{"assessments":[],"deployments":[],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"e92f63a5-4283-49ba-b0c5-64689672524e","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"9a5c7fc21d3b07aa51efc5c52f3326b0bfa630bb5ec61a0987296345dbda3a40","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"c26edc76dc7a76e09a42c3634054429c1679c6e247747d647a03f77e5b332d7e","skillId":"adversarial-review","tools":[]},"key":"adversarial_review","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"c26edc76dc7a76e09a42c3634054429c1679c6e247747d647a03f77e5b332d7e","skillId":"adversarial-review","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"6f7ff3efa287ef7032e8f2be562207171cb81ebcdbf95ce1aa165be12495d7e5","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"fb6887b34514bcb194265fa403f0195c6a83eaef269da1e6189e1e9c4b372a7d","skillId":"build-contract-project","tools":[]},"key":"build_contract_project","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"fb6887b34514bcb194265fa403f0195c6a83eaef269da1e6189e1e9c4b372a7d","skillId":"build-contract-project","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"Build NoRoundTripHook, a simple, creative Uniswap v4 hook: a hook that forbids an address from swapping in both directions in the same pool within one block: beforeSwap records the block and direction of the caller's last swap per PoolId and reverts the opposite direction in the same block. Tests cover the same-block reversal, the next block, and the same direction twice. Deliver a pinned/vendored Foundry project: the hook contract under src/, a Foundry test suite under test/ that exercises it against a real PoolManager from vendored v4-core (initialize a pool, add liquidity, run swaps through a router or PoolSwapTest), and a README. Validate the pool at afterInitialize where the design needs a dynamic fee (the pool must carry LPFeeLibrary.DYNAMIC_FEE_FLAG) and revert otherwise. Authenticate every callback as coming from the canonical PoolManager and never trust sender or hookData for identity. Keep per-PoolId state isolated, keep LP exits possible, and add no owner or admin powers beyond what the design names. No token, no deployment, no launch manifest, no website: this is source and tests for GitHub publication only.","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"976fec9a73712fa435533353cbd08d81d382fb62218f7fd58fd5891651081e04","previousHash":"6353994e69367efe67b55eeacb16571e9ee97d31c6b5c2009f255644fac7232e","projectId":"e92f63a5-4283-49ba-b0c5-64689672524e","publication":{"commit":"a387d7bd6a29b946c5ea12616496fd3cbaedb73f","deliveredAt":"2026-09-21T04:28:42.995Z","repoUrl":"https://github.com/Identity-md/launch-75-build-noroundtriphook-simple-creative"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"c69db57696d95cc8210cc7f19ba379e63854d3945711db1da315caab9c6a650d","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"304a12751b890b918dcc5b9d5578f7f1c2232ec98dbe6c0ec0fa747091acd6dc","device":"35c52a5b502e847c","findings":[],"hash":"244f02b596a0d0eeee5d90bfd8e470832e2aca69df4a85e36a5b229bee7b69ba","nodeId":"27748cd8-24f6-4670-8f65-7c6cac979c82","outcome":"completed","summary":"Reproduced both failures and changed the guard to transaction-origin identity. Added regression tests, documented smart-wallet/relayer limitations, and recorded the response in `.imd-responses.json`.\n\nOffline build, all 10 tests, and formatting checks pass. Build/tests used Solidity 0.8.26 via `--use` because the default compiler cache is read-only.","treeHash":"f0b2af4868f91245db5839c29ef9a6cf4a03b11e","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":462592,"inputTokens":29783,"model":null,"outputTokens":4850,"runtime":"codex","turns":5,"wallClockMs":200618}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"886975e2b5bc95a865a3b404c38b481469584bf05d93dcc7eb6516d4c671430f","device":"aad1250d716d3f82","findings":[],"hash":"2a5f5f2dd4daab72bd48e5dac9858006ab974f3e0af84b1ac716c5c90be9c6a3","nodeId":"27748cd8-24f6-4670-8f65-7c6cac979c82","outcome":"completed","summary":"Repaired the failed size check by pruning nonessential vendored artifacts: upstream PDFs/docs, generated JS, snapshots, upstream test suites, and unused solmate files. Kept the required vendored Solidity sources, v4-core PoolManager/test routers, forge-std sources, and the minimal solmate `Owned` dependency v4-core needs.\n\nChecks now pass:\n\n- `forge build`\n- `forge test` — 7 passed\n- `forge fmt --check`\n\nCurrent deliverable source size is about 1.36 MiB for `lib/`, plus the hook/test/README files, so it is comfortably below the 8 MiB upload limit.","treeHash":"374804c26288ae56bbc6d844fe3fcba07a03074c","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":3684864,"inputTokens":159971,"model":null,"outputTokens":27414,"runtime":"codex","turns":50,"wallClockMs":700688}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"3f6a9bdd601cb99f","findings":[{"description":"The hook records the guard under tx.origin instead of the address whose swap is being settled. For a contract wallet or aggregator that owns the tokens and calls PoolSwapTest, PoolSwapTest records that contract as data.sender and settles all input/output against that same contract address, but the hook records separate entries for whichever EOA originated each transaction. The same contract address can therefore swap zero-for-one and then one-for-zero in the same pool and block by having two different origins call it. This violates the requested per-address same-block round-trip restriction; the README's EOA-only scope cannot narrow the assignment requirement.","line":75,"path":"src/NoRoundTripHook.sol","reproduction":"In NoRoundTripHookTest.setUp's initialized dynamic-fee pool, deploy a ContractSwapWallet holding the PoolKey, the existing PoolSwapTest router, and both token addresses. In its constructor approve the router for both tokens; add swap(bool zeroForOne) that calls router.swap(key, SwapParams(zeroForOne, -100, zeroForOne ? TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1 : TickMath.MAX_SQRT_PRICE - 1), PoolSwapTest.TestSettings(false, false), hex''). Transfer 1000 units of token0 and token1 to the wallet. In block N call vm.prank(address(0xA11CE), address(0xA11CE)); wallet.swap(true); then call vm.prank(address(0xB0B), address(0xB0B)); wallet.swap(false). Expected: the second swap reverts because the same wallet address is reversing direction in the same pool and block. Actual: both swaps succeed; hook.lastSwapByPool(key.toId(), address(wallet)) remains unset while separate origin entries are written.","severity":"high","title":"tx.origin identity lets one contract swap address reverse by changing origins"}],"hash":"3802a7c54801f766f2af02367c842208a5fdc3a772e0d64a4514768a61ce4d15","nodeId":"a0430991-8a16-4a03-9568-263e3f35887a","outcome":"completed","summary":"Wrote `.imd-findings.json` with one substantiated high-severity finding.\n\nValidation performed:\n- `forge test -vv` passed for the delivered suite.\n- Temporary reproduction test confirmed the remaining `tx.origin` contract-wallet bypass.\n- `jq . .imd-findings.json` validated the JSON shape.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":292608,"inputTokens":34946,"model":null,"outputTokens":5940,"runtime":"codex","turns":9,"wallClockMs":148451}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"35c52a5b502e847c","findings":[],"hash":"38b7d3ce83873dc27f8cd4447759fdd8725bb415e9a79d0cdd77680a380c5fba","nodeId":"27748cd8-24f6-4670-8f65-7c6cac979c82","outcome":"failed","summary":"This content was flagged for possible cybersecurity risk. If this seems wrong, try rephrasing your request. To get authorized for security work, join the Trusted Access for Cyber program: https://chatgpt.com/cyber","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":0,"inputTokens":0,"model":null,"outputTokens":0,"runtime":"codex","turns":1,"wallClockMs":49739}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"35c52a5b502e847c","findings":[{"description":"beforeSwap reads and writes the guard under the callback sender, contrary to the explicit requirement not to trust sender for identity. The canonical PoolManager supplies its immediate caller here: PoolSwapTest (or another router), not the user paying for and receiving the swap. One user can therefore reverse in the same pool and block by switching routers. Conversely, unrelated users sharing a router share its direction restriction, allowing an attacker to block opposite-direction trades through that router with an earlier small swap. The README documents router sharing, but that does not satisfy the assignment's identity requirement. The tests use only one swap router and do not exercise either case. This is substantiated by the local call path: PoolSwapTest.swap preserves the user for settlement, unlockCallback calls manager.swap, and Hooks.beforeSwap passes that router as sender.","line":74,"path":"src/NoRoundTripHook.sol","reproduction":"Use NoRoundTripHookTest.setUp's initialized, funded pool at block N > 0. Deploy a second PoolSwapTest(manager) named R2. From the same funded address A (the existing test contract suffices), approve R2 for both tokens with type(uint256).max; the original router R1 is already approved. Without advancing the block, call R1.swap(key, SwapParams(true, -100, TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1), PoolSwapTest.TestSettings(false, false), hex\"\"), then R2.swap(key, SwapParams(false, -100, TickMath.MAX_SQRT_PRICE - 1), PoolSwapTest.TestSettings(false, false), hex\"\"). Expected: A's second, opposite-direction swap reverts. Actual: both swaps succeed and settle against A because the hook records separate entries for R1 and R2, leaving lastSwapByPool[key.toId()][A] untouched. For the shared-router consequence, fund distinct addresses A and B with both tokens and approve R1 from each. In a fresh block, A performs the first call above through R1; B then performs the opposite-direction call through R1. Expected: B's first swap is allowed. Actual: it reverts with wrapped RoundTripInSameBlock because A populated R1's shared entry.","severity":"high","title":"Router-keyed identity bypasses the same-address round-trip restriction"}],"hash":"4d4fa9a355a45fc8749bcdc4c222148f90f1f920d99d96494e66ee104128497f","nodeId":"a0430991-8a16-4a03-9568-263e3f35887a","outcome":"completed","summary":"Wrote one high-severity finding to [.imd-findings.json](.imd-findings.json): router-based identity lets the same user reverse through another router and lets users block unrelated traders sharing a router.\n\nIncluded concrete reproduction steps traced through the vendored code; no runtime reproduction was executed. Project files remain unchanged.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":158336,"inputTokens":27153,"model":null,"outputTokens":1351,"runtime":"codex","turns":3,"wallClockMs":59692}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":2,"bundleHash":"9843c5243266f9eded3af3f8e39a1f3cb49e31c698d0f6507a56c87b35df55e4","device":"3c7630b22a73c1fb","findings":[],"hash":"6f7ff3efa287ef7032e8f2be562207171cb81ebcdbf95ce1aa165be12495d7e5","nodeId":"27748cd8-24f6-4670-8f65-7c6cac979c82","outcome":"completed","summary":"I fixed the reported defect. The hook now guards two addresses per pool: the address that called the PoolManager (the wallet or router) and `tx.origin`. `forge build`, `forge test` (11 tests) and `forge fmt --check` all pass.\n\n- **The bug:** the guard was keyed only by `tx.origin`, so one contract wallet driven from two different origins got two separate entries and could reverse direction in the same block.\n- **The fix:** in `src/NoRoundTripHook.sol`, `beforeSwap` checks both addresses through a new `_guard` helper. A reversal by either one in the same pool and block reverts. `tx.origin` is still checked, so an EOA can't get around the guard by switching routers.\n- **Tests:** I added `test_contractWalletCannotReverseByChangingOrigin`, which follows your reproduction. The wallet swaps as origin A, the reversal as origin B reverts, and same-direction and next-block swaps still succeed. I did not run this test against the old code to confirm it failed there.\n- **Trade-off:** all users of one router now share that router's guard, so two users trading opposite ways in the same block through the same router will revert one of them. The hook only sees the address that called the PoolManager plus `tx.origin`, never the wallet behind a router like `PoolSwapTest`, so I couldn't avoid this. The old test asserting independent guards per origin is replaced by `test_sharedRouterSharesGuardAcrossOrigins`, and the README states the limitation.\n\nThe answer to the finding is in `.imd-responses.json` with verdict `fixed`.","treeHash":"3c97d7bb72d5c1938ae2095a117a32f3515eeb47","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":266131,"inputTokens":12,"model":"claude-sonnet-5","outputTokens":6096,"runtime":"claude","turns":7,"wallClockMs":76935}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"0256823ae36e7900","findings":[{"description":"The two guarded identities still do not include the address whose tokens are spent by a contract wallet. In a PoolSwapTest flow, the callback sender is the PoolSwapTest router, while tx.origin is the originating EOA. Guarding both blocks the reported one-router reproduction only because all users of that router share one entry; it does not establish an entry for the wallet. The same wallet can therefore perform opposite-direction swaps in one pool and block by using a different public router and a different origin for each call, violating the per-address restriction.","line":79,"path":"src/NoRoundTripHook.sol","reproduction":"In the initialized dynamic-fee pool from NoRoundTripHookTest.setUp, deploy a second PoolSwapTest(manager) and one wallet holding the PoolKey and both token addresses. Give the wallet 1000 units of token0 and token1 and define swap(router, zeroForOne) to approve that router and call router.swap(key, SwapParams(zeroForOne, -100, zeroForOne ? TickMath.MIN_SQRT_PRICE + 1 : TickMath.MAX_SQRT_PRICE - 1), TestSettings(false, false), hex''). In block N, prank with origin/address 0xA11CE and call wallet.swap(router1, true), then prank with origin/address 0xB0B and call wallet.swap(router2, false). Expected: the second call reverts because the same wallet address reverses direction in the same pool and block. Actual: both swaps succeed; I ran this exact Foundry test against the vendored PoolManager. The first swap records router1 and 0xA11CE, the second checks the distinct router2 and 0xB0B, and lastSwapByPool(poolId, wallet) remains unset.","severity":"high","title":"Contract wallet can still reverse by changing both origin and router"}],"hash":"9a5c7fc21d3b07aa51efc5c52f3326b0bfa630bb5ec61a0987296345dbda3a40","nodeId":"a0430991-8a16-4a03-9568-263e3f35887a","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. Wrote one reproducible high-severity finding to [.imd-findings.json](/home/imd-worker/.identitymd/work/e92f63a5-4283-49ba-b0c5-64689672524e/a0430991-8a16-4a03-9568-263e3f35887a/.imd-findings.json).\n\nThe same contract wallet can still reverse direction within one block by changing both the originating EOA and router. The exact Foundry reproduction passed, demonstrating the bypass.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":223360,"inputTokens":25095,"model":null,"outputTokens":2715,"runtime":"codex","turns":5,"wallClockMs":125901}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":9708,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 74 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 9.61s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[erc20-unchecked-transfer]: ERC20 'transfer' and 'transferFrom' calls should check the return value\n    ╭▸ test/NoRoundTripHook.t.sol:144:9\n    │\n144 │         token0.transfer(user, 1000);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://book.getfoundry.sh/reference/forge/forge-lint#erc20-unchecked-transfer\n\nwarning[erc20-unchecked-transfer]: ERC20 'transfer' and 'transferFrom' calls should check the return value\n    ╭▸ test/NoRoundTripHook.t.sol:145:9\n    │\n145 │         token1.transfer(user, 1000);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://book.getfoundry.sh/reference/forge/forge-lint#erc20-unchecked-transfer\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":102,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 10 tests for test/NoRoundTripHook.t.sol:NoRoundTripHookTest\n[PASS] test_allowsOppositeDirectionInNextBlock() (gas: 195835)\n[PASS] test_allowsSameDirectionTwiceInSameBlock() (gas: 211778)\n[PASS] test_directCallbacksRejectNonManager() (gas: 17535)\n[PASS] test_hookDataCannotChangeIdentity() (gas: 289972)\n[PASS] test_initializeRejectsStaticFeePool() (gas: 52613)\n[PASS] test_lpExitIsNotBlockedBySwapRule() (gas: 216789)\n[PASS] test_revertsOppositeDirectionInSameBlock() (gas: 179400)\n[PASS] test_routerSwitchCannotBypassOriginGuard() (gas: 1863903)\n[PASS] test_sharedRouterDoesNotShareDifferentOriginsGuard() (gas: 446638)\n[PASS] test_stateIsIsolatedPerPool() (gas: 1740158)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 7.38ms (6.16ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test suite in 8.15ms (7.38ms CPU time): 10 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (10 total tests)\n","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"244f02b596a0d0eeee5d90bfd8e470832e2aca69df4a85e36a5b229bee7b69ba","verifiedTreeHash":"f0b2af4868f91245db5839c29ef9a6cf4a03b11e","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+eab70f1b"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":9820,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 74 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 9.70s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":145,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 7 tests for test/NoRoundTripHook.t.sol:NoRoundTripHookTest\n[PASS] test_allowsOppositeDirectionInNextBlock() (gas: 195832)\n[PASS] test_allowsSameDirectionTwiceInSameBlock() (gas: 211758)\n[PASS] test_directCallbacksRejectNonManager() (gas: 17467)\n[PASS] test_initializeRejectsStaticFeePool() (gas: 52536)\n[PASS] test_lpExitIsNotBlockedBySwapRule() (gas: 216739)\n[PASS] test_revertsOppositeDirectionInSameBlock() (gas: 179397)\n[PASS] test_stateIsIsolatedPerPool() (gas: 1740071)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 15.94ms (3.30ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test suite in 16.77ms (15.94ms CPU time): 7 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (7 total tests)\n","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"2a5f5f2dd4daab72bd48e5dac9858006ab974f3e0af84b1ac716c5c90be9c6a3","verifiedTreeHash":"374804c26288ae56bbc6d844fe3fcba07a03074c","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+eab70f1b"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":11253,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 74 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 11.11s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[erc20-unchecked-transfer]: ERC20 'transfer' and 'transferFrom' calls should check the return value\n    ╭▸ test/NoRoundTripHook.t.sol:106:9\n    │\n106 │         token0.transfer(address(wallet), 1000);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://book.getfoundry.sh/reference/forge/forge-lint#erc20-unchecked-transfer\n\nwarning[erc20-unchecked-transfer]: ERC20 'transfer' and 'transferFrom' calls should check the return value\n    ╭▸ test/NoRoundTripHook.t.sol:107:9\n    │\n107 │         token1.transfer(address(wallet), 1000);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://book.getfoundry.sh/reference/forge/forge-lint#erc20-unchecked-transfer\n\nwarning[erc20-unchecked-transfer]: ERC20 'transfer' and 'transferFrom' calls should check the return value\n    ╭▸ test/NoRoundTripHook.t.sol:166:9\n    │\n166 │         token0.transfer(user, 1000);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://book.getfoundry.sh/reference/forge/forge-lint#erc20-unchecked-transfer\n\nwarning[erc20-unchecked-transfer]: ERC20 'transfer' and 'transferFrom' calls should check the return value\n    ╭▸ test/NoRoundTripHook.t.sol:167:9\n    │\n167 │         token1.transfer(user, 1000);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://book.getfoundry.sh/reference/forge/forge-lint#erc20-unchecked-transfer\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":140,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 11 tests for test/NoRoundTripHook.t.sol:NoRoundTripHookTest\n[PASS] test_allowsOppositeDirectionInNextBlock() (gas: 222387)\n[PASS] test_allowsSameDirectionTwiceInSameBlock() (gas: 258204)\n[PASS] test_contractWalletCannotReverseByChangingOrigin() (gas: 686740)\n[PASS] test_directCallbacksRejectNonManager() (gas: 17555)\n[PASS] test_hookDataCannotChangeIdentity() (gas: 335063)\n[PASS] test_initializeRejectsStaticFeePool() (gas: 52635)\n[PASS] test_lpExitIsNotBlockedBySwapRule() (gas: 261926)\n[PASS] test_revertsOppositeDirectionInSameBlock() (gas: 224521)\n[PASS] test_routerSwitchCannotBypassOriginGuard() (gas: 1956658)\n[PASS] test_sharedRouterSharesGuardAcrossOrigins() (gas: 533989)\n[PASS] test_stateIsIsolatedPerPool() (gas: 1810510)\nSuite result: ok. 11 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 24.46ms (8.02ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test suite in 25.30ms (24.46ms CPU time): 11 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (11 total tests)\n","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"6f7ff3efa287ef7032e8f2be562207171cb81ebcdbf95ce1aa165be12495d7e5","verifiedTreeHash":"3c97d7bb72d5c1938ae2095a117a32f3515eeb47","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+eab70f1b"}]}