{"assessments":[],"deployments":[],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"d46fa76e-4911-4d90-b4c0-40fe369cb921","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"e7b98cfb6da74e838f9ca958576f84c6835b9f66a68e9214e2f4ed738ad24add","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_economics","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"47cfd7a3476db4d4d3194505ccaf5c6f979e119f377d798300e8880ae985c4b4","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_flow","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"398417ea175fcac0ed25227a171fff6bf2965fc6abcfce97abc62f7d5c0c75a8","dependsOn":["build_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest","audit_math","audit_permissions","audit_economics","audit_flow"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"af3aa01159bbf354f621cafa5c0006f6169e0938a8b015be508b7377dbf165bc","skillId":"audit-judge","tools":[]},"key":"audit_judge","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"af3aa01159bbf354f621cafa5c0006f6169e0938a8b015be508b7377dbf165bc","skillId":"audit-judge","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"2fe558bf3c64e877b0df25eff791901d445a01b5a510b8af34521ccc5614ecd4","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_math","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"166f83e154a0821b6c85697a0830579ab6d0a7d86f3ad2ae011178d7c70ab557","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_permissions","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"cd8d29cec51e272a9265fbced532286ec3b991f16d06141178e9ee0f0628f32f","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"d59561da3b378461b7c749f6bd5084477d44993aa94972ddea90f542535751df","skillId":"build-contract-project","tools":[]},"key":"build_contract_project","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"d59561da3b378461b7c749f6bd5084477d44993aa94972ddea90f542535751df","skillId":"build-contract-project","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"63f84d6684921ec79a012144ce28f844be73eb3662c748786a513eb5bd750596","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"tools":[]},"key":"manifest","kind":"code","role":"integrate","skillHash":null,"skillId":null,"state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"621fa013ec1d311af70babbfbebbbf68abcf95ea690b5c3a095fa2e84b9811d2","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"4c76766b00591dfe982fe85d3de589fdb2f810e5137c301155d1c5e36a1d3b23","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","tools":[]},"key":"write_foundry_tests","kind":"code","role":"tests","skillHash":"4c76766b00591dfe982fe85d3de589fdb2f810e5137c301155d1c5e36a1d3b23","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"A custom token: IMDPot (IMDPOT).\nToken name: IMDPot\nToken symbol: IMDPOT\nToken supply: 1,000,000,000 with 18 decimals, all minted once to the deployer in the constructor.","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"7023a8bdca5cc4347ad8720f963fcf6b54d65779bb41749aff9dde664545a081","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"d46fa76e-4911-4d90-b4c0-40fe369cb921","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-2240-imdpot"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"51511","feedbackHash":"bc544590f33b44e2e57f5e1ffc571336f9b63269faedb846943897d73bc509a6","nodeKey":"audit_economics","submissionHash":"e7b98cfb6da74e838f9ca958576f84c6835b9f66a68e9214e2f4ed738ad24add","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52268","feedbackHash":"29478427c070a5d564524fa026d004eaf9550c2031812f873ef571872a52d76d","nodeKey":"audit_flow","submissionHash":"47cfd7a3476db4d4d3194505ccaf5c6f979e119f377d798300e8880ae985c4b4","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51447","feedbackHash":"9cba5d9f1281d1108de44d2328fe3bab6ad5a56b0128bb7adb7972a270c1d965","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"398417ea175fcac0ed25227a171fff6bf2965fc6abcfce97abc62f7d5c0c75a8","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51081","feedbackHash":"a7d8961a8bd59169952ac7cd444c083bfa180b3de01c0dbf5f16604b8cba64ba","nodeKey":"audit_math","submissionHash":"2fe558bf3c64e877b0df25eff791901d445a01b5a510b8af34521ccc5614ecd4","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52264","feedbackHash":"0bb1c382496bf8b0536cc64a0646b8612f2947b802cb7a52b71b6566309d5559","nodeKey":"audit_permissions","submissionHash":"166f83e154a0821b6c85697a0830579ab6d0a7d86f3ad2ae011178d7c70ab557","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51468","feedbackHash":"0ba9186fb0793a841b0c2c8fc832d4a4252e15bb38b4b5c5c7e0c84778f72722","nodeKey":"build_contract_project","submissionHash":"cd8d29cec51e272a9265fbced532286ec3b991f16d06141178e9ee0f0628f32f","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51002","feedbackHash":"9fee51eb627d93f5cd247c7cb1f8cdede09e875f34671813c3ed2ab14482a6c2","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"63f84d6684921ec79a012144ce28f844be73eb3662c748786a513eb5bd750596","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51198","feedbackHash":"9e57403042d62979c387390ddd695357da132ec7f1a9d3858c808f995b9b3344","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"621fa013ec1d311af70babbfbebbbf68abcf95ea690b5c3a095fa2e84b9811d2","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"28e2e9179277ab0afc7815faac6849169845bc517bdca4b509ef0e022b233841","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"c97fd6a73e3737dc","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Asymmetry between the two sentinel-address checks in the transfer path. _transfer() rejects a zero RECEIVER (ERC20InvalidReceiver) but never rejects a zero SENDER, and transferFrom() has no own check either. Since allowance[address(0)][anyone] is 0 and the allowance branch only reverts when `current < value`, a zero-value transferFrom(address(0), to, 0) passes the allowance check, passes the balance check (0 < 0 is false) and reaches `emit Transfer(from, to, value)` with from == address(0). The ERC-6093 reference behaviour (OpenZeppelin v5 ERC20._transfer) reverts here with ERC20InvalidSender(address(0)); this token instead lets any unprivileged caller publish Transfer events from the zero address after deployment. Indexers, explorers and supply trackers treat a Transfer from address(0) as a mint; the contract's documented invariant is that the only mint is the constructor's. No balance or supply changes (value is forced to 0 because balanceOf[address(0)] is 0), so the impact is limited to log/event integrity and tooling confusion, hence low. Access control, trust-gap and the other asymmetry pairs (transfer/transferFrom, approve/transferFrom, unlimited vs bounded allowance, self-transfer) were checked and hold. Minimal fix that preserves intended behaviour: add `if (from == address(0)) revert ERC20InvalidSender(address(0));` at the top of _transfer (declare the ERC-6093 error), or reject `from == address(0)` in transferFrom.","line":61,"path":"src/IMDPotToken.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test, Vm} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {IMDPotToken} from \"src/IMDPotToken.sol\";\n\n/// @notice Fails on the current code: transferFrom(address(0), to, 0) succeeds and emits\n/// Transfer(address(0), to, 0), a mint-shaped event nobody authorised. Passes once _transfer\n/// (or transferFrom) rejects from == address(0), as the ERC-6093 reference does with\n/// ERC20InvalidSender.\ncontract ZeroSenderTest is Test {\n    event Transfer(address indexed from, address indexed to, uint256 value);\n\n    IMDPotToken token;\n    address deployer = address(0xFAC7);\n    address attacker = address(0xBAD);\n    address bob = address(0xB0B);\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        vm.prank(deployer);\n        token = new IMDPotToken();\n    }\n\n    function test_transferFromZeroSenderReverts() public {\n        vm.prank(attacker);\n        (bool ok, bytes memory ret) =\n            address(token).call(abi.encodeWithSelector(token.transferFrom.selector, address(0), bob, 0));\n        assertFalse(ok, \"transferFrom from address(0) must revert\");\n        ret;\n        assertEq(token.balanceOf(bob), 0);\n        assertEq(token.totalSupply(), 1_000_000_000 ether);\n    }\n\n    function test_noMintShapedEventAfterDeployment() public {\n        // Record logs; the only Transfer from address(0) must be the constructor's.\n        vm.recordLogs();\n        vm.prank(attacker);\n        (bool ok,) = address(token).call(abi.encodeWithSelector(token.transferFrom.selector, address(0), bob, 0));\n        ok;\n        Vm.Log[] memory logs = vm.getRecordedLogs();\n        for (uint256 i; i < logs.length; ++i) {\n            if (logs[i].topics[0] == keccak256(\"Transfer(address,address,uint256)\")) {\n                assertTrue(\n                    address(uint160(uint256(logs[i].topics[1]))) != address(0),\n                    \"a Transfer from address(0) was emitted after deployment\"\n                );\n            }\n        }\n    }\n}","reproduction":"State: freshly deployed IMDPotToken (constructor minted 1e27 to deployer). Call, from any address A with no balance and no allowance: token.transferFrom(address(0), B, 0). Expected: revert (sender is the zero address; only the constructor may emit a Transfer from address(0)). Actual: returns true and emits Transfer(from=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000, to=B, value=0). Same call with value=1 reverts with ERC20InsufficientAllowance(A, 0, 1), so the spoof is limited to value 0. Proof test: forge test --match-path test/scratch/ZeroSender.t.sol -> both tests FAIL on current code ('transferFrom from address(0) must revert', 'a Transfer from address(0) was emitted after deployment').","severity":"low","snippet":"    function _transfer(address from, address to, uint256 value) private {\n        if (to == address(0)) revert ERC20InvalidReceiver(address(0));\n        uint256 fromBalance = balanceOf[from];\n        if (fromBalance < value) revert ERC20InsufficientBalance(from, fromBalance, value);","title":"transferFrom accepts from == address(0): anyone can emit a mint-shaped Transfer(0x0, to, 0) event"}],"hash":"166f83e154a0821b6c85697a0830579ab6d0a7d86f3ad2ae011178d7c70ab557","nodeId":"8bceda24-487c-498e-8dba-52666d1e55a9","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and the findings file is written and validated.\n\n**Outcome:** the IMDPot token has no privileged surface, so the Access Control and Trust Gap guides produce no failures. The Asymmetry pass found one low-severity defect, which I confirmed with a failing Foundry test.\n\n**Finding (low):** `src/IMDPotToken.sol:61` checks for a zero receiver but never for a zero sender. Any address can call `transferFrom(address(0), B, 0)`. The allowance check passes because zero is not less than zero, the balance check passes the same way, and the contract emits a Transfer event from the zero address. Explorers and supply indexers read that as a mint, which contradicts the documented invariant that the constructor is the only mint. No balance or supply changes, since the value is forced to zero. The proof test under test/scratch fails on the current code with both assertions and would pass once the sender-zero check is added.\n\n**What I verified and found holding:**\n- approve writes only the caller's own allowance row and rejects a zero spender.\n- transfer moves only the caller's balance, and unchecked arithmetic is safe because the balance sum equals the fixed supply.\n- transferFrom enforces allowance, keeps the unlimited allowance bounded by balance, and conserves supply under fuzzing.\n- No owner, mint, burn, pause, blacklist, initializer, delegatecall or selfdestruct exists, so no trust-gap seam is reachable.\n- Every transfer path moves exactly the named amount, so launch flows arrive whole.\n\n**Coverage record:** all three listed entry points have rows, plus six invariant rows. Only transferFrom carries the finding.\n\n**Not reached:** the protected launch harness could not be run locally because it needs v4-core and launch environment variables. Its token-side requirements were traced by reading.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":586275,"inputTokens":290,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":12791,"runtime":"claude","turns":23,"wallClockMs":195570}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"2c968e88904ec22b","findings":[],"hash":"2fe558bf3c64e877b0df25eff791901d445a01b5a510b8af34521ccc5614ecd4","nodeId":"311b4c4f-a93b-41f8-afb6-ddb1d4223c7b","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is written and the tree is otherwise untouched.\n\n**Result: no defects in the Math Precision, Boundary or Numerical Gap areas.** The findings file holds an empty list and eight coverage rows, one per entry point plus the invariants checked.\n\n**What the token contains.** `src/IMDPotToken.sol` is a fixed-supply ERC-20 with no division, multiplication, scaling, casts, external calls, payable paths or bytes decoding. The only arithmetic is two guarded unchecked subtractions and one unchecked addition.\n\n**What I verified, with concrete inputs:**\n- The unchecked balance and allowance subtractions each sit behind a strict less-than guard, so a transfer of the full balance plus one and an allowance consumed exactly then overdrawn by one both revert with the exact error arguments.\n- The unchecked addition to the recipient cannot overflow because the sum of balances is pinned to the constructor's mint. A stateful fuzz over random transfer, approve and transferFrom sequences kept the sum at exactly 1e27 across all runs.\n- Edges: value zero proceeds, value max reverts on balance rather than wrapping, self-transfer and self-transferFrom leave the balance unchanged, allowance of max minus one is decreased while exactly max is not, and transfers to the zero address revert even for zero value.\n- The supply literal flagged by aderyn evaluates to exactly 1,000,000,000 times 10^18, matching the brief and README.\n- The runtime bytecode contains no CALL, DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE, CREATE or SELFDESTRUCT. A first scan flagged a byte 0xff, but it was the immediate of a PUSH1 for the uint8 mask, and the floor test's loop counts that correctly.\n\n**Test outcome.** The project's 17 tests plus 14 scratch tests all passed. The scratch tests were removed afterwards since nothing under test/scratch/ is kept.\n\n**Not reached.** The protected launch floor test could not be run locally because it imports Uniswap v4 core, which is not vendored here. Its checks on this token were traced by reading rather than executed. The standard ERC-20 approve front-running property is noted in the approve coverage row as inherent to the interface, not reported as a defect.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":629276,"inputTokens":290,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":12857,"runtime":"claude","turns":20,"wallClockMs":217229}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"e0f64c10e30e33e2","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_permissions (low), audit_flow (low) and audit_economics (info): same root cause. _transfer checks the receiver and balance but not the sender, and transferFrom (line 52: `if (current < value) revert ERC20InsufficientAllowance(msg.sender, current, value);`) lets value 0 through with a zero allowance. So transferFrom(address(0), to, 0) passes both checks and reaches line 70 `emit Transfer(from, to, value);` with from = address(0). No balance or totalSupply changes and the launch flows are unaffected; the harm is a forged mint-shaped log after deployment, which contradicts the README's 'no mint' claim and the ERC-6093 / OpenZeppelin v5 behaviour the contract otherwise follows (OZ reverts with ERC20InvalidSender). Severity low: event integrity only. Fix: declare `error ERC20InvalidSender(address sender);` and add `if (from == address(0)) revert ERC20InvalidSender(address(0));` at the top of _transfer.","line":62,"path":"src/IMDPotToken.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test, Vm} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {IMDPotToken} from \"src/IMDPotToken.sol\";\n\n/// @notice Fails on the current code: transferFrom(address(0), to, 0) succeeds and emits\n/// Transfer(address(0), to, 0), a mint-shaped event nobody authorised. Passes once _transfer\n/// (or transferFrom) rejects from == address(0), as the ERC-6093 reference does with\n/// ERC20InvalidSender.\ncontract ZeroSenderTest is Test {\n    event Transfer(address indexed from, address indexed to, uint256 value);\n\n    IMDPotToken token;\n    address deployer = address(0xFAC7);\n    address attacker = address(0xBAD);\n    address bob = address(0xB0B);\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        vm.prank(deployer);\n        token = new IMDPotToken();\n    }\n\n    function test_transferFromZeroSenderReverts() public {\n        vm.prank(attacker);\n        (bool ok, bytes memory ret) =\n            address(token).call(abi.encodeWithSelector(token.transferFrom.selector, address(0), bob, 0));\n        assertFalse(ok, \"transferFrom from address(0) must revert\");\n        ret;\n        assertEq(token.balanceOf(bob), 0);\n        assertEq(token.totalSupply(), 1_000_000_000 ether);\n    }\n\n    function test_noMintShapedEventAfterDeployment() public {\n        // Record logs; the only Transfer from address(0) must be the constructor's.\n        vm.recordLogs();\n        vm.prank(attacker);\n        (bool ok,) = address(token).call(abi.encodeWithSelector(token.transferFrom.selector, address(0), bob, 0));\n        ok;\n        Vm.Log[] memory logs = vm.getRecordedLogs();\n        for (uint256 i; i < logs.length; ++i) {\n            if (logs[i].topics[0] == keccak256(\"Transfer(address,address,uint256)\")) {\n                assertTrue(\n                    address(uint160(uint256(logs[i].topics[1]))) != address(0),\n                    \"a Transfer from address(0) was emitted after deployment\"\n                );\n            }\n        }\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Freshly deployed IMDPotToken (deployer holds 1e27). From any address A with no balance and no allowance, call token.transferFrom(address(0), B, 0). Expected: revert ERC20InvalidSender(address(0)). Actual: returns true and emits Transfer(0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000, B, 0); balances and totalSupply unchanged. With value = 1 it reverts ERC20InsufficientAllowance(A, 0, 1). I ran the specialist proof (forge test --match-path test/scratch/Proof_3d2eba068a00.t.sol): both tests fail on the current code for the stated reason ('transferFrom from address(0) must revert', 'a Transfer from address(0) was emitted after deployment').","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (to == address(0)) revert ERC20InvalidReceiver(address(0));","title":"_transfer never rejects from == address(0): anyone can emit a mint-shaped Transfer(address(0), to, 0) through transferFrom"}],"hash":"398417ea175fcac0ed25227a171fff6bf2965fc6abcfce97abc62f7d5c0c75a8","nodeId":"c6e93834-7ac7-4f74-be80-7647fd97d895","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is finished: I kept one low-severity finding and found nothing more serious. The results are in `.imd-findings.json`, and no files in the tree were changed.\n\n**Finding 1 (low), `src/IMDPotToken.sol:62`.** All three specialists who reported something (permissions, flow and economics) found the same flaw, so I merged their reports into one. `_transfer` rejects a zero receiver but never a zero sender. As a result, anyone can call `transferFrom(address(0), B, 0)`. The allowance check (0 < 0 is false) and the balance check both pass, so the call succeeds and logs `Transfer(address(0), B, 0)`. Explorers and indexers read that as a mint, which the README says never happens. No balances or supply change, so the only harm is a misleading log; that is why it is low. The same call with value 1 is refused for lack of allowance.\n- **Reproduction:** I ran the specialist's proof test under `test/scratch/`, then deleted the copy. Both of its tests fail on the current code for the reason the finding gives.\n- **Fix:** add an `ERC20InvalidSender` error and revert at the top of `_transfer` when `from == address(0)`. This matches OpenZeppelin v5.\n\n**Coverage:**\n- **`approve`: holds.** It rejects a zero spender and sets the allowance exactly.\n- **`transfer`: holds.** It moves exactly the named amount, including a transfer to yourself, and can't overflow because the supply is fixed.\n- **`transferFrom`: finding 1.** The allowance handling itself is correct: the maximum value is treated as unlimited, otherwise the allowance is reduced, and a short allowance is refused.\n- **Two invariants: hold.** The supply is fixed and minted only once, in the constructor. `launch.json` matches the code: no constructor arguments, the same name, symbol, 18 decimals and total supply, and no keys outside the schema.\n\nOn the static analysis: Slither reported nothing. Aderyn's large-number note on line 14 is the supply constant, `1_000_000_000 * 10 ** 18`, which is correct. Neither is a defect.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":147317,"inputTokens":8,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":2985,"runtime":"claude","turns":4,"wallClockMs":37695}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"ff35db055462d2ad","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"The contract adopts ERC-6093 errors (README: 'Errors follow ERC-6093 naming') but omits ERC20InvalidSender: _transfer checks the receiver and the balance, never the sender. transferFrom(from, to, value) reads allowance[from][msg.sender], which for from = address(0) is 0, and the allowance check at line 52 is `current < value`, so value = 0 passes. _transfer then runs with from = address(0): balanceOf[address(0)] is 0, 0 < 0 is false, the unchecked block writes 0 - 0 and += 0, and line 70 emits Transfer(address(0), to, 0). Any caller can therefore make the token emit a Transfer event whose `from` is the zero address, the shape every indexer, explorer and accounting tool treats as a mint. No balance or totalSupply changes (value is forced to 0), so there is no loss of funds; the impact is a forged mint-shaped log that mint-event filters, supply reconstruction from events, and 'first minted to' heuristics will pick up, and a spec deviation from the OpenZeppelin v5 / ERC-6093 behaviour the token otherwise mirrors (OZ reverts with ERC20InvalidSender(address(0))). Minimal fix that preserves intended behaviour: add `error ERC20InvalidSender(address sender);` and at the top of _transfer `if (from == address(0)) revert ERC20InvalidSender(address(0));`. The ordinary zero-value transferFrom without allowance from a real holder (also allowed here) matches OZ and is not part of this finding.","line":62,"path":"src/IMDPotToken.sol","reproduction":"State: freshly deployed IMDPotToken (deployer holds the whole supply). Call, from any address X (e.g. 0xBAD) with no allowance: token.transferFrom(address(0), 0xB0B, 0). Expected (per ERC-6093/OZ semantics the contract claims): revert ERC20InvalidSender(address(0)). Actual: returns true and emits Transfer(from=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000, to=0xB0B, value=0); totalSupply and all balances are unchanged. Verified with a Foundry test using vm.expectEmit(true,true,false,true,address(token)); emit Transfer(address(0), bob, 0); vm.prank(0xBAD); assertTrue(token.transferFrom(address(0), bob, 0)); which passes on the current code. With value = 1 the same call reverts ERC20InsufficientAllowance(0xBAD, 0, 1), so only the zero-value shape is reachable.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (to == address(0)) revert ERC20InvalidReceiver(address(0));\n        uint256 fromBalance = balanceOf[from];\n        if (fromBalance < value) revert ERC20InsufficientBalance(from, fromBalance, value);","title":"_transfer does not reject from == address(0): anyone can emit Transfer(address(0), to, 0), a spoofed zero-value mint event"}],"hash":"47cfd7a3476db4d4d3194505ccaf5c6f979e119f377d798300e8880ae985c4b4","nodeId":"c9c65796-11f4-4220-9942-cc61cefa8bd8","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is written and validated, the snippet matches the tree at the cited lines, and the scratch tests are removed so the only change in the tree is `.imd-findings.json`.\n\n**Outcome: one low-severity finding, no critical, high or medium defects.** The token is a minimal fixed-supply ERC-20 with no external calls, no admin surface and no fee logic, and it holds up under the Execution Trace, Periphery and First Principles guides.\n\n**What I found**\n\n- **Low: missing zero-sender guard in `_transfer`** at `src/IMDPotToken.sol:62`. The contract adopts ERC-6093 errors but omits `ERC20InvalidSender`. Calling `transferFrom(address(0), to, 0)` from any address succeeds and emits `Transfer(address(0), to, 0)`, a mint-shaped event. No balance or supply changes, so it is a forged log and a spec deviation, not a loss. Reproduced with a Foundry test on the current code. The fix is a one-line `from == address(0)` revert at the top of the private transfer helper.\n\n**What I verified as holding**\n\n- `approve`, `transfer` and the constructor trace cleanly: receiver and balance checks guard the unchecked math, self-transfers preserve balances, and supply is conserved under fuzzing of transfer and transferFrom chains.\n- The compiled runtime passes the protected floor's opcode scan for DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE and SELFDESTRUCT. The only trailer is the solc CBOR tag.\n- No privileged powers exist, so launch flows to the distributor, pool seed and swaps move exact amounts.\n- The deploy script is local-only periphery with nothing reachable on chain.\n\n**Leads rejected**\n\n- Aderyn's large-numeric-literal note on line 14 is correct arithmetic, confirmed by the existing metadata test.\n- Zero-value `transferFrom` without allowance from a real holder matches OpenZeppelin v5 and is not reported.\n\nCoverage rows are recorded for all three listed entry points plus the constructor, the supply invariant, the no-privilege invariant, the opcode invariant, the launch flows and the deploy script. Nothing in the assigned area was left unreached.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":458636,"inputTokens":226,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":11503,"runtime":"claude","turns":16,"wallClockMs":168223}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"f79383ee4c34d6202e1a4580e5f8cbed769b514811c6854e4d9ad5f6579c4bd3","device":"29ea8835baa3dfe1","findings":[],"hash":"621fa013ec1d311af70babbfbebbbf68abcf95ea690b5c3a095fa2e84b9811d2","nodeId":"b4f1ecf1-f3e5-4650-abc1-f1eb87c70a04","outcome":"completed","summary":"Added failure-path, edge-case, fuzz, and stateful invariant tests under `test/`.\n\nValidation passed offline with the required seed:\n\n- `forge build`\n- `forge test`: 37 reported tests passed\n- 32,768 invariant handler calls\n\nNo defects found. Only two new test files were added.","treeHash":"34e9c0540d55602e0a0276533d1049f02b682c15","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":543232,"inputTokens":71857,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":14233,"runtime":"codex","turns":6,"wallClockMs":401637}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"ea066f302a501d8acc689990c3337d8cb753cac9f2941dd722358fb01eaa0c5b","device":"ea5566a759ea17b3","findings":[],"hash":"63f84d6684921ec79a012144ce28f844be73eb3662c748786a513eb5bd750596","nodeId":"ea6903c3-0bae-4db5-a94b-09bfe3973c4a","outcome":"completed","summary":"Created [launch.json](/home/imd-worker/.identitymd/work/d46fa76e-4911-4d90-b4c0-40fe369cb921/ea6903c3-0bae-4db5-a94b-09bfe3973c4a/launch.json) with the accepted token, empty constructor arguments, exact supply, pool settings, and economics.\n\nVerified manifest fields against the compiled ABI. `forge build` succeeded; all 17 tests passed with the supplied fuzz seed. Only `launch.json` is changed for submission.","treeHash":"ec7c142503df4cc7852acb161e16292b1f31cd55","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":128000,"inputTokens":25726,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":2154,"runtime":"codex","turns":3,"wallClockMs":62212}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"407efd93b27667161818469407f982509ed4ee09649f23b4c110f16c5fecf126","device":"ea62f3bebece9304","findings":[],"hash":"cd8d29cec51e272a9265fbced532286ec3b991f16d06141178e9ee0f0628f32f","nodeId":"11a959ac-f281-4de9-902d-f15837e8d373","outcome":"completed","summary":"I built the IMDPot (IMDPOT) token as a Foundry project at the repository root and committed it as `4345c76`. `forge build`, `forge test` (17 of 17 pass, fuzz tests run with the verifier's seed) and `forge fmt --check` all pass.\n\n**The token** (`src/IMDPotToken.sol`, contract name `IMDPotToken`):\n- It is named IMDPot, with symbol IMDPOT and 18 decimals.\n- The constructor takes no arguments and mints the full 1,000,000,000 tokens (`1e27` in minor units) once to whoever deploys it. On the launch, that's IMD's factory.\n- It's a plain ERC-20: no fees, burns, mint, pause, blacklist or owner. Every transfer moves exactly the amount it says, which the factory, distributor, pool seed and swaps need. Nobody can ever increase the supply.\n- It makes no calls to other contracts and uses no libraries.\n\n**Tests** (`test/IMDPotToken.t.sol`):\n- **Success cases:** the token's details, minting the full supply to the deployer, transfers, approvals and spending them, and unlimited approvals.\n- **Failure cases:** spending more than the balance or the approval, sending to the zero address, and approving the zero address.\n- **No admin calls:** common admin calls like mint, pause and transferOwnership fail and leave the supply unchanged.\n- **Fuzz tests:** the total supply never changes, and spending can't exceed an approval.\n\nI couldn't run the two protected launch checks here. They rely on files and settings that only the verifier supplies. The token is built to meet what they check.\n\n**Other files:**\n- `foundry.toml` pins solc 0.8.26 with `bytecode_hash = \"none\"`.\n- forge-std is copied into `lib/forge-std` as ordinary files. I removed its own `.github` folder because `.github/` paths are off limits.\n- `script/Deploy.s.sol` is a deploy script for local testing only; the tests call it directly.\n- `README.md` covers the token's behaviour, assumptions, deployment, and who runs what. Its \"After launch\" section says there is nothing to configure.\n\nI did not write a `launch.json`, because the later manifest step creates it. Git had no author identity on this machine, so I set your email and the name \"bkenny1123\" for this one commit only. As the README says, passing tests are not a security audit.","treeHash":"30640c210a257ba279ec5b1c537b10b70b65f55c","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":394858,"inputTokens":18,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":9688,"runtime":"claude","turns":12,"wallClockMs":89935}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"fbcdfc017217af1f","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"_transfer rejects a zero receiver but never rejects a zero sender. Because allowance[address(0)][caller] is 0 and the allowance check is `current < value`, any account can call transferFrom(address(0), to, 0): the allowance check passes (0 < 0 is false), the balance check passes (0 < 0 is false), and the contract emits Transfer(address(0), to, 0). No balance or supply changes, so there is no economic loss and the supply-conservation invariant (sum of balances == totalSupply == 1e27) still holds. The only effect is an event that indexers and explorers conventionally read as a mint, which the token's documentation says can never happen. OpenZeppelin's reference ERC20 reverts here with ERC20InvalidSender. The same mechanism lets any account emit Transfer(holder, x, 0) for any holder without an allowance; that part matches OpenZeppelin behaviour and is standard. Reported for completeness of the ERC-20 compliance pass of the Economic Security guide; it does not affect the launch flows, the pool, or any holder. Minimal fix, if wanted: `if (from == address(0)) revert ERC20InvalidSender(address(0));` at the top of _transfer, which keeps every other behaviour unchanged.","line":62,"path":"src/IMDPotToken.sol","reproduction":"State: freshly deployed IMDPotToken (deployer holds 1e27). Call, from any address A: token.transferFrom(address(0), B, 0). Expected (per README 'no mint' and OpenZeppelin ERC-6093 semantics): revert ERC20InvalidSender(address(0)). Actual: returns true and emits Transfer(address(0), B, 0); totalSupply and all balances unchanged. Verified with test/scratch/Review.t.sol::test_zeroValueTransferFromZeroAddressEmitsMintLikeEvent (passes on current code, confirming the event is emitted).","severity":"info","snippet":"        if (to == address(0)) revert ERC20InvalidReceiver(address(0));\n        uint256 fromBalance = balanceOf[from];\n        if (fromBalance < value) revert ERC20InsufficientBalance(from, fromBalance, value);","title":"transferFrom accepts from == address(0) for zero value and emits a mint-shaped Transfer event"}],"hash":"e7b98cfb6da74e838f9ca958576f84c6835b9f66a68e9214e2f4ed738ad24add","nodeId":"fafda7ef-6328-4136-a553-9cf555520456","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and the findings file is written at the repository root. No source files were changed.\n\n**Result: no economic, invariant, or flow-gap defect found.** IMDPot is a minimal fixed-supply ERC-20 with no owner, no mint or burn path, no fees, no hooks, and no external calls. Every failure mode in the three assigned guides that depends on an external dependency, a token misbehaviour, a cached pre-call value, or a capped value with a second write path is structurally absent.\n\n**What I checked**\n\n- **Supply conservation.** A fuzzed probe ran sixteen-step random transfer and transferFrom sequences across six actors. The sum of balances always equalled the immutable total supply of one billion tokens.\n- **Launch flows.** The swarm share, the pool seed, the remainder to the requester, a claim, and a buy and sell round trip all moved exactly the named amount.\n- **Allowance semantics.** The unlimited-allowance sentinel is exact at the max value and decrements normally one below it. A reverted transferFrom leaves the allowance untouched.\n- **Boundaries.** Self-transfer through both paths keeps the balance. Zero receiver reverts. Unchecked addition cannot overflow because the total is fixed.\n- **Bytecode.** The runtime has no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE, SELFDESTRUCT, CALL, STATICCALL or CREATE opcodes.\n- **Existing suite.** All seventeen project tests pass.\n\n**One informational finding.** The internal transfer helper rejects a zero receiver but not a zero sender. Any account can call transferFrom with address zero as the sender and a zero value. No balance or supply changes, but the contract emits a Transfer event from address zero, which explorers read as a mint. The reproduction and a one-line fix are in the findings file. This does not affect holders, the pool, or any launch flow.\n\n**Coverage.** All three listed entry points have rows: approve and transfer hold, transferFrom carries the info finding. Three invariant rows and the constructor are also recorded as holding. The aderyn large-literal lead is a style note with no behavioural effect and was left out.\n\nThe scratch probe file under test/scratch/ is review material only and is not part of the submission.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1268567,"inputTokens":642,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":12786,"runtime":"claude","turns":21,"wallClockMs":190484}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":1258,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 25 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 1.18s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":9656,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 17 tests for test/IMDPotToken.t.sol:IMDPotTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 96421, ~: 97008)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 134143221735484234262332\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFromRespectsAllowance(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 140589, ~: 168481)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 106229\n  Bound result 119664594910867663564\n\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_approveZeroSpender() (gas: 32827)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferExceedsBalance() (gas: 37528)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromExceedsAllowance() (gas: 87116)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromExceedsBalance() (gas: 90461)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromWithoutApproval() (gas: 39944)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferToZeroAddress() (gas: 32862)\n[PASS] test_approveAndTransferFrom() (gas: 157568)\n[PASS] test_constructorMintsWholeSupplyToDeployer() (gas: 32277)\n[PASS] test_deployScriptDeploysToken() (gas: 865896)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 34934)\n[PASS] test_noAdminFunctions() (gas: 142277)\n[PASS] test_transfer() (gas: 85038)\n[PASS] test_transferToSelfKeepsBalance() (gas: 42905)\n[PASS] test_transferZeroAmount() (gas: 47259)\n[PASS] test_unlimitedAllowanceIsNotDecreased() (gas: 134685)\nSuite result: ok. 17 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 273.39ms (512.41ms CPU time)\n\nRan 18 tests for test/IMDPotTokenProperties.t.sol:IMDPotTokenPropertiesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_approvalOverwritesAndIsIdempotent(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 844238, ~: 844326)\n[PASS] testFuzz_excessTransferLeavesStateUnchanged(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 631115, ~: 631808)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1615746814675071332\n  Bound result 4024372681564812877980931882043245860221340952684835001805920860019\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_insufficientAllowanceLeavesStateUnchanged(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 625286, ~: 626951)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 818042004597773934028618920\n  Bound result 598378165954338523283971691\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_insufficientBalanceRollsBackAllowance(uint256,uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 688339, ~: 688938)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913129639935\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913129639935\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_partialSpendsUseOnlyTheApprovedBudget(uint256,uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 267007, ~: 272746)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 1\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_selfTransferFromConsumesBudgetWithoutMovingTokens(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 141938, ~: 142331)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1680627198263695145809801\n  Bound result 1193184512484098626537619009\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_splitTransfersAndRoundTripPreserveAllState(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 694290, ~: 695030)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1680627198263695145809801\n  Bound result 1619828915138768158469391\n\n[PASS] test_allowanceBelongsToTheSpecificOwnerAndSpender() (gas: 1241238)\n[PASS] test_contractRecipientsNeedNoReceiverCallback() (gas: 152536)\n[PASS] test_finiteAllowanceCanBeExhaustedButNotReplayed() (gas: 774304)\n[PASS] test_maximumMinusOneIsAFiniteAllowance() (gas: 151650)\n[PASS] test_maximumTransferFailsEvenWithUnlimitedApproval() (gas: 1191225)\n[PASS] test_oneWeiAndEntireSupplyCanMakeARoundTrip() (gas: 1614433)\n[PASS] test_selfTransfersPreserveBalanceButDelegatedTransferConsumesAllowance() (gas: 1503581)\n[PASS] test_spenderCanBeTheRecipientOrTheOwner() (gas: 278987)\n[PASS] test_unlimitedAllowanceCanBeReplacedAndRevoked() (gas: 781533)\n[PASS] test_zeroAddressesRejectZeroOneAndFullSupplyWithoutChangingState() (gas: 5163923)\n[PASS] test_zeroTransfersEmitEventsWithoutChangingState() (gas: 609463)\nSuite result: ok. 18 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 274.86ms (1.82s CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/IMDPotTokenInvariant.t.sol:IMDPotTokenInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nIMDPotTokenInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_eachAllowanceMatchesTheOwnersLatestGrant\n[PASS] invariant_eachBalanceMatchesItsTransferHistory\n[PASS] invariant_supplyIsFixedAndEveryTokenIsAccountedFor\n IMDPotTokenInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 32768, reverts: 0)\n\n╭--------------------+-----------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract           | Selector              | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=========================================================================+\n| IMDPotTokenHandler | approve               | 4148  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------+-----------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| IMDPotTokenHandler | approveUnlimited      | 4025  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------+-----------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| IMDPotTokenHandler | rejectZeroAddress     | 4055  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------+-----------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| IMDPotTokenHandler | revoke                | 4070  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------+-----------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| IMDPotTokenHandler | transfer              | 4126  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------+-----------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| IMDPotTokenHandler | transferBeyondBalance | 4068  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------+-----------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| IMDPotTokenHandler | transferFrom          | 4182  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------+-----------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| IMDPotTokenHandler | transferFromUnbounded | 4094  | 0       | 0        |\n╰--------------------+-----------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640314039457584007913129641034\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 22542350411889507305511276\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 45\n  Bound result 112036793164217482649538126\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640314039457584007913129641377\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640314039457584007914129639935\n  Bound result 2513089225522488464976688422924826544464144030819593181050454790\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640314039457584007913129649176\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 224\n  Bound result 1373\n  Bound result 196098767650\n  Bound result 941112473820008876822814\n  Bound result 1511\n  Bound result 77\n  Bound result 61732276920927460334\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640064039519316284834057098941\n  Bound result 6222\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 499999938267723079072547219\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 6926\n  Bound result 308259007080182311249875303204128051\n  Bound result 249999999999999999999993736\n  Bound result 249999999999999999999993731\n  Bound result 1767\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665639814039519316284834057102420\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665639814039519316284837181944460\n  Bound result 4267\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039395851730992202181961\n  Bound result 23\n  Bound result 64199\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 749999938267723079072602079\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 23025268374467438883389877\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640541014127477263553318847025\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 357017293484035154804406406\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 8271169665746039686528622\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640337064725958475352013034964\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913129639935\n  Bound result 3963891461\n  Bound result 1255\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640337064725958475352013037143\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665639814039519316284838021589234\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 25\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640337064725958475352013036761\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640337064725958475352013039026\n\n[PASS] test_handlerExercisesSuccessAndFailurePaths() (gas: 1734052)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913129639935\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1\n\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 9.58s (9.58s CPU time)\n\nRan 3 test suites in 9.58s (10.13s CPU time): 37 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (37 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":44,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"IMDPotToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"IMDPotToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"IMDPotToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":3,\"README.md\":64,\"foundry.toml\":13,\"remappings.txt\":1,\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":20,\"src/IMDPotToken.sol\":72,\"test/IMDPotToken.t.sol\":178,\"test/IMDPotTokenInvariant.t.sol\":271,\"test/IMDPotTokenProperties.t.sol\":354},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"621fa013ec1d311af70babbfbebbbf68abcf95ea690b5c3a095fa2e84b9811d2","verifiedTreeHash":"34e9c0540d55602e0a0276533d1049f02b682c15","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+a6ee6548"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":708,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 23 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 638.26ms\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":97,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 17 tests for test/IMDPotToken.t.sol:IMDPotTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 96331, ~: 97002)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 134143221735484234262332\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFromRespectsAllowance(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 143044, ~: 168493)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 3006971081178266904789938\n  Bound result 657832972326096114575380729\n\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_approveZeroSpender() (gas: 32827)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferExceedsBalance() (gas: 37528)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromExceedsAllowance() (gas: 87116)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromExceedsBalance() (gas: 90461)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromWithoutApproval() (gas: 39944)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferToZeroAddress() (gas: 32862)\n[PASS] test_approveAndTransferFrom() (gas: 157568)\n[PASS] test_constructorMintsWholeSupplyToDeployer() (gas: 32277)\n[PASS] test_deployScriptDeploysToken() (gas: 865896)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 34934)\n[PASS] test_noAdminFunctions() (gas: 142277)\n[PASS] test_transfer() (gas: 85038)\n[PASS] test_transferToSelfKeepsBalance() (gas: 42905)\n[PASS] test_transferZeroAmount() (gas: 47259)\n[PASS] test_unlimitedAllowanceIsNotDecreased() (gas: 134685)\nSuite result: ok. 17 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 8.49ms (14.97ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test suite in 9.23ms (8.49ms CPU time): 17 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (17 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":36,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"IMDPotToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"IMDPotToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"IMDPotToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":3,\"README.md\":64,\"foundry.toml\":13,\"launch.json\":24,\"remappings.txt\":1,\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":20,\"src/IMDPotToken.sol\":72,\"test/IMDPotToken.t.sol\":178},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"63f84d6684921ec79a012144ce28f844be73eb3662c748786a513eb5bd750596","verifiedTreeHash":"ec7c142503df4cc7852acb161e16292b1f31cd55","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+a6ee6548"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":614,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 23 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 553.35ms\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":82,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 17 tests for test/IMDPotToken.t.sol:IMDPotTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 96331, ~: 97002)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 134143221735484234262332\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFromRespectsAllowance(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 143044, ~: 168493)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 106229\n  Bound result 119664594910867663564\n\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_approveZeroSpender() (gas: 32827)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferExceedsBalance() (gas: 37528)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromExceedsAllowance() (gas: 87116)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromExceedsBalance() (gas: 90461)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferFromWithoutApproval() (gas: 39944)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_transferToZeroAddress() (gas: 32862)\n[PASS] test_approveAndTransferFrom() (gas: 157568)\n[PASS] test_constructorMintsWholeSupplyToDeployer() (gas: 32277)\n[PASS] test_deployScriptDeploysToken() (gas: 865896)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 34934)\n[PASS] test_noAdminFunctions() (gas: 142277)\n[PASS] test_transfer() (gas: 85038)\n[PASS] test_transferToSelfKeepsBalance() (gas: 42905)\n[PASS] test_transferZeroAmount() (gas: 47259)\n[PASS] test_unlimitedAllowanceIsNotDecreased() (gas: 134685)\nSuite result: ok. 17 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 6.14ms (12.04ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test suite in 6.94ms (6.14ms CPU time): 17 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (17 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":23,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"IMDPotToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"IMDPotToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"IMDPotToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":3,\"README.md\":64,\"foundry.toml\":13,\"remappings.txt\":1,\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":20,\"src/IMDPotToken.sol\":72,\"test/IMDPotToken.t.sol\":178},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":270,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"slither: no results at low impact or above","passed":true},{"durationMs":105,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[low] large-numeric-literal at src/IMDPotToken.sol:14: Large Numeric Literal","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"cd8d29cec51e272a9265fbced532286ec3b991f16d06141178e9ee0f0628f32f","verifiedTreeHash":"30640c210a257ba279ec5b1c537b10b70b65f55c","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+a6ee6548"}]}