{"assessments":[],"deployments":[],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"88c9683a-ede9-4813-bc89-fa1fb178d983","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"0e0d69e06d857d57b91540b3406281a80597dabde2c599568bc1311857cda605","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","subagents":3,"tools":[]},"key":"audit_economics","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"a014aa92388035bc2865cf9e4d23fe4e87306a95b1d2a3b0a67d9a2499faddc3","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","subagents":3,"tools":[]},"key":"audit_flow","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"2d26664627da0520bbc1a305bf6e59dc3abdc81f8bd65b4261eddc3666ba83d6","dependsOn":["build_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest","audit_math","audit_permissions","audit_economics","audit_flow"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"b89279670f5a00f5d26286edee00c97dd158b997031350a01cafe6e0329ad227","skillId":"audit-judge","subagents":4,"tools":[]},"key":"audit_judge","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"b89279670f5a00f5d26286edee00c97dd158b997031350a01cafe6e0329ad227","skillId":"audit-judge","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"6992fadd5e1d5e2a057644fb7f28f755f0e58a0fb2d1cf61383131188f40b4de","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","subagents":3,"tools":[]},"key":"audit_math","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"5807a788daf1f0eb9622e9d12b44c4b6db3ce37d6ac7f09e28b7d2f353104c49","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","subagents":3,"tools":[]},"key":"audit_permissions","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"473f0a1c405aab84331a9cabefe24a8d23d4ff2acf5411f13ecf64d0c9f2d0cf","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"15b04fc8f60521936b9e2b37c09a804685ec689fc98cd5b04510d986d3106a15","skillId":"build-contract-project","tools":[]},"key":"build_contract_project","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"15b04fc8f60521936b9e2b37c09a804685ec689fc98cd5b04510d986d3106a15","skillId":"build-contract-project","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"cf88db376dbad21a514933b1e90cd5e1b848f29f23bea0d5b7d0483f4721d1d8","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"tools":[]},"key":"manifest","kind":"code","role":"integrate","skillHash":null,"skillId":null,"state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"4da67483313f3d54bffbcf34c5b588a8e1347cc8bcdec317a042bd785b2abf6e","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"forkChains":[11155111],"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"606842ccca0e7c5d3017a54684625438eab9b351eb51dcf0cf88c43d1ea41464","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","subagents":4,"tools":[]},"key":"write_foundry_tests","kind":"code","role":"tests","skillHash":"606842ccca0e7c5d3017a54684625438eab9b351eb51dcf0cf88c43d1ea41464","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"Project: Hamster Mining Reserve (HMR) — a merge-pooling mining VAULT for Squeekchain's v9 Squeek mining NFTs. Deploy on Sepolia (chainId 11155111).\n\nThis is a plain smart-contract deployment. It does NOT create, name, or offer any tradeable/sellable asset, liquidity pool, or pair — there is no name, symbol, or supply to set. The vault's hmSQUEEK is a purely INTERNAL share ledger (standard transferable-share interface, used only as bookkeeping): the vault credits shares to a depositor and debits them on exit. Shares are never pre-created, pooled, or sold. Author the contracts from this spec; do not import an external repo. Do NOT call api.squeekchain.com — read the chain directly.\n\nIntegrate Squeekchain GRAPH C (the live v9 graph) ONLY. Sepolia contracts (UNVERIFIED — use these selectors; confirm by eth_call on a fork):\n- SqueekNFT (Genesis) 0xCB98349c134aB983dA5BfD80527dfe2552bDB70F — ERC-721. level(uint256)=0x05c58df2; merge(uint256 survivor,uint256 donor)=0xd1c2babb (burns donor, +1 level; caller owns BOTH; single-collection, no collection arg); MAXIMUM_LEVEL()==10; mining()->0xcd46990f; sqkCore()->0x980B4424.\n- Staking/rewards 0x4b67b739dFd832f4EAC67a7Aa3bc244fB74cea4F — reward surface, per-ACCOUNT by power. deposit(address collection,uint256[] ids)=0xa71604e8 (first arg = the NFT collection, pulls NFTs, credits msg.sender power); withdraw(address,uint256[])=0x8293744b (free); claim(address account)=0x1e83409a; claimable(address)=0x402914f5; accountPower(address)=0x9624178f (xPOWER_UNIT 1e18). genesis()->the NFT, mining()->0xcd46990f, token()->SQK reward asset.\n- Emission engine 0xcd46990f8349057335289Ef282c276204B6CDC62 — implementationCodeVersion()==9; checkpoint()=0xc2c4c5c1 (permissionless); checkpointStatus()->(bool corePaused,uint64 nextRound,bool roundSettled).\n- SqueekCore 0x980B4424c007CAf7a1f3670B48c8EaEf7EbC3d44 — implementationCodeVersion()==3.\n- SQK reward asset 0x5501E1Fa81Be1c3F49225fa7668DA0245d07Db60 — 18 decimals (external, already live; READ-ONLY, do not deploy it).\n\nv9 mechanics (verified on-chain):\n- Power curve x1e18: Level 1=1000, Level 2=2200 (super-linear). Merging two equal L1s into one L2 raises accountPower by exactly +200e18 and frees a staking slot. L3-L10 not yet observable — do NOT hardcode; read accountPower deltas; treat the curve as strictly increasing per merge, verified only L1->L2.\n- Rewards are per-account by power. Live emission may pay 0 SQK per round (core clock can be idle on testnet) — do NOT assert any claimable/reward amount and do NOT fail the build if rewards read 0; the claim PLUMBING must work and return 0 cleanly when nothing accrued.\n- Merge needs equal level + per-NFT cooldown (~3000 core-blocks); staked NFTs are owned by the staking contract, so mergeStep must withdraw the pair -> NFT.merge -> re-deposit the survivor, atomically.\n\nContracts (Solidity 0.8.26, OpenZeppelin 5.x, Foundry): HamsterMiningReserve — internal hmSQUEEK share ledger (standard transferable-share interface, transferable so holders can exit), Ownable2Step, ReentrancyGuard, IERC721Receiver. deposit(uint256[]) pulls the caller's Squeek NFTs, stakes them under the vault's own account, credits hmSQUEEK shares in proportion to the accountPower the stake adds (NAV: firstDeposit ? deltaPower : deltaPower*existingShares/powerBefore). A strategist runs mergeStep(survivor,donor) (withdraw pair -> NFT.merge -> restake survivor, atomic; REVERT unless total power strictly increases). Anyone can poke()/harvest() (settle emission + pull SQK into the vault, never-reverting). Depositors claim pro-rata SQK or exit by transferring shares. Settle-before-every-balance-change (checkpoint + claim + index bump) so no deposit/transfer can snipe unsettled rewards. Permanent-reserve model: no NFT withdrawal is ever exposed to depositors. Full Foundry tests including a deposit -> merge -> claim cycle on a Sepolia fork with real NFTs.\n\nAcceptance (all checkable on a Sepolia fork):\n- Builds; all Foundry tests pass on a Sepolia fork.\n- Vault reads staking 0x4b67b739, NFT 0xCB98349c, emission 0xcd46990f, core 0x980B4424 directly; never calls api.squeekchain.com.\n- On a fork: SqueekNFT.MAXIMUM_LEVEL()==10; emission.implementationCodeVersion()==9; core.implementationCodeVersion()==3; staking.genesis()==0xCB98349c, staking.mining()==0xcd46990f, staking.token()==0x5501E1Fa.\n- Power invariant proven by test: staking one L1 adds 1000e18 to accountPower; merging two staked L1s into one L2 nets exactly +200e18 and reduces the vault's held-NFT count by one.\n- Reward AMOUNTS are NOT asserted; the claim path is exercised and returns cleanly at 0.\n- No tradeable/sellable asset, pool, or economics is created; hmSQUEEK is internal bookkeeping only.\n- If a website is included: static export, no backend private key, no fabricated data — live vault stats read from the deployed vault + the v9 graph.\n\nRelease: source code published to GitHub; contracts deployed on Sepolia; optional static site on IPFS.","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"376e8ad86b20f0a3565f556234cdeb16888543f1b44ace949084cda560390229","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"88c9683a-ede9-4813-bc89-fa1fb178d983","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-2805-project-hamster-mining-reserve"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"55447","feedbackHash":"f3d7e3cd9ddee56567477b574d5a69f4895aa487bbd7ab21acf06341869e1207","nodeKey":"audit_economics","submissionHash":"0e0d69e06d857d57b91540b3406281a80597dabde2c599568bc1311857cda605","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"55452","feedbackHash":"3f4e201dbfafbbee931d1c63457bff380c68db4e2e4704105af1aef1890eed2b","nodeKey":"audit_flow","submissionHash":"a014aa92388035bc2865cf9e4d23fe4e87306a95b1d2a3b0a67d9a2499faddc3","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52366","feedbackHash":"73a3eae4c682fb4981749aad15d78f625690312f467c5b8295f96cecb165b6b3","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"64b370ccd02a0f79fd4f74ed5c1d5ecf77d931d0340959b47bdd6c47dce736af","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"53929","feedbackHash":"e07ba6dd2b94ce85f6531e0bfd474347b837ee2a04c06f48b3adf560686baed7","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"2d26664627da0520bbc1a305bf6e59dc3abdc81f8bd65b4261eddc3666ba83d6","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"55444","feedbackHash":"7fde00e4ba9dd016ee5c590d54f9bd781ef2de12f2fa689257d1eb1ff2681102","nodeKey":"audit_math","submissionHash":"6992fadd5e1d5e2a057644fb7f28f755f0e58a0fb2d1cf61383131188f40b4de","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"55450","feedbackHash":"ef940aea3e062c03f2e90e17e19bed215272296e0fda12534133ecc005c67b82","nodeKey":"audit_permissions","submissionHash":"5807a788daf1f0eb9622e9d12b44c4b6db3ce37d6ac7f09e28b7d2f353104c49","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51486","feedbackHash":"593a12222c5f2d5fd67af0e7f3e944c69bd471a2ca367989db77800b8df818e7","nodeKey":"build_contract_project","submissionHash":"be0f4dbf56806570a2d86d9477726970400a23e0faa1d99c2389b7244deaa85c","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"55451","feedbackHash":"c8b862aa874f0c5230ef53f7d4e5a675df11b4569356c57465d1fee838545beb","nodeKey":"build_contract_project","submissionHash":"473f0a1c405aab84331a9cabefe24a8d23d4ff2acf5411f13ecf64d0c9f2d0cf","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"55449","feedbackHash":"d51ecbb5f081585b3cfdce6f2d6848e355d7d0b353e33a8601da434126dc2f2f","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"cf88db376dbad21a514933b1e90cd5e1b848f29f23bea0d5b7d0483f4721d1d8","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52274","feedbackHash":"3a88610d797589e703c9b0aa57adf71e5276d8dcef1fd960404ffc2747ee85f9","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"d04d76e1aab33c7e09f5640faece1cb1da555270612c8943e5c984b9cac78140","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51741","feedbackHash":"546f2c5278e050992b70bb288eee69b30a537fbc30b9f070e10302541cfded04","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"33ddeea0e7b4d8a6c1ca8b0103cdf386935ebd17c431e4c670dacf77f8af18e9","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51450","feedbackHash":"73a5530bf401c84d64a3235d6e4440dcdbfe2e21264ed0e9b7b845cc73d9972f","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"4da67483313f3d54bffbcf34c5b588a8e1347cc8bcdec317a042bd785b2abf6e","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"7063a686285dd8ac0566c0ffa1de13ac4d2cac74777376849d2729528f7073cb","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"21644a133f76db30","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Shares are priced at the vault's live accountPower, and mergeStep raises that power without minting shares, so the merge gain is split across whoever holds shares at the moment the merge lands. A mergeStep transaction is visible in the public mempool (and merge candidates are predictable on-chain: two held tokens of equal level past cooldown). A depositor who lands deposit() in the block before the strategist's mergeStep is priced at the pre-merge NAV and then receives a pro-rata slice of the +200e18 (L1->L2) or larger gain that was produced entirely by NFTs other holders contributed. The same depositor landing after the merge pays the post-merge NAV and receives exactly the power they brought. The difference is a permanent transfer of future-reward share from existing holders to the front-runner. This is a property of the agreed pooled design (merge gains accrue to all shares) rather than a coding slip, so it is reported as low; the spec's settle-before-balance-change guarantee covers unsettled SQK but not unrealised merge gains. Invariant broken: commutativity of deposit and mergeStep (A then B should leave each party with the same power-equivalent as B then A). Possible mitigations within the design: have the strategist submit mergeStep through a private relay, or credit merge gains to shares outstanding at a prior checkpoint (e.g. shares minted in the current round are excluded from that round's merge uplift).","line":174,"path":"src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol","reproduction":"Using test/mocks/MockSqueekchain.sol (same numbers hold on the Sepolia fork, where one L1 = 1000e18 and L1+L1 -> L2 = 2200e18): (1) alice deposit([1,2]) -> 2000e18 shares, vault power 2000e18. (2) Strategist broadcasts mergeStep(1,2). Scenario A (front-run): bob deposit([3]) first -> shares = 1000e18*2000e18/2000e18 = 1000e18; then mergeStep(1,2) -> power 3200e18. Power-equivalent by shares: alice 2000/3000*3200 = 2133.33e18, bob 1066.67e18. staking.fund(vault, 3200e18); harvest -> pendingRewards(alice) = 2133.33e18, pendingRewards(bob) = 1066.67e18. Scenario B (bob deposits after the merge): bob shares = 1000e18*2000e18/2200e18 = 909.09e18; alice 2200e18, bob 1000e18 power-equivalent. Expected: alice's share of rewards is 2200e18 of every 3200e18 regardless of ordering (she supplied both merged NFTs). Actual: ordering moves 66.67e18 of power-equivalent (3.03% of alice's position) per front-run merge from alice to bob, permanently, with no cost to bob beyond depositing an NFT he intended to deposit anyway.","severity":"low","snippet":"        shares = (supply == 0 || powerBefore == 0) ? deltaPower : (deltaPower * supply) / powerBefore;","title":"Deposit timed just before a mergeStep captures the merge gain from existing holders (ordering-dependent NAV)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The brief's NAV rule is firstDeposit ? deltaPower : deltaPower*existingShares/powerBefore. The code adds a second condition, powerBefore == 0, that also mints shares equal to deltaPower while leaving the previous supply in place. That branch is only reachable if the staking contract reports zero accountPower for the vault while hmSQUEEK shares exist (the staking, emission and core contracts are upgradeable proxies and the staking implementation exposes pause(), recover(address,uint256,address) and a migration-style initialize; a reset or migration of the vault's power is the realistic trigger). When it is hit, the new depositor's NFTs are the only source of power yet their shares are diluted by the full pre-existing supply, so most of the SQK their NFTs mine goes to holders whose backing is gone. Under the specified formula the call would revert (division by zero), which at least fails closed; silently minting at face value transfers value from the only productive depositor to unproductive shares. Suggested fix: when powerBefore == 0 and supply > 0, revert (matching the spec) or expose an owner-only acknowledgement step, rather than minting at face value.","line":174,"path":"src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol","reproduction":"Using test/mocks/MockSqueekchain.sol: (1) alice deposit([1,2]) -> supply 2000e18, vault power 2000e18. (2) Force the external condition: staking reports accountPower(vault) == 0 (in the mock, vm.store(staking, keccak256(abi.encode(vault, 1)), 0); on the live graph this corresponds to the staking proxy zeroing or migrating the vault's power). (3) bob deposit([3]) -> powerBefore 0, deltaPower 1000e18, shares = 1000e18 (face value), supply 3000e18. (4) staking.fund(vault, 300e18), harvest. Expected: bob's NFT is the vault's only power, so bob should receive 300e18 (or the deposit should revert as the specified formula does). Actual: pendingRewards(alice) = 200e18, pendingRewards(bob) = 100e18; bob loses two thirds of every round his NFT mines, permanently, because the deposit is irreversible.","severity":"low","snippet":"        shares = (supply == 0 || powerBefore == 0) ? deltaPower : (deltaPower * supply) / powerBefore;","title":"powerBefore == 0 with outstanding shares mints at face value and hands two thirds of a new depositor's rewards to dead shares"}],"hash":"0e0d69e06d857d57b91540b3406281a80597dabde2c599568bc1311857cda605","nodeId":"8127d9e5-3985-4397-a277-e2263c3ffe2c","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is valid JSON with 2 findings and 17 coverage rows, the cited line matches the tree, and the scratch tests are removed so the tree is unchanged.\n\n**Outcome.** The economics of the vault hold up well on the live Sepolia graph. I found two low-severity pricing defects, both on the share-minting line in `deposit`, and no loss-of-funds path.\n\n**Findings written to `.imd-findings.json`:**\n- **Low, merge front-running.** A deposit landed just before a pending `mergeStep` is priced at pre-merge NAV and then shares the merge uplift that other holders' NFTs produced. With the live numbers, one such front-run moves about 3% of the existing holder's reward share to the front-runner, permanently. This follows from the agreed pooled design, so it is reported as a property to mitigate rather than a coding slip.\n- **Low, off-spec zero-power branch.** If the staking proxy ever reports zero power for the vault while shares exist, the next depositor is minted at face value and keeps only a third of rewards their NFT alone produces. The spec's formula would have reverted instead.\n\n**Verified on the live graph** rather than assumed:\n- The 100-token staking cap is per call, not per account. 102 NFTs staked linearly.\n- `staking.deposit` moves no SQK, so settle-before-mint cannot be bypassed mid-deposit.\n- Twenty L1 merges ran in one block with no exit-policy limit. Each netted +200e18 and freed one slot.\n- The power curve is geometric: L3 reads 4840, matching the mock's extrapolation.\n- `claim(address)` is self-only on the real contract. The vault calls it for itself, so harvest works and pays 0 cleanly with no swallowed failure.\n\n**Not reachable in budget.** Whether a late-round deposit can take part of that round's payout depends on how the staking contract accrues per account within a round. The emission cannot be made to pay on a fork because rounds advance only through the core's signed reporter submissions. That invariant is marked unreached in the coverage record. Higher-level merges also wait on the core's own block clock, so only the L1 to L2 step was observed.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1794108,"inputTokens":546,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":47394,"runtime":"claude","turns":37,"wallClockMs":892662}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"23617eab0c5242d6","findings":[],"hash":"2d26664627da0520bbc1a305bf6e59dc3abdc81f8bd65b4261eddc3666ba83d6","nodeId":"66366599-e1fc-461b-bcd5-6e9bf81417b0","outcome":"completed","summary":"All seven findings from my earlier review are fixed, and I'm reporting no new findings. `.imd-findings.json` has an empty findings list and a coverage row marked `holds` for each of the 13 entry points.\n\n**The two medium findings:**\n- **SQK re-split after a failed claim (`4a24efff…`):** fixed. `_settle()` now reports whether it settled. `deposit` and share transfers (`_update`) revert with `RewardsUnsettled` when the claim failed and SQK is still claimable, or when the claimable amount can't be read. `harvest`, `poke`, `claimRewards` and `mergeStep` keep working during the outage. Both of my proof tests and the math specialist's proof now pass.\n- **A claim that returns no data broke every function (`3587babe…`):** fixed. The vault now makes the claim as a raw call and ignores what it returns, and it reads `claimable` with a staticcall, decoding only when 32 or more bytes come back. My proof and the flow specialist's proof both pass.\n\n**The five advisory findings:**\n- **Former owner kept the strategist role:** fixed. The strategist role now moves with ownership unless the owner appointed someone else. I traced the constructor: it still makes the initial owner the initial strategist.\n- **The vault accepted itself as a recipient:** fixed. It now rejects its own address, for shares at `_update` and for rewards at `claimRewards(address)` (line 204).\n- **Deposit when the vault's power reads zero but shares exist:** fixed. `deposit` now reverts with `ZeroPowerWithShares` instead of minting at face value.\n- **NFTs pushed with plain `transferFrom` were stranded:** fixed. A new `stakeStranded` function stakes them for the reserve. It only accepts tokens the vault owns and doesn't already hold, mints no shares, cannot move anything out of the vault, and requires power to rise.\n- **`renounceOwnership`:** fixed. It now always reverts.\n- **Deposit just before a merge takes part of the merge gain:** the author disputed it as part of the agreed design and documented it in the README. I accept that; it stays informational.\n\n**Dropped:** the tester's new finding, that the freeze doesn't engage when `claim` succeeds but pays nothing while `claimable` stays above zero. It only reproduces against a mock written to behave that way. Nothing on the live graph shows that behaviour: `claim` returns 0 cleanly there. The suggested fix could also freeze deposits for good if `claimable` reports SQK that `claim` can't pay yet. Neither the static analysis warnings nor the earlier specialists' findings showed a defect left in the current code.\n\n**Checks run:** all 108 tests outside the fork suite pass. I did not run the Sepolia fork tests in this round. I ran the earlier proofs from a scratch copy and deleted it afterwards, so no files in the tree were changed.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":397646,"inputTokens":14,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":5830,"runtime":"claude","turns":8,"wallClockMs":79482}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"ffa27c0c1a08c486864c7112904bddd6456165d0418287ecc416ebc04c1c2a1e","device":"523a0aade61e8902","findings":[{"description":"The brief requires settlement before every share balance change so new deposits and transfers cannot capture unsettled rewards. _settle catches a revert from staking.claim and returns normally without indexing the outstanding rewards. deposit (line 155) and _update (line 346) then change share balances. When claiming recovers, the entire deferred amount is indexed against the new supply and balances, permanently reallocating already-earned SQK to new holders. A temporary staking claim outage therefore enables dilution of existing rewards through new deposits and can remove all accrued rewards from a holder exiting by transfer. The existing failure mocks and documented outage tolerance make this a supported failure condition, not a malicious reward token assumption. Keep harvest/poke tolerant, but prevent balance changes when historical rewards cannot be settled, or preserve their entitlement separately before allowing the mutation.","line":366,"path":"src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {HamsterMiningReserve} from \"src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol\";\n\n// Minimal deterministic graph, without forks, storage edits or imports from other tests.\ncontract DeferredRewardToken {\n    mapping(address => uint256) public balanceOf;\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external { balanceOf[to] += amount; }\n    function transfer(address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        balanceOf[msg.sender] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n}\n\ncontract DeferredRewardNFT {\n    mapping(uint256 => address) public ownerOf;\n    mapping(address => mapping(address => bool)) public isApprovedForAll;\n    function mint(address to, uint256 id) external { ownerOf[id] = to; }\n    function setApprovalForAll(address operator, bool approved) external {\n        isApprovedForAll[msg.sender][operator] = approved;\n    }\n    function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 id) external {\n        require(ownerOf[id] == from, \"owner\");\n        require(msg.sender == from || isApprovedForAll[from][msg.sender], \"approval\");\n        ownerOf[id] = to;\n    }\n}\n\ncontract DeferredRewardEmission {\n    function checkpoint() external {}\n}\n\ncontract DeferredRewardStaking {\n    DeferredRewardNFT public immutable nft;\n    DeferredRewardToken public immutable token;\n    mapping(address => uint256) public accountPower;\n    mapping(address => uint256) public claimable;\n    bool public unavailable;\n    constructor(DeferredRewardNFT n, DeferredRewardToken t) { nft = n; token = t; }\n    function deposit(address collection, uint256[] calldata ids) external {\n        require(collection == address(nft), \"collection\");\n        for (uint256 i; i < ids.length; ++i) {\n            nft.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), ids[i]);\n            accountPower[msg.sender] += 1000e18;\n        }\n    }\n    function accrue(address account, uint256 amount) external {\n        token.mint(address(this), amount);\n        claimable[account] += amount;\n    }\n    function setUnavailable(bool value) external { unavailable = value; }\n    function claim(address account) external returns (uint256 amount) {\n        require(!unavailable, \"temporary claim outage\");\n        amount = claimable[account];\n        claimable[account] = 0;\n        token.transfer(account, amount);\n    }\n}\n\ncontract DeferredRewardsProof is Test {\n    HamsterMiningReserve vault;\n    DeferredRewardToken token;\n    DeferredRewardNFT nft;\n    DeferredRewardStaking staking;\n    address alice;\n    address bob;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        alice = makeAddr(\"original holder\");\n        bob = makeAddr(\"new holder\");\n        nft = new DeferredRewardNFT();\n        token = new DeferredRewardToken();\n        staking = new DeferredRewardStaking(nft, token);\n        DeferredRewardEmission emission = new DeferredRewardEmission();\n        vault = new HamsterMiningReserve(\n            address(this), address(nft), address(staking), address(emission), address(emission), address(token)\n        );\n        nft.mint(alice, 1);\n        nft.mint(bob, 2);\n        vm.prank(alice);\n        nft.setApprovalForAll(address(vault), true);\n        vm.prank(bob);\n        nft.setApprovalForAll(address(vault), true);\n        uint256[] memory ids = new uint256[](1);\n        ids[0] = 1;\n        vm.prank(alice);\n        vault.deposit(ids);\n        staking.accrue(address(vault), 100e18);\n        staking.setUnavailable(true);\n    }\n\n    function test_newDepositorCannotCaptureRewardsFromBeforeTheirDeposit() public {\n        uint256[] memory ids = new uint256[](1);\n        ids[0] = 2;\n        // A fix may reject the balance change until settlement is possible, or preserve\n        // the original entitlement while allowing it. Both satisfy the specification.\n        vm.prank(bob);\n        (bool accepted,) = address(vault).call(abi.encodeCall(vault.deposit, (ids)));\n        if (!accepted) assertEq(nft.ownerOf(2), bob, \"rejected deposit must return Bob's NFT\");\n        staking.setUnavailable(false);\n        vm.prank(alice);\n        uint256 alicePaid = vault.claimRewards();\n        vm.prank(bob);\n        uint256 bobPaid = vault.claimRewards();\n        emit log_named_uint(\"Alice received\", alicePaid);\n        emit log_named_uint(\"Bob received\", bobPaid);\n        assertEq(alicePaid, 100e18, \"Alice must retain all rewards earned before Bob deposited\");\n        assertEq(bobPaid, 0, \"Bob did not hold shares when the rewards accrued\");\n    }\n\n    function test_transferCannotMoveAlreadyEarnedRewardsToNewHolder() public {\n        uint256 shares = vault.balanceOf(alice);\n        vm.prank(alice);\n        (bool accepted,) = address(vault).call(abi.encodeCall(vault.transfer, (bob, shares)));\n        if (!accepted) assertEq(vault.balanceOf(alice), shares, \"rejected transfer must preserve Alice's shares\");\n        staking.setUnavailable(false);\n        vm.prank(alice);\n        uint256 alicePaid = vault.claimRewards();\n        vm.prank(bob);\n        uint256 bobPaid = vault.claimRewards();\n        emit log_named_uint(\"Alice received\", alicePaid);\n        emit log_named_uint(\"Bob received\", bobPaid);\n        assertEq(alicePaid, 100e18, \"Exit transfers future rewards, not the exiting holder's accrued SQK\");\n        assertEq(bobPaid, 0, \"Transfer recipient must not receive previously accrued rewards\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Run the self-contained proof as test/scratch/DeferredRewardsProof.t.sol with forge test --match-path test/scratch/DeferredRewardsProof.t.sol -vv. Alice deposits one NFT adding 1000e18 power/shares. Accrue exactly 100e18 SQK for the vault, then make staking.claim revert. In the first test Bob deposits one equal NFT during the outage; restore claiming and claim for both users. Expected Alice=100e18 and Bob=0; observed Alice=50e18 and Bob=50e18. In the second test Alice transfers all shares to Bob during the outage; after recovery expected Alice=100e18 and Bob=0, observed Alice=0 and Bob=100e18. Both tests were executed and failed at the entitlement assertion. A correction may either reject the balance change or preserve the old entitlement; the proof accepts either design. This offline proof asserts controlled mock funding only and makes no claim about live Sepolia reward quantities.","severity":"high","title":"Failed staking claims allow new share balances to capture previously accrued SQK"},{"description":"The brief requires settlement before every deposit or share transfer so new holders cannot take unsettled rewards. _settle catches staking.claim failures and returns without reserving the old holders' entitlements. deposit and _update then change share balances anyway. On recovery, the previously accrued SQK is indexed using the new supply and balances. An equal-power late depositor receives half the old holder's rewards, and a recipient of all shares receives all rewards earned before the transfer. This is conditional on an upstream claim failure; the proof injects that failure in an offline staking mock, not into the live graph. Conservation and solvency invariants do not establish correct ownership. Keep keeper harvest/poke best-effort, but preserve accrued ownership or reject balance changes when settlement cannot complete.","line":366,"path":"src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {HamsterMiningReserve} from \"src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol\";\n\ncontract ProofReward {\n    mapping(address => uint256) public balanceOf;\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n    }\n\n    function transfer(address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        balanceOf[msg.sender] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n}\n\ncontract ProofNft {\n    mapping(uint256 => address) public ownerOf;\n    mapping(address => mapping(address => bool)) public isApprovedForAll;\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 id) external {\n        require(ownerOf[id] == address(0), \"already minted\");\n        ownerOf[id] = to;\n    }\n\n    function level(uint256) external pure returns (uint256) {\n        return 1;\n    }\n\n    function setApprovalForAll(address operator, bool approved) external {\n        isApprovedForAll[msg.sender][operator] = approved;\n    }\n\n    function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 id) external {\n        require(ownerOf[id] == from, \"not owner\");\n        require(msg.sender == from || isApprovedForAll[from][msg.sender], \"not approved\");\n        ownerOf[id] = to;\n    }\n}\n\ncontract ProofEmission {\n    function checkpoint() external {}\n}\n\ncontract ProofStaking {\n    ProofNft public immutable nft;\n    ProofReward public immutable reward;\n    mapping(address => uint256) public accountPower;\n    mapping(address => uint256) public claimable;\n    bool public claimDisabled;\n\n    constructor(ProofNft nft_, ProofReward reward_) {\n        nft = nft_;\n        reward = reward_;\n    }\n\n    function setClaimDisabled(bool disabled) external {\n        claimDisabled = disabled;\n    }\n\n    function fund(address account, uint256 amount) external {\n        reward.mint(address(this), amount);\n        claimable[account] += amount;\n    }\n\n    function deposit(address collection, uint256[] calldata ids) external {\n        require(collection == address(nft), \"wrong collection\");\n        for (uint256 i; i < ids.length; ++i) {\n            nft.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), ids[i]);\n            accountPower[msg.sender] += 1000e18;\n        }\n    }\n\n    function claim(address account) external returns (uint256 amount) {\n        require(!claimDisabled, \"temporary claim outage\");\n        amount = claimable[account];\n        claimable[account] = 0;\n        reward.transfer(account, amount);\n    }\n}\n\ncontract DelayedRewardsProofTest is Test {\n    ProofReward reward;\n    ProofNft nft;\n    ProofStaking staking;\n    HamsterMiningReserve vault;\n    address alice;\n    address bob;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        alice = makeAddr(\"original depositor\");\n        bob = makeAddr(\"later holder\");\n        reward = new ProofReward();\n        nft = new ProofNft();\n        staking = new ProofStaking(nft, reward);\n        ProofEmission emission = new ProofEmission();\n        // Core is not called in these reward paths; no live graph is used in this proof.\n        vault = new HamsterMiningReserve(\n            address(this), address(nft), address(staking), address(emission), address(emission), address(reward)\n        );\n        nft.mint(alice, 1);\n        nft.mint(bob, 2);\n        vm.prank(alice);\n        nft.setApprovalForAll(address(vault), true);\n        vm.prank(bob);\n        nft.setApprovalForAll(address(vault), true);\n        vm.prank(alice);\n        vault.deposit(_one(1));\n        // Only Alice has shares when all 100 SQK accrue. No rewards accrue later.\n        staking.fund(address(vault), 100e18);\n        assertEq(vault.pendingRewards(alice), 100e18);\n        staking.setClaimDisabled(true);\n    }\n\n    function _one(uint256 id) internal pure returns (uint256[] memory ids) {\n        ids = new uint256[](1);\n        ids[0] = id;\n    }\n\n    function _recoverAndCheckOriginalEntitlement() internal {\n        staking.setClaimDisabled(false);\n        vault.harvest();\n        vm.prank(alice);\n        uint256 alicePaid = vault.claimRewards();\n        vm.prank(bob);\n        uint256 bobPaid = vault.claimRewards();\n        assertEq(alicePaid, 100e18, \"original holder must keep rewards earned before balance change\");\n        assertEq(bobPaid, 0, \"later holder must not receive old rewards\");\n        assertEq(reward.balanceOf(alice), 100e18);\n        assertEq(reward.balanceOf(bob), 0);\n    }\n\n    function test_depositDuringClaimOutageCannotTakeEarlierRewards() public {\n        vm.prank(bob);\n        // A fix may either reject the mutation or preserve old reward ownership.\n        (bool accepted,) = address(vault).call(abi.encodeCall(vault.deposit, (_one(2))));\n        if (accepted) {\n            assertGt(vault.balanceOf(bob), 0);\n        } else {\n            assertEq(vault.balanceOf(bob), 0);\n            assertEq(nft.ownerOf(2), bob);\n        }\n        _recoverAndCheckOriginalEntitlement();\n    }\n\n    function test_transferDuringClaimOutageCannotMoveEarlierRewards() public {\n        uint256 shares = vault.balanceOf(alice);\n        vm.prank(alice);\n        (bool accepted,) = address(vault).call(abi.encodeCall(vault.transfer, (bob, shares)));\n        if (accepted) {\n            assertEq(vault.balanceOf(bob), shares);\n        } else {\n            assertEq(vault.balanceOf(alice), shares);\n            assertEq(vault.balanceOf(bob), 0);\n        }\n        _recoverAndCheckOriginalEntitlement();\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Run the embedded source as test/scratch/DelayedRewardsProof.t.sol with forge test --match-path test/scratch/DelayedRewardsProof.t.sol -vv. Alice deposits one L1 NFT (1000e18 shares); fund the staking mock with 100e18 SQK owed to the vault; disable staking claims. In test_depositDuringClaimOutageCannotTakeEarlierRewards, Bob deposits another L1 while settlement fails; restore claims and harvest. Expected: Alice receives 100e18 and Bob receives zero of those preexisting rewards (or Bob's deposit reverts). Actual: Alice receives 50e18 and Bob receives 50e18. In test_transferDuringClaimOutageCannotMoveEarlierRewards, Alice transfers all shares to Bob during the outage; restore claims and harvest. Expected: Alice keeps 100e18 and Bob receives zero pre-transfer rewards (or transfer reverts). Actual: Alice receives zero and Bob receives 100e18. Both tests were executed and failed at the original-holder entitlement assertion; neither relies on a fork, FFI, skipped tests, vault storage edits, or other test imports.","severity":"high","title":"Failed settlement lets balance changes reassign previously earned SQK"}],"hash":"33ddeea0e7b4d8a6c1ca8b0103cdf386935ebd17c431e4c670dacf77f8af18e9","nodeId":"6fb86bc0-0172-4ece-97de-22c104864236","outcome":"completed","summary":"`forge build` and seeded tests pass: **97 tests**, including **18 fork tests** with caching disabled.\n\nAdded pinned-state RPC checks. Restored `.imd-findings.json` with a reproduced high-severity reward-reassignment defect and failing proof.\n\nThe original checker rejection still needs a runner-side fix: unsupported `eth_getAccountInfo` is an optional [Forge probe with fallback](https://github.com/foundry-rs/foundry-core/blob/39c03a49ade2f74a6e97e2af308283a42d78d302/crates/fork-db/src/backend.rs#L397).","treeHash":"787eeea26e4a63f342bcb47f2a590602a50c8abc","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":4156800,"inputTokens":197909,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":45515,"runtime":"codex","turns":15,"wallClockMs":1133809}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"6e46c7e2d5a5462f2de592f0784f63d2596fb11b0abbab2f36c78393a3299c83","device":"315195f3a27aaad1","findings":[],"hash":"473f0a1c405aab84331a9cabefe24a8d23d4ff2acf5411f13ecf64d0c9f2d0cf","nodeId":"58981c93-d93f-479e-b438-87bcfaddcc35","outcome":"completed","summary":"Revision complete. Both reviewer proofs reproduced on the starting tree and now pass. All eight findings are answered in `.imd-responses.json`.\n\n**Reproduced and fixed (the two blocking findings)**\n\n- **Balance changes during a claim outage.** `_settle()` now returns whether settlement succeeded. It is false only when the claim failed and the staking contract does not report exactly zero claimable SQK. Deposits, transfers and transferFrom revert with `RewardsUnsettled` in that state. Harvest, poke, claimRewards and mergeStep ignore the result and still never revert, as the brief requires. I chose the revert path over virtual crediting because crediting SQK the vault does not hold would break if upstream later reduced the claimable amount.\n- **Return-data decoding of claim.** The claim is now a raw call with its return data ignored. The claimable read in the new helper is a raw staticcall decoded only when 32 bytes come back. A void-returning claim mock proves deposit, harvest, claim, transfer and merge all keep working.\n\n**Advisory findings, all reproduced and fixed**\n\n- Default strategist now follows a completed two-step ownership transfer. An explicitly appointed strategist is untouched. `renounceOwnership` reverts.\n- The vault rejects itself as share recipient and reward recipient.\n- Deposit reverts with `ZeroPowerWithShares` when shares exist but power reads zero, matching the brief's formula.\n- New permissionless `stakeStranded` stakes Squeeks pushed in with plain `transferFrom`, minting no shares. Verified against the live Sepolia NFT.\n\n**Disputed as a design property:** the ordering-dependent merge gain. It reproduces arithmetically but is the agreed pooled model. It is documented in the README with the private-relay mitigation.\n\n**Verification**\n\n| Check | Result |\n| --- | --- |\n| forge build | clean, runtime 12.8 KB |\n| forge test with verifier fuzz seed | 73 passed (55 offline, 2 deploy, 13 fork, 3 proof copies) |\n| forge fmt --check | passes |\n\nChanged files: the vault, its interface comment, the mocks, the offline and fork test suites, and the README. The README gains a revision-history section, updated role table, and new operational steps for the settlement pause and stranded tokens.","treeHash":"5ebdf3b22c1556c0f384ae480a583581ce5e43ed","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1244633,"inputTokens":418,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":34861,"runtime":"claude","turns":45,"wallClockMs":541196}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"14fd6a020f517bbf8dae8cf5a81c3410aac6b53c3620f1e5ebb5ae0807e942f1","device":"f2101c240e0b52a9","findings":[{"description":"_settle() returns settled=true whenever the raw call to staking.claim(address(this)) succeeds (line 430), without checking that the vault's claimable balance was actually paid out. The RewardsUnsettled freeze added for the earlier finding therefore only engages when claim reverts. If the upgradeable staking proxy's claim succeeds but pays nothing or only part (for example it returns 0 while the core clock is paused, or caps the payout) while claimable(vault) still reports accrued SQK, deposit() and transfers go ahead and that SQK is later indexed against the new balances. This is the same misallocation as before, reached by a claim that succeeds instead of one that reverts. Suggested fix: after a successful claim, also require _nothingClaimable() before a balance change, or treat claimable(vault) != 0 after the claim as unsettled.","line":430,"path":"src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol","reproduction":"Scripted staking mock (ScriptedStaking in test/ReserveSettlement.t.sol, claimMode 3 = claim returns success and pays nothing). alice deposits one L1 (1000e18 shares). Fund 100e18 SQK claimable for the vault. Set claimMode=3. bob deposits one L1: expected revert RewardsUnsettled because 100e18 is still claimable; actual: the deposit succeeds and mints 1000e18 shares. Set claimMode=0. alice.claimRewards() returns 50e18 and bob.claimRewards() returns 50e18. Expected: alice 100e18, bob 0.","severity":"low","title":"Freeze guard trusts a successful staking.claim even when SQK stays claimable, so a late depositor can share pre-deposit rewards"}],"hash":"4da67483313f3d54bffbcf34c5b588a8e1347cc8bcdec317a042bd785b2abf6e","nodeId":"6fb86bc0-0172-4ece-97de-22c104864236","outcome":"completed","summary":"The author's fix for my earlier high-severity finding is in, and the suite now passes against the revised vault: 123 tests pass with your verifier seed, and the 20 Sepolia fork tests reached the chain at block 12038088 and passed. With `SEPOLIA_RPC_URL` empty, 19 fork tests skip and one offline selector check still runs.\n\n**The one failure I fixed:** the invariant campaign broke because the vault now correctly refuses deposits during a claim outage (`RewardsUnsettled`), which my old handler didn't expect. The handler now expects that refusal whenever the claim fails while SQK is still claimable for the vault, and checks that no NFT, share or power moved.\n\n**New checks:**\n- **Reward ownership:** an independent tracker in the invariant campaign records who should get each SQK amount, based on balances at the moment it accrued. A new invariant says no holder ever claims more than that. After recovery, each holder must have received their full amount, give or take rounding. To make sure it actually catches something, I temporarily put the old bug back in `src`: the campaign failed, then I restored the file.\n- **Stranded NFTs:** the handler now also pushes NFTs into the vault with a plain transfer and has a random caller stake them. That must add exactly one L1 of power, mint no shares, and refuse a second attempt.\n- **New file `test/ReserveSettlement.t.sol` (13 tests), covering:**\n  - **When the vault freezes:** if the claim fails and the \"how much is claimable\" read also fails or returns nothing, the vault freezes even with nothing owed. If the claim only fails because there is nothing to claim, it does not freeze.\n  - **What a freeze blocks:** zero-amount, self and delegated transfers are refused, while approvals and already-counted rewards still pay out.\n  - **Late depositors:** a 1,000-run fuzz confirms a later depositor never gets rewards that accrued before they joined.\n  - **Stranded staking:** a duplicate in a batch rolls back the whole batch, a burned token is rejected, staking one before anyone deposits goes to the first depositor as a gift, and staking during a freeze works.\n  - **Ownership:** renouncing is refused, a cancelled handover changes nothing, and after a completed handover the old owner can no longer merge or appoint a strategist.\n\n**One new defect, reported (low) in `.imd-findings.json`:** the freeze only kicks in when the staking contract's `claim` *reverts*. If `claim` succeeds but pays nothing while SQK is still claimable, the vault treats rewards as settled (`src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:430`). The concrete case: alice deposits one L1 and 100 SQK accrues. `claim` then succeeds without paying, and bob is allowed to deposit when he should have been refused. They each later get 50 SQK, where alice should get 100 and bob 0. The suggested fix is to also require that nothing is still claimable after a successful `claim`. No test treats this behaviour as correct.\n\nI also updated `test/TESTING.md`: the old defect is now listed as fixed and covered by tests, and the new finding is noted. Everything I changed is under `test/`, apart from the findings file in the repository root.","treeHash":"85c3ed7c33c802b9ec94804fb6d1da05a397d017","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1234965,"inputTokens":34,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":26625,"runtime":"claude","turns":19,"wallClockMs":426821}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"06a310a5c144dce3","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Access Control / Asymmetry (permissions area). The constructor seeds `strategist` with the initial owner and the role is documented (README 'Roles and trust assumptions', NatSpec on `strategist`) as 'the owner, until setStrategist is called'. But the strategist slot never follows ownership: `Ownable2Step.acceptOwnership` writes only `_owner`, and `onlyStrategist` (line 138: `if (msg.sender != strategist && msg.sender != owner()) revert NotStrategist(msg.sender);`) accepts either the stored strategist OR the current owner. So after owner A hands the vault to owner B and B accepts, A is no longer owner but is still the stored strategist and can keep calling `mergeStep` until B remembers to call `setStrategist`. The two-step handover therefore does not revoke every privilege the outgoing key held, which is the asymmetry: ownership transfer (one side of the pair) moves `_owner`, but the derived default of the second role (`strategist = owner_`) is a copy, not a reference, and is not mirrored. Impact is bounded because `mergeStep` cannot move NFTs or SQK out and must strictly raise power, but a compromised or departed previous owner retains an operational role the new owner believes was transferred, and can keep selecting which pairs merge (and thereby which NFTs enter cooldown). Fix preserving the design: either track 'strategist unset' explicitly (e.g. `address(0)` meaning 'owner is strategist') and drop the eager copy on line 131, or clear/replace `strategist` inside an override of `_transferOwnership` when it still equals the previous owner.","line":131,"path":"src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol","reproduction":"Mocks or fork, any Squeekchain graph. 1) Deploy HamsterMiningReserve(owner_=A, ...). strategist()==A, owner()==A. 2) A calls transferOwnership(B); B calls acceptOwnership(). Now owner()==B, pendingOwner()==0, but strategist() still == A. 3) Alice deposits two L1 Squeeks (ids 1,2). 4) A (no longer owner) calls mergeStep(1,2). Expected per documented role model: revert NotStrategist(A) because A holds no role after the handover. Actual: the call succeeds, token 1 becomes level 2, MergeStep event emitted. Verified with a scratch test on the mocks (test passes: A merges after B accepted ownership).","severity":"low","snippet":"        strategist = owner_;","title":"Former owner keeps the strategist (mergeStep) privilege after a completed two-step ownership transfer"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Asymmetry between the two exit paths. `claimRewards()` pays `msg.sender`'s accrued SQK, and `transfer`/`transferFrom` are the documented way to exit ('transfer hmSQUEEK to exit'). The overrides add settlement but no destination check, so `to == address(this)` is accepted (OpenZeppelin ERC20 v5 only rejects `address(0)`). Shares that land on the vault's own address keep accruing through `_sync` in `_update`/`_settle` exactly like any other holder's, but the vault has no function that calls `_claim(address(this), ...)` and no way to move its own shares, so the SQK attributed to those shares is locked in `accountedBalance` forever and is excluded from every other holder's index. Unlike an arbitrary wrong address, the vault's own address is a predictable mistake (users and integrators routinely 'return shares to the vault' expecting a redemption) and the contract can detect it for free. A `transferFrom(from, address(this), v)` by an approved spender has the same effect. Fix preserving the design: revert in the `transfer`/`transferFrom` overrides (or in `_update`) when `to == address(this)`.","line":332,"path":"src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol","reproduction":"Mocks (test/mocks/MockSqueekchain.sol) or fork. 1) Alice deposits two L1 Squeeks -> 2000e18 shares. 2) Alice calls vault.transfer(address(vault), 1000e18); the call succeeds (expected: revert, the vault cannot redeem or claim for itself). 3) 100e18 SQK becomes claimable for the vault (mock: staking.fund(vault, 100e18)); anyone calls harvest(): rewardIndex = 5e25, accountedBalance = 100e18. 4) pendingRewards(address(vault)) == 50e18. 5) Alice claimRewards() -> 50e18 (correct for her half). Actual end state: sqk.balanceOf(vault) == 50e18, accountedBalance == 50e18, totalSupply still 2000e18 with 1000e18 held by the vault itself; no entry point can pay the 50e18 to anyone, and every future harvest keeps sending half of all SQK into the same dead slot. Expected: the transfer to the vault address is rejected, or the self-held slice is excluded from distribution. Verified with a scratch test on the mocks.","severity":"low","snippet":"    function transfer(address to, uint256 value) public override nonReentrant returns (bool) {","title":"Shares transferred to the vault's own address permanently strand their pro-rata SQK (no exit for self-held shares)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Role-powers documentation item for the Access Control guide ('trigger renounce to leave the system unrecoverable'), not a permission bypass. The contract inherits `Ownable.renounceOwnership()` (owner-only, sets owner to address(0), not two-step) without overriding it. After renounce, `setStrategist` can never be called again, so the strategist address is frozen at whatever it was: if that key is later lost or compromised there is no way to rotate it, and (per finding 1) by default it is the renouncing owner's own key. No funds are at risk because the strategist can only run power-increasing merges, but the vault's merge-pooling purpose then depends on a single unrotatable key forever. README's role table does not list `renounceOwnership`. Suggested: either override `renounceOwnership` to revert (ownership transfer stays available through the two-step path) or document the consequence in the roles table.","line":32,"path":"src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol","reproduction":"1) Deploy with owner A (strategist = A). 2) Alice deposits ids 1,2. 3) A calls renounceOwnership(): owner()==address(0), strategist()==A. 4) A can still call mergeStep(1,2) (succeeds, since strategist storage still holds A). 5) A (or anyone) calls setStrategist(X): reverts OwnableUnauthorizedAccount. The strategist can never be changed again. Verified with a scratch test on the mocks.","severity":"info","snippet":"contract HamsterMiningReserve is ERC20, Ownable2Step, ReentrancyGuard, IERC721Receiver {","title":"renounceOwnership() is inherited unmodified: it permanently freezes the strategist assignment (trust assumption, owner-only action)"}],"hash":"5807a788daf1f0eb9622e9d12b44c4b6db3ce37d6ac7f09e28b7d2f353104c49","nodeId":"5e26017d-e46f-4da5-9975-3080b6881379","outcome":"completed","summary":"The findings file is in place (it is ignored by git along with the other review artifacts, which is why the status was silent), the scratch directory is removed, and no source file was touched.\n\n**Outcome.** The permission model of HamsterMiningReserve is tight. Two roles exist: the owner can only set the strategist and transfer ownership, and the strategist can only run merges that must strictly raise staked power. No path moves an NFT or SQK out except a holder's own reward claim. I found no permission bypass of medium or higher severity. All 46 offline tests and 11 Sepolia fork tests pass, and I confirmed on the live graph that the staking contract's `claim(address)` is self-only (third parties get Solady's `Unauthorized`) and returns 32 bytes, so the settle path is sound against the real contracts.\n\n**Findings written to `.imd-findings.json`:**\n\n- **Low: former owner keeps the strategist role after a two-step ownership handover.** The constructor copies the owner into the strategist slot and nothing updates it when ownership moves. Reproduced on mocks: A transfers to B, B accepts, A can still call mergeStep. Bounded impact, since merges cannot extract value.\n- **Low: shares transferred to the vault's own address strand their SQK forever.** The transfer overrides accept the vault as recipient, the self-held slice keeps accruing, and no function can pay it out. Reproduced: half the shares sent to the vault leave 50 SQK permanently locked in accounted balance.\n- **Info: inherited renounceOwnership freezes the strategist assignment permanently.** Documented as a trust assumption rather than a bypass, since it is owner-only and risks no funds.\n\n**Coverage.** All 13 listed entry points have a row, plus four invariant rows (receiver gate, no NFT exit, no mint without power, factory holds no role). Nothing was left unreached. I also checked and dropped two leads: the per-account staking slot cap (ten NFTs stake fine on the fork) and the static-analysis reentrancy lines (every settle path is behind the reentrancy guard and the external callees are the trusted graph contracts).\n\n**What I did not cover.** Math, economics and control-flow guides belong to the other three specialists; I only noted that the NAV and reward index formulas behaved as documented along the paths I traced.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1327342,"inputTokens":418,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":35896,"runtime":"claude","turns":38,"wallClockMs":744257}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"1188f01303e45ecd","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from the two tester findings and the math specialist's finding (same root cause). The brief requires settle-before-every-balance-change so that no deposit or transfer can take SQK that accrued before it, and README states a missed harvest never misallocates rewards. _settle() swallows a reverting staking.claim (ClaimFailed event only), and deposit() at line 155 and _update() at line 346 then mint or move shares with rewardIndex unchanged. When the claim path recovers, the next _settle indexes the whole deferred amount against the post-change supply and balances. A depositor who enters during the outage receives a slice of SQK that was earned entirely by earlier holders, and a holder who exits by transfer during the outage loses all SQK accrued before the transfer to the recipient. Precondition: staking.claim(vault) reverts for a while. On the live graph claim(self) currently returns 0 cleanly (checked by eth_call and a fork test at block 12038281), but the staking contract is an EIP-1967 proxy (implementation 0xBBb8...230B) whose claim already has at least one revert path (Unauthorized when caller != account), so a pause or outage is a supported failure state, and the project's own mocks model it. Severity medium: funds go to the wrong party only under an upstream outage, but the explicit settlement guarantee is broken and the misallocation is permanent. Fix preserving never-reverting harvest()/poke(): have _settle() return whether the claim succeeded and revert deposit and _update when it did not; or, if liveness is preferred, read staking.claimable(address(this)) in _settle and credit it to rewardIndex virtually so shares minted during the outage are priced after the accrued SQK.","line":366,"path":"src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {HamsterMiningReserve} from \"src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol\";\n\ncontract ProofReward {\n    mapping(address => uint256) public balanceOf;\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n    }\n\n    function transfer(address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        balanceOf[msg.sender] -= amount;\n        balanceOf[to] += amount;\n        return true;\n    }\n}\n\ncontract ProofNft {\n    mapping(uint256 => address) public ownerOf;\n    mapping(address => mapping(address => bool)) public isApprovedForAll;\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 id) external {\n        require(ownerOf[id] == address(0), \"already minted\");\n        ownerOf[id] = to;\n    }\n\n    function level(uint256) external pure returns (uint256) {\n        return 1;\n    }\n\n    function setApprovalForAll(address operator, bool approved) external {\n        isApprovedForAll[msg.sender][operator] = approved;\n    }\n\n    function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 id) external {\n        require(ownerOf[id] == from, \"not owner\");\n        require(msg.sender == from || isApprovedForAll[from][msg.sender], \"not approved\");\n        ownerOf[id] = to;\n    }\n}\n\ncontract ProofEmission {\n    function checkpoint() external {}\n}\n\ncontract ProofStaking {\n    ProofNft public immutable nft;\n    ProofReward public immutable reward;\n    mapping(address => uint256) public accountPower;\n    mapping(address => uint256) public claimable;\n    bool public claimDisabled;\n\n    constructor(ProofNft nft_, ProofReward reward_) {\n        nft = nft_;\n        reward = reward_;\n    }\n\n    function setClaimDisabled(bool disabled) external {\n        claimDisabled = disabled;\n    }\n\n    function fund(address account, uint256 amount) external {\n        reward.mint(address(this), amount);\n        claimable[account] += amount;\n    }\n\n    function deposit(address collection, uint256[] calldata ids) external {\n        require(collection == address(nft), \"wrong collection\");\n        for (uint256 i; i < ids.length; ++i) {\n            nft.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), ids[i]);\n            accountPower[msg.sender] += 1000e18;\n        }\n    }\n\n    function claim(address account) external returns (uint256 amount) {\n        require(!claimDisabled, \"temporary claim outage\");\n        amount = claimable[account];\n        claimable[account] = 0;\n        reward.transfer(account, amount);\n    }\n}\n\ncontract DelayedRewardsProofTest is Test {\n    ProofReward reward;\n    ProofNft nft;\n    ProofStaking staking;\n    HamsterMiningReserve vault;\n    address alice;\n    address bob;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        alice = makeAddr(\"original depositor\");\n        bob = makeAddr(\"later holder\");\n        reward = new ProofReward();\n        nft = new ProofNft();\n        staking = new ProofStaking(nft, reward);\n        ProofEmission emission = new ProofEmission();\n        // Core is not called in these reward paths; no live graph is used in this proof.\n        vault = new HamsterMiningReserve(\n            address(this), address(nft), address(staking), address(emission), address(emission), address(reward)\n        );\n        nft.mint(alice, 1);\n        nft.mint(bob, 2);\n        vm.prank(alice);\n        nft.setApprovalForAll(address(vault), true);\n        vm.prank(bob);\n        nft.setApprovalForAll(address(vault), true);\n        vm.prank(alice);\n        vault.deposit(_one(1));\n        // Only Alice has shares when all 100 SQK accrue. No rewards accrue later.\n        staking.fund(address(vault), 100e18);\n        assertEq(vault.pendingRewards(alice), 100e18);\n        staking.setClaimDisabled(true);\n    }\n\n    function _one(uint256 id) internal pure returns (uint256[] memory ids) {\n        ids = new uint256[](1);\n        ids[0] = id;\n    }\n\n    function _recoverAndCheckOriginalEntitlement() internal {\n        staking.setClaimDisabled(false);\n        vault.harvest();\n        vm.prank(alice);\n        uint256 alicePaid = vault.claimRewards();\n        vm.prank(bob);\n        uint256 bobPaid = vault.claimRewards();\n        assertEq(alicePaid, 100e18, \"original holder must keep rewards earned before balance change\");\n        assertEq(bobPaid, 0, \"later holder must not receive old rewards\");\n        assertEq(reward.balanceOf(alice), 100e18);\n        assertEq(reward.balanceOf(bob), 0);\n    }\n\n    function test_depositDuringClaimOutageCannotTakeEarlierRewards() public {\n        vm.prank(bob);\n        // A fix may either reject the mutation or preserve old reward ownership.\n        (bool accepted,) = address(vault).call(abi.encodeCall(vault.deposit, (_one(2))));\n        if (accepted) {\n            assertGt(vault.balanceOf(bob), 0);\n        } else {\n            assertEq(vault.balanceOf(bob), 0);\n            assertEq(nft.ownerOf(2), bob);\n        }\n        _recoverAndCheckOriginalEntitlement();\n    }\n\n    function test_transferDuringClaimOutageCannotMoveEarlierRewards() public {\n        uint256 shares = vault.balanceOf(alice);\n        vm.prank(alice);\n        (bool accepted,) = address(vault).call(abi.encodeCall(vault.transfer, (bob, shares)));\n        if (accepted) {\n            assertEq(vault.balanceOf(bob), shares);\n        } else {\n            assertEq(vault.balanceOf(alice), shares);\n            assertEq(vault.balanceOf(bob), 0);\n        }\n        _recoverAndCheckOriginalEntitlement();\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Mocks (test/mocks/MockSqueekchain.sol or the proof's stand-ins). 1) alice deposits one L1 -> 1000e18 shares. 2) staking.fund(vault, 100e18) so 100e18 SQK is claimable by the vault. 3) staking.setRevertOnClaim(true). 4) bob deposits one L1 -> deposit succeeds, ClaimFailed emitted, rewardIndex unchanged, supply 2000e18. 5) staking.setRevertOnClaim(false); harvest(). Expected: pendingRewards(alice)==100e18, pendingRewards(bob)==0. Actual: alice 50e18, bob 50e18. Transfer variant: after step 3 alice transfers all 1000e18 shares to bob; after recovery expected alice 100e18 / bob 0, actual alice 0 / bob 100e18. Ran test/scratch/DelayedRewardsProof.t.sol: both tests fail with '50000000000000000000 != 100000000000000000000' and '0 != 100000000000000000000'.","severity":"medium","snippet":"        try staking.claim(address(this)) returns (uint256) {}\n        catch (bytes memory reason) {\n            emit ClaimFailed(reason);\n        }","title":"Balance changes proceed when staking.claim fails inside _settle, so SQK accrued before a deposit or transfer is re-split by the new balances"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from the flow specialist (medium) and the math specialist (low). Solidity's try/catch only catches a revert inside the callee; decoding the return data against `returns (uint256)` happens in the caller and a decode failure (fewer than 32 bytes returned) reverts the whole transaction with empty data. _settle() is on the path of deposit, transfer, transferFrom, claimRewards (both overloads), harvest, poke and mergeStep, and the vault has no owner escape hatch, no NFT withdrawal and no sweep. The brief lists claim(address)=0x1e83409a with no return type, the staking contract is unverified and upgradeable (EIP-1967 implementation slot set), and the live claim currently returns exactly one 32-byte word only because the current implementation happens to. If an upgrade (or a re-wire to a surface whose claim is void) changes that, every entry point reverts: holders cannot claim SQK already inside the vault, cannot exit by transfer, and the NFTs remain staked for good. This contradicts README's guarantee that a broken checkpoint/claim never blocks deposits, transfers or claims of already-received SQK. Severity medium: permanent breakage with funds inside, conditional on an upstream ABI change. Fix: drop the `returns (uint256)` clause (the value is unused; accounting is balance-delta based) or make the claim with a raw address(staking).call(abi.encodeCall(ISqueekStaking.claim, (address(this)))) and ignore the return data; consider the same for checkpoint().","line":366,"path":"src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {ERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\";\nimport {ERC721} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol\";\n\nimport {HamsterMiningReserve} from \"src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol\";\n\n/// @notice Proof for: `_settle()` wraps `staking.claim(address(this))` in try/catch but declares\n///         `returns (uint256)`. Solidity decodes the return data outside the catch, so a staking\n///         implementation whose `claim` returns no data (a legitimate upgrade of the unverified\n///         Squeekchain proxy) makes `_settle` revert, and with it deposit, transfer, transferFrom,\n///         claimRewards, harvest, poke and mergeStep. SQK already inside the vault becomes\n///         unreachable. README states that a broken `claim` never blocks claims of received SQK.\n///\n///         Fails on the current code (harvest / claimRewards / transfer revert with empty data).\n///         Passes once `_settle` ignores the return data of `claim` (e.g. a raw `call` or a\n///         `try` without a `returns` clause).\ncontract SQK is ERC20 {\n    constructor() ERC20(\"SQK\", \"SQK\") {}\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        _mint(to, amount);\n    }\n}\n\ncontract Squeek is ERC721 {\n    mapping(uint256 => uint256) public level;\n\n    constructor() ERC721(\"Squeek\", \"SQUEEK\") {}\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 id) external {\n        level[id] = 1;\n        _mint(to, id);\n    }\n}\n\ncontract Emission {\n    function checkpoint() external {}\n}\n\n/// @dev Staking surface whose `claim(address)` returns nothing. Everything else behaves like v9.\ncontract VoidClaimStaking {\n    Squeek public immutable nft;\n    SQK public immutable sqk;\n    mapping(address => uint256) public accountPower;\n    mapping(address => uint256) public claimable;\n\n    constructor(Squeek nft_, SQK sqk_) {\n        nft = nft_;\n        sqk = sqk_;\n    }\n\n    function deposit(address, uint256[] calldata ids) external {\n        for (uint256 i; i < ids.length; ++i) {\n            nft.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), ids[i]);\n            accountPower[msg.sender] += 1000e18;\n        }\n    }\n\n    function withdraw(address, uint256[] calldata) external {}\n\n    function fund(address account, uint256 amount) external {\n        sqk.mint(address(this), amount);\n        claimable[account] += amount;\n    }\n\n    /// @dev Pays accrued SQK but returns no value.\n    function claim(address account) external {\n        uint256 amount = claimable[account];\n        if (amount == 0) return;\n        claimable[account] = 0;\n        sqk.transfer(account, amount);\n    }\n}\n\ncontract VoidClaimBricksSettleTest is Test {\n    address owner = makeAddr(\"owner\");\n    address alice = makeAddr(\"alice\");\n    address bob = makeAddr(\"bob\");\n\n    SQK sqk;\n    Squeek nft;\n    Emission emission;\n    VoidClaimStaking staking;\n    HamsterMiningReserve vault;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        sqk = new SQK();\n        nft = new Squeek();\n        emission = new Emission();\n        staking = new VoidClaimStaking(nft, sqk);\n        vault = new HamsterMiningReserve(\n            owner, address(nft), address(staking), address(emission), address(0xC0DE), address(sqk)\n        );\n        nft.mint(alice, 1);\n        vm.prank(alice);\n        nft.setApprovalForAll(address(vault), true);\n    }\n\n    function test_voidClaimDoesNotBlockVault() public {\n        // The first deposit already runs _settle(); with a void-returning claim it must still work.\n        uint256[] memory ids = new uint256[](1);\n        ids[0] = 1;\n        vm.prank(alice);\n        vault.deposit(ids);\n        assertEq(vault.balanceOf(alice), 1000e18);\n\n        // Rewards accrue and are pulled in by the vault on settle.\n        staking.fund(address(vault), 10e18);\n        vault.harvest();\n\n        // Holder can still claim what the vault received, and still exit by transfer.\n        vm.prank(alice);\n        uint256 paid = vault.claimRewards();\n        assertEq(paid, 10e18);\n        assertEq(sqk.balanceOf(alice), 10e18);\n\n        vm.prank(alice);\n        vault.transfer(bob, 1000e18);\n        assertEq(vault.balanceOf(bob), 1000e18);\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Deploy the vault against a staking stand-in identical to v9 except `function claim(address) external {}` (void, still pays SQK). alice owns Squeek #1 and has approved the vault. alice calls deposit([1]). Expected (README): deposit succeeds, at worst ClaimFailed is emitted; later harvest() and claimRewards() work and transfer() moves shares. Actual: deposit reverts with empty revert data at _settle(); harvest(), poke(), claimRewards() and transfer() revert the same way. Ran test/scratch/VoidClaim.t.sol: fails with 'EvmError: Revert' at the first deposit. Live check: cast call staking 'claim(address)' acct --from acct returns 0x00..00 (32 bytes) at block 12038281, so the vault depends on that return shape persisting across upgrades.","severity":"medium","snippet":"        try staking.claim(address(this)) returns (uint256) {}","title":"try/catch in _settle does not cover return-data decoding of staking.claim; a claim that returns no data reverts every entry point and strands SQK and shares"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"From the permissions specialist; reproduced. The constructor copies the initial owner into `strategist`, and onlyStrategist (line 138) accepts either the stored strategist or the current owner. Ownable2Step.acceptOwnership rewrites only _owner, so after owner A transfers to B and B accepts, A is no longer owner but remains the stored strategist and can keep calling mergeStep until B calls setStrategist. README documents the strategist default as 'the owner, until setStrategist is called', which is not what the storage does. Impact is bounded (mergeStep cannot move NFTs or SQK out and must strictly raise power) but the handover leaves an operational privilege with the outgoing key, which may be the reason for the handover. Fix preserving the design: treat strategist == address(0) as 'owner is strategist' and do not copy owner_ in the constructor, or clear strategist in an override of _transferOwnership when it equals the previous owner.","line":131,"path":"src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol","reproduction":"Mocks: 1) deploy with owner_ = A; strategist()==A. 2) A calls transferOwnership(B); B calls acceptOwnership(); owner()==B, strategist()==A. 3) alice deposits two L1 Squeeks ids 1,2. 4) A calls mergeStep(1,2). Expected per the documented role model: revert NotStrategist(A). Actual: succeeds, token 1 is level 2. Ran test/scratch/LowChecks.t.sol::test_formerOwnerStillStrategist (passes, i.e. the merge by A goes through).","severity":"low","snippet":"        strategist = owner_;","title":"Former owner keeps the strategist (mergeStep) privilege after a completed two-step ownership transfer"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from the permissions and flow specialists; reproduced. transfer/transferFrom (lines 332-339) and _update only reject address(0) via OpenZeppelin, so `to == address(this)` is accepted. The vault then _syncs itself as a holder and every settle credits unclaimedRewards[address(this)], but no function ever calls _claim(address(this), ..) and nothing can move the vault's own shares, so that slice of every future SQK round is permanently locked while still counted in accountedBalance and totalSupply (powerPerShare is understated). Separately, claimRewards(address(this)) passes the zero check, _claim subtracts the amount from accountedBalance and safeTransfers to the vault itself (no balance change), so the next _settle sees balance > accounted and distributes the claimant's SQK to all holders pro rata. Both are self-inflicted but silent, and 'return shares to the vault' is a predictable integrator mistake. Fix: revert when to == address(this) in claimRewards(address) and in _update (or the transfer overrides).","line":191,"path":"src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol","reproduction":"Mocks: alice deposits #1, bob deposits #2 (1000e18 shares each); staking.fund(vault, 100e18). alice calls claimRewards(address(vault)) -> returns 50e18; sqk.balanceOf(vault) stays 100e18 while accountedBalance drops to 50e18. harvest() -> pendingRewards(bob)==75e18, pendingRewards(alice)==25e18 (expected: alice paid 50e18 or the call reverts). Then bob calls transfer(address(vault), 1000e18) -> succeeds (expected: revert); staking.fund(vault, 100e18); harvest() -> balanceOf(vault)==1000e18 and pendingRewards(address(vault))==50e18 with no entry point able to pay it. Ran test/scratch/LowChecks.t.sol::test_selfAddressStrandsAndRedistributes with exactly these assertions.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (to == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();","title":"The vault accepts its own address as share recipient and as reward recipient: shares sent to the vault strand their SQK forever and claimRewards(vault) silently redistributes the claimant's SQK"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from the economics (low) and math (info) specialists; reproduced on the mocks with an externally zeroed power. The brief's NAV rule is firstDeposit ? deltaPower : deltaPower*existingShares/powerBefore, which fails closed (division by zero) when the vault's power reads 0 while shares exist. The code adds a second condition that mints 1 share per unit of power while the stale supply stays outstanding. The vault itself can never reach this state (deposit and mergeStep require strict power increase; supply never shrinks), so it needs the upgradeable staking proxy to zero, slash or migrate the vault's account power. If that happens, the next depositor's NFTs are the only backing yet their shares are diluted by the whole dead supply, permanently and irreversibly (no withdrawal). Fix: revert when powerBefore == 0 and supply > 0 (matching the spec), leaving the owner to decide on a recovery path explicitly.","line":174,"path":"src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol","reproduction":"Mocks: 1) alice deposits two L1 -> supply 2000e18, power 2000e18. 2) vm.store the staking accountPower[vault] slot to 0 (stands in for an upstream reset). 3) bob deposits one L1 -> shares minted 1000e18, supply 3000e18. 4) staking.fund(vault, 300e18); harvest(). Expected: revert at step 3 per the specified formula, or bob entitled to 300e18 since his NFT is the only power. Actual: pendingRewards(alice)==200e18, pendingRewards(bob)==100e18. Ran test/scratch/LowChecks.t.sol::test_zeroPowerBranchDilutesNewDepositor.","severity":"low","snippet":"        shares = (supply == 0 || powerBefore == 0) ? deltaPower : (deltaPower * supply) / powerBefore;","title":"powerBefore == 0 with outstanding shares mints at face value instead of reverting, diluting the only productive depositor"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"From the flow specialist; reproduced on the mocks and on the live Sepolia NFT. onERC721Received blocks unsolicited safeTransferFrom, but ERC-721 transferFrom invokes no hook, so a wallet, marketplace settlement or mistaken user can move a Squeek straight into the vault. The token is then owned by the vault with isHeld false and unstaked: deposit([id]) by the former owner reverts (vault is the owner now), mergeStep(id, x) reverts NotHeld(id), and under the permanent-reserve model there is no withdrawal or sweep. The token mines nothing for anyone forever. Fix within the no-withdrawal design: a permissionless or strategist-only stakeStranded(uint256[] ids) that stakes tokens the vault already owns under its own account without minting shares, so the reserve benefits; or at least document that plain pushes are unrecoverable.","line":325,"path":"src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol","reproduction":"Mocks: alice owns #1 and calls nft.transferFrom(alice, vault, 1). nft.ownerOf(1)==vault, vault.isHeld(1)==false, totalPower()==0. alice calls deposit([1]) -> reverts (ERC721IncorrectOwner). owner calls mergeStep(1, 2) -> reverts NotHeld(1). Ran test/scratch/LowChecks.t.sol::test_plainPushStrandsNft. On a Sepolia fork at block 12038281 the live SqueekNFT accepted nft.transferFrom(HOLDER, vault, 4) and isHeld(4) stayed false (test/scratch/LiveFork.t.sol).","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (msg.sender != address(nft) || !_acceptingNfts) revert UnexpectedNft(operator, tokenId);","title":"A Squeek pushed to the vault with plain ERC-721 transferFrom is stranded: not held, not staked, not depositable, not mergeable"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from the economics and flow specialists (both low). Reproduced arithmetically and on the mocks. Shares are priced at live accountPower and mergeStep raises power without minting shares, so the gain is split across whoever holds shares when the merge lands. mergeStep is a public-mempool transaction from a known strategist and candidate pairs are readable on-chain, so a depositor can front-run it and be priced at the pre-merge NAV. This is a property of the agreed pooled design (the brief says merge gains accrue to every share holder) rather than a coding slip, the front-runner must still deposit NFTs permanently, and the gain is bounded by one merge delta, so it is recorded as informational. Operational mitigation: submit mergeStep through a private relay; design mitigation would need a scope decision (entry smoothing or excluding shares minted in the current round from that round's merge uplift).","line":174,"path":"src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol","reproduction":"Mocks: alice deposits #1,#2 -> 2000e18 shares, power 2000e18. bob deposits #3 before mergeStep(1,2) -> 1000e18 shares at NAV 1.0; merge -> power 3200e18, supply 3000e18: alice's shares back 2133.33e18, bob's 1066.67e18. If bob deposits after the merge: 1000e18*2000e18/2200e18 = 909.09e18 shares, alice backs 2200e18 and bob 1000e18. Ordering moves 66.67e18 power-equivalent (and the same fraction of all future SQK) from alice to bob at no cost beyond a deposit bob intended anyway.","severity":"info","snippet":"        shares = (supply == 0 || powerBefore == 0) ? deltaPower : (deltaPower * supply) / powerBefore;","title":"A deposit landing just before mergeStep takes a pro-rata slice of the merge gain from existing holders (ordering-dependent NAV)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"From the permissions specialist; reproduced by reading OpenZeppelin Ownable (renounceOwnership is single-step, owner-only, sets owner to address(0)). After renounce, setStrategist can never be called, so the strategist is frozen at its current value, which by default is the renouncing owner's own key (finding 3). No funds are at risk and this is an owner-only action, so it is a trust-assumption note: README's roles table does not list renounceOwnership. Suggested: override renounceOwnership to revert (two-step transfer remains available) or document the consequence.","line":32,"path":"src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol","reproduction":"Mocks: deploy with owner A (strategist A). alice deposits ids 1,2. A calls renounceOwnership(): owner()==address(0), strategist()==A. A can still call mergeStep(1,2) (succeeds). Any call to setStrategist(X) reverts OwnableUnauthorizedAccount; the strategist can never change again.","severity":"info","snippet":"contract HamsterMiningReserve is ERC20, Ownable2Step, ReentrancyGuard, IERC721Receiver {","title":"renounceOwnership() is inherited unmodified and permanently freezes the strategist assignment"}],"hash":"64b370ccd02a0f79fd4f74ed5c1d5ecf77d931d0340959b47bdd6c47dce736af","nodeId":"66366599-e1fc-461b-bcd5-6e9bf81417b0","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and `.imd-findings.json` holds 8 findings with a 16-row coverage record. Nothing outside that file and `test/scratch/` was touched.\n\n**What I verified**\n\n- The offline suite passes locally, 79 of 79 tests including the invariant suite. The pinned-block fork tests could not run because no reachable public endpoint serves Sepolia state at block 12038088. I wrote my own fork test at the latest block instead. On the real graph, one L1 stake adds 1000e18, merging two staked L1s nets exactly +200e18 and drops the held count by one, the claim path returns 0 cleanly, and the version and wiring reads match the brief.\n- All four specialist proofs fail on the current code for the stated reasons. I also built a patched copy of the vault under `test/scratch/fixed` and confirmed the two proofs I kept pass against it.\n\n**Findings kept, after merging duplicates**\n\n1. **Medium.** When `staking.claim` reverts, `_settle` swallows it and deposit and transfer still change balances, so SQK accrued before the change is re-split by the new supply. Three specialist reports collapsed into this one. Proof attached. Rated medium rather than high because it needs an upstream claim outage, though it breaks the brief's explicit settlement guarantee.\n2. **Medium.** The `try` clause declares `returns (uint256)`, and a return-data decode failure is not caught. A staking upgrade whose claim returns nothing reverts every entry point with SQK and shares stranded. Two reports merged. Proof attached. The live claim returns 32 bytes today, so this is conditional on an upgrade of the unverified proxy.\n3. **Low.** The former owner stays stored as strategist after a completed two-step handover and can keep calling mergeStep.\n4. **Low.** The vault accepts its own address as share and reward recipient, which strands or silently redistributes SQK. Two reports merged.\n5. **Low.** The extra `powerBefore == 0` branch mints at face value instead of failing closed as the specified formula would.\n6. **Low.** A Squeek pushed in with plain `transferFrom` is permanently stuck, confirmed against the live NFT.\n7. **Info.** Depositing just before a mergeStep captures a slice of the merge gain. Design-inherent, so downgraded from low.\n8. **Info.** `renounceOwnership` freezes the strategist forever.\n\n**My own pass** found nothing beyond the specialists. Reentrancy guards, claim ordering, NAV rounding, the manifest, and the constructor's empty-chain behavior all hold. The in-round reward timing question could not be measured because live emission pays zero.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1505277,"inputTokens":482,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":42036,"runtime":"claude","turns":30,"wallClockMs":609126}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"322201e0794fc891","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"The brief requires settle-before-every-balance-change so that no deposit or transfer can pick up SQK that accrued before it, and the README states that a missed harvest 'never misallocates rewards'. `_settle()` wraps `staking.claim(address(this))` in try/catch and only emits `ClaimFailed` on revert; `deposit()` (line 155) and `_update()` (line 346) then proceed to change balances even though nothing was settled. SQK that the staking contract already credits to the vault (claimable) but could not be pulled is therefore not in `rewardIndex` when the new shares are minted or moved. When the claim path works again, the next `_settle` distributes the whole accrued amount by the post-change supply, so the new depositor (or the transfer recipient) receives rewards earned entirely by earlier holders. Preconditions: the upstream staking claim path reverts for a while (pause, upgrade, out-of-funds reward pool); on the live Sepolia graph `claim(self)` currently succeeds, and the real contracts are upgradeable proxies (Unauthorized is one of the revert paths observed). Concrete numbers: alice holds 1000e18 shares and 90e18 SQK is claimable to the vault; claim reverts; bob deposits two L1 (2000e18 shares); claim resumes; harvest bumps index by 90e18*1e27/3000e18, giving alice 30e18 and bob 60e18 although all 90e18 accrued before bob existed. The same mechanism moves a sender's unsettled rewards to the recipient on `transfer`/`transferFrom` during the outage. The related timing exposure within one emission round (rewards accrued since the last checkpoint that the staking layer does not yet expose to `claim`) could not be measured on the fork because emission currently pays 0. Minimal fix that preserves the never-reverting `harvest()`/`poke()`: have `_settle()` return whether the claim succeeded and revert `deposit` and `_update` (the balance-changing paths) when it did not, or, if liveness during an outage is preferred, read `staking.claimable(address(this))` in `_settle` and credit it to the index virtually (tracking a separate `virtuallyAccounted` so `accountedBalance` stays consistent) so that the shares minted during the outage are priced after the accrued rewards.","line":366,"path":"src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {ERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\";\nimport {ERC721} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol\";\nimport {IERC721Receiver} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/IERC721Receiver.sol\";\n\nimport {HamsterMiningReserve} from \"src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol\";\n\n/// @notice Minimal stand-ins (self-contained; nothing imported from other test files).\ncontract PSQK is ERC20 {\n    constructor() ERC20(\"SQK\", \"SQK\") {}\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 a) external {\n        _mint(to, a);\n    }\n}\n\ncontract PCore {\n    function implementationCodeVersion() external pure returns (uint256) {\n        return 3;\n    }\n}\n\ncontract PEmission {\n    function implementationCodeVersion() external pure returns (uint256) {\n        return 9;\n    }\n\n    function checkpoint() external {}\n\n    function checkpointStatus() external pure returns (bool, uint64, bool) {\n        return (false, 1, true);\n    }\n}\n\ncontract PNft is ERC721 {\n    uint256 public constant MAXIMUM_LEVEL = 10;\n    address public mining;\n    address public sqkCore;\n    uint256 public next = 1;\n    mapping(uint256 => uint256) public level;\n\n    constructor(address m, address c) ERC721(\"Squeek\", \"SQUEEK\") {\n        mining = m;\n        sqkCore = c;\n    }\n\n    function mint(address to) external returns (uint256 id) {\n        id = next++;\n        level[id] = 1;\n        _mint(to, id);\n    }\n\n    function merge(uint256 survivor, uint256 donor) external {\n        require(ownerOf(survivor) == msg.sender && ownerOf(donor) == msg.sender);\n        require(level[survivor] == level[donor]);\n        _burn(donor);\n        level[survivor] += 1;\n    }\n}\n\n/// @dev Staking stand-in: per-account power, claimable SQK, and a switch that makes `claim`\n///      revert (an upstream pause / outage of the reward path).\ncontract PStaking is IERC721Receiver {\n    PNft public immutable genesisNft;\n    PSQK public immutable sqk;\n    address public mining;\n    bool public claimPaused;\n    mapping(address => uint256) public accountPower;\n    mapping(address => uint256) public claimable;\n    mapping(uint256 => address) public stakerOf;\n\n    constructor(PNft n, PSQK s, address m) {\n        genesisNft = n;\n        sqk = s;\n        mining = m;\n    }\n\n    function genesis() external view returns (address) {\n        return address(genesisNft);\n    }\n\n    function token() external view returns (address) {\n        return address(sqk);\n    }\n\n    function setClaimPaused(bool v) external {\n        claimPaused = v;\n    }\n\n    /// @notice Emission credits `account` with SQK (accrued by its power).\n    function fund(address account, uint256 amount) external {\n        sqk.mint(address(this), amount);\n        claimable[account] += amount;\n    }\n\n    function powerOf(uint256 lvl) public pure returns (uint256) {\n        return lvl == 1 ? 1000e18 : 2200e18;\n    }\n\n    function deposit(address, uint256[] calldata ids) external {\n        for (uint256 i; i < ids.length; ++i) {\n            genesisNft.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), ids[i]);\n            stakerOf[ids[i]] = msg.sender;\n            accountPower[msg.sender] += powerOf(genesisNft.level(ids[i]));\n        }\n    }\n\n    function withdraw(address, uint256[] calldata ids) external {\n        for (uint256 i; i < ids.length; ++i) {\n            require(stakerOf[ids[i]] == msg.sender);\n            delete stakerOf[ids[i]];\n            accountPower[msg.sender] -= powerOf(genesisNft.level(ids[i]));\n            genesisNft.safeTransferFrom(address(this), msg.sender, ids[i]);\n        }\n    }\n\n    function claim(address account) external returns (uint256 amount) {\n        require(!claimPaused, \"staking: paused\");\n        amount = claimable[account];\n        if (amount == 0) return 0;\n        claimable[account] = 0;\n        sqk.transfer(account, amount);\n    }\n\n    function onERC721Received(address, address, uint256, bytes calldata) external pure returns (bytes4) {\n        return IERC721Receiver.onERC721Received.selector;\n    }\n}\n\n/// @title Unsettled rewards are shared with a depositor who entered while `staking.claim` reverted.\n/// @dev The brief's guarantee: \"Settle-before-every-balance-change ... so no deposit/transfer can snipe\n///      unsettled rewards\". `_settle()` swallows a reverting `staking.claim`, so `deposit` mints shares\n///      without having settled, and the SQK that accrued entirely before the deposit is later split by the\n///      post-deposit supply.\ncontract UnsettledRewardSnipeTest is Test {\n    address owner = makeAddr(\"owner\");\n    address alice = makeAddr(\"alice\");\n    address bob = makeAddr(\"bob\");\n\n    PSQK sqk;\n    PCore core;\n    PEmission emission;\n    PNft nft;\n    PStaking staking;\n    HamsterMiningReserve vault;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        sqk = new PSQK();\n        core = new PCore();\n        emission = new PEmission();\n        nft = new PNft(address(emission), address(core));\n        staking = new PStaking(nft, sqk, address(emission));\n        vault = new HamsterMiningReserve(\n            owner, address(nft), address(staking), address(emission), address(core), address(sqk)\n        );\n        vm.prank(alice);\n        nft.setApprovalForAll(address(vault), true);\n        vm.prank(bob);\n        nft.setApprovalForAll(address(vault), true);\n    }\n\n    function _one(uint256 a) internal pure returns (uint256[] memory ids) {\n        ids = new uint256[](1);\n        ids[0] = a;\n    }\n\n    function test_depositDuringClaimOutageCannotTakeEarlierRewards() public {\n        // 1. Alice is the only holder: 1 L1 -> 1000e18 shares.\n        uint256 a = nft.mint(alice);\n        vm.prank(alice);\n        vault.deposit(_one(a));\n\n        // 2. 90 SQK accrue to the vault's staking account while alice is the sole holder.\n        staking.fund(address(vault), 90e18);\n\n        // 3. The upstream claim path is down (reverts). The vault's `_settle` swallows this.\n        staking.setClaimPaused(true);\n\n        // 4. Bob deposits two L1s (2000e18 power) during the outage.\n        uint256 b1 = nft.mint(bob);\n        uint256 b2 = nft.mint(bob);\n        uint256[] memory bids = new uint256[](2);\n        bids[0] = b1;\n        bids[1] = b2;\n        vm.prank(bob);\n        bool bobEntered;\n        try vault.deposit(bids) {\n            bobEntered = true;\n        } catch {\n            // A fixed vault may instead refuse to change balances while it cannot settle. Acceptable.\n            bobEntered = false;\n        }\n\n        // 5. Claim path comes back; anyone harvests.\n        staking.setClaimPaused(false);\n        vault.harvest();\n\n        // Everything that accrued before bob's deposit belongs to alice. Bob must get none of it.\n        assertEq(vault.pendingRewards(alice), 90e18, \"alice must keep the 90 SQK that accrued before bob\");\n        if (bobEntered) {\n            assertEq(vault.pendingRewards(bob), 0, \"bob must not receive rewards accrued before his deposit\");\n        }\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Mocks (or any staking whose claim reverts): 1) alice.deposit([L1]) -> 1000e18 shares. 2) staking credits 90e18 SQK claimable to the vault. 3) staking.claim reverts (paused). 4) bob.deposit([L1,L1]) succeeds (ClaimFailed emitted, index unchanged). 5) claim works again; anyone calls harvest(). Expected: pendingRewards(alice)==90e18, pendingRewards(bob)==0. Actual: pendingRewards(alice)==30e18, pendingRewards(bob)==60e18. Proof test test/scratch/UnsettledRewardSnipe.t.sol fails on the current code with 'alice must keep the 90 SQK that accrued before bob: 30000000000000000000 != 90000000000000000000' and passes against a copy of the vault whose deposit/_update revert when the claim in _settle fails.","severity":"medium","snippet":"        try staking.claim(address(this)) returns (uint256) {}\n        catch (bytes memory reason) {\n            emit ClaimFailed(reason);\n        }","title":"Settle is best-effort: a deposit or transfer made while staking.claim reverts shares SQK that accrued before it (sniping of unsettled rewards)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"`_settle()` relies on try/catch so that 'If Squeekchain pauses or breaks checkpoint/claim, deposits, transfers and claims of already-received SQK keep working' (README). Solidity's try/catch only catches reverts inside the callee; a failure to ABI-decode the return data against `returns (uint256)` reverts in the caller and is not caught. The staking contract is an upgradeable proxy (implementation 0xBBb8...230B behind 0x4b67...ea4F, already at version 9 of the graph). If an upgrade changes `claim(address)` to return no value (or a struct), every `_settle()` reverts, which means every `deposit`, `transfer`, `transferFrom`, `claimRewards` and `harvest`/`poke` reverts: holders can neither exit by transfer nor claim SQK already sitting in the vault, and NFTs are permanently staked, so the reserve is dead with funds inside. The same applies if the emission or staking proxy ever had no code at its address, since the extcodesize check before `emission.checkpoint()` also happens outside the try. Fix: make the calls with a low-level `address(staking).call(abi.encodeCall(ISqueekStaking.claim, (address(this))))` and ignore the returndata (the vault already measures SQK by balance delta), and do the same for `checkpoint()`.","line":366,"path":"src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol","reproduction":"Deploy the vault against a staking contract whose `claim(address)` is `function claim(address) external {}` (void) but otherwise works (deposit credits power). alice approves and calls deposit([id]). Expected (per README/brief): deposit succeeds and ClaimFailed is emitted at worst. Actual: deposit reverts (decoding failure is not caught by the catch clause); harvest() also reverts. Reproduced in test/scratch/VoidClaim.t.sol (expectRevert on both deposit and harvest passes).","severity":"low","snippet":"        try staking.claim(address(this)) returns (uint256) {}","title":"try/catch does not cover return-data decoding: a staking upgrade whose claim(address) returns nothing bricks deposit, transfers, claims and harvest"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The `powerBefore == 0` guard avoids a division by zero, but the fallback prices the new deposit at 1 share per unit of power while existing shares (which no longer back any power) stay outstanding. Reachable only if the staking contract (an upgradeable proxy) zeroes or slashes the vault's power externally; the vault itself never lets power fall (deposit requires powerAfter > powerBefore, mergeStep requires a strict increase, no NFT withdrawal). Numbers: supply 1000e18 (alice), accountPower(vault) externally reset to 0; bob deposits one L1 (deltaPower 1000e18) and gets 1000e18 shares; the vault now has 1000e18 power and 2000e18 shares, so alice's dead shares own 500e18 of bob's power and half of all future SQK. Not reproducible on the live graph; reported as a note for the author to decide whether such a state should revert instead.","line":174,"path":"src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol","reproduction":"Requires an external zeroing of staking.accountPower(vault) with totalSupply()>0, which no vault path can produce; then deposit([L1]) mints deltaPower shares (1:1) instead of reverting or re-pricing. Not a confirmed defect on the live v9 graph.","severity":"info","snippet":"        shares = (supply == 0 || powerBefore == 0) ? deltaPower : (deltaPower * supply) / powerBefore;","title":"If the vault's accountPower ever reads 0 while shares exist, the 1:1 fallback mints shares that hand half of the new depositor's power to the stale holders"}],"hash":"6992fadd5e1d5e2a057644fb7f28f755f0e58a0fb2d1cf61383131188f40b4de","nodeId":"091e42fc-a59d-46db-bde6-65250138ce04","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and `.imd-findings.json` holds three findings and 18 coverage rows.\n\n**What I checked.** I read the Mindset and the Math Precision, Boundary and Numerical Gap guides, then traced the share NAV formula, the per-share reward index, every division and multiplication, every external call site, and the zero and early-return paths in `src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol`. The offline suite passes with 46 tests. The Sepolia fork suite passes with 11 tests against the live graph, where I also confirmed that the staking contract's `claim(self)` is authorized and returns a `uint256`, that checkpoint succeeds, and that 20 level-1 Squeeks stake into one vault account without hitting a slot cap.\n\n**Findings**\n\n- **Medium. Unsettled rewards can be sniped during a claim outage.** `_settle` swallows a reverting `staking.claim`, so `deposit`, `transfer` and `transferFrom` change balances without settling. SQK already credited to the vault is later split by the new supply. Concrete case: alice alone holds shares with 90 SQK accrued, claim reverts, bob deposits two L1 NFTs, claim resumes. Alice gets 30 SQK and bob 60 SQK. This contradicts the brief's settle-before-every-balance-change guarantee and the README's \"never misallocates\" claim. The proof test in `test/scratch/UnsettledRewardSnipe.t.sol` fails on the current code and passes against a fixed copy that reverts balance changes when the claim fails.\n- **Low. Try/catch does not cover return-data decoding.** The staking contract is an upgradeable proxy. If a later version makes `claim(address)` return nothing, every settle reverts outside the catch, which bricks deposits, share transfers, reward claims and harvest with NFTs permanently staked. Reproduced with a void-returning staking mock.\n- **Info. The `powerBefore == 0` fallback with live shares** mints 1:1 and hands half of the new depositor's power to stale holders. Only reachable if the staking contract externally zeroes the vault's power, so it is reported as a note.\n\n**What holds.** Share rounding favors existing holders and cannot reach zero for a level-1 or higher NFT, since supply never exceeds power. The index bump and holder sync cannot overflow and lose under 1 wei of dust per settle. The `accountedBalance` subtraction on claim cannot underflow. The merge path proves exactly +200e18 and one fewer held NFT on the fork. All division-by-zero guards are in place.\n\n**Not reached.** Whether a mid-round depositor shares rewards that the staking layer has accrued but not yet exposed to `claim` could not be measured, because Sepolia emission currently pays 0.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1213734,"inputTokens":418,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":36018,"runtime":"claude","turns":30,"wallClockMs":546709}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"29c7a64054aac554","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Execution trace / periphery. `_settle()` is on the path of deposit, transfer, transferFrom, claimRewards, harvest, poke and mergeStep. It calls the unverified, upgradeable staking proxy with `try staking.claim(address(this)) returns (uint256) {} catch {...}`. In Solidity a `try` with a `returns` clause decodes the return data in the CALLER after the call succeeds; a decode failure (return data shorter than 32 bytes) is not routed to the catch block and reverts the whole transaction with empty revert data. The live v9 `claim` currently returns one 32-byte word (checked by eth_call at block 12038160), so the vault works today, but the brief lists `claim(address)=0x1e83409a` with no return type and the staking contract is an EIP-1967 proxy Squeekchain can upgrade. If an upgrade makes `claim` return nothing (or the vault is ever pointed at a staking surface whose claim is void), `_settle()` reverts on every call: no deposit, no share transfer (the only exit), no claimRewards, and SQK already sitting in the vault (accountedBalance) is unreachable forever. This contradicts README 'Roles and trust assumptions': 'If Squeekchain pauses or breaks checkpoint/claim, deposits, transfers and claims of already-received SQK keep working.' The catch only protects against a REVERTING claim, not a differently-shaped one. The same `_settle()` also reverts (outside any catch) when `emission` or `staking` has no code, because solc's extcodesize check for `checkpoint()` runs before the call; the constructor deliberately makes no external calls and the README's 'every outside contract is checked on first use' is not implemented, so a mis-wired deploy is only discovered when the first deposit reverts. Fix: drop the `returns (uint256)` clause (the return value is unused; accounting is balance-delta based) or use a raw `address(staking).call(abi.encodeCall(ISqueekStaking.claim, (address(this))))` and ignore the return data; optionally also guard `address(staking).code.length == 0` / `address(emission).code.length == 0` inside `_settle` so a missing dependency degrades to the catch path instead of a revert.","line":366,"path":"src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {ERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\";\nimport {ERC721} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol\";\n\nimport {HamsterMiningReserve} from \"src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol\";\n\n/// @notice Proof for: `_settle()` wraps `staking.claim(address(this))` in try/catch but declares\n///         `returns (uint256)`. Solidity decodes the return data outside the catch, so a staking\n///         implementation whose `claim` returns no data (a legitimate upgrade of the unverified\n///         Squeekchain proxy) makes `_settle` revert, and with it deposit, transfer, transferFrom,\n///         claimRewards, harvest, poke and mergeStep. SQK already inside the vault becomes\n///         unreachable. README states that a broken `claim` never blocks claims of received SQK.\n///\n///         Fails on the current code (harvest / claimRewards / transfer revert with empty data).\n///         Passes once `_settle` ignores the return data of `claim` (e.g. a raw `call` or a\n///         `try` without a `returns` clause).\ncontract SQK is ERC20 {\n    constructor() ERC20(\"SQK\", \"SQK\") {}\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        _mint(to, amount);\n    }\n}\n\ncontract Squeek is ERC721 {\n    mapping(uint256 => uint256) public level;\n\n    constructor() ERC721(\"Squeek\", \"SQUEEK\") {}\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 id) external {\n        level[id] = 1;\n        _mint(to, id);\n    }\n}\n\ncontract Emission {\n    function checkpoint() external {}\n}\n\n/// @dev Staking surface whose `claim(address)` returns nothing. Everything else behaves like v9.\ncontract VoidClaimStaking {\n    Squeek public immutable nft;\n    SQK public immutable sqk;\n    mapping(address => uint256) public accountPower;\n    mapping(address => uint256) public claimable;\n\n    constructor(Squeek nft_, SQK sqk_) {\n        nft = nft_;\n        sqk = sqk_;\n    }\n\n    function deposit(address, uint256[] calldata ids) external {\n        for (uint256 i; i < ids.length; ++i) {\n            nft.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), ids[i]);\n            accountPower[msg.sender] += 1000e18;\n        }\n    }\n\n    function withdraw(address, uint256[] calldata) external {}\n\n    function fund(address account, uint256 amount) external {\n        sqk.mint(address(this), amount);\n        claimable[account] += amount;\n    }\n\n    /// @dev Pays accrued SQK but returns no value.\n    function claim(address account) external {\n        uint256 amount = claimable[account];\n        if (amount == 0) return;\n        claimable[account] = 0;\n        sqk.transfer(account, amount);\n    }\n}\n\ncontract VoidClaimBricksSettleTest is Test {\n    address owner = makeAddr(\"owner\");\n    address alice = makeAddr(\"alice\");\n    address bob = makeAddr(\"bob\");\n\n    SQK sqk;\n    Squeek nft;\n    Emission emission;\n    VoidClaimStaking staking;\n    HamsterMiningReserve vault;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        sqk = new SQK();\n        nft = new Squeek();\n        emission = new Emission();\n        staking = new VoidClaimStaking(nft, sqk);\n        vault = new HamsterMiningReserve(\n            owner, address(nft), address(staking), address(emission), address(0xC0DE), address(sqk)\n        );\n        nft.mint(alice, 1);\n        vm.prank(alice);\n        nft.setApprovalForAll(address(vault), true);\n    }\n\n    function test_voidClaimDoesNotBlockVault() public {\n        // The first deposit already runs _settle(); with a void-returning claim it must still work.\n        uint256[] memory ids = new uint256[](1);\n        ids[0] = 1;\n        vm.prank(alice);\n        vault.deposit(ids);\n        assertEq(vault.balanceOf(alice), 1000e18);\n\n        // Rewards accrue and are pulled in by the vault on settle.\n        staking.fund(address(vault), 10e18);\n        vault.harvest();\n\n        // Holder can still claim what the vault received, and still exit by transfer.\n        vm.prank(alice);\n        uint256 paid = vault.claimRewards();\n        assertEq(paid, 10e18);\n        assertEq(sqk.balanceOf(alice), 10e18);\n\n        vm.prank(alice);\n        vault.transfer(bob, 1000e18);\n        assertEq(vault.balanceOf(bob), 1000e18);\n    }\n}","reproduction":"State: vault deployed against a staking surface identical to v9 except `claim(address)` returns no data (see proof). alice holds Squeek #1, approved the vault. Call `vault.deposit([1])` as alice. Expected (README guarantee): deposit succeeds, later `harvest()` and `claimRewards()` work. Actual: deposit reverts with empty data at `_settle()` line 366 (EvmError: Revert); `harvest()`, `poke()`, `claimRewards()`, `transfer()` all revert the same way. With shares already outstanding and 10e18 SQK already transferred into the vault before the upgrade, `claimRewards()` can never pay it out and `transfer` can never move the shares. Live check: `cast call 0x4b67b739dFd832f4EAC67a7Aa3bc244fB74cea4F 'claim(address)' <acct>` returns 0x00..00 (32 bytes) today, so the vault depends on that ABI shape persisting through upgrades.","severity":"medium","snippet":"        try staking.claim(address(this)) returns (uint256) {}","title":"_settle() try/catch does not cover return-data decoding of staking.claim; a void-returning claim bricks every entry point and strands SQK"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"First principles. `claimRewards(address to)` rejects only `to == address(0)`. If `to == address(this)` the `safeTransfer` is a no-op on the vault's balance while `accountedBalance -= amount` still runs, so the next `_settle()` sees `balance > accounted` and re-distributes the claimant's SQK to ALL holders pro rata. Likewise `transfer(address(this), x)` / `transferFrom(.., address(this), x)` are accepted by `_update`; the vault then `_sync`s itself as a holder, and every settle thereafter credits `unclaimedRewards[address(this)]` which nobody can ever claim (there is no function that calls `_claim(address(this), ..)`), so that slice of every future round of SQK is permanently dead while still counted in `accountedBalance`. Both are self-inflicted but silent (no revert, no event anomaly), and the second one permanently reduces the claimable fraction for everyone who later receives those shares' stream, i.e. the shares are destroyed in effect while `totalSupply()` still counts them, lowering `powerPerShare()` and misreporting NAV. Fix: revert in `claimRewards(address)` when `to == address(this)`, and in `_update` when `to == address(this)` (shares are internal bookkeeping; the vault never needs to hold its own shares).","line":191,"path":"src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol","reproduction":"Mocks: alice deposits #1, bob deposits #5 (1000e18 shares each). staking.fund(vault, 100e18). alice calls `vault.claimRewards(address(vault))` -> returns 50e18, accountedBalance drops to 50e18 while the vault's SQK balance stays 100e18. `vault.harvest()` -> pendingRewards(bob) = 75e18, pendingRewards(alice) = 25e18. Expected: alice receives 50e18 (or the call reverts); actual: alice's 50e18 is split 25/25 between alice and bob. Then bob calls `vault.transfer(address(vault), 1000e18)`; staking.fund(vault, 100e18); `vault.harvest()` -> balanceOf(vault)=1000e18, pendingRewards(address(vault)) = 50e18 with no path to claim it; the SQK stays in the vault forever and `accountedBalance` keeps counting it.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (to == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();","title":"Vault accepts its own address as reward recipient and share recipient; SQK is silently redistributed or stranded"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Periphery / first principles. The vault blocks unsolicited `safeTransferFrom` via `onERC721Received`, but ERC-721 `transferFrom` has no hook, so any holder (or a marketplace settlement, or a mistaken wallet UI) can move a Squeek into the vault directly. Such a token is owned by the vault but `isHeld[id]` is false and it is not staked, so it earns no power; `deposit([id])` by the former owner reverts because `nft.transferFrom(msg.sender, vault, id)` fails (sender is no longer the owner); `mergeStep(id, x)` reverts with `NotHeld(id)`. Under the permanent-reserve model there is deliberately no NFT withdrawal, and there is also no stake-only recovery, so the token is lost to everyone including the reserve. A `stakeStranded(uint256[] ids)` (permissionless or strategist-only) that stakes tokens the vault already owns under its own account without minting shares would keep the no-withdrawal guarantee and let the reserve benefit. Also worth documenting that the vault does not credit shares for tokens that arrive this way.","line":318,"path":"src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol","reproduction":"Mocks: alice owns Squeek #1 and calls `nft.transferFrom(alice, address(vault), 1)` (plain, no `safe`). Result: `nft.ownerOf(1) == vault`, `vault.isHeld(1) == false`, `vault.totalPower() == 0`. alice calls `vault.deposit([1])` -> reverts (ERC721IncorrectOwner). owner calls `vault.mergeStep(1, 2)` -> reverts `NotHeld(1)`. Expected: a path for the token to join the reserve (or the push to be rejected). Actual: token is irrecoverably stuck and mines nothing. On Sepolia the live Squeek NFT exposes standard `transferFrom`, so the path is reachable today.","severity":"low","snippet":"    ///         Unsolicited `safeTransferFrom` to the vault reverts: use `deposit`.","title":"Squeek NFTs pushed to the vault with plain transferFrom are permanently stranded: not held, not stakeable, not depositable"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Execution trace across transactions. Shares are priced at NAV measured at deposit time, while `mergeStep` strictly increases power without changing supply. `mergeStep` is a public-mempool transaction by a known strategist and its effect (+200e18 for an L1 pair, more for higher levels) is predictable from `isHeld` and `level()`. Any depositor can front-run it: deposit at the pre-merge NAV and immediately own `d/(P+d)` of the gain that was created from NFTs the existing holders contributed. There is no entry fee, no NAV smoothing and no commit/reveal, so the transfer is free. Impact is a permanent re-allocation of a slice of the mining power (and hence of every future SQK round) from earlier depositors to the front-runner; it is bounded by the merge gain and is design-adjacent, but it is an unprivileged, repeatable extraction and the strategist cannot prevent it except by using a private relay. Mitigations that keep the design: have the strategist submit `mergeStep` via a private mempool; or add an optional owner-settable short deposit cooldown/entry smoothing; at minimum document it.","line":174,"path":"src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol","reproduction":"Mocks: alice deposits #1,#2 (power 2000e18, shares 2000e18). Strategist broadcasts `mergeStep(1,2)`. bob front-runs with `deposit([5])` (one L1): gets 1000e18 shares at NAV 1.0. mergeStep executes: power 3200e18, supply 3000e18. bob's shares now back 1066.67e18 power for 1000e18 contributed; alice's back 2133.33e18 for 2000e18 contributed plus the full 200e18 gain she would otherwise have received. Expected (if existing holders own the gain): alice 2200e18 / bob 1000e18. Actual: 66.67e18 of power moved from alice to bob with no cost to bob.","severity":"low","snippet":"        shares = (supply == 0 || powerBefore == 0) ? deltaPower : (deltaPower * supply) / powerBefore;","title":"A deposit mined just before mergeStep captures a pro-rata slice of the merge gain from existing holders"}],"hash":"a014aa92388035bc2865cf9e4d23fe4e87306a95b1d2a3b0a67d9a2499faddc3","nodeId":"881b8bff-f731-4029-8af2-4e904a0e8206","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. The findings file is written and validated, and the working tree is unchanged apart from the allowed findings file and my scratch tests.\n\n**Outcome.** Build passes, all 46 offline tests and 11 live Sepolia fork tests pass. The core control flow is sound: settle-before-balance-change holds on every path, the merge is atomic on the real NFT (cooldown and level-mismatch reverts leave both tokens staked), the strict power guard works, and the receiver hook only accepts the NFT during the vault's own unstake. I found no critical or high defect. Four findings are recorded, one medium and three low.\n\n**Findings in `.imd-findings.json`:**\n\n1. **Medium: `_settle` decode failure escapes the catch.** The `try staking.claim(...) returns (uint256)` at `src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:366` only catches a reverting claim. If the upgradeable staking proxy ever returns no data from `claim`, the decode reverts outside the catch and every entry point dies: deposit, transfer, claimRewards, harvest, mergeStep. SQK already in the vault becomes unreachable. This contradicts the README's promise that a broken claim never blocks claims of received SQK. The live `claim` returns a 32-byte word today, so this is conditional on an upstream change. A self-contained proof test is attached. It fails on the current code and I confirmed it passes with a one-line fix in a throwaway copy.\n2. **Low: the vault accepts its own address as recipient.** Claiming to the vault silently redistributes the claimant's SQK to everyone. Transferring shares to the vault strands their reward stream forever while supply still counts them.\n3. **Low: NFTs pushed in with plain `transferFrom` are stranded.** Not held, not stakeable, not re-depositable, and no stake-only recovery exists under the permanent-reserve model.\n4. **Low: merge front-running.** A deposit mined just before `mergeStep` captures a pro-rata slice of the merge gain from existing holders. Design-adjacent, but unprivileged and free.\n\n**Coverage.** All 13 entry points have a row, plus four invariant rows. Live probes beyond the shipped tests: 20 NFTs stake under one account with no slot cap hit, reversed merge order keeps the first argument as survivor, and an L2 pair merged immediately reverts on the NFT's cooldown. Static analysis leads were checked: the aderyn ERC-721 interface and the slither strict-equality and unused-return lines are false positives here.\n\n**Not reached.** Reward-accrual behavior of the live staking contract under non-zero emission could not be observed because testnet emission currently pays 0, so any auto-claim-on-deposit or round-eligibility semantics of `withdraw`/`deposit` remain unverified.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1452161,"inputTokens":450,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":41666,"runtime":"claude","turns":35,"wallClockMs":782561}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"35f280d408fd5af95c5e9e8b514cd46ac14e4efb83df856f0385d976bda027b7","device":"0e78515c4d95885a","findings":[],"hash":"be0f4dbf56806570a2d86d9477726970400a23e0faa1d99c2389b7244deaa85c","nodeId":"58981c93-d93f-479e-b438-87bcfaddcc35","outcome":"completed","summary":"The Hamster Mining Reserve vault is built, tested against the live Squeekchain v9 graph on a Sepolia fork, documented, and committed on `main` (commit `58de6f1`).\n\n**What was delivered**\n\n- `src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol`: one deployable contract. Internal hmSQUEEK share ledger on the ERC-20 interface, Ownable2Step, ReentrancyGuard, IERC721Receiver. Deposit prices shares by the measured accountPower delta (first deposit equals delta, later deposits at NAV). The strategist's `mergeStep` withdraws the pair, merges, restakes the survivor and reverts unless power strictly increases. `harvest`/`poke` are permissionless and wrap checkpoint and claim in try/catch so a paused emission engine never blocks the vault. Every deposit, transfer and claim settles first, so no late entrant can take earlier rewards. There is no NFT withdrawal or sweep surface for anyone.\n- Constructor takes the owner plus the five graph addresses, makes no external calls, and is verified to deploy on an empty chain. The strategist defaults to the owner and is owner-settable with an event.\n- `script/Deploy.s.sol` with Sepolia constants and a `deploy(Config)` function that tests call directly. No environment variables anywhere.\n- `lib/` holds forge-std 1.9.7 and OpenZeppelin 5.1.0 as plain committed files. `foundry.toml` pins solc 0.8.26, `bytecode_hash = \"none\"`, no ffi, no fs permissions.\n- README covers mechanics, roles and trust assumptions, chosen constants, deployment parameters, and an \"After launch\" checklist.\n\n**Verification**\n\n| Suite | Result |\n| --- | --- |\n| Offline mock tests (success, failure, reentrancy, two fuzz tests with the verifier's seed) | 44 passed |\n| Deploy script tests | 2 passed |\n| Sepolia fork tests against the real graph | 11 passed |\n| `forge fmt --check` | clean |\n\nOn the fork the brief's facts all held: MAXIMUM_LEVEL is 10, emission version 9, core version 3, staking genesis/mining/token match, staking one L1 adds exactly 1000e18, merging two staked L1s nets +200e18 and drops the held count by one, and the claim path returns 0 cleanly. The fork suite is confirmed to report its on-chain tests as skipped, not failed, when no RPC is reachable, which is how the offline verifier will see it.\n\n**Left out, and why**\n\n- No website. The brief marked it optional; the README states what a future static site must read and must not fabricate.\n- My mock power curve above level 2 is a geometric extrapolation of the observed 2.2x ratio. The vault itself never uses a curve; it only measures deltas, so this affects mock tests only.\n- The fork tests depend on holder `0x5989…Ff54` still owning level-1 tokens 1 to 10 at the pinned block. If a pruned node forces the latest block and that holder has merged them, the test names the fix.\n- Tests passing are not an audit. An independent adversarial review is still required before real deposits.","treeHash":"ced7ba9e740f7855158a69b27189c8c65d3ee786","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1610028,"inputTokens":674,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":62655,"runtime":"claude","turns":46,"wallClockMs":811423}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"41914f8816b729c4ef431d30644e1c7535775586bc4c533c76fc8ce3b487113a","device":"42e24fc69d14a4d2","findings":[],"hash":"cf88db376dbad21a514933b1e90cd5e1b848f29f23bea0d5b7d0483f4721d1d8","nodeId":"588a5505-6959-4d55-a3f5-a2aaf6d32f74","outcome":"completed","summary":"The manifest is complete and verified. Only launch.json changed.\n\n**What I checked**\n\n- The accepted revision kept the constructor signature unchanged. It takes owner, Genesis NFT, staking, emission engine, SqueekCore and the SQK reward asset, in that order, and makes no external calls, so it deploys on an empty chain.\n- The five Sepolia addresses in the manifest match the repository's `SepoliaAddresses` constants and the brief.\n- The owner argument is `$owner`. The revised ownership hook now makes that owner the initial strategist, so the previous note stayed true.\n- The file has exactly the three schema keys, one contract entry with six string arguments, and notes under the 4000 character limit.\n\n**What I changed**\n\n- Updated the notes only, to describe the revised ownership behavior: two-step transfer, renounce disabled, and the strategist role following a completed handover unless a separate strategist was appointed.\n\n**Verification**\n\n```\nforge build: ok\nforge test (FOUNDRY_FUZZ_SEED=0x6495…89f3): 70 passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped\n  including 13 Sepolia fork tests\n```\n\nThe working tree shows launch.json as the only modified file. No configuration, source or library file was touched.","treeHash":"0d843f7b48f9aa714dd0bfa1405e113b1371d850","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":145186,"inputTokens":130,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":3630,"runtime":"claude","turns":10,"wallClockMs":98699}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"8c14d67840c796174f119521dcf71f2228d5f7077c65502d12d7f17c096f7d4b","device":"7d2db8d9021f8063","findings":[],"hash":"d04d76e1aab33c7e09f5640faece1cb1da555270612c8943e5c984b9cac78140","nodeId":"588a5505-6959-4d55-a3f5-a2aaf6d32f74","outcome":"completed","summary":"Created [launch.json](/home/imd3/.identitymd/work/88c9683a-ede9-4813-bc89-fa1fb178d983/588a5505-6959-4d55-a3f5-a2aaf6d32f74/launch.json) with `$owner` and the five GRAPH C addresses matching the accepted constructor.\n\n`forge build` succeeded. All 57 tests passed, including 11 Sepolia fork tests, using the required fuzz seed.\n\nOnly `launch.json` changed.","treeHash":"ff9fa9267de225ec609addf1619f123df99cc7b5","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":167436,"inputTokens":38325,"model":"gpt-6.1-sol","outputTokens":2300,"runtime":"codex","turns":2,"wallClockMs":33174}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":4653,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 60 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 4.52s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":12364,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 2 tests for test/Deploy.t.sol:DeployTest\n[PASS] test_deploy_runtimeFitsEip170() (gas: 5491650)\n[PASS] test_deploy_sepoliaConfigWiresOwnerAndGraph() (gas: 5563456)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 865.76µs (930.15µs CPU time)\n\nRan 44 tests for test/HamsterMiningReserve.t.sol:HamsterMiningReserveTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_rewardConservation(uint96,uint96,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 1580746, ~: 1587457)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 18482267383932818711228\n  Bound result 1419689\n  Bound result 4579\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_sharesTrackPowerFraction(uint8,uint8) (runs: 256, μ: 1409670, ~: 1414727)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 4\n\n[PASS] test_constructor_makesNoExternalCalls() (gas: 14075)\n[PASS] test_constructor_revertsOnZeroAddresses() (gas: 15020)\n[PASS] test_constructor_setsWiringAndStrategistDefaultsToOwner() (gas: 110178)\n[PASS] test_deposit_batchStakesAll() (gas: 415860)\n[PASS] test_deposit_emitsEvent() (gas: 333525)\n[PASS] test_deposit_firstDepositMintsSharesEqualToPower() (gas: 418295)\n[PASS] test_deposit_higherLevelNftGetsProportionallyMoreShares() (gas: 606163)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsOnDuplicateIds() (gas: 180093)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsOnEmptyBatch() (gas: 37806)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsOnOversizedBatch() (gas: 49489)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsWhenCallerDoesNotOwnToken() (gas: 135402)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsWhenStakeAddsNoPower() (gas: 348930)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsWithoutApproval() (gas: 130313)\n[PASS] test_deposit_secondDepositorPricedAtNav() (gas: 923867)\n[PASS] test_graphHealth_readsGraphConstants() (gas: 51507)\n[PASS] test_harvest_atZeroIsCleanAndClaimReturnsZero() (gas: 633592)\n[PASS] test_harvest_checkpointsEmission() (gas: 94940)\n[PASS] test_harvest_neverRevertsWhenEmissionOrClaimRevert() (gas: 783232)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_chainsToHigherLevels() (gas: 1204859)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_netsPlus200AndFreesOneSlot() (gas: 686513)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_ownerMayMerge() (gas: 579214)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_revertsForNonStrategist() (gas: 428753)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_revertsOnLevelMismatch() (gas: 788093)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_revertsOnSameToken() (gas: 362261)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_revertsUnlessPowerStrictlyIncreases() (gas: 666617)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_revertsWhenNftCooldownBlocks() (gas: 1423577)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_revertsWhenTokenNotHeld() (gas: 399786)\n[PASS] test_noNftWithdrawalSurfaceExists() (gas: 397909)\n[PASS] test_onERC721Received_rejectsForeignCollection() (gas: 11684)\n[PASS] test_ownershipIsTwoStep() (gas: 150192)\n[PASS] test_reentrancy_transferDuringSettleIsBlocked() (gas: 719940)\n[PASS] test_rewards_claimToRecipient() (gas: 670340)\n[PASS] test_rewards_directDonationIsSharedAtNextSettle() (gas: 598989)\n[PASS] test_rewards_exitByTransferMovesFutureStream() (gas: 583977)\n[PASS] test_rewards_lateDepositorCannotSnipeUnsettledRewards() (gas: 983489)\n[PASS] test_rewards_mergeDoesNotDisturbAccounting() (gas: 984268)\n[PASS] test_rewards_noSharesNoIndexBump() (gas: 664671)\n[PASS] test_rewards_proRataByShares() (gas: 1298937)\n[PASS] test_rewards_transferFromSettlesToo() (gas: 771348)\n[PASS] test_rewards_transferSettlesBothSides() (gas: 1077890)\n[PASS] test_setStrategist_onlyOwnerAndEmits() (gas: 708614)\n[PASS] test_unsolicitedSafeTransferIsRejected() (gas: 79744)\nSuite result: ok. 44 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 136.43ms (220.17ms CPU time)\n\nRan 11 tests for test/ReserveDependencies.t.sol:ReserveDependenciesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_unknownHigherLevelCurveIsMeasuredAtNav(uint8,uint96,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 1507216, ~: 1511732)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 99999999000000000000252610\n  Bound result 1749\n\n[PASS] test_allGuardedEntrypointsRejectCallbacksFromDepositWithdrawAndClaim() (gas: 20852545)\n[PASS] test_allGuardedEntrypointsRejectRewardPayoutCallbacks() (gas: 6574947)\n[PASS] test_depositSettlesExactlyOnceBeforeMinting() (gas: 1224208)\n[PASS] test_equalPowerMergeIsRejectedNotJustDecreasingPower() (gas: 1109139)\n[PASS] test_failedRestakeRestoresBurnedDonorAndSurvivorLevel() (gas: 1368086)\n[PASS] test_failedStakingDepositRestoresCustodyRewardsAndApprovalThenCanRetry() (gas: 1271617)\n[PASS] test_failedWithdrawRestoresPreMergeSettlement() (gas: 1172335)\n[PASS] test_falseReturningRewardTransferRestoresDebtAndCanBeRetried() (gas: 3297312)\n[PASS] test_positivePowerButZeroRoundedSharesRevertsWithoutTakingNft() (gas: 1360603)\n[PASS] test_revertingRewardTransferRestoresDebtAndCanBeRetried() (gas: 3296973)\nSuite result: ok. 11 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 136.49ms (156.28ms CPU time)\n\nRan 20 tests for test/ReserveEdges.t.sol:ReserveEdgesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_rewardSplitUsesSharesAfterMergeAndLaterDeposit(uint96,uint16) (runs: 1000, μ: 1702877, ~: 1716719)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 98\n  Bound result 1\n\n[PASS] test_burnedDonorCannotBeMergedAgain() (gas: 939935)\n[PASS] test_checkpointFailureStillAllowsClaimOfAlreadyAccruedRewards() (gas: 788772)\n[PASS] test_claimFailureDoesNotLoseEntitlementWhenBalancesAreUnchanged() (gas: 1023035)\n[PASS] test_cooldownJustBeforeAndAtBoundary() (gas: 1625159)\n[PASS] test_depositAlreadyStakedTokenCannotMintAgain() (gas: 597067)\n[PASS] test_duplicateAtEndOfMaximumBatchRollsBackTransfersAndSettlement() (gas: 6707969)\n[PASS] test_failedTransferRollsBackRewardSettlement() (gas: 864509)\n[PASS] test_finiteAndInfiniteAllowanceRespectFullExitAndRewardOwnership() (gas: 1392397)\n[PASS] test_harvestAndClaimsAreIdempotentWithoutNewRewards() (gas: 1298347)\n[PASS] test_maximumBatchSucceedsAndEveryNftIsInCustody() (gas: 7694198)\n[PASS] test_maximumLevelMergeRevertsAtomically() (gas: 882408)\n[PASS] test_partialBatchWithForeignLastTokenRollsBack() (gas: 632684)\n[PASS] test_pendingOwnerHasNoAuthorityAndPreviousOwnerLosesItOnAcceptance() (gas: 983797)\n[PASS] test_previewIsReadOnlyAndIncludesUnharvestedAndDonatedRewards() (gas: 1386055)\n[PASS] test_receiverWindowClosesAfterSuccessfulAndFailedMerge() (gas: 1670890)\n[PASS] test_singleTokenApprovalSuffices() (gas: 514635)\n[PASS] test_transferToZeroAndInsufficientAllowanceCannotBurnOrMoveShares() (gas: 555328)\n[PASS] test_unexposedWithdrawalAndSweepSelectorsCannotReleaseReserve() (gas: 754966)\n[PASS] test_zeroAndSelfTransfersSettleWithoutChangingSupply() (gas: 1138380)\nSuite result: ok. 20 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 138.61ms (143.77ms CPU time)\n\nRan 18 tests for test/fork/SepoliaFork.t.sol:SepoliaForkTest\n[PASS] test_fork_claimPlumbingAtZero() (gas: 299910)\n[PASS] test_fork_depositMergeClaimCycle() (gas: 1671779)\n[PASS] test_fork_depositRevertsForNonOwner() (gas: 242437)\n[PASS] test_fork_duplicateBatchRestoresRealNftOwnership() (gas: 359160)\n[PASS] test_fork_freshlyMergedPairRejectsImmediateMergeAtomically() (gas: 1685146)\n[PASS] test_fork_graphConstantsMatchBrief() (gas: 112788)\n[PASS] test_fork_holdersAndOwnerCannotWithdrawVaultStake() (gas: 706020)\n[PASS] test_fork_mergeStepRevertsForNonStrategist() (gas: 602501)\n[PASS] test_fork_mergeStepRevertsOnLevelMismatchAgainstRealNft() (gas: 982671)\n[PASS] test_fork_mergeTwoL1NetsPlus200e18AndFreesOneNft() (gas: 991978)\n[PASS] test_fork_missingApprovalRevertsAndOwnerCanRetry() (gas: 814313)\n[PASS] test_fork_pinnedRpcReadsAgreeWithEvm() (gas: 71108)\n[PASS] test_fork_sameTokenRejectedBeforeWithdraw() (gas: 597964)\n[PASS] test_fork_secondDepositorPaysNavAfterRealMerge() (gas: 1500740)\n[PASS] test_fork_selectorsMatchBrief() (gas: 6310)\n[PASS] test_fork_stakingOneL1AddsExactly1000e18() (gas: 576719)\n[PASS] test_fork_unsolicitedSafeTransferRejected() (gas: 122865)\n[PASS] test_fork_vaultGraphHealthView() (gas: 122005)\nSuite result: ok. 18 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.08s (8.30s CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/invariant/ReserveInvariant.t.sol:ReserveInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nReserveInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_allRewardCashIsConservedAndLiabilitiesAreCovered\n[PASS] invariant_reserveCountAndCustodyMatchEveryNft\n[PASS] invariant_sharesAreConservedAndBackedByDepositedPower\n ReserveInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭----------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract       | Selector          | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=================================================================+\n| ReserveHandler | accrue            | 1673  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReserveHandler | claim             | 1628  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReserveHandler | deposit           | 1609  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReserveHandler | failedMerge       | 1622  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReserveHandler | harvest           | 1670  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReserveHandler | merge             | 1626  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReserveHandler | outage            | 1644  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReserveHandler | tinyAccrual       | 1657  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReserveHandler | transferShares    | 1605  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReserveHandler | unauthorizedMerge | 1650  | 0       | 0        |\n╰----------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 17000000000000000000\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 85875438872985777924268\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 25000000000000000000\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 4965\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 879742465623697246948127\n  Bound result 1184\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 3\n\n[PASS] test_handlerExercisesEveryActionAndBothOutageStates() (gas: 4224813)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 17000000000000000000\n  Bound result 3000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1\n\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 12.19s (12.19s CPU time)\n\nRan 6 test suites in 12.21s (13.69s CPU time): 97 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (97 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":77,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"HamsterMiningReserve.acceptOwnership()\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.approve(address,uint256)\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.claimRewards()\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.claimRewards(address)\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.deposit(uint256[])\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.harvest()\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.mergeStep(uint256,uint256)\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.poke()\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.renounceOwnership()\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.setStrategist(address)\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.transferOwnership(address)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"README.md\":190,\"foundry.toml\":27,\"remappings.txt\":2,\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":44,\"script/SepoliaAddresses.sol\":24,\"src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol\":401,\"src/interfaces/ISqueekchain.sol\":57,\"test/Deploy.t.sol\":33,\"test/HamsterMiningReserve.t.sol\":685,\"test/ReserveDependencies.t.sol\":251,\"test/ReserveEdges.t.sol\":349,\"test/TESTING.md\":106,\"test/fork/SepoliaFork.t.sol\":431,\"test/helpers/ReserveFixture.sol\":64,\"test/invariant/ReserveHandler.sol\":240,\"test/invariant/ReserveInvariant.t.sol\":139,\"test/mocks/AdversarialGraph.sol\":141,\"test/mocks/MockSqueekchain.sol\":198},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"33ddeea0e7b4d8a6c1ca8b0103cdf386935ebd17c431e4c670dacf77f8af18e9","verifiedTreeHash":"787eeea26e4a63f342bcb47f2a590602a50c8abc","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+a6eb4461"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":2650,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 54 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 2.54s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":216,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 2 tests for test/Deploy.t.sol:DeployTest\n[PASS] test_deploy_runtimeFitsEip170() (gas: 6166991)\n[PASS] test_deploy_sepoliaConfigWiresOwnerAndGraph() (gas: 6238862)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.04ms (1.09ms CPU time)\n\nRan 13 tests for test/fork/SepoliaFork.t.sol:SepoliaForkTest\n[SKIP] test_fork_claimPlumbingAtZero() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_depositMergeClaimCycle() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_depositRevertsForNonOwner() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_graphConstantsMatchBrief() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_mergeStepRevertsForNonStrategist() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_mergeStepRevertsOnLevelMismatchAgainstRealNft() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_mergeTwoL1NetsPlus200e18AndFreesOneNft() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_plainPushedSqueekCanBeStakedForTheReserve() (gas: 0)\n[PASS] test_fork_selectorsMatchBrief() (gas: 6266)\n[SKIP] test_fork_stakingOneL1AddsExactly1000e18() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_unsolicitedSafeTransferRejected() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_vaultGraphHealthView() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_vaultRejectsItselfAsRecipient() (gas: 0)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 12 skipped; finished in 12.69ms (714.93µs CPU time)\n\nRan 55 tests for test/HamsterMiningReserve.t.sol:HamsterMiningReserveTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_rewardConservation(uint96,uint96,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 1583538, ~: 1590561)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 833163407\n  Bound result 11723\n  Bound result 6409\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_sharesTrackPowerFraction(uint8,uint8) (runs: 256, μ: 1407027, ~: 1388936)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 1\n\n[PASS] test_constructor_makesNoExternalCalls() (gas: 14075)\n[PASS] test_constructor_revertsOnZeroAddresses() (gas: 15106)\n[PASS] test_constructor_setsWiringAndStrategistDefaultsToOwner() (gas: 110265)\n[PASS] test_deposit_batchStakesAll() (gas: 416226)\n[PASS] test_deposit_emitsEvent() (gas: 333935)\n[PASS] test_deposit_firstDepositMintsSharesEqualToPower() (gas: 418682)\n[PASS] test_deposit_higherLevelNftGetsProportionallyMoreShares() (gas: 606962)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsOnDuplicateIds() (gas: 180558)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsOnEmptyBatch() (gas: 37783)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsOnOversizedBatch() (gas: 49356)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsWhenCallerDoesNotOwnToken() (gas: 135800)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsWhenPowerWasZeroedUpstreamWhileSharesExist() (gas: 508581)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsWhenStakeAddsNoPower() (gas: 349306)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsWithoutApproval() (gas: 130711)\n[PASS] test_deposit_secondDepositorPricedAtNav() (gas: 925191)\n[PASS] test_graphHealth_readsGraphConstants() (gas: 51507)\n[PASS] test_harvest_atZeroIsCleanAndClaimReturnsZero() (gas: 635158)\n[PASS] test_harvest_checkpointsEmission() (gas: 95331)\n[PASS] test_harvest_neverRevertsWhenEmissionOrClaimRevert() (gas: 797780)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_chainsToHigherLevels() (gas: 1206564)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_netsPlus200AndFreesOneSlot() (gas: 687074)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_ownerMayMerge() (gas: 579908)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_revertsForNonStrategist() (gas: 429233)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_revertsOnLevelMismatch() (gas: 789164)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_revertsOnSameToken() (gas: 362649)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_revertsUnlessPowerStrictlyIncreases() (gas: 667419)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_revertsWhenNftCooldownBlocks() (gas: 1425650)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_revertsWhenTokenNotHeld() (gas: 400218)\n[PASS] test_noNftWithdrawalSurfaceExists() (gas: 398252)\n[PASS] test_onERC721Received_rejectsForeignCollection() (gas: 11695)\n[PASS] test_ownershipIsTwoStep() (gas: 152626)\n[PASS] test_ownershipTransfer_keepsExplicitStrategist() (gas: 700583)\n[PASS] test_ownershipTransfer_movesDefaultStrategistWithOwner() (gas: 829240)\n[PASS] test_reentrancy_transferDuringSettleIsBlocked() (gas: 720749)\n[PASS] test_renounceOwnershipIsDisabled() (gas: 38974)\n[PASS] test_rewards_claimToRecipient() (gas: 670985)\n[PASS] test_rewards_directDonationIsSharedAtNextSettle() (gas: 599551)\n[PASS] test_rewards_exitByTransferMovesFutureStream() (gas: 584544)\n[PASS] test_rewards_lateDepositorCannotSnipeUnsettledRewards() (gas: 983862)\n[PASS] test_rewards_mergeDoesNotDisturbAccounting() (gas: 985144)\n[PASS] test_rewards_noSharesNoIndexBump() (gas: 665537)\n[PASS] test_rewards_proRataByShares() (gas: 1300822)\n[PASS] test_rewards_transferFromSettlesToo() (gas: 771984)\n[PASS] test_rewards_transferSettlesBothSides() (gas: 1078962)\n[PASS] test_rewards_vaultCannotBeShareOrRewardRecipient() (gas: 844213)\n[PASS] test_setStrategist_onlyOwnerAndEmits() (gas: 709429)\n[PASS] test_settle_claimOutageWithClaimableSqkFreezesDepositsAndTransfers() (gas: 1516981)\n[PASS] test_settle_claimOutageWithNothingClaimableDoesNotFreeze() (gas: 666013)\n[PASS] test_settle_mergeStepStillWorksDuringClaimOutage() (gas: 785060)\n[PASS] test_settle_voidReturningClaimDoesNotBlockVault() (gas: 888844)\n[PASS] test_stakeStranded_putsPlainPushedNftToWorkWithoutShares() (gas: 951788)\n[PASS] test_stakeStranded_rejectsHeldOrForeignTokens() (gas: 711497)\n[PASS] test_unsolicitedSafeTransferIsRejected() (gas: 79874)\nSuite result: ok. 55 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 56.53ms (139.48ms CPU time)\n\nRan 3 test suites in 57.58ms (70.26ms CPU time): 58 tests passed, 0 failed, 12 skipped (70 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":67,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"HamsterMiningReserve.acceptOwnership()\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.approve(address,uint256)\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.claimRewards()\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.claimRewards(address)\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.deposit(uint256[])\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.harvest()\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.mergeStep(uint256,uint256)\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.poke()\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.setStrategist(address)\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.stakeStranded(uint256[])\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.transferOwnership(address)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"README.md\":243,\"foundry.toml\":27,\"remappings.txt\":2,\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":44,\"script/SepoliaAddresses.sol\":24,\"src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol\":475,\"src/interfaces/ISqueekchain.sol\":58,\"test/Deploy.t.sol\":33,\"test/HamsterMiningReserve.t.sol\":909,\"test/fork/SepoliaFork.t.sol\":319,\"test/mocks/MockSqueekchain.sol\":217},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":1225,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[medium/medium] reentrancy-no-eth at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:456: Reentrancy in HamsterMiningReserve._claim(address,address) (src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol#456-466):\n[medium/medium] reentrancy-no-eth at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:249: Reentrancy in HamsterMiningReserve.mergeStep(uint256,uint256) (src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol#249-282):\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:161: HamsterMiningReserve.deposit(uint256[]) (src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol#161-194) has external calls inside a loop: nft.transferFrom(msg.sender,address(this),id) (src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol#175)\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:212: HamsterMiningReserve.stakeStranded(uint256[]) (src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol#212-229) has external calls inside a loop: isHeld[id] || nft.ownerOf(id) != address(this) (src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol#220)\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:161: Reentrancy in HamsterMiningReserve.deposit(uint256[]) (src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol#161-194):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:249: Reentrancy in HamsterMiningReserve.mergeStep(uint256,uint256) (src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol#249-282):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:161: Reentrancy in HamsterMiningReserve.deposit(uint256[]) (src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol#161-194):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:249: Reentrancy in HamsterMiningReserve.mergeStep(uint256,uint256) (src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol#249-282):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:456: Reentrancy in HamsterMiningReserve._claim(address,address) (src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol#456-466):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:421: Reentrancy in HamsterMiningReserve._settle() (src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol#421-446):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:249: Reentrancy in HamsterMiningReserve.mergeStep(uint256,uint256) (src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol#249-282):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:421: Reentrancy in HamsterMiningReserve._settle() (src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol#421-446):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:421: Reentrancy in HamsterMiningReserve._settle() (src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol#421-446):","passed":true},{"durationMs":345,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[high] incorrect-erc721-interface at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:392: Incorrect ERC721 interface\n[high] reentrancy-state-change at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:168: Reentrancy: State change after external call (11 places)\n[low] centralization-risk at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:32: Centralization Risk (3 places)\n[low] costly-loop at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:172: Costly operations inside loop (2 places)\n[low] modifier-used-only-once at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:147: Modifier Invoked Only Once\n[low] require-revert-in-loop at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:218: Loop Contains `require`/`revert`\n[low] state-no-address-check at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:308: Address State Variable Set Without Checks\n[low] unchecked-return at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:236: Unchecked Return (4 places)\n[low] uninitialized-local-variable at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:172: Uninitialized Local Variable (2 places)\n[low] unsafe-erc20-operation at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:388: Unsafe ERC20 Operation\n[low] unsafe-oz-erc721-mint at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:190: Unsafe `ERC721::_mint()`","passed":true},{"durationMs":2134,"exitCode":0,"name":"proof 4a24efffe5ec","output":"Compiling 49 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 1.37s\nCompiler run successful!\n\nRan 2 tests for test/imd-proof-3f1fa7a0/Proof_4a24efffe5ec.t.sol:DelayedRewardsProofTest\n[PASS] test_depositDuringClaimOutageCannotTakeEarlierRewards() (gas: 448628)\n[PASS] test_transferDuringClaimOutageCannotMoveEarlierRewards() (gas: 464487)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.77ms (965.71µs CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test suite in 4.43ms (1.77ms CPU time): 2 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (2 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":1782,"exitCode":0,"name":"proof 3587babe55b7","output":"2026-11-01T03:39:17.027463Z ERROR foundry_compilers_artifacts_solc::sources: error=\"/tmp/imd-verify-MyeC0U/repo/test/imd-proof-3f1fa7a0/Proof_4a24efffe5ec.t.sol\": No such file or directory (os error 2)\nCompiling 1 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 1.13s\nCompiler run successful!\n\nRan 1 test for test/imd-proof-04b961d0/Proof_3587babe55b7.t.sol:VoidClaimBricksSettleTest\n[PASS] test_voidClaimDoesNotBlockVault() (gas: 734062)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.59ms (422.47µs CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test suite in 4.81ms (1.59ms CPU time): 1 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (1 total tests)\n","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"473f0a1c405aab84331a9cabefe24a8d23d4ff2acf5411f13ecf64d0c9f2d0cf","verifiedTreeHash":"5ebdf3b22c1556c0f384ae480a583581ce5e43ed","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+a6eb4461"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":5369,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 61 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 5.24s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":12464,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 2 tests for test/Deploy.t.sol:DeployTest\n[PASS] test_deploy_runtimeFitsEip170() (gas: 6166991)\n[PASS] test_deploy_sepoliaConfigWiresOwnerAndGraph() (gas: 6238862)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 891.62µs (865.53µs CPU time)\n\nRan 11 tests for test/ReserveDependencies.t.sol:ReserveDependenciesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_unknownHigherLevelCurveIsMeasuredAtNav(uint8,uint96,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 1507758, ~: 1512063)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 8791557746091582575731\n  Bound result 3\n\n[PASS] test_allGuardedEntrypointsRejectCallbacksFromDepositWithdrawAndClaim() (gas: 20863439)\n[PASS] test_allGuardedEntrypointsRejectRewardPayoutCallbacks() (gas: 6577605)\n[PASS] test_depositSettlesExactlyOnceBeforeMinting() (gas: 1224509)\n[PASS] test_equalPowerMergeIsRejectedNotJustDecreasingPower() (gas: 1109596)\n[PASS] test_failedRestakeRestoresBurnedDonorAndSurvivorLevel() (gas: 1368740)\n[PASS] test_failedStakingDepositRestoresCustodyRewardsAndApprovalThenCanRetry() (gas: 1272057)\n[PASS] test_failedWithdrawRestoresPreMergeSettlement() (gas: 1172749)\n[PASS] test_falseReturningRewardTransferRestoresDebtAndCanBeRetried() (gas: 3298016)\n[PASS] test_positivePowerButZeroRoundedSharesRevertsWithoutTakingNft() (gas: 1361099)\n[PASS] test_revertingRewardTransferRestoresDebtAndCanBeRetried() (gas: 3297677)\nSuite result: ok. 11 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 160.57ms (180.55ms CPU time)\n\nRan 20 tests for test/ReserveEdges.t.sol:ReserveEdgesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_rewardSplitUsesSharesAfterMergeAndLaterDeposit(uint96,uint16) (runs: 1000, μ: 1704986, ~: 1718735)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 3757536415\n\n[PASS] test_burnedDonorCannotBeMergedAgain() (gas: 940552)\n[PASS] test_checkpointFailureStillAllowsClaimOfAlreadyAccruedRewards() (gas: 789402)\n[PASS] test_claimFailureDoesNotLoseEntitlementWhenBalancesAreUnchanged() (gas: 1034196)\n[PASS] test_cooldownJustBeforeAndAtBoundary() (gas: 1626911)\n[PASS] test_depositAlreadyStakedTokenCannotMintAgain() (gas: 597772)\n[PASS] test_duplicateAtEndOfMaximumBatchRollsBackTransfersAndSettlement() (gas: 6709756)\n[PASS] test_failedTransferRollsBackRewardSettlement() (gas: 865297)\n[PASS] test_finiteAndInfiniteAllowanceRespectFullExitAndRewardOwnership() (gas: 1394129)\n[PASS] test_harvestAndClaimsAreIdempotentWithoutNewRewards() (gas: 1301679)\n[PASS] test_maximumBatchSucceedsAndEveryNftIsInCustody() (gas: 7695577)\n[PASS] test_maximumLevelMergeRevertsAtomically() (gas: 883210)\n[PASS] test_partialBatchWithForeignLastTokenRollsBack() (gas: 633015)\n[PASS] test_pendingOwnerHasNoAuthorityAndPreviousOwnerLosesItOnAcceptance() (gas: 986936)\n[PASS] test_previewIsReadOnlyAndIncludesUnharvestedAndDonatedRewards() (gas: 1387094)\n[PASS] test_receiverWindowClosesAfterSuccessfulAndFailedMerge() (gas: 1672316)\n[PASS] test_singleTokenApprovalSuffices() (gas: 515045)\n[PASS] test_transferToZeroAndInsufficientAllowanceCannotBurnOrMoveShares() (gas: 555671)\n[PASS] test_unexposedWithdrawalAndSweepSelectorsCannotReleaseReserve() (gas: 755506)\n[PASS] test_zeroAndSelfTransfersSettleWithoutChangingSupply() (gas: 1139656)\nSuite result: ok. 20 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 178.14ms (199.88ms CPU time)\n\nRan 13 tests for test/ReserveSettlement.t.sol:ReserveSettlementTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_outageNeverHandsEarlierRewardsToLaterDepositor(uint96,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 1458351, ~: 1459954)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 26747144068449190701650\n  Bound result 16538213327143436548297809\n\n[PASS] test_cancelledHandoverLeavesDefaultStrategistWithOwner() (gas: 155666)\n[PASS] test_claimDownAndClaimableViewReturningNoDataFreezes() (gas: 570298)\n[PASS] test_claimDownAndClaimableViewRevertingFreezesEvenWithNothingOwed() (gas: 1103589)\n[PASS] test_claimThatRevertsOnlyWhenNothingIsOwedDoesNotFreeze() (gas: 1317917)\n[PASS] test_completedHandoverStripsOldOwnerOfMergeAndStrategistRights() (gas: 169989)\n[PASS] test_frozenLedgerRefusesZeroSelfAndDelegatedTransfersAndKeepsOldOwnerReward() (gas: 1407667)\n[PASS] test_frozenLedgerStillPaysAlreadyIndexedRewards() (gas: 1131223)\n[PASS] test_renounceByNonOwnerIsUnauthorizedAndOwnerKeepsControl() (gas: 38987)\n[PASS] test_stakeStrandedBeforeAnyDepositIsAGiftToTheFirstDepositorAndNavPricesLaterOnes() (gas: 1141307)\n[PASS] test_stakeStrandedDuplicateInBatchRollsBackWholeBatch() (gas: 721317)\n[PASS] test_stakeStrandedDuringFrozenOutageAddsPowerWithoutMovingRewards() (gas: 1218414)\n[PASS] test_stakeStrandedRejectsBurnedDonorAndStakedTokens() (gas: 846456)\nSuite result: ok. 13 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 178.12ms (166.70ms CPU time)\n\nRan 55 tests for test/HamsterMiningReserve.t.sol:HamsterMiningReserveTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_rewardConservation(uint96,uint96,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 1583538, ~: 1590561)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 833163407\n  Bound result 11723\n  Bound result 6409\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_sharesTrackPowerFraction(uint8,uint8) (runs: 256, μ: 1411448, ~: 1388796)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 6\n\n[PASS] test_constructor_makesNoExternalCalls() (gas: 14075)\n[PASS] test_constructor_revertsOnZeroAddresses() (gas: 15106)\n[PASS] test_constructor_setsWiringAndStrategistDefaultsToOwner() (gas: 110265)\n[PASS] test_deposit_batchStakesAll() (gas: 416226)\n[PASS] test_deposit_emitsEvent() (gas: 333935)\n[PASS] test_deposit_firstDepositMintsSharesEqualToPower() (gas: 418682)\n[PASS] test_deposit_higherLevelNftGetsProportionallyMoreShares() (gas: 606962)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsOnDuplicateIds() (gas: 180558)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsOnEmptyBatch() (gas: 37783)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsOnOversizedBatch() (gas: 49356)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsWhenCallerDoesNotOwnToken() (gas: 135800)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsWhenPowerWasZeroedUpstreamWhileSharesExist() (gas: 508581)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsWhenStakeAddsNoPower() (gas: 349306)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsWithoutApproval() (gas: 130711)\n[PASS] test_deposit_secondDepositorPricedAtNav() (gas: 925191)\n[PASS] test_graphHealth_readsGraphConstants() (gas: 51507)\n[PASS] test_harvest_atZeroIsCleanAndClaimReturnsZero() (gas: 635158)\n[PASS] test_harvest_checkpointsEmission() (gas: 95331)\n[PASS] test_harvest_neverRevertsWhenEmissionOrClaimRevert() (gas: 797780)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_chainsToHigherLevels() (gas: 1206564)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_netsPlus200AndFreesOneSlot() (gas: 687074)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_ownerMayMerge() (gas: 579908)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_revertsForNonStrategist() (gas: 429233)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_revertsOnLevelMismatch() (gas: 789164)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_revertsOnSameToken() (gas: 362649)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_revertsUnlessPowerStrictlyIncreases() (gas: 667419)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_revertsWhenNftCooldownBlocks() (gas: 1425650)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_revertsWhenTokenNotHeld() (gas: 400218)\n[PASS] test_noNftWithdrawalSurfaceExists() (gas: 398252)\n[PASS] test_onERC721Received_rejectsForeignCollection() (gas: 11695)\n[PASS] test_ownershipIsTwoStep() (gas: 152626)\n[PASS] test_ownershipTransfer_keepsExplicitStrategist() (gas: 700583)\n[PASS] test_ownershipTransfer_movesDefaultStrategistWithOwner() (gas: 829240)\n[PASS] test_reentrancy_transferDuringSettleIsBlocked() (gas: 720749)\n[PASS] test_renounceOwnershipIsDisabled() (gas: 38974)\n[PASS] test_rewards_claimToRecipient() (gas: 670985)\n[PASS] test_rewards_directDonationIsSharedAtNextSettle() (gas: 599551)\n[PASS] test_rewards_exitByTransferMovesFutureStream() (gas: 584544)\n[PASS] test_rewards_lateDepositorCannotSnipeUnsettledRewards() (gas: 983862)\n[PASS] test_rewards_mergeDoesNotDisturbAccounting() (gas: 985144)\n[PASS] test_rewards_noSharesNoIndexBump() (gas: 665537)\n[PASS] test_rewards_proRataByShares() (gas: 1300822)\n[PASS] test_rewards_transferFromSettlesToo() (gas: 771984)\n[PASS] test_rewards_transferSettlesBothSides() (gas: 1078962)\n[PASS] test_rewards_vaultCannotBeShareOrRewardRecipient() (gas: 844213)\n[PASS] test_setStrategist_onlyOwnerAndEmits() (gas: 709429)\n[PASS] test_settle_claimOutageWithClaimableSqkFreezesDepositsAndTransfers() (gas: 1516981)\n[PASS] test_settle_claimOutageWithNothingClaimableDoesNotFreeze() (gas: 666013)\n[PASS] test_settle_mergeStepStillWorksDuringClaimOutage() (gas: 785060)\n[PASS] test_settle_voidReturningClaimDoesNotBlockVault() (gas: 888844)\n[PASS] test_stakeStranded_putsPlainPushedNftToWorkWithoutShares() (gas: 951788)\n[PASS] test_stakeStranded_rejectsHeldOrForeignTokens() (gas: 711497)\n[PASS] test_unsolicitedSafeTransferIsRejected() (gas: 79874)\nSuite result: ok. 55 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 178.13ms (344.51ms CPU time)\n\nRan 20 tests for test/fork/SepoliaFork.t.sol:SepoliaForkTest\n[PASS] test_fork_claimPlumbingAtZero() (gas: 300309)\n[PASS] test_fork_depositMergeClaimCycle() (gas: 1673200)\n[PASS] test_fork_depositRevertsForNonOwner() (gas: 242729)\n[PASS] test_fork_duplicateBatchRestoresRealNftOwnership() (gas: 359429)\n[PASS] test_fork_freshlyMergedPairRejectsImmediateMergeAtomically() (gas: 1685852)\n[PASS] test_fork_graphConstantsMatchBrief() (gas: 112788)\n[PASS] test_fork_holdersAndOwnerCannotWithdrawVaultStake() (gas: 706259)\n[PASS] test_fork_mergeStepRevertsForNonStrategist() (gas: 602762)\n[PASS] test_fork_mergeStepRevertsOnLevelMismatchAgainstRealNft() (gas: 983134)\n[PASS] test_fork_mergeTwoL1NetsPlus200e18AndFreesOneNft() (gas: 992285)\n[PASS] test_fork_missingApprovalRevertsAndOwnerCanRetry() (gas: 814799)\n[PASS] test_fork_pinnedRpcReadsAgreeWithEvm() (gas: 71108)\n[PASS] test_fork_plainPushedSqueekCanBeStakedForTheReserve() (gas: 1166772)\n[PASS] test_fork_sameTokenRejectedBeforeWithdraw() (gas: 598224)\n[PASS] test_fork_secondDepositorPaysNavAfterRealMerge() (gas: 1501575)\n[PASS] test_fork_selectorsMatchBrief() (gas: 6310)\n[PASS] test_fork_stakingOneL1AddsExactly1000e18() (gas: 576935)\n[PASS] test_fork_unsolicitedSafeTransferRejected() (gas: 122876)\n[PASS] test_fork_vaultGraphHealthView() (gas: 122049)\n[PASS] test_fork_vaultRejectsItselfAsRecipient() (gas: 558807)\nSuite result: ok. 20 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 887.74ms (7.25s CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/invariant/ReserveInvariant.t.sol:ReserveInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nReserveInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_allRewardCashIsConservedAndLiabilitiesAreCovered\n[PASS] invariant_noHolderClaimsMoreThanTheirEntitlement\n[PASS] invariant_reserveCountAndCustodyMatchEveryNft\n[PASS] invariant_sharesAreConservedAndBackedByDepositedPower\n ReserveInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭----------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract       | Selector          | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=================================================================+\n| ReserveHandler | accrue            | 1524  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReserveHandler | claim             | 1514  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReserveHandler | deposit           | 1429  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReserveHandler | failedMerge       | 1520  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReserveHandler | harvest           | 1440  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReserveHandler | merge             | 1500  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReserveHandler | outage            | 1495  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReserveHandler | stranded          | 1454  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReserveHandler | tinyAccrual       | 1545  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReserveHandler | transferShares    | 1521  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| ReserveHandler | unauthorizedMerge | 1442  | 0       | 0        |\n╰----------------+-------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 17000000000000000000\n  Bound result 90000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 911421359464961568026\n  Bound result 880230923961941969944888\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 4192535835\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 51\n  Bound result 9317\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 40\n\n[PASS] test_handlerExercisesEveryActionAndBothOutageStates() (gas: 5747917)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 17000000000000000000\n  Bound result 3000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 5000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 12.30s (12.30s CPU time)\n\nRan 7 test suites in 12.31s (13.89s CPU time): 123 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (123 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":82,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"HamsterMiningReserve.acceptOwnership()\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.approve(address,uint256)\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.claimRewards()\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.claimRewards(address)\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.deposit(uint256[])\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.harvest()\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.mergeStep(uint256,uint256)\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.poke()\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.setStrategist(address)\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.stakeStranded(uint256[])\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.transferOwnership(address)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"README.md\":243,\"foundry.toml\":27,\"remappings.txt\":2,\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":44,\"script/SepoliaAddresses.sol\":24,\"src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol\":475,\"src/interfaces/ISqueekchain.sol\":58,\"test/Deploy.t.sol\":33,\"test/HamsterMiningReserve.t.sol\":909,\"test/ReserveDependencies.t.sol\":251,\"test/ReserveEdges.t.sol\":349,\"test/ReserveSettlement.t.sol\":327,\"test/TESTING.md\":118,\"test/fork/SepoliaFork.t.sol\":467,\"test/helpers/ReserveFixture.sol\":64,\"test/invariant/ReserveHandler.sol\":317,\"test/invariant/ReserveInvariant.t.sol\":169,\"test/mocks/AdversarialGraph.sol\":141,\"test/mocks/MockSqueekchain.sol\":217},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"4da67483313f3d54bffbcf34c5b588a8e1347cc8bcdec317a042bd785b2abf6e","verifiedTreeHash":"85c3ed7c33c802b9ec94804fb6d1da05a397d017","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+a6eb4461"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":2739,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 54 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 2.52s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":407,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 2 tests for test/Deploy.t.sol:DeployTest\n[PASS] test_deploy_runtimeFitsEip170() (gas: 5491650)\n[PASS] test_deploy_sepoliaConfigWiresOwnerAndGraph() (gas: 5563456)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 15.96ms (15.23ms CPU time)\n\nRan 44 tests for test/HamsterMiningReserve.t.sol:HamsterMiningReserveTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_rewardConservation(uint96,uint96,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 1580746, ~: 1587457)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 682441472\n  Bound result 1247\n  Bound result 99\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_sharesTrackPowerFraction(uint8,uint8) (runs: 256, μ: 1439397, ~: 1441761)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 1\n\n[PASS] test_constructor_makesNoExternalCalls() (gas: 14075)\n[PASS] test_constructor_revertsOnZeroAddresses() (gas: 15020)\n[PASS] test_constructor_setsWiringAndStrategistDefaultsToOwner() (gas: 110178)\n[PASS] test_deposit_batchStakesAll() (gas: 415860)\n[PASS] test_deposit_emitsEvent() (gas: 333525)\n[PASS] test_deposit_firstDepositMintsSharesEqualToPower() (gas: 418295)\n[PASS] test_deposit_higherLevelNftGetsProportionallyMoreShares() (gas: 606163)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsOnDuplicateIds() (gas: 180093)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsOnEmptyBatch() (gas: 37806)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsOnOversizedBatch() (gas: 49489)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsWhenCallerDoesNotOwnToken() (gas: 135402)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsWhenStakeAddsNoPower() (gas: 348930)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsWithoutApproval() (gas: 130313)\n[PASS] test_deposit_secondDepositorPricedAtNav() (gas: 923867)\n[PASS] test_graphHealth_readsGraphConstants() (gas: 51507)\n[PASS] test_harvest_atZeroIsCleanAndClaimReturnsZero() (gas: 633592)\n[PASS] test_harvest_checkpointsEmission() (gas: 94940)\n[PASS] test_harvest_neverRevertsWhenEmissionOrClaimRevert() (gas: 783232)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_chainsToHigherLevels() (gas: 1204859)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_netsPlus200AndFreesOneSlot() (gas: 686513)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_ownerMayMerge() (gas: 579214)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_revertsForNonStrategist() (gas: 428753)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_revertsOnLevelMismatch() (gas: 788093)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_revertsOnSameToken() (gas: 362261)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_revertsUnlessPowerStrictlyIncreases() (gas: 666617)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_revertsWhenNftCooldownBlocks() (gas: 1423577)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_revertsWhenTokenNotHeld() (gas: 399786)\n[PASS] test_noNftWithdrawalSurfaceExists() (gas: 397909)\n[PASS] test_onERC721Received_rejectsForeignCollection() (gas: 11684)\n[PASS] test_ownershipIsTwoStep() (gas: 150192)\n[PASS] test_reentrancy_transferDuringSettleIsBlocked() (gas: 719940)\n[PASS] test_rewards_claimToRecipient() (gas: 670340)\n[PASS] test_rewards_directDonationIsSharedAtNextSettle() (gas: 598989)\n[PASS] test_rewards_exitByTransferMovesFutureStream() (gas: 583977)\n[PASS] test_rewards_lateDepositorCannotSnipeUnsettledRewards() (gas: 983489)\n[PASS] test_rewards_mergeDoesNotDisturbAccounting() (gas: 984268)\n[PASS] test_rewards_noSharesNoIndexBump() (gas: 664671)\n[PASS] test_rewards_proRataByShares() (gas: 1298937)\n[PASS] test_rewards_transferFromSettlesToo() (gas: 771348)\n[PASS] test_rewards_transferSettlesBothSides() (gas: 1077890)\n[PASS] test_setStrategist_onlyOwnerAndEmits() (gas: 708614)\n[PASS] test_unsolicitedSafeTransferIsRejected() (gas: 79744)\nSuite result: ok. 44 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 94.77ms (170.36ms CPU time)\n\nRan 11 tests for test/fork/SepoliaFork.t.sol:SepoliaForkTest\n[SKIP] test_fork_claimPlumbingAtZero() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_depositMergeClaimCycle() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_depositRevertsForNonOwner() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_graphConstantsMatchBrief() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_mergeStepRevertsForNonStrategist() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_mergeStepRevertsOnLevelMismatchAgainstRealNft() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_mergeTwoL1NetsPlus200e18AndFreesOneNft() (gas: 0)\n[PASS] test_fork_selectorsMatchBrief() (gas: 6243)\n[SKIP] test_fork_stakingOneL1AddsExactly1000e18() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_unsolicitedSafeTransferRejected() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_vaultGraphHealthView() (gas: 0)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 10 skipped; finished in 166.16ms (13.07ms CPU time)\n\nRan 3 test suites in 170.47ms (276.89ms CPU time): 47 tests passed, 0 failed, 10 skipped (57 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":61,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"HamsterMiningReserve.acceptOwnership()\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.approve(address,uint256)\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.claimRewards()\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.claimRewards(address)\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.deposit(uint256[])\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.harvest()\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.mergeStep(uint256,uint256)\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.poke()\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.renounceOwnership()\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.setStrategist(address)\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.transferOwnership(address)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"README.md\":190,\"foundry.toml\":27,\"remappings.txt\":2,\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":44,\"script/SepoliaAddresses.sol\":24,\"src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol\":401,\"src/interfaces/ISqueekchain.sol\":57,\"test/Deploy.t.sol\":33,\"test/HamsterMiningReserve.t.sol\":685,\"test/fork/SepoliaFork.t.sol\":283,\"test/mocks/MockSqueekchain.sol\":198},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":1821,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[medium/high] incorrect-equality at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:382: HamsterMiningReserve._claim(address,address) (src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol#382-392) uses a dangerous strict equality:\n[medium/medium] reentrancy-no-eth at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:213: Reentrancy in HamsterMiningReserve.mergeStep(uint256,uint256) (src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol#213-246):\n[medium/medium] reentrancy-no-eth at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:382: Reentrancy in HamsterMiningReserve._claim(address,address) (src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol#382-392):\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:361: HamsterMiningReserve._settle() (src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol#361-380) ignores return value by staking.claim(address(this)) (src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol#366-369)\n[low/medium] missing-zero-check at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:118: HamsterMiningReserve.constructor(address,address,address,address,address,address).owner_ (src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol#118) lacks a zero-check on :\n[low/medium] calls-loop at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:150: HamsterMiningReserve.deposit(uint256[]) (src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol#150-182) has external calls inside a loop: nft.transferFrom(msg.sender,address(this),id) (src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol#162)\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:213: Reentrancy in HamsterMiningReserve.mergeStep(uint256,uint256) (src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol#213-246):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:150: Reentrancy in HamsterMiningReserve.deposit(uint256[]) (src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol#150-182):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:361: Reentrancy in HamsterMiningReserve._settle() (src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol#361-380):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:150: Reentrancy in HamsterMiningReserve.deposit(uint256[]) (src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol#150-182):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:382: Reentrancy in HamsterMiningReserve._claim(address,address) (src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol#382-392):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:213: Reentrancy in HamsterMiningReserve.mergeStep(uint256,uint256) (src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol#213-246):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:213: Reentrancy in HamsterMiningReserve.mergeStep(uint256,uint256) (src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol#213-246):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:361: Reentrancy in HamsterMiningReserve._settle() (src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol#361-380):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:361: Reentrancy in HamsterMiningReserve._settle() (src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol#361-380):","passed":true},{"durationMs":691,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[high] incorrect-erc721-interface at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:337: Incorrect ERC721 interface\n[high] reentrancy-state-change at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:157: Reentrancy: State change after external call (9 places)\n[low] centralization-risk at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:32: Centralization Risk (2 places)\n[low] costly-loop at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:159: Costly operations inside loop\n[low] modifier-used-only-once at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:137: Modifier Invoked Only Once\n[low] state-no-address-check at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:131: Address State Variable Set Without Checks\n[low] uninitialized-local-variable at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:159: Uninitialized Local Variable\n[low] unsafe-erc20-operation at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:333: Unsafe ERC20 Operation\n[low] unsafe-oz-erc721-mint at src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol:178: Unsafe `ERC721::_mint()`","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"be0f4dbf56806570a2d86d9477726970400a23e0faa1d99c2389b7244deaa85c","verifiedTreeHash":"ced7ba9e740f7855158a69b27189c8c65d3ee786","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+a6eb4461"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":2727,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 54 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 2.62s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":200,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 2 tests for test/Deploy.t.sol:DeployTest\n[PASS] test_deploy_runtimeFitsEip170() (gas: 6166991)\n[PASS] test_deploy_sepoliaConfigWiresOwnerAndGraph() (gas: 6238862)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 871.45µs (818.82µs CPU time)\n\nRan 13 tests for test/fork/SepoliaFork.t.sol:SepoliaForkTest\n[SKIP] test_fork_claimPlumbingAtZero() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_depositMergeClaimCycle() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_depositRevertsForNonOwner() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_graphConstantsMatchBrief() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_mergeStepRevertsForNonStrategist() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_mergeStepRevertsOnLevelMismatchAgainstRealNft() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_mergeTwoL1NetsPlus200e18AndFreesOneNft() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_plainPushedSqueekCanBeStakedForTheReserve() (gas: 0)\n[PASS] test_fork_selectorsMatchBrief() (gas: 6266)\n[SKIP] test_fork_stakingOneL1AddsExactly1000e18() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_unsolicitedSafeTransferRejected() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_vaultGraphHealthView() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_vaultRejectsItselfAsRecipient() (gas: 0)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 12 skipped; finished in 13.41ms (561.81µs CPU time)\n\nRan 55 tests for test/HamsterMiningReserve.t.sol:HamsterMiningReserveTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_rewardConservation(uint96,uint96,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 1583538, ~: 1590561)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 18482267383932818711228\n  Bound result 1419689\n  Bound result 4579\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_sharesTrackPowerFraction(uint8,uint8) (runs: 256, μ: 1407027, ~: 1388936)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 3\n\n[PASS] test_constructor_makesNoExternalCalls() (gas: 14075)\n[PASS] test_constructor_revertsOnZeroAddresses() (gas: 15106)\n[PASS] test_constructor_setsWiringAndStrategistDefaultsToOwner() (gas: 110265)\n[PASS] test_deposit_batchStakesAll() (gas: 416226)\n[PASS] test_deposit_emitsEvent() (gas: 333935)\n[PASS] test_deposit_firstDepositMintsSharesEqualToPower() (gas: 418682)\n[PASS] test_deposit_higherLevelNftGetsProportionallyMoreShares() (gas: 606962)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsOnDuplicateIds() (gas: 180558)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsOnEmptyBatch() (gas: 37783)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsOnOversizedBatch() (gas: 49356)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsWhenCallerDoesNotOwnToken() (gas: 135800)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsWhenPowerWasZeroedUpstreamWhileSharesExist() (gas: 508581)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsWhenStakeAddsNoPower() (gas: 349306)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsWithoutApproval() (gas: 130711)\n[PASS] test_deposit_secondDepositorPricedAtNav() (gas: 925191)\n[PASS] test_graphHealth_readsGraphConstants() (gas: 51507)\n[PASS] test_harvest_atZeroIsCleanAndClaimReturnsZero() (gas: 635158)\n[PASS] test_harvest_checkpointsEmission() (gas: 95331)\n[PASS] test_harvest_neverRevertsWhenEmissionOrClaimRevert() (gas: 797780)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_chainsToHigherLevels() (gas: 1206564)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_netsPlus200AndFreesOneSlot() (gas: 687074)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_ownerMayMerge() (gas: 579908)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_revertsForNonStrategist() (gas: 429233)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_revertsOnLevelMismatch() (gas: 789164)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_revertsOnSameToken() (gas: 362649)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_revertsUnlessPowerStrictlyIncreases() (gas: 667419)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_revertsWhenNftCooldownBlocks() (gas: 1425650)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_revertsWhenTokenNotHeld() (gas: 400218)\n[PASS] test_noNftWithdrawalSurfaceExists() (gas: 398252)\n[PASS] test_onERC721Received_rejectsForeignCollection() (gas: 11695)\n[PASS] test_ownershipIsTwoStep() (gas: 152626)\n[PASS] test_ownershipTransfer_keepsExplicitStrategist() (gas: 700583)\n[PASS] test_ownershipTransfer_movesDefaultStrategistWithOwner() (gas: 829240)\n[PASS] test_reentrancy_transferDuringSettleIsBlocked() (gas: 720749)\n[PASS] test_renounceOwnershipIsDisabled() (gas: 38974)\n[PASS] test_rewards_claimToRecipient() (gas: 670985)\n[PASS] test_rewards_directDonationIsSharedAtNextSettle() (gas: 599551)\n[PASS] test_rewards_exitByTransferMovesFutureStream() (gas: 584544)\n[PASS] test_rewards_lateDepositorCannotSnipeUnsettledRewards() (gas: 983862)\n[PASS] test_rewards_mergeDoesNotDisturbAccounting() (gas: 985144)\n[PASS] test_rewards_noSharesNoIndexBump() (gas: 665537)\n[PASS] test_rewards_proRataByShares() (gas: 1300822)\n[PASS] test_rewards_transferFromSettlesToo() (gas: 771984)\n[PASS] test_rewards_transferSettlesBothSides() (gas: 1078962)\n[PASS] test_rewards_vaultCannotBeShareOrRewardRecipient() (gas: 844213)\n[PASS] test_setStrategist_onlyOwnerAndEmits() (gas: 709429)\n[PASS] test_settle_claimOutageWithClaimableSqkFreezesDepositsAndTransfers() (gas: 1516981)\n[PASS] test_settle_claimOutageWithNothingClaimableDoesNotFreeze() (gas: 666013)\n[PASS] test_settle_mergeStepStillWorksDuringClaimOutage() (gas: 785060)\n[PASS] test_settle_voidReturningClaimDoesNotBlockVault() (gas: 888844)\n[PASS] test_stakeStranded_putsPlainPushedNftToWorkWithoutShares() (gas: 951788)\n[PASS] test_stakeStranded_rejectsHeldOrForeignTokens() (gas: 711497)\n[PASS] test_unsolicitedSafeTransferIsRejected() (gas: 79874)\nSuite result: ok. 55 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 53.50ms (133.37ms CPU time)\n\nRan 3 test suites in 54.47ms (67.78ms CPU time): 58 tests passed, 0 failed, 12 skipped (70 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":71,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"HamsterMiningReserve.acceptOwnership()\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.approve(address,uint256)\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.claimRewards()\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.claimRewards(address)\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.deposit(uint256[])\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.harvest()\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.mergeStep(uint256,uint256)\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.poke()\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.setStrategist(address)\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.stakeStranded(uint256[])\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.transferOwnership(address)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"README.md\":243,\"foundry.toml\":27,\"launch.json\":17,\"remappings.txt\":2,\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":44,\"script/SepoliaAddresses.sol\":24,\"src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol\":475,\"src/interfaces/ISqueekchain.sol\":58,\"test/Deploy.t.sol\":33,\"test/HamsterMiningReserve.t.sol\":909,\"test/fork/SepoliaFork.t.sol\":319,\"test/mocks/MockSqueekchain.sol\":217},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"cf88db376dbad21a514933b1e90cd5e1b848f29f23bea0d5b7d0483f4721d1d8","verifiedTreeHash":"0d843f7b48f9aa714dd0bfa1405e113b1371d850","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+a6eb4461"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":2657,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 54 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 2.55s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":189,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 2 tests for test/Deploy.t.sol:DeployTest\n[PASS] test_deploy_runtimeFitsEip170() (gas: 5491650)\n[PASS] test_deploy_sepoliaConfigWiresOwnerAndGraph() (gas: 5563456)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 733.01µs (738.44µs CPU time)\n\nRan 11 tests for test/fork/SepoliaFork.t.sol:SepoliaForkTest\n[SKIP] test_fork_claimPlumbingAtZero() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_depositMergeClaimCycle() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_depositRevertsForNonOwner() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_graphConstantsMatchBrief() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_mergeStepRevertsForNonStrategist() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_mergeStepRevertsOnLevelMismatchAgainstRealNft() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_mergeTwoL1NetsPlus200e18AndFreesOneNft() (gas: 0)\n[PASS] test_fork_selectorsMatchBrief() (gas: 6243)\n[SKIP] test_fork_stakingOneL1AddsExactly1000e18() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_unsolicitedSafeTransferRejected() (gas: 0)\n[SKIP] test_fork_vaultGraphHealthView() (gas: 0)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 10 skipped; finished in 13.69ms (548.36µs CPU time)\n\nRan 44 tests for test/HamsterMiningReserve.t.sol:HamsterMiningReserveTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_rewardConservation(uint96,uint96,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 1580746, ~: 1587457)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 682441472\n  Bound result 1247\n  Bound result 99\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_sharesTrackPowerFraction(uint8,uint8) (runs: 256, μ: 1439397, ~: 1441761)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 4\n\n[PASS] test_constructor_makesNoExternalCalls() (gas: 14075)\n[PASS] test_constructor_revertsOnZeroAddresses() (gas: 15020)\n[PASS] test_constructor_setsWiringAndStrategistDefaultsToOwner() (gas: 110178)\n[PASS] test_deposit_batchStakesAll() (gas: 415860)\n[PASS] test_deposit_emitsEvent() (gas: 333525)\n[PASS] test_deposit_firstDepositMintsSharesEqualToPower() (gas: 418295)\n[PASS] test_deposit_higherLevelNftGetsProportionallyMoreShares() (gas: 606163)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsOnDuplicateIds() (gas: 180093)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsOnEmptyBatch() (gas: 37806)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsOnOversizedBatch() (gas: 49489)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsWhenCallerDoesNotOwnToken() (gas: 135402)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsWhenStakeAddsNoPower() (gas: 348930)\n[PASS] test_deposit_revertsWithoutApproval() (gas: 130313)\n[PASS] test_deposit_secondDepositorPricedAtNav() (gas: 923867)\n[PASS] test_graphHealth_readsGraphConstants() (gas: 51507)\n[PASS] test_harvest_atZeroIsCleanAndClaimReturnsZero() (gas: 633592)\n[PASS] test_harvest_checkpointsEmission() (gas: 94940)\n[PASS] test_harvest_neverRevertsWhenEmissionOrClaimRevert() (gas: 783232)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_chainsToHigherLevels() (gas: 1204859)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_netsPlus200AndFreesOneSlot() (gas: 686513)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_ownerMayMerge() (gas: 579214)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_revertsForNonStrategist() (gas: 428753)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_revertsOnLevelMismatch() (gas: 788093)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_revertsOnSameToken() (gas: 362261)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_revertsUnlessPowerStrictlyIncreases() (gas: 666617)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_revertsWhenNftCooldownBlocks() (gas: 1423577)\n[PASS] test_mergeStep_revertsWhenTokenNotHeld() (gas: 399786)\n[PASS] test_noNftWithdrawalSurfaceExists() (gas: 397909)\n[PASS] test_onERC721Received_rejectsForeignCollection() (gas: 11684)\n[PASS] test_ownershipIsTwoStep() (gas: 150192)\n[PASS] test_reentrancy_transferDuringSettleIsBlocked() (gas: 719940)\n[PASS] test_rewards_claimToRecipient() (gas: 670340)\n[PASS] test_rewards_directDonationIsSharedAtNextSettle() (gas: 598989)\n[PASS] test_rewards_exitByTransferMovesFutureStream() (gas: 583977)\n[PASS] test_rewards_lateDepositorCannotSnipeUnsettledRewards() (gas: 983489)\n[PASS] test_rewards_mergeDoesNotDisturbAccounting() (gas: 984268)\n[PASS] test_rewards_noSharesNoIndexBump() (gas: 664671)\n[PASS] test_rewards_proRataByShares() (gas: 1298937)\n[PASS] test_rewards_transferFromSettlesToo() (gas: 771348)\n[PASS] test_rewards_transferSettlesBothSides() (gas: 1077890)\n[PASS] test_setStrategist_onlyOwnerAndEmits() (gas: 708614)\n[PASS] test_unsolicitedSafeTransferIsRejected() (gas: 79744)\nSuite result: ok. 44 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 60.66ms (124.99ms CPU time)\n\nRan 3 test suites in 62.50ms (75.09ms CPU time): 47 tests passed, 0 failed, 10 skipped (57 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":68,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"HamsterMiningReserve.acceptOwnership()\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.approve(address,uint256)\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.claimRewards()\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.claimRewards(address)\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.deposit(uint256[])\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.harvest()\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.mergeStep(uint256,uint256)\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.poke()\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.renounceOwnership()\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.setStrategist(address)\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"HamsterMiningReserve.transferOwnership(address)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"README.md\":190,\"foundry.toml\":27,\"launch.json\":17,\"remappings.txt\":2,\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":44,\"script/SepoliaAddresses.sol\":24,\"src/HamsterMiningReserve.sol\":401,\"src/interfaces/ISqueekchain.sol\":57,\"test/Deploy.t.sol\":33,\"test/HamsterMiningReserve.t.sol\":685,\"test/fork/SepoliaFork.t.sol\":283,\"test/mocks/MockSqueekchain.sol\":198},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"d04d76e1aab33c7e09f5640faece1cb1da555270612c8943e5c984b9cac78140","verifiedTreeHash":"ff9fa9267de225ec609addf1619f123df99cc7b5","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+a6eb4461"}]}