 upper) = abi.decode(data, (bool, int24, int24));\n        BalanceDelta delta;\n        if (swap) {\n            bool zeroForOne = Currency.unwrap(key.currency0) == IMD;\n            uint160 limit = zeroForOne ? 4295128740 : 1461446703485210103287273052203988822378723970341;\n            delta = manager.swap(key, SwapParams(zeroForOne, -100 ether, limit), \"\");\n        } else {\n            (delta,) = manager.modifyLiquidity(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(lower, upper, 1e24, 0), \"\");\n        }\n        settle(key.currency0, delta.amount0());\n        settle(key.currency1, delta.amount1());\n        return \"\";\n    }\n\n    function settle(Currency currency, int128 delta) private {\n        if (delta < 0) {\n            manager.sync(currency);\n            require(IERC20(Currency.unwrap(currency)).transfer(address(manager), uint256(-int256(delta))));\n            manager.settle();\n        } else if (delta > 0) {\n            manager.take(currency, address(this), uint256(int256(delta)));\n        }\n    }\n}\n\ncontract FirstBuyProof is ProofFixtureFirstBuy {\n    function test_firstBuyCanPayFeesInSameSwapWithoutExternalBacking() public {\n        bool paperIs0 = Currency.unwrap(key.currency0) == address(paper);\n        seed(paperIs0 ? int24(60) : int24(-120), paperIs0 ? int24(120) : int24(-60));\n        assertGt(paper.balanceOf(address(manager)), 0);\n        assertEq(IERC20(IMD).balanceOf(address(manager)), 0);\n        uint256 paperBefore = paper.balanceOf(address(this));\n        buy();\n        assertGt(paper.balanceOf(address(this)), paperBefore);\n        assertEq(IERC20(IMD).balanceOf(ORDERS), 0.5 ether);\n        assertEq(IERC20(IMD).balanceOf(DEV), 1.5 ether);\n        assertEq(IERC20(IMD).balanceOf(address(hook)), 0);\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Save proof as test/scratch/FirstBuyProof.t.sol and run forge test --match-path test/scratch/FirstBuyProof.t.sol -vv. At sqrtPriceX96=2^96, seed 1e24 liquidity into ticks [60,120] when paper is currency0 or [-120,-60] when paper is currency1; the manager then holds paper and zero IMD. The trader owns 1e30 IMD and the unlock callback settles all debts. Buy paper with 100e18 IMD exact input and a wide valid price limit. Expected: paper received, 0.5e18 IMD to orders and 1.5e18 to dev in this swap. Actual: beforeSwap reverts with WrappedError(..., 0x575e24b4, 0xe4c4588d, 0xa9e35b2f); 0xe4c4588d is InsufficientFeeBacking(). The self-contained proof was run and failed at this call.","severity":"medium","title":"A freshly seeded paper-only pool cannot execute its first fee-bearing buy"},{"description":"The pinned Hook.protected.t.sol test_runtimeCodeHasNoEscapeHatch prohibits every executable DELEGATECALL. PaperProxy necessarily uses DELEGATECALL to implement the expressly requested transparent upgrades. This is an admission-policy/specification conflict; removing legitimate delegatecall behavior from a passing test would hide it. The supplied admission check or the proxy requirement needs an explicit policy resolution. The local default suite does not execute the removed, environment-driven protected checks.","line":8,"path":"src/PaperProxy.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {Paper} from \"src/Paper.sol\";\nimport {PaperHook} from \"src/PaperHook.sol\";\nimport {PaperDeployment} from \"src/PaperDeployment.sol\";\nimport {ERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\";\nimport {IERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol\";\nimport {ProxyAdmin} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/proxy/transparent/ProxyAdmin.sol\";\nimport {ITransparentUpgradeableProxy} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/proxy/transparent/TransparentUpgradeableProxy.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {IUnlockCallback} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/callback/IUnlockCallback.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {SwapParams, ModifyLiquidityParams} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\nimport {BalanceDelta, BalanceDeltaLibrary} from \"v4-core/src/types/BalanceDelta.sol\";\nimport {BeforeSwapDelta, toBeforeSwapDelta} from \"v4-core/src/types/BeforeSwapDelta.sol\";\n\ncontract ProofImdAdmission is ERC20 {\n    constructor() ERC20(\"Local IMD\", \"IMD\") {}\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external { _mint(to, amount); }\n}\n\nabstract contract ProofFixtureAdmission is Test, IUnlockCallback {\n    using BalanceDeltaLibrary for BalanceDelta;\n    address constant IMD = 0xD34a99Bc0f67aE1bbd63C660e6d0b0dd03E263B7;\n    address constant ORDERS = 0x721F8232e19c92516eB753FEF53d8A33a3637989;\n    address constant DEV = 0xb59eac9882Ba98f4170d99D5F402C3EDb6D50D75;\n    uint160 constant Q96 = 79228162514264337593543950336;\n    Paper paper;\n    PaperHook hook;\n    PaperHook logic;\n    PoolManager manager;\n    PoolKey key;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        paper = new Paper();\n        ProofImdAdmission template = new ProofImdAdmission();\n        vm.etch(IMD, address(template).code);\n        ProofImdAdmission(IMD).mint(address(this), 1e30);\n        manager = new PoolManager(address(this));\n        logic = new PaperHook(manager);\n        PaperDeployment deployment = new PaperDeployment();\n        PaperDeployment.Config memory config = PaperDeployment.Config(\n            manager, address(paper), address(this), 1 ether, Q96, 3000, 60\n        );\n        bytes32 codeHash = keccak256(deployment.proxyInitCode(address(logic), config));\n        (bytes32 salt,) = deployment.mine(address(deployment), codeHash, 0, 200_000);\n        hook = deployment.deployHook(salt, address(logic), config);\n        key = hook.poolKey();\n    }\n\n    function seed(int24 lower, int24 upper) internal {\n        manager.unlock(abi.encode(false, lower, upper));\n    }\n\n    function buy() internal {\n        manager.unlock(abi.encode(true, int24(0), int24(0)));\n    }\n\n    function unlockCallback(bytes calldata data) external returns (bytes memory) {\n        require(msg.sender == address(manager));\n        (bool swap, int24 lower, int24 upper) = abi.decode(data, (bool, int24, int24));\n        BalanceDelta delta;\n        if (swap) {\n            bool zeroForOne = Currency.unwrap(key.currency0) == IMD;\n            uint160 limit = zeroForOne ? 4295128740 : 1461446703485210103287273052203988822378723970341;\n            delta = manager.swap(key, SwapParams(zeroForOne, -100 ether, limit), \"\");\n        } else {\n            (delta,) = manager.modifyLiquidity(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(lower, upper, 1e24, 0), \"\");\n        }\n        settle(key.currency0, delta.amount0());\n        settle(key.currency1, delta.amount1());\n        return \"\";\n    }\n\n    function settle(Currency currency, int128 delta) private {\n        if (delta < 0) {\n            manager.sync(currency);\n            require(IERC20(Currency.unwrap(currency)).transfer(address(manager), uint256(-int256(delta))));\n            manager.settle();\n        } else if (delta > 0) {\n            manager.take(currency, address(this), uint256(int256(delta)));\n        }\n    }\n}\n\ncontract AdmissionProof is ProofFixtureAdmission {\n    function test_requestedProxyPassesPinnedRuntimeScanner() public view {\n        bytes memory code = address(hook).code;\n        assertGt(code.length, 0);\n        assertLe(code.length, 24_576);\n        for (uint256 i; i < code.length; ++i) {\n            uint8 op = uint8(code[i]);\n            if (op >= 0x60 && op <= 0x7f) {\n                i += op - 0x60 + 1;\n                continue;\n            }\n            assertTrue(op != 0xff, \"runtime code contains SELFDESTRUCT\");\n            assertTrue(op != 0xf4, \"runtime code contains DELEGATECALL\");\n            assertTrue(op != 0xf2, \"runtime code contains CALLCODE\");\n        }\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Save proof as test/scratch/AdmissionProof.t.sol and run forge test --match-path test/scratch/AdmissionProof.t.sol -vv. The proof deploys the actual mined initialized proxy and applies the pinned PUSH-aware runtime scanner. Expected under the pinned admission rule: no forbidden opcode. Actual observed assertion failure: \"runtime code contains DELEGATECALL\". This proof records the policy conflict; it is not a claim that a legitimate transparent proxy should avoid delegation.","severity":"info","title":"Pinned immutable-runtime admission check conflicts with the required transparent proxy"}],"hash":"edeefbf0da13ab7f056c5833890ee89c40773617242206e2ea07d1e7b59c48ee","nodeId":"9bda0ce5-ee03-45e3-9b6b-772d8a7989dc","outcome":"completed","summary":"Added 30 tests covering failure rollback, voting, upgrades, and randomized accounting.\n\n`forge build` succeeds. `forge test`: **110 passed, zero failures or skips**.\n\nReported three reproduced findings with executable proofs in [.imd-findings.json](/home/imd/.identitymd-5/work/17d14f70-4f1b-4de2-8289-95465e51b17b/9bda0ce5-ee03-45e3-9b6b-772d8a7989dc/.imd-findings.json):\n\n- **High:** authorized upgrades bypass the 2% fee cap.\n- **Medium:** paper-only pools cannot fund the first buy’s fee.\n- **Info:** the required proxy conflicts with the pinned admission scanner.\n\nMainnet fork testing remains outstanding.","treeHash":"afc330874dc88f6d82ac91bc6de38190ae097de5","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1351424,"inputTokens":96734,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":22487,"runtime":"codex","turns":6,"wallClockMs":635629}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":9069,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 116 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 8.90s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[missing-zero-check]: address parameter is used in a state write or value transfer without a zero-address check\n   ╭▸ src/PaperProxy.sol:25:17\n   │\n25 │     constructor(address implementation, bytes memory initialization)\n   │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-zero-check\n\nwarning[missing-events-access-control]: `callbackHash` is changed without an event but is used for access control\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:69:9\n   │\n69 │         callbackHash = bytes32(0);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-events-access-control\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperProxy.sol:32:20\n   │\n32 │                 && bytes4(initialization) == bytes4(keccak256(\"initialize(address,address,uint256)\")),\n   │                    ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'bytes4' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperProxy.sol:32:46\n   │\n32 │                 && bytes4(initialization) == bytes4(keccak256(\"initialize(address,address,uint256)\")),\n   │                                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'bytes4' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:40:9\n   │\n40 │         emit TokenAllocated(address(token), msg.sender, poolAmount, remainder);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:61:28\n   │\n61 │         delta = abi.decode(manager.unlock(data), (BalanceDelta));\n   │                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[encode-packed-collision]: `abi.encodePacked()` called with multiple dynamic type arguments; hash collisions possible\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:46:16\n   │\n46 │         return abi.encodePacked(type(PaperProxy).creationCode, abi.encode(implementation, initialization));\n   │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/encode-packed-collision\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:47:13\n   │\n47 │         if (block.timestamp > deadline) revert Expired();\n   │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:49:41\n   │\n49 │             maxInput == 0 || maxInput > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max)) || params.amountSpecified == 0\n   │                                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:49:49\n   │\n49 │             maxInput == 0 || maxInput > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max)) || params.amountSpecified == 0\n   │                                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[incorrect-strict-equality]: dangerous strict equality check on an externally-influenced value\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:57:13\n   │\n57 │         if (input.balanceOf(address(this)) - beforeBalance != maxInput) revert InexactTransfer();\n   │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/incorrect-strict-equality\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:83:9\n   │\n83 │         emit HookDeployed(address(hook), implementation, salt);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:82:9\n   │\n82 │         config.manager.initialize(key, config.sqrtPriceX96);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:123:9\n    │\n123 │         emit OwnershipTransferred(address(0), owner_);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:124:9\n    │\n124 │         emit SplitChanged(ORDERS, s.ordersBps, DEV, s.devBps);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:125:9\n    │\n125 │         emit PostFeeUsdChanged(1);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:126:9\n    │\n126 │         emit ImdUsdChanged(usdWad);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:82:25\n   │\n82 │         uint256 spent = uint256(-int256(inputDelta));\n   │                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:83:28\n   │\n83 │         uint256 received = uint256(int256(outputDelta));\n   │                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:86:63\n   │\n86 │                 || (params.amountSpecified > 0 && received != uint256(params.amountSpecified))\n   │                                                               ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:174:69\n    │\n174 │     function transferOwnership(address newOwner) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {\n    │                                                                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:177:9\n    │\n177 │         emit OwnershipTransferred(s.owner, newOwner);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:184:9\n    │\n184 │         nonReentrant\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:197:9\n    │\n197 │         emit SplitChanged(ordersWallet, ordersBps, devWallet, devBps);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:201:60\n    │\n201 │     function setPostFeeUsd(uint256 usd) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {\n    │                                                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:203:9\n    │\n203 │         emit PostFeeUsdChanged(usd);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:206:59\n    │\n206 │     function setImdUsd(uint256 usdWad) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {\n    │                                                           ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:209:9\n    │\n209 │         emit ImdUsdChanged(usdWad);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:252:9\n    │\n252 │         emit DraftPosted(draftId, msg.sender, textHash, amount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:258:9\n    │\n258 │         emit Burned(draftId, msg.sender, amount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[incorrect-strict-equality]: dangerous strict equality check on an externally-influenced value\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:265:13\n    │\n265 │         if (paper.balanceOf(DEAD) - beforeBalance != amount) revert InexactTransfer();\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/incorrect-strict-equality\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:284:9\n    │\n284 │         emit PoolBound(key.toId(), s.token);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:291:9\n    │\n291 │         nonReentrant\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:346:9\n    │\n346 │         emit FeesPaid(fee, ordersAmount, devAmount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:305:9\n    │\n305 │         nonReentrant\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:351:26\n    │\n351 │         uint256 amount = uint256(value < 0 ? -value : value);\n    │                          ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:352:22\n    │\n352 │         if (amount > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                      ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:352:30\n    │\n352 │         if (amount > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:357:21\n    │\n357 │         if (value > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:357:29\n    │\n357 │         if (value > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:358:16\n    │\n358 │         return int128(int256(value));\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:358:23\n    │\n358 │         return int128(int256(value));\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":5870,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 4 tests for test/Paper.t.sol:PaperTest\n[PASS] test_allowanceAndBalanceFailures() (gas: 162803)\n[PASS] test_deploymentAllocatesEightyPercentAndRemainder() (gas: 555001)\n[PASS] test_metadataSupplyAndTransfer() (gas: 118951)\n[PASS] test_noMintOrAdminEvenForDeployer() (gas: 53689)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.49ms (2.43ms CPU time)\n\nRan 7 tests for test/VotingProperties.t.sol:VotingPropertiesReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_quoteIsSmallestSufficientWholeTokenAmount(uint64,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 128266, ~: 128218)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 3295\n  Bound result 5991\n\n[PASS] test_eventsAttributeEveryVoteExactlyOnceAcrossAuthorsAndRepeatedHashes() (gas: 675580)\n[PASS] test_exactApprovalProtectsPostWhenPoolPriceChanges() (gas: 669672)\n[PASS] test_existingDraftRemainsVotableWhenLiquidityIsRemoved() (gas: 521593)\n[PASS] test_freshV2ReversedDefaultsActuallyPayBothDirections() (gas: 3773034)\n[PASS] test_maximumBurnFailsWithoutChangingExistingDraft() (gas: 289453)\n[PASS] test_transferringHookOwnershipDoesNotTransferUpgradeAuthority() (gas: 542610)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 77.33ms (99.87ms CPU time)\n\nRan 20 tests for test/Router.t.sol:RouterTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allModesConserveFunds(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 478638, ~: 478451)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 83754100165473885481\n\n[PASS] test_attackerCannotSpendAnotherAccountsApproval() (gas: 229978)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 468602)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutputRefundsUnusedBudget() (gas: 474309)\n[PASS] test_callbackRequiresManagerAndActiveRequest() (gas: 185600)\n[PASS] test_excessiveMinOutputRollsBackPrepaymentAndFees() (gas: 501076)\n[PASS] test_expiredDeadlineDoesNotPullFunds() (gas: 186836)\n[PASS] test_firstBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolPaysBothWalletsWithoutBacking() (gas: 15178790)\n[PASS] test_firstExactOutputBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolRefundsBudget() (gas: 15171780)\n[PASS] test_inputTokenCannotReenterSwap() (gas: 1634314)\n[PASS] test_insufficientExactOutputBudgetRollsBack() (gas: 450357)\n[PASS] test_partialExactOutputRollsBackEvenWithLowMinimum() (gas: 460437)\n[PASS] test_refusedOutputRollsBackAlreadyPaidRefundAndAllowsRetry() (gas: 1919566)\n[PASS] test_refusedRefundRollsBackSwapAndAllowsRetry() (gas: 1905591)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 474104)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutputRefundsUnusedBudget() (gas: 480124)\n[PASS] test_shortInputTransferRollsBack() (gas: 1131285)\n[PASS] test_shortManagerSettlementRollsBackSuccessfulInitialPull() (gas: 1749997)\n[PASS] test_unrelatedRouterDepositsAreNotRefundedToTrader() (gas: 523976)\n[PASS] test_zeroRecipientRefused() (gas: 169136)\nSuite result: ok. 20 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 181.34ms (113.94ms CPU time)\n\nRan 7 tests for test/VotingProperties.t.sol:VotingPropertiesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_quoteIsSmallestSufficientWholeTokenAmount(uint64,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 128264, ~: 128207)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 148558450216296802184991\n\n[PASS] test_eventsAttributeEveryVoteExactlyOnceAcrossAuthorsAndRepeatedHashes() (gas: 675558)\n[PASS] test_exactApprovalProtectsPostWhenPoolPriceChanges() (gas: 675728)\n[PASS] test_existingDraftRemainsVotableWhenLiquidityIsRemoved() (gas: 521343)\n[PASS] test_freshV2ReversedDefaultsActuallyPayBothDirections() (gas: 45988438)\n[PASS] test_maximumBurnFailsWithoutChangingExistingDraft() (gas: 289442)\n[PASS] test_transferringHookOwnershipDoesNotTransferUpgradeAuthority() (gas: 536080)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 218.89ms (152.83ms CPU time)\n\nRan 14 tests for test/Voting.t.sol:VotingTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_burnConservesTokens(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 308526, ~: 308495)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 9962\n\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceAndBurnAllowance() (gas: 353098)\n[PASS] test_largeSqrtPriceDoesNotOverflow() (gas: 47238843)\n[PASS] test_nonexistentDraftCannotBurn() (gas: 238878)\n[PASS] test_postAllowanceFailureRollsBackId() (gas: 327872)\n[PASS] test_postBurnsAndEmitsAuthorsVotes() (gas: 252950)\n[PASS] test_priceAndUsdSettingsChangeQuote() (gas: 391532)\n[PASS] test_quoteReadsPoolPriceBothCurrencyOrders() (gas: 47742825)\n[PASS] test_quoteUsesLaunchPriceBeforeSeeding() (gas: 47114677)\n[PASS] test_quotesAndPostsRefuseUnlockedPool() (gas: 701502)\n[PASS] test_repeatBurnAnyExistingDraftAndZeroAmount() (gas: 568553)\n[PASS] test_roundingUpPreventsFreeDustPost() (gas: 164661)\n[PASS] test_settingsOwnerOnlyAndOwnershipTransfer() (gas: 247363)\n[PASS] test_sixDecimalImdNormalization() (gas: 47756894)\nSuite result: ok. 14 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 229.29ms (311.36ms CPU time)\n\nRan 11 tests for test/Adversarial.t.sol:AdversarialTest\n[PASS] test_allAllowedLpFeesInitialize() (gas: 131728963)\n[PASS] test_badFeeDeploymentRollsBackProxyAndPool() (gas: 76390372)\n[PASS] test_everyCallbackRefusesNonManager() (gas: 358806)\n[PASS] test_feePaymentBlocksTokenReentrancy() (gas: 1351853)\n[PASS] test_liquidityAndDonationNoOpsDoNotChargeFees() (gas: 447423)\n[PASS] test_minedDeploymentCannotBeFrontRunByChangingPrice() (gas: 39656)\n[PASS] test_minerHashIncludesProxyInitialization() (gas: 41758)\n[PASS] test_permissionsDeclareAllFourteenBits() (gas: 17758)\n[PASS] test_postAndBurnBlockTokenReentrancy() (gas: 1326815)\n[PASS] test_shortTransferAndFalseReturnCannotCreateVotes() (gas: 1232931)\n[PASS] test_wrongPoolRejectedAndNoRebinding() (gas: 85859)\nSuite result: ok. 11 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 249.70ms (197.88ms CPU time)\n\nRan 15 tests for test/Fees.t.sol:FeesReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allSwapModes(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 429063, ~: 426964)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 69402976912036506109\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_splitConservation(uint8,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 402867, ~: 409738)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 46\n  Bound result 4100096\n\n[PASS] test_badAmountAndZeroSwap() (gas: 103304)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 428566)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput() (gas: 427147)\n[PASS] test_dustFeeRoundsDown() (gas: 279006)\n[PASS] test_freshTokenOnlyPoolNeedsPrepaidImdFee() (gas: 14644431)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBackingRevertsAtomically() (gas: 415255)\n[PASS] test_partialImdSpecifiedRevertsAndRollsBackFee() (gas: 350911)\n[PASS] test_partialPaperSpecifiedChargesActualImd() (gas: 343031)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 421794)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput() (gas: 422602)\n[PASS] test_splitChangePayments() (gas: 441393)\n[PASS] test_splitInvalidAndUnauthorized() (gas: 238457)\n[PASS] test_zeroSplitAndSameRecipient() (gas: 644303)\nSuite result: ok. 15 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 282.07ms (270.39ms CPU time)\n\nRan 15 tests for test/Fees.t.sol:FeesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allSwapModes(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 429063, ~: 430736)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 83754100165473885481\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_splitConservation(uint8,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 395683, ~: 402901)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 88\n  Bound result 86100122160731798697\n\n[PASS] test_badAmountAndZeroSwap() (gas: 103038)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 422036)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput() (gas: 421901)\n[PASS] test_dustFeeRoundsDown() (gas: 272159)\n[PASS] test_freshTokenOnlyPoolNeedsPrepaidImdFee() (gas: 21462272)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBackingRevertsAtomically() (gas: 415217)\n[PASS] test_partialImdSpecifiedRevertsAndRollsBackFee() (gas: 344662)\n[PASS] test_partialPaperSpecifiedChargesActualImd() (gas: 348840)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 427881)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput() (gas: 427405)\n[PASS] test_splitChangePayments() (gas: 434863)\n[PASS] test_splitInvalidAndUnauthorized() (gas: 238457)\n[PASS] test_zeroSplitAndSameRecipient() (gas: 637275)\nSuite result: ok. 15 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 284.39ms (284.43ms CPU time)\n\nRan 18 tests for test/VotingProtection.t.sol:VotingProtectionTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_capBoundaryAfterTrading(bool,bool,uint96,uint8) (runs: 1000, μ: 623318, ~: 587450)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 2125244889856045\n\n[PASS] test_adminPriceChangeCannotExceedCallerCap() (gas: 206148)\n[PASS] test_bothPostingOverloadsAndBurnShareReentrancyGuard() (gas: 1666269)\n[PASS] test_capAtQuoteSucceedsAndEmitsActualVotes() (gas: 234786)\n[PASS] test_capCannotReplaceAllowanceAndFailureDoesNotConsumeDraftId() (gas: 398437)\n[PASS] test_cappedPostCannotReadFallbackDuringUnlockEvenWhenFree() (gas: 21886220)\n[PASS] test_cappedPostRejectsReentrantPost() (gas: 1190942)\n[PASS] test_cappedPostTransferFailuresRollBackAndAllowRetry() (gas: 1605429)\n[PASS] test_displacementCannotOverburnCappedPostWithUnlimitedAllowance() (gas: 22351682)\n[PASS] test_emptyRangeSwapCannotOverwriteLaunchQuote() (gas: 21747517)\n[PASS] test_failedSwapCannotOverwriteFallbackPrice() (gas: 1038777)\n[PASS] test_fallbackRepricesUsdAndEnforcesCapAfterEmptyRangeMovement() (gas: 21872563)\n[PASS] test_largerCapBurnsOnlyExecutionQuote() (gas: 157063)\n[PASS] test_paperOnlyLaunchSupportsQuoteAndPost() (gas: 21366512)\n[PASS] test_quoteReturnsToLivePriceWhenLiquidityResumes() (gas: 1231337)\n[PASS] test_removingAllLiquidityKeepsLastActiveQuote() (gas: 714605)\n[PASS] test_roundTripCannotDisablePostingOrOverwriteLastActiveQuote() (gas: 22570759)\n[PASS] test_zeroCapAllowsOnlyFreePost() (gas: 238053)\nSuite result: ok. 18 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 283.78ms (378.72ms CPU time)\n\nRan 14 tests for test/Voting.t.sol:VotingReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_burnConservesTokens(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 308518, ~: 308512)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 8\n\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceAndBurnAllowance() (gas: 353120)\n[PASS] test_largeSqrtPriceDoesNotOverflow() (gas: 50122799)\n[PASS] test_nonexistentDraftCannotBurn() (gas: 238889)\n[PASS] test_postAllowanceFailureRollsBackId() (gas: 327894)\n[PASS] test_postBurnsAndEmitsAuthorsVotes() (gas: 252972)\n[PASS] test_priceAndUsdSettingsChangeQuote() (gas: 391576)\n[PASS] test_quoteReadsPoolPriceBothCurrencyOrders() (gas: 50633164)\n[PASS] test_quoteUsesLaunchPriceBeforeSeeding() (gas: 49998226)\n[PASS] test_quotesAndPostsRefuseUnlockedPool() (gas: 701502)\n[PASS] test_repeatBurnAnyExistingDraftAndZeroAmount() (gas: 568575)\n[PASS] test_roundingUpPreventsFreeDustPost() (gas: 164683)\n[PASS] test_settingsOwnerOnlyAndOwnershipTransfer() (gas: 247363)\n[PASS] test_sixDecimalImdNormalization() (gas: 50640660)\nSuite result: ok. 14 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 284.49ms (518.46ms CPU time)\n\nRan 7 tests for test/FailureAtomicity.t.sol:FailureAtomicityTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_failedSettlementRollsBackEverySwapMode(bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 969205, ~: 968405)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 24034653120984554288\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_invalidSplitNeverMutatesState(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 135991, ~: 135978)\n[PASS] test_everyBoundCallbackRejectsAnotherPoolFromTheRealManager() (gas: 667174)\n[PASS] test_failedBurnCannotConsumeAllowanceOrCreateVotesAndRecovers() (gas: 1510589)\n[PASS] test_falseReturnSettlementRestoresTokenCallbackState() (gas: 1549993)\n[PASS] test_invalidRecipientInEitherPositionEvenWithZeroShare() (gas: 490663)\n[PASS] test_oversizedAmountsFailBeforeAnyPayment() (gas: 811797)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 284.76ms (185.56ms CPU time)\n\nRan 14 tests for test/Upgrade.t.sol:UpgradeTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_runtimeWhitelistRejectsChangesBeforeDelegation(uint16,uint8,bool) (runs: 1000, μ: 85672, ~: 85495)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 4108\n  Bound result 50\n\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsCounterfeitBeforeInitialization() (gas: 152803)\n[PASS] test_hookOwnerAndStrangerCannotUpgrade() (gas: 94511)\n[PASS] test_initializersCannotBeUsedAgainOrOnImplementations() (gas: 127709)\n[PASS] test_managerNormalizationRejectsDirtyAddressPadding() (gas: 59653)\n[PASS] test_proxyAdminCannotCallHookFunctions() (gas: 6947)\n[PASS] test_proxyFlagsAndAdminOwnerAreFixed() (gas: 59280)\n[PASS] test_upgradeKeepsAllStateAndTradingVotingWork() (gas: 1269202)\n[PASS] test_upgradeKeepsFallbackPriceAndCappedPosting() (gas: 865234)\n[PASS] test_upgradeRejectsCanonicalImplementationForAnotherManager() (gas: 4432431)\n[PASS] test_upgradeRejectsCounterfeitFeeGetterBeforeInitialization() (gas: 450729)\n[PASS] test_upgradeRejectsModifiedCanonicalRuntime() (gas: 59055)\n[PASS] test_v2ReversesDefaultsOnlyForFreshProxy() (gas: 45136814)\n[PASS] test_whitelistRejectsAppendedRuntimeEvenWhenBehaviorIsUnchanged() (gas: 66363)\nSuite result: ok. 14 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 284.51ms (291.70ms CPU time)\n\nRan 18 tests for test/VotingProtection.t.sol:VotingProtectionReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_capBoundaryAfterTrading(bool,bool,uint96,uint8) (runs: 1000, μ: 623151, ~: 587231)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 2125244889856045\n\n[PASS] test_adminPriceChangeCannotExceedCallerCap() (gas: 206170)\n[PASS] test_bothPostingOverloadsAndBurnShareReentrancyGuard() (gas: 1666302)\n[PASS] test_capAtQuoteSucceedsAndEmitsActualVotes() (gas: 234797)\n[PASS] test_capCannotReplaceAllowanceAndFailureDoesNotConsumeDraftId() (gas: 398470)\n[PASS] test_cappedPostCannotReadFallbackDuringUnlockEvenWhenFree() (gas: 15061602)\n[PASS] test_cappedPostRejectsReentrantPost() (gas: 1190953)\n[PASS] test_cappedPostTransferFailuresRollBackAndAllowRetry() (gas: 1605462)\n[PASS] test_displacementCannotOverburnCappedPostWithUnlimitedAllowance() (gas: 15506275)\n[PASS] test_emptyRangeSwapCannotOverwriteLaunchQuote() (gas: 14916652)\n[PASS] test_failedSwapCannotOverwriteFallbackPrice() (gas: 1033302)\n[PASS] test_fallbackRepricesUsdAndEnforcesCapAfterEmptyRangeMovement() (gas: 15041709)\n[PASS] test_largerCapBurnsOnlyExecutionQuote() (gas: 157074)\n[PASS] test_paperOnlyLaunchSupportsQuoteAndPost() (gas: 14541916)\n[PASS] test_quoteReturnsToLivePriceWhenLiquidityResumes() (gas: 1232679)\n[PASS] test_removingAllLiquidityKeepsLastActiveQuote() (gas: 721396)\n[PASS] test_roundTripCannotDisablePostingOrOverwriteLastActiveQuote() (gas: 15748457)\n[PASS] test_zeroCapAllowsOnlyFreePost() (gas: 238075)\nSuite result: ok. 18 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 284.43ms (461.81ms CPU time)\n\nRan 7 tests for test/FailureAtomicity.t.sol:FailureAtomicityReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_failedSettlementRollsBackEverySwapMode(bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 966146, ~: 966059)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1000000000000\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_invalidSplitNeverMutatesState(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 135991, ~: 135978)\n[PASS] test_everyBoundCallbackRejectsAnotherPoolFromTheRealManager() (gas: 669226)\n[PASS] test_failedBurnCannotConsumeAllowanceOrCreateVotesAndRecovers() (gas: 1510600)\n[PASS] test_falseReturnSettlementRestoresTokenCallbackState() (gas: 1538515)\n[PASS] test_invalidRecipientInEitherPositionEvenWithZeroShare() (gas: 497193)\n[PASS] test_oversizedAmountsFailBeforeAnyPayment() (gas: 812427)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 284.78ms (560.00ms CPU time)\n\nRan 20 tests for test/Router.t.sol:RouterReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allModesConserveFunds(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 478399, ~: 479177)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 83754100165473885481\n\n[PASS] test_attackerCannotSpendAnotherAccountsApproval() (gas: 229778)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 474852)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutputRefundsUnusedBudget() (gas: 479262)\n[PASS] test_callbackRequiresManagerAndActiveRequest() (gas: 185600)\n[PASS] test_excessiveMinOutputRollsBackPrepaymentAndFees() (gas: 507326)\n[PASS] test_expiredDeadlineDoesNotPullFunds() (gas: 186646)\n[PASS] test_firstBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolPaysBothWalletsWithoutBacking() (gas: 13567818)\n[PASS] test_firstExactOutputBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolRefundsBudget() (gas: 13559511)\n[PASS] test_inputTokenCannotReenterSwap() (gas: 1640374)\n[PASS] test_insufficientExactOutputBudgetRollsBack() (gas: 455310)\n[PASS] test_partialExactOutputRollsBackEvenWithLowMinimum() (gas: 466260)\n[PASS] test_refusedOutputRollsBackAlreadyPaidRefundAndAllowsRetry() (gas: 1929472)\n[PASS] test_refusedRefundRollsBackSwapAndAllowsRetry() (gas: 1915497)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 467828)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutputRefundsUnusedBudget() (gas: 475145)\n[PASS] test_shortInputTransferRollsBack() (gas: 1131085)\n[PASS] test_shortManagerSettlementRollsBackSuccessfulInitialPull() (gas: 1754730)\n[PASS] test_unrelatedRouterDepositsAreNotRefundedToTrader() (gas: 528916)\n[PASS] test_zeroRecipientRefused() (gas: 168946)\nSuite result: ok. 20 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 285.81ms (187.25ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/Invariant.t.sol:HookInvariantTest\n[PASS] invariant_feeConservationAndNoHookBalances() (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract    | Selector    | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+========================================================+\n| HookHandler | postAndBurn | 699   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | split       | 675   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | swap        | 674   | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999000000985095\n  Bound result 176\n  Bound result 1889567280\n  Bound result 72808546572853838369\n  Bound result 77092216111978211890\n  Bound result 3954\n  Bound result 50\n  Bound result 99999999000000000246\n  Bound result 9730\n  Bound result 192\n  Bound result 99999999000000000402\n  Bound result 16912\n  Bound result 16\n  Bound result 12582911\n  Bound result 58\n  Bound result 100\n  Bound result 61\n  Bound result 9056\n  Bound result 154\n  Bound result 80\n  Bound result 1000000000001\n  Bound result 514413\n  Bound result 762\n  Bound result 99999999000000008710\n  Bound result 99999999000000001084\n  Bound result 99999999000001000001\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 119\n  Bound result 11\n  Bound result 31\n  Bound result 8306\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 196\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 635.11ms (519.13ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/StatefulReview.t.sol:StatefulReviewReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] invariant_allFeesAndVotesAreBackedAndStateSurvivesUpgrades() (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract      | Selector      | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+============================================================+\n| ReviewHandler | cappedPost    | 1793  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | changeSplit   | 1849  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | configure     | 1847  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | post          | 1788  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | rejectedAdmin | 1880  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | rejectedVote  | 1813  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | trade         | 1807  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | upgrade       | 1812  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | vote          | 1795  | 0       | 0        |\n╰---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 50\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 157011383\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 3361\n  Bound result 9\n  Bound result 9900000000000001424\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 9900000000000510091\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 9979\n  Bound result 2530\n  Bound result 20\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 5373\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 12900\n  Bound result 166\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 64\n  Bound result 1345\n  Bound result 113\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 4269076572\n  Bound result 14212645766425369828\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 9900000000000015289\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 20508378781655660853\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 9900000015223263327\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 4064337585541105635\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 663714115\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 5030\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 15625\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 9900000000000001747\n  Bound result 2000000000000000000\n  Bound result 27\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 6558\n  Bound result 190644914219608685\n  Bound result 192\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 5.24s (5.23s CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/StatefulReview.t.sol:StatefulReviewTest\n[PASS] invariant_allFeesAndVotesAreBackedAndStateSurvivesUpgrades() (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract      | Selector      | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+============================================================+\n| ReviewHandler | cappedPost    | 1793  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | changeSplit   | 1849  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | configure     | 1847  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | post          | 1788  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | rejectedAdmin | 1880  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | rejectedVote  | 1813  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | trade         | 1807  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | upgrade       | 1812  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | vote          | 1795  | 0       | 0        |\n╰---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 50\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 2163258445\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 8255\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 9900000000000010592\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 9900000000000510091\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 6113\n  Bound result 99999999999999999942\n  Bound result 20\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 3196814598\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 36028797018963969\n  Bound result 19\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 15\n  Bound result 10543\n  Bound result 34\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 12552\n  Bound result 14212645766425369828\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 9900000000000012689\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 20508378781655660853\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 9900000015223263327\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 4064337585541105635\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 12890\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 7536\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 15538\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 9900000000000000806\n  Bound result 12452\n  Bound result 27\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 6219\n  Bound result 204164566656160604\n  Bound result 192\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 5.28s (5.16s CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/RouterStateful.t.sol:RouterStatefulReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] invariant_routerPreservesEachUsersFundsAndOnlyRetainsUnsolicitedDeposits() (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract             | Selector         | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+======================================================================+\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | changeSplit      | 3230  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | depositResidual  | 3296  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | rejectedSlippage | 3307  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | trade            | 3246  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | upgrade          | 3305  | 0       | 0        |\n╰----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 7000000000000000000\n  Bound result 999999999999999999\n  Bound result 73\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 6689481569227\n  Bound result 2376452956\n  Bound result 9999999999990000\n  Bound result 2734\n  Bound result 8536\n  Bound result 580\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 109\n  Bound result 99999999000000008818\n  Bound result 99999999000000015539\n  Bound result 99999999000000009963\n  Bound result 99999999000000009652\n  Bound result 99999999000000000859\n  Bound result 51\n  Bound result 52033985001972277764\n  Bound result 26\n  Bound result 2187\n  Bound result 33\n  Bound result 85\n  Bound result 99999999000157011384\n  Bound result 99999999000000003681\n  Bound result 99999999000000003436\n  Bound result 113\n  Bound result 193\n  Bound result 99999999000000011314\n  Bound result 6641\n  Bound result 99999999000000002333\n  Bound result 40020725820275\n  Bound result 363312326866\n  Bound result 883776956\n  Bound result 99999999000000000564\n  Bound result 9\n  Bound result 156\n  Bound result 4264337585621134082\n  Bound result 15422\n  Bound result 12\n  Bound result 11172\n  Bound result 99999999002293517445\n  Bound result 99999999000000008195\n  Bound result 99999999000000018363\n  Bound result 99999999000000000526\n  Bound result 99999999001327784377\n  Bound result 99999999000008388608\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 99999999000000001205\n  Bound result 99999999000000001527\n  Bound result 99999999001376963491\n  Bound result 99999999000000008656\n  Bound result 99999999000000002168\n  Bound result 99999999000538426783\n  Bound result 99768653082642302333\n  Bound result 1000000000000\n  Bound result 12170\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 5.66s (5.65s CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/RouterStateful.t.sol:RouterStatefulTest\n[PASS] invariant_routerPreservesEachUsersFundsAndOnlyRetainsUnsolicitedDeposits() (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract             | Selector         | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+======================================================================+\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | changeSplit      | 3230  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | depositResidual  | 3296  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | rejectedSlippage | 3307  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | trade            | 3246  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | upgrade          | 3305  | 0       | 0        |\n╰----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 7000000000000000000\n  Bound result 999999999999999999\n  Bound result 73\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 6689481569227\n  Bound result 2259\n  Bound result 99999999000000013112\n  Bound result 1272\n  Bound result 6044\n  Bound result 3378598730\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 10657\n  Bound result 99999999000004100097\n  Bound result 99999999000000015439\n  Bound result 99999999000000007389\n  Bound result 99999999000000006395\n  Bound result 99999999000000013214\n  Bound result 51\n  Bound result 52033985001972277764\n  Bound result 26\n  Bound result 994\n  Bound result 33\n  Bound result 50\n  Bound result 99999999000000016807\n  Bound result 99999999000000001130\n  Bound result 99999999000000000206\n  Bound result 150\n  Bound result 153\n  Bound result 99999999000000009324\n  Bound result 4818\n  Bound result 99999999000000000630\n  Bound result 40020725820275\n  Bound result 363312326866\n  Bound result 914\n  Bound result 99999999000000001641\n  Bound result 195\n  Bound result 9\n  Bound result 4264337585621134082\n  Bound result 1516987328\n  Bound result 12\n  Bound result 9091\n  Bound result 99999999000000006801\n  Bound result 99999999000000018883\n  Bound result 99999999000000018258\n  Bound result 99999999000000000526\n  Bound result 90987927722409105386\n  Bound result 99999999000000006736\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 53158718051926729055\n  Bound result 99999999004090335566\n  Bound result 99999999000819074626\n  Bound result 99999999000000006103\n  Bound result 99999999000000002228\n  Bound result 99999999000538426783\n  Bound result 99768653082642302337\n  Bound result 1000000000000\n  Bound result 10397\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 5.73s (5.65s CPU time)\n\nRan 20 test suites in 5.73s (26.06s CPU time): 196 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (196 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":66,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"Paper.approve(address,uint256)\",\"Paper.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"Paper.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"PaperDeployment.deployHook(bytes32,address,(address,address,address,uint256,uint160,uint24,int24))\",\"PaperDeployment.deployToken()\",\"PaperHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"PaperHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"PaperHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"PaperHook.burn(uint256,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.initialize(address,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.postDraft(bytes32)\",\"PaperHook.postDraft(bytes32,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.setImdUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHook.setPostFeeUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHook.setSplit(address,uint256,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.transferOwnership(address)\",\"PaperHookV2.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"PaperHookV2.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"PaperHookV2.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"PaperHookV2.burn(uint256,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.initialize(address,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.postDraft(bytes32)\",\"PaperHookV2.postDraft(bytes32,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.setImdUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.setPostFeeUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.setSplit(address,uint256,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.transferOwnership(address)\",\"PaperProxy.fallback()\",\"PaperSwapRouter.swap((bool,int256,uint160),uint256,uint256,address,uint256)\",\"PaperSwapRouter.unlockCallback(bytes)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"LICENSE\":21,\"README.md\":132,\"docs/ADVERSARIAL_REVIEW.md\":51,\"docs/dependencies.json\":22,\"docs/deployment-parameters.json\":54,\"foundry.toml\":22,\"launch.json\":36,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/MineSalt.s.sol\":16,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":28,\"src/Paper.sol\":11,\"src/PaperDeployment.sol\":85,\"src/PaperHook.sol\":439,\"src/PaperHookV2.sol\":14,\"src/PaperProxy.sol\":68,\"src/PaperSwapRouter.sol\":92,\"test/Adversarial.t.sol\":151,\"test/FailureAtomicity.t.sol\":175,\"test/Fees.t.sol\":203,\"test/HookFixture.sol\":98,\"test/Invariant.t.sol\":90,\"test/Paper.t.sol\":52,\"test/REVIEW.md\":40,\"test/Router.t.sol\":361,\"test/RouterStateful.t.sol\":238,\"test/StatefulReview.t.sol\":265,\"test/Upgrade.t.sol\":253,\"test/Voting.t.sol\":194,\"test/VotingProperties.t.sol\":183,\"test/VotingProtection.t.sol\":367,\"test/mocks/HostilePaper.sol\":45,\"test/mocks/MockDecimalsERC20.sol\":16,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":14,\"test/mocks/PoolRouter.sol\":65,\"test/mocks/UnlockProbe.sol\":32},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"1a1866a6669eb61499d621cb6a23253ebd385ef8f09d2fbcb0aefe690c566216","verifiedTreeHash":"4c8b1d49edb1b3c22c034b059e48fe6335d89151","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+94826a22"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":19704,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 115 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 19.30s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[missing-events-access-control]: `callbackHash` is changed without an event but is used for access control\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:69:9\n   │\n69 │         callbackHash = bytes32(0);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-events-access-control\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:40:9\n   │\n40 │         emit TokenAllocated(address(token), msg.sender, poolAmount, remainder);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[encode-packed-collision]: `abi.encodePacked()` called with multiple dynamic type arguments; hash collisions possible\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:46:16\n   │\n46 │         return abi.encodePacked(type(PaperProxy).creationCode, abi.encode(implementation, initialization));\n   │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/encode-packed-collision\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:61:28\n   │\n61 │         delta = abi.decode(manager.unlock(data), (BalanceDelta));\n   │                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:47:13\n   │\n47 │         if (block.timestamp > deadline) revert Expired();\n   │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:83:9\n   │\n83 │         emit HookDeployed(address(hook), implementation, salt);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:49:41\n   │\n49 │             maxInput == 0 || maxInput > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max)) || params.amountSpecified == 0\n   │                                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:82:9\n   │\n82 │         config.manager.initialize(key, config.sqrtPriceX96);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:49:49\n   │\n49 │             maxInput == 0 || maxInput > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max)) || params.amountSpecified == 0\n   │                                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[incorrect-strict-equality]: dangerous strict equality check on an externally-influenced value\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:57:13\n   │\n57 │         if (input.balanceOf(address(this)) - beforeBalance != maxInput) revert InexactTransfer();\n   │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/incorrect-strict-equality\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:82:25\n   │\n82 │         uint256 spent = uint256(-int256(inputDelta));\n   │                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:83:28\n   │\n83 │         uint256 received = uint256(int256(outputDelta));\n   │                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:86:63\n   │\n86 │                 || (params.amountSpecified > 0 && received != uint256(params.amountSpecified))\n   │                                                               ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:121:9\n    │\n121 │         emit OwnershipTransferred(address(0), owner_);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:122:9\n    │\n122 │         emit SplitChanged(ORDERS, s.ordersBps, DEV, s.devBps);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:123:9\n    │\n123 │         emit PostFeeUsdChanged(1);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:124:9\n    │\n124 │         emit ImdUsdChanged(usdWad);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:172:69\n    │\n172 │     function transferOwnership(address newOwner) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {\n    │                                                                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:175:9\n    │\n175 │         emit OwnershipTransferred(s.owner, newOwner);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:182:9\n    │\n182 │         nonReentrant\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:195:9\n    │\n195 │         emit SplitChanged(ordersWallet, ordersBps, devWallet, devBps);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:199:60\n    │\n199 │     function setPostFeeUsd(uint256 usd) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {\n    │                                                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:201:9\n    │\n201 │         emit PostFeeUsdChanged(usd);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:204:59\n    │\n204 │     function setImdUsd(uint256 usdWad) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {\n    │                                                           ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:207:9\n    │\n207 │         emit ImdUsdChanged(usdWad);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:235:9\n    │\n235 │         emit DraftPosted(draftId, msg.sender, textHash, amount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:241:9\n    │\n241 │         emit Burned(draftId, msg.sender, amount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[incorrect-strict-equality]: dangerous strict equality check on an externally-influenced value\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:248:13\n    │\n248 │         if (paper.balanceOf(DEAD) - beforeBalance != amount) revert InexactTransfer();\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/incorrect-strict-equality\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:262:9\n    │\n262 │         emit PoolBound(key.toId(), s.token);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:269:9\n    │\n269 │         nonReentrant\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:319:9\n    │\n319 │         emit FeesPaid(fee, ordersAmount, devAmount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:283:9\n    │\n283 │         nonReentrant\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:324:26\n    │\n324 │         uint256 amount = uint256(value < 0 ? -value : value);\n    │                          ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:325:22\n    │\n325 │         if (amount > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                      ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:325:30\n    │\n325 │         if (amount > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:330:21\n    │\n330 │         if (value > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:330:29\n    │\n330 │         if (value > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:331:16\n    │\n331 │         return int128(int256(value));\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:331:23\n    │\n331 │         return int128(int256(value));\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[missing-zero-check]: address parameter is used in a state write or value transfer without a zero-address check\n   ╭▸ src/PaperProxy.sol:25:17\n   │\n25 │     constructor(address implementation, bytes memory initialization)\n   │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-zero-check\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperProxy.sol:32:20\n   │\n32 │                 && bytes4(initialization) == bytes4(keccak256(\"initialize(address,address,uint256)\")),\n   │                    ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'bytes4' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperProxy.sol:32:46\n   │\n32 │                 && bytes4(initialization) == bytes4(keccak256(\"initialize(address,address,uint256)\")),\n   │                                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'bytes4' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":10661,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 4 tests for test/Paper.t.sol:PaperTest\n[PASS] test_allowanceAndBalanceFailures() (gas: 162803)\n[PASS] test_deploymentAllocatesEightyPercentAndRemainder() (gas: 555001)\n[PASS] test_metadataSupplyAndTransfer() (gas: 118951)\n[PASS] test_noMintOrAdminEvenForDeployer() (gas: 53689)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 3.29ms (2.18ms CPU time)\n\nRan 14 tests for test/Voting.t.sol:VotingTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_burnConservesTokens(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 308384, ~: 308347)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 2672\n\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceAndBurnAllowance() (gas: 352959)\n[PASS] test_largeSqrtPriceDoesNotOverflow() (gas: 7947081)\n[PASS] test_nonexistentDraftCannotBurn() (gas: 238698)\n[PASS] test_postAllowanceFailureRollsBackId() (gas: 327755)\n[PASS] test_postBurnsAndEmitsAuthorsVotes() (gas: 252863)\n[PASS] test_priceAndUsdSettingsChangeQuote() (gas: 391438)\n[PASS] test_quoteReadsPoolPriceBothCurrencyOrders() (gas: 8443418)\n[PASS] test_quoteRejectsUnseededPool() (gas: 7692140)\n[PASS] test_quotesAndPostsRefuseUnlockedPool() (gas: 572294)\n[PASS] test_repeatBurnAnyExistingDraftAndZeroAmount() (gas: 568263)\n[PASS] test_roundingUpPreventsFreeDustPost() (gas: 164585)\n[PASS] test_settingsOwnerOnlyAndOwnershipTransfer() (gas: 247498)\n[PASS] test_sixDecimalImdNormalization() (gas: 8465219)\nSuite result: ok. 14 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 99.81ms (141.11ms CPU time)\n\nRan 7 tests for test/VotingProperties.t.sol:VotingPropertiesReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_quoteIsSmallestSufficientWholeTokenAmount(uint64,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 128259, ~: 128259)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 395248\n  Bound result 1288393354291255591\n\n[PASS] test_eventsAttributeEveryVoteExactlyOnceAcrossAuthorsAndRepeatedHashes() (gas: 675350)\n[PASS] test_exactApprovalProtectsPostWhenPoolPriceChanges() (gas: 662003)\n[PASS] test_existingDraftRemainsVotableWhenLiquidityIsRemoved() (gas: 487223)\n[PASS] test_freshV2ReversedDefaultsActuallyPayBothDirections() (gas: 19723960)\n[PASS] test_maximumBurnFailsWithoutChangingExistingDraft() (gas: 289360)\n[PASS] test_transferringHookOwnershipDoesNotTransferUpgradeAuthority() (gas: 535062)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 122.48ms (165.02ms CPU time)\n\nRan 11 tests for test/Adversarial.t.sol:AdversarialTest\n[PASS] test_allAllowedLpFeesInitialize() (gas: 63543588)\n[PASS] test_badFeeDeploymentRollsBackProxyAndPool() (gas: 16571870)\n[PASS] test_everyCallbackRefusesNonManager() (gas: 358696)\n[PASS] test_feePaymentBlocksTokenReentrancy() (gas: 1344442)\n[PASS] test_liquidityAndDonationNoOpsDoNotChargeFees() (gas: 447379)\n[PASS] test_minedDeploymentCannotBeFrontRunByChangingPrice() (gas: 39656)\n[PASS] test_minerHashIncludesProxyInitialization() (gas: 41758)\n[PASS] test_permissionsDeclareAllFourteenBits() (gas: 17736)\n[PASS] test_postAndBurnBlockTokenReentrancy() (gas: 1326700)\n[PASS] test_shortTransferAndFalseReturnCannotCreateVotes() (gas: 1232869)\n[PASS] test_wrongPoolRejectedAndNoRebinding() (gas: 85815)\nSuite result: ok. 11 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 191.52ms (194.68ms CPU time)\n\nRan 20 tests for test/Router.t.sol:RouterTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allModesConserveFunds(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 471086, ~: 470997)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999000000009544\n\n[PASS] test_attackerCannotSpendAnotherAccountsApproval() (gas: 229978)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 461148)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutputRefundsUnusedBudget() (gas: 466855)\n[PASS] test_callbackRequiresManagerAndActiveRequest() (gas: 185600)\n[PASS] test_excessiveMinOutputRollsBackPrepaymentAndFees() (gas: 496422)\n[PASS] test_expiredDeadlineDoesNotPullFunds() (gas: 186836)\n[PASS] test_firstBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolPaysBothWalletsWithoutBacking() (gas: 40393952)\n[PASS] test_firstExactOutputBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolRefundsBudget() (gas: 40386942)\n[PASS] test_inputTokenCannotReenterSwap() (gas: 1626860)\n[PASS] test_insufficientExactOutputBudgetRollsBack() (gas: 445703)\n[PASS] test_partialExactOutputRollsBackEvenWithLowMinimum() (gas: 455783)\n[PASS] test_refusedOutputRollsBackAlreadyPaidRefundAndAllowsRetry() (gas: 1907458)\n[PASS] test_refusedRefundRollsBackSwapAndAllowsRetry() (gas: 1893483)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 466650)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutputRefundsUnusedBudget() (gas: 472670)\n[PASS] test_shortInputTransferRollsBack() (gas: 1131285)\n[PASS] test_shortManagerSettlementRollsBackSuccessfulInitialPull() (gas: 1742543)\n[PASS] test_unrelatedRouterDepositsAreNotRefundedToTrader() (gas: 516522)\n[PASS] test_zeroRecipientRefused() (gas: 169136)\nSuite result: ok. 20 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 220.09ms (327.54ms CPU time)\n\nRan 13 tests for test/Upgrade.t.sol:UpgradeTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_runtimeWhitelistRejectsChangesBeforeDelegation(uint16,uint8,bool) (runs: 1000, μ: 85294, ~: 85099)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 5679\n  Bound result 94\n\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsCounterfeitBeforeInitialization() (gas: 152803)\n[PASS] test_hookOwnerAndStrangerCannotUpgrade() (gas: 94511)\n[PASS] test_initializersCannotBeUsedAgainOrOnImplementations() (gas: 127480)\n[PASS] test_managerNormalizationRejectsDirtyAddressPadding() (gas: 59275)\n[PASS] test_proxyAdminCannotCallHookFunctions() (gas: 6947)\n[PASS] test_proxyFlagsAndAdminOwnerAreFixed() (gas: 59436)\n[PASS] test_upgradeKeepsAllStateAndTradingVotingWork() (gas: 1253911)\n[PASS] test_upgradeRejectsCanonicalImplementationForAnotherManager() (gas: 4432269)\n[PASS] test_upgradeRejectsCounterfeitFeeGetterBeforeInitialization() (gas: 443275)\n[PASS] test_upgradeRejectsModifiedCanonicalRuntime() (gas: 58721)\n[PASS] test_v2ReversesDefaultsOnlyForFreshProxy() (gas: 35511217)\n[PASS] test_whitelistRejectsAppendedRuntimeEvenWhenBehaviorIsUnchanged() (gas: 65824)\nSuite result: ok. 13 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 290.06ms (313.46ms CPU time)\n\nRan 7 tests for test/VotingProperties.t.sol:VotingPropertiesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_quoteIsSmallestSufficientWholeTokenAmount(uint64,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 128248, ~: 128248)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 395248\n  Bound result 1288393354291255591\n\n[PASS] test_eventsAttributeEveryVoteExactlyOnceAcrossAuthorsAndRepeatedHashes() (gas: 675328)\n[PASS] test_exactApprovalProtectsPostWhenPoolPriceChanges() (gas: 668059)\n[PASS] test_existingDraftRemainsVotableWhenLiquidityIsRemoved() (gas: 486984)\n[PASS] test_freshV2ReversedDefaultsActuallyPayBothDirections() (gas: 36347889)\n[PASS] test_maximumBurnFailsWithoutChangingExistingDraft() (gas: 289349)\n[PASS] test_transferringHookOwnershipDoesNotTransferUpgradeAuthority() (gas: 528532)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 292.05ms (329.12ms CPU time)\n\nRan 15 tests for test/Fees.t.sol:FeesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allSwapModes(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 421680, ~: 423294)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999000000010161\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_splitConservation(uint8,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 389402, ~: 395425)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 104\n\n[PASS] test_badAmountAndZeroSwap() (gas: 103038)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 414582)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput() (gas: 414447)\n[PASS] test_dustFeeRoundsDown() (gas: 264705)\n[PASS] test_freshTokenOnlyPoolNeedsPrepaidImdFee() (gas: 50115565)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBackingRevertsAtomically() (gas: 415217)\n[PASS] test_partialImdSpecifiedRevertsAndRollsBackFee() (gas: 340010)\n[PASS] test_partialPaperSpecifiedChargesActualImd() (gas: 341386)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 420427)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput() (gas: 419951)\n[PASS] test_splitChangePayments() (gas: 427387)\n[PASS] test_splitInvalidAndUnauthorized() (gas: 238325)\n[PASS] test_zeroSplitAndSameRecipient() (gas: 622323)\nSuite result: ok. 15 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 292.12ms (500.97ms CPU time)\n\nRan 20 tests for test/Router.t.sol:RouterReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allModesConserveFunds(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 470775, ~: 471723)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999000000011470\n\n[PASS] test_attackerCannotSpendAnotherAccountsApproval() (gas: 229778)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 467398)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutputRefundsUnusedBudget() (gas: 471808)\n[PASS] test_callbackRequiresManagerAndActiveRequest() (gas: 185600)\n[PASS] test_excessiveMinOutputRollsBackPrepaymentAndFees() (gas: 502672)\n[PASS] test_expiredDeadlineDoesNotPullFunds() (gas: 186646)\n[PASS] test_firstBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolPaysBothWalletsWithoutBacking() (gas: 8622600)\n[PASS] test_firstExactOutputBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolRefundsBudget() (gas: 8614293)\n[PASS] test_inputTokenCannotReenterSwap() (gas: 1632920)\n[PASS] test_insufficientExactOutputBudgetRollsBack() (gas: 450656)\n[PASS] test_partialExactOutputRollsBackEvenWithLowMinimum() (gas: 461606)\n[PASS] test_refusedOutputRollsBackAlreadyPaidRefundAndAllowsRetry() (gas: 1917364)\n[PASS] test_refusedRefundRollsBackSwapAndAllowsRetry() (gas: 1903389)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 460374)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutputRefundsUnusedBudget() (gas: 467691)\n[PASS] test_shortInputTransferRollsBack() (gas: 1131085)\n[PASS] test_shortManagerSettlementRollsBackSuccessfulInitialPull() (gas: 1747276)\n[PASS] test_unrelatedRouterDepositsAreNotRefundedToTrader() (gas: 521462)\n[PASS] test_zeroRecipientRefused() (gas: 168946)\nSuite result: ok. 20 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 296.73ms (220.15ms CPU time)\n\nRan 14 tests for test/Voting.t.sol:VotingReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_burnConservesTokens(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 308389, ~: 308358)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1337726683\n\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceAndBurnAllowance() (gas: 352981)\n[PASS] test_largeSqrtPriceDoesNotOverflow() (gas: 10192861)\n[PASS] test_nonexistentDraftCannotBurn() (gas: 238709)\n[PASS] test_postAllowanceFailureRollsBackId() (gas: 327777)\n[PASS] test_postBurnsAndEmitsAuthorsVotes() (gas: 252885)\n[PASS] test_priceAndUsdSettingsChangeQuote() (gas: 391482)\n[PASS] test_quoteReadsPoolPriceBothCurrencyOrders() (gas: 10695581)\n[PASS] test_quoteRejectsUnseededPool() (gas: 9937491)\n[PASS] test_quotesAndPostsRefuseUnlockedPool() (gas: 572294)\n[PASS] test_repeatBurnAnyExistingDraftAndZeroAmount() (gas: 568285)\n[PASS] test_roundingUpPreventsFreeDustPost() (gas: 164607)\n[PASS] test_settingsOwnerOnlyAndOwnershipTransfer() (gas: 247498)\n[PASS] test_sixDecimalImdNormalization() (gas: 10710809)\nSuite result: ok. 14 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 301.48ms (426.78ms CPU time)\n\nRan 7 tests for test/FailureAtomicity.t.sol:FailureAtomicityReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_failedSettlementRollsBackEverySwapMode(bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 954024, ~: 954081)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 20603079572057\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_invalidSplitNeverMutatesState(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 135935, ~: 135924)\n[PASS] test_everyBoundCallbackRejectsAnotherPoolFromTheRealManager() (gas: 669268)\n[PASS] test_failedBurnCannotConsumeAllowanceOrCreateVotesAndRecovers() (gas: 1510473)\n[PASS] test_falseReturnSettlementRestoresTokenCallbackState() (gas: 1533969)\n[PASS] test_invalidRecipientInEitherPositionEvenWithZeroShare() (gas: 489607)\n[PASS] test_oversizedAmountsFailBeforeAnyPayment() (gas: 812687)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 301.53ms (573.72ms CPU time)\n\nRan 15 tests for test/Fees.t.sol:FeesReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allSwapModes(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 421611, ~: 419510)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999000000002689\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_splitConservation(uint8,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 395812, ~: 402262)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 28592373135488648028\n\n[PASS] test_badAmountAndZeroSwap() (gas: 103304)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 421112)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput() (gas: 419693)\n[PASS] test_dustFeeRoundsDown() (gas: 271552)\n[PASS] test_freshTokenOnlyPoolNeedsPrepaidImdFee() (gas: 19300110)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBackingRevertsAtomically() (gas: 415255)\n[PASS] test_partialImdSpecifiedRevertsAndRollsBackFee() (gas: 346259)\n[PASS] test_partialPaperSpecifiedChargesActualImd() (gas: 335577)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 414340)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput() (gas: 415148)\n[PASS] test_splitChangePayments() (gas: 433917)\n[PASS] test_splitInvalidAndUnauthorized() (gas: 238325)\n[PASS] test_zeroSplitAndSameRecipient() (gas: 629351)\nSuite result: ok. 15 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 302.06ms (392.73ms CPU time)\n\nRan 7 tests for test/FailureAtomicity.t.sol:FailureAtomicityTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_failedSettlementRollsBackEverySwapMode(bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 957254, ~: 956429)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 88668600974803405784\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_invalidSplitNeverMutatesState(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 135935, ~: 135924)\n[PASS] test_everyBoundCallbackRejectsAnotherPoolFromTheRealManager() (gas: 667216)\n[PASS] test_failedBurnCannotConsumeAllowanceOrCreateVotesAndRecovers() (gas: 1510462)\n[PASS] test_falseReturnSettlementRestoresTokenCallbackState() (gas: 1545447)\n[PASS] test_invalidRecipientInEitherPositionEvenWithZeroShare() (gas: 483077)\n[PASS] test_oversizedAmountsFailBeforeAnyPayment() (gas: 812057)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 302.43ms (384.61ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/Invariant.t.sol:HookInvariantTest\n[PASS] invariant_feeConservationAndNoHookBalances() (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract    | Selector    | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+========================================================+\n| HookHandler | postAndBurn | 724   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | split       | 623   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | swap        | 701   | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1295\n  Bound result 83420786789137608473\n  Bound result 99999999000000010589\n  Bound result 28\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 99999999000000007207\n  Bound result 9937\n  Bound result 99999999001889567283\n  Bound result 99999999000000005064\n  Bound result 99999999000000006566\n  Bound result 9283\n  Bound result 34400594728105807810\n  Bound result 64\n  Bound result 81100415585525032793\n  Bound result 18\n  Bound result 61\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 123\n  Bound result 58423646737681\n  Bound result 49\n  Bound result 1559\n  Bound result 1817\n  Bound result 4525668432943813393\n  Bound result 99999999000000005259\n  Bound result 2624\n  Bound result 1000000000002\n  Bound result 10453\n  Bound result 99999999000000007203\n  Bound result 99999999000000005274\n  Bound result 17079\n  Bound result 99999999000000004994\n  Bound result 123\n  Bound result 29791932035017250525\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 999.19ms (929.71ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/StatefulReview.t.sol:StatefulReviewTest\n[PASS] invariant_allFeesAndVotesAreBackedAndStateSurvivesUpgrades() (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract      | Selector      | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+============================================================+\n| ReviewHandler | changeSplit   | 2059  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | configure     | 2001  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | post          | 2063  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | rejectedAdmin | 2027  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | rejectedVote  | 2067  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | trade         | 2029  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | upgrade       | 2036  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | vote          | 2102  | 0       | 0        |\n╰---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 50\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 102\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 5772\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 9900000000001720788\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 4409\n  Bound result 4150608246\n  Bound result 47052569729910\n  Bound result 4492\n  Bound result 2445\n  Bound result 210216\n  Bound result 9\n  Bound result 6000032278256232605\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 9900000000000008555\n  Bound result 1251\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 8303\n  Bound result 100000000000000000\n  Bound result 110\n  Bound result 61816965859750726484\n  Bound result 128\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 591554262\n  Bound result 2474945639607636713\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 1821\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 1469\n  Bound result 39\n  Bound result 25\n  Bound result 652\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 23\n  Bound result 8851\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 9900000000000011115\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 9.24s (9.18s CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/StatefulReview.t.sol:StatefulReviewReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] invariant_allFeesAndVotesAreBackedAndStateSurvivesUpgrades() (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract      | Selector      | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+============================================================+\n| ReviewHandler | changeSplit   | 2059  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | configure     | 2001  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | post          | 2063  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | rejectedAdmin | 2027  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | rejectedVote  | 2067  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | trade         | 2029  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | upgrade       | 2036  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | vote          | 2102  | 0       | 0        |\n╰---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 50\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 102\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 10255\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 9900000000001720788\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 9252\n  Bound result 2819\n  Bound result 47052569729910\n  Bound result 10155\n  Bound result 5354\n  Bound result 210216\n  Bound result 9\n  Bound result 7899983860871782700\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 9900000000000000871\n  Bound result 519\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 8237\n  Bound result 50044460647947916817\n  Bound result 161\n  Bound result 61816965859750726486\n  Bound result 62\n  Bound result 156\n  Bound result 413\n  Bound result 2474945639607636713\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 6637\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 2810\n  Bound result 15\n  Bound result 140\n  Bound result 1401\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 23\n  Bound result 444\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 9900000000000007481\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 9.47s (9.45s CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/RouterStateful.t.sol:RouterStatefulReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] invariant_routerPreservesEachUsersFundsAndOnlyRetainsUnsolicitedDeposits() (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract             | Selector         | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+======================================================================+\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | changeSplit      | 3364  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | depositResidual  | 3293  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | rejectedSlippage | 3221  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | trade            | 3276  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | upgrade          | 3230  | 0       | 0        |\n╰----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 7000000000000000000\n  Bound result 999999999999999999\n  Bound result 73\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 53\n  Bound result 3765\n  Bound result 171\n  Bound result 1038\n  Bound result 99999999000495041409\n  Bound result 87009494831473038246\n  Bound result 1046363171\n  Bound result 99999999000000001096\n  Bound result 99999999000000000030\n  Bound result 99999999000000002919\n  Bound result 120\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 99999999019384705916\n  Bound result 196\n  Bound result 32\n  Bound result 99999999000000000601\n  Bound result 99999999000418630443\n  Bound result 99999999000000002852\n  Bound result 77574481785443641524\n  Bound result 54\n  Bound result 93884934785005548888\n  Bound result 622\n  Bound result 8270495401522381702\n  Bound result 13\n  Bound result 1658\n  Bound result 87\n  Bound result 3948\n  Bound result 99999999000000006257\n  Bound result 97159565840736453829\n  Bound result 254073434483135662\n  Bound result 449\n  Bound result 3629\n  Bound result 2719\n  Bound result 3786714985\n  Bound result 99999999004295128739\n  Bound result 99999999000000000810\n  Bound result 7511\n  Bound result 99999999000000001960\n  Bound result 99999999000000007205\n  Bound result 11416\n  Bound result 99999999000000000149\n  Bound result 99999999000000016792\n  Bound result 43194234186300318271\n  Bound result 99999999000000010694\n  Bound result 99999999000000012167\n  Bound result 99999999004295128742\n  Bound result 99999999000115788165\n  Bound result 17\n  Bound result 99999999000000009283\n  Bound result 5582\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 10.39s (10.36s CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/RouterStateful.t.sol:RouterStatefulTest\n[PASS] invariant_routerPreservesEachUsersFundsAndOnlyRetainsUnsolicitedDeposits() (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract             | Selector         | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+======================================================================+\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | changeSplit      | 3364  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | depositResidual  | 3293  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | rejectedSlippage | 3221  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | trade            | 3276  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | upgrade          | 3230  | 0       | 0        |\n╰----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 7000000000000000000\n  Bound result 999999999999999999\n  Bound result 73\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 175\n  Bound result 1158268367\n  Bound result 15\n  Bound result 1264811664\n  Bound result 99999999000495041409\n  Bound result 87009494831473038246\n  Bound result 9649\n  Bound result 99999999000000012699\n  Bound result 99999999000000000030\n  Bound result 99999999000000000921\n  Bound result 120\n  Bound result 73\n  Bound result 99999999019384705916\n  Bound result 16\n  Bound result 149\n  Bound result 99999999000000000950\n  Bound result 99999999000000004600\n  Bound result 99999999000000000623\n  Bound result 77574481785443641524\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 93884934785005548888\n  Bound result 12343\n  Bound result 8270495401522381702\n  Bound result 13\n  Bound result 2701\n  Bound result 68\n  Bound result 4863407971334416347\n  Bound result 99999999000000002343\n  Bound result 97159565840736453829\n  Bound result 6454348275160837520\n  Bound result 2479\n  Bound result 3053\n  Bound result 3786714986\n  Bound result 7325775260366914966\n  Bound result 99999999000000012384\n  Bound result 99999999000000000499\n  Bound result 2428830011\n  Bound result 99999999000000011725\n  Bound result 99999999000000002967\n  Bound result 7652\n  Bound result 35105306151474549700\n  Bound result 99999999000000016634\n  Bound result 26866443218654264323\n  Bound result 99999999000000001796\n  Bound result 99999999000000008158\n  Bound result 99999999000000003430\n  Bound result 99999999000000008568\n  Bound result 38\n  Bound result 99999999000000005152\n  Bound result 1442\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 10.43s (10.38s CPU time)\n\nRan 18 test suites in 10.44s (43.55s CPU time): 159 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (159 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":170,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"Paper.approve(address,uint256)\",\"Paper.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"Paper.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"PaperDeployment.deployHook(bytes32,address,(address,address,address,uint256,uint160,uint24,int24))\",\"PaperDeployment.deployToken()\",\"PaperHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"PaperHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"PaperHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"PaperHook.burn(uint256,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.initialize(address,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.postDraft(bytes32)\",\"PaperHook.setImdUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHook.setPostFeeUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHook.setSplit(address,uint256,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.transferOwnership(address)\",\"PaperHookV2.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"PaperHookV2.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"PaperHookV2.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"PaperHookV2.burn(uint256,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.initialize(address,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.postDraft(bytes32)\",\"PaperHookV2.setImdUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.setPostFeeUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.setSplit(address,uint256,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.transferOwnership(address)\",\"PaperProxy.fallback()\",\"PaperSwapRouter.swap((bool,int256,uint160),uint256,uint256,address,uint256)\",\"PaperSwapRouter.unlockCallback(bytes)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"LICENSE\":21,\"README.md\":128,\"docs/ADVERSARIAL_REVIEW.md\":49,\"docs/dependencies.json\":22,\"docs/deployment-parameters.json\":47,\"foundry.toml\":22,\"launch.json\":36,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/MineSalt.s.sol\":16,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":28,\"src/Paper.sol\":11,\"src/PaperDeployment.sol\":85,\"src/PaperHook.sol\":412,\"src/PaperHookV2.sol\":14,\"src/PaperProxy.sol\":68,\"src/PaperSwapRouter.sol\":92,\"test/Adversarial.t.sol\":151,\"test/FailureAtomicity.t.sol\":175,\"test/Fees.t.sol\":203,\"test/HookFixture.sol\":98,\"test/Invariant.t.sol\":90,\"test/Paper.t.sol\":52,\"test/REVIEW.md\":36,\"test/Router.t.sol\":361,\"test/RouterStateful.t.sol\":238,\"test/StatefulReview.t.sol\":232,\"test/Upgrade.t.sol\":233,\"test/Voting.t.sol\":194,\"test/VotingProperties.t.sol\":183,\"test/mocks/HostilePaper.sol\":45,\"test/mocks/MockDecimalsERC20.sol\":16,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":14,\"test/mocks/PoolRouter.sol\":65,\"test/mocks/UnlockProbe.sol\":27},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"27fce3471595e3cda5d39c9cf27239ba2716c21a1cd3ec520aea8af9746c6bbd","verifiedTreeHash":"4f528f3bed5a67de54053de9797a35a44a498c96","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+94826a22"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":11935,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 111 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 11.63s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[missing-events-access-control]: `callbackHash` is changed without an event but is used for access control\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:69:9\n   │\n69 │         callbackHash = bytes32(0);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-events-access-control\n\nwarning[missing-zero-check]: address parameter is used in a state write or value transfer without a zero-address check\n   ╭▸ src/PaperProxy.sol:25:17\n   │\n25 │     constructor(address implementation, bytes memory initialization)\n   │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-zero-check\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:40:9\n   │\n40 │         emit TokenAllocated(address(token), msg.sender, poolAmount, remainder);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperProxy.sol:32:20\n   │\n32 │                 && bytes4(initialization) == bytes4(keccak256(\"initialize(address,address,uint256)\")),\n   │                    ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'bytes4' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[encode-packed-collision]: `abi.encodePacked()` called with multiple dynamic type arguments; hash collisions possible\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:46:16\n   │\n46 │         return abi.encodePacked(type(PaperProxy).creationCode, abi.encode(implementation, initialization));\n   │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/encode-packed-collision\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperProxy.sol:32:46\n   │\n32 │                 && bytes4(initialization) == bytes4(keccak256(\"initialize(address,address,uint256)\")),\n   │                                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'bytes4' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:83:9\n   │\n83 │         emit HookDeployed(address(hook), implementation, salt);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:82:9\n   │\n82 │         config.manager.initialize(key, config.sqrtPriceX96);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:61:28\n   │\n61 │         delta = abi.decode(manager.unlock(data), (BalanceDelta));\n   │                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:47:13\n   │\n47 │         if (block.timestamp > deadline) revert Expired();\n   │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:49:41\n   │\n49 │             maxInput == 0 || maxInput > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max)) || params.amountSpecified == 0\n   │                                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:121:9\n    │\n121 │         emit OwnershipTransferred(address(0), owner_);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:122:9\n    │\n122 │         emit SplitChanged(ORDERS, s.ordersBps, DEV, s.devBps);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:123:9\n    │\n123 │         emit PostFeeUsdChanged(1);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:124:9\n    │\n124 │         emit ImdUsdChanged(usdWad);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:49:49\n   │\n49 │             maxInput == 0 || maxInput > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max)) || params.amountSpecified == 0\n   │                                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[incorrect-strict-equality]: dangerous strict equality check on an externally-influenced value\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:57:13\n   │\n57 │         if (input.balanceOf(address(this)) - beforeBalance != maxInput) revert InexactTransfer();\n   │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/incorrect-strict-equality\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:172:69\n    │\n172 │     function transferOwnership(address newOwner) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {\n    │                                                                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:175:9\n    │\n175 │         emit OwnershipTransferred(s.owner, newOwner);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:82:25\n   │\n82 │         uint256 spent = uint256(-int256(inputDelta));\n   │                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:83:28\n   │\n83 │         uint256 received = uint256(int256(outputDelta));\n   │                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:86:63\n   │\n86 │                 || (params.amountSpecified > 0 && received != uint256(params.amountSpecified))\n   │                                                               ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:182:9\n    │\n182 │         nonReentrant\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:195:9\n    │\n195 │         emit SplitChanged(ordersWallet, ordersBps, devWallet, devBps);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:199:60\n    │\n199 │     function setPostFeeUsd(uint256 usd) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {\n    │                                                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:201:9\n    │\n201 │         emit PostFeeUsdChanged(usd);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:204:59\n    │\n204 │     function setImdUsd(uint256 usdWad) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {\n    │                                                           ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:207:9\n    │\n207 │         emit ImdUsdChanged(usdWad);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:235:9\n    │\n235 │         emit DraftPosted(draftId, msg.sender, textHash, amount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:241:9\n    │\n241 │         emit Burned(draftId, msg.sender, amount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[incorrect-strict-equality]: dangerous strict equality check on an externally-influenced value\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:248:13\n    │\n248 │         if (paper.balanceOf(DEAD) - beforeBalance != amount) revert InexactTransfer();\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/incorrect-strict-equality\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:262:9\n    │\n262 │         emit PoolBound(key.toId(), s.token);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:269:9\n    │\n269 │         nonReentrant\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:319:9\n    │\n319 │         emit FeesPaid(fee, ordersAmount, devAmount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:283:9\n    │\n283 │         nonReentrant\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:324:26\n    │\n324 │         uint256 amount = uint256(value < 0 ? -value : value);\n    │                          ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:325:22\n    │\n325 │         if (amount > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                      ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:325:30\n    │\n325 │         if (amount > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:330:21\n    │\n330 │         if (value > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:330:29\n    │\n330 │         if (value > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:331:16\n    │\n331 │         return int128(int256(value));\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:331:23\n    │\n331 │         return int128(int256(value));\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":1024,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 4 tests for test/Paper.t.sol:PaperTest\n[PASS] test_allowanceAndBalanceFailures() (gas: 162803)\n[PASS] test_deploymentAllocatesEightyPercentAndRemainder() (gas: 555001)\n[PASS] test_metadataSupplyAndTransfer() (gas: 118951)\n[PASS] test_noMintOrAdminEvenForDeployer() (gas: 53689)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 2.91ms (5.79ms CPU time)\n\nRan 17 tests for test/Router.t.sol:RouterReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allModesConserveFunds(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 470809, ~: 471573)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999000000003769\n\n[PASS] test_attackerCannotSpendAnotherAccountsApproval() (gas: 229714)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 467248)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutputRefundsUnusedBudget() (gas: 471658)\n[PASS] test_callbackRequiresManagerAndActiveRequest() (gas: 185590)\n[PASS] test_excessiveMinOutputRollsBackPrepaymentAndFees() (gas: 502652)\n[PASS] test_expiredDeadlineDoesNotPullFunds() (gas: 186560)\n[PASS] test_firstBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolPaysBothWalletsWithoutBacking() (gas: 8622289)\n[PASS] test_firstExactOutputBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolRefundsBudget() (gas: 8613982)\n[PASS] test_inputTokenCannotReenterSwap() (gas: 1632762)\n[PASS] test_insufficientExactOutputBudgetRollsBack() (gas: 450592)\n[PASS] test_partialExactOutputRollsBackEvenWithLowMinimum() (gas: 461520)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 460246)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutputRefundsUnusedBudget() (gas: 467563)\n[PASS] test_shortInputTransferRollsBack() (gas: 1130935)\n[PASS] test_unrelatedRouterDepositsAreNotRefundedToTrader() (gas: 521218)\n[PASS] test_zeroRecipientRefused() (gas: 168882)\nSuite result: ok. 17 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 90.76ms (103.36ms CPU time)\n\nRan 14 tests for test/Voting.t.sol:VotingTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_burnConservesTokens(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 308367, ~: 308347)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 10525\n\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceAndBurnAllowance() (gas: 352959)\n[PASS] test_largeSqrtPriceDoesNotOverflow() (gas: 7947081)\n[PASS] test_nonexistentDraftCannotBurn() (gas: 238698)\n[PASS] test_postAllowanceFailureRollsBackId() (gas: 327755)\n[PASS] test_postBurnsAndEmitsAuthorsVotes() (gas: 252863)\n[PASS] test_priceAndUsdSettingsChangeQuote() (gas: 391438)\n[PASS] test_quoteReadsPoolPriceBothCurrencyOrders() (gas: 8443418)\n[PASS] test_quoteRejectsUnseededPool() (gas: 7692140)\n[PASS] test_quotesAndPostsRefuseUnlockedPool() (gas: 572294)\n[PASS] test_repeatBurnAnyExistingDraftAndZeroAmount() (gas: 568263)\n[PASS] test_roundingUpPreventsFreeDustPost() (gas: 164585)\n[PASS] test_settingsOwnerOnlyAndOwnershipTransfer() (gas: 247498)\n[PASS] test_sixDecimalImdNormalization() (gas: 8465219)\nSuite result: ok. 14 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 90.81ms (115.02ms CPU time)\n\nRan 15 tests for test/Fees.t.sol:FeesReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allSwapModes(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 421300, ~: 419510)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 72167185001512165461\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_splitConservation(uint8,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 395806, ~: 402262)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 2369693\n\n[PASS] test_badAmountAndZeroSwap() (gas: 103304)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 421112)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput() (gas: 419693)\n[PASS] test_dustFeeRoundsDown() (gas: 271552)\n[PASS] test_freshTokenOnlyPoolNeedsPrepaidImdFee() (gas: 19300110)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBackingRevertsAtomically() (gas: 415255)\n[PASS] test_partialImdSpecifiedRevertsAndRollsBackFee() (gas: 346259)\n[PASS] test_partialPaperSpecifiedChargesActualImd() (gas: 335577)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 414340)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput() (gas: 415148)\n[PASS] test_splitChangePayments() (gas: 433917)\n[PASS] test_splitInvalidAndUnauthorized() (gas: 238325)\n[PASS] test_zeroSplitAndSameRecipient() (gas: 629351)\nSuite result: ok. 15 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 98.81ms (224.17ms CPU time)\n\nRan 15 tests for test/Fees.t.sol:FeesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allSwapModes(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 421860, ~: 423550)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 72167185001512165461\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_splitConservation(uint8,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 389330, ~: 395425)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 19\n  Bound result 100\n\n[PASS] test_badAmountAndZeroSwap() (gas: 103038)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 414582)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput() (gas: 414447)\n[PASS] test_dustFeeRoundsDown() (gas: 264705)\n[PASS] test_freshTokenOnlyPoolNeedsPrepaidImdFee() (gas: 50115565)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBackingRevertsAtomically() (gas: 415217)\n[PASS] test_partialImdSpecifiedRevertsAndRollsBackFee() (gas: 340010)\n[PASS] test_partialPaperSpecifiedChargesActualImd() (gas: 341386)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 420427)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput() (gas: 419951)\n[PASS] test_splitChangePayments() (gas: 427387)\n[PASS] test_splitInvalidAndUnauthorized() (gas: 238325)\n[PASS] test_zeroSplitAndSameRecipient() (gas: 622323)\nSuite result: ok. 15 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 145.43ms (203.81ms CPU time)\n\nRan 17 tests for test/Router.t.sol:RouterTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allModesConserveFunds(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 471602, ~: 470985)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 72167185001512165461\n\n[PASS] test_attackerCannotSpendAnotherAccountsApproval() (gas: 229914)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 460998)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutputRefundsUnusedBudget() (gas: 466705)\n[PASS] test_callbackRequiresManagerAndActiveRequest() (gas: 185590)\n[PASS] test_excessiveMinOutputRollsBackPrepaymentAndFees() (gas: 496402)\n[PASS] test_expiredDeadlineDoesNotPullFunds() (gas: 186750)\n[PASS] test_firstBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolPaysBothWalletsWithoutBacking() (gas: 40393641)\n[PASS] test_firstExactOutputBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolRefundsBudget() (gas: 40386631)\n[PASS] test_inputTokenCannotReenterSwap() (gas: 1626702)\n[PASS] test_insufficientExactOutputBudgetRollsBack() (gas: 445639)\n[PASS] test_partialExactOutputRollsBackEvenWithLowMinimum() (gas: 455697)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 466522)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutputRefundsUnusedBudget() (gas: 472542)\n[PASS] test_shortInputTransferRollsBack() (gas: 1131135)\n[PASS] test_unrelatedRouterDepositsAreNotRefundedToTrader() (gas: 516278)\n[PASS] test_zeroRecipientRefused() (gas: 169072)\nSuite result: ok. 17 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 145.55ms (190.12ms CPU time)\n\nRan 10 tests for test/Upgrade.t.sol:UpgradeTest\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsCounterfeitBeforeInitialization() (gas: 152780)\n[PASS] test_hookOwnerAndStrangerCannotUpgrade() (gas: 94501)\n[PASS] test_initializersCannotBeUsedAgainOrOnImplementations() (gas: 127536)\n[PASS] test_proxyAdminCannotCallHookFunctions() (gas: 6969)\n[PASS] test_proxyFlagsAndAdminOwnerAreFixed() (gas: 59348)\n[PASS] test_upgradeKeepsAllStateAndTradingVotingWork() (gas: 1253934)\n[PASS] test_upgradeRejectsCanonicalImplementationForAnotherManager() (gas: 4432192)\n[PASS] test_upgradeRejectsCounterfeitFeeGetterBeforeInitialization() (gas: 443135)\n[PASS] test_upgradeRejectsModifiedCanonicalRuntime() (gas: 58667)\n[PASS] test_v2ReversesDefaultsOnlyForFreshProxy() (gas: 35511119)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 145.54ms (99.03ms CPU time)\n\nRan 14 tests for test/Voting.t.sol:VotingReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_burnConservesTokens(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 308378, ~: 308358)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 860140401139636016940071\n\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceAndBurnAllowance() (gas: 352981)\n[PASS] test_largeSqrtPriceDoesNotOverflow() (gas: 10192861)\n[PASS] test_nonexistentDraftCannotBurn() (gas: 238709)\n[PASS] test_postAllowanceFailureRollsBackId() (gas: 327777)\n[PASS] test_postBurnsAndEmitsAuthorsVotes() (gas: 252885)\n[PASS] test_priceAndUsdSettingsChangeQuote() (gas: 391482)\n[PASS] test_quoteReadsPoolPriceBothCurrencyOrders() (gas: 10695581)\n[PASS] test_quoteRejectsUnseededPool() (gas: 9937491)\n[PASS] test_quotesAndPostsRefuseUnlockedPool() (gas: 572294)\n[PASS] test_repeatBurnAnyExistingDraftAndZeroAmount() (gas: 568285)\n[PASS] test_roundingUpPreventsFreeDustPost() (gas: 164607)\n[PASS] test_settingsOwnerOnlyAndOwnershipTransfer() (gas: 247498)\n[PASS] test_sixDecimalImdNormalization() (gas: 10710809)\nSuite result: ok. 14 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 145.46ms (280.25ms CPU time)\n\nRan 11 tests for test/Adversarial.t.sol:AdversarialTest\n[PASS] test_allAllowedLpFeesInitialize() (gas: 63543588)\n[PASS] test_badFeeDeploymentRollsBackProxyAndPool() (gas: 16571870)\n[PASS] test_everyCallbackRefusesNonManager() (gas: 358696)\n[PASS] test_feePaymentBlocksTokenReentrancy() (gas: 1344442)\n[PASS] test_liquidityAndDonationNoOpsDoNotChargeFees() (gas: 447379)\n[PASS] test_minedDeploymentCannotBeFrontRunByChangingPrice() (gas: 39656)\n[PASS] test_minerHashIncludesProxyInitialization() (gas: 41758)\n[PASS] test_permissionsDeclareAllFourteenBits() (gas: 17736)\n[PASS] test_postAndBurnBlockTokenReentrancy() (gas: 1326700)\n[PASS] test_shortTransferAndFalseReturnCannotCreateVotes() (gas: 1232869)\n[PASS] test_wrongPoolRejectedAndNoRebinding() (gas: 85815)\nSuite result: ok. 11 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 152.87ms (157.23ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/Invariant.t.sol:HookInvariantTest\n[PASS] invariant_feeConservationAndNoHookBalances() (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract    | Selector    | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+========================================================+\n| HookHandler | postAndBurn | 679   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | split       | 708   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | swap        | 661   | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 529\n  Bound result 19298\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 99999999000000005017\n  Bound result 58180798902150853765\n  Bound result 29\n  Bound result 27603348490982348583\n  Bound result 2164\n  Bound result 12001\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 123\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 43\n  Bound result 99999999000000004585\n  Bound result 503615006\n  Bound result 161\n  Bound result 55844487076864751811\n  Bound result 78493577086952772648\n  Bound result 54\n  Bound result 99999999000000004311\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 99999999000000010569\n  Bound result 73\n  Bound result 2514000704\n  Bound result 100\n  Bound result 25\n  Bound result 99999999000000009708\n  Bound result 14591972429741336104\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 99999999003033974660\n  Bound result 99999999004228666475\n  Bound result 38958999603826344583\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 830.79ms (786.28ms CPU time)\n\nRan 10 test suites in 833.18ms (1.85s CPU time): 118 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (118 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":105,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"Paper.approve(address,uint256)\",\"Paper.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"Paper.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"PaperDeployment.deployHook(bytes32,address,(address,address,address,uint256,uint160,uint24,int24))\",\"PaperDeployment.deployToken()\",\"PaperHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"PaperHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"PaperHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"PaperHook.burn(uint256,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.initialize(address,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.postDraft(bytes32)\",\"PaperHook.setImdUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHook.setPostFeeUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHook.setSplit(address,uint256,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.transferOwnership(address)\",\"PaperHookV2.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"PaperHookV2.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"PaperHookV2.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"PaperHookV2.burn(uint256,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.initialize(address,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.postDraft(bytes32)\",\"PaperHookV2.setImdUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.setPostFeeUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.setSplit(address,uint256,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.transferOwnership(address)\",\"PaperProxy.fallback()\",\"PaperSwapRouter.swap((bool,int256,uint160),uint256,uint256,address,uint256)\",\"PaperSwapRouter.unlockCallback(bytes)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"LICENSE\":21,\"README.md\":128,\"docs/ADVERSARIAL_REVIEW.md\":49,\"docs/dependencies.json\":22,\"docs/deployment-parameters.json\":47,\"foundry.toml\":22,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/MineSalt.s.sol\":16,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":28,\"src/Paper.sol\":11,\"src/PaperDeployment.sol\":85,\"src/PaperHook.sol\":412,\"src/PaperHookV2.sol\":14,\"src/PaperProxy.sol\":68,\"src/PaperSwapRouter.sol\":92,\"test/Adversarial.t.sol\":151,\"test/Fees.t.sol\":203,\"test/HookFixture.sol\":98,\"test/Invariant.t.sol\":90,\"test/Paper.t.sol\":52,\"test/Router.t.sol\":271,\"test/Upgrade.t.sol\":176,\"test/Voting.t.sol\":194,\"test/mocks/HostilePaper.sol\":45,\"test/mocks/MockDecimalsERC20.sol\":16,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":14,\"test/mocks/PoolRouter.sol\":65,\"test/mocks/UnlockProbe.sol\":27},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":4592,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[medium/medium] unused-return at src/PaperHook.sol:210: PaperHook.postFeeTokens() (src/PaperHook.sol#210-229) ignores return value by (sqrtPrice,None,None,None) = s.manager.getSlot0(s.key.toId()) (src/PaperHook.sol#213)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/PaperDeployment.sol:69: PaperDeployment.deployHook(bytes32,address,PaperDeployment.Config) (src/PaperDeployment.sol#69-84) ignores return value by config.manager.initialize(key,config.sqrtPriceX96) (src/PaperDeployment.sol#82)\n[low/medium] missing-zero-check at src/PaperProxy.sol:25: PaperProxy.constructor(address,bytes).implementation (src/PaperProxy.sol#25) lacks a zero-check on :\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/PaperDeployment.sol:34: Reentrancy in PaperDeployment.deployToken() (src/PaperDeployment.sol#34-41):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/PaperDeployment.sol:69: Reentrancy in PaperDeployment.deployHook(bytes32,address,PaperDeployment.Config) (src/PaperDeployment.sol#69-84):\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:42: PaperSwapRouter.swap(SwapParams,uint256,uint256,address,uint256) (src/PaperSwapRouter.sol#42-63) uses timestamp for comparisons","passed":true},{"durationMs":981,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[high] abi-encode-packed-hash-collision at src/PaperDeployment.sol:46: `abi.encodePacked()` Hash Collision\n[high] contract-locks-ether at src/PaperProxy.sol:11: Contract locks Ether without a withdraw function\n[high] reentrancy-state-change at src/PaperHook.sol:108: Reentrancy: State change after external call (5 places)\n[low] centralization-risk at src/PaperHook.sol:172: Centralization Risk (4 places)\n[low] internal-function-used-once at src/HookFlags.sol:21: Internal Function Used Only Once\n[low] large-numeric-literal at src/Paper.sol:9: Large Numeric Literal (5 places)\n[low] literal-instead-of-constant at src/PaperHook.sol:109: Literal Instead of Constant (8 places)\n[low] non-reentrant-not-first at src/PaperHook.sol:172: `nonReentrant` is Not the First Modifier (6 places)\n[low] state-change-without-event at src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:42: State Change Without Event (2 places)\n[low] unchecked-return at src/PaperDeployment.sol:82: Unchecked Return (2 places)\n[low] uninitialized-local-variable at src/PaperDeployment.sol:60: Uninitialized Local Variable\n[low] unsafe-erc20-operation at src/PaperDeployment.sol:38: Unsafe ERC20 Operation (2 places)\n[low] unused-public-function at src/PaperDeployment.sol:43: Public Function Not Used Internally","passed":true},{"durationMs":5438,"exitCode":0,"name":"proof 8aa86c117502","output":"Compiling 103 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 4.27s\nCompiler run successful!\n\nRan 1 test for test/imd-proof-eccc765c/Proof_8aa86c117502.t.sol:ImmutableFeeProof\n[PASS] test_upgradeCannotRaiseTheTwoPercentFee() (gas: 1031011)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 39.43ms (962.83µs CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test suite in 40.12ms (39.43ms CPU time): 1 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (1 total tests)\n","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"3ac0bb58ae1ac089136110ec1344c7e87a125d5d81ad2df8d841034b61c06970","verifiedTreeHash":"8324e54596b612f05417f18592db34c8acc1602b","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+94826a22"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":15459,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 116 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 15.18s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:40:9\n   │\n40 │         emit TokenAllocated(address(token), msg.sender, poolAmount, remainder);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[missing-events-access-control]: `callbackHash` is changed without an event but is used for access control\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:69:9\n   │\n69 │         callbackHash = bytes32(0);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-events-access-control\n\nwarning[missing-zero-check]: address parameter is used in a state write or value transfer without a zero-address check\n   ╭▸ src/PaperProxy.sol:25:17\n   │\n25 │     constructor(address implementation, bytes memory initialization)\n   │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-zero-check\n\nwarning[encode-packed-collision]: `abi.encodePacked()` called with multiple dynamic type arguments; hash collisions possible\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:46:16\n   │\n46 │         return abi.encodePacked(type(PaperProxy).creationCode, abi.encode(implementation, initialization));\n   │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/encode-packed-collision\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:61:28\n   │\n61 │         delta = abi.decode(manager.unlock(data), (BalanceDelta));\n   │                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:83:9\n   │\n83 │         emit HookDeployed(address(hook), implementation, salt);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:82:9\n   │\n82 │         config.manager.initialize(key, config.sqrtPriceX96);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:47:13\n   │\n47 │         if (block.timestamp > deadline) revert Expired();\n   │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:49:41\n   │\n49 │             maxInput == 0 || maxInput > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max)) || params.amountSpecified == 0\n   │                                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:49:49\n   │\n49 │             maxInput == 0 || maxInput > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max)) || params.amountSpecified == 0\n   │                                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[incorrect-strict-equality]: dangerous strict equality check on an externally-influenced value\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:57:13\n   │\n57 │         if (input.balanceOf(address(this)) - beforeBalance != maxInput) revert InexactTransfer();\n   │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/incorrect-strict-equality\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:82:25\n   │\n82 │         uint256 spent = uint256(-int256(inputDelta));\n   │                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:83:28\n   │\n83 │         uint256 received = uint256(int256(outputDelta));\n   │                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:86:63\n   │\n86 │                 || (params.amountSpecified > 0 && received != uint256(params.amountSpecified))\n   │                                                               ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperProxy.sol:32:20\n   │\n32 │                 && bytes4(initialization) == bytes4(keccak256(\"initialize(address,address,uint256)\")),\n   │                    ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'bytes4' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperProxy.sol:32:46\n   │\n32 │                 && bytes4(initialization) == bytes4(keccak256(\"initialize(address,address,uint256)\")),\n   │                                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'bytes4' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:123:9\n    │\n123 │         emit OwnershipTransferred(address(0), owner_);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:124:9\n    │\n124 │         emit SplitChanged(ORDERS, s.ordersBps, DEV, s.devBps);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:125:9\n    │\n125 │         emit PostFeeUsdChanged(1);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:126:9\n    │\n126 │         emit ImdUsdChanged(usdWad);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:174:69\n    │\n174 │     function transferOwnership(address newOwner) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {\n    │                                                                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:177:9\n    │\n177 │         emit OwnershipTransferred(s.owner, newOwner);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:184:9\n    │\n184 │         nonReentrant\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:197:9\n    │\n197 │         emit SplitChanged(ordersWallet, ordersBps, devWallet, devBps);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:201:60\n    │\n201 │     function setPostFeeUsd(uint256 usd) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {\n    │                                                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:203:9\n    │\n203 │         emit PostFeeUsdChanged(usd);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:206:59\n    │\n206 │     function setImdUsd(uint256 usdWad) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {\n    │                                                           ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:209:9\n    │\n209 │         emit ImdUsdChanged(usdWad);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:252:9\n    │\n252 │         emit DraftPosted(draftId, msg.sender, textHash, amount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:258:9\n    │\n258 │         emit Burned(draftId, msg.sender, amount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[incorrect-strict-equality]: dangerous strict equality check on an externally-influenced value\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:265:13\n    │\n265 │         if (paper.balanceOf(DEAD) - beforeBalance != amount) revert InexactTransfer();\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/incorrect-strict-equality\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:284:9\n    │\n284 │         emit PoolBound(key.toId(), s.token);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:291:9\n    │\n291 │         nonReentrant\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:346:9\n    │\n346 │         emit FeesPaid(fee, ordersAmount, devAmount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:305:9\n    │\n305 │         nonReentrant\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:351:26\n    │\n351 │         uint256 amount = uint256(value < 0 ? -value : value);\n    │                          ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:352:22\n    │\n352 │         if (amount > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                      ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:352:30\n    │\n352 │         if (amount > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:357:21\n    │\n357 │         if (value > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:357:29\n    │\n357 │         if (value > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:358:16\n    │\n358 │         return int128(int256(value));\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:358:23\n    │\n358 │         return int128(int256(value));\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":8695,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 4 tests for test/Paper.t.sol:PaperTest\n[PASS] test_allowanceAndBalanceFailures() (gas: 162803)\n[PASS] test_deploymentAllocatesEightyPercentAndRemainder() (gas: 555001)\n[PASS] test_metadataSupplyAndTransfer() (gas: 118951)\n[PASS] test_noMintOrAdminEvenForDeployer() (gas: 53689)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.18ms (2.34ms CPU time)\n\nRan 7 tests for test/VotingProperties.t.sol:VotingPropertiesReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_quoteIsSmallestSufficientWholeTokenAmount(uint64,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 128214, ~: 128218)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 486482680725058280527235\n\n[PASS] test_eventsAttributeEveryVoteExactlyOnceAcrossAuthorsAndRepeatedHashes() (gas: 675580)\n[PASS] test_exactApprovalProtectsPostWhenPoolPriceChanges() (gas: 669672)\n[PASS] test_existingDraftRemainsVotableWhenLiquidityIsRemoved() (gas: 521593)\n[PASS] test_freshV2ReversedDefaultsActuallyPayBothDirections() (gas: 3773034)\n[PASS] test_maximumBurnFailsWithoutChangingExistingDraft() (gas: 289453)\n[PASS] test_transferringHookOwnershipDoesNotTransferUpgradeAuthority() (gas: 542610)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 121.28ms (129.13ms CPU time)\n\nRan 14 tests for test/Upgrade.t.sol:UpgradeTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_runtimeWhitelistRejectsChangesBeforeDelegation(uint16,uint8,bool) (runs: 1000, μ: 85684, ~: 85495)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 9\n  Bound result 255\n\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsCounterfeitBeforeInitialization() (gas: 152803)\n[PASS] test_hookOwnerAndStrangerCannotUpgrade() (gas: 94511)\n[PASS] test_initializersCannotBeUsedAgainOrOnImplementations() (gas: 127709)\n[PASS] test_managerNormalizationRejectsDirtyAddressPadding() (gas: 59653)\n[PASS] test_proxyAdminCannotCallHookFunctions() (gas: 6947)\n[PASS] test_proxyFlagsAndAdminOwnerAreFixed() (gas: 59280)\n[PASS] test_upgradeKeepsAllStateAndTradingVotingWork() (gas: 1269202)\n[PASS] test_upgradeKeepsFallbackPriceAndCappedPosting() (gas: 865234)\n[PASS] test_upgradeRejectsCanonicalImplementationForAnotherManager() (gas: 4432431)\n[PASS] test_upgradeRejectsCounterfeitFeeGetterBeforeInitialization() (gas: 450729)\n[PASS] test_upgradeRejectsModifiedCanonicalRuntime() (gas: 59055)\n[PASS] test_v2ReversesDefaultsOnlyForFreshProxy() (gas: 45136814)\n[PASS] test_whitelistRejectsAppendedRuntimeEvenWhenBehaviorIsUnchanged() (gas: 66363)\nSuite result: ok. 14 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 294.49ms (197.48ms CPU time)\n\nRan 7 tests for test/FailureAtomicity.t.sol:FailureAtomicityReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_failedSettlementRollsBackEverySwapMode(bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 966037, ~: 966059)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 394842328089077996\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_invalidSplitNeverMutatesState(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 135982, ~: 135954)\n[PASS] test_everyBoundCallbackRejectsAnotherPoolFromTheRealManager() (gas: 669226)\n[PASS] test_failedBurnCannotConsumeAllowanceOrCreateVotesAndRecovers() (gas: 1510600)\n[PASS] test_falseReturnSettlementRestoresTokenCallbackState() (gas: 1538515)\n[PASS] test_invalidRecipientInEitherPositionEvenWithZeroShare() (gas: 497193)\n[PASS] test_oversizedAmountsFailBeforeAnyPayment() (gas: 812427)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 296.39ms (388.26ms CPU time)\n\nRan 15 tests for test/Fees.t.sol:FeesReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allSwapModes(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 429157, ~: 426965)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999000000000011\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_splitConservation(uint8,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 403370, ~: 409738)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 102\n\n[PASS] test_badAmountAndZeroSwap() (gas: 103304)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 428566)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput() (gas: 427147)\n[PASS] test_dustFeeRoundsDown() (gas: 279006)\n[PASS] test_freshTokenOnlyPoolNeedsPrepaidImdFee() (gas: 14644431)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBackingRevertsAtomically() (gas: 415255)\n[PASS] test_partialImdSpecifiedRevertsAndRollsBackFee() (gas: 350911)\n[PASS] test_partialPaperSpecifiedChargesActualImd() (gas: 343031)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 421794)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput() (gas: 422602)\n[PASS] test_splitChangePayments() (gas: 441393)\n[PASS] test_splitInvalidAndUnauthorized() (gas: 238457)\n[PASS] test_zeroSplitAndSameRecipient() (gas: 644303)\nSuite result: ok. 15 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 296.56ms (335.02ms CPU time)\n\nRan 18 tests for test/VotingProtection.t.sol:VotingProtectionReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_capBoundaryAfterTrading(bool,bool,uint96,uint8) (runs: 1000, μ: 624462, ~: 588040)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 17306996517142840661\n\n[PASS] test_adminPriceChangeCannotExceedCallerCap() (gas: 206170)\n[PASS] test_bothPostingOverloadsAndBurnShareReentrancyGuard() (gas: 1666302)\n[PASS] test_capAtQuoteSucceedsAndEmitsActualVotes() (gas: 234797)\n[PASS] test_capCannotReplaceAllowanceAndFailureDoesNotConsumeDraftId() (gas: 398470)\n[PASS] test_cappedPostCannotReadFallbackDuringUnlockEvenWhenFree() (gas: 15061602)\n[PASS] test_cappedPostRejectsReentrantPost() (gas: 1190953)\n[PASS] test_cappedPostTransferFailuresRollBackAndAllowRetry() (gas: 1605462)\n[PASS] test_displacementCannotOverburnCappedPostWithUnlimitedAllowance() (gas: 15506275)\n[PASS] test_emptyRangeSwapCannotOverwriteLaunchQuote() (gas: 14916652)\n[PASS] test_failedSwapCannotOverwriteFallbackPrice() (gas: 1033302)\n[PASS] test_fallbackRepricesUsdAndEnforcesCapAfterEmptyRangeMovement() (gas: 15041709)\n[PASS] test_largerCapBurnsOnlyExecutionQuote() (gas: 157074)\n[PASS] test_paperOnlyLaunchSupportsQuoteAndPost() (gas: 14541916)\n[PASS] test_quoteReturnsToLivePriceWhenLiquidityResumes() (gas: 1232679)\n[PASS] test_removingAllLiquidityKeepsLastActiveQuote() (gas: 721396)\n[PASS] test_roundTripCannotDisablePostingOrOverwriteLastActiveQuote() (gas: 15748457)\n[PASS] test_zeroCapAllowsOnlyFreePost() (gas: 238075)\nSuite result: ok. 18 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 296.55ms (548.85ms CPU time)\n\nRan 20 tests for test/Router.t.sol:RouterReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allModesConserveFunds(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 478317, ~: 479177)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999000000004362\n\n[PASS] test_attackerCannotSpendAnotherAccountsApproval() (gas: 229778)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 474852)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutputRefundsUnusedBudget() (gas: 479262)\n[PASS] test_callbackRequiresManagerAndActiveRequest() (gas: 185600)\n[PASS] test_excessiveMinOutputRollsBackPrepaymentAndFees() (gas: 507326)\n[PASS] test_expiredDeadlineDoesNotPullFunds() (gas: 186646)\n[PASS] test_firstBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolPaysBothWalletsWithoutBacking() (gas: 13567818)\n[PASS] test_firstExactOutputBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolRefundsBudget() (gas: 13559511)\n[PASS] test_inputTokenCannotReenterSwap() (gas: 1640374)\n[PASS] test_insufficientExactOutputBudgetRollsBack() (gas: 455310)\n[PASS] test_partialExactOutputRollsBackEvenWithLowMinimum() (gas: 466260)\n[PASS] test_refusedOutputRollsBackAlreadyPaidRefundAndAllowsRetry() (gas: 1929472)\n[PASS] test_refusedRefundRollsBackSwapAndAllowsRetry() (gas: 1915497)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 467828)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutputRefundsUnusedBudget() (gas: 475145)\n[PASS] test_shortInputTransferRollsBack() (gas: 1131085)\n[PASS] test_shortManagerSettlementRollsBackSuccessfulInitialPull() (gas: 1754730)\n[PASS] test_unrelatedRouterDepositsAreNotRefundedToTrader() (gas: 528916)\n[PASS] test_zeroRecipientRefused() (gas: 168946)\nSuite result: ok. 20 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 297.39ms (357.22ms CPU time)\n\nRan 14 tests for test/Voting.t.sol:VotingReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_burnConservesTokens(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 308429, ~: 308506)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 480020174198\n\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceAndBurnAllowance() (gas: 353120)\n[PASS] test_largeSqrtPriceDoesNotOverflow() (gas: 50122799)\n[PASS] test_nonexistentDraftCannotBurn() (gas: 238889)\n[PASS] test_postAllowanceFailureRollsBackId() (gas: 327894)\n[PASS] test_postBurnsAndEmitsAuthorsVotes() (gas: 252972)\n[PASS] test_priceAndUsdSettingsChangeQuote() (gas: 391576)\n[PASS] test_quoteReadsPoolPriceBothCurrencyOrders() (gas: 50633164)\n[PASS] test_quoteUsesLaunchPriceBeforeSeeding() (gas: 49998226)\n[PASS] test_quotesAndPostsRefuseUnlockedPool() (gas: 701502)\n[PASS] test_repeatBurnAnyExistingDraftAndZeroAmount() (gas: 568575)\n[PASS] test_roundingUpPreventsFreeDustPost() (gas: 164683)\n[PASS] test_settingsOwnerOnlyAndOwnershipTransfer() (gas: 247363)\n[PASS] test_sixDecimalImdNormalization() (gas: 50640660)\nSuite result: ok. 14 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 324.04ms (813.57ms CPU time)\n\nRan 7 tests for test/VotingProperties.t.sol:VotingPropertiesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_quoteIsSmallestSufficientWholeTokenAmount(uint64,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 128201, ~: 128207)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 78839778\n  Bound result 1928\n\n[PASS] test_eventsAttributeEveryVoteExactlyOnceAcrossAuthorsAndRepeatedHashes() (gas: 675558)\n[PASS] test_exactApprovalProtectsPostWhenPoolPriceChanges() (gas: 675728)\n[PASS] test_existingDraftRemainsVotableWhenLiquidityIsRemoved() (gas: 521343)\n[PASS] test_freshV2ReversedDefaultsActuallyPayBothDirections() (gas: 45988438)\n[PASS] test_maximumBurnFailsWithoutChangingExistingDraft() (gas: 289442)\n[PASS] test_transferringHookOwnershipDoesNotTransferUpgradeAuthority() (gas: 536080)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 377.15ms (156.60ms CPU time)\n\nRan 20 tests for test/Router.t.sol:RouterTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allModesConserveFunds(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 478451, ~: 478451)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999000000000011\n\n[PASS] test_attackerCannotSpendAnotherAccountsApproval() (gas: 229978)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 468602)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutputRefundsUnusedBudget() (gas: 474309)\n[PASS] test_callbackRequiresManagerAndActiveRequest() (gas: 185600)\n[PASS] test_excessiveMinOutputRollsBackPrepaymentAndFees() (gas: 501076)\n[PASS] test_expiredDeadlineDoesNotPullFunds() (gas: 186836)\n[PASS] test_firstBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolPaysBothWalletsWithoutBacking() (gas: 15178790)\n[PASS] test_firstExactOutputBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolRefundsBudget() (gas: 15171780)\n[PASS] test_inputTokenCannotReenterSwap() (gas: 1634314)\n[PASS] test_insufficientExactOutputBudgetRollsBack() (gas: 450357)\n[PASS] test_partialExactOutputRollsBackEvenWithLowMinimum() (gas: 460437)\n[PASS] test_refusedOutputRollsBackAlreadyPaidRefundAndAllowsRetry() (gas: 1919566)\n[PASS] test_refusedRefundRollsBackSwapAndAllowsRetry() (gas: 1905591)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 474104)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutputRefundsUnusedBudget() (gas: 480124)\n[PASS] test_shortInputTransferRollsBack() (gas: 1131285)\n[PASS] test_shortManagerSettlementRollsBackSuccessfulInitialPull() (gas: 1749997)\n[PASS] test_unrelatedRouterDepositsAreNotRefundedToTrader() (gas: 523976)\n[PASS] test_zeroRecipientRefused() (gas: 169136)\nSuite result: ok. 20 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 517.78ms (247.46ms CPU time)\n\nRan 15 tests for test/Fees.t.sol:FeesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allSwapModes(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 429058, ~: 430736)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 574343563991087\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_splitConservation(uint8,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 396930, ~: 402901)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 102\n\n[PASS] test_badAmountAndZeroSwap() (gas: 103038)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 422036)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput() (gas: 421901)\n[PASS] test_dustFeeRoundsDown() (gas: 272159)\n[PASS] test_freshTokenOnlyPoolNeedsPrepaidImdFee() (gas: 21462272)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBackingRevertsAtomically() (gas: 415217)\n[PASS] test_partialImdSpecifiedRevertsAndRollsBackFee() (gas: 344662)\n[PASS] test_partialPaperSpecifiedChargesActualImd() (gas: 348840)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 427881)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput() (gas: 427405)\n[PASS] test_splitChangePayments() (gas: 434863)\n[PASS] test_splitInvalidAndUnauthorized() (gas: 238457)\n[PASS] test_zeroSplitAndSameRecipient() (gas: 637275)\nSuite result: ok. 15 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 536.84ms (383.81ms CPU time)\n\nRan 18 tests for test/VotingProtection.t.sol:VotingProtectionTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_capBoundaryAfterTrading(bool,bool,uint96,uint8) (runs: 1000, μ: 623964, ~: 587448)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999000000017562\n\n[PASS] test_adminPriceChangeCannotExceedCallerCap() (gas: 206148)\n[PASS] test_bothPostingOverloadsAndBurnShareReentrancyGuard() (gas: 1666269)\n[PASS] test_capAtQuoteSucceedsAndEmitsActualVotes() (gas: 234786)\n[PASS] test_capCannotReplaceAllowanceAndFailureDoesNotConsumeDraftId() (gas: 398437)\n[PASS] test_cappedPostCannotReadFallbackDuringUnlockEvenWhenFree() (gas: 21886220)\n[PASS] test_cappedPostRejectsReentrantPost() (gas: 1190942)\n[PASS] test_cappedPostTransferFailuresRollBackAndAllowRetry() (gas: 1605429)\n[PASS] test_displacementCannotOverburnCappedPostWithUnlimitedAllowance() (gas: 22351682)\n[PASS] test_emptyRangeSwapCannotOverwriteLaunchQuote() (gas: 21747517)\n[PASS] test_failedSwapCannotOverwriteFallbackPrice() (gas: 1038777)\n[PASS] test_fallbackRepricesUsdAndEnforcesCapAfterEmptyRangeMovement() (gas: 21872563)\n[PASS] test_largerCapBurnsOnlyExecutionQuote() (gas: 157063)\n[PASS] test_paperOnlyLaunchSupportsQuoteAndPost() (gas: 21366512)\n[PASS] test_quoteReturnsToLivePriceWhenLiquidityResumes() (gas: 1231337)\n[PASS] test_removingAllLiquidityKeepsLastActiveQuote() (gas: 714605)\n[PASS] test_roundTripCannotDisablePostingOrOverwriteLastActiveQuote() (gas: 22570759)\n[PASS] test_zeroCapAllowsOnlyFreePost() (gas: 238053)\nSuite result: ok. 18 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 543.17ms (508.27ms CPU time)\n\nRan 14 tests for test/Voting.t.sol:VotingTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_burnConservesTokens(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 308443, ~: 308507)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 3942596573926954925810368\n\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceAndBurnAllowance() (gas: 353098)\n[PASS] test_largeSqrtPriceDoesNotOverflow() (gas: 47238843)\n[PASS] test_nonexistentDraftCannotBurn() (gas: 238878)\n[PASS] test_postAllowanceFailureRollsBackId() (gas: 327872)\n[PASS] test_postBurnsAndEmitsAuthorsVotes() (gas: 252950)\n[PASS] test_priceAndUsdSettingsChangeQuote() (gas: 391532)\n[PASS] test_quoteReadsPoolPriceBothCurrencyOrders() (gas: 47742825)\n[PASS] test_quoteUsesLaunchPriceBeforeSeeding() (gas: 47114677)\n[PASS] test_quotesAndPostsRefuseUnlockedPool() (gas: 701502)\n[PASS] test_repeatBurnAnyExistingDraftAndZeroAmount() (gas: 568553)\n[PASS] test_roundingUpPreventsFreeDustPost() (gas: 164661)\n[PASS] test_settingsOwnerOnlyAndOwnershipTransfer() (gas: 247363)\n[PASS] test_sixDecimalImdNormalization() (gas: 47756894)\nSuite result: ok. 14 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 551.52ms (387.91ms CPU time)\n\nRan 7 tests for test/FailureAtomicity.t.sol:FailureAtomicityTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_failedSettlementRollsBackEverySwapMode(bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 969215, ~: 968407)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 66815615893801612520\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_invalidSplitNeverMutatesState(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 135982, ~: 135954)\n[PASS] test_everyBoundCallbackRejectsAnotherPoolFromTheRealManager() (gas: 667174)\n[PASS] test_failedBurnCannotConsumeAllowanceOrCreateVotesAndRecovers() (gas: 1510589)\n[PASS] test_falseReturnSettlementRestoresTokenCallbackState() (gas: 1549993)\n[PASS] test_invalidRecipientInEitherPositionEvenWithZeroShare() (gas: 490663)\n[PASS] test_oversizedAmountsFailBeforeAnyPayment() (gas: 811797)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 551.80ms (327.05ms CPU time)\n\nRan 11 tests for test/Adversarial.t.sol:AdversarialTest\n[PASS] test_allAllowedLpFeesInitialize() (gas: 131728963)\n[PASS] test_badFeeDeploymentRollsBackProxyAndPool() (gas: 76390372)\n[PASS] test_everyCallbackRefusesNonManager() (gas: 358806)\n[PASS] test_feePaymentBlocksTokenReentrancy() (gas: 1351853)\n[PASS] test_liquidityAndDonationNoOpsDoNotChargeFees() (gas: 447423)\n[PASS] test_minedDeploymentCannotBeFrontRunByChangingPrice() (gas: 39656)\n[PASS] test_minerHashIncludesProxyInitialization() (gas: 41758)\n[PASS] test_permissionsDeclareAllFourteenBits() (gas: 17758)\n[PASS] test_postAndBurnBlockTokenReentrancy() (gas: 1326815)\n[PASS] test_shortTransferAndFalseReturnCannotCreateVotes() (gas: 1232931)\n[PASS] test_wrongPoolRejectedAndNoRebinding() (gas: 85859)\nSuite result: ok. 11 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 664.51ms (238.97ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/Invariant.t.sol:HookInvariantTest\n[PASS] invariant_feeConservationAndNoHookBalances() (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract    | Selector    | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+========================================================+\n| HookHandler | postAndBurn | 688   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | split       | 708   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | swap        | 652   | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 32\n  Bound result 13\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 184\n  Bound result 31976167206279047\n  Bound result 99999999000000010236\n  Bound result 43\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 2110234842\n  Bound result 23\n  Bound result 48\n  Bound result 99999999000000001129\n  Bound result 12178\n  Bound result 12\n  Bound result 1429\n  Bound result 51\n  Bound result 74826366670561284142\n  Bound result 99\n  Bound result 60326256175999154812\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 99999999000000009336\n  Bound result 60\n  Bound result 18\n  Bound result 1403418622637458226\n  Bound result 7480\n  Bound result 99999999000000000585\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 20030604910311\n  Bound result 903\n  Bound result 104\n  Bound result 147\n  Bound result 50\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.24s (730.36ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/StatefulReview.t.sol:StatefulReviewReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] invariant_allFeesAndVotesAreBackedAndStateSurvivesUpgrades() (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract      | Selector      | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+============================================================+\n| ReviewHandler | cappedPost    | 1775  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | changeSplit   | 1849  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | configure     | 1800  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | post          | 1855  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | rejectedAdmin | 1838  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | rejectedVote  | 1792  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | trade         | 1824  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | upgrade       | 1856  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | vote          | 1795  | 0       | 0        |\n╰---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 50\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 3762\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 3012608172\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 548449113\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 4000016142140728237\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 4000016139128120064\n  Bound result 1967854\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 1383\n  Bound result 17730\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 17190\n  Bound result 17371\n  Bound result 809779766065414620\n  Bound result 998586174433981\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 131071\n  Bound result 30\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 9900000000000002674\n  Bound result 2813059831\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 560\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 5034\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 7672\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 9900000002552851541\n  Bound result 14542\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 9900000000000001334\n  Bound result 17\n  Bound result 15630\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 13124\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 10010\n  Bound result 1511\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 9900000000911912719\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 9900000000000000120\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 9900000000000008539\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 7.74s (7.73s CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/StatefulReview.t.sol:StatefulReviewTest\n[PASS] invariant_allFeesAndVotesAreBackedAndStateSurvivesUpgrades() (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract      | Selector      | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+============================================================+\n| ReviewHandler | cappedPost    | 1775  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | changeSplit   | 1849  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | configure     | 1800  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | post          | 1855  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | rejectedAdmin | 1838  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | rejectedVote  | 1792  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | trade         | 1824  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | upgrade       | 1856  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | vote          | 1795  | 0       | 0        |\n╰---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 50\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 11310\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 218\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 554145395\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 4000016139128127831\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 4000016139128127612\n  Bound result 1967854\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 212\n  Bound result 17580\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 16874\n  Bound result 17088\n  Bound result 809779766065414620\n  Bound result 998586174433981\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 11716\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 9900000000000002860\n  Bound result 8566\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 3858947844\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 4169656895\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 5112\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 9900000000000007756\n  Bound result 14282\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 9900000000000002727\n  Bound result 21\n  Bound result 12582912\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 2251799813685247\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 7197\n  Bound result 3162\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 9900000000000003312\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 9900000000000000120\n  Bound result 9\n  Bound result 9900000000000005839\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 7.82s (7.57s CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/RouterStateful.t.sol:RouterStatefulReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] invariant_routerPreservesEachUsersFundsAndOnlyRetainsUnsolicitedDeposits() (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract             | Selector         | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+======================================================================+\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | changeSplit      | 3321  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | depositResidual  | 3198  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | rejectedSlippage | 3311  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | trade            | 3288  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | upgrade          | 3266  | 0       | 0        |\n╰----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 7000000000000000000\n  Bound result 999999999999999999\n  Bound result 73\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 210\n  Bound result 99999999000000000058\n  Bound result 99999999000000004518\n  Bound result 99999999000000000024\n  Bound result 6173\n  Bound result 3829\n  Bound result 54\n  Bound result 3223057859686233904\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 14275511012\n  Bound result 3715\n  Bound result 99999999000000010124\n  Bound result 17836\n  Bound result 4223057859686265456\n  Bound result 99999999000000011588\n  Bound result 99999999000000003233\n  Bound result 99999999000000001554\n  Bound result 99999999000000015129\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 99999999000000010906\n  Bound result 5203748187914155769\n  Bound result 18014398509481985\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 11566631278123535939\n  Bound result 9999999999986172\n  Bound result 437\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 24\n  Bound result 98123719420494610175\n  Bound result 68\n  Bound result 13165\n  Bound result 2850\n  Bound result 99999999000000007105\n  Bound result 99999999000000012861\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 99999999000000012906\n  Bound result 42\n  Bound result 99999999000000000905\n  Bound result 6545970592751668699\n  Bound result 99999999000000003102\n  Bound result 10215\n  Bound result 99999999549272981065\n  Bound result 99999999000000000022\n  Bound result 99999999000000000048\n  Bound result 99999999000000000905\n  Bound result 86994191261803930690\n  Bound result 2061148317179429\n  Bound result 99999999000000003810\n  Bound result 156\n  Bound result 99999999000000010666\n  Bound result 99999999000000000168\n  Bound result 11683\n  Bound result 99999999000000011385\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 130950241904075686\n  Bound result 140\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 8.48s (8.47s CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/RouterStateful.t.sol:RouterStatefulTest\n[PASS] invariant_routerPreservesEachUsersFundsAndOnlyRetainsUnsolicitedDeposits() (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract             | Selector         | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+======================================================================+\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | changeSplit      | 3321  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | depositResidual  | 3198  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | rejectedSlippage | 3311  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | trade            | 3288  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | upgrade          | 3266  | 0       | 0        |\n╰----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 7000000000000000000\n  Bound result 999999999999999999\n  Bound result 73\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 170\n  Bound result 99999999000000000058\n  Bound result 99999999000000004691\n  Bound result 99999999000000000024\n  Bound result 6173\n  Bound result 119\n  Bound result 54\n  Bound result 15929\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 10744\n  Bound result 7318\n  Bound result 99999999000000007675\n  Bound result 17773\n  Bound result 1000000000000047311\n  Bound result 99999999000000011651\n  Bound result 99999999000000000260\n  Bound result 99999999000000001351\n  Bound result 99999999000000008374\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 99999999000000010780\n  Bound result 5203748187914155769\n  Bound result 38961556603826344585\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 9999999999989999\n  Bound result 9999999999989880\n  Bound result 437\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 24\n  Bound result 99999999000000013007\n  Bound result 68\n  Bound result 5947\n  Bound result 886\n  Bound result 99999999000000005547\n  Bound result 99999999000000011770\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 99999999000000013107\n  Bound result 19\n  Bound result 99999999000000000862\n  Bound result 6545970592751668699\n  Bound result 99999999000000000700\n  Bound result 5769\n  Bound result 99999999549272981065\n  Bound result 99999999000000000616\n  Bound result 99999999004295128741\n  Bound result 52151286562194415836\n  Bound result 99999999000000008524\n  Bound result 2061148317179429\n  Bound result 99999999003500914325\n  Bound result 72\n  Bound result 99999999000000007231\n  Bound result 99999999002514000707\n  Bound result 1568429952057161447\n  Bound result 99999999000000009486\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 130950241904075686\n  Bound result 67\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 8.49s (8.13s CPU time)\n\nRan 20 test suites in 8.49s (39.45s CPU time): 196 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (196 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":133,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"Paper.approve(address,uint256)\",\"Paper.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"Paper.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"PaperDeployment.deployHook(bytes32,address,(address,address,address,uint256,uint160,uint24,int24))\",\"PaperDeployment.deployToken()\",\"PaperHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"PaperHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"PaperHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"PaperHook.burn(uint256,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.initialize(address,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.postDraft(bytes32)\",\"PaperHook.postDraft(bytes32,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.setImdUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHook.setPostFeeUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHook.setSplit(address,uint256,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.transferOwnership(address)\",\"PaperHookV2.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"PaperHookV2.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"PaperHookV2.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"PaperHookV2.burn(uint256,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.initialize(address,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.postDraft(bytes32)\",\"PaperHookV2.postDraft(bytes32,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.setImdUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.setPostFeeUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.setSplit(address,uint256,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.transferOwnership(address)\",\"PaperProxy.fallback()\",\"PaperSwapRouter.swap((bool,int256,uint160),uint256,uint256,address,uint256)\",\"PaperSwapRouter.unlockCallback(bytes)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"LICENSE\":21,\"README.md\":132,\"docs/ADVERSARIAL_REVIEW.md\":51,\"docs/dependencies.json\":22,\"docs/deployment-parameters.json\":54,\"foundry.toml\":22,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/MineSalt.s.sol\":16,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":28,\"src/Paper.sol\":11,\"src/PaperDeployment.sol\":85,\"src/PaperHook.sol\":439,\"src/PaperHookV2.sol\":14,\"src/PaperProxy.sol\":68,\"src/PaperSwapRouter.sol\":92,\"test/Adversarial.t.sol\":151,\"test/FailureAtomicity.t.sol\":175,\"test/Fees.t.sol\":203,\"test/HookFixture.sol\":98,\"test/Invariant.t.sol\":90,\"test/Paper.t.sol\":52,\"test/REVIEW.md\":40,\"test/Router.t.sol\":361,\"test/RouterStateful.t.sol\":238,\"test/StatefulReview.t.sol\":265,\"test/Upgrade.t.sol\":253,\"test/Voting.t.sol\":194,\"test/VotingProperties.t.sol\":183,\"test/VotingProtection.t.sol\":367,\"test/mocks/HostilePaper.sol\":45,\"test/mocks/MockDecimalsERC20.sol\":16,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":14,\"test/mocks/PoolRouter.sol\":65,\"test/mocks/UnlockProbe.sol\":32},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"73c8136bdd6f29edc0128fec55b6c6425a279b1411b03481a6b141a3c3fcbc86","verifiedTreeHash":"46cab6b801aa9eeda656c3f80f145f13cd15f845","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+94826a22"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":9809,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 117 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 9.62s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[missing-zero-check]: address parameter is used in a state write or value transfer without a zero-address check\n   ╭▸ src/PaperProxy.sol:25:17\n   │\n25 │     constructor(address implementation, bytes memory initialization)\n   │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-zero-check\n\nwarning[missing-events-access-control]: `callbackHash` is changed without an event but is used for access control\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:69:9\n   │\n69 │         callbackHash = bytes32(0);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-events-access-control\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:40:9\n   │\n40 │         emit TokenAllocated(address(token), msg.sender, poolAmount, remainder);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperProxy.sol:32:20\n   │\n32 │                 && bytes4(initialization) == bytes4(keccak256(\"initialize(address,address,uint256)\")),\n   │                    ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'bytes4' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperProxy.sol:32:46\n   │\n32 │                 && bytes4(initialization) == bytes4(keccak256(\"initialize(address,address,uint256)\")),\n   │                                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'bytes4' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[encode-packed-collision]: `abi.encodePacked()` called with multiple dynamic type arguments; hash collisions possible\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:46:16\n   │\n46 │         return abi.encodePacked(type(PaperProxy).creationCode, abi.encode(implementation, initialization));\n   │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/encode-packed-collision\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:61:28\n   │\n61 │         delta = abi.decode(manager.unlock(data), (BalanceDelta));\n   │                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:47:13\n   │\n47 │         if (block.timestamp > deadline) revert Expired();\n   │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:49:41\n   │\n49 │             maxInput == 0 || maxInput > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max)) || params.amountSpecified == 0\n   │                                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:49:49\n   │\n49 │             maxInput == 0 || maxInput > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max)) || params.amountSpecified == 0\n   │                                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:83:9\n   │\n83 │         emit HookDeployed(address(hook), implementation, salt);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[incorrect-strict-equality]: dangerous strict equality check on an externally-influenced value\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:57:13\n   │\n57 │         if (input.balanceOf(address(this)) - beforeBalance != maxInput) revert InexactTransfer();\n   │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/incorrect-strict-equality\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:82:9\n   │\n82 │         config.manager.initialize(key, config.sqrtPriceX96);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:123:9\n    │\n123 │         emit OwnershipTransferred(address(0), owner_);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:124:9\n    │\n124 │         emit SplitChanged(ORDERS, s.ordersBps, DEV, s.devBps);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:125:9\n    │\n125 │         emit PostFeeUsdChanged(1);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:126:9\n    │\n126 │         emit ImdUsdChanged(usdWad);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:174:69\n    │\n174 │     function transferOwnership(address newOwner) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {\n    │                                                                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:177:9\n    │\n177 │         emit OwnershipTransferred(s.owner, newOwner);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:82:25\n   │\n82 │         uint256 spent = uint256(-int256(inputDelta));\n   │                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:83:28\n   │\n83 │         uint256 received = uint256(int256(outputDelta));\n   │                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:86:63\n   │\n86 │                 || (params.amountSpecified > 0 && received != uint256(params.amountSpecified))\n   │                                                               ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:184:9\n    │\n184 │         nonReentrant\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:197:9\n    │\n197 │         emit SplitChanged(ordersWallet, ordersBps, devWallet, devBps);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:201:60\n    │\n201 │     function setPostFeeUsd(uint256 usd) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {\n    │                                                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:203:9\n    │\n203 │         emit PostFeeUsdChanged(usd);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:206:59\n    │\n206 │     function setImdUsd(uint256 usdWad) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {\n    │                                                           ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:209:9\n    │\n209 │         emit ImdUsdChanged(usdWad);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:252:9\n    │\n252 │         emit DraftPosted(draftId, msg.sender, textHash, amount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:258:9\n    │\n258 │         emit Burned(draftId, msg.sender, amount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[incorrect-strict-equality]: dangerous strict equality check on an externally-influenced value\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:265:13\n    │\n265 │         if (paper.balanceOf(DEAD) - beforeBalance != amount) revert InexactTransfer();\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/incorrect-strict-equality\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:284:9\n    │\n284 │         emit PoolBound(key.toId(), s.token);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:291:9\n    │\n291 │         nonReentrant\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:346:9\n    │\n346 │         emit FeesPaid(fee, ordersAmount, devAmount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:305:9\n    │\n305 │         nonReentrant\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:351:26\n    │\n351 │         uint256 amount = uint256(value < 0 ? -value : value);\n    │                          ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:352:22\n    │\n352 │         if (amount > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                      ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:352:30\n    │\n352 │         if (amount > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:357:21\n    │\n357 │         if (value > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:357:29\n    │\n357 │         if (value > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:358:16\n    │\n358 │         return int128(int256(value));\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:358:23\n    │\n358 │         return int128(int256(value));\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":6230,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 4 tests for test/Paper.t.sol:PaperTest\n[PASS] test_allowanceAndBalanceFailures() (gas: 162803)\n[PASS] test_deploymentAllocatesEightyPercentAndRemainder() (gas: 555001)\n[PASS] test_metadataSupplyAndTransfer() (gas: 118951)\n[PASS] test_noMintOrAdminEvenForDeployer() (gas: 53689)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 743.68µs (1.70ms CPU time)\n\nRan 20 tests for test/Router.t.sol:RouterTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allModesConserveFunds(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 478126, ~: 478451)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 11761820836955\n\n[PASS] test_attackerCannotSpendAnotherAccountsApproval() (gas: 229978)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 468602)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutputRefundsUnusedBudget() (gas: 474309)\n[PASS] test_callbackRequiresManagerAndActiveRequest() (gas: 185600)\n[PASS] test_excessiveMinOutputRollsBackPrepaymentAndFees() (gas: 501076)\n[PASS] test_expiredDeadlineDoesNotPullFunds() (gas: 186836)\n[PASS] test_firstBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolPaysBothWalletsWithoutBacking() (gas: 15178790)\n[PASS] test_firstExactOutputBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolRefundsBudget() (gas: 15171780)\n[PASS] test_inputTokenCannotReenterSwap() (gas: 1634314)\n[PASS] test_insufficientExactOutputBudgetRollsBack() (gas: 450357)\n[PASS] test_partialExactOutputRollsBackEvenWithLowMinimum() (gas: 460437)\n[PASS] test_refusedOutputRollsBackAlreadyPaidRefundAndAllowsRetry() (gas: 1919566)\n[PASS] test_refusedRefundRollsBackSwapAndAllowsRetry() (gas: 1905591)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 474104)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutputRefundsUnusedBudget() (gas: 480124)\n[PASS] test_shortInputTransferRollsBack() (gas: 1131285)\n[PASS] test_shortManagerSettlementRollsBackSuccessfulInitialPull() (gas: 1749997)\n[PASS] test_unrelatedRouterDepositsAreNotRefundedToTrader() (gas: 523976)\n[PASS] test_zeroRecipientRefused() (gas: 169136)\nSuite result: ok. 20 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 227.32ms (152.90ms CPU time)\n\nRan 7 tests for test/VotingProperties.t.sol:VotingPropertiesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_quoteIsSmallestSufficientWholeTokenAmount(uint64,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 128287, ~: 128219)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1080184629\n  Bound result 122998462930\n\n[PASS] test_eventsAttributeEveryVoteExactlyOnceAcrossAuthorsAndRepeatedHashes() (gas: 675558)\n[PASS] test_exactApprovalProtectsPostWhenPoolPriceChanges() (gas: 675728)\n[PASS] test_existingDraftRemainsVotableWhenLiquidityIsRemoved() (gas: 521343)\n[PASS] test_freshV2ReversedDefaultsActuallyPayBothDirections() (gas: 45988438)\n[PASS] test_maximumBurnFailsWithoutChangingExistingDraft() (gas: 289442)\n[PASS] test_transferringHookOwnershipDoesNotTransferUpgradeAuthority() (gas: 536080)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 231.63ms (119.93ms CPU time)\n\nRan 11 tests for test/Adversarial.t.sol:AdversarialTest\n[PASS] test_allAllowedLpFeesInitialize() (gas: 131728963)\n[PASS] test_badFeeDeploymentRollsBackProxyAndPool() (gas: 76390372)\n[PASS] test_everyCallbackRefusesNonManager() (gas: 358806)\n[PASS] test_feePaymentBlocksTokenReentrancy() (gas: 1351853)\n[PASS] test_liquidityAndDonationNoOpsDoNotChargeFees() (gas: 447423)\n[PASS] test_minedDeploymentCannotBeFrontRunByChangingPrice() (gas: 39656)\n[PASS] test_minerHashIncludesProxyInitialization() (gas: 41758)\n[PASS] test_permissionsDeclareAllFourteenBits() (gas: 17758)\n[PASS] test_postAndBurnBlockTokenReentrancy() (gas: 1326815)\n[PASS] test_shortTransferAndFalseReturnCannotCreateVotes() (gas: 1232931)\n[PASS] test_wrongPoolRejectedAndNoRebinding() (gas: 85859)\nSuite result: ok. 11 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 254.98ms (196.50ms CPU time)\n\nRan 15 tests for test/Fees.t.sol:FeesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allSwapModes(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 428677, ~: 426419)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 11761820836955\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_splitConservation(uint8,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 395921, ~: 402901)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 17939643750\n\n[PASS] test_badAmountAndZeroSwap() (gas: 103038)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 422036)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput() (gas: 421901)\n[PASS] test_dustFeeRoundsDown() (gas: 272159)\n[PASS] test_freshTokenOnlyPoolNeedsPrepaidImdFee() (gas: 21462272)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBackingRevertsAtomically() (gas: 415217)\n[PASS] test_partialImdSpecifiedRevertsAndRollsBackFee() (gas: 344662)\n[PASS] test_partialPaperSpecifiedChargesActualImd() (gas: 348840)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 427881)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput() (gas: 427405)\n[PASS] test_splitChangePayments() (gas: 434863)\n[PASS] test_splitInvalidAndUnauthorized() (gas: 238457)\n[PASS] test_zeroSplitAndSameRecipient() (gas: 637275)\nSuite result: ok. 15 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 288.88ms (272.47ms CPU time)\n\nRan 14 tests for test/Voting.t.sol:VotingTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_burnConservesTokens(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 308446, ~: 308495)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 36028797018963967\n\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceAndBurnAllowance() (gas: 353098)\n[PASS] test_largeSqrtPriceDoesNotOverflow() (gas: 47238843)\n[PASS] test_nonexistentDraftCannotBurn() (gas: 238878)\n[PASS] test_postAllowanceFailureRollsBackId() (gas: 327872)\n[PASS] test_postBurnsAndEmitsAuthorsVotes() (gas: 252950)\n[PASS] test_priceAndUsdSettingsChangeQuote() (gas: 391532)\n[PASS] test_quoteReadsPoolPriceBothCurrencyOrders() (gas: 47742825)\n[PASS] test_quoteUsesLaunchPriceBeforeSeeding() (gas: 47114677)\n[PASS] test_quotesAndPostsRefuseUnlockedPool() (gas: 701502)\n[PASS] test_repeatBurnAnyExistingDraftAndZeroAmount() (gas: 568553)\n[PASS] test_roundingUpPreventsFreeDustPost() (gas: 164661)\n[PASS] test_settingsOwnerOnlyAndOwnershipTransfer() (gas: 247363)\n[PASS] test_sixDecimalImdNormalization() (gas: 47756894)\nSuite result: ok. 14 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 307.32ms (257.01ms CPU time)\n\nRan 15 tests for test/Fees.t.sol:FeesReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allSwapModes(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 429567, ~: 431475)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 11761820836955\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_splitConservation(uint8,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 402385, ~: 409738)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 16\n  Bound result 94039931730121202754\n\n[PASS] test_badAmountAndZeroSwap() (gas: 103304)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 428566)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput() (gas: 427147)\n[PASS] test_dustFeeRoundsDown() (gas: 279006)\n[PASS] test_freshTokenOnlyPoolNeedsPrepaidImdFee() (gas: 14644431)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBackingRevertsAtomically() (gas: 415255)\n[PASS] test_partialImdSpecifiedRevertsAndRollsBackFee() (gas: 350911)\n[PASS] test_partialPaperSpecifiedChargesActualImd() (gas: 343031)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 421794)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput() (gas: 422602)\n[PASS] test_splitChangePayments() (gas: 441393)\n[PASS] test_splitInvalidAndUnauthorized() (gas: 238457)\n[PASS] test_zeroSplitAndSameRecipient() (gas: 644303)\nSuite result: ok. 15 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 307.45ms (392.84ms CPU time)\n\nRan 14 tests for test/Upgrade.t.sol:UpgradeTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_runtimeWhitelistRejectsChangesBeforeDelegation(uint16,uint8,bool) (runs: 1000, μ: 85676, ~: 85495)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 4625\n  Bound result 4\n\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsCounterfeitBeforeInitialization() (gas: 152803)\n[PASS] test_hookOwnerAndStrangerCannotUpgrade() (gas: 94511)\n[PASS] test_initializersCannotBeUsedAgainOrOnImplementations() (gas: 127709)\n[PASS] test_managerNormalizationRejectsDirtyAddressPadding() (gas: 59653)\n[PASS] test_proxyAdminCannotCallHookFunctions() (gas: 6947)\n[PASS] test_proxyFlagsAndAdminOwnerAreFixed() (gas: 59280)\n[PASS] test_upgradeKeepsAllStateAndTradingVotingWork() (gas: 1269202)\n[PASS] test_upgradeKeepsFallbackPriceAndCappedPosting() (gas: 865234)\n[PASS] test_upgradeRejectsCanonicalImplementationForAnotherManager() (gas: 4432431)\n[PASS] test_upgradeRejectsCounterfeitFeeGetterBeforeInitialization() (gas: 450729)\n[PASS] test_upgradeRejectsModifiedCanonicalRuntime() (gas: 59055)\n[PASS] test_v2ReversesDefaultsOnlyForFreshProxy() (gas: 45136814)\n[PASS] test_whitelistRejectsAppendedRuntimeEvenWhenBehaviorIsUnchanged() (gas: 66363)\nSuite result: ok. 14 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 307.24ms (251.77ms CPU time)\n\nRan 14 tests for test/Voting.t.sol:VotingReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_burnConservesTokens(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 308457, ~: 308506)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 12383\n\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceAndBurnAllowance() (gas: 353120)\n[PASS] test_largeSqrtPriceDoesNotOverflow() (gas: 50122799)\n[PASS] test_nonexistentDraftCannotBurn() (gas: 238889)\n[PASS] test_postAllowanceFailureRollsBackId() (gas: 327894)\n[PASS] test_postBurnsAndEmitsAuthorsVotes() (gas: 252972)\n[PASS] test_priceAndUsdSettingsChangeQuote() (gas: 391576)\n[PASS] test_quoteReadsPoolPriceBothCurrencyOrders() (gas: 50633164)\n[PASS] test_quoteUsesLaunchPriceBeforeSeeding() (gas: 49998226)\n[PASS] test_quotesAndPostsRefuseUnlockedPool() (gas: 701502)\n[PASS] test_repeatBurnAnyExistingDraftAndZeroAmount() (gas: 568575)\n[PASS] test_roundingUpPreventsFreeDustPost() (gas: 164683)\n[PASS] test_settingsOwnerOnlyAndOwnershipTransfer() (gas: 247363)\n[PASS] test_sixDecimalImdNormalization() (gas: 50640660)\nSuite result: ok. 14 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 339.69ms (342.67ms CPU time)\n\nRan 7 tests for test/FailureAtomicity.t.sol:FailureAtomicityReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_failedSettlementRollsBackEverySwapMode(bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 966028, ~: 966059)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999000000000102\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_invalidSplitNeverMutatesState(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 135998, ~: 135990)\n[PASS] test_everyBoundCallbackRejectsAnotherPoolFromTheRealManager() (gas: 669226)\n[PASS] test_failedBurnCannotConsumeAllowanceOrCreateVotesAndRecovers() (gas: 1510600)\n[PASS] test_falseReturnSettlementRestoresTokenCallbackState() (gas: 1538515)\n[PASS] test_invalidRecipientInEitherPositionEvenWithZeroShare() (gas: 497193)\n[PASS] test_oversizedAmountsFailBeforeAnyPayment() (gas: 812427)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 339.80ms (374.60ms CPU time)\n\nRan 20 tests for test/Router.t.sol:RouterReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allModesConserveFunds(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 478784, ~: 479177)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 11761820836955\n\n[PASS] test_attackerCannotSpendAnotherAccountsApproval() (gas: 229778)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 474852)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutputRefundsUnusedBudget() (gas: 479262)\n[PASS] test_callbackRequiresManagerAndActiveRequest() (gas: 185600)\n[PASS] test_excessiveMinOutputRollsBackPrepaymentAndFees() (gas: 507326)\n[PASS] test_expiredDeadlineDoesNotPullFunds() (gas: 186646)\n[PASS] test_firstBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolPaysBothWalletsWithoutBacking() (gas: 13567818)\n[PASS] test_firstExactOutputBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolRefundsBudget() (gas: 13559511)\n[PASS] test_inputTokenCannotReenterSwap() (gas: 1640374)\n[PASS] test_insufficientExactOutputBudgetRollsBack() (gas: 455310)\n[PASS] test_partialExactOutputRollsBackEvenWithLowMinimum() (gas: 466260)\n[PASS] test_refusedOutputRollsBackAlreadyPaidRefundAndAllowsRetry() (gas: 1929472)\n[PASS] test_refusedRefundRollsBackSwapAndAllowsRetry() (gas: 1915497)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 467828)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutputRefundsUnusedBudget() (gas: 475145)\n[PASS] test_shortInputTransferRollsBack() (gas: 1131085)\n[PASS] test_shortManagerSettlementRollsBackSuccessfulInitialPull() (gas: 1754730)\n[PASS] test_unrelatedRouterDepositsAreNotRefundedToTrader() (gas: 528916)\n[PASS] test_zeroRecipientRefused() (gas: 168946)\nSuite result: ok. 20 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 340.90ms (140.58ms CPU time)\n\nRan 7 tests for test/VotingProperties.t.sol:VotingPropertiesReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_quoteIsSmallestSufficientWholeTokenAmount(uint64,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 128299, ~: 128230)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1080184629\n  Bound result 122998462930\n\n[PASS] test_eventsAttributeEveryVoteExactlyOnceAcrossAuthorsAndRepeatedHashes() (gas: 675580)\n[PASS] test_exactApprovalProtectsPostWhenPoolPriceChanges() (gas: 669672)\n[PASS] test_existingDraftRemainsVotableWhenLiquidityIsRemoved() (gas: 521593)\n[PASS] test_freshV2ReversedDefaultsActuallyPayBothDirections() (gas: 3773034)\n[PASS] test_maximumBurnFailsWithoutChangingExistingDraft() (gas: 289453)\n[PASS] test_transferringHookOwnershipDoesNotTransferUpgradeAuthority() (gas: 542610)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 340.88ms (346.39ms CPU time)\n\nRan 7 tests for test/FailureAtomicity.t.sol:FailureAtomicityTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_failedSettlementRollsBackEverySwapMode(bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 969294, ~: 969377)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999000000015710\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_invalidSplitNeverMutatesState(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 135997, ~: 135990)\n[PASS] test_everyBoundCallbackRejectsAnotherPoolFromTheRealManager() (gas: 667174)\n[PASS] test_failedBurnCannotConsumeAllowanceOrCreateVotesAndRecovers() (gas: 1510589)\n[PASS] test_falseReturnSettlementRestoresTokenCallbackState() (gas: 1549993)\n[PASS] test_invalidRecipientInEitherPositionEvenWithZeroShare() (gas: 490663)\n[PASS] test_oversizedAmountsFailBeforeAnyPayment() (gas: 811797)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 341.02ms (364.04ms CPU time)\n\nRan 19 tests for test/VotingProtection.t.sol:VotingProtectionTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_capBoundaryAfterTrading(bool,bool,uint96,uint8) (runs: 1000, μ: 624077, ~: 587606)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999000000016597\n\n[PASS] test_adminPriceChangeCannotExceedCallerCap() (gas: 206126)\n[PASS] test_bothPostingOverloadsAndBurnShareReentrancyGuard() (gas: 1666247)\n[PASS] test_capAtQuoteSucceedsAndEmitsActualVotes() (gas: 234848)\n[PASS] test_capCannotReplaceAllowanceAndFailureDoesNotConsumeDraftId() (gas: 398503)\n[PASS] test_cappedPostCannotReadFallbackDuringUnlockEvenWhenFree() (gas: 21886198)\n[PASS] test_cappedPostRejectsReentrantPost() (gas: 1190942)\n[PASS] test_cappedPostTransferFailuresRollBackAndAllowRetry() (gas: 1605407)\n[PASS] test_displacementCannotOverburnCappedPostWithUnlimitedAllowance() (gas: 22351661)\n[PASS] test_emptyRangeSwapCannotOverwriteLaunchQuote() (gas: 21747584)\n[PASS] test_failedSwapCannotOverwriteFallbackPrice() (gas: 1038777)\n[PASS] test_fallbackRepricesUsdAndEnforcesCapAfterEmptyRangeMovement() (gas: 21872541)\n[PASS] test_largerCapBurnsOnlyExecutionQuote() (gas: 157041)\n[PASS] test_paperOnlyLaunchSupportsQuoteAndPost() (gas: 21366490)\n[PASS] test_quoteReturnsToLivePriceWhenLiquidityResumes() (gas: 1231315)\n[PASS] test_removingAllLiquidityKeepsLastActiveQuote() (gas: 714605)\n[PASS] test_roundTripCannotDisablePostingOrOverwriteLastActiveQuote() (gas: 22570737)\n[PASS] test_savedManipulatedPriceStillRequiresCallerCapAfterDustRemoval() (gas: 23079275)\n[PASS] test_zeroCapAllowsOnlyFreePost() (gas: 238053)\nSuite result: ok. 19 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 340.84ms (423.16ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/FeeEdges.t.sol:FeeEdgesReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_partialSellRefundsUnusedBudget(uint96,uint8) (runs: 1000, μ: 611537, ~: 611743)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99000000000003041954473\n  Bound result 5\n\n[PASS] test_partialSellMinimumBoundaryRollsBackAndAllowsRetry() (gas: 1946352)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 340.98ms (337.83ms CPU time)\n\nRan 19 tests for test/VotingProtection.t.sol:VotingProtectionReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_capBoundaryAfterTrading(bool,bool,uint96,uint8) (runs: 1000, μ: 622286, ~: 587375)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999000000020632\n\n[PASS] test_adminPriceChangeCannotExceedCallerCap() (gas: 206148)\n[PASS] test_bothPostingOverloadsAndBurnShareReentrancyGuard() (gas: 1666280)\n[PASS] test_capAtQuoteSucceedsAndEmitsActualVotes() (gas: 234859)\n[PASS] test_capCannotReplaceAllowanceAndFailureDoesNotConsumeDraftId() (gas: 398536)\n[PASS] test_cappedPostCannotReadFallbackDuringUnlockEvenWhenFree() (gas: 15061580)\n[PASS] test_cappedPostRejectsReentrantPost() (gas: 1190953)\n[PASS] test_cappedPostTransferFailuresRollBackAndAllowRetry() (gas: 1605440)\n[PASS] test_displacementCannotOverburnCappedPostWithUnlimitedAllowance() (gas: 15506254)\n[PASS] test_emptyRangeSwapCannotOverwriteLaunchQuote() (gas: 14916719)\n[PASS] test_failedSwapCannotOverwriteFallbackPrice() (gas: 1033302)\n[PASS] test_fallbackRepricesUsdAndEnforcesCapAfterEmptyRangeMovement() (gas: 15041687)\n[PASS] test_largerCapBurnsOnlyExecutionQuote() (gas: 157052)\n[PASS] test_paperOnlyLaunchSupportsQuoteAndPost() (gas: 14541894)\n[PASS] test_quoteReturnsToLivePriceWhenLiquidityResumes() (gas: 1232657)\n[PASS] test_removingAllLiquidityKeepsLastActiveQuote() (gas: 721396)\n[PASS] test_roundTripCannotDisablePostingOrOverwriteLastActiveQuote() (gas: 15748435)\n[PASS] test_savedManipulatedPriceStillRequiresCallerCapAfterDustRemoval() (gas: 16235117)\n[PASS] test_zeroCapAllowsOnlyFreePost() (gas: 238075)\nSuite result: ok. 19 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 340.85ms (479.79ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/FeeEdges.t.sol:FeeEdgesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_partialSellRefundsUnusedBudget(uint96,uint8) (runs: 1000, μ: 617601, ~: 617804)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99000000120361096204086\n  Bound result 2\n\n[PASS] test_partialSellMinimumBoundaryRollsBackAndAllowsRetry() (gas: 1964397)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 340.85ms (223.83ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/Invariant.t.sol:HookInvariantTest\n[PASS] invariant_feeConservationAndNoHookBalances() (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract    | Selector    | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+========================================================+\n| HookHandler | postAndBurn | 643   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | split       | 766   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | swap        | 639   | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999000000014131\n  Bound result 99999999000000005878\n  Bound result 17613\n  Bound result 2252\n  Bound result 99999999000000018021\n  Bound result 1073\n  Bound result 99999999000000016743\n  Bound result 126\n  Bound result 37771561746496601559\n  Bound result 1337\n  Bound result 99999999000000008240\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 99999999000000001180\n  Bound result 99999999000911912717\n  Bound result 6030\n  Bound result 99999999000000001582\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 17\n  Bound result 17786\n  Bound result 30\n  Bound result 15\n  Bound result 99999999000000001135\n  Bound result 9301\n  Bound result 1468\n  Bound result 3064508665\n  Bound result 26875825911089412713\n  Bound result 226\n  Bound result 99999999000000011909\n  Bound result 99999999000000001953\n  Bound result 150\n  Bound result 99999999000000004132\n  Bound result 184\n  Bound result 6545970592751668702\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 729.58ms (600.73ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/StatefulReview.t.sol:StatefulReviewReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] invariant_allFeesAndVotesAreBackedAndStateSurvivesUpgrades() (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract      | Selector      | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+============================================================+\n| ReviewHandler | cappedPost    | 1807  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | changeSplit   | 1847  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | configure     | 1779  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | post          | 1771  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | rejectedAdmin | 1872  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | rejectedVote  | 1904  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | trade         | 1800  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | upgrade       | 1818  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | vote          | 1786  | 0       | 0        |\n╰---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 50\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1504\n  Bound result 52\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 11631\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 9900000000000003102\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 10966\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 778\n  Bound result 50\n  Bound result 347\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 288\n  Bound result 145865\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 9900000000000001399\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 9900000000000012881\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 15603\n  Bound result 41\n  Bound result 14134\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 9900000000000001186\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 11842\n  Bound result 1333\n  Bound result 155\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 4099\n  Bound result 15\n  Bound result 60\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 9900000000000005838\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 1959791475511024953\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 9900000000000003429\n  Bound result 251729048025149406\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 9900029591252455155\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 2350\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 329\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 28030686263559712293\n  Bound result 15\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 5.46s (5.45s CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/StatefulReview.t.sol:StatefulReviewTest\n[PASS] invariant_allFeesAndVotesAreBackedAndStateSurvivesUpgrades() (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract      | Selector      | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+============================================================+\n| ReviewHandler | cappedPost    | 1807  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | changeSplit   | 1847  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | configure     | 1779  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | post          | 1771  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | rejectedAdmin | 1872  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | rejectedVote  | 1904  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | trade         | 1800  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | upgrade       | 1818  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | vote          | 1786  | 0       | 0        |\n╰---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 50\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 111\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 2917\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 1637068496743295376\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 6949\n  Bound result 170\n  Bound result 1644\n  Bound result 50\n  Bound result 97\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 1408\n  Bound result 145865\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 9900000000000014426\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 288230376151711744\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 15197253306767492562\n  Bound result 142\n  Bound result 32742195629345763489\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 7812411813324659043\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 11619\n  Bound result 1333\n  Bound result 13\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 8566\n  Bound result 65\n  Bound result 155\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 9900000000000003641\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 1959791475511024953\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 7866185675041111121\n  Bound result 1376963488\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 9900029591252455155\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 668\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 13147\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 21260875447830074382\n  Bound result 4\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 5.58s (5.41s CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/RouterStateful.t.sol:RouterStatefulTest\n[PASS] invariant_routerPreservesEachUsersFundsAndOnlyRetainsUnsolicitedDeposits() (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract             | Selector         | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+======================================================================+\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | changeSplit      | 3274  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | depositResidual  | 3249  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | rejectedSlippage | 3292  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | trade            | 3303  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | upgrade          | 3266  | 0       | 0        |\n╰----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 7000000000000000000\n  Bound result 999999999999999999\n  Bound result 73\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 99999999000000019618\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 5235\n  Bound result 17258\n  Bound result 99999999058926116435\n  Bound result 13\n  Bound result 99999999000000013865\n  Bound result 99999999000000015549\n  Bound result 99999999000000007097\n  Bound result 64\n  Bound result 99999999001632305591\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 99999999000004594638\n  Bound result 99999999292912820093\n  Bound result 51\n  Bound result 99999999000000000802\n  Bound result 99999999000000001327\n  Bound result 120\n  Bound result 196\n  Bound result 99999999000000002821\n  Bound result 99999999000000005918\n  Bound result 99999999000000009951\n  Bound result 99999999000203399663\n  Bound result 288584177\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 1687\n  Bound result 12\n  Bound result 80\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 99999999000000006470\n  Bound result 1668\n  Bound result 8022993867563984026\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 6165\n  Bound result 99999999000000012738\n  Bound result 966713465832979085\n  Bound result 7893\n  Bound result 630817509\n  Bound result 99999999000000002324\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 3259\n  Bound result 64\n  Bound result 99999999000000003552\n  Bound result 6545970592751668699\n  Bound result 5417\n  Bound result 1327454329\n  Bound result 99999999000000012281\n  Bound result 4264337585621134081\n  Bound result 99999999000000003816\n  Bound result 666996670\n  Bound result 99999999000000011748\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 5.97s (5.89s CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/RouterStateful.t.sol:RouterStatefulReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] invariant_routerPreservesEachUsersFundsAndOnlyRetainsUnsolicitedDeposits() (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract             | Selector         | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+======================================================================+\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | changeSplit      | 3274  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | depositResidual  | 3249  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | rejectedSlippage | 3292  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | trade            | 3303  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | upgrade          | 3266  | 0       | 0        |\n╰----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 7000000000000000000\n  Bound result 999999999999999999\n  Bound result 73\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 99999999000258158516\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 7207\n  Bound result 17360\n  Bound result 99999999058926116435\n  Bound result 13\n  Bound result 99999999000000013865\n  Bound result 99999999000000013677\n  Bound result 99999999000000009914\n  Bound result 64\n  Bound result 99999999000000010798\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 77483379145567057846\n  Bound result 99999999292912820093\n  Bound result 51\n  Bound result 99999999000000003308\n  Bound result 99999999000000002423\n  Bound result 120\n  Bound result 241\n  Bound result 99999999000000003892\n  Bound result 99999999001026354288\n  Bound result 99999999000000011470\n  Bound result 99999999000000011705\n  Bound result 5808\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 13795\n  Bound result 12\n  Bound result 80\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 99999999002023415125\n  Bound result 3841\n  Bound result 8022993867563984026\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 9444\n  Bound result 99999999000000001944\n  Bound result 783\n  Bound result 5338\n  Bound result 1652\n  Bound result 99999999000000002806\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 5160\n  Bound result 64\n  Bound result 99999999000000010259\n  Bound result 6545970592751668699\n  Bound result 8919\n  Bound result 1327454329\n  Bound result 99999999000000013922\n  Bound result 4264337585621134081\n  Bound result 99999999000000008507\n  Bound result 6523\n  Bound result 69402976912036506109\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 6.08s (6.07s CPU time)\n\nRan 22 test suites in 6.08s (28.81s CPU time): 202 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (202 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":93,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"Paper.approve(address,uint256)\",\"Paper.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"Paper.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"PaperDeployment.deployHook(bytes32,address,(address,address,address,uint256,uint160,uint24,int24))\",\"PaperDeployment.deployToken()\",\"PaperHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"PaperHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"PaperHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"PaperHook.burn(uint256,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.initialize(address,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.postDraft(bytes32)\",\"PaperHook.postDraft(bytes32,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.setImdUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHook.setPostFeeUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHook.setSplit(address,uint256,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.transferOwnership(address)\",\"PaperHookV2.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"PaperHookV2.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"PaperHookV2.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"PaperHookV2.burn(uint256,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.initialize(address,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.postDraft(bytes32)\",\"PaperHookV2.postDraft(bytes32,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.setImdUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.setPostFeeUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.setSplit(address,uint256,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.transferOwnership(address)\",\"PaperProxy.fallback()\",\"PaperSwapRouter.swap((bool,int256,uint160),uint256,uint256,address,uint256)\",\"PaperSwapRouter.unlockCallback(bytes)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"LICENSE\":21,\"README.md\":136,\"docs/ADVERSARIAL_REVIEW.md\":64,\"docs/dependencies.json\":22,\"docs/deployment-parameters.json\":54,\"foundry.toml\":22,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/MineSalt.s.sol\":16,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":28,\"src/Paper.sol\":11,\"src/PaperDeployment.sol\":85,\"src/PaperHook.sol\":439,\"src/PaperHookV2.sol\":14,\"src/PaperProxy.sol\":68,\"src/PaperSwapRouter.sol\":92,\"test/Adversarial.t.sol\":151,\"test/FailureAtomicity.t.sol\":175,\"test/FeeEdges.t.sol\":138,\"test/Fees.t.sol\":203,\"test/HookFixture.sol\":98,\"test/Invariant.t.sol\":90,\"test/Paper.t.sol\":52,\"test/REVIEW.md\":41,\"test/Router.t.sol\":361,\"test/RouterStateful.t.sol\":238,\"test/StatefulReview.t.sol\":265,\"test/Upgrade.t.sol\":253,\"test/Voting.t.sol\":194,\"test/VotingProperties.t.sol\":183,\"test/VotingProtection.t.sol\":412,\"test/mocks/HostilePaper.sol\":45,\"test/mocks/MockDecimalsERC20.sol\":16,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":14,\"test/mocks/PoolRouter.sol\":65,\"test/mocks/UnlockProbe.sol\":32},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"77318bd2a52d443d66d260e5b7c2ffea77631690a2a525851dbc2a35ad2a6a2b","verifiedTreeHash":"b933e91f93a0996cd89a19bbef54c06eb08956e7","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+94826a22"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":8514,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 108 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 8.24s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:40:9\n   │\n40 │         emit TokenAllocated(address(token), msg.sender, poolAmount, remainder);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:121:9\n    │\n121 │         emit OwnershipTransferred(address(0), owner_);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[encode-packed-collision]: `abi.encodePacked()` called with multiple dynamic type arguments; hash collisions possible\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:46:16\n   │\n46 │         return abi.encodePacked(type(PaperProxy).creationCode, abi.encode(implementation, initialization));\n   │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/encode-packed-collision\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:122:9\n    │\n122 │         emit SplitChanged(ORDERS, s.ordersBps, DEV, s.devBps);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:123:9\n    │\n123 │         emit PostFeeUsdChanged(1);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:124:9\n    │\n124 │         emit ImdUsdChanged(usdWad);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:83:9\n   │\n83 │         emit HookDeployed(address(hook), implementation, salt);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:172:69\n    │\n172 │     function transferOwnership(address newOwner) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {\n    │                                                                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:82:9\n   │\n82 │         config.manager.initialize(key, config.sqrtPriceX96);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:175:9\n    │\n175 │         emit OwnershipTransferred(s.owner, newOwner);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:182:9\n    │\n182 │         nonReentrant\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:195:9\n    │\n195 │         emit SplitChanged(ordersWallet, ordersBps, devWallet, devBps);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:199:60\n    │\n199 │     function setPostFeeUsd(uint256 usd) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {\n    │                                                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:201:9\n    │\n201 │         emit PostFeeUsdChanged(usd);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:204:59\n    │\n204 │     function setImdUsd(uint256 usdWad) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {\n    │                                                           ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:207:9\n    │\n207 │         emit ImdUsdChanged(usdWad);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:235:9\n    │\n235 │         emit DraftPosted(draftId, msg.sender, textHash, amount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:241:9\n    │\n241 │         emit Burned(draftId, msg.sender, amount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperProxy.sol:17:20\n   │\n17 │                 && bytes4(initialization) == bytes4(keccak256(\"initialize(address,address,uint256)\")),\n   │                    ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'bytes4' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperProxy.sol:17:46\n   │\n17 │                 && bytes4(initialization) == bytes4(keccak256(\"initialize(address,address,uint256)\")),\n   │                                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'bytes4' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[incorrect-strict-equality]: dangerous strict equality check on an externally-influenced value\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:248:13\n    │\n248 │         if (paper.balanceOf(DEAD) - beforeBalance != amount) revert InexactTransfer();\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/incorrect-strict-equality\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:262:9\n    │\n262 │         emit PoolBound(key.toId(), s.token);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:269:9\n    │\n269 │         nonReentrant\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:319:9\n    │\n319 │         emit FeesPaid(fee, ordersAmount, devAmount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:283:9\n    │\n283 │         nonReentrant\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:324:26\n    │\n324 │         uint256 amount = uint256(value < 0 ? -value : value);\n    │                          ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:325:22\n    │\n325 │         if (amount > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                      ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:325:30\n    │\n325 │         if (amount > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:330:21\n    │\n330 │         if (value > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:330:29\n    │\n330 │         if (value > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:331:16\n    │\n331 │         return int128(int256(value));\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:331:23\n    │\n331 │         return int128(int256(value));\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":897,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 4 tests for test/Paper.t.sol:PaperTest\n[PASS] test_allowanceAndBalanceFailures() (gas: 162803)\n[PASS] test_deploymentAllocatesEightyPercentAndRemainder() (gas: 555001)\n[PASS] test_metadataSupplyAndTransfer() (gas: 118951)\n[PASS] test_noMintOrAdminEvenForDeployer() (gas: 53689)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 925.76µs (2.10ms CPU time)\n\nRan 14 tests for test/Voting.t.sol:VotingReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_burnConservesTokens(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 308202, ~: 308214)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1949\n\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceAndBurnAllowance() (gas: 352669)\n[PASS] test_largeSqrtPriceDoesNotOverflow() (gas: 7217093)\n[PASS] test_nonexistentDraftCannotBurn() (gas: 238397)\n[PASS] test_postAllowanceFailureRollsBackId() (gas: 327543)\n[PASS] test_postBurnsAndEmitsAuthorsVotes() (gas: 252573)\n[PASS] test_priceAndUsdSettingsChangeQuote() (gas: 390858)\n[PASS] test_quoteReadsPoolPriceBothCurrencyOrders() (gas: 7719421)\n[PASS] test_quoteRejectsUnseededPool() (gas: 6961826)\n[PASS] test_quotesAndPostsRefuseUnlockedPool() (gas: 572060)\n[PASS] test_repeatBurnAnyExistingDraftAndZeroAmount() (gas: 567833)\n[PASS] test_roundingUpPreventsFreeDustPost() (gas: 164295)\n[PASS] test_settingsOwnerOnlyAndOwnershipTransfer() (gas: 246874)\n[PASS] test_sixDecimalImdNormalization() (gas: 7735028)\nSuite result: ok. 14 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 93.03ms (160.72ms CPU time)\n\nRan 15 tests for test/Fees.t.sol:FeesReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allSwapModes(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 421700, ~: 422870)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999000000017807\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_splitConservation(uint8,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 395761, ~: 402028)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 14\n  Bound result 14264337671979831209\n\n[PASS] test_badAmountAndZeroSwap() (gas: 103226)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 420956)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput() (gas: 419537)\n[PASS] test_dustFeeRoundsDown() (gas: 271396)\n[PASS] test_freshTokenOnlyPoolNeedsPrepaidImdFee() (gas: 18125952)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBackingRevertsAtomically() (gas: 415177)\n[PASS] test_partialImdSpecifiedRevertsAndRollsBackFee() (gas: 346103)\n[PASS] test_partialPaperSpecifiedChargesActualImd() (gas: 335421)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 414184)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput() (gas: 414992)\n[PASS] test_splitChangePayments() (gas: 433605)\n[PASS] test_splitInvalidAndUnauthorized() (gas: 237779)\n[PASS] test_zeroSplitAndSameRecipient() (gas: 628883)\nSuite result: ok. 15 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 93.81ms (215.74ms CPU time)\n\nRan 6 tests for test/Upgrade.t.sol:UpgradeTest\n[PASS] test_hookOwnerAndStrangerCannotUpgrade() (gas: 94244)\n[PASS] test_initializersCannotBeUsedAgainOrOnImplementations() (gas: 120687)\n[PASS] test_proxyAdminCannotCallHookFunctions() (gas: 6756)\n[PASS] test_proxyFlagsAndAdminOwnerAreFixed() (gas: 59008)\n[PASS] test_upgradeKeepsAllStateAndTradingVotingWork() (gas: 1244530)\n[PASS] test_v2ReversesDefaultsOnlyForFreshProxy() (gas: 2666761)\nSuite result: ok. 6 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 106.52ms (7.35ms CPU time)\n\nRan 15 tests for test/Fees.t.sol:FeesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allSwapModes(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 421273, ~: 418809)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 88987524362696098153\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_splitConservation(uint8,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 388354, ~: 395191)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 372809396\n\n[PASS] test_badAmountAndZeroSwap() (gas: 102960)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 414426)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput() (gas: 414291)\n[PASS] test_dustFeeRoundsDown() (gas: 264549)\n[PASS] test_freshTokenOnlyPoolNeedsPrepaidImdFee() (gas: 7401210)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBackingRevertsAtomically() (gas: 415139)\n[PASS] test_partialImdSpecifiedRevertsAndRollsBackFee() (gas: 339854)\n[PASS] test_partialPaperSpecifiedChargesActualImd() (gas: 341230)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 420271)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput() (gas: 419795)\n[PASS] test_splitChangePayments() (gas: 427075)\n[PASS] test_splitInvalidAndUnauthorized() (gas: 237779)\n[PASS] test_zeroSplitAndSameRecipient() (gas: 621855)\nSuite result: ok. 15 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 189.49ms (137.72ms CPU time)\n\nRan 14 tests for test/Voting.t.sol:VotingTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_burnConservesTokens(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 308185, ~: 308203)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 56773279\n\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceAndBurnAllowance() (gas: 352647)\n[PASS] test_largeSqrtPriceDoesNotOverflow() (gas: 16674405)\n[PASS] test_nonexistentDraftCannotBurn() (gas: 238386)\n[PASS] test_postAllowanceFailureRollsBackId() (gas: 327521)\n[PASS] test_postBurnsAndEmitsAuthorsVotes() (gas: 252551)\n[PASS] test_priceAndUsdSettingsChangeQuote() (gas: 390814)\n[PASS] test_quoteReadsPoolPriceBothCurrencyOrders() (gas: 17170350)\n[PASS] test_quoteRejectsUnseededPool() (gas: 16419567)\n[PASS] test_quotesAndPostsRefuseUnlockedPool() (gas: 572060)\n[PASS] test_repeatBurnAnyExistingDraftAndZeroAmount() (gas: 567811)\n[PASS] test_roundingUpPreventsFreeDustPost() (gas: 164273)\n[PASS] test_settingsOwnerOnlyAndOwnershipTransfer() (gas: 246874)\n[PASS] test_sixDecimalImdNormalization() (gas: 17192530)\nSuite result: ok. 14 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 199.89ms (283.36ms CPU time)\n\nRan 11 tests for test/Adversarial.t.sol:AdversarialTest\n[PASS] test_allAllowedLpFeesInitialize() (gas: 104695779)\n[PASS] test_badFeeDeploymentRollsBackProxyAndPool() (gas: 9940090)\n[PASS] test_everyCallbackRefusesNonManager() (gas: 357916)\n[PASS] test_feePaymentBlocksTokenReentrancy() (gas: 1344130)\n[PASS] test_liquidityAndDonationNoOpsDoNotChargeFees() (gas: 447067)\n[PASS] test_minedDeploymentCannotBeFrontRunByChangingPrice() (gas: 39656)\n[PASS] test_minerHashIncludesProxyInitialization() (gas: 39111)\n[PASS] test_permissionsDeclareAllFourteenBits() (gas: 17658)\n[PASS] test_postAndBurnBlockTokenReentrancy() (gas: 1326310)\n[PASS] test_shortTransferAndFalseReturnCannotCreateVotes() (gas: 1232557)\n[PASS] test_wrongPoolRejectedAndNoRebinding() (gas: 85659)\nSuite result: ok. 11 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 236.11ms (252.67ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/Invariant.t.sol:HookInvariantTest\n[PASS] invariant_feeConservationAndNoHookBalances() (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract    | Selector    | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+========================================================+\n| HookHandler | postAndBurn | 665   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | split       | 687   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | swap        | 696   | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 11319\n  Bound result 1000000000002\n  Bound result 68\n  Bound result 99999999000000006423\n  Bound result 177\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 18360\n  Bound result 188\n  Bound result 128\n  Bound result 51\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 99999999000000002520\n  Bound result 579\n  Bound result 54\n  Bound result 99999999000000000079\n  Bound result 51\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 99999999000000007170\n  Bound result 62960294841505168389\n  Bound result 114\n  Bound result 159\n  Bound result 151\n  Bound result 19920\n  Bound result 80174476332310009\n  Bound result 123\n  Bound result 50\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 97\n  Bound result 47866243025845374439\n  Bound result 2783\n  Bound result 18014398509481985\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 713.99ms (662.09ms CPU time)\n\nRan 8 test suites in 716.02ms (1.63s CPU time): 80 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (80 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":129,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"Paper.approve(address,uint256)\",\"Paper.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"Paper.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"PaperDeployment.deployHook(bytes32,address,(address,address,address,uint256,uint160,uint24,int24))\",\"PaperDeployment.deployToken()\",\"PaperHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"PaperHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"PaperHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"PaperHook.burn(uint256,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.initialize(address,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.postDraft(bytes32)\",\"PaperHook.setImdUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHook.setPostFeeUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHook.setSplit(address,uint256,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.transferOwnership(address)\",\"PaperHookV2.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"PaperHookV2.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"PaperHookV2.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"PaperHookV2.burn(uint256,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.initialize(address,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.postDraft(bytes32)\",\"PaperHookV2.setImdUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.setPostFeeUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.setSplit(address,uint256,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.transferOwnership(address)\",\"PaperProxy.fallback()\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"LICENSE\":21,\"README.md\":121,\"docs/ADVERSARIAL_REVIEW.md\":46,\"docs/dependencies.json\":22,\"docs/deployment-parameters.json\":40,\"foundry.toml\":22,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/MineSalt.s.sol\":16,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":28,\"src/Paper.sol\":11,\"src/PaperDeployment.sol\":85,\"src/PaperHook.sol\":412,\"src/PaperHookV2.sol\":14,\"src/PaperProxy.sol\":21,\"test/Adversarial.t.sol\":151,\"test/Fees.t.sol\":203,\"test/HookFixture.sol\":98,\"test/Invariant.t.sol\":90,\"test/Paper.t.sol\":52,\"test/Upgrade.t.sol\":117,\"test/Voting.t.sol\":194,\"test/mocks/HostilePaper.sol\":45,\"test/mocks/MockDecimalsERC20.sol\":16,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":14,\"test/mocks/PoolRouter.sol\":65,\"test/mocks/UnlockProbe.sol\":27},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":4480,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[medium/medium] unused-return at src/PaperHook.sol:210: PaperHook.postFeeTokens() (src/PaperHook.sol#210-229) ignores return value by (sqrtPrice,None,None,None) = s.manager.getSlot0(s.key.toId()) (src/PaperHook.sol#213)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/PaperDeployment.sol:69: PaperDeployment.deployHook(bytes32,address,PaperDeployment.Config) (src/PaperDeployment.sol#69-84) ignores return value by config.manager.initialize(key,config.sqrtPriceX96) (src/PaperDeployment.sol#82)\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/PaperDeployment.sol:34: Reentrancy in PaperDeployment.deployToken() (src/PaperDeployment.sol#34-41):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/PaperDeployment.sol:69: Reentrancy in PaperDeployment.deployHook(bytes32,address,PaperDeployment.Config) (src/PaperDeployment.sol#69-84):","passed":true},{"durationMs":1319,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[high] abi-encode-packed-hash-collision at src/PaperDeployment.sol:46: `abi.encodePacked()` Hash Collision\n[high] contract-locks-ether at src/PaperProxy.sol:8: Contract locks Ether without a withdraw function\n[high] reentrancy-state-change at src/PaperHook.sol:108: Reentrancy: State change after external call (2 places)\n[low] centralization-risk at src/PaperHook.sol:172: Centralization Risk (4 places)\n[low] internal-function-used-once at src/HookFlags.sol:21: Internal Function Used Only Once\n[low] large-numeric-literal at src/Paper.sol:9: Large Numeric Literal (5 places)\n[low] literal-instead-of-constant at src/PaperHook.sol:109: Literal Instead of Constant (8 places)\n[low] non-reentrant-not-first at src/PaperHook.sol:172: `nonReentrant` is Not the First Modifier (6 places)\n[low] unchecked-return at src/PaperDeployment.sol:82: Unchecked Return (2 places)\n[low] uninitialized-local-variable at src/PaperDeployment.sol:60: Uninitialized Local Variable\n[low] unsafe-erc20-operation at src/PaperDeployment.sol:38: Unsafe ERC20 Operation (2 places)\n[low] unused-public-function at src/PaperDeployment.sol:43: Public Function Not Used Internally","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"b3139bfde989005f758631cd6e5a218cfac1e35352cda93db910e20fe693d996","verifiedTreeHash":"56223ca2189e07dd18997d64ee6a203b5011cd3b","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+94826a22"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":10168,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 117 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 10.00s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[missing-zero-check]: address parameter is used in a state write or value transfer without a zero-address check\n   ╭▸ src/PaperProxy.sol:25:17\n   │\n25 │     constructor(address implementation, bytes memory initialization)\n   │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-zero-check\n\nwarning[missing-events-access-control]: `callbackHash` is changed without an event but is used for access control\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:69:9\n   │\n69 │         callbackHash = bytes32(0);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-events-access-control\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:40:9\n   │\n40 │         emit TokenAllocated(address(token), msg.sender, poolAmount, remainder);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperProxy.sol:32:20\n   │\n32 │                 && bytes4(initialization) == bytes4(keccak256(\"initialize(address,address,uint256)\")),\n   │                    ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'bytes4' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[encode-packed-collision]: `abi.encodePacked()` called with multiple dynamic type arguments; hash collisions possible\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:46:16\n   │\n46 │         return abi.encodePacked(type(PaperProxy).creationCode, abi.encode(implementation, initialization));\n   │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/encode-packed-collision\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperProxy.sol:32:46\n   │\n32 │                 && bytes4(initialization) == bytes4(keccak256(\"initialize(address,address,uint256)\")),\n   │                                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'bytes4' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:61:28\n   │\n61 │         delta = abi.decode(manager.unlock(data), (BalanceDelta));\n   │                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:83:9\n   │\n83 │         emit HookDeployed(address(hook), implementation, salt);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:82:9\n   │\n82 │         config.manager.initialize(key, config.sqrtPriceX96);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:47:13\n   │\n47 │         if (block.timestamp > deadline) revert Expired();\n   │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:49:41\n   │\n49 │             maxInput == 0 || maxInput > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max)) || params.amountSpecified == 0\n   │                                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:49:49\n   │\n49 │             maxInput == 0 || maxInput > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max)) || params.amountSpecified == 0\n   │                                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:123:9\n    │\n123 │         emit OwnershipTransferred(address(0), owner_);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:124:9\n    │\n124 │         emit SplitChanged(ORDERS, s.ordersBps, DEV, s.devBps);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:125:9\n    │\n125 │         emit PostFeeUsdChanged(1);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:126:9\n    │\n126 │         emit ImdUsdChanged(usdWad);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[incorrect-strict-equality]: dangerous strict equality check on an externally-influenced value\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:57:13\n   │\n57 │         if (input.balanceOf(address(this)) - beforeBalance != maxInput) revert InexactTransfer();\n   │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/incorrect-strict-equality\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:174:69\n    │\n174 │     function transferOwnership(address newOwner) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {\n    │                                                                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:177:9\n    │\n177 │         emit OwnershipTransferred(s.owner, newOwner);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:184:9\n    │\n184 │         nonReentrant\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:82:25\n   │\n82 │         uint256 spent = uint256(-int256(inputDelta));\n   │                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:197:9\n    │\n197 │         emit SplitChanged(ordersWallet, ordersBps, devWallet, devBps);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:83:28\n   │\n83 │         uint256 received = uint256(int256(outputDelta));\n   │                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:86:63\n   │\n86 │                 || (params.amountSpecified > 0 && received != uint256(params.amountSpecified))\n   │                                                               ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:201:60\n    │\n201 │     function setPostFeeUsd(uint256 usd) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {\n    │                                                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:203:9\n    │\n203 │         emit PostFeeUsdChanged(usd);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:206:59\n    │\n206 │     function setImdUsd(uint256 usdWad) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {\n    │                                                           ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:209:9\n    │\n209 │         emit ImdUsdChanged(usdWad);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:252:9\n    │\n252 │         emit DraftPosted(draftId, msg.sender, textHash, amount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:258:9\n    │\n258 │         emit Burned(draftId, msg.sender, amount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[incorrect-strict-equality]: dangerous strict equality check on an externally-influenced value\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:265:13\n    │\n265 │         if (paper.balanceOf(DEAD) - beforeBalance != amount) revert InexactTransfer();\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/incorrect-strict-equality\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:284:9\n    │\n284 │         emit PoolBound(key.toId(), s.token);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:291:9\n    │\n291 │         nonReentrant\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:346:9\n    │\n346 │         emit FeesPaid(fee, ordersAmount, devAmount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:305:9\n    │\n305 │         nonReentrant\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:351:26\n    │\n351 │         uint256 amount = uint256(value < 0 ? -value : value);\n    │                          ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:352:22\n    │\n352 │         if (amount > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                      ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:352:30\n    │\n352 │         if (amount > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:357:21\n    │\n357 │         if (value > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:357:29\n    │\n357 │         if (value > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:358:16\n    │\n358 │         return int128(int256(value));\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:358:23\n    │\n358 │         return int128(int256(value));\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":6197,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 4 tests for test/Paper.t.sol:PaperTest\n[PASS] test_allowanceAndBalanceFailures() (gas: 162803)\n[PASS] test_deploymentAllocatesEightyPercentAndRemainder() (gas: 555001)\n[PASS] test_metadataSupplyAndTransfer() (gas: 118951)\n[PASS] test_noMintOrAdminEvenForDeployer() (gas: 53689)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 587.65µs (1.53ms CPU time)\n\nRan 7 tests for test/VotingProperties.t.sol:VotingPropertiesReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_quoteIsSmallestSufficientWholeTokenAmount(uint64,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 128261, ~: 128218)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 3913514\n\n[PASS] test_eventsAttributeEveryVoteExactlyOnceAcrossAuthorsAndRepeatedHashes() (gas: 675580)\n[PASS] test_exactApprovalProtectsPostWhenPoolPriceChanges() (gas: 669672)\n[PASS] test_existingDraftRemainsVotableWhenLiquidityIsRemoved() (gas: 521593)\n[PASS] test_freshV2ReversedDefaultsActuallyPayBothDirections() (gas: 3773034)\n[PASS] test_maximumBurnFailsWithoutChangingExistingDraft() (gas: 289453)\n[PASS] test_transferringHookOwnershipDoesNotTransferUpgradeAuthority() (gas: 542610)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 97.97ms (98.64ms CPU time)\n\nRan 7 tests for test/VotingProperties.t.sol:VotingPropertiesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_quoteIsSmallestSufficientWholeTokenAmount(uint64,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 128255, ~: 128207)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 3913514\n\n[PASS] test_eventsAttributeEveryVoteExactlyOnceAcrossAuthorsAndRepeatedHashes() (gas: 675558)\n[PASS] test_exactApprovalProtectsPostWhenPoolPriceChanges() (gas: 675728)\n[PASS] test_existingDraftRemainsVotableWhenLiquidityIsRemoved() (gas: 521343)\n[PASS] test_freshV2ReversedDefaultsActuallyPayBothDirections() (gas: 45988438)\n[PASS] test_maximumBurnFailsWithoutChangingExistingDraft() (gas: 289442)\n[PASS] test_transferringHookOwnershipDoesNotTransferUpgradeAuthority() (gas: 536080)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 175.15ms (125.63ms CPU time)\n\nRan 14 tests for test/Voting.t.sol:VotingReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_burnConservesTokens(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 308576, ~: 308506)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 155448692\n\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceAndBurnAllowance() (gas: 353120)\n[PASS] test_largeSqrtPriceDoesNotOverflow() (gas: 50122799)\n[PASS] test_nonexistentDraftCannotBurn() (gas: 238889)\n[PASS] test_postAllowanceFailureRollsBackId() (gas: 327894)\n[PASS] test_postBurnsAndEmitsAuthorsVotes() (gas: 252972)\n[PASS] test_priceAndUsdSettingsChangeQuote() (gas: 391576)\n[PASS] test_quoteReadsPoolPriceBothCurrencyOrders() (gas: 50633164)\n[PASS] test_quoteUsesLaunchPriceBeforeSeeding() (gas: 49998226)\n[PASS] test_quotesAndPostsRefuseUnlockedPool() (gas: 701502)\n[PASS] test_repeatBurnAnyExistingDraftAndZeroAmount() (gas: 568575)\n[PASS] test_roundingUpPreventsFreeDustPost() (gas: 164683)\n[PASS] test_settingsOwnerOnlyAndOwnershipTransfer() (gas: 247363)\n[PASS] test_sixDecimalImdNormalization() (gas: 50640660)\nSuite result: ok. 14 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 175.74ms (260.49ms CPU time)\n\nRan 20 tests for test/Router.t.sol:RouterReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allModesConserveFunds(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 478491, ~: 479177)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999000000001105\n\n[PASS] test_attackerCannotSpendAnotherAccountsApproval() (gas: 229778)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 474852)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutputRefundsUnusedBudget() (gas: 479262)\n[PASS] test_callbackRequiresManagerAndActiveRequest() (gas: 185600)\n[PASS] test_excessiveMinOutputRollsBackPrepaymentAndFees() (gas: 507326)\n[PASS] test_expiredDeadlineDoesNotPullFunds() (gas: 186646)\n[PASS] test_firstBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolPaysBothWalletsWithoutBacking() (gas: 13567818)\n[PASS] test_firstExactOutputBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolRefundsBudget() (gas: 13559511)\n[PASS] test_inputTokenCannotReenterSwap() (gas: 1640374)\n[PASS] test_insufficientExactOutputBudgetRollsBack() (gas: 455310)\n[PASS] test_partialExactOutputRollsBackEvenWithLowMinimum() (gas: 466260)\n[PASS] test_refusedOutputRollsBackAlreadyPaidRefundAndAllowsRetry() (gas: 1929472)\n[PASS] test_refusedRefundRollsBackSwapAndAllowsRetry() (gas: 1915497)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 467828)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutputRefundsUnusedBudget() (gas: 475145)\n[PASS] test_shortInputTransferRollsBack() (gas: 1131085)\n[PASS] test_shortManagerSettlementRollsBackSuccessfulInitialPull() (gas: 1754730)\n[PASS] test_unrelatedRouterDepositsAreNotRefundedToTrader() (gas: 528916)\n[PASS] test_zeroRecipientRefused() (gas: 168946)\nSuite result: ok. 20 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 189.50ms (160.28ms CPU time)\n\nRan 20 tests for test/Router.t.sol:RouterTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allModesConserveFunds(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 478381, ~: 478451)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999001264811663\n\n[PASS] test_attackerCannotSpendAnotherAccountsApproval() (gas: 229978)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 468602)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutputRefundsUnusedBudget() (gas: 474309)\n[PASS] test_callbackRequiresManagerAndActiveRequest() (gas: 185600)\n[PASS] test_excessiveMinOutputRollsBackPrepaymentAndFees() (gas: 501076)\n[PASS] test_expiredDeadlineDoesNotPullFunds() (gas: 186836)\n[PASS] test_firstBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolPaysBothWalletsWithoutBacking() (gas: 15178790)\n[PASS] test_firstExactOutputBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolRefundsBudget() (gas: 15171780)\n[PASS] test_inputTokenCannotReenterSwap() (gas: 1634314)\n[PASS] test_insufficientExactOutputBudgetRollsBack() (gas: 450357)\n[PASS] test_partialExactOutputRollsBackEvenWithLowMinimum() (gas: 460437)\n[PASS] test_refusedOutputRollsBackAlreadyPaidRefundAndAllowsRetry() (gas: 1919566)\n[PASS] test_refusedRefundRollsBackSwapAndAllowsRetry() (gas: 1905591)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 474104)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutputRefundsUnusedBudget() (gas: 480124)\n[PASS] test_shortInputTransferRollsBack() (gas: 1131285)\n[PASS] test_shortManagerSettlementRollsBackSuccessfulInitialPull() (gas: 1749997)\n[PASS] test_unrelatedRouterDepositsAreNotRefundedToTrader() (gas: 523976)\n[PASS] test_zeroRecipientRefused() (gas: 169136)\nSuite result: ok. 20 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 201.52ms (149.89ms CPU time)\n\nRan 11 tests for test/Adversarial.t.sol:AdversarialTest\n[PASS] test_allAllowedLpFeesInitialize() (gas: 131728963)\n[PASS] test_badFeeDeploymentRollsBackProxyAndPool() (gas: 76390372)\n[PASS] test_everyCallbackRefusesNonManager() (gas: 358806)\n[PASS] test_feePaymentBlocksTokenReentrancy() (gas: 1351853)\n[PASS] test_liquidityAndDonationNoOpsDoNotChargeFees() (gas: 447423)\n[PASS] test_minedDeploymentCannotBeFrontRunByChangingPrice() (gas: 39656)\n[PASS] test_minerHashIncludesProxyInitialization() (gas: 41758)\n[PASS] test_permissionsDeclareAllFourteenBits() (gas: 17758)\n[PASS] test_postAndBurnBlockTokenReentrancy() (gas: 1326815)\n[PASS] test_shortTransferAndFalseReturnCannotCreateVotes() (gas: 1232931)\n[PASS] test_wrongPoolRejectedAndNoRebinding() (gas: 85859)\nSuite result: ok. 11 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 277.52ms (251.79ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/FeeEdges.t.sol:FeeEdgesReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_partialSellRefundsUnusedBudget(uint96,uint8) (runs: 1000, μ: 611559, ~: 611743)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99000000000000000017089\n  Bound result 2\n\n[PASS] test_partialSellMinimumBoundaryRollsBackAndAllowsRetry() (gas: 1946352)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 289.28ms (286.09ms CPU time)\n\nRan 7 tests for test/FailureAtomicity.t.sol:FailureAtomicityTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_failedSettlementRollsBackEverySwapMode(bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 969168, ~: 968405)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999000000000022\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_invalidSplitNeverMutatesState(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 135984, ~: 135954)\n[PASS] test_everyBoundCallbackRejectsAnotherPoolFromTheRealManager() (gas: 667174)\n[PASS] test_failedBurnCannotConsumeAllowanceOrCreateVotesAndRecovers() (gas: 1510589)\n[PASS] test_falseReturnSettlementRestoresTokenCallbackState() (gas: 1549993)\n[PASS] test_invalidRecipientInEitherPositionEvenWithZeroShare() (gas: 490663)\n[PASS] test_oversizedAmountsFailBeforeAnyPayment() (gas: 811797)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 289.62ms (328.09ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/FeeEdges.t.sol:FeeEdgesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_partialSellRefundsUnusedBudget(uint96,uint8) (runs: 1000, μ: 617619, ~: 617804)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99000000000000000017207\n  Bound result 2\n\n[PASS] test_partialSellMinimumBoundaryRollsBackAndAllowsRetry() (gas: 1964397)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 289.56ms (179.52ms CPU time)\n\nRan 14 tests for test/Voting.t.sol:VotingTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_burnConservesTokens(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 308583, ~: 308495)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 155448692\n\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceAndBurnAllowance() (gas: 353098)\n[PASS] test_largeSqrtPriceDoesNotOverflow() (gas: 47238843)\n[PASS] test_nonexistentDraftCannotBurn() (gas: 238878)\n[PASS] test_postAllowanceFailureRollsBackId() (gas: 327872)\n[PASS] test_postBurnsAndEmitsAuthorsVotes() (gas: 252950)\n[PASS] test_priceAndUsdSettingsChangeQuote() (gas: 391532)\n[PASS] test_quoteReadsPoolPriceBothCurrencyOrders() (gas: 47742825)\n[PASS] test_quoteUsesLaunchPriceBeforeSeeding() (gas: 47114677)\n[PASS] test_quotesAndPostsRefuseUnlockedPool() (gas: 701502)\n[PASS] test_repeatBurnAnyExistingDraftAndZeroAmount() (gas: 568553)\n[PASS] test_roundingUpPreventsFreeDustPost() (gas: 164661)\n[PASS] test_settingsOwnerOnlyAndOwnershipTransfer() (gas: 247363)\n[PASS] test_sixDecimalImdNormalization() (gas: 47756894)\nSuite result: ok. 14 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 294.78ms (246.60ms CPU time)\n\nRan 15 tests for test/Fees.t.sol:FeesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allSwapModes(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 428932, ~: 426419)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999001264811663\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_splitConservation(uint8,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 395635, ~: 402901)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 119\n  Bound result 7409\n\n[PASS] test_badAmountAndZeroSwap() (gas: 103038)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 422036)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput() (gas: 421901)\n[PASS] test_dustFeeRoundsDown() (gas: 272159)\n[PASS] test_freshTokenOnlyPoolNeedsPrepaidImdFee() (gas: 21462272)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBackingRevertsAtomically() (gas: 415217)\n[PASS] test_partialImdSpecifiedRevertsAndRollsBackFee() (gas: 344662)\n[PASS] test_partialPaperSpecifiedChargesActualImd() (gas: 348840)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 427881)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput() (gas: 427405)\n[PASS] test_splitChangePayments() (gas: 434863)\n[PASS] test_splitInvalidAndUnauthorized() (gas: 238457)\n[PASS] test_zeroSplitAndSameRecipient() (gas: 637275)\nSuite result: ok. 15 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 294.72ms (310.49ms CPU time)\n\nRan 14 tests for test/Upgrade.t.sol:UpgradeTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_runtimeWhitelistRejectsChangesBeforeDelegation(uint16,uint8,bool) (runs: 1000, μ: 85670, ~: 85495)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 4190\n  Bound result 1\n\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsCounterfeitBeforeInitialization() (gas: 152803)\n[PASS] test_hookOwnerAndStrangerCannotUpgrade() (gas: 94511)\n[PASS] test_initializersCannotBeUsedAgainOrOnImplementations() (gas: 127709)\n[PASS] test_managerNormalizationRejectsDirtyAddressPadding() (gas: 59653)\n[PASS] test_proxyAdminCannotCallHookFunctions() (gas: 6947)\n[PASS] test_proxyFlagsAndAdminOwnerAreFixed() (gas: 59280)\n[PASS] test_upgradeKeepsAllStateAndTradingVotingWork() (gas: 1269202)\n[PASS] test_upgradeKeepsFallbackPriceAndCappedPosting() (gas: 865234)\n[PASS] test_upgradeRejectsCanonicalImplementationForAnotherManager() (gas: 4432431)\n[PASS] test_upgradeRejectsCounterfeitFeeGetterBeforeInitialization() (gas: 450729)\n[PASS] test_upgradeRejectsModifiedCanonicalRuntime() (gas: 59055)\n[PASS] test_v2ReversesDefaultsOnlyForFreshProxy() (gas: 45136814)\n[PASS] test_whitelistRejectsAppendedRuntimeEvenWhenBehaviorIsUnchanged() (gas: 66363)\nSuite result: ok. 14 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 294.92ms (249.74ms CPU time)\n\nRan 15 tests for test/Fees.t.sol:FeesReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allSwapModes(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 429280, ~: 430468)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999000000000995\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_splitConservation(uint8,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 402571, ~: 409738)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 200\n  Bound result 16437\n\n[PASS] test_badAmountAndZeroSwap() (gas: 103304)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 428566)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput() (gas: 427147)\n[PASS] test_dustFeeRoundsDown() (gas: 279006)\n[PASS] test_freshTokenOnlyPoolNeedsPrepaidImdFee() (gas: 14644431)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBackingRevertsAtomically() (gas: 415255)\n[PASS] test_partialImdSpecifiedRevertsAndRollsBackFee() (gas: 350911)\n[PASS] test_partialPaperSpecifiedChargesActualImd() (gas: 343031)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 421794)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput() (gas: 422602)\n[PASS] test_splitChangePayments() (gas: 441393)\n[PASS] test_splitInvalidAndUnauthorized() (gas: 238457)\n[PASS] test_zeroSplitAndSameRecipient() (gas: 644303)\nSuite result: ok. 15 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 294.89ms (334.30ms CPU time)\n\nRan 19 tests for test/VotingProtection.t.sol:VotingProtectionTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_capBoundaryAfterTrading(bool,bool,uint96,uint8) (runs: 1000, μ: 622944, ~: 587600)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999000000000639\n\n[PASS] test_adminPriceChangeCannotExceedCallerCap() (gas: 206126)\n[PASS] test_bothPostingOverloadsAndBurnShareReentrancyGuard() (gas: 1666247)\n[PASS] test_capAtQuoteSucceedsAndEmitsActualVotes() (gas: 234848)\n[PASS] test_capCannotReplaceAllowanceAndFailureDoesNotConsumeDraftId() (gas: 398503)\n[PASS] test_cappedPostCannotReadFallbackDuringUnlockEvenWhenFree() (gas: 21886198)\n[PASS] test_cappedPostRejectsReentrantPost() (gas: 1190942)\n[PASS] test_cappedPostTransferFailuresRollBackAndAllowRetry() (gas: 1605407)\n[PASS] test_displacementCannotOverburnCappedPostWithUnlimitedAllowance() (gas: 22351661)\n[PASS] test_emptyRangeSwapCannotOverwriteLaunchQuote() (gas: 21747584)\n[PASS] test_failedSwapCannotOverwriteFallbackPrice() (gas: 1038777)\n[PASS] test_fallbackRepricesUsdAndEnforcesCapAfterEmptyRangeMovement() (gas: 21872541)\n[PASS] test_largerCapBurnsOnlyExecutionQuote() (gas: 157041)\n[PASS] test_paperOnlyLaunchSupportsQuoteAndPost() (gas: 21366490)\n[PASS] test_quoteReturnsToLivePriceWhenLiquidityResumes() (gas: 1231315)\n[PASS] test_removingAllLiquidityKeepsLastActiveQuote() (gas: 714605)\n[PASS] test_roundTripCannotDisablePostingOrOverwriteLastActiveQuote() (gas: 22570737)\n[PASS] test_savedManipulatedPriceStillRequiresCallerCapAfterDustRemoval() (gas: 23079275)\n[PASS] test_zeroCapAllowsOnlyFreePost() (gas: 238053)\nSuite result: ok. 19 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 294.81ms (401.11ms CPU time)\n\nRan 7 tests for test/FailureAtomicity.t.sol:FailureAtomicityReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_failedSettlementRollsBackEverySwapMode(bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 965987, ~: 966059)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999000000005227\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_invalidSplitNeverMutatesState(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 135985, ~: 135954)\n[PASS] test_everyBoundCallbackRejectsAnotherPoolFromTheRealManager() (gas: 669226)\n[PASS] test_failedBurnCannotConsumeAllowanceOrCreateVotesAndRecovers() (gas: 1510600)\n[PASS] test_falseReturnSettlementRestoresTokenCallbackState() (gas: 1538515)\n[PASS] test_invalidRecipientInEitherPositionEvenWithZeroShare() (gas: 497193)\n[PASS] test_oversizedAmountsFailBeforeAnyPayment() (gas: 812427)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 294.96ms (340.99ms CPU time)\n\nRan 19 tests for test/VotingProtection.t.sol:VotingProtectionReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_capBoundaryAfterTrading(bool,bool,uint96,uint8) (runs: 1000, μ: 623098, ~: 587375)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 28741431743856401954\n\n[PASS] test_adminPriceChangeCannotExceedCallerCap() (gas: 206148)\n[PASS] test_bothPostingOverloadsAndBurnShareReentrancyGuard() (gas: 1666280)\n[PASS] test_capAtQuoteSucceedsAndEmitsActualVotes() (gas: 234859)\n[PASS] test_capCannotReplaceAllowanceAndFailureDoesNotConsumeDraftId() (gas: 398536)\n[PASS] test_cappedPostCannotReadFallbackDuringUnlockEvenWhenFree() (gas: 15061580)\n[PASS] test_cappedPostRejectsReentrantPost() (gas: 1190953)\n[PASS] test_cappedPostTransferFailuresRollBackAndAllowRetry() (gas: 1605440)\n[PASS] test_displacementCannotOverburnCappedPostWithUnlimitedAllowance() (gas: 15506254)\n[PASS] test_emptyRangeSwapCannotOverwriteLaunchQuote() (gas: 14916719)\n[PASS] test_failedSwapCannotOverwriteFallbackPrice() (gas: 1033302)\n[PASS] test_fallbackRepricesUsdAndEnforcesCapAfterEmptyRangeMovement() (gas: 15041687)\n[PASS] test_largerCapBurnsOnlyExecutionQuote() (gas: 157052)\n[PASS] test_paperOnlyLaunchSupportsQuoteAndPost() (gas: 14541894)\n[PASS] test_quoteReturnsToLivePriceWhenLiquidityResumes() (gas: 1232657)\n[PASS] test_removingAllLiquidityKeepsLastActiveQuote() (gas: 721396)\n[PASS] test_roundTripCannotDisablePostingOrOverwriteLastActiveQuote() (gas: 15748435)\n[PASS] test_savedManipulatedPriceStillRequiresCallerCapAfterDustRemoval() (gas: 16235117)\n[PASS] test_zeroCapAllowsOnlyFreePost() (gas: 238075)\nSuite result: ok. 19 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 295.12ms (421.14ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/Invariant.t.sol:HookInvariantTest\n[PASS] invariant_feeConservationAndNoHookBalances() (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract    | Selector    | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+========================================================+\n| HookHandler | postAndBurn | 678   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | split       | 663   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | swap        | 707   | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999000000005412\n  Bound result 86702293490982348584\n  Bound result 14518\n  Bound result 105\n  Bound result 72057594037927935\n  Bound result 99999999000000000627\n  Bound result 1457\n  Bound result 99999999000000002099\n  Bound result 88063069630029935586\n  Bound result 99999999000000000414\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 99999999000000003629\n  Bound result 50\n  Bound result 745\n  Bound result 61813399456043286874\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 99999999000000001093\n  Bound result 1897144\n  Bound result 14544\n  Bound result 10105417907577833160\n  Bound result 60\n  Bound result 99999999999999990002\n  Bound result 17423\n  Bound result 4773\n  Bound result 99999999000000000608\n  Bound result 161\n  Bound result 78323480778491840481\n  Bound result 6475354150594499326\n  Bound result 99999999000000000385\n  Bound result 1324\n  Bound result 15\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 1805963346206952919\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 613.98ms (524.40ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/StatefulReview.t.sol:StatefulReviewReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] invariant_allFeesAndVotesAreBackedAndStateSurvivesUpgrades() (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract      | Selector      | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+============================================================+\n| ReviewHandler | cappedPost    | 1803  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | changeSplit   | 1831  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | configure     | 1870  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | post          | 1743  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | rejectedAdmin | 1862  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | rejectedVote  | 1806  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | trade         | 1908  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | upgrade       | 1798  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | vote          | 1763  | 0       | 0        |\n╰---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 50\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 145\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 189\n  Bound result 12524\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 6839\n  Bound result 34978048485762347\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 6013\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 6899975791307711508\n  Bound result 192\n  Bound result 145\n  Bound result 2378\n  Bound result 9\n  Bound result 9900000000000003193\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 2836972\n  Bound result 50\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 3786714984\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 9900000000000016033\n  Bound result 9\n  Bound result 14266560\n  Bound result 7974\n  Bound result 57\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 3194\n  Bound result 13\n  Bound result 3482331276\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 9900000000000000763\n  Bound result 14333\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 1482\n  Bound result 50\n  Bound result 14\n  Bound result 5436\n  Bound result 20\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 5.36s (5.35s CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/StatefulReview.t.sol:StatefulReviewTest\n[PASS] invariant_allFeesAndVotesAreBackedAndStateSurvivesUpgrades() (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract      | Selector      | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+============================================================+\n| ReviewHandler | cappedPost    | 1803  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | changeSplit   | 1831  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | configure     | 1870  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | post          | 1743  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | rejectedAdmin | 1862  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | rejectedVote  | 1806  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | trade         | 1908  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | upgrade       | 1798  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | vote          | 1763  | 0       | 0        |\n╰---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 50\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 164\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 13647\n  Bound result 210\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 6419\n  Bound result 11233\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 10214\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 8899991930435824218\n  Bound result 153\n  Bound result 16\n  Bound result 1285328098\n  Bound result 9\n  Bound result 8181197868174803472\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 2836972\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 168\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 9900000000000013204\n  Bound result 9\n  Bound result 14266560\n  Bound result 8388607\n  Bound result 146\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 82081197870620418731\n  Bound result 13\n  Bound result 3482331276\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 9900000000000002736\n  Bound result 13232\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 15202\n  Bound result 50\n  Bound result 14\n  Bound result 3523\n  Bound result 20\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 5.55s (5.38s CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/RouterStateful.t.sol:RouterStatefulTest\n[PASS] invariant_routerPreservesEachUsersFundsAndOnlyRetainsUnsolicitedDeposits() (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract             | Selector         | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+======================================================================+\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | changeSplit      | 3265  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | depositResidual  | 3348  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | rejectedSlippage | 3289  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | trade            | 3283  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | upgrade          | 3199  | 0       | 0        |\n╰----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 7000000000000000000\n  Bound result 999999999999999999\n  Bound result 73\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 99999999000000010012\n  Bound result 13573\n  Bound result 99999999000000010561\n  Bound result 172\n  Bound result 17440\n  Bound result 4594\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 99999999000000034311\n  Bound result 117286493\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 2616616030\n  Bound result 821\n  Bound result 34829598951011965422\n  Bound result 99999999000905798426\n  Bound result 99999999000000002428\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 35\n  Bound result 99999999000000000964\n  Bound result 99999999000026057010\n  Bound result 13\n  Bound result 99999999000000005778\n  Bound result 60\n  Bound result 99999999000000000342\n  Bound result 99999999000000003097\n  Bound result 99999999000007526502\n  Bound result 99999999000000006030\n  Bound result 14636\n  Bound result 92593156280552838071\n  Bound result 4352\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 111\n  Bound result 1993626115108236983\n  Bound result 16500\n  Bound result 3170\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 99999999000000011584\n  Bound result 14\n  Bound result 58612049369411187772\n  Bound result 99999999000000003832\n  Bound result 99999999000000010415\n  Bound result 7693416\n  Bound result 25055799962383517\n  Bound result 8446384067531670584\n  Bound result 99999999000000001450\n  Bound result 99999999001262970832\n  Bound result 26856276124438583740\n  Bound result 13874\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 6.06s (5.94s CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/RouterStateful.t.sol:RouterStatefulReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] invariant_routerPreservesEachUsersFundsAndOnlyRetainsUnsolicitedDeposits() (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract             | Selector         | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+======================================================================+\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | changeSplit      | 3265  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | depositResidual  | 3348  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | rejectedSlippage | 3289  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | trade            | 3283  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | upgrade          | 3199  | 0       | 0        |\n╰----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 7000000000000000000\n  Bound result 999999999999999999\n  Bound result 73\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 99999999000000011778\n  Bound result 1218\n  Bound result 99999999000000000142\n  Bound result 105\n  Bound result 708\n  Bound result 6568\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 99999999000000034311\n  Bound result 5022\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 4029539251\n  Bound result 11308\n  Bound result 34829598951011965422\n  Bound result 99999999000000000336\n  Bound result 99999999000000000368\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 42\n  Bound result 7549755068394208689\n  Bound result 99999999000026057010\n  Bound result 103\n  Bound result 99999999000000008210\n  Bound result 152\n  Bound result 99999999001313373042\n  Bound result 99999999000000002115\n  Bound result 99999999000007526502\n  Bound result 99999999001484145233\n  Bound result 6978\n  Bound result 92593156280552838071\n  Bound result 11078\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 13\n  Bound result 9681305755412031357\n  Bound result 16597\n  Bound result 10799\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 99999999000000011581\n  Bound result 57\n  Bound result 99999999000000011717\n  Bound result 99999999000000004927\n  Bound result 99999999000000012203\n  Bound result 235\n  Bound result 25055799962383517\n  Bound result 11206\n  Bound result 99999999000000008614\n  Bound result 99999999001262970832\n  Bound result 26856276124438583740\n  Bound result 5405\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 6.08s (6.06s CPU time)\n\nRan 22 test suites in 6.08s (27.71s CPU time): 202 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (202 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":83,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"Paper.approve(address,uint256)\",\"Paper.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"Paper.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"PaperDeployment.deployHook(bytes32,address,(address,address,address,uint256,uint160,uint24,int24))\",\"PaperDeployment.deployToken()\",\"PaperHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"PaperHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"PaperHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"PaperHook.burn(uint256,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.initialize(address,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.postDraft(bytes32)\",\"PaperHook.postDraft(bytes32,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.setImdUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHook.setPostFeeUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHook.setSplit(address,uint256,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.transferOwnership(address)\",\"PaperHookV2.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"PaperHookV2.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"PaperHookV2.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"PaperHookV2.burn(uint256,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.initialize(address,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.postDraft(bytes32)\",\"PaperHookV2.postDraft(bytes32,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.setImdUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.setPostFeeUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.setSplit(address,uint256,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.transferOwnership(address)\",\"PaperProxy.fallback()\",\"PaperSwapRouter.swap((bool,int256,uint160),uint256,uint256,address,uint256)\",\"PaperSwapRouter.unlockCallback(bytes)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"LICENSE\":21,\"README.md\":136,\"docs/ADVERSARIAL_REVIEW.md\":64,\"docs/dependencies.json\":22,\"docs/deployment-parameters.json\":54,\"foundry.toml\":22,\"launch.json\":36,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/MineSalt.s.sol\":16,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":28,\"src/Paper.sol\":11,\"src/PaperDeployment.sol\":85,\"src/PaperHook.sol\":439,\"src/PaperHookV2.sol\":14,\"src/PaperProxy.sol\":68,\"src/PaperSwapRouter.sol\":92,\"test/Adversarial.t.sol\":151,\"test/FailureAtomicity.t.sol\":175,\"test/FeeEdges.t.sol\":138,\"test/Fees.t.sol\":203,\"test/HookFixture.sol\":98,\"test/Invariant.t.sol\":90,\"test/Paper.t.sol\":52,\"test/REVIEW.md\":41,\"test/Router.t.sol\":361,\"test/RouterStateful.t.sol\":238,\"test/StatefulReview.t.sol\":265,\"test/Upgrade.t.sol\":253,\"test/Voting.t.sol\":194,\"test/VotingProperties.t.sol\":183,\"test/VotingProtection.t.sol\":412,\"test/mocks/HostilePaper.sol\":45,\"test/mocks/MockDecimalsERC20.sol\":16,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":14,\"test/mocks/PoolRouter.sol\":65,\"test/mocks/UnlockProbe.sol\":32},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"b6641ad3627975b05cca890cebde0f6f1f4e7d958c3cab932a2fb143153cce39","verifiedTreeHash":"7162c4b1f03dd6bc9bf235439c922f3547a33fa8","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+94826a22"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":21283,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 115 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 20.76s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[missing-events-access-control]: `callbackHash` is changed without an event but is used for access control\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:69:9\n   │\n69 │         callbackHash = bytes32(0);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-events-access-control\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:40:9\n   │\n40 │         emit TokenAllocated(address(token), msg.sender, poolAmount, remainder);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[missing-zero-check]: address parameter is used in a state write or value transfer without a zero-address check\n   ╭▸ src/PaperProxy.sol:25:17\n   │\n25 │     constructor(address implementation, bytes memory initialization)\n   │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-zero-check\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:61:28\n   │\n61 │         delta = abi.decode(manager.unlock(data), (BalanceDelta));\n   │                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[encode-packed-collision]: `abi.encodePacked()` called with multiple dynamic type arguments; hash collisions possible\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:46:16\n   │\n46 │         return abi.encodePacked(type(PaperProxy).creationCode, abi.encode(implementation, initialization));\n   │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/encode-packed-collision\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:47:13\n   │\n47 │         if (block.timestamp > deadline) revert Expired();\n   │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperProxy.sol:32:20\n   │\n32 │                 && bytes4(initialization) == bytes4(keccak256(\"initialize(address,address,uint256)\")),\n   │                    ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'bytes4' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperProxy.sol:32:46\n   │\n32 │                 && bytes4(initialization) == bytes4(keccak256(\"initialize(address,address,uint256)\")),\n   │                                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'bytes4' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:83:9\n   │\n83 │         emit HookDeployed(address(hook), implementation, salt);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:82:9\n   │\n82 │         config.manager.initialize(key, config.sqrtPriceX96);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:49:41\n   │\n49 │             maxInput == 0 || maxInput > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max)) || params.amountSpecified == 0\n   │                                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:49:49\n   │\n49 │             maxInput == 0 || maxInput > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max)) || params.amountSpecified == 0\n   │                                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[incorrect-strict-equality]: dangerous strict equality check on an externally-influenced value\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:57:13\n   │\n57 │         if (input.balanceOf(address(this)) - beforeBalance != maxInput) revert InexactTransfer();\n   │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/incorrect-strict-equality\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:121:9\n    │\n121 │         emit OwnershipTransferred(address(0), owner_);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:82:25\n   │\n82 │         uint256 spent = uint256(-int256(inputDelta));\n   │                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:83:28\n   │\n83 │         uint256 received = uint256(int256(outputDelta));\n   │                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:86:63\n   │\n86 │                 || (params.amountSpecified > 0 && received != uint256(params.amountSpecified))\n   │                                                               ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:122:9\n    │\n122 │         emit SplitChanged(ORDERS, s.ordersBps, DEV, s.devBps);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:123:9\n    │\n123 │         emit PostFeeUsdChanged(1);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:124:9\n    │\n124 │         emit ImdUsdChanged(usdWad);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:172:69\n    │\n172 │     function transferOwnership(address newOwner) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {\n    │                                                                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:175:9\n    │\n175 │         emit OwnershipTransferred(s.owner, newOwner);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:182:9\n    │\n182 │         nonReentrant\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:195:9\n    │\n195 │         emit SplitChanged(ordersWallet, ordersBps, devWallet, devBps);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:199:60\n    │\n199 │     function setPostFeeUsd(uint256 usd) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {\n    │                                                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:201:9\n    │\n201 │         emit PostFeeUsdChanged(usd);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:204:59\n    │\n204 │     function setImdUsd(uint256 usdWad) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {\n    │                                                           ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:207:9\n    │\n207 │         emit ImdUsdChanged(usdWad);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:235:9\n    │\n235 │         emit DraftPosted(draftId, msg.sender, textHash, amount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:241:9\n    │\n241 │         emit Burned(draftId, msg.sender, amount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[incorrect-strict-equality]: dangerous strict equality check on an externally-influenced value\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:248:13\n    │\n248 │         if (paper.balanceOf(DEAD) - beforeBalance != amount) revert InexactTransfer();\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/incorrect-strict-equality\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:262:9\n    │\n262 │         emit PoolBound(key.toId(), s.token);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:269:9\n    │\n269 │         nonReentrant\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:319:9\n    │\n319 │         emit FeesPaid(fee, ordersAmount, devAmount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:283:9\n    │\n283 │         nonReentrant\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:324:26\n    │\n324 │         uint256 amount = uint256(value < 0 ? -value : value);\n    │                          ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:325:22\n    │\n325 │         if (amount > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                      ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:325:30\n    │\n325 │         if (amount > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:330:21\n    │\n330 │         if (value > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:330:29\n    │\n330 │         if (value > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:331:16\n    │\n331 │         return int128(int256(value));\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:331:23\n    │\n331 │         return int128(int256(value));\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":12645,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 4 tests for test/Paper.t.sol:PaperTest\n[PASS] test_allowanceAndBalanceFailures() (gas: 162803)\n[PASS] test_deploymentAllocatesEightyPercentAndRemainder() (gas: 555001)\n[PASS] test_metadataSupplyAndTransfer() (gas: 118951)\n[PASS] test_noMintOrAdminEvenForDeployer() (gas: 53689)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.12ms (1.38ms CPU time)\n\nRan 11 tests for test/Adversarial.t.sol:AdversarialTest\n[PASS] test_allAllowedLpFeesInitialize() (gas: 63543588)\n[PASS] test_badFeeDeploymentRollsBackProxyAndPool() (gas: 16571870)\n[PASS] test_everyCallbackRefusesNonManager() (gas: 358696)\n[PASS] test_feePaymentBlocksTokenReentrancy() (gas: 1344442)\n[PASS] test_liquidityAndDonationNoOpsDoNotChargeFees() (gas: 447379)\n[PASS] test_minedDeploymentCannotBeFrontRunByChangingPrice() (gas: 39656)\n[PASS] test_minerHashIncludesProxyInitialization() (gas: 41758)\n[PASS] test_permissionsDeclareAllFourteenBits() (gas: 17736)\n[PASS] test_postAndBurnBlockTokenReentrancy() (gas: 1326700)\n[PASS] test_shortTransferAndFalseReturnCannotCreateVotes() (gas: 1232869)\n[PASS] test_wrongPoolRejectedAndNoRebinding() (gas: 85815)\nSuite result: ok. 11 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 199.51ms (163.38ms CPU time)\n\nRan 14 tests for test/Voting.t.sol:VotingReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_burnConservesTokens(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 308367, ~: 308370)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 32818269390245\n\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceAndBurnAllowance() (gas: 352981)\n[PASS] test_largeSqrtPriceDoesNotOverflow() (gas: 10192861)\n[PASS] test_nonexistentDraftCannotBurn() (gas: 238709)\n[PASS] test_postAllowanceFailureRollsBackId() (gas: 327777)\n[PASS] test_postBurnsAndEmitsAuthorsVotes() (gas: 252885)\n[PASS] test_priceAndUsdSettingsChangeQuote() (gas: 391482)\n[PASS] test_quoteReadsPoolPriceBothCurrencyOrders() (gas: 10695581)\n[PASS] test_quoteRejectsUnseededPool() (gas: 9937491)\n[PASS] test_quotesAndPostsRefuseUnlockedPool() (gas: 572294)\n[PASS] test_repeatBurnAnyExistingDraftAndZeroAmount() (gas: 568285)\n[PASS] test_roundingUpPreventsFreeDustPost() (gas: 164607)\n[PASS] test_settingsOwnerOnlyAndOwnershipTransfer() (gas: 247498)\n[PASS] test_sixDecimalImdNormalization() (gas: 10710809)\nSuite result: ok. 14 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 246.49ms (199.55ms CPU time)\n\nRan 15 tests for test/Fees.t.sol:FeesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allSwapModes(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 421377, ~: 418965)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999000000015624\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_splitConservation(uint8,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 388706, ~: 395425)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 5080\n\n[PASS] test_badAmountAndZeroSwap() (gas: 103038)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 414582)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput() (gas: 414447)\n[PASS] test_dustFeeRoundsDown() (gas: 264705)\n[PASS] test_freshTokenOnlyPoolNeedsPrepaidImdFee() (gas: 50115565)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBackingRevertsAtomically() (gas: 415217)\n[PASS] test_partialImdSpecifiedRevertsAndRollsBackFee() (gas: 340010)\n[PASS] test_partialPaperSpecifiedChargesActualImd() (gas: 341386)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 420427)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput() (gas: 419951)\n[PASS] test_splitChangePayments() (gas: 427387)\n[PASS] test_splitInvalidAndUnauthorized() (gas: 238325)\n[PASS] test_zeroSplitAndSameRecipient() (gas: 622323)\nSuite result: ok. 15 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 326.03ms (487.41ms CPU time)\n\nRan 7 tests for test/VotingProperties.t.sol:VotingPropertiesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_quoteIsSmallestSufficientWholeTokenAmount(uint64,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 128319, ~: 128224)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 774826275930186270853\n\n[PASS] test_eventsAttributeEveryVoteExactlyOnceAcrossAuthorsAndRepeatedHashes() (gas: 675328)\n[PASS] test_exactApprovalProtectsPostWhenPoolPriceChanges() (gas: 668059)\n[PASS] test_existingDraftRemainsVotableWhenLiquidityIsRemoved() (gas: 486984)\n[PASS] test_freshV2ReversedDefaultsActuallyPayBothDirections() (gas: 36347889)\n[PASS] test_maximumBurnFailsWithoutChangingExistingDraft() (gas: 289349)\n[PASS] test_transferringHookOwnershipDoesNotTransferUpgradeAuthority() (gas: 528532)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 330.92ms (358.91ms CPU time)\n\nRan 14 tests for test/Voting.t.sol:VotingTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_burnConservesTokens(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 308359, ~: 308359)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 558018932887950974893\n\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceAndBurnAllowance() (gas: 352959)\n[PASS] test_largeSqrtPriceDoesNotOverflow() (gas: 7947081)\n[PASS] test_nonexistentDraftCannotBurn() (gas: 238698)\n[PASS] test_postAllowanceFailureRollsBackId() (gas: 327755)\n[PASS] test_postBurnsAndEmitsAuthorsVotes() (gas: 252863)\n[PASS] test_priceAndUsdSettingsChangeQuote() (gas: 391438)\n[PASS] test_quoteReadsPoolPriceBothCurrencyOrders() (gas: 8443418)\n[PASS] test_quoteRejectsUnseededPool() (gas: 7692140)\n[PASS] test_quotesAndPostsRefuseUnlockedPool() (gas: 572294)\n[PASS] test_repeatBurnAnyExistingDraftAndZeroAmount() (gas: 568263)\n[PASS] test_roundingUpPreventsFreeDustPost() (gas: 164585)\n[PASS] test_settingsOwnerOnlyAndOwnershipTransfer() (gas: 247498)\n[PASS] test_sixDecimalImdNormalization() (gas: 8465219)\nSuite result: ok. 14 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 331.15ms (184.98ms CPU time)\n\nRan 7 tests for test/FailureAtomicity.t.sol:FailureAtomicityReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_failedSettlementRollsBackEverySwapMode(bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 953985, ~: 954081)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 33487685381048969689\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_invalidSplitNeverMutatesState(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 135916, ~: 135888)\n[PASS] test_everyBoundCallbackRejectsAnotherPoolFromTheRealManager() (gas: 669268)\n[PASS] test_failedBurnCannotConsumeAllowanceOrCreateVotesAndRecovers() (gas: 1510473)\n[PASS] test_falseReturnSettlementRestoresTokenCallbackState() (gas: 1533969)\n[PASS] test_invalidRecipientInEitherPositionEvenWithZeroShare() (gas: 489607)\n[PASS] test_oversizedAmountsFailBeforeAnyPayment() (gas: 812687)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 333.84ms (538.44ms CPU time)\n\nRan 15 tests for test/Fees.t.sol:FeesReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allSwapModes(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 421863, ~: 423002)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1293173229347968798\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_splitConservation(uint8,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 395083, ~: 402262)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 5080\n\n[PASS] test_badAmountAndZeroSwap() (gas: 103304)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 421112)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput() (gas: 419693)\n[PASS] test_dustFeeRoundsDown() (gas: 271552)\n[PASS] test_freshTokenOnlyPoolNeedsPrepaidImdFee() (gas: 19300110)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBackingRevertsAtomically() (gas: 415255)\n[PASS] test_partialImdSpecifiedRevertsAndRollsBackFee() (gas: 346259)\n[PASS] test_partialPaperSpecifiedChargesActualImd() (gas: 335577)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 414340)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput() (gas: 415148)\n[PASS] test_splitChangePayments() (gas: 433917)\n[PASS] test_splitInvalidAndUnauthorized() (gas: 238325)\n[PASS] test_zeroSplitAndSameRecipient() (gas: 629351)\nSuite result: ok. 15 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 338.08ms (421.16ms CPU time)\n\nRan 7 tests for test/VotingProperties.t.sol:VotingPropertiesReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_quoteIsSmallestSufficientWholeTokenAmount(uint64,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 128333, ~: 128235)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 80\n  Bound result 929151\n\n[PASS] test_eventsAttributeEveryVoteExactlyOnceAcrossAuthorsAndRepeatedHashes() (gas: 675350)\n[PASS] test_exactApprovalProtectsPostWhenPoolPriceChanges() (gas: 662003)\n[PASS] test_existingDraftRemainsVotableWhenLiquidityIsRemoved() (gas: 487223)\n[PASS] test_freshV2ReversedDefaultsActuallyPayBothDirections() (gas: 19723960)\n[PASS] test_maximumBurnFailsWithoutChangingExistingDraft() (gas: 289360)\n[PASS] test_transferringHookOwnershipDoesNotTransferUpgradeAuthority() (gas: 535062)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 360.92ms (237.00ms CPU time)\n\nRan 20 tests for test/Router.t.sol:RouterReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allModesConserveFunds(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 471183, ~: 471723)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1293173229347968798\n\n[PASS] test_attackerCannotSpendAnotherAccountsApproval() (gas: 229778)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 467398)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutputRefundsUnusedBudget() (gas: 471808)\n[PASS] test_callbackRequiresManagerAndActiveRequest() (gas: 185600)\n[PASS] test_excessiveMinOutputRollsBackPrepaymentAndFees() (gas: 502672)\n[PASS] test_expiredDeadlineDoesNotPullFunds() (gas: 186646)\n[PASS] test_firstBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolPaysBothWalletsWithoutBacking() (gas: 8622600)\n[PASS] test_firstExactOutputBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolRefundsBudget() (gas: 8614293)\n[PASS] test_inputTokenCannotReenterSwap() (gas: 1632920)\n[PASS] test_insufficientExactOutputBudgetRollsBack() (gas: 450656)\n[PASS] test_partialExactOutputRollsBackEvenWithLowMinimum() (gas: 461606)\n[PASS] test_refusedOutputRollsBackAlreadyPaidRefundAndAllowsRetry() (gas: 1917364)\n[PASS] test_refusedRefundRollsBackSwapAndAllowsRetry() (gas: 1903389)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 460374)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutputRefundsUnusedBudget() (gas: 467691)\n[PASS] test_shortInputTransferRollsBack() (gas: 1131085)\n[PASS] test_shortManagerSettlementRollsBackSuccessfulInitialPull() (gas: 1747276)\n[PASS] test_unrelatedRouterDepositsAreNotRefundedToTrader() (gas: 521462)\n[PASS] test_zeroRecipientRefused() (gas: 168946)\nSuite result: ok. 20 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 360.91ms (214.88ms CPU time)\n\nRan 20 tests for test/Router.t.sol:RouterTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allModesConserveFunds(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 470945, ~: 470997)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999001508384135\n\n[PASS] test_attackerCannotSpendAnotherAccountsApproval() (gas: 229978)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 461148)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutputRefundsUnusedBudget() (gas: 466855)\n[PASS] test_callbackRequiresManagerAndActiveRequest() (gas: 185600)\n[PASS] test_excessiveMinOutputRollsBackPrepaymentAndFees() (gas: 496422)\n[PASS] test_expiredDeadlineDoesNotPullFunds() (gas: 186836)\n[PASS] test_firstBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolPaysBothWalletsWithoutBacking() (gas: 40393952)\n[PASS] test_firstExactOutputBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolRefundsBudget() (gas: 40386942)\n[PASS] test_inputTokenCannotReenterSwap() (gas: 1626860)\n[PASS] test_insufficientExactOutputBudgetRollsBack() (gas: 445703)\n[PASS] test_partialExactOutputRollsBackEvenWithLowMinimum() (gas: 455783)\n[PASS] test_refusedOutputRollsBackAlreadyPaidRefundAndAllowsRetry() (gas: 1907458)\n[PASS] test_refusedRefundRollsBackSwapAndAllowsRetry() (gas: 1893483)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 466650)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutputRefundsUnusedBudget() (gas: 472670)\n[PASS] test_shortInputTransferRollsBack() (gas: 1131285)\n[PASS] test_shortManagerSettlementRollsBackSuccessfulInitialPull() (gas: 1742543)\n[PASS] test_unrelatedRouterDepositsAreNotRefundedToTrader() (gas: 516522)\n[PASS] test_zeroRecipientRefused() (gas: 169136)\nSuite result: ok. 20 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 361.03ms (488.48ms CPU time)\n\nRan 13 tests for test/Upgrade.t.sol:UpgradeTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_runtimeWhitelistRejectsChangesBeforeDelegation(uint16,uint8,bool) (runs: 1000, μ: 85285, ~: 85099)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 6\n\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsCounterfeitBeforeInitialization() (gas: 152803)\n[PASS] test_hookOwnerAndStrangerCannotUpgrade() (gas: 94511)\n[PASS] test_initializersCannotBeUsedAgainOrOnImplementations() (gas: 127480)\n[PASS] test_managerNormalizationRejectsDirtyAddressPadding() (gas: 59275)\n[PASS] test_proxyAdminCannotCallHookFunctions() (gas: 6947)\n[PASS] test_proxyFlagsAndAdminOwnerAreFixed() (gas: 59436)\n[PASS] test_upgradeKeepsAllStateAndTradingVotingWork() (gas: 1253911)\n[PASS] test_upgradeRejectsCanonicalImplementationForAnotherManager() (gas: 4432269)\n[PASS] test_upgradeRejectsCounterfeitFeeGetterBeforeInitialization() (gas: 443275)\n[PASS] test_upgradeRejectsModifiedCanonicalRuntime() (gas: 58721)\n[PASS] test_v2ReversesDefaultsOnlyForFreshProxy() (gas: 35511217)\n[PASS] test_whitelistRejectsAppendedRuntimeEvenWhenBehaviorIsUnchanged() (gas: 65824)\nSuite result: ok. 13 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 360.80ms (408.09ms CPU time)\n\nRan 7 tests for test/FailureAtomicity.t.sol:FailureAtomicityTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_failedSettlementRollsBackEverySwapMode(bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 957228, ~: 956429)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999001800703343\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_invalidSplitNeverMutatesState(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 135917, ~: 135888)\n[PASS] test_everyBoundCallbackRejectsAnotherPoolFromTheRealManager() (gas: 667216)\n[PASS] test_failedBurnCannotConsumeAllowanceOrCreateVotesAndRecovers() (gas: 1510462)\n[PASS] test_falseReturnSettlementRestoresTokenCallbackState() (gas: 1545447)\n[PASS] test_invalidRecipientInEitherPositionEvenWithZeroShare() (gas: 483077)\n[PASS] test_oversizedAmountsFailBeforeAnyPayment() (gas: 812057)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 361.40ms (244.22ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/Invariant.t.sol:HookInvariantTest\n[PASS] invariant_feeConservationAndNoHookBalances() (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract    | Selector    | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+========================================================+\n| HookHandler | postAndBurn | 705   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | split       | 625   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | swap        | 718   | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999001084732503\n  Bound result 4247\n  Bound result 99999999000000003656\n  Bound result 116410749725007\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 9223372036854775808\n  Bound result 735\n  Bound result 34658656859\n  Bound result 99999999003041954475\n  Bound result 1155\n  Bound result 7027857718061606\n  Bound result 43257169845116750276\n  Bound result 58\n  Bound result 99999999000000005250\n  Bound result 99999999000000003540\n  Bound result 99999999000000000244\n  Bound result 99999999000000007171\n  Bound result 1456\n  Bound result 9\n  Bound result 99999999000294443688\n  Bound result 14264337592751668710\n  Bound result 99999999000000001795\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 99999999000000001570\n  Bound result 3459\n  Bound result 99999999001725540770\n  Bound result 998915167497\n  Bound result 24\n  Bound result 19158\n  Bound result 99999999000000002881\n  Bound result 4358\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 0\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.07s (1.03s CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/StatefulReview.t.sol:StatefulReviewTest\n[PASS] invariant_allFeesAndVotesAreBackedAndStateSurvivesUpgrades() (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract      | Selector      | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+============================================================+\n| ReviewHandler | changeSplit   | 1992  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | configure     | 2102  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | post          | 2052  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | rejectedAdmin | 2020  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | rejectedVote  | 2103  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | trade         | 2063  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | upgrade       | 2038  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | vote          | 2014  | 0       | 0        |\n╰---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 50\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 2864\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 27325775277770772206\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 4366\n  Bound result 85\n  Bound result 9\n  Bound result 9900000000000005137\n  Bound result 187\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 11241\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 7992\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 9900000000000017582\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 99999999999999999\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 999999999999898979\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 12999\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 9900000000000000974\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 9900000000000004062\n  Bound result 185\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 9900000000000008185\n  Bound result 80\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 3330963311742982708\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 9900000000000002888\n  Bound result 19110\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 4062325194\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 9900031697669757473\n  Bound result 36\n  Bound result 1659\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 9900000003696005333\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 9900000000000000996\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 9900000000000011427\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 7928737110456855389\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 10.96s (10.86s CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/StatefulReview.t.sol:StatefulReviewReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] invariant_allFeesAndVotesAreBackedAndStateSurvivesUpgrades() (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract      | Selector      | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+============================================================+\n| ReviewHandler | changeSplit   | 1992  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | configure     | 2102  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | post          | 2052  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | rejectedAdmin | 2020  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | rejectedVote  | 2103  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | trade         | 2063  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | upgrade       | 2038  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | vote          | 2014  | 0       | 0        |\n╰---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 50\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 3221\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 2476\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 1781\n  Bound result 58\n  Bound result 9\n  Bound result 9900000000000009596\n  Bound result 85\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 6246\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 11661\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 9900000000000017761\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 50044460615897521517\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 9900000000000004319\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 15590\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 9900000000000000841\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 9900000000000008192\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 9900000004099217082\n  Bound result 80\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 3330963311742982708\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 9900000000000004198\n  Bound result 8937\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 4062325194\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 9900031697669757473\n  Bound result 155\n  Bound result 620\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 9900000000000002718\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 9900000000000007207\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 9900000000000012026\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 9900000000000011374\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 11.59s (11.57s CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/RouterStateful.t.sol:RouterStatefulTest\n[PASS] invariant_routerPreservesEachUsersFundsAndOnlyRetainsUnsolicitedDeposits() (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract             | Selector         | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+======================================================================+\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | changeSplit      | 3257  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | depositResidual  | 3322  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | rejectedSlippage | 3249  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | trade            | 3304  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | upgrade          | 3252  | 0       | 0        |\n╰----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 7000000000000000000\n  Bound result 999999999999999999\n  Bound result 73\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 98\n  Bound result 99999999000000014250\n  Bound result 78\n  Bound result 4213\n  Bound result 8827948872546845340\n  Bound result 77757496446006345373\n  Bound result 32\n  Bound result 99999999000000001915\n  Bound result 99999999000000012982\n  Bound result 99999999000000011930\n  Bound result 2863514456947828\n  Bound result 16485\n  Bound result 73\n  Bound result 99999999000000005386\n  Bound result 99999999000000013708\n  Bound result 99999999000000003270\n  Bound result 99999999000000016250\n  Bound result 161059894375448\n  Bound result 1427\n  Bound result 99999999000000014054\n  Bound result 99999999000000010350\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 99999999000000030874\n  Bound result 99999999000000008914\n  Bound result 99999999000000012497\n  Bound result 99999999000000008008\n  Bound result 70\n  Bound result 99999999000000011417\n  Bound result 11414\n  Bound result 12150\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 7316\n  Bound result 59\n  Bound result 99999999000000002653\n  Bound result 14414041441471954\n  Bound result 6247721430793253774\n  Bound result 99999999000000007382\n  Bound result 99999999000000016325\n  Bound result 1000000000003\n  Bound result 85\n  Bound result 166\n  Bound result 85\n  Bound result 99999999000000011496\n  Bound result 99999999000000010824\n  Bound result 99999999000000009922\n  Bound result 5257\n  Bound result 5814192411222556570\n  Bound result 14728\n  Bound result 99999999000000002241\n  Bound result 99999999000000001065\n  Bound result 10042695199319638044\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 12.28s (12.23s CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/RouterStateful.t.sol:RouterStatefulReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] invariant_routerPreservesEachUsersFundsAndOnlyRetainsUnsolicitedDeposits() (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract             | Selector         | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+======================================================================+\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | changeSplit      | 3257  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | depositResidual  | 3322  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | rejectedSlippage | 3249  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | trade            | 3304  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| PrepaidRouterHandler | upgrade          | 3252  | 0       | 0        |\n╰----------------------+------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 7000000000000000000\n  Bound result 999999999999999999\n  Bound result 73\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 120\n  Bound result 99999999000000008957\n  Bound result 28\n  Bound result 7840\n  Bound result 999999999979\n  Bound result 77757496446006345373\n  Bound result 32\n  Bound result 99999999001264811664\n  Bound result 99999999000000001327\n  Bound result 99999999003016768270\n  Bound result 2863514456947828\n  Bound result 16300\n  Bound result 73\n  Bound result 99999999000000004879\n  Bound result 99999999000000013548\n  Bound result 99999999000000006387\n  Bound result 99999999000000016243\n  Bound result 161059894375448\n  Bound result 13671\n  Bound result 99999999000000019535\n  Bound result 99999999000000001616\n  Bound result 13\n  Bound result 99999999002114333239\n  Bound result 99999999000000001190\n  Bound result 99999999000000001167\n  Bound result 99999999000000006087\n  Bound result 93\n  Bound result 99999999000000001522\n  Bound result 922\n  Bound result 259\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 6076\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 99999999000000001422\n  Bound result 14414041441471954\n  Bound result 5942415311407226209\n  Bound result 99999999000000006992\n  Bound result 99999999000000016354\n  Bound result 1000000000003\n  Bound result 85\n  Bound result 176\n  Bound result 113\n  Bound result 99999999000000011311\n  Bound result 99999999000000014677\n  Bound result 90814630333548690461\n  Bound result 9531\n  Bound result 5814192411222556570\n  Bound result 14728\n  Bound result 99999999000000000759\n  Bound result 99999999000000006052\n  Bound result 10042695199319638044\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 12.33s (12.32s CPU time)\n\nRan 18 test suites in 12.34s (52.15s CPU time): 159 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (159 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":170,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"Paper.approve(address,uint256)\",\"Paper.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"Paper.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"PaperDeployment.deployHook(bytes32,address,(address,address,address,uint256,uint160,uint24,int24))\",\"PaperDeployment.deployToken()\",\"PaperHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"PaperHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"PaperHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"PaperHook.burn(uint256,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.initialize(address,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.postDraft(bytes32)\",\"PaperHook.setImdUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHook.setPostFeeUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHook.setSplit(address,uint256,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.transferOwnership(address)\",\"PaperHookV2.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"PaperHookV2.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"PaperHookV2.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"PaperHookV2.burn(uint256,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.initialize(address,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.postDraft(bytes32)\",\"PaperHookV2.setImdUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.setPostFeeUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.setSplit(address,uint256,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.transferOwnership(address)\",\"PaperProxy.fallback()\",\"PaperSwapRouter.swap((bool,int256,uint160),uint256,uint256,address,uint256)\",\"PaperSwapRouter.unlockCallback(bytes)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"LICENSE\":21,\"README.md\":128,\"docs/ADVERSARIAL_REVIEW.md\":49,\"docs/dependencies.json\":22,\"docs/deployment-parameters.json\":47,\"foundry.toml\":22,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/MineSalt.s.sol\":16,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":28,\"src/Paper.sol\":11,\"src/PaperDeployment.sol\":85,\"src/PaperHook.sol\":412,\"src/PaperHookV2.sol\":14,\"src/PaperProxy.sol\":68,\"src/PaperSwapRouter.sol\":92,\"test/Adversarial.t.sol\":151,\"test/FailureAtomicity.t.sol\":175,\"test/Fees.t.sol\":203,\"test/HookFixture.sol\":98,\"test/Invariant.t.sol\":90,\"test/Paper.t.sol\":52,\"test/REVIEW.md\":36,\"test/Router.t.sol\":361,\"test/RouterStateful.t.sol\":238,\"test/StatefulReview.t.sol\":232,\"test/Upgrade.t.sol\":233,\"test/Voting.t.sol\":194,\"test/VotingProperties.t.sol\":183,\"test/mocks/HostilePaper.sol\":45,\"test/mocks/MockDecimalsERC20.sol\":16,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":14,\"test/mocks/PoolRouter.sol\":65,\"test/mocks/UnlockProbe.sol\":27},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"c0cba1c6cd8344b4c03dbad219f69c0f7245a2aa8bfbf320c5f10a17188c5514","verifiedTreeHash":"c4caae181256adbfb3a98bc89492405d05cb0d46","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+94826a22"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":10592,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 112 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 10.33s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[missing-events-access-control]: `callbackHash` is changed without an event but is used for access control\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:69:9\n   │\n69 │         callbackHash = bytes32(0);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-events-access-control\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:40:9\n   │\n40 │         emit TokenAllocated(address(token), msg.sender, poolAmount, remainder);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:61:28\n   │\n61 │         delta = abi.decode(manager.unlock(data), (BalanceDelta));\n   │                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[encode-packed-collision]: `abi.encodePacked()` called with multiple dynamic type arguments; hash collisions possible\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:46:16\n   │\n46 │         return abi.encodePacked(type(PaperProxy).creationCode, abi.encode(implementation, initialization));\n   │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/encode-packed-collision\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:123:9\n    │\n123 │         emit OwnershipTransferred(address(0), owner_);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:124:9\n    │\n124 │         emit SplitChanged(ORDERS, s.ordersBps, DEV, s.devBps);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[missing-zero-check]: address parameter is used in a state write or value transfer without a zero-address check\n   ╭▸ src/PaperProxy.sol:25:17\n   │\n25 │     constructor(address implementation, bytes memory initialization)\n   │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-zero-check\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:125:9\n    │\n125 │         emit PostFeeUsdChanged(1);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperProxy.sol:32:20\n   │\n32 │                 && bytes4(initialization) == bytes4(keccak256(\"initialize(address,address,uint256)\")),\n   │                    ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'bytes4' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperProxy.sol:32:46\n   │\n32 │                 && bytes4(initialization) == bytes4(keccak256(\"initialize(address,address,uint256)\")),\n   │                                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'bytes4' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:83:9\n   │\n83 │         emit HookDeployed(address(hook), implementation, salt);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:47:13\n   │\n47 │         if (block.timestamp > deadline) revert Expired();\n   │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:126:9\n    │\n126 │         emit ImdUsdChanged(usdWad);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:82:9\n   │\n82 │         config.manager.initialize(key, config.sqrtPriceX96);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:49:41\n   │\n49 │             maxInput == 0 || maxInput > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max)) || params.amountSpecified == 0\n   │                                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:49:49\n   │\n49 │             maxInput == 0 || maxInput > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max)) || params.amountSpecified == 0\n   │                                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[incorrect-strict-equality]: dangerous strict equality check on an externally-influenced value\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:57:13\n   │\n57 │         if (input.balanceOf(address(this)) - beforeBalance != maxInput) revert InexactTransfer();\n   │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/incorrect-strict-equality\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:174:69\n    │\n174 │     function transferOwnership(address newOwner) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {\n    │                                                                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:177:9\n    │\n177 │         emit OwnershipTransferred(s.owner, newOwner);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:184:9\n    │\n184 │         nonReentrant\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:197:9\n    │\n197 │         emit SplitChanged(ordersWallet, ordersBps, devWallet, devBps);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:201:60\n    │\n201 │     function setPostFeeUsd(uint256 usd) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {\n    │                                                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:82:25\n   │\n82 │         uint256 spent = uint256(-int256(inputDelta));\n   │                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:83:28\n   │\n83 │         uint256 received = uint256(int256(outputDelta));\n   │                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:86:63\n   │\n86 │                 || (params.amountSpecified > 0 && received != uint256(params.amountSpecified))\n   │                                                               ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:203:9\n    │\n203 │         emit PostFeeUsdChanged(usd);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:206:59\n    │\n206 │     function setImdUsd(uint256 usdWad) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {\n    │                                                           ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:209:9\n    │\n209 │         emit ImdUsdChanged(usdWad);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:252:9\n    │\n252 │         emit DraftPosted(draftId, msg.sender, textHash, amount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:258:9\n    │\n258 │         emit Burned(draftId, msg.sender, amount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[incorrect-strict-equality]: dangerous strict equality check on an externally-influenced value\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:265:13\n    │\n265 │         if (paper.balanceOf(DEAD) - beforeBalance != amount) revert InexactTransfer();\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/incorrect-strict-equality\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:284:9\n    │\n284 │         emit PoolBound(key.toId(), s.token);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:291:9\n    │\n291 │         nonReentrant\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:346:9\n    │\n346 │         emit FeesPaid(fee, ordersAmount, devAmount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:305:9\n    │\n305 │         nonReentrant\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:351:26\n    │\n351 │         uint256 amount = uint256(value < 0 ? -value : value);\n    │                          ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:352:22\n    │\n352 │         if (amount > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                      ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:352:30\n    │\n352 │         if (amount > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:357:21\n    │\n357 │         if (value > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:357:29\n    │\n357 │         if (value > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:358:16\n    │\n358 │         return int128(int256(value));\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:358:23\n    │\n358 │         return int128(int256(value));\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":1110,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 4 tests for test/Paper.t.sol:PaperTest\n[PASS] test_allowanceAndBalanceFailures() (gas: 162803)\n[PASS] test_deploymentAllocatesEightyPercentAndRemainder() (gas: 555001)\n[PASS] test_metadataSupplyAndTransfer() (gas: 118951)\n[PASS] test_noMintOrAdminEvenForDeployer() (gas: 53689)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 789.65µs (1.71ms CPU time)\n\nRan 15 tests for test/Fees.t.sol:FeesReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allSwapModes(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 429076, ~: 426964)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 34153488261136844024\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_splitConservation(uint8,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 403025, ~: 409738)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 23\n  Bound result 4591\n\n[PASS] test_badAmountAndZeroSwap() (gas: 103304)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 428566)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput() (gas: 427147)\n[PASS] test_dustFeeRoundsDown() (gas: 279006)\n[PASS] test_freshTokenOnlyPoolNeedsPrepaidImdFee() (gas: 14644431)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBackingRevertsAtomically() (gas: 415255)\n[PASS] test_partialImdSpecifiedRevertsAndRollsBackFee() (gas: 350911)\n[PASS] test_partialPaperSpecifiedChargesActualImd() (gas: 343031)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 421794)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput() (gas: 422602)\n[PASS] test_splitChangePayments() (gas: 441393)\n[PASS] test_splitInvalidAndUnauthorized() (gas: 238457)\n[PASS] test_zeroSplitAndSameRecipient() (gas: 644303)\nSuite result: ok. 15 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 108.64ms (194.83ms CPU time)\n\nRan 11 tests for test/VotingProtection.t.sol:VotingProtectionReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] test_adminPriceChangeCannotExceedCallerCap() (gas: 206192)\n[PASS] test_capAtQuoteSucceedsAndEmitsActualVotes() (gas: 234785)\n[PASS] test_cappedPostRejectsReentrantPost() (gas: 1190957)\n[PASS] test_displacementCannotOverburnCappedPostWithUnlimitedAllowance() (gas: 15506072)\n[PASS] test_emptyRangeSwapCannotOverwriteLaunchQuote() (gas: 14916609)\n[PASS] test_largerCapBurnsOnlyExecutionQuote() (gas: 156985)\n[PASS] test_paperOnlyLaunchSupportsQuoteAndPost() (gas: 14541773)\n[PASS] test_removingAllLiquidityKeepsLastActiveQuote() (gas: 721384)\n[PASS] test_roundTripCannotDisablePostingOrOverwriteLastActiveQuote() (gas: 15748130)\n[PASS] test_savedManipulatedPriceStillRequiresCallerCapAfterDustRemoval() (gas: 16234632)\n[PASS] test_zeroCapAllowsOnlyFreePost() (gas: 238052)\nSuite result: ok. 11 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 108.65ms (179.57ms CPU time)\n\nRan 17 tests for test/Router.t.sol:RouterReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allModesConserveFunds(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 477715, ~: 479027)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999000000006523\n\n[PASS] test_attackerCannotSpendAnotherAccountsApproval() (gas: 229714)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 474702)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutputRefundsUnusedBudget() (gas: 479112)\n[PASS] test_callbackRequiresManagerAndActiveRequest() (gas: 185590)\n[PASS] test_excessiveMinOutputRollsBackPrepaymentAndFees() (gas: 507306)\n[PASS] test_expiredDeadlineDoesNotPullFunds() (gas: 186560)\n[PASS] test_firstBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolPaysBothWalletsWithoutBacking() (gas: 13567507)\n[PASS] test_firstExactOutputBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolRefundsBudget() (gas: 13559200)\n[PASS] test_inputTokenCannotReenterSwap() (gas: 1640216)\n[PASS] test_insufficientExactOutputBudgetRollsBack() (gas: 455246)\n[PASS] test_partialExactOutputRollsBackEvenWithLowMinimum() (gas: 466174)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 467700)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutputRefundsUnusedBudget() (gas: 475017)\n[PASS] test_shortInputTransferRollsBack() (gas: 1130935)\n[PASS] test_unrelatedRouterDepositsAreNotRefundedToTrader() (gas: 528672)\n[PASS] test_zeroRecipientRefused() (gas: 168882)\nSuite result: ok. 17 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 108.78ms (132.11ms CPU time)\n\nRan 14 tests for test/Voting.t.sol:VotingReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_burnConservesTokens(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 308504, ~: 308518)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 292807027749099079217\n\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceAndBurnAllowance() (gas: 353120)\n[PASS] test_largeSqrtPriceDoesNotOverflow() (gas: 50122799)\n[PASS] test_nonexistentDraftCannotBurn() (gas: 238889)\n[PASS] test_postAllowanceFailureRollsBackId() (gas: 327894)\n[PASS] test_postBurnsAndEmitsAuthorsVotes() (gas: 252972)\n[PASS] test_priceAndUsdSettingsChangeQuote() (gas: 391576)\n[PASS] test_quoteReadsPoolPriceBothCurrencyOrders() (gas: 50633164)\n[PASS] test_quoteUsesLaunchPriceBeforeSeeding() (gas: 49998226)\n[PASS] test_quotesAndPostsRefuseUnlockedPool() (gas: 572299)\n[PASS] test_repeatBurnAnyExistingDraftAndZeroAmount() (gas: 568575)\n[PASS] test_roundingUpPreventsFreeDustPost() (gas: 164683)\n[PASS] test_settingsOwnerOnlyAndOwnershipTransfer() (gas: 247363)\n[PASS] test_sixDecimalImdNormalization() (gas: 50640660)\nSuite result: ok. 14 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 108.74ms (405.80ms CPU time)\n\nRan 11 tests for test/Upgrade.t.sol:UpgradeTest\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsCounterfeitBeforeInitialization() (gas: 152891)\n[PASS] test_hookOwnerAndStrangerCannotUpgrade() (gas: 94479)\n[PASS] test_initializersCannotBeUsedAgainOrOnImplementations() (gas: 127677)\n[PASS] test_proxyAdminCannotCallHookFunctions() (gas: 6947)\n[PASS] test_proxyFlagsAndAdminOwnerAreFixed() (gas: 59192)\n[PASS] test_upgradeKeepsAllStateAndTradingVotingWork() (gas: 1269225)\n[PASS] test_upgradeKeepsFallbackPriceAndCappedPosting() (gas: 865147)\n[PASS] test_upgradeRejectsCanonicalImplementationForAnotherManager() (gas: 4432332)\n[PASS] test_upgradeRejectsCounterfeitFeeGetterBeforeInitialization() (gas: 450589)\n[PASS] test_upgradeRejectsModifiedCanonicalRuntime() (gas: 59023)\n[PASS] test_v2ReversesDefaultsOnlyForFreshProxy() (gas: 45136738)\nSuite result: ok. 11 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 205.03ms (77.68ms CPU time)\n\nRan 17 tests for test/Router.t.sol:RouterTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allModesConserveFunds(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 478002, ~: 478301)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 15916336697756853034\n\n[PASS] test_attackerCannotSpendAnotherAccountsApproval() (gas: 229914)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 468452)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutputRefundsUnusedBudget() (gas: 474159)\n[PASS] test_callbackRequiresManagerAndActiveRequest() (gas: 185590)\n[PASS] test_excessiveMinOutputRollsBackPrepaymentAndFees() (gas: 501056)\n[PASS] test_expiredDeadlineDoesNotPullFunds() (gas: 186750)\n[PASS] test_firstBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolPaysBothWalletsWithoutBacking() (gas: 15178479)\n[PASS] test_firstExactOutputBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolRefundsBudget() (gas: 15171469)\n[PASS] test_inputTokenCannotReenterSwap() (gas: 1634156)\n[PASS] test_insufficientExactOutputBudgetRollsBack() (gas: 450293)\n[PASS] test_partialExactOutputRollsBackEvenWithLowMinimum() (gas: 460351)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 473976)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutputRefundsUnusedBudget() (gas: 479996)\n[PASS] test_shortInputTransferRollsBack() (gas: 1131135)\n[PASS] test_unrelatedRouterDepositsAreNotRefundedToTrader() (gas: 523732)\n[PASS] test_zeroRecipientRefused() (gas: 169072)\nSuite result: ok. 17 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 214.87ms (137.94ms CPU time)\n\nRan 14 tests for test/Voting.t.sol:VotingTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_burnConservesTokens(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 308496, ~: 308507)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 292807027749099079217\n\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceAndBurnAllowance() (gas: 353098)\n[PASS] test_largeSqrtPriceDoesNotOverflow() (gas: 47238843)\n[PASS] test_nonexistentDraftCannotBurn() (gas: 238878)\n[PASS] test_postAllowanceFailureRollsBackId() (gas: 327872)\n[PASS] test_postBurnsAndEmitsAuthorsVotes() (gas: 252950)\n[PASS] test_priceAndUsdSettingsChangeQuote() (gas: 391532)\n[PASS] test_quoteReadsPoolPriceBothCurrencyOrders() (gas: 47742825)\n[PASS] test_quoteUsesLaunchPriceBeforeSeeding() (gas: 47114677)\n[PASS] test_quotesAndPostsRefuseUnlockedPool() (gas: 572299)\n[PASS] test_repeatBurnAnyExistingDraftAndZeroAmount() (gas: 568553)\n[PASS] test_roundingUpPreventsFreeDustPost() (gas: 164661)\n[PASS] test_settingsOwnerOnlyAndOwnershipTransfer() (gas: 247363)\n[PASS] test_sixDecimalImdNormalization() (gas: 47756894)\nSuite result: ok. 14 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 218.41ms (370.36ms CPU time)\n\nRan 11 tests for test/VotingProtection.t.sol:VotingProtectionTest\n[PASS] test_adminPriceChangeCannotExceedCallerCap() (gas: 206170)\n[PASS] test_capAtQuoteSucceedsAndEmitsActualVotes() (gas: 234774)\n[PASS] test_cappedPostRejectsReentrantPost() (gas: 1190946)\n[PASS] test_displacementCannotOverburnCappedPostWithUnlimitedAllowance() (gas: 22351479)\n[PASS] test_emptyRangeSwapCannotOverwriteLaunchQuote() (gas: 21747474)\n[PASS] test_largerCapBurnsOnlyExecutionQuote() (gas: 156974)\n[PASS] test_paperOnlyLaunchSupportsQuoteAndPost() (gas: 21366369)\n[PASS] test_removingAllLiquidityKeepsLastActiveQuote() (gas: 714593)\n[PASS] test_roundTripCannotDisablePostingOrOverwriteLastActiveQuote() (gas: 22570432)\n[PASS] test_savedManipulatedPriceStillRequiresCallerCapAfterDustRemoval() (gas: 23078790)\n[PASS] test_zeroCapAllowsOnlyFreePost() (gas: 238030)\nSuite result: ok. 11 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 222.80ms (234.78ms CPU time)\n\nRan 15 tests for test/Fees.t.sol:FeesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allSwapModes(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 429135, ~: 430748)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999000000005648\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_splitConservation(uint8,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 396764, ~: 402901)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 365812156834192\n\n[PASS] test_badAmountAndZeroSwap() (gas: 103038)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 422036)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput() (gas: 421901)\n[PASS] test_dustFeeRoundsDown() (gas: 272159)\n[PASS] test_freshTokenOnlyPoolNeedsPrepaidImdFee() (gas: 21462272)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBackingRevertsAtomically() (gas: 415217)\n[PASS] test_partialImdSpecifiedRevertsAndRollsBackFee() (gas: 344662)\n[PASS] test_partialPaperSpecifiedChargesActualImd() (gas: 348840)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 427881)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput() (gas: 427405)\n[PASS] test_splitChangePayments() (gas: 434863)\n[PASS] test_splitInvalidAndUnauthorized() (gas: 238457)\n[PASS] test_zeroSplitAndSameRecipient() (gas: 637275)\nSuite result: ok. 15 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 260.12ms (204.47ms CPU time)\n\nRan 11 tests for test/Adversarial.t.sol:AdversarialTest\n[PASS] test_allAllowedLpFeesInitialize() (gas: 131728963)\n[PASS] test_badFeeDeploymentRollsBackProxyAndPool() (gas: 76390372)\n[PASS] test_everyCallbackRefusesNonManager() (gas: 358806)\n[PASS] test_feePaymentBlocksTokenReentrancy() (gas: 1351853)\n[PASS] test_liquidityAndDonationNoOpsDoNotChargeFees() (gas: 447423)\n[PASS] test_minedDeploymentCannotBeFrontRunByChangingPrice() (gas: 39656)\n[PASS] test_minerHashIncludesProxyInitialization() (gas: 41758)\n[PASS] test_permissionsDeclareAllFourteenBits() (gas: 17758)\n[PASS] test_postAndBurnBlockTokenReentrancy() (gas: 1326815)\n[PASS] test_shortTransferAndFalseReturnCannotCreateVotes() (gas: 1232931)\n[PASS] test_wrongPoolRejectedAndNoRebinding() (gas: 85859)\nSuite result: ok. 11 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 371.46ms (281.87ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/Invariant.t.sol:HookInvariantTest\n[PASS] invariant_feeConservationAndNoHookBalances() (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract    | Selector    | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+========================================================+\n| HookHandler | postAndBurn | 688   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | split       | 688   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | swap        | 672   | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 5209\n  Bound result 54\n  Bound result 99999999000000004226\n  Bound result 154\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 1721\n  Bound result 99999999000000001459\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 11\n  Bound result 8732\n  Bound result 8290\n  Bound result 153\n  Bound result 23582836957752999873\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 99999999000000005919\n  Bound result 905710298\n  Bound result 2131\n  Bound result 64431021288647\n  Bound result 99999999000000000987\n  Bound result 2119\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 130\n  Bound result 14\n  Bound result 2032\n  Bound result 8187\n  Bound result 13781\n  Bound result 99999999000000019078\n  Bound result 120\n  Bound result 99999999000000002911\n  Bound result 11939\n  Bound result 9288\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 32\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 929.37ms (711.06ms CPU time)\n\nRan 12 test suites in 932.47ms (2.86s CPU time): 141 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (141 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":128,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"Paper.approve(address,uint256)\",\"Paper.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"Paper.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"PaperDeployment.deployHook(bytes32,address,(address,address,address,uint256,uint160,uint24,int24))\",\"PaperDeployment.deployToken()\",\"PaperHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"PaperHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"PaperHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"PaperHook.burn(uint256,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.initialize(address,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.postDraft(bytes32)\",\"PaperHook.postDraft(bytes32,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.setImdUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHook.setPostFeeUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHook.setSplit(address,uint256,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.transferOwnership(address)\",\"PaperHookV2.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"PaperHookV2.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"PaperHookV2.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"PaperHookV2.burn(uint256,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.initialize(address,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.postDraft(bytes32)\",\"PaperHookV2.postDraft(bytes32,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.setImdUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.setPostFeeUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.setSplit(address,uint256,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.transferOwnership(address)\",\"PaperProxy.fallback()\",\"PaperSwapRouter.swap((bool,int256,uint160),uint256,uint256,address,uint256)\",\"PaperSwapRouter.unlockCallback(bytes)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"LICENSE\":21,\"README.md\":136,\"docs/ADVERSARIAL_REVIEW.md\":64,\"docs/dependencies.json\":22,\"docs/deployment-parameters.json\":54,\"foundry.toml\":22,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/MineSalt.s.sol\":16,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":28,\"src/Paper.sol\":11,\"src/PaperDeployment.sol\":85,\"src/PaperHook.sol\":439,\"src/PaperHookV2.sol\":14,\"src/PaperProxy.sol\":68,\"src/PaperSwapRouter.sol\":92,\"test/Adversarial.t.sol\":151,\"test/Fees.t.sol\":203,\"test/HookFixture.sol\":98,\"test/Invariant.t.sol\":90,\"test/Paper.t.sol\":52,\"test/Router.t.sol\":271,\"test/Upgrade.t.sol\":196,\"test/Voting.t.sol\":194,\"test/VotingProtection.t.sol\":239,\"test/mocks/HostilePaper.sol\":45,\"test/mocks/MockDecimalsERC20.sol\":16,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":14,\"test/mocks/PoolRouter.sol\":65,\"test/mocks/UnlockProbe.sol\":28},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"c45551fa437c3abd37f1c405d4ed144b140f8948837aa561936e7f830c42079e","verifiedTreeHash":"58db8e3b6b773fa777bf42b21f31638b7bee6665","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+94826a22"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":9933,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 112 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 9.71s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[missing-events-access-control]: `callbackHash` is changed without an event but is used for access control\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:69:9\n   │\n69 │         callbackHash = bytes32(0);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-events-access-control\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:40:9\n   │\n40 │         emit TokenAllocated(address(token), msg.sender, poolAmount, remainder);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[encode-packed-collision]: `abi.encodePacked()` called with multiple dynamic type arguments; hash collisions possible\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:46:16\n   │\n46 │         return abi.encodePacked(type(PaperProxy).creationCode, abi.encode(implementation, initialization));\n   │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/encode-packed-collision\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:61:28\n   │\n61 │         delta = abi.decode(manager.unlock(data), (BalanceDelta));\n   │                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:47:13\n   │\n47 │         if (block.timestamp > deadline) revert Expired();\n   │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:83:9\n   │\n83 │         emit HookDeployed(address(hook), implementation, salt);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:49:41\n   │\n49 │             maxInput == 0 || maxInput > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max)) || params.amountSpecified == 0\n   │                                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:49:49\n   │\n49 │             maxInput == 0 || maxInput > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max)) || params.amountSpecified == 0\n   │                                                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:82:9\n   │\n82 │         config.manager.initialize(key, config.sqrtPriceX96);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[incorrect-strict-equality]: dangerous strict equality check on an externally-influenced value\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:57:13\n   │\n57 │         if (input.balanceOf(address(this)) - beforeBalance != maxInput) revert InexactTransfer();\n   │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/incorrect-strict-equality\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:123:9\n    │\n123 │         emit OwnershipTransferred(address(0), owner_);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:124:9\n    │\n124 │         emit SplitChanged(ORDERS, s.ordersBps, DEV, s.devBps);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:125:9\n    │\n125 │         emit PostFeeUsdChanged(1);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:126:9\n    │\n126 │         emit ImdUsdChanged(usdWad);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:174:69\n    │\n174 │     function transferOwnership(address newOwner) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {\n    │                                                                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:177:9\n    │\n177 │         emit OwnershipTransferred(s.owner, newOwner);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:82:25\n   │\n82 │         uint256 spent = uint256(-int256(inputDelta));\n   │                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:83:28\n   │\n83 │         uint256 received = uint256(int256(outputDelta));\n   │                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:86:63\n   │\n86 │                 || (params.amountSpecified > 0 && received != uint256(params.amountSpecified))\n   │                                                               ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:184:9\n    │\n184 │         nonReentrant\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:197:9\n    │\n197 │         emit SplitChanged(ordersWallet, ordersBps, devWallet, devBps);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:201:60\n    │\n201 │     function setPostFeeUsd(uint256 usd) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {\n    │                                                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:203:9\n    │\n203 │         emit PostFeeUsdChanged(usd);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:206:59\n    │\n206 │     function setImdUsd(uint256 usdWad) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {\n    │                                                           ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:209:9\n    │\n209 │         emit ImdUsdChanged(usdWad);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:252:9\n    │\n252 │         emit DraftPosted(draftId, msg.sender, textHash, amount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[missing-zero-check]: address parameter is used in a state write or value transfer without a zero-address check\n   ╭▸ src/PaperProxy.sol:25:17\n   │\n25 │     constructor(address implementation, bytes memory initialization)\n   │                 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-zero-check\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperProxy.sol:32:20\n   │\n32 │                 && bytes4(initialization) == bytes4(keccak256(\"initialize(address,address,uint256)\")),\n   │                    ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'bytes4' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperProxy.sol:32:46\n   │\n32 │                 && bytes4(initialization) == bytes4(keccak256(\"initialize(address,address,uint256)\")),\n   │                                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'bytes4' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:258:9\n    │\n258 │         emit Burned(draftId, msg.sender, amount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[incorrect-strict-equality]: dangerous strict equality check on an externally-influenced value\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:265:13\n    │\n265 │         if (paper.balanceOf(DEAD) - beforeBalance != amount) revert InexactTransfer();\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/incorrect-strict-equality\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:284:9\n    │\n284 │         emit PoolBound(key.toId(), s.token);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:291:9\n    │\n291 │         nonReentrant\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:346:9\n    │\n346 │         emit FeesPaid(fee, ordersAmount, devAmount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:305:9\n    │\n305 │         nonReentrant\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:351:26\n    │\n351 │         uint256 amount = uint256(value < 0 ? -value : value);\n    │                          ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:352:22\n    │\n352 │         if (amount > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                      ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:352:30\n    │\n352 │         if (amount > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:357:21\n    │\n357 │         if (value > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:357:29\n    │\n357 │         if (value > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:358:16\n    │\n358 │         return int128(int256(value));\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:358:23\n    │\n358 │         return int128(int256(value));\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":1035,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 4 tests for test/Paper.t.sol:PaperTest\n[PASS] test_allowanceAndBalanceFailures() (gas: 162803)\n[PASS] test_deploymentAllocatesEightyPercentAndRemainder() (gas: 555001)\n[PASS] test_metadataSupplyAndTransfer() (gas: 118951)\n[PASS] test_noMintOrAdminEvenForDeployer() (gas: 53689)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 907.86µs (1.89ms CPU time)\n\nRan 17 tests for test/Router.t.sol:RouterReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allModesConserveFunds(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 478529, ~: 479027)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999000000001131\n\n[PASS] test_attackerCannotSpendAnotherAccountsApproval() (gas: 229714)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 474702)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutputRefundsUnusedBudget() (gas: 479112)\n[PASS] test_callbackRequiresManagerAndActiveRequest() (gas: 185590)\n[PASS] test_excessiveMinOutputRollsBackPrepaymentAndFees() (gas: 507306)\n[PASS] test_expiredDeadlineDoesNotPullFunds() (gas: 186560)\n[PASS] test_firstBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolPaysBothWalletsWithoutBacking() (gas: 13567507)\n[PASS] test_firstExactOutputBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolRefundsBudget() (gas: 13559200)\n[PASS] test_inputTokenCannotReenterSwap() (gas: 1640216)\n[PASS] test_insufficientExactOutputBudgetRollsBack() (gas: 455246)\n[PASS] test_partialExactOutputRollsBackEvenWithLowMinimum() (gas: 466174)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 467700)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutputRefundsUnusedBudget() (gas: 475017)\n[PASS] test_shortInputTransferRollsBack() (gas: 1130935)\n[PASS] test_unrelatedRouterDepositsAreNotRefundedToTrader() (gas: 528672)\n[PASS] test_zeroRecipientRefused() (gas: 168882)\nSuite result: ok. 17 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 59.12ms (136.60ms CPU time)\n\nRan 10 tests for test/VotingProtection.t.sol:VotingProtectionReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] test_adminPriceChangeCannotExceedCallerCap() (gas: 206082)\n[PASS] test_capAtQuoteSucceedsAndEmitsActualVotes() (gas: 234807)\n[PASS] test_cappedPostRejectsReentrantPost() (gas: 1190957)\n[PASS] test_displacementCannotOverburnCappedPostWithUnlimitedAllowance() (gas: 15506071)\n[PASS] test_emptyRangeSwapCannotOverwriteLaunchQuote() (gas: 14916631)\n[PASS] test_largerCapBurnsOnlyExecutionQuote() (gas: 157007)\n[PASS] test_paperOnlyLaunchSupportsQuoteAndPost() (gas: 14541795)\n[PASS] test_removingAllLiquidityKeepsLastActiveQuote() (gas: 721384)\n[PASS] test_roundTripCannotDisablePostingOrOverwriteLastActiveQuote() (gas: 15748152)\n[PASS] test_zeroCapAllowsOnlyFreePost() (gas: 238052)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 75.51ms (148.74ms CPU time)\n\nRan 15 tests for test/Fees.t.sol:FeesReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allSwapModes(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 429479, ~: 430480)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999000000000006\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_splitConservation(uint8,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 402276, ~: 409738)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 125\n  Bound result 14747\n\n[PASS] test_badAmountAndZeroSwap() (gas: 103304)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 428566)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput() (gas: 427147)\n[PASS] test_dustFeeRoundsDown() (gas: 279006)\n[PASS] test_freshTokenOnlyPoolNeedsPrepaidImdFee() (gas: 14644431)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBackingRevertsAtomically() (gas: 415255)\n[PASS] test_partialImdSpecifiedRevertsAndRollsBackFee() (gas: 350911)\n[PASS] test_partialPaperSpecifiedChargesActualImd() (gas: 343031)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 421794)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput() (gas: 422602)\n[PASS] test_splitChangePayments() (gas: 441393)\n[PASS] test_splitInvalidAndUnauthorized() (gas: 238457)\n[PASS] test_zeroSplitAndSameRecipient() (gas: 644303)\nSuite result: ok. 15 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 75.75ms (179.18ms CPU time)\n\nRan 14 tests for test/Voting.t.sol:VotingReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_burnConservesTokens(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 308450, ~: 308518)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 4294967294\n\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceAndBurnAllowance() (gas: 353120)\n[PASS] test_largeSqrtPriceDoesNotOverflow() (gas: 50122799)\n[PASS] test_nonexistentDraftCannotBurn() (gas: 238889)\n[PASS] test_postAllowanceFailureRollsBackId() (gas: 327894)\n[PASS] test_postBurnsAndEmitsAuthorsVotes() (gas: 252972)\n[PASS] test_priceAndUsdSettingsChangeQuote() (gas: 391576)\n[PASS] test_quoteReadsPoolPriceBothCurrencyOrders() (gas: 50633164)\n[PASS] test_quoteUsesLaunchPriceBeforeSeeding() (gas: 49998226)\n[PASS] test_quotesAndPostsRefuseUnlockedPool() (gas: 572299)\n[PASS] test_repeatBurnAnyExistingDraftAndZeroAmount() (gas: 568575)\n[PASS] test_roundingUpPreventsFreeDustPost() (gas: 164683)\n[PASS] test_settingsOwnerOnlyAndOwnershipTransfer() (gas: 247363)\n[PASS] test_sixDecimalImdNormalization() (gas: 50640660)\nSuite result: ok. 14 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 109.38ms (413.64ms CPU time)\n\nRan 11 tests for test/Upgrade.t.sol:UpgradeTest\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsCounterfeitBeforeInitialization() (gas: 152891)\n[PASS] test_hookOwnerAndStrangerCannotUpgrade() (gas: 94479)\n[PASS] test_initializersCannotBeUsedAgainOrOnImplementations() (gas: 127677)\n[PASS] test_proxyAdminCannotCallHookFunctions() (gas: 6947)\n[PASS] test_proxyFlagsAndAdminOwnerAreFixed() (gas: 59192)\n[PASS] test_upgradeKeepsAllStateAndTradingVotingWork() (gas: 1269225)\n[PASS] test_upgradeKeepsFallbackPriceAndCappedPosting() (gas: 865147)\n[PASS] test_upgradeRejectsCanonicalImplementationForAnotherManager() (gas: 4432332)\n[PASS] test_upgradeRejectsCounterfeitFeeGetterBeforeInitialization() (gas: 450589)\n[PASS] test_upgradeRejectsModifiedCanonicalRuntime() (gas: 59023)\n[PASS] test_v2ReversesDefaultsOnlyForFreshProxy() (gas: 45136738)\nSuite result: ok. 11 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 184.39ms (68.73ms CPU time)\n\nRan 17 tests for test/Router.t.sol:RouterTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allModesConserveFunds(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 478022, ~: 478301)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1000000000002\n\n[PASS] test_attackerCannotSpendAnotherAccountsApproval() (gas: 229914)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 468452)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutputRefundsUnusedBudget() (gas: 474159)\n[PASS] test_callbackRequiresManagerAndActiveRequest() (gas: 185590)\n[PASS] test_excessiveMinOutputRollsBackPrepaymentAndFees() (gas: 501056)\n[PASS] test_expiredDeadlineDoesNotPullFunds() (gas: 186750)\n[PASS] test_firstBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolPaysBothWalletsWithoutBacking() (gas: 15178479)\n[PASS] test_firstExactOutputBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolRefundsBudget() (gas: 15171469)\n[PASS] test_inputTokenCannotReenterSwap() (gas: 1634156)\n[PASS] test_insufficientExactOutputBudgetRollsBack() (gas: 450293)\n[PASS] test_partialExactOutputRollsBackEvenWithLowMinimum() (gas: 460351)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 473976)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutputRefundsUnusedBudget() (gas: 479996)\n[PASS] test_shortInputTransferRollsBack() (gas: 1131135)\n[PASS] test_unrelatedRouterDepositsAreNotRefundedToTrader() (gas: 523732)\n[PASS] test_zeroRecipientRefused() (gas: 169072)\nSuite result: ok. 17 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 193.27ms (146.11ms CPU time)\n\nRan 15 tests for test/Fees.t.sol:FeesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allSwapModes(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 428731, ~: 426419)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999000000000006\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_splitConservation(uint8,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 395506, ~: 402901)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 125\n  Bound result 11552\n\n[PASS] test_badAmountAndZeroSwap() (gas: 103038)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 422036)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput() (gas: 421901)\n[PASS] test_dustFeeRoundsDown() (gas: 272159)\n[PASS] test_freshTokenOnlyPoolNeedsPrepaidImdFee() (gas: 21462272)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBackingRevertsAtomically() (gas: 415217)\n[PASS] test_partialImdSpecifiedRevertsAndRollsBackFee() (gas: 344662)\n[PASS] test_partialPaperSpecifiedChargesActualImd() (gas: 348840)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 427881)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput() (gas: 427405)\n[PASS] test_splitChangePayments() (gas: 434863)\n[PASS] test_splitInvalidAndUnauthorized() (gas: 238457)\n[PASS] test_zeroSplitAndSameRecipient() (gas: 637275)\nSuite result: ok. 15 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 224.49ms (146.03ms CPU time)\n\nRan 10 tests for test/VotingProtection.t.sol:VotingProtectionTest\n[PASS] test_adminPriceChangeCannotExceedCallerCap() (gas: 206060)\n[PASS] test_capAtQuoteSucceedsAndEmitsActualVotes() (gas: 234796)\n[PASS] test_cappedPostRejectsReentrantPost() (gas: 1190946)\n[PASS] test_displacementCannotOverburnCappedPostWithUnlimitedAllowance() (gas: 22351478)\n[PASS] test_emptyRangeSwapCannotOverwriteLaunchQuote() (gas: 21747496)\n[PASS] test_largerCapBurnsOnlyExecutionQuote() (gas: 156996)\n[PASS] test_paperOnlyLaunchSupportsQuoteAndPost() (gas: 21366391)\n[PASS] test_removingAllLiquidityKeepsLastActiveQuote() (gas: 714593)\n[PASS] test_roundTripCannotDisablePostingOrOverwriteLastActiveQuote() (gas: 22570454)\n[PASS] test_zeroCapAllowsOnlyFreePost() (gas: 238030)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 224.42ms (208.82ms CPU time)\n\nRan 14 tests for test/Voting.t.sol:VotingTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_burnConservesTokens(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 308460, ~: 308501)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 321208683\n\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceAndBurnAllowance() (gas: 353098)\n[PASS] test_largeSqrtPriceDoesNotOverflow() (gas: 47238843)\n[PASS] test_nonexistentDraftCannotBurn() (gas: 238878)\n[PASS] test_postAllowanceFailureRollsBackId() (gas: 327872)\n[PASS] test_postBurnsAndEmitsAuthorsVotes() (gas: 252950)\n[PASS] test_priceAndUsdSettingsChangeQuote() (gas: 391532)\n[PASS] test_quoteReadsPoolPriceBothCurrencyOrders() (gas: 47742825)\n[PASS] test_quoteUsesLaunchPriceBeforeSeeding() (gas: 47114677)\n[PASS] test_quotesAndPostsRefuseUnlockedPool() (gas: 572299)\n[PASS] test_repeatBurnAnyExistingDraftAndZeroAmount() (gas: 568553)\n[PASS] test_roundingUpPreventsFreeDustPost() (gas: 164661)\n[PASS] test_settingsOwnerOnlyAndOwnershipTransfer() (gas: 247363)\n[PASS] test_sixDecimalImdNormalization() (gas: 47756894)\nSuite result: ok. 14 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 224.55ms (372.71ms CPU time)\n\nRan 11 tests for test/Adversarial.t.sol:AdversarialTest\n[PASS] test_allAllowedLpFeesInitialize() (gas: 131728963)\n[PASS] test_badFeeDeploymentRollsBackProxyAndPool() (gas: 76390372)\n[PASS] test_everyCallbackRefusesNonManager() (gas: 358806)\n[PASS] test_feePaymentBlocksTokenReentrancy() (gas: 1351853)\n[PASS] test_liquidityAndDonationNoOpsDoNotChargeFees() (gas: 447423)\n[PASS] test_minedDeploymentCannotBeFrontRunByChangingPrice() (gas: 39656)\n[PASS] test_minerHashIncludesProxyInitialization() (gas: 41758)\n[PASS] test_permissionsDeclareAllFourteenBits() (gas: 17758)\n[PASS] test_postAndBurnBlockTokenReentrancy() (gas: 1326815)\n[PASS] test_shortTransferAndFalseReturnCannotCreateVotes() (gas: 1232931)\n[PASS] test_wrongPoolRejectedAndNoRebinding() (gas: 85859)\nSuite result: ok. 11 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 307.59ms (265.32ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/Invariant.t.sol:HookInvariantTest\n[PASS] invariant_feeConservationAndNoHookBalances() (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract    | Selector    | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+========================================================+\n| HookHandler | postAndBurn | 701   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | split       | 670   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | swap        | 677   | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 10409\n  Bound result 99999999000000007350\n  Bound result 13\n  Bound result 2750\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 50\n  Bound result 99999999000000004653\n  Bound result 99999999000000009775\n  Bound result 99999999000000003394\n  Bound result 20084074314256098798\n  Bound result 2606\n  Bound result 99999999000000004790\n  Bound result 155\n  Bound result 178\n  Bound result 80606157471943423294\n  Bound result 7198\n  Bound result 6155\n  Bound result 12\n  Bound result 99999999000000000051\n  Bound result 99999999999990000002\n  Bound result 99999999000000056681\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 99999999000000001530\n  Bound result 1114277012\n  Bound result 18\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 2024213041532\n  Bound result 99999999000000001285\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 99999999000000001337\n  Bound result 14995\n  Bound result 19\n  Bound result 99999999001224066031\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 851.59ms (651.79ms CPU time)\n\nRan 12 test suites in 853.26ms (2.53s CPU time): 139 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (139 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":125,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"Paper.approve(address,uint256)\",\"Paper.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"Paper.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"PaperDeployment.deployHook(bytes32,address,(address,address,address,uint256,uint160,uint24,int24))\",\"PaperDeployment.deployToken()\",\"PaperHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"PaperHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"PaperHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"PaperHook.burn(uint256,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.initialize(address,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.postDraft(bytes32)\",\"PaperHook.postDraft(bytes32,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.setImdUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHook.setPostFeeUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHook.setSplit(address,uint256,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.transferOwnership(address)\",\"PaperHookV2.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"PaperHookV2.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"PaperHookV2.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"PaperHookV2.burn(uint256,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.initialize(address,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.postDraft(bytes32)\",\"PaperHookV2.postDraft(bytes32,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.setImdUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.setPostFeeUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.setSplit(address,uint256,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.transferOwnership(address)\",\"PaperProxy.fallback()\",\"PaperSwapRouter.swap((bool,int256,uint160),uint256,uint256,address,uint256)\",\"PaperSwapRouter.unlockCallback(bytes)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"LICENSE\":21,\"README.md\":132,\"docs/ADVERSARIAL_REVIEW.md\":51,\"docs/dependencies.json\":22,\"docs/deployment-parameters.json\":54,\"foundry.toml\":22,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/MineSalt.s.sol\":16,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":28,\"src/Paper.sol\":11,\"src/PaperDeployment.sol\":85,\"src/PaperHook.sol\":439,\"src/PaperHookV2.sol\":14,\"src/PaperProxy.sol\":68,\"src/PaperSwapRouter.sol\":92,\"test/Adversarial.t.sol\":151,\"test/Fees.t.sol\":203,\"test/HookFixture.sol\":98,\"test/Invariant.t.sol\":90,\"test/Paper.t.sol\":52,\"test/Router.t.sol\":271,\"test/Upgrade.t.sol\":196,\"test/Voting.t.sol\":194,\"test/VotingProtection.t.sol\":194,\"test/mocks/HostilePaper.sol\":45,\"test/mocks/MockDecimalsERC20.sol\":16,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":14,\"test/mocks/PoolRouter.sol\":65,\"test/mocks/UnlockProbe.sol\":28},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":3833,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[medium/medium] unused-return at src/PaperHook.sol:302: PaperHook.afterSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,BalanceDelta,bytes) (src/PaperHook.sol#302-329) ignores return value by (sqrtPrice,None,None,None) = s.manager.getSlot0(key.toId()) (src/PaperHook.sol#311)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/PaperDeployment.sol:69: PaperDeployment.deployHook(bytes32,address,PaperDeployment.Config) (src/PaperDeployment.sol#69-84) ignores return value by config.manager.initialize(key,config.sqrtPriceX96) (src/PaperDeployment.sol#82)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/PaperHook.sol:212: PaperHook.postFeeTokens() (src/PaperHook.sol#212-234) ignores return value by (sqrtPrice,None,None,None) = s.manager.getSlot0(s.key.toId()) (src/PaperHook.sol#215)\n[low/medium] missing-zero-check at src/PaperProxy.sol:25: PaperProxy.constructor(address,bytes).implementation (src/PaperProxy.sol#25) lacks a zero-check on :\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/PaperDeployment.sol:34: Reentrancy in PaperDeployment.deployToken() (src/PaperDeployment.sol#34-41):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/PaperDeployment.sol:69: Reentrancy in PaperDeployment.deployHook(bytes32,address,PaperDeployment.Config) (src/PaperDeployment.sol#69-84):\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:42: PaperSwapRouter.swap(SwapParams,uint256,uint256,address,uint256) (src/PaperSwapRouter.sol#42-63) uses timestamp for comparisons","passed":true},{"durationMs":795,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[high] abi-encode-packed-hash-collision at src/PaperDeployment.sol:46: `abi.encodePacked()` Hash Collision\n[high] contract-locks-ether at src/PaperProxy.sol:11: Contract locks Ether without a withdraw function\n[high] reentrancy-state-change at src/PaperHook.sol:110: Reentrancy: State change after external call (5 places)\n[low] centralization-risk at src/PaperHook.sol:174: Centralization Risk (4 places)\n[low] internal-function-used-once at src/HookFlags.sol:21: Internal Function Used Only Once\n[low] large-numeric-literal at src/Paper.sol:9: Large Numeric Literal (5 places)\n[low] literal-instead-of-constant at src/PaperHook.sol:111: Literal Instead of Constant (8 places)\n[low] non-reentrant-not-first at src/PaperHook.sol:174: `nonReentrant` is Not the First Modifier (6 places)\n[low] state-change-without-event at src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:42: State Change Without Event (2 places)\n[low] unchecked-return at src/PaperDeployment.sol:82: Unchecked Return (2 places)\n[low] uninitialized-local-variable at src/PaperDeployment.sol:60: Uninitialized Local Variable\n[low] unsafe-erc20-operation at src/PaperDeployment.sol:38: Unsafe ERC20 Operation (2 places)\n[low] unused-public-function at src/PaperDeployment.sol:43: Public Function Not Used Internally","passed":true},{"durationMs":4352,"exitCode":0,"name":"proof 82a15f9ef175","output":"Compiling 103 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 3.34s\nCompiler run successful!\n\nRan 1 test for test/imd-proof-5c8bfc74/Proof_82a15f9ef175.t.sol:LaunchStatePostingProof\n[PASS] test_postingWorksAtLaunchPrice() (gas: 249754)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 30.10ms (275.61µs CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test suite in 31.01ms (30.10ms CPU time): 1 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (1 total tests)\n","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"daa1570bf77bfd32427edd63eea6dcfc39f90b79c1a82f8a2cd5d6e5c90ccc94","verifiedTreeHash":"4ffa30ad39958a57eec9a92c0418a2c707f4c390","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+94826a22"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":6105,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 112 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 5.93s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperProxy.sol:26:20\n   │\n26 │                 && bytes4(initialization) == bytes4(keccak256(\"initialize(address,address,uint256)\")),\n   │                    ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'bytes4' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:40:9\n   │\n40 │         emit TokenAllocated(address(token), msg.sender, poolAmount, remainder);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:45:13\n   │\n45 │         if (block.timestamp > deadline) revert Expired();\n   │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperProxy.sol:26:46\n   │\n26 │                 && bytes4(initialization) == bytes4(keccak256(\"initialize(address,address,uint256)\")),\n   │                                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'bytes4' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[encode-packed-collision]: `abi.encodePacked()` called with multiple dynamic type arguments; hash collisions possible\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:47:13\n   │\n47 │             abi.encodePacked(type(PaperProxy).creationCode, abi.encode(implementation, initialization, config.manager));\n   │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/encode-packed-collision\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:49:31\n   │\n49 │                 || maxInput > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max)) || recipient == address(0)\n   │                               ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:49:39\n   │\n49 │                 || maxInput > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max)) || recipient == address(0)\n   │                                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:52:43\n   │\n52 │         if (params.amountSpecified < 0 && uint256(-params.amountSpecified) != maxInput) revert InvalidSwap();\n   │                                           ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[arbitrary-send-erc20]: `transferFrom` uses an arbitrary `from`; require it to equal `msg.sender` or `address(this)`\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:67:9\n   │\n67 │         IERC20(Currency.unwrap(input)).safeTransferFrom(payer, address(manager), maxInput);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/arbitrary-send-erc20\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:84:9\n   │\n84 │         emit HookDeployed(address(hook), implementation, salt);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:83:9\n   │\n83 │         config.manager.initialize(key, config.sqrtPriceX96);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:74:25\n   │\n74 │         uint256 spent = uint256(-int256(inputDelta));\n   │                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:75:28\n   │\n75 │         uint256 received = uint256(int256(outputDelta));\n   │                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:121:9\n    │\n121 │         emit OwnershipTransferred(address(0), owner_);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:122:9\n    │\n122 │         emit SplitChanged(ORDERS, s.ordersBps, DEV, s.devBps);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:123:9\n    │\n123 │         emit PostFeeUsdChanged(1);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:124:9\n    │\n124 │         emit ImdUsdChanged(usdWad);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:78:63\n   │\n78 │                 || (params.amountSpecified > 0 && received != uint256(params.amountSpecified))\n   │                                                               ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:172:69\n    │\n172 │     function transferOwnership(address newOwner) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {\n    │                                                                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:175:9\n    │\n175 │         emit OwnershipTransferred(s.owner, newOwner);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:182:9\n    │\n182 │         nonReentrant\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:195:9\n    │\n195 │         emit SplitChanged(ordersWallet, ordersBps, devWallet, devBps);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:199:60\n    │\n199 │     function setPostFeeUsd(uint256 usd) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {\n    │                                                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:201:9\n    │\n201 │         emit PostFeeUsdChanged(usd);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:204:59\n    │\n204 │     function setImdUsd(uint256 usdWad) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {\n    │                                                           ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:207:9\n    │\n207 │         emit ImdUsdChanged(usdWad);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:235:9\n    │\n235 │         emit DraftPosted(draftId, msg.sender, textHash, amount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:241:9\n    │\n241 │         emit Burned(draftId, msg.sender, amount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[incorrect-strict-equality]: dangerous strict equality check on an externally-influenced value\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:248:13\n    │\n248 │         if (paper.balanceOf(DEAD) - beforeBalance != amount) revert InexactTransfer();\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/incorrect-strict-equality\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:262:9\n    │\n262 │         emit PoolBound(key.toId(), s.token);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:269:9\n    │\n269 │         nonReentrant\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:319:9\n    │\n319 │         emit FeesPaid(fee, ordersAmount, devAmount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:283:9\n    │\n283 │         nonReentrant\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:324:26\n    │\n324 │         uint256 amount = uint256(value < 0 ? -value : value);\n    │                          ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:325:22\n    │\n325 │         if (amount > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                      ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:325:30\n    │\n325 │         if (amount > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:330:21\n    │\n330 │         if (value > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:330:29\n    │\n330 │         if (value > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:331:16\n    │\n331 │         return int128(int256(value));\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:331:23\n    │\n331 │         return int128(int256(value));\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":943,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 4 tests for test/Paper.t.sol:PaperTest\n[PASS] test_allowanceAndBalanceFailures() (gas: 162803)\n[PASS] test_deploymentAllocatesEightyPercentAndRemainder() (gas: 555001)\n[PASS] test_metadataSupplyAndTransfer() (gas: 118951)\n[PASS] test_noMintOrAdminEvenForDeployer() (gas: 53689)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.39ms (3.80ms CPU time)\n\nRan 12 tests for test/SwapRouter.t.sol:SwapRouterTest\n[PASS] test_callbackCannotBeForgedOrRunOutsideSwap() (gas: 61654)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputBudgetCannotBeExceeded() (gas: 388067)\n[PASS] test_expiryAndInvalidBudgetRecipientAndAmount() (gas: 132574)\n[PASS] test_firstBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolPaysBothWalletsWithoutReserve() (gas: 25332421)\n[PASS] test_firstExactOutputBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolRefundsUnusedBudget() (gas: 25317765)\n[PASS] test_insufficientAllowanceRollsBackWithoutFees() (gas: 248825)\n[PASS] test_minimumOutputFailureRollsBackPrepaymentAndFees() (gas: 25314661)\n[PASS] test_outputRecipientDoesNotReceiveInputRefund() (gas: 421496)\n[PASS] test_partialExactInputSellRefundsUnspentPaper() (gas: 395209)\n[PASS] test_partialExactOutputIsRejected() (gas: 369840)\n[PASS] test_preSettlementSupportsAllFourModes() (gas: 1625735)\n[PASS] test_reentrantAndShortInputTransfers() (gas: 1691689)\nSuite result: ok. 12 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 117.99ms (104.89ms CPU time)\n\nRan 12 tests for test/SwapRouter.t.sol:SwapRouterReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] test_callbackCannotBeForgedOrRunOutsideSwap() (gas: 61654)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputBudgetCannotBeExceeded() (gas: 393030)\n[PASS] test_expiryAndInvalidBudgetRecipientAndAmount() (gas: 131844)\n[PASS] test_firstBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolPaysBothWalletsWithoutReserve() (gas: 95912451)\n[PASS] test_firstExactOutputBuyFromPaperOnlyPoolRefundsUnusedBudget() (gas: 95896459)\n[PASS] test_insufficientAllowanceRollsBackWithoutFees() (gas: 248615)\n[PASS] test_minimumOutputFailureRollsBackPrepaymentAndFees() (gas: 95894665)\n[PASS] test_outputRecipientDoesNotReceiveInputRefund() (gas: 426446)\n[PASS] test_partialExactInputSellRefundsUnspentPaper() (gas: 389237)\n[PASS] test_partialExactOutputIsRejected() (gas: 375673)\n[PASS] test_preSettlementSupportsAllFourModes() (gas: 1625815)\n[PASS] test_reentrantAndShortInputTransfers() (gas: 1697569)\nSuite result: ok. 12 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 132.28ms (274.87ms CPU time)\n\nRan 15 tests for test/Fees.t.sol:FeesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allSwapModes(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 421666, ~: 423300)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 14323274120292173\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_splitConservation(uint8,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 387648, ~: 395425)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 90\n  Bound result 9860\n\n[PASS] test_badAmountAndZeroSwap() (gas: 103038)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 414582)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput() (gas: 414447)\n[PASS] test_dustFeeRoundsDown() (gas: 264705)\n[PASS] test_freshTokenOnlyPoolNeedsPrepaidImdFee() (gas: 39875969)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBackingRevertsAtomically() (gas: 415217)\n[PASS] test_partialImdSpecifiedRevertsAndRollsBackFee() (gas: 340010)\n[PASS] test_partialPaperSpecifiedChargesActualImd() (gas: 341386)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 420427)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput() (gas: 419951)\n[PASS] test_splitChangePayments() (gas: 427387)\n[PASS] test_splitInvalidAndUnauthorized() (gas: 238325)\n[PASS] test_zeroSplitAndSameRecipient() (gas: 622323)\nSuite result: ok. 15 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 132.40ms (118.50ms CPU time)\n\nRan 9 tests for test/Upgrade.t.sol:UpgradeTest\n[PASS] test_codeAdmissionSurvivesUpgradeDowngradeAndAdminOwnershipChange() (gas: 866809)\n[PASS] test_hookOwnerAndStrangerCannotUpgrade() (gas: 94512)\n[PASS] test_initializersCannotBeUsedAgainOrOnImplementations() (gas: 121959)\n[PASS] test_legitimateAdminCannotInstallHigherFeeEvenWithHonestGetter() (gas: 763355)\n[PASS] test_proxyAdminCannotCallHookFunctions() (gas: 6903)\n[PASS] test_proxyFlagsAndAdminOwnerAreFixed() (gas: 59305)\n[PASS] test_upgradeKeepsAllStateAndTradingVotingWork() (gas: 1248590)\n[PASS] test_v2ForDifferentManagerIsNotAdmitted() (gas: 4423811)\n[PASS] test_v2ReversesDefaultsOnlyForFreshProxy() (gas: 14701567)\nSuite result: ok. 9 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 132.40ms (32.06ms CPU time)\n\nRan 15 tests for test/Fees.t.sol:FeesReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allSwapModes(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 421677, ~: 419510)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 14323274120292173\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_splitConservation(uint8,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 393963, ~: 402262)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 6385\n\n[PASS] test_badAmountAndZeroSwap() (gas: 103304)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 421112)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput() (gas: 419693)\n[PASS] test_dustFeeRoundsDown() (gas: 271552)\n[PASS] test_freshTokenOnlyPoolNeedsPrepaidImdFee() (gas: 16319762)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBackingRevertsAtomically() (gas: 415255)\n[PASS] test_partialImdSpecifiedRevertsAndRollsBackFee() (gas: 346259)\n[PASS] test_partialPaperSpecifiedChargesActualImd() (gas: 335577)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 414340)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput() (gas: 415148)\n[PASS] test_splitChangePayments() (gas: 433917)\n[PASS] test_splitInvalidAndUnauthorized() (gas: 238325)\n[PASS] test_zeroSplitAndSameRecipient() (gas: 629351)\nSuite result: ok. 15 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 132.43ms (122.64ms CPU time)\n\nRan 14 tests for test/Voting.t.sol:VotingReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_burnConservesTokens(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 308428, ~: 308370)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 7206843466267786909977152\n\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceAndBurnAllowance() (gas: 352981)\n[PASS] test_largeSqrtPriceDoesNotOverflow() (gas: 50491509)\n[PASS] test_nonexistentDraftCannotBurn() (gas: 238709)\n[PASS] test_postAllowanceFailureRollsBackId() (gas: 327777)\n[PASS] test_postBurnsAndEmitsAuthorsVotes() (gas: 252885)\n[PASS] test_priceAndUsdSettingsChangeQuote() (gas: 391482)\n[PASS] test_quoteReadsPoolPriceBothCurrencyOrders() (gas: 50994252)\n[PASS] test_quoteRejectsUnseededPool() (gas: 50236812)\n[PASS] test_quotesAndPostsRefuseUnlockedPool() (gas: 572294)\n[PASS] test_repeatBurnAnyExistingDraftAndZeroAmount() (gas: 568285)\n[PASS] test_roundingUpPreventsFreeDustPost() (gas: 164607)\n[PASS] test_settingsOwnerOnlyAndOwnershipTransfer() (gas: 247498)\n[PASS] test_sixDecimalImdNormalization() (gas: 51009618)\nSuite result: ok. 14 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 132.33ms (361.76ms CPU time)\n\nRan 14 tests for test/Voting.t.sol:VotingTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_burnConservesTokens(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 308420, ~: 308359)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 7206843466267786909977152\n\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceAndBurnAllowance() (gas: 352959)\n[PASS] test_largeSqrtPriceDoesNotOverflow() (gas: 14737898)\n[PASS] test_nonexistentDraftCannotBurn() (gas: 238698)\n[PASS] test_postAllowanceFailureRollsBackId() (gas: 327755)\n[PASS] test_postBurnsAndEmitsAuthorsVotes() (gas: 252863)\n[PASS] test_priceAndUsdSettingsChangeQuote() (gas: 391438)\n[PASS] test_quoteReadsPoolPriceBothCurrencyOrders() (gas: 15234258)\n[PASS] test_quoteRejectsUnseededPool() (gas: 14483630)\n[PASS] test_quotesAndPostsRefuseUnlockedPool() (gas: 572294)\n[PASS] test_repeatBurnAnyExistingDraftAndZeroAmount() (gas: 568263)\n[PASS] test_roundingUpPreventsFreeDustPost() (gas: 164585)\n[PASS] test_settingsOwnerOnlyAndOwnershipTransfer() (gas: 247498)\n[PASS] test_sixDecimalImdNormalization() (gas: 15256197)\nSuite result: ok. 14 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 132.54ms (164.43ms CPU time)\n\nRan 11 tests for test/Adversarial.t.sol:AdversarialTest\n[PASS] test_allAllowedLpFeesInitialize() (gas: 93526031)\n[PASS] test_badFeeDeploymentRollsBackProxyAndPool() (gas: 10282124)\n[PASS] test_everyCallbackRefusesNonManager() (gas: 358696)\n[PASS] test_feePaymentBlocksTokenReentrancy() (gas: 1344442)\n[PASS] test_liquidityAndDonationNoOpsDoNotChargeFees() (gas: 447379)\n[PASS] test_minedDeploymentCannotBeFrontRunByChangingPrice() (gas: 39656)\n[PASS] test_minerHashIncludesProxyInitialization() (gas: 85258)\n[PASS] test_permissionsDeclareAllFourteenBits() (gas: 17736)\n[PASS] test_postAndBurnBlockTokenReentrancy() (gas: 1326700)\n[PASS] test_shortTransferAndFalseReturnCannotCreateVotes() (gas: 1232869)\n[PASS] test_wrongPoolRejectedAndNoRebinding() (gas: 85815)\nSuite result: ok. 11 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 134.58ms (98.63ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/Invariant.t.sol:HookInvariantTest\n[PASS] invariant_feeConservationAndNoHookBalances() (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract    | Selector    | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+========================================================+\n| HookHandler | postAndBurn | 673   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | split       | 694   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | swap        | 681   | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 150\n  Bound result 15786059014284\n  Bound result 99999999000000008676\n  Bound result 26\n  Bound result 128\n  Bound result 1491737204734972553\n  Bound result 99999999000000017819\n  Bound result 63\n  Bound result 2294\n  Bound result 68455647130716463897\n  Bound result 7451\n  Bound result 99999999000000003656\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 13708\n  Bound result 7589\n  Bound result 6960\n  Bound result 17286\n  Bound result 200\n  Bound result 146\n  Bound result 99999999000000001905\n  Bound result 1671\n  Bound result 99999999000103089153\n  Bound result 192\n  Bound result 3655\n  Bound result 2643840056\n  Bound result 949467290\n  Bound result 37\n  Bound result 6217\n  Bound result 99999999000000017838\n  Bound result 75\n  Bound result 99999999000000002551\n  Bound result 99999999000000000713\n  Bound result 89331280969888912099\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 814.89ms (740.62ms CPU time)\n\nRan 10 test suites in 816.57ms (1.86s CPU time): 107 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (107 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":77,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"Paper.approve(address,uint256)\",\"Paper.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"Paper.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"PaperDeployment.deployHook(bytes32,address,(address,address,address,uint256,uint160,uint24,int24))\",\"PaperDeployment.deployToken()\",\"PaperHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"PaperHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"PaperHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"PaperHook.burn(uint256,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.initialize(address,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.postDraft(bytes32)\",\"PaperHook.setImdUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHook.setPostFeeUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHook.setSplit(address,uint256,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.transferOwnership(address)\",\"PaperHookV2.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"PaperHookV2.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"PaperHookV2.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"PaperHookV2.burn(uint256,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.initialize(address,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.postDraft(bytes32)\",\"PaperHookV2.setImdUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.setPostFeeUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.setSplit(address,uint256,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.transferOwnership(address)\",\"PaperProxy.fallback()\",\"PaperSwapRouter.swap((bool,int256,uint160),uint256,uint256,address,uint256)\",\"PaperSwapRouter.unlockCallback(bytes)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"LICENSE\":21,\"README.md\":128,\"docs/ADVERSARIAL_REVIEW.md\":58,\"docs/dependencies.json\":22,\"docs/deployment-parameters.json\":47,\"foundry.toml\":22,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/MineSalt.s.sol\":16,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":28,\"src/Paper.sol\":11,\"src/PaperDeployment.sol\":86,\"src/PaperHook.sol\":412,\"src/PaperHookV2.sol\":14,\"src/PaperProxy.sol\":43,\"src/PaperSwapRouter.sol\":85,\"test/Adversarial.t.sol\":151,\"test/Fees.t.sol\":203,\"test/HookFixture.sol\":98,\"test/Invariant.t.sol\":90,\"test/Paper.t.sol\":52,\"test/SwapRouter.t.sol\":231,\"test/Upgrade.t.sol\":162,\"test/Voting.t.sol\":194,\"test/mocks/HostilePaper.sol\":45,\"test/mocks/InflatedFeeHook.sol\":59,\"test/mocks/MockDecimalsERC20.sol\":16,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":14,\"test/mocks/PoolRouter.sol\":65,\"test/mocks/UnlockProbe.sol\":27},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":3491,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[high/high] arbitrary-send-erc20 at src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:57: PaperSwapRouter.unlockCallback(bytes) (src/PaperSwapRouter.sol#57-84) uses arbitrary from in transferFrom: IERC20(Currency.unwrap(input)).safeTransferFrom(payer,address(manager),maxInput) (src/PaperSwapRouter.sol#67)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/PaperHook.sol:210: PaperHook.postFeeTokens() (src/PaperHook.sol#210-229) ignores return value by (sqrtPrice,None,None,None) = s.manager.getSlot0(s.key.toId()) (src/PaperHook.sol#213)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/PaperDeployment.sol:70: PaperDeployment.deployHook(bytes32,address,PaperDeployment.Config) (src/PaperDeployment.sol#70-85) ignores return value by config.manager.initialize(key,config.sqrtPriceX96) (src/PaperDeployment.sol#83)\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/PaperDeployment.sol:34: Reentrancy in PaperDeployment.deployToken() (src/PaperDeployment.sol#34-41):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/PaperDeployment.sol:70: Reentrancy in PaperDeployment.deployHook(bytes32,address,PaperDeployment.Config) (src/PaperDeployment.sol#70-85):\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:40: PaperSwapRouter.swap(SwapParams,uint256,uint256,address,uint256) (src/PaperSwapRouter.sol#40-55) uses timestamp for comparisons","passed":false}],"detail":"static analysis found arbitrary-send-erc20 at src/PaperSwapRouter.sol:57: PaperSwapRouter.unlockCallback(bytes) (src/PaperSwapRouter.sol#57-84) uses arbitrary from in transferFrom: IERC20(Currency.unwrap(input)).safeTransferFrom(payer,address(manager),maxInput) (src/PaperSwapRouter.sol#67)","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"rejected","submissionHash":"e411ae4ed39585ea606081b0a9751fc784331ecf403d7b313d135101b4ffec82","verifiedTreeHash":"cfbb05829022e63fa6c3a97ca5061aeea6dc5b93","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+94826a22"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":6489,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 111 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 6.29s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperProxy.sol:17:20\n   │\n17 │                 && bytes4(initialization) == bytes4(keccak256(\"initialize(address,address,uint256)\")),\n   │                    ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'bytes4' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/PaperProxy.sol:17:46\n   │\n17 │                 && bytes4(initialization) == bytes4(keccak256(\"initialize(address,address,uint256)\")),\n   │                                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'bytes4' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:121:9\n    │\n121 │         emit OwnershipTransferred(address(0), owner_);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:122:9\n    │\n122 │         emit SplitChanged(ORDERS, s.ordersBps, DEV, s.devBps);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:123:9\n    │\n123 │         emit PostFeeUsdChanged(1);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:124:9\n    │\n124 │         emit ImdUsdChanged(usdWad);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:172:69\n    │\n172 │     function transferOwnership(address newOwner) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {\n    │                                                                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:175:9\n    │\n175 │         emit OwnershipTransferred(s.owner, newOwner);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:182:9\n    │\n182 │         nonReentrant\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:195:9\n    │\n195 │         emit SplitChanged(ordersWallet, ordersBps, devWallet, devBps);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:199:60\n    │\n199 │     function setPostFeeUsd(uint256 usd) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {\n    │                                                            ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:201:9\n    │\n201 │         emit PostFeeUsdChanged(usd);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:204:59\n    │\n204 │     function setImdUsd(uint256 usdWad) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {\n    │                                                           ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:207:9\n    │\n207 │         emit ImdUsdChanged(usdWad);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:235:9\n    │\n235 │         emit DraftPosted(draftId, msg.sender, textHash, amount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:241:9\n    │\n241 │         emit Burned(draftId, msg.sender, amount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:40:9\n   │\n40 │         emit TokenAllocated(address(token), msg.sender, poolAmount, remainder);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[encode-packed-collision]: `abi.encodePacked()` called with multiple dynamic type arguments; hash collisions possible\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:46:16\n   │\n46 │         return abi.encodePacked(type(PaperProxy).creationCode, abi.encode(implementation, initialization));\n   │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/encode-packed-collision\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:83:9\n   │\n83 │         emit HookDeployed(address(hook), implementation, salt);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unused-return]: return value of an external call is not used\n   ╭▸ src/PaperDeployment.sol:82:9\n   │\n82 │         config.manager.initialize(key, config.sqrtPriceX96);\n   │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unused-return\n\nwarning[incorrect-strict-equality]: dangerous strict equality check on an externally-influenced value\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:248:13\n    │\n248 │         if (paper.balanceOf(DEAD) - beforeBalance != amount) revert InexactTransfer();\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/incorrect-strict-equality\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:262:9\n    │\n262 │         emit PoolBound(key.toId(), s.token);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:269:9\n    │\n269 │         nonReentrant\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:319:9\n    │\n319 │         emit FeesPaid(fee, ordersAmount, devAmount);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[non-reentrant-not-first]: `nonReentrant` is not the first modifier\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:283:9\n    │\n283 │         nonReentrant\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/non-reentrant-not-first\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:324:26\n    │\n324 │         uint256 amount = uint256(value < 0 ? -value : value);\n    │                          ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:325:22\n    │\n325 │         if (amount > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                      ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:325:30\n    │\n325 │         if (amount > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:330:21\n    │\n330 │         if (value > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                     ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:330:29\n    │\n330 │         if (value > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();\n    │                             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:331:16\n    │\n331 │         return int128(int256(value));\n    │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int128' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/PaperHook.sol:331:23\n    │\n331 │         return int128(int256(value));\n    │                       ━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'int256' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":5169,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 4 tests for test/Paper.t.sol:PaperTest\n[PASS] test_allowanceAndBalanceFailures() (gas: 162803)\n[PASS] test_deploymentAllocatesEightyPercentAndRemainder() (gas: 555001)\n[PASS] test_metadataSupplyAndTransfer() (gas: 118951)\n[PASS] test_noMintOrAdminEvenForDeployer() (gas: 53689)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 532.90µs (1.08ms CPU time)\n\nRan 7 tests for test/VotingProperties.t.sol:VotingPropertiesReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_quoteIsSmallestSufficientWholeTokenAmount(uint64,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 128088, ~: 128025)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 999999750001\n  Bound result 268\n\n[PASS] test_eventsAttributeEveryVoteExactlyOnceAcrossAuthorsAndRepeatedHashes() (gas: 674882)\n[PASS] test_exactApprovalProtectsPostWhenPoolPriceChanges() (gas: 661457)\n[PASS] test_existingDraftRemainsVotableWhenLiquidityIsRemoved() (gas: 486755)\n[PASS] test_freshV2ReversedDefaultsActuallyPayBothDirections() (gas: 2029350)\n[PASS] test_maximumBurnFailsWithoutChangingExistingDraft() (gas: 289048)\n[PASS] test_transferringHookOwnershipDoesNotTransferUpgradeAuthority() (gas: 528384)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 127.90ms (113.84ms CPU time)\n\nRan 7 tests for test/VotingProperties.t.sol:VotingPropertiesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_quoteIsSmallestSufficientWholeTokenAmount(uint64,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 128074, ~: 128014)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 847638891\n  Bound result 1135\n\n[PASS] test_eventsAttributeEveryVoteExactlyOnceAcrossAuthorsAndRepeatedHashes() (gas: 674860)\n[PASS] test_exactApprovalProtectsPostWhenPoolPriceChanges() (gas: 667513)\n[PASS] test_existingDraftRemainsVotableWhenLiquidityIsRemoved() (gas: 486516)\n[PASS] test_freshV2ReversedDefaultsActuallyPayBothDirections() (gas: 3503214)\n[PASS] test_maximumBurnFailsWithoutChangingExistingDraft() (gas: 289037)\n[PASS] test_transferringHookOwnershipDoesNotTransferUpgradeAuthority() (gas: 521854)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 127.95ms (111.63ms CPU time)\n\nRan 11 tests for test/Adversarial.t.sol:AdversarialTest\n[PASS] test_allAllowedLpFeesInitialize() (gas: 104695779)\n[PASS] test_badFeeDeploymentRollsBackProxyAndPool() (gas: 9940090)\n[PASS] test_everyCallbackRefusesNonManager() (gas: 357916)\n[PASS] test_feePaymentBlocksTokenReentrancy() (gas: 1344130)\n[PASS] test_liquidityAndDonationNoOpsDoNotChargeFees() (gas: 447067)\n[PASS] test_minedDeploymentCannotBeFrontRunByChangingPrice() (gas: 39656)\n[PASS] test_minerHashIncludesProxyInitialization() (gas: 39111)\n[PASS] test_permissionsDeclareAllFourteenBits() (gas: 17658)\n[PASS] test_postAndBurnBlockTokenReentrancy() (gas: 1326310)\n[PASS] test_shortTransferAndFalseReturnCannotCreateVotes() (gas: 1232557)\n[PASS] test_wrongPoolRejectedAndNoRebinding() (gas: 85659)\nSuite result: ok. 11 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 132.82ms (129.45ms CPU time)\n\nRan 6 tests for test/Upgrade.t.sol:UpgradeTest\n[PASS] test_hookOwnerAndStrangerCannotUpgrade() (gas: 94244)\n[PASS] test_initializersCannotBeUsedAgainOrOnImplementations() (gas: 120687)\n[PASS] test_proxyAdminCannotCallHookFunctions() (gas: 6756)\n[PASS] test_proxyFlagsAndAdminOwnerAreFixed() (gas: 59008)\n[PASS] test_upgradeKeepsAllStateAndTradingVotingWork() (gas: 1244530)\n[PASS] test_v2ReversesDefaultsOnlyForFreshProxy() (gas: 2666761)\nSuite result: ok. 6 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 140.79ms (4.98ms CPU time)\n\nRan 14 tests for test/Voting.t.sol:VotingTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_burnConservesTokens(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 308049, ~: 308191)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1279209974629998468674828\n\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceAndBurnAllowance() (gas: 352647)\n[PASS] test_largeSqrtPriceDoesNotOverflow() (gas: 16674405)\n[PASS] test_nonexistentDraftCannotBurn() (gas: 238386)\n[PASS] test_postAllowanceFailureRollsBackId() (gas: 327521)\n[PASS] test_postBurnsAndEmitsAuthorsVotes() (gas: 252551)\n[PASS] test_priceAndUsdSettingsChangeQuote() (gas: 390814)\n[PASS] test_quoteReadsPoolPriceBothCurrencyOrders() (gas: 17170350)\n[PASS] test_quoteRejectsUnseededPool() (gas: 16419567)\n[PASS] test_quotesAndPostsRefuseUnlockedPool() (gas: 572060)\n[PASS] test_repeatBurnAnyExistingDraftAndZeroAmount() (gas: 567811)\n[PASS] test_roundingUpPreventsFreeDustPost() (gas: 164273)\n[PASS] test_settingsOwnerOnlyAndOwnershipTransfer() (gas: 246874)\n[PASS] test_sixDecimalImdNormalization() (gas: 17192530)\nSuite result: ok. 14 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 142.68ms (220.41ms CPU time)\n\nRan 15 tests for test/Fees.t.sol:FeesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allSwapModes(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 421358, ~: 418810)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999000094933814\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_splitConservation(uint8,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 389254, ~: 395191)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 49\n  Bound result 3675\n\n[PASS] test_badAmountAndZeroSwap() (gas: 102960)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 414426)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput() (gas: 414291)\n[PASS] test_dustFeeRoundsDown() (gas: 264549)\n[PASS] test_freshTokenOnlyPoolNeedsPrepaidImdFee() (gas: 7401210)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBackingRevertsAtomically() (gas: 415139)\n[PASS] test_partialImdSpecifiedRevertsAndRollsBackFee() (gas: 339854)\n[PASS] test_partialPaperSpecifiedChargesActualImd() (gas: 341230)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 420271)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput() (gas: 419795)\n[PASS] test_splitChangePayments() (gas: 427075)\n[PASS] test_splitInvalidAndUnauthorized() (gas: 237779)\n[PASS] test_zeroSplitAndSameRecipient() (gas: 621855)\nSuite result: ok. 15 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 148.65ms (137.04ms CPU time)\n\nRan 14 tests for test/Voting.t.sol:VotingReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_burnConservesTokens(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 308057, ~: 308202)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1279209974629998468674828\n\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceAndBurnAllowance() (gas: 352669)\n[PASS] test_largeSqrtPriceDoesNotOverflow() (gas: 7217093)\n[PASS] test_nonexistentDraftCannotBurn() (gas: 238397)\n[PASS] test_postAllowanceFailureRollsBackId() (gas: 327543)\n[PASS] test_postBurnsAndEmitsAuthorsVotes() (gas: 252573)\n[PASS] test_priceAndUsdSettingsChangeQuote() (gas: 390858)\n[PASS] test_quoteReadsPoolPriceBothCurrencyOrders() (gas: 7719421)\n[PASS] test_quoteRejectsUnseededPool() (gas: 6961826)\n[PASS] test_quotesAndPostsRefuseUnlockedPool() (gas: 572060)\n[PASS] test_repeatBurnAnyExistingDraftAndZeroAmount() (gas: 567833)\n[PASS] test_roundingUpPreventsFreeDustPost() (gas: 164295)\n[PASS] test_settingsOwnerOnlyAndOwnershipTransfer() (gas: 246874)\n[PASS] test_sixDecimalImdNormalization() (gas: 7735028)\nSuite result: ok. 14 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 156.37ms (100.07ms CPU time)\n\nRan 7 tests for test/FailureAtomicity.t.sol:FailureAtomicityTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_failedSettlementRollsBackEverySwapMode(bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 956824, ~: 956907)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999000000019535\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_invalidSplitNeverMutatesState(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 135625, ~: 135600)\n[PASS] test_everyBoundCallbackRejectsAnotherPoolFromTheRealManager() (gas: 666358)\n[PASS] test_failedBurnCannotConsumeAllowanceOrCreateVotesAndRecovers() (gas: 1510072)\n[PASS] test_falseReturnSettlementRestoresTokenCallbackState() (gas: 1545057)\n[PASS] test_invalidRecipientInEitherPositionEvenWithZeroShare() (gas: 482453)\n[PASS] test_oversizedAmountsFailBeforeAnyPayment() (gas: 811511)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 156.47ms (236.86ms CPU time)\n\nRan 15 tests for test/Fees.t.sol:FeesReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allSwapModes(uint96,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 421645, ~: 422816)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999000000018098\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_splitConservation(uint8,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 395680, ~: 402028)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 12582911\n\n[PASS] test_badAmountAndZeroSwap() (gas: 103226)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput() (gas: 420956)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput() (gas: 419537)\n[PASS] test_dustFeeRoundsDown() (gas: 271396)\n[PASS] test_freshTokenOnlyPoolNeedsPrepaidImdFee() (gas: 18125952)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBackingRevertsAtomically() (gas: 415177)\n[PASS] test_partialImdSpecifiedRevertsAndRollsBackFee() (gas: 346103)\n[PASS] test_partialPaperSpecifiedChargesActualImd() (gas: 335421)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput() (gas: 414184)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput() (gas: 414992)\n[PASS] test_splitChangePayments() (gas: 433605)\n[PASS] test_splitInvalidAndUnauthorized() (gas: 237779)\n[PASS] test_zeroSplitAndSameRecipient() (gas: 628883)\nSuite result: ok. 15 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 161.44ms (218.68ms CPU time)\n\nRan 7 tests for test/FailureAtomicity.t.sol:FailureAtomicityReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_failedSettlementRollsBackEverySwapMode(bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 953544, ~: 953613)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 99999999000002450043\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_invalidSplitNeverMutatesState(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 135626, ~: 135600)\n[PASS] test_everyBoundCallbackRejectsAnotherPoolFromTheRealManager() (gas: 668410)\n[PASS] test_failedBurnCannotConsumeAllowanceOrCreateVotesAndRecovers() (gas: 1510083)\n[PASS] test_falseReturnSettlementRestoresTokenCallbackState() (gas: 1533579)\n[PASS] test_invalidRecipientInEitherPositionEvenWithZeroShare() (gas: 488983)\n[PASS] test_oversizedAmountsFailBeforeAnyPayment() (gas: 812141)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 161.47ms (264.57ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/Invariant.t.sol:HookInvariantTest\n[PASS] invariant_feeConservationAndNoHookBalances() (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract    | Selector    | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+========================================================+\n| HookHandler | postAndBurn | 681   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | split       | 680   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HookHandler | swap        | 687   | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------+-------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1679750854254135\n  Bound result 49\n  Bound result 99999999000000000565\n  Bound result 123\n  Bound result 99999999000000007653\n  Bound result 99999999000000005322\n  Bound result 117\n  Bound result 6486\n  Bound result 8300\n  Bound result 99999999000000013599\n  Bound result 192\n  Bound result 99999999000000006781\n  Bound result 99999999000000002426\n  Bound result 92\n  Bound result 6306\n  Bound result 2712\n  Bound result 99999999000008388610\n  Bound result 14264337592751668708\n  Bound result 99999999000000000005\n  Bound result 99999999000000007527\n  Bound result 13977\n  Bound result 99999999000404098525\n  Bound result 54724626366725883513\n  Bound result 99999999000000018040\n  Bound result 99999999000000006320\n  Bound result 99999999000000004960\n  Bound result 99999999000000005233\n  Bound result 17338\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 27388430752083044063\n  Bound result 10313\n  Bound result 826921008949775450\n  Bound result 59724157722409105388\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 549.08ms (512.13ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/StatefulReview.t.sol:StatefulReviewReverseOrderTest\n[PASS] invariant_allFeesAndVotesAreBackedAndStateSurvivesUpgrades() (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract      | Selector      | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+============================================================+\n| ReviewHandler | changeSplit   | 2127  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | configure     | 2044  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | post          | 2067  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | rejectedAdmin | 2047  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | rejectedVote  | 2031  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | trade         | 2022  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | upgrade       | 2035  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | vote          | 2011  | 0       | 0        |\n╰---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 50\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 17949\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 209\n  Bound result 35\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 9900000000000005713\n  Bound result 1444\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 17438\n  Bound result 12029\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 9900000000000002584\n  Bound result 1304\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 4611686018427387904\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 6584\n  Bound result 123\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 340\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1285328099\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 5632\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 9900000000000013823\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 10220\n  Bound result 2296\n  Bound result 8958\n  Bound result 496\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 164\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 9900000000000000548\n  Bound result 16\n  Bound result 10758\n  Bound result 4555\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 4.87s (4.85s CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/StatefulReview.t.sol:StatefulReviewTest\n[PASS] invariant_allFeesAndVotesAreBackedAndStateSurvivesUpgrades() (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract      | Selector      | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+============================================================+\n| ReviewHandler | changeSplit   | 2127  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | configure     | 2044  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | post          | 2067  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | rejectedAdmin | 2047  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | rejectedVote  | 2031  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | trade         | 2022  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | upgrade       | 2035  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReviewHandler | vote          | 2011  | 0       | 0        |\n╰---------------+---------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 50\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 4017\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 6362\n  Bound result 113\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 9900000000000005774\n  Bound result 2835717307\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 815\n  Bound result 7857\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 9900000000000000432\n  Bound result 219\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 9900000000000012385\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 4722\n  Bound result 123\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 3338\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 9589\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2480602610\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 9900000000000016261\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 91793625716427764471\n  Bound result 3016768271\n  Bound result 6392\n  Bound result 10435\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 32\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 9900000000000001102\n  Bound result 156\n  Bound result 3369558043\n  Bound result 2252\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 5.07s (5.04s CPU time)\n\nRan 14 test suites in 5.07s (11.94s CPU time): 110 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (110 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":73,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"Paper.approve(address,uint256)\",\"Paper.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"Paper.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"PaperDeployment.deployHook(bytes32,address,(address,address,address,uint256,uint160,uint24,int24))\",\"PaperDeployment.deployToken()\",\"PaperHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"PaperHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"PaperHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"PaperHook.burn(uint256,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.initialize(address,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.postDraft(bytes32)\",\"PaperHook.setImdUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHook.setPostFeeUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHook.setSplit(address,uint256,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHook.transferOwnership(address)\",\"PaperHookV2.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"PaperHookV2.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"PaperHookV2.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"PaperHookV2.burn(uint256,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.initialize(address,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.postDraft(bytes32)\",\"PaperHookV2.setImdUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.setPostFeeUsd(uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.setSplit(address,uint256,address,uint256)\",\"PaperHookV2.transferOwnership(address)\",\"PaperProxy.fallback()\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"LICENSE\":21,\"README.md\":121,\"docs/ADVERSARIAL_REVIEW.md\":46,\"docs/dependencies.json\":22,\"docs/deployment-parameters.json\":40,\"foundry.toml\":22,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/MineSalt.s.sol\":16,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":28,\"src/Paper.sol\":11,\"src/PaperDeployment.sol\":85,\"src/PaperHook.sol\":412,\"src/PaperHookV2.sol\":14,\"src/PaperProxy.sol\":21,\"test/Adversarial.t.sol\":151,\"test/FailureAtomicity.t.sol\":175,\"test/Fees.t.sol\":203,\"test/HookFixture.sol\":98,\"test/Invariant.t.sol\":90,\"test/Paper.t.sol\":52,\"test/REVIEW.md\":33,\"test/StatefulReview.t.sol\":232,\"test/Upgrade.t.sol\":117,\"test/Voting.t.sol\":194,\"test/VotingProperties.t.sol\":183,\"test/mocks/HostilePaper.sol\":45,\"test/mocks/MockDecimalsERC20.sol\":16,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":14,\"test/mocks/PoolRouter.sol\":65,\"test/mocks/UnlockProbe.sol\":27},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"edeefbf0da13ab7f056c5833890ee89c40773617242206e2ea07d1e7b59c48ee","verifiedTreeHash":"afc330874dc88f6d82ac91bc6de38190ae097de5","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+94826a22"}]}