{"assessments":[],"deployments":[],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"2fa09353-83ef-4906-991c-920358bb6005","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"90aaf31c27a532802a77f22ed289e65929f99e7e73f4896bf8dcaf0f4409e7cf","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_economics","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"3e747d4959394ad921a1daf6ad4ab71af377700be24fe13b6b6a07f93e1e72db","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_flow","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"f978fce4d15d490a2285df5fa6e1d8548d040c761b0695466acd93c168496e17","dependsOn":["build_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest","audit_math","audit_permissions","audit_economics","audit_flow"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"3014f1ea5961918ca059453a484bf4c8bcbbfc2248dbe31d94ac7c5cdf8f50bd","skillId":"audit-judge","tools":[]},"key":"audit_judge","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"3014f1ea5961918ca059453a484bf4c8bcbbfc2248dbe31d94ac7c5cdf8f50bd","skillId":"audit-judge","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"47ac5dd7dfcec827d491e482f4414dae2e24e4bb037fe6d974ab2496a2802e90","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_math","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"86d185a1c8afa953bcdbce85c7b66ad84edaaf8174480f4f6b187c2fa19e9615","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_permissions","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"aa6124b31d5fda910306acf453ce27c42a08ef0f993422ff08de484b0b13583d","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"47381b166d1f406a34f0ebdc740ee21bc0383e56e7ad9084b26abf1bf7570904","skillId":"build-contract-project","tools":[]},"key":"build_contract_project","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"47381b166d1f406a34f0ebdc740ee21bc0383e56e7ad9084b26abf1bf7570904","skillId":"build-contract-project","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"d602232023853f6a048d30c3b3eca44d2cbe8cba5d0a27d7f08c2e516c4c6507","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"tools":[]},"key":"manifest","kind":"code","role":"integrate","skillHash":null,"skillId":null,"state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"aca93b1bb4851f10c07a390982ce0684c851acdb8c1cf7e1c1ed37e0892cd9bc","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"73431852439ad3a343f3d2b7db1c43cd363b9f48f9bb51497374a0cf6d50b223","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","tools":[]},"key":"write_foundry_tests","kind":"code","role":"tests","skillHash":"73431852439ad3a343f3d2b7db1c43cd363b9f48f9bb51497374a0cf6d50b223","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"A swap-counter hook: afterSwap counts swaps per sender address and in total and emits an event per swap; it never changes amounts or fees. Expose the counts as views.","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"65688e1489cda40024854811abaa5f56dd45efe60e9ac9a3b68c1b8aaa5fe2eb","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"2fa09353-83ef-4906-991c-920358bb6005","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-549-swap-counter-hook-afterswap-counts"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"51018","feedbackHash":"d3c6091733bd39f6a05e46814a1eba25d196f92cfd21e8ef376da942a56a03d5","nodeKey":"audit_economics","submissionHash":"90aaf31c27a532802a77f22ed289e65929f99e7e73f4896bf8dcaf0f4409e7cf","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51412","feedbackHash":"e03e09a58cb286ae6fe74171a211b954e70c2af0eb48ec1a49df197e48063901","nodeKey":"audit_flow","submissionHash":"3e747d4959394ad921a1daf6ad4ab71af377700be24fe13b6b6a07f93e1e72db","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"50955","feedbackHash":"82dfdbedf5f1337aa731694adc190bd09db2c6a900efe086a25633a727fedc79","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"f978fce4d15d490a2285df5fa6e1d8548d040c761b0695466acd93c168496e17","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"50974","feedbackHash":"2785d12c126021eecbe2460ccc75ff777ec8c09c8c413df80ebc6bccbcb4d7b8","nodeKey":"audit_math","submissionHash":"47ac5dd7dfcec827d491e482f4414dae2e24e4bb037fe6d974ab2496a2802e90","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51300","feedbackHash":"31e186f947dbae83bd70ad34326a707b221bfb10e43699e9ca3822edd1919f42","nodeKey":"audit_permissions","submissionHash":"86d185a1c8afa953bcdbce85c7b66ad84edaaf8174480f4f6b187c2fa19e9615","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"50957","feedbackHash":"db3dfa6fbebbc392f31ed8711cc01a6f5ad935c61d84d6ccaba93f547ce0f11c","nodeKey":"build_contract_project","submissionHash":"aa6124b31d5fda910306acf453ce27c42a08ef0f993422ff08de484b0b13583d","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"50971","feedbackHash":"abc5e6784f4da8965732c94d17b59ef1413a6f2d0d131cc79b74f4921564d60c","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"d602232023853f6a048d30c3b3eca44d2cbe8cba5d0a27d7f08c2e516c4c6507","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"50957","feedbackHash":"7f41c8a013c4633f0d81acbb8d723fa71feb4350041e69e08cc431f5f78bcae4","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"aca93b1bb4851f10c07a390982ce0684c851acdb8c1cf7e1c1ed37e0892cd9bc","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"82824b6edb2454691030e619f1bbd1a20b3cbad5666ee3503de8cdcf7f69c4a2","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"40aae51ff9854f9f","findings":[],"hash":"3e747d4959394ad921a1daf6ad4ab71af377700be24fe13b6b6a07f93e1e72db","nodeId":"69027c75-1916-482b-b5c1-e827e2d7429b","outcome":"completed","summary":"Saved [.imd-findings.json](/home/debian/.identitymd/work/2fa09353-83ef-4906-991c-920358bb6005/69027c75-1916-482b-b5c1-e827e2d7429b/.imd-findings.json): no substantiated defects; all 13 entry points covered.\n\n- `forge build --offline`: passed.\n- `forge test --offline -vv`: 29 passed.\n- Slither: no findings in production scope.\n- Aderyn unavailable; protected suites inspected but not executed.\n\nBuild artifacts were redirected to `/tmp`. Implementation files remain unchanged.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":845440,"inputTokens":110468,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":6562,"runtime":"codex","turns":4,"wallClockMs":236576}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"98b4506bef931d13","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Boundary guide, sentinel-value case. PoolKey.fee has one sentinel: LPFeeLibrary.DYNAMIC_FEE_FLAG (0x800000 = 8388608, above MAX_LP_FEE 1000000). PoolManager.initialize treats it as valid for any non-zero-flag hook (Hooks.isValidHookAddress), sets the initial LP fee to 0 (LPFeeLibrary.getInitialLPFee), and then only `msg.sender == address(key.hooks)` may ever call PoolManager.updateDynamicLPFee; a beforeSwap fee override additionally needs the BEFORE_SWAP flag, which this hook does not carry. SwapCounterHook has no function that calls updateDynamicLPFee and no beforeSwap, so the only validation point it controls, _beforeInitialize, unconditionally accepts a key it can never service. Pool initialization is permissionless (README: 'After deployment, initialization is permissionless'), so any third party can open a dynamic-fee pool pairing any currencies with this hook; that pool is a zero-fee pool forever, and its swaps are folded into the same global swapCount/totalSwaps the README documents as counting 'all pools that select it', contradicting the README sentence 'ordinary pool LP and protocol fees still apply'. No funds are lost and the IMD launch pool is unaffected (the manifest fee is bounded to 0..1000000, so it cannot select the sentinel), which is why this is low. Fix that preserves the intended behaviour: in _beforeInitialize `if (key.fee.isDynamicFee()) revert DynamicFeeNotSupported();` (import LPFeeLibrary and `using LPFeeLibrary for uint24`). The initialization callback then rejects exactly the one fee value the hook cannot honour and keeps accepting every static fee.","line":42,"path":"src/SwapCounterHook.sol","reproduction":"State: PoolManager deployed; SwapCounterHook deployed at an address whose low 14 bits are 0x2040 with that manager. Inputs: key = PoolKey(currency0, currency1, fee = 0x800000, tickSpacing = 60, hooks = hook); initial price 1:1 (sqrtPriceX96 = 79228162514264337593543950336). Calls: (1) manager.initialize(key, sqrtPriceX96) -> succeeds; getSlot0(key.toId()).lpFee == 0. (2) add full-range liquidity 100_000 ether via an unlock router. (3) swap zeroForOne exact-input 1 ether (sqrtPriceLimit = MIN_SQRT_PRICE+1) -> delta.amount0 = -1000000000000000000, delta.amount1 = +999990000099999000 (price impact only, zero fee); getFeeGrowthGlobals(key.toId()) == (0, 0); hook.totalSwaps() == 1. (4) manager.updateDynamicLPFee(key, 3000) from any EOA -> reverts UnauthorizedDynamicLPFeeUpdate; the only authorised caller is the hook, which has no code path that makes this call. Expected: a hook that cannot manage a dynamic fee refuses the dynamic-fee key in beforeInitialize (revert), so no zero-fee-forever pool can be attached to it. Actual: initialization succeeds and the pool is permanently fee-less. Verified with a scratch Foundry test against the vendored v4-core (test passes on current code, demonstrating the behaviour).","severity":"low","snippet":"    function _beforeInitialize(address, PoolKey calldata, uint160) internal pure override returns (bytes4) {\n        return IHooks.beforeInitialize.selector;\n    }","title":"beforeInitialize accepts the dynamic-fee sentinel (fee == 0x800000) although the hook can never set a dynamic fee, so such pools trade at a permanent 0 LP fee"}],"hash":"47ac5dd7dfcec827d491e482f4414dae2e24e4bb037fe6d974ab2496a2802e90","nodeId":"eff64594-7166-46be-ba36-0cbef9edf000","outcome":"completed","summary":"The findings file is excluded from git by the harness's own exclude rule, which is expected for a review deliverable. The scratch directory is gone and no tracked file changed.\n\n## Review result\n\n**One low-severity finding, no critical, high, or medium.** The math in this hook is two checked `++` operations and a `keccak` pool ID, and all of it holds. The file `.imd-findings.json` at the repository root carries the finding and a 16-row coverage record covering all 13 listed entry points plus three invariants.\n\n**Finding 1 (low):** `_beforeInitialize` in `src/SwapCounterHook.sol:42` accepts a pool key whose fee is the dynamic-fee sentinel. The hook has no `beforeSwap` and never calls the manager's fee setter, and only the hook is authorised to set that fee. So anyone can open a dynamic-fee pool on this hook that trades at a zero LP fee forever, and its swaps roll into the same global counters. I reproduced it against the vendored PoolManager: initialise with fee 0x800000, add liquidity, swap 1 ether, and fee growth stays zero while the counter increments. No funds are lost, and the launch manifest cannot select that fee value, so the launch pool itself is unaffected. The fix is a one-line revert on `key.fee.isDynamicFee()` in the initialization callback.\n\n**What held, with the probes I ran:**\n- Counter saturation: forcing either counter to `type(uint256).max` makes the next callback revert with a checked-arithmetic panic and no partial write. Reaching it honestly needs 2^256 callbacks.\n- Sum invariant: fuzzed callbacks over 8 senders kept `totalSwaps` equal to the sum of per-sender counts, and every event payload matched the views.\n- Flag arithmetic: `0x2040` is exactly `beforeInitialize | afterSwap` in the vendored constants, and the constructor validates it.\n- Return data: `afterSwap` returns 64 bytes with the right selector. The manager discards the zero delta since the return-delta flag is off.\n- Token: supply literal is exactly 1e27 (the aderyn lead), no rounding anywhere, OpenZeppelin 5.1 ERC20 unmodified.\n- Full suite passes offline from a clean build with an empty environment: 29 tests.\n\n**Not reached:** nothing within the assigned area. Gas for a first-time sender is about 84k, above the security guide's 30k target but under its 100k ceiling. I recorded that in coverage rather than as a finding.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1552279,"inputTokens":418,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":24659,"runtime":"claude","turns":31,"wallClockMs":307010}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"05778e691c371384","findings":[],"hash":"86d185a1c8afa953bcdbce85c7b66ad84edaaf8174480f4f6b187c2fa19e9615","nodeId":"47cbb4a8-166a-4b04-86d9-891575630e7e","outcome":"completed","summary":"No substantiated defects found in the assigned permissions review.\n\nSaved [.imd-findings.json](/root/.identitymd/work/2fa09353-83ef-4906-991c-920358bb6005/47cbb4a8-166a-4b04-86d9-891575630e7e/.imd-findings.json) with coverage for all 13 entry points and five invariants.\n\nAll 29 existing Foundry tests passed offline. Protected verifier tests and live deployment checks were not run. No source or configuration files changed.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":656384,"inputTokens":103771,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":5239,"runtime":"codex","turns":4,"wallClockMs":201616}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"30a6c1a419ef4f9c","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Flow Gap (periphery x first principles). PoolManager.initialize accepts key.fee == LPFeeLibrary.DYNAMIC_FEE_FLAG (0x800000) for any hook address and sets the pool's initial LP fee to 0 (lib/v4-core/src/libraries/LPFeeLibrary.sol:51-53). Only the pool's hook may later raise it via updateDynamicLPFee or a beforeSwap fee override, and SwapCounterHook has neither (afterSwap only, no beforeSwap, no fee calls). _beforeInitialize returns its selector unconditionally, so anyone can permissionlessly create a dynamic-fee pool bound to this hook whose LP fee is 0 and can never change. The README's guarantee that 'ordinary pool LP and protocol fees still apply' is false for every such pool: LPs who deposit into it earn no swap fees at all, and the hook address (which is the launch's public identity) is attached to a fee-free pool. The IMD launch pool itself is unaffected because the manifest caps pool.fee at 1000000 (< 8388608), so this only harms third parties who LP into a dynamic-fee pool that selects this hook; hence low. Minimal fix that preserves counting semantics: in _beforeInitialize, revert when key.fee.isDynamicFee() (LPFeeLibrary), e.g. `if (key.fee.isDynamicFee()) revert DynamicFeeNotSupported();`.","line":42,"path":"src/SwapCounterHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {LPFeeLibrary} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/LPFeeLibrary.sol\";\nimport {SwapCounterHook} from \"src/SwapCounterHook.sol\";\n\n/// @notice Fails on the current code: a dynamic-fee pool (fee == 0x800000) is accepted by beforeInitialize although\n/// the hook can never set its LP fee, so that pool charges LPs a 0% fee forever. Passes once beforeInitialize rejects\n/// the dynamic-fee sentinel (any revert is accepted).\ncontract DynamicFeePoolRejectedTest is Test {\n    uint160 constant SQRT_PRICE_1_1 = 79228162514264337593543950336;\n    IPoolManager manager;\n    SwapCounterHook hook;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        manager = IPoolManager(address(new PoolManager(address(this))));\n        bytes memory cc = abi.encodePacked(type(SwapCounterHook).creationCode, abi.encode(manager));\n        bytes32 h = keccak256(cc);\n        address deployed;\n        for (uint256 i; i < 200_000; ++i) {\n            address pred =\n                address(uint160(uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0xff), address(this), bytes32(i), h)))));\n            if (uint160(pred) & 0x3fff != 0x2040) continue;\n            bytes32 salt = bytes32(i);\n            assembly {\n                deployed := create2(0, add(cc, 0x20), mload(cc), salt)\n            }\n            break;\n        }\n        require(deployed != address(0), \"hook deployment failed\");\n        hook = SwapCounterHook(deployed);\n    }\n\n    function test_dynamicFeePoolIsRejectedAtInitialization() public {\n        PoolKey memory dyn = PoolKey(\n            Currency.wrap(address(0x1111)),\n            Currency.wrap(address(0x2222)),\n            LPFeeLibrary.DYNAMIC_FEE_FLAG,\n            60,\n            IHooks(address(hook))\n        );\n        vm.expectRevert();\n        manager.initialize(dyn, SQRT_PRICE_1_1);\n    }\n}","reproduction":"State: hook deployed at an address with flags 0x2040 against a real PoolManager; MockERC20 t0 < t1. Calls: (1) manager.initialize(PoolKey(t0, t1, 0x800000, 60, hook), 2^96) -> succeeds, no revert from the hook. (2) add 100_000e18 full-range liquidity to that pool and to an otherwise identical static pool with fee 3000. (3) swap exactIn 1e18 token0 in each. Observed (forge, vendored v4-core): dynamic pool slot0.lpFee == 0, feeGrowthGlobal0/1 == 0 after the swap, output 999990000099999000 wei vs 996990060009101709 wei in the 0.30% pool, i.e. LPs in the dynamic pool collected nothing on the trade; hook.totalSwaps() == 2 so the hook happily counts swaps on the pool it cannot price. Expected: the hook refuses to be bound to a pool whose fee only it can set but never does (initialize reverts), or the README stops promising that ordinary LP fees apply to every pool selecting the hook.","severity":"low","snippet":"    function _beforeInitialize(address, PoolKey calldata, uint160) internal pure override returns (bytes4) {\n        return IHooks.beforeInitialize.selector;\n    }","title":"beforeInitialize accepts dynamic-fee pools the hook can never price, so any such pool charges LPs 0% forever"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Economic Security (cheapest inflation vector), recorded for the judge as a trust assumption rather than a defect: the README already states that counts are callbacks, not economic activity, that a callback with no token movement still counts, and that counts are global across all pools selecting the hook. Concretely, because beforeInitialize is permissionless and PoolManager calls afterSwap even when a swap moves zero tokens (zero-liquidity pool: price slides to the limit, delta is (0,0), nothing to settle), anyone can create an empty pool bound to this hook and run unlimited counted swaps at pure gas cost with no capital, no fee paid to any LP, and no effect on the launch pool. Any off-chain consumer that reads totalSwaps or swapCount as a measure of activity or as a reward basis must filter SwapCounted by the launch poolId and must not treat the numbers as Sybil-resistant. No code change is required if the documented semantics are the accepted design; if a per-pool or liquidity-gated count is wanted, that is a scope decision for the author.","line":52,"path":"src/SwapCounterHook.sol","reproduction":"State: hook deployed with flags 0x2040; launch pool (fee 3000) funded. Calls: (1) manager.initialize(PoolKey(t0, t1, 500, 60, hook), 2^96) with no liquidity ever added. (2) via a router, five swaps on that pool with amountSpecified = -1 and sqrtPriceLimit at the min/max bound, alternating direction. Observed: every swap returns BalanceDelta 0 (no settle, no take), the caller's t0/t1 balances are unchanged, yet hook.totalSwaps() == 5 and hook.swapCount(router) == 5. Cost to the inflater: gas only (about 60-70k per swap on this test manager). Expected per the README: exactly this; reported so that the judge records the trust assumption with its concrete cost.","severity":"info","snippet":"        uint256 senderCount = ++swapCount[sender];\n        uint256 totalCount = ++totalSwaps;","title":"Counters inflate for gas only via swaps on an unfunded pool selecting the hook (documented, not Sybil-resistant)"}],"hash":"90aaf31c27a532802a77f22ed289e65929f99e7e73f4896bf8dcaf0f4409e7cf","nodeId":"3f86d20c-3267-4583-b47c-03837d6c4be8","outcome":"completed","summary":"The findings file is in place at the repository root, deliberately excluded from git by the harness, and the working tree has no other changes. The scratch tests were removed after use.\n\n## Review outcome\n\nThe audit covered the Economic Security, Invariant and Flow Gap guides against `SwapCounterHook` and `SwapCounterToken`. The code is sound in its assigned area. I found no fund-loss, counter-corruption or accounting defect. Two items are reported, one low and one informational.\n\n**Finding 1, low: beforeInitialize accepts dynamic-fee pools the hook can never price.** The PoolManager sets a dynamic-fee pool's LP fee to zero and only the pool's hook can ever raise it. This hook has no fee path, so anyone can permissionlessly create a dynamic-fee pool bound to it where LPs earn 0% forever. Reproduced in Foundry: after one 1e18 swap, the dynamic pool's fee growth stays zero and the trader receives more than in the 0.30% pool. The launch pool is unaffected because the manifest caps the fee below the dynamic sentinel. A proof test is attached that fails on current code and passes once initialization rejects the sentinel.\n\n**Finding 2, info: counters inflate for gas only on an unfunded pool.** Five swaps on an empty pool moved zero tokens yet raised both counters to five. The README already documents this, so it is recorded as a trust assumption with its concrete cost, not as a defect.\n\n**What held.** The sum invariant across senders, event-to-view consistency, overflow reverting rather than wrapping, amounts and fees matching a hookless pool, caller authentication on every callback, and the token's fixed supply and standard transfers. All 13 listed entry points have a coverage row; none are unreached.\n\n**Not reached.** Fork rehearsal against a live PoolManager and gas profiling under a production router were outside the local budget.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1320737,"inputTokens":386,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":20424,"runtime":"claude","turns":31,"wallClockMs":280512}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"ba1c4c9096f51a19b5ad6e4eb0c77d508fefa3f45db1a10b589c0ced39e0c447","device":"0256823ae36e7900","findings":[],"hash":"aa6124b31d5fda910306acf453ce27c42a08ef0f993422ff08de484b0b13583d","nodeId":"4e9b1d45-3609-4c5e-b77b-931f44eaa597","outcome":"completed","summary":"Implemented the swap-counter hook, required fixed-supply token, offline dependencies, and [deployment documentation](README.md).\n\nVerified with Solidity 0.8.26:\n\n- `forge build` passes.\n- `forge test`: 29 tests pass, including fuzzing, real swaps, unchanged amounts/fees, and settlement rollback.\n- `forge fmt --check` passes.","treeHash":"7445c73bcef79273cf312ef3480c0d229660e6c2","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1006976,"inputTokens":53234,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":10991,"runtime":"codex","turns":4,"wallClockMs":452669}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"a07759fe4a59554f0f36f82c10ba3e746b8ac06b7ecdc33c52cdb4360bf8c71d","device":"0256823ae36e7900","findings":[],"hash":"aca93b1bb4851f10c07a390982ce0684c851acdb8c1cf7e1c1ed37e0892cd9bc","nodeId":"4dc37685-fdb1-40b4-8391-4b7931e18074","outcome":"completed","summary":"Added tests for counter/event accuracy, failure paths, batch rollback, unchanged swap amounts and fees, and randomized hook/token invariants.\n\n`forge build` and `forge test` pass: **47 tests**, including **16,384 invariant calls**.\n\nOnly files under `test/` were added. No implementation defects were found.","treeHash":"f902717632b11578ddc8f72cbfcbb9609babcd3a","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1420800,"inputTokens":86149,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":7562,"runtime":"codex","turns":5,"wallClockMs":303804}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"729274501f8153578e05575353d9bef04291aebf531585326c548b76dfd4fdd1","device":"35c52a5b502e847c","findings":[],"hash":"d602232023853f6a048d30c3b3eca44d2cbe8cba5d0a27d7f08c2e516c4c6507","nodeId":"502c5247-9fe1-43a6-a3cf-254674a9b86b","outcome":"completed","summary":"Created `launch.json` with matching contract names, permissions, `$poolManager`, native ETH pairing, and decimal `sqrtPriceX96`.\n\nSchema validation and `forge build` passed. `forge test`: 29 passed, zero failures.\n\nOnly `launch.json` changed outside permitted scratch artifacts.","treeHash":"54cd816c86847aacd3a4040801346d7111a96c3a","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":212608,"inputTokens":43189,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":3361,"runtime":"codex","turns":3,"wallClockMs":130747}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"3c7630b22a73c1fb","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_math and audit_economics (same root cause, same fix). PoolManager.initialize (lib/v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol:125-127) accepts key.fee == LPFeeLibrary.DYNAMIC_FEE_FLAG for any hook whose address carries at least one flag (Hooks.isValidHookAddress, lib/v4-core/src/libraries/Hooks.sol:126-127) and sets the initial LP fee to 0 (LPFeeLibrary.getInitialLPFee, line 51-53). Afterwards only msg.sender == key.hooks may call PoolManager.updateDynamicLPFee (PoolManager.sol:339), and a beforeSwap fee override needs the BEFORE_SWAP flag. SwapCounterHook has no beforeSwap and no code path calling updateDynamicLPFee, yet _beforeInitialize returns its selector unconditionally. Pool initialization is permissionless (README line 76-77), so any third party can bind a dynamic-fee pool to this hook; its LP fee is 0 and can never change, which contradicts README line 54 ('ordinary pool LP and protocol fees still apply'). Impact: no loss of funds and the IMD launch pool is unaffected (manifest fee 3000, schema caps fee at 1000000 < 8388608); LPs who choose such a pool can read lpFee == 0 from slot0, so this is a hardening gap and a documentation contradiction, hence low. Minimal fix preserving intended behaviour: in _beforeInitialize, `if (key.fee.isDynamicFee()) revert DynamicFeeNotSupported();` (import LPFeeLibrary, `using LPFeeLibrary for uint24`). Every static fee keeps working.","line":42,"path":"src/SwapCounterHook.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {PoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IPoolManager} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol\";\nimport {IHooks} from \"v4-core/src/interfaces/IHooks.sol\";\nimport {Currency} from \"v4-core/src/types/Currency.sol\";\nimport {PoolKey} from \"v4-core/src/types/PoolKey.sol\";\nimport {LPFeeLibrary} from \"v4-core/src/libraries/LPFeeLibrary.sol\";\nimport {SwapCounterHook} from \"src/SwapCounterHook.sol\";\n\n/// @notice Fails on the current code: a dynamic-fee pool (fee == 0x800000) is accepted by beforeInitialize although\n/// the hook can never set its LP fee, so that pool charges LPs a 0% fee forever. Passes once beforeInitialize rejects\n/// the dynamic-fee sentinel (any revert is accepted).\ncontract DynamicFeePoolRejectedTest is Test {\n    uint160 constant SQRT_PRICE_1_1 = 79228162514264337593543950336;\n    IPoolManager manager;\n    SwapCounterHook hook;\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        manager = IPoolManager(address(new PoolManager(address(this))));\n        bytes memory cc = abi.encodePacked(type(SwapCounterHook).creationCode, abi.encode(manager));\n        bytes32 h = keccak256(cc);\n        address deployed;\n        for (uint256 i; i < 200_000; ++i) {\n            address pred =\n                address(uint160(uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0xff), address(this), bytes32(i), h)))));\n            if (uint160(pred) & 0x3fff != 0x2040) continue;\n            bytes32 salt = bytes32(i);\n            assembly {\n                deployed := create2(0, add(cc, 0x20), mload(cc), salt)\n            }\n            break;\n        }\n        require(deployed != address(0), \"hook deployment failed\");\n        hook = SwapCounterHook(deployed);\n    }\n\n    function test_dynamicFeePoolIsRejectedAtInitialization() public {\n        PoolKey memory dyn = PoolKey(\n            Currency.wrap(address(0x1111)),\n            Currency.wrap(address(0x2222)),\n            LPFeeLibrary.DYNAMIC_FEE_FLAG,\n            60,\n            IHooks(address(hook))\n        );\n        vm.expectRevert();\n        manager.initialize(dyn, SQRT_PRICE_1_1);\n    }\n}","reproduction":"State: fresh PoolManager; SwapCounterHook deployed by CREATE2 at an address with low 14 bits 0x2040 against that manager. Input: PoolKey(currency0=0x1111, currency1=0x2222, fee=0x800000 (8388608), tickSpacing=60, hooks=hook); sqrtPriceX96 = 79228162514264337593543950336. Call: manager.initialize(key, sqrtPriceX96). Expected: revert from the hook's beforeInitialize because it can never set a dynamic fee. Actual: succeeds; getSlot0(key.toId()).lpFee == 0; manager.updateDynamicLPFee(key, 3000) from any EOA reverts UnauthorizedDynamicLPFeeUpdate and the hook has no function that makes that call, so the fee is 0 forever. Verified by running the attached proof under test/scratch/ with `forge test --match-path`: it fails on current code with 'next call did not revert as expected' (gas 66778) and passes once beforeInitialize rejects the sentinel. Also re-traced the specialists' swap figures in the vendored v4-core: an exact-input 1e18 swap on the dynamic pool with 100_000e18 full-range liquidity yields 999990000099999000 out with feeGrowthGlobal0/1 == 0, versus 996990060009101709 in an identical fee-3000 pool.","severity":"low","snippet":"    function _beforeInitialize(address, PoolKey calldata, uint160) internal pure override returns (bytes4) {\n        return IHooks.beforeInitialize.selector;\n    }","title":"beforeInitialize accepts the dynamic-fee sentinel (fee == 0x800000) that the hook can never service, so any such pool is a permanent 0% LP-fee pool bound to this hook"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"From audit_economics; kept as info, not a defect. README lines 37-39 and 46-48 already state that counts are callbacks rather than economic activity, that a callback with no token movement counts, and that counts are global across every pool selecting the hook; README line 127-128 tells consumers not to use them as a Sybil-resistant measure. Because beforeInitialize is permissionless and PoolManager invokes afterSwap even when a swap on a zero-liquidity pool moves nothing (price slides to the limit, delta is (0,0), nothing to settle), anyone can open an empty pool bound to the hook and raise swapCount and totalSwaps without capital or fees. Any off-chain consumer must filter SwapCounted by the launch poolId and treat the numbers as unauthenticated. No code change required if the documented semantics are the accepted design; a per-pool or liquidity-gated count would be a scope decision for the author.","line":52,"path":"src/SwapCounterHook.sol","reproduction":"State: hook deployed with flags 0x2040; PoolKey(0x1111, 0x2222, fee 500, tickSpacing 60, hooks=hook) initialized at sqrtPriceX96 2^96 with no liquidity ever added. Calls: through a minimal unlock-callback router, five swaps with amountSpecified = -1 alternating zeroForOne with sqrtPriceLimitX96 = MIN_SQRT_PRICE+1 / MAX_SQRT_PRICE-1. Observed (scratch test test/scratch/EmptyPoolInflation.t.sol, passes): every swap returns BalanceDelta 0 (router asserts it), no token is transferred, yet hook.totalSwaps() == 5 and hook.swapCount(router) == 5. Cost per swap in this setup: about 460k gas for the first and 766k-770k for later ones (the empty-pool swap walks the tick bitmap to the price limit), i.e. gas only. Expected per the README: exactly this.","severity":"info","snippet":"        uint256 senderCount = ++swapCount[sender];\n        uint256 totalCount = ++totalSwaps;","title":"Counters are inflatable at gas-only cost via swaps on an unfunded pool that selects the hook (documented behaviour, recorded as a trust assumption)"}],"hash":"f978fce4d15d490a2285df5fa6e1d8548d040c761b0695466acd93c168496e17","nodeId":"88caa527-be2f-42e6-afe7-f332a056a7ad","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is written and validated, the scratch directory is removed, and the working tree holds only the new `.imd-findings.json`.\n\n**Outcome**\n\nThe hook and token are sound. I kept one merged low finding, one info note, and answered all 13 entry points plus three invariants.\n\n- **Finding 1, low, merged.** Both the math and economics specialists reported the same root cause: `_beforeInitialize` accepts the dynamic-fee sentinel fee value although the hook has no beforeSwap and never calls the manager's dynamic-fee update, so any third-party pool created with that sentinel has a 0% LP fee forever. I traced the path through the vendored PoolManager and Hooks library, and I ran the economics specialist's proof from test/scratch/. It fails on the current code with \"next call did not revert as expected\", which is the stated reason, so it is attached to the finding. Low severity is right: no funds are lost, the launch pool uses a static 0.3% fee, and the manifest schema cannot select the sentinel. The suggested fix, reverting on a dynamic-fee key in beforeInitialize, preserves every static-fee pool.\n- **Finding 2, info.** The economics specialist's note that counters inflate at gas-only cost on an unfunded pool reproduces. My own scratch test ran five zero-delta swaps on an empty pool and saw both counters reach five. The README already documents this as intended semantics, so it is recorded as a trust assumption, not a defect. I reported my measured gas rather than the specialist's figure, since an empty-pool swap walks the tick bitmap and costs far more than they stated.\n- **Dropped nothing** from the permissions, flow, and test-writing areas, since they reported no findings, and my own pass with the auditor mindset found nothing further. Callback guards, flag encoding, ignored return delta, checked arithmetic, and the fixed-supply OZ token all hold. The aderyn large-literal line is style only.\n\n**One observation outside the findings.** The manifest's initial price of 2^96 with native ETH as currency0 prices one SWAPC at one ETH. The manifest notes say this is copied from test fixtures because no launch value was given, so it is a parameter choice for the launch owner to confirm, not a code defect.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":647102,"inputTokens":258,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":15086,"runtime":"claude","turns":18,"wallClockMs":195304}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":1755,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 82 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 1.64s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":275,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 10 tests for test/SwapCounterToken.t.sol:SwapCounterTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferMovesExactAmountAndPreservesSupply(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 92017, ~: 92215)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 999999999999999999999999999\n\n[PASS] test_approvalAndTransferFromConsumeAllowance() (gas: 153029)\n[PASS] test_approvalRevocationPreventsSpending() (gas: 122412)\n[PASS] test_commonMintAndAdminCallsAreAbsentForDeployerAndOthers() (gas: 397475)\n[PASS] test_metadataAndFixedSupply() (gas: 63217)\n[PASS] test_transferAboveBalanceRevertsWithoutChangingBalances() (gas: 112858)\n[PASS] test_transferFromAboveAllowanceRevertsAtomically() (gas: 108480)\n[PASS] test_wholeSupplyGoesToActualDeployer() (gas: 25964)\n[PASS] test_zeroRecipientCannotBurnSupply() (gas: 47613)\n[PASS] test_zeroSpenderIsRejected() (gas: 30348)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 3.97ms (5.43ms CPU time)\n\nRan 9 tests for test/SwapCounterIntegration.t.sol:SwapCounterIntegrationTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_realSwapAmountsMatchHooklessPool(bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 742005, ~: 745170)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1000000003\n\n[PASS] test_amountsFeesAndPoolStateMatchHooklessPool() (gas: 2028352)\n[PASS] test_countsAggregateAcrossPoolsAndEventIdentifiesPool() (gas: 689346)\n[PASS] test_countsRouterSendersAndIgnoresSpoofedHookData() (gas: 778246)\n[PASS] test_lifecycleCountsOnlySwapsAndAllowsFullWithdrawal() (gas: 1011071)\n[PASS] test_routerRejectsUnauthorizedUnlockCallback() (gas: 31996)\n[PASS] test_settlementFailureRollsBackCountersAndPoolState() (gas: 397535)\n[PASS] test_uninitializedPoolRejectedWithoutCounting() (gas: 78022)\n[PASS] test_zeroAmountRejectedWithoutCounting() (gas: 75223)\nSuite result: ok. 9 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 58.56ms (49.98ms CPU time)\n\nRan 10 tests for test/SwapCounterHook.t.sol:SwapCounterHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allCallbacksRejectUnauthorizedCaller(address) (runs: 256, μ: 307505, ~: 307505)\n[PASS] testFuzz_observationDoesNotDependOnSwapData(address,(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes,uint8) (runs: 256, μ: 574563, ~: 397244)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 13\n\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsIncorrectPermissionBits() (gas: 11286)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsMissingManagerCode() (gas: 32433379)\n[PASS] test_countsSenderAndEmitsUpdatedCounts() (gas: 250024)\n[PASS] test_disabledCallbacksRejectEvenTheManager() (gas: 245089)\n[PASS] test_initialStateAndExactPermissions() (gas: 47411)\n[PASS] test_initializationReturnsSelectorWithoutCounting() (gas: 46442)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoEscapeHatch() (gas: 1365187)\n[PASS] test_saltPreviewDeploysProductionBytecode() (gas: 38821552)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 180.47ms (356.79ms CPU time)\n\nRan 3 test suites in 181.07ms (243.00ms CPU time): 29 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (29 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":41,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"SwapCounterHook.afterAddLiquidity(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(int24,int24,int256,bytes32),int256,int256,bytes)\",\"SwapCounterHook.afterDonate(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint256,uint256,bytes)\",\"SwapCounterHook.afterInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160,int24)\",\"SwapCounterHook.afterRemoveLiquidity(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(int24,int24,int256,bytes32),int256,int256,bytes)\",\"SwapCounterHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"SwapCounterHook.beforeAddLiquidity(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(int24,int24,int256,bytes32),bytes)\",\"SwapCounterHook.beforeDonate(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint256,uint256,bytes)\",\"SwapCounterHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"SwapCounterHook.beforeRemoveLiquidity(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(int24,int24,int256,bytes32),bytes)\",\"SwapCounterHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"SwapCounterToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"SwapCounterToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"SwapCounterToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":3,\"DEPENDENCIES.md\":44,\"README.md\":146,\"foundry.toml\":24,\"remappings.txt\":6,\"script/FindHookSalt.s.sol\":20,\"src/SwapCounterHook.sol\":57,\"src/SwapCounterToken.sol\":12,\"test/SwapCounterHook.t.sol\":177,\"test/SwapCounterIntegration.t.sol\":293,\"test/SwapCounterToken.t.sol\":131,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":48,\"test/utils/HookTestBase.sol\":27},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":1048,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"slither: no results at low impact or above","passed":true},{"durationMs":367,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[low] large-numeric-literal at src/SwapCounterToken.sol:10: Large Numeric Literal","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"aa6124b31d5fda910306acf453ce27c42a08ef0f993422ff08de484b0b13583d","verifiedTreeHash":"7445c73bcef79273cf312ef3480c0d229660e6c2","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+da6bdbe5"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":3572,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 87 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 3.43s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":4116,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 10 tests for test/SwapCounterToken.t.sol:SwapCounterTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferMovesExactAmountAndPreservesSupply(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 92023, ~: 92209)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 754844761046990570672349250\n\n[PASS] test_approvalAndTransferFromConsumeAllowance() (gas: 153029)\n[PASS] test_approvalRevocationPreventsSpending() (gas: 122412)\n[PASS] test_commonMintAndAdminCallsAreAbsentForDeployerAndOthers() (gas: 397475)\n[PASS] test_metadataAndFixedSupply() (gas: 63217)\n[PASS] test_transferAboveBalanceRevertsWithoutChangingBalances() (gas: 112858)\n[PASS] test_transferFromAboveAllowanceRevertsAtomically() (gas: 108480)\n[PASS] test_wholeSupplyGoesToActualDeployer() (gas: 25964)\n[PASS] test_zeroRecipientCannotBurnSupply() (gas: 47613)\n[PASS] test_zeroSpenderIsRejected() (gas: 30348)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 5.54ms (8.85ms CPU time)\n\nRan 3 tests for test/SwapCounterBatch.t.sol:SwapCounterBatchTest\n[PASS] test_eachSwapInOneUnlockCountsAndEmitsOnceAcrossPools() (gas: 552495)\n[PASS] test_finalSettlementFailureRollsBackAllBatchCounters() (gas: 1213773)\n[PASS] test_lastSwapFailureRollsBackEarlierSwapsAcrossPools() (gas: 1166499)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 33.54ms (6.46ms CPU time)\n\nRan 10 tests for test/SwapCounterHookEdgeCases.t.sol:SwapCounterHookEdgeCasesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_eachCallbackEmitsExactlyOneEventForTheEntirePoolKey(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address)) (runs: 1000, μ: 156776, ~: 157170)\n[PASS] testFuzz_spoofingSenderAndOriginCannotChangeExistingCounts(address) (runs: 1000, μ: 256129, ~: 256129)\n[PASS] test_artificialCounterBoundaryReachesMaximumWithoutWrapping() (gas: 473103)\n[PASS] test_artificialSenderOverflowRevertsWithoutChangingEitherCount() (gas: 455788)\n[PASS] test_artificialTotalOverflowRollsBackTheEarlierSenderIncrement() (gas: 488178)\n[PASS] test_countGettersWorkViaStaticcallForPopulatedAndAbsentSenders() (gas: 262204)\n[PASS] test_initializationAfterSwapsNeitherResetsCountsNorEmitsSwapEvents() (gas: 267655)\n[PASS] test_nonpayableSwapRejectsEtherWithoutChangingExistingCounts() (gas: 251680)\n[PASS] test_truncatedCallbackCannotCountASwap() (gas: 240008)\n[PASS] test_zeroAndMaximumSenderAndSwapValuesAreObservedWithoutArithmeticOnAmounts() (gas: 258615)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 213.49ms (262.78ms CPU time)\n\nRan 9 tests for test/SwapCounterIntegration.t.sol:SwapCounterIntegrationTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_realSwapAmountsMatchHooklessPool(bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 741062, ~: 736560)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 10000000000000000000\n\n[PASS] test_amountsFeesAndPoolStateMatchHooklessPool() (gas: 2028352)\n[PASS] test_countsAggregateAcrossPoolsAndEventIdentifiesPool() (gas: 689346)\n[PASS] test_countsRouterSendersAndIgnoresSpoofedHookData() (gas: 778246)\n[PASS] test_lifecycleCountsOnlySwapsAndAllowsFullWithdrawal() (gas: 1011071)\n[PASS] test_routerRejectsUnauthorizedUnlockCallback() (gas: 31996)\n[PASS] test_settlementFailureRollsBackCountersAndPoolState() (gas: 397535)\n[PASS] test_uninitializedPoolRejectedWithoutCounting() (gas: 78022)\n[PASS] test_zeroAmountRejectedWithoutCounting() (gas: 75223)\nSuite result: ok. 9 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 214.82ms (59.36ms CPU time)\n\nRan 10 tests for test/SwapCounterHook.t.sol:SwapCounterHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allCallbacksRejectUnauthorizedCaller(address) (runs: 256, μ: 307505, ~: 307505)\n[PASS] testFuzz_observationDoesNotDependOnSwapData(address,(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes,uint8) (runs: 256, μ: 550912, ~: 363473)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 6\n\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsIncorrectPermissionBits() (gas: 11286)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsMissingManagerCode() (gas: 32433379)\n[PASS] test_countsSenderAndEmitsUpdatedCounts() (gas: 250024)\n[PASS] test_disabledCallbacksRejectEvenTheManager() (gas: 245089)\n[PASS] test_initialStateAndExactPermissions() (gas: 47411)\n[PASS] test_initializationReturnsSelectorWithoutCounting() (gas: 46442)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoEscapeHatch() (gas: 1365187)\n[PASS] test_saltPreviewDeploysProductionBytecode() (gas: 38821552)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 214.78ms (439.35ms CPU time)\n\nRan 3 tests for test/SwapCounterTokenInvariant.t.sol:SwapCounterTokenInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nSwapCounterTokenInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_allowancesMatchApprovalsAndSuccessfulSpending\n[PASS] invariant_fixedSupplyAndExactBalances\n SwapCounterTokenInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 8192, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------------------+----------------------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract                | Selector                         | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=========================================================================================+\n| SwapCounterTokenHandler | approve                          | 1046  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+----------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SwapCounterTokenHandler | rejectTransferAboveBalance       | 978   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+----------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SwapCounterTokenHandler | rejectTransferFromAboveAllowance | 1107  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+----------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SwapCounterTokenHandler | rejectTransferFromAboveBalance   | 994   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+----------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SwapCounterTokenHandler | rejectZeroRecipient              | 1029  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+----------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SwapCounterTokenHandler | rejectZeroSpender                | 992   | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+----------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SwapCounterTokenHandler | transfer                         | 1015  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------------------+----------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SwapCounterTokenHandler | transferFrom                     | 1031  | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------------------+----------------------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 111303857\n  Bound result 1014\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 8207\n  Bound result 184288076021477224554939485\n  Bound result 226900094272399218811870875\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 999\n  Bound result 10000000000000000000\n  Bound result 16\n  Bound result 8441734781611169017471210\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 828417\n  Bound result 2142\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 9007\n\n[PASS] test_edgeSequenceFullSupplySelfTransferAndZero() (gas: 1107838)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 999999999999999999999999999\n\n[PASS] test_edgeSequenceInfiniteApprovalRevocationAndReverts() (gas: 1127413)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 249999999999999999999999999\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 0\n\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 2.45s (2.45s CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/SwapCounterSequenceInvariant.t.sol:SwapCounterSequenceInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nSwapCounterSequenceInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_countersMatchOnlySuccessfulRouterCalls\n[PASS] invariant_hookIsEconomicallyTransparent\n SwapCounterSequenceInvariantTest invariants (runs: 128, calls: 8192, reverts: 0)\n\n╭----------------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract                   | Selector        | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+===========================================================================+\n| SwapCounterSequenceHandler | changeLiquidity | 2664  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SwapCounterSequenceHandler | rejectedSwap    | 2818  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| SwapCounterSequenceHandler | swap            | 2710  | 0       | 0        |\n╰----------------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 2329\n  Bound result 10000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 10000000000000000000\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 13293\n  Bound result 164856355\n  Bound result 999999999999999955\n  Bound result 29\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 6617\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 70495743141093235293\n  Bound result 1999999999999989129\n  Bound result 10000000000000000000\n  Bound result 20495\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 13218027\n  Bound result 14241\n  Bound result 11110\n  Bound result 2034291687927648381\n  Bound result 211757959\n  Bound result 10000000000000000000\n  Bound result 327\n  Bound result 6099533837557061746\n  Bound result 2678\n  Bound result 40497264799121560\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 10000000000000000000\n  Bound result 14241\n  Bound result 13005\n  Bound result 301547\n  Bound result 18791436092\n  Bound result 10000000000000000000\n  Bound result 10854\n  Bound result 3700\n  Bound result 16763478127527183\n  Bound result 10000000000000000000\n  Bound result 241143\n  Bound result 10000000000000000000\n  Bound result 10000000000000000000\n  Bound result 207366592507044312\n  Bound result 145205\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 10000000000000000000\n  Bound result 506375855\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 158\n  Bound result 4264337593543950334\n  Bound result 14981\n  Bound result 2873\n  Bound result 10000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 8023\n  Bound result 2122829436\n  Bound result 746927562615\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 5588\n  Bound result 907403072\n\n[PASS] test_sequenceIncludesDustAllSwapModesAndRollback() (gas: 5098724)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 10000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 10000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 10000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 10000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 4.00s (4.00s CPU time)\n\nRan 7 test suites in 4.00s (7.14s CPU time): 47 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (47 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":68,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"SwapCounterHook.afterAddLiquidity(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(int24,int24,int256,bytes32),int256,int256,bytes)\",\"SwapCounterHook.afterDonate(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint256,uint256,bytes)\",\"SwapCounterHook.afterInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160,int24)\",\"SwapCounterHook.afterRemoveLiquidity(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(int24,int24,int256,bytes32),int256,int256,bytes)\",\"SwapCounterHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"SwapCounterHook.beforeAddLiquidity(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(int24,int24,int256,bytes32),bytes)\",\"SwapCounterHook.beforeDonate(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint256,uint256,bytes)\",\"SwapCounterHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"SwapCounterHook.beforeRemoveLiquidity(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(int24,int24,int256,bytes32),bytes)\",\"SwapCounterHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"SwapCounterToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"SwapCounterToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"SwapCounterToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":3,\"DEPENDENCIES.md\":44,\"README.md\":146,\"foundry.toml\":24,\"remappings.txt\":6,\"script/FindHookSalt.s.sol\":20,\"src/SwapCounterHook.sol\":57,\"src/SwapCounterToken.sol\":12,\"test/README.md\":21,\"test/SwapCounterBatch.t.sol\":206,\"test/SwapCounterHook.t.sol\":177,\"test/SwapCounterHookEdgeCases.t.sol\":232,\"test/SwapCounterIntegration.t.sol\":293,\"test/SwapCounterSequenceInvariant.t.sol\":239,\"test/SwapCounterToken.t.sol\":131,\"test/SwapCounterTokenInvariant.t.sol\":219,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":48,\"test/utils/HookTestBase.sol\":27},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"aca93b1bb4851f10c07a390982ce0684c851acdb8c1cf7e1c1ed37e0892cd9bc","verifiedTreeHash":"f902717632b11578ddc8f72cbfcbb9609babcd3a","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+da6bdbe5"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":8030,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 82 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 7.28s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":1375,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 10 tests for test/SwapCounterToken.t.sol:SwapCounterTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferMovesExactAmountAndPreservesSupply(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 92321, ~: 92221)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 121240450213562914416809379\n\n[PASS] test_approvalAndTransferFromConsumeAllowance() (gas: 153029)\n[PASS] test_approvalRevocationPreventsSpending() (gas: 122412)\n[PASS] test_commonMintAndAdminCallsAreAbsentForDeployerAndOthers() (gas: 397475)\n[PASS] test_metadataAndFixedSupply() (gas: 63217)\n[PASS] test_transferAboveBalanceRevertsWithoutChangingBalances() (gas: 112858)\n[PASS] test_transferFromAboveAllowanceRevertsAtomically() (gas: 108480)\n[PASS] test_wholeSupplyGoesToActualDeployer() (gas: 25964)\n[PASS] test_zeroRecipientCannotBurnSupply() (gas: 47613)\n[PASS] test_zeroSpenderIsRejected() (gas: 30348)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 14.93ms (22.90ms CPU time)\n\nRan 9 tests for test/SwapCounterIntegration.t.sol:SwapCounterIntegrationTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_realSwapAmountsMatchHooklessPool(bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 741277, ~: 736545)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 4434822996517\n\n[PASS] test_amountsFeesAndPoolStateMatchHooklessPool() (gas: 2028352)\n[PASS] test_countsAggregateAcrossPoolsAndEventIdentifiesPool() (gas: 689346)\n[PASS] test_countsRouterSendersAndIgnoresSpoofedHookData() (gas: 778246)\n[PASS] test_lifecycleCountsOnlySwapsAndAllowsFullWithdrawal() (gas: 1011071)\n[PASS] test_routerRejectsUnauthorizedUnlockCallback() (gas: 31996)\n[PASS] test_settlementFailureRollsBackCountersAndPoolState() (gas: 397535)\n[PASS] test_uninitializedPoolRejectedWithoutCounting() (gas: 78022)\n[PASS] test_zeroAmountRejectedWithoutCounting() (gas: 75223)\nSuite result: ok. 9 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 184.62ms (161.36ms CPU time)\n\nRan 10 tests for test/SwapCounterHook.t.sol:SwapCounterHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allCallbacksRejectUnauthorizedCaller(address) (runs: 256, μ: 307505, ~: 307505)\n[PASS] testFuzz_observationDoesNotDependOnSwapData(address,(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes,uint8) (runs: 256, μ: 586464, ~: 435940)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 28\n\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsIncorrectPermissionBits() (gas: 11286)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsMissingManagerCode() (gas: 32433379)\n[PASS] test_countsSenderAndEmitsUpdatedCounts() (gas: 250024)\n[PASS] test_disabledCallbacksRejectEvenTheManager() (gas: 245089)\n[PASS] test_initialStateAndExactPermissions() (gas: 47411)\n[PASS] test_initializationReturnsSelectorWithoutCounting() (gas: 46442)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoEscapeHatch() (gas: 1365187)\n[PASS] test_saltPreviewDeploysProductionBytecode() (gas: 38821552)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 634.64ms (1.20s CPU time)\n\nRan 3 test suites in 637.17ms (834.18ms CPU time): 29 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (29 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":380,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"SwapCounterHook.afterAddLiquidity(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(int24,int24,int256,bytes32),int256,int256,bytes)\",\"SwapCounterHook.afterDonate(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint256,uint256,bytes)\",\"SwapCounterHook.afterInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160,int24)\",\"SwapCounterHook.afterRemoveLiquidity(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(int24,int24,int256,bytes32),int256,int256,bytes)\",\"SwapCounterHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"SwapCounterHook.beforeAddLiquidity(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(int24,int24,int256,bytes32),bytes)\",\"SwapCounterHook.beforeDonate(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint256,uint256,bytes)\",\"SwapCounterHook.beforeInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160)\",\"SwapCounterHook.beforeRemoveLiquidity(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(int24,int24,int256,bytes32),bytes)\",\"SwapCounterHook.beforeSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),bytes)\",\"SwapCounterToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"SwapCounterToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"SwapCounterToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":3,\"DEPENDENCIES.md\":44,\"README.md\":146,\"foundry.toml\":24,\"launch.json\":21,\"remappings.txt\":6,\"script/FindHookSalt.s.sol\":20,\"src/SwapCounterHook.sol\":57,\"src/SwapCounterToken.sol\":12,\"test/SwapCounterHook.t.sol\":177,\"test/SwapCounterIntegration.t.sol\":293,\"test/SwapCounterToken.t.sol\":131,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":48,\"test/utils/HookTestBase.sol\":27},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"d602232023853f6a048d30c3b3eca44d2cbe8cba5d0a27d7f08c2e516c4c6507","verifiedTreeHash":"54cd816c86847aacd3a4040801346d7111a96c3a","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+da6bdbe5"}]}