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custom token: 1 Million Dolar (1MD).\nToken name: 1 Million Dolar\nToken symbol: 1MD\nToken supply: 1,000,000,000 with 18 decimals, all minted once to the deployer in the constructor.\nWhat it does: create another factory,changing the deployer of the token","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"6d9312bfe8c566811a30f90e99b14eac087788237bdb678125fdba1f1473ed87","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"1cecbf8e-35ad-40e0-8c2a-041de867d2d6","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-945-1-million-dolar"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"52011","feedbackHash":"051b2bc8ea5a696fbd57a63fa8ba14767578d859aca28f44ed0ba421cfd3cd7e","nodeKey":"audit_economics","submissionHash":"25fed32e6c281ca7f78b282e967603c2481dcb3d05a6e08f76cbb78306bb23ae","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51040","feedbackHash":"595269acdee20b1a4760eb2b34f111b2ccdb73ef70067c6b8fb52203de191cd8","nodeKey":"audit_flow","submissionHash":"1606240d9696075d7b1db6f80791caa8069e8b793975392c13fec2d890028f5d","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51511","feedbackHash":"039070153a8a02da75e3042291ca03b47d88ef67dfee5c1b66991dd9d389bd4e","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"ad3f24b0d6b77124e6eaf711201efebb3e91f8f37cc7d4f8f1c4873885c3b242","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51429","feedbackHash":"b0d7b0f5456ca362cd8478c0ee5601c48e69a9bd836899c963fb968e387b8ac9","nodeKey":"audit_math","submissionHash":"c6e6f6befd84c8e89b2034705cd5b6eda3fc0d0558dd49ccb8dba8a6d2ed18d6","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51315","feedbackHash":"991db316fe7ef5e466c4f623d42dfd3a628e19762cd276704ded647be905e0b7","nodeKey":"audit_permissions","submissionHash":"a5faa69a7cb5013a733b9d2370747627b066d56dd63cbe2e581c7bbe12d87593","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52224","feedbackHash":"9afdff5d187a9781ca371036236eaaaf1fd785c288fec52f0b4d06ba68e4a7eb","nodeKey":"build_contract_project","submissionHash":"18cbce3cf6d7d652353ea8d5bc005b1e3de95ffa35887ac064e8dc7b673c2afa","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51320","feedbackHash":"cb4d8c3d42dcc36c1f41343ac488bd6654a1542d522efc839fa806a2392e70e0","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"41020ad4551d393bd3d95d9b3e2b1d261b36005ff1519ef4ed85f29b0128d9ec","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"50993","feedbackHash":"c60a5061918c601afb1727e26b67bc938cb0a162a28bf2e3d973ae07db3c9e95","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"293b54d0a4ca02ca5766c3e92c7d4a55a818f721dc47bf269547876af506832d","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"0f6443be7b1977421c5c431f66fc9494911fe971b94c4626f43e7ec1270379a7","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"df74f6c887684f20","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"The recipient guard exists because tokens forwarded to an address with no way to spend them are unrecoverable (the comment on line 19 and README lines 64-68 say so for address(0) and the factory itself). The token that createToken is about to deploy is in exactly the same class: it is created with CREATE from the factory's nonce, so its address is computable by anyone before the call (keccak256(rlp(factory, nonce))), it has no code path that moves its own balance, and nobody can hold an allowance from it. The guard does not exclude it. Execution trace: createToken(predicted) passes line 22, `new Token()` on line 26 deploys at `predicted` and mints 10^27 to the factory, line 29 transfers 10^27 to `predicted` == address(token), the TokenCreated event reports a successful distribution, and the entire supply of that token is frozen inside the token contract forever. The inconsistency is in the factory's own reasoning rather than the ERC-20: the two excluded sentinels and the omitted one share the same failure. Impact is confined to the caller's own freshly created token (no existing holder loses anything), hence low. Minimal fix that preserves the design: compute the address first (`vm`-free: `address predicted = address(uint160(uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0xd6), bytes1(0x94), address(this), )))))` is awkward), or simpler, deploy first and then check `recipient != address(token)` before the transfer, reverting with InvalidRecipient(recipient).","line":22,"path":"src/TokenFactory.sol","reproduction":"State: a deployed TokenFactory F with nonce n (fresh factory: n = 1). Input: recipient = computeCreateAddress(F, n) (forge: vm.computeCreateAddress(address(F), vm.getNonce(address(F)))). Call F.createToken(recipient). Expected (by the guard's own rationale): revert InvalidRecipient(recipient). Actual: the call succeeds, returns token T with address(T) == recipient, T.balanceOf(address(T)) == 1_000_000_000e18, T.balanceOf(F) == 0, T.balanceOf(caller) == 0, T.allowance(address(T), anyone) == 0, and T.transferFrom(address(T), caller, 1) reverts with ERC20InsufficientAllowance. Verified with a scratch Foundry test (test/scratch/FactoryRecipientIsTokenConfirm.t.sol, passes against the current code, confirming the lock; a companion test expecting InvalidRecipient fails with 'next call did not revert as expected').","severity":"low","snippet":" if (recipient == address(0) || recipient == address(this)) {\n revert InvalidRecipient(recipient);\n }","title":"TokenFactory.createToken accepts the new token's own (predictable) address as recipient, permanently locking the full 10^27 supply"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"DEPENDENCIES.md states that forge-std v1.9.7 was 'copied without changes' and that every vendored file can be verified with `sha256sum -c dependencies.sha256`. In the committed tree (HEAD 22479ea, working tree clean) that command reports 7 FAILED entries, all under lib/forge-std/src: StdAssertions.sol, StdJson.sol, StdToml.sol, Vm.sol, console.sol, interfaces/IERC7540.sol, interfaces/IMulticall3.sol. I downloaded the upstream v1.9.7 release archive and compared: the hashes recorded in dependencies.sha256 match the upstream files exactly, while the committed copies differ only by line wrapping (identical after stripping all whitespace), i.e. `forge fmt` was run over lib/ after the hash file was generated. The OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 files (the only library compiled into production bytecode) are byte-identical to upstream and their hashes verify. So there is no change in behaviour, but the one integrity control the repository offers for its vendored code fails, and a verifier running with no network, as the task describes, cannot tell a formatting-only change from a semantic one without this diff. Fix: either restore the seven upstream files byte-for-byte (so the README's 'copied without changes' claim and the hash file both hold) or regenerate dependencies.sha256 and drop the 'without changes' claim. Note: lib/ is outside the paths a contributor may modify, so this likely needs the repository owner.","line":18,"path":"DEPENDENCIES.md","reproduction":"In the repository root at HEAD 22479ea run `sha256sum -c dependencies.sha256 | grep -v ': OK$'`. Expected: no output (every file OK, as DEPENDENCIES.md line 18 promises). Actual: 7 lines ending in FAILED (lib/forge-std/src/StdAssertions.sol, StdJson.sol, StdToml.sol, Vm.sol, console.sol, interfaces/IERC7540.sol, interfaces/IMulticall3.sol) and 'WARNING: 7 computed checksums did NOT match'. Cross-check: `curl -sSL https://codeload.github.com/foundry-rs/forge-std/tar.gz/refs/tags/v1.9.7 | tar xz` then `sha256sum forge-std-1.9.7/src/Vm.sol` gives 9068805b59ac..., which equals the hash recorded in dependencies.sha256 and differs from the committed file's a1b1c82924ae...; `tr -d '[:space:]'` on both copies yields identical content.","severity":"low","snippet":"vendored file and can be checked with `sha256sum -c dependencies.sha256`.","title":"Documented vendored-dependency integrity check fails: seven committed forge-std files were reformatted after dependencies.sha256 was written"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"This is the requested design (the README states the factory is permissionless and that 'repeated names and symbols do not establish identity'), so it is recorded as a trust assumption rather than a defect. Consequence worth making explicit for the launch: if TokenFactory is deployed as an application contract of the launch, its address becomes an official, attested address. Any caller can then create a token with the exact name, symbol, decimals and supply of the launched 1MD whose `deployer()` returns the official TokenFactory address and whose `creatorOf` entry is set in the official factory. Front-ends or integrators that treat `deployer()` or `creatorOf` as a provenance signal would be misled; only the attested token address identifies the real 1MD. No funds of real 1MD holders are affected and no privileged role exists. No code change is required for the agreed design; if provenance is wanted, the factory would need an allow-list or a distinct name/symbol for factory-created tokens, which is a scope decision for the requester.","line":21,"path":"src/TokenFactory.sol","reproduction":"Call officialTokenFactory.createToken(0xBAD) from 0xBAD. Result (verified in a scratch test): fake.name() == '1 Million Dolar', fake.symbol() == '1MD', fake.decimals() == 18, fake.totalSupply() == 1_000_000_000e18, fake.deployer() == address(officialTokenFactory), officialTokenFactory.creatorOf(fake) == 0xBAD, fake.balanceOf(0xBAD) == 1_000_000_000e18. Expected under the documented design: exactly this; the point is that nothing on-chain distinguishes it from the launched token except the attested address.","severity":"info","snippet":" function createToken(address recipient) external returns (Token token) {","title":"Trust assumption: the permissionless TokenFactory lets anyone mint look-alike '1 Million Dolar / 1MD' tokens whose deployer() and creatorOf provenance point at the official factory"}],"hash":"1606240d9696075d7b1db6f80791caa8069e8b793975392c13fec2d890028f5d","nodeId":"65860ebc-85bb-43b3-a16b-be70ee20f6d2","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is at the repository root, excluded from git by the repository's own exclude rule, and the scratch tests are removed so the tree is otherwise untouched.\n\n**Outcome: no critical, high, or medium defects.** The token is an unmodified OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 ERC-20 with a no-argument constructor that mints the full supply once to the deployer, and the factory forwards that supply exactly. I traced all four entry points from my area (Execution Trace, Periphery, First Principles) and wrote three findings plus twelve coverage rows.\n\nFindings written to `.imd-findings.json`:\n\n- **Low, factory recipient guard gap.** The factory rejects the zero address and itself as recipient because tokens sent there are unrecoverable, but accepts the new token's own address, which is predictable from the factory nonce before the call. Calling createToken with that address succeeds and freezes the whole supply inside the token. Confirmed with a scratch Foundry test. Only the caller's own new token is affected.\n- **Low, dependency integrity check fails.** DEPENDENCIES.md says every vendored file verifies with the recorded hashes, but seven forge-std files fail. I downloaded upstream v1.9.7 and showed the recorded hashes match upstream while the committed copies were reformatted after hashing. Content is identical ignoring whitespace, so no behavioural change. The OpenZeppelin files compiled into production are byte-identical to upstream.\n- **Info, trust assumption.** The permissionless factory lets anyone create a token with identical name, symbol and supply whose deployer and creator provenance point at the official factory. This is the documented design, recorded so integrators do not treat those fields as identity.\n\nCoverage: the three token entry points hold. createToken carries finding 1. Extra rows cover both constructors, the supply conservation invariant, both vendored libraries, and the three static-analysis leads, all of which I rejected with reasons. The existing 33-test suite passes and fmt is clean. I could not run the protected launch harness, since it needs host contracts absent from this project, so pool seed and swap behaviour rests on the token being a plain ERC-20 with no transfer hooks.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":698787,"inputTokens":322,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":17922,"runtime":"claude","turns":28,"wallClockMs":366889}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"152cc9eba2fd30990ee60eac22ade99e07978ba0e17dd64a099cad72801eb544","device":"2a2028177fd413f2","findings":[],"hash":"18cbce3cf6d7d652353ea8d5bc005b1e3de95ffa35887ac064e8dc7b673c2afa","nodeId":"fd9252a7-4f4e-43b3-9c1e-8d8258a6c917","outcome":"completed","summary":"Implemented 1MD with 1,000,000,000 tokens, 18 decimals, and constructor-only minting to the deployer. Added a separate factory that deploys new tokens and forwards their supply to a chosen recipient.\n\nDependencies are vendored; assumptions and deployment responsibilities are documented in `README.md`.\n\nVerified with Solidity 0.8.26:\n\n- `forge build` passed.\n- `forge test`: 33 passed, including fuzz and invariant tests.\n- `forge fmt --check` passed.\n\nThe platform’s pool integration harness requires launch infrastructure absent from this repository and was not run locally.","treeHash":"eea94e0a6530b6165a8f0b3aa4e0eff11f48bd6f","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":407552,"inputTokens":44638,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":14223,"runtime":"codex","turns":6,"wallClockMs":317679}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"a406deaac63a93b0","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"DEPENDENCIES.md states that sources were copied without changes from the forge-std v1.9.7 and OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 release archives and that dependencies.sha256 records every vendored file so it can be verified with `sha256sum -c`. The committed dependencies.sha256 holds the upstream v1.9.7 hashes (verified: the hash of each upstream file appears in the committed record), but seven committed forge-std files were reformatted before commit (line wrapping only, confirmed whitespace-only against the upstream archive; `forge fmt` ran over lib/ because foundry.toml does not exclude it). The check therefore fails on the committed tree, so the integrity claim the verifier is told to rely on is wrong. Production impact is nil: the five OpenZeppelin files, including ERC20.sol that Token inherits, are byte-identical to upstream v5.0.2 and pass the check; forge-std is used only by tests. This is a documentation/provenance defect, not an economic one, reported because it is outside the assigned area but concrete and reproducible.","line":18,"path":"DEPENDENCIES.md","reproduction":"In the repository root run `sha256sum -c dependencies.sha256`. Expected (per DEPENDENCIES.md line 11 and 18): 36 lines of `OK`. Actual: 29 OK and 7 FAILED: lib/forge-std/src/StdAssertions.sol, StdJson.sol, StdToml.sol, Vm.sol, console.sol, interfaces/IERC7540.sol, interfaces/IMulticall3.sol, with the warning `7 computed checksums did NOT match`. Example: recorded hash for lib/forge-std/src/Vm.sol is 9068805b...b2cb1 (upstream), actual file hash is a1b1c829...02a15. Fix: either re-copy the seven files unchanged from the v1.9.7 archive and stop running forge fmt over lib/, or regenerate dependencies.sha256 from the committed files and reword the 'copied without changes' claim to say they were reformatted.","severity":"low","snippet":"vendored file and can be checked with `sha256sum -c dependencies.sha256`.","title":"Vendored dependency integrity record is false: 7 forge-std files fail the documented sha256 check"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Economic Security pass, 'legitimate features turned against the protocol'. The requested feature is a second factory that becomes the constructor deployer of new tokens, and it is permissionless by design. Consequence for the launched token's market: anyone can call the project's own TokenFactory and receive 1,000,000,000 1MD of a fresh token with identical name, symbol, decimals and supply, whose immutable deployer() is the official factory and whose creatorOf() entry is non-zero. Nothing on chain except the address distinguishes such a token from the launched one, and the official factory's involvement makes the usual 'anyone can deploy a token with any name' caveat stronger, since explorers and front-ends that trust deployer()/creatorOf() provenance will show the official factory. Buyers of a pool seeded with the look-alike lose what they pay; the launched token's holders are not affected and no launch flow is touched. The README already documents that repeated names do not establish identity and that creatorOf is provenance, not an access role, so this is recorded as the material trust assumption the design carries, not as a code defect. If the requester wants the factory to confer no provenance, a scope decision is needed (for example restricting createToken to a known creator, or not deploying TokenFactory as a launch application); not recommended silently.","line":21,"path":"src/TokenFactory.sol","reproduction":"State: official TokenFactory deployed (as the launch application). Call from any address A: `fake = factory.createToken(A)`. Observed: fake.name() == \"1 Million Dolar\", fake.symbol() == \"1MD\", fake.decimals() == 18, fake.totalSupply() == 1e27, fake.deployer() == address(factory), factory.creatorOf(fake) == A, fake.balanceOf(A) == 1e27. Confirmed by a scratch test (test_lookAlikeTokenCarriesOfficialProvenance) that passes on the current tree. Expected under the stated design: exactly this; the point is that the provenance signal is free to obtain.","severity":"info","snippet":" function createToken(address recipient) external returns (Token token) {","title":"Permissionless official factory lends on-chain provenance to look-alike 1MD tokens (design trust assumption)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Invariant pass, boundary abuse. The guard's stated purpose (NatSpec line 19 and README) is to refuse recipients that would strand the newly minted supply. The token's own address is such a recipient: it is computable before the call from the factory address and nonce (CREATE), the token has no rescue path, and OpenZeppelin ERC20 happily credits the contract itself. The result is a token whose entire 1e27 supply is permanently unspendable. Only the caller who chose that recipient is harmed, so under the validation gates this is self-harm and not a defect that opens a revision; it is recorded because the guard is asymmetric with its own intent and the fix is a one-line check if the author wants it (compute the next CREATE address and reject it, or check `recipient != address(token)` after creation).","line":22,"path":"src/TokenFactory.sol","reproduction":"State: TokenFactory at F with nonce n. Compute `predicted = computeCreateAddress(F, n)` (forge-std vm.computeCreateAddress). Call `token = F.createToken(predicted)`. Observed: address(token) == predicted, token.balanceOf(address(token)) == 1e27, no function on Token or TokenFactory can move it. Expected under the guard's intent: revert InvalidRecipient(predicted). Confirmed by scratch test test_recipientEqualToTokenAddressStrandsSupply on the current tree.","severity":"info","snippet":" if (recipient == address(0) || recipient == address(this)) {\n revert InvalidRecipient(recipient);\n }","title":"createToken recipient guard rejects zero and the factory but not the predictable token address, which strands the whole supply"}],"hash":"25fed32e6c281ca7f78b282e967603c2481dcb3d05a6e08f76cbb78306bb23ae","nodeId":"c30d40d1-f164-4c04-af78-7382c90b6631","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is written at `.imd-findings.json`, and the working tree is otherwise untouched (scratch test removed, no source edits).\n\n**Outcome:** no economic defect in the production code. The token is an unmodified OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 ERC-20 with a fixed supply of 10^27 minor units minted once to its constructor caller, so every launch flow (swarm share, seed, remainder, claims, swaps) moves exactly what it says, the supply cannot grow, and no privileged hand exists. The factory forwards the whole supply atomically and keeps nothing. All 33 existing tests pass, and the three static-analysis leads were rejected after tracing.\n\n**Findings recorded (3):**\n- **Low, DEPENDENCIES.md line 18.** The documented integrity check fails. Running `sha256sum -c dependencies.sha256` reports seven forge-std files as FAILED because they were reformatted before commit while the record holds the upstream v1.9.7 hashes. The difference is whitespace only, and the OpenZeppelin files Token depends on are byte-identical to upstream. Test-only dependency, so no production impact.\n- **Info, TokenFactory.createToken line 21.** The permissionless factory gives look-alike 1MD tokens official provenance: identical name, symbol, decimals and supply, with the immutable deployer pointing at the official factory. This is the requested design and the README documents it, so it is recorded as a trust assumption with a concrete reproduction rather than a defect.\n- **Info, TokenFactory.createToken line 22.** The recipient guard rejects zero and the factory itself but not the predictable token address, which strands the full supply inside the token. Self-inflicted only, so it does not meet the impact gate.\n\n**Coverage:** all four verifier entry points have rows (three hold, one points at the info findings), plus five rows for the supply, conservation, factory-balance, launch-floor and static-analysis invariants. The protected launch harness could not be executed locally since it needs the host launch contracts.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":764872,"inputTokens":322,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":18395,"runtime":"claude","turns":27,"wallClockMs":276905}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"265539fc479d239cc6ec03e788ebe8c50fbedd2e8aa5bd425b8f17db34c12adf","device":"75bef36d3764a939","findings":[],"hash":"293b54d0a4ca02ca5766c3e92c7d4a55a818f721dc47bf269547876af506832d","nodeId":"219f3fff-8b77-469b-b5ca-c91d25a94344","outcome":"completed","summary":"Added failure-path, boundary, fuzz, and multi-actor invariant tests exclusively under `test/`.\n\n- `forge build`: passed.\n- `forge test`: **54 passed**, including 16,384 new invariant-handler calls.\n- Slither: one warning, reviewed as a false positive.\n- Aderyn: unavailable.\n\nNo implementation defects reproduced. Coverage and integration limitations are documented in `test/TESTING.md`.","treeHash":"97977464ea818008ac02d05e6f0f80e4318817fc","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":871168,"inputTokens":59877,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":14887,"runtime":"codex","turns":6,"wallClockMs":363849}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"a329f2b91646a001c79b04fa0199768c44128653b499b2e7f4d388c3dfbb46f9","device":"fe36973c683b5abb","findings":[],"hash":"41020ad4551d393bd3d95d9b3e2b1d261b36005ff1519ef4ed85f29b0128d9ec","nodeId":"d1287463-4b0e-4938-b27d-d66fa7271c89","outcome":"completed","summary":"Created [launch.json](/home/imd-worker-361/.identitymd/work/1cecbf8e-35ad-40e0-8c2a-041de867d2d6/d1287463-4b0e-4938-b27d-d66fa7271c89/launch.json) with exact supply and economics, matching `Token` and `TokenFactory` constructors.\n\nValidated against the supplied schema and compiled ABIs. `forge build` succeeded; all 33 tests passed. Only `launch.json` is changed for submission.","treeHash":"80d70f2468703570e41654f53e2694e0c70a8aa8","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":192256,"inputTokens":35763,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":3388,"runtime":"codex","turns":3,"wallClockMs":194323}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"e3a598aae0640402","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"DEPENDENCIES.md states the vendored libraries were copied without changes from the pinned release archives and that `sha256sum -c dependencies.sha256` verifies them (README.md:121-124 repeats the claim). Seven files under lib/forge-std/src/ do not match: StdAssertions.sol, StdJson.sol, StdToml.sol, Vm.sol, console.sol, interfaces/IERC7540.sol and interfaces/IMulticall3.sol. The hashes recorded in dependencies.sha256 are the upstream v1.9.7 hashes (e.g. Vm.sol 9068805b...), so the hash list is right and the files are what changed. I fetched the v1.9.7 archive and diffed: every difference is `forge fmt` line-wrapping of signatures and an assembly block; no token, identifier or semantic change (OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 files are byte-identical to upstream). Trust-gap impact: the one integrity control the repository offers for its vendored code reports failure, so a reviewer cannot distinguish this benign reformat from a tampered cheatcode interface without re-fetching upstream, and the written provenance claim is false. Production bytecode is unaffected (forge-std is test-only). Fix: either restore the seven files to their upstream bytes (add lib/ to the `[fmt] ignore` list so the formatter does not touch them again), or regenerate dependencies.sha256 and change the 'without changes' sentence to say the files were reformatted.","line":11,"path":"DEPENDENCIES.md","reproduction":"In the repository root run `sha256sum -c dependencies.sha256`. Expected: every line `OK`, exit 0, as DEPENDENCIES.md promises. Actual: `lib/forge-std/src/StdAssertions.sol: FAILED`, `StdJson.sol: FAILED`, `StdToml.sol: FAILED`, `Vm.sol: FAILED`, `console.sol: FAILED`, `interfaces/IERC7540.sol: FAILED`, `interfaces/IMulticall3.sol: FAILED`, `WARNING: 7 computed checksums did NOT match`, exit 1. Cross-check: `curl -sSL https://codeload.github.com/foundry-rs/forge-std/tar.gz/refs/tags/v1.9.7 | tar xz` then `diff forge-std-1.9.7/src/Vm.sol lib/forge-std/src/Vm.sol` shows 72 lines of whitespace-only differences while `sha256sum forge-std-1.9.7/src/Vm.sol` equals the hash on line 18 of dependencies.sha256.","severity":"low","snippet":"Sources were copied without changes from these release archives:","title":"Vendored forge-std does not match the archive DEPENDENCIES.md says it was copied from; the documented integrity check fails"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Permission map of the project: Token has no roles at all (deployer() is a read-only immutable; approve/transfer/transferFrom are standard OpenZeppelin v5.0.2, byte-identical to upstream), and TokenFactory has exactly one state-changing entry point, createToken, classified Public/Unrestricted. Its effect is large relative to its guard: it deploys a contract with the same creation code, name '1 Million Dolar', symbol '1MD', 18 decimals and 10^27 supply as the real launch token, hands the whole supply to a caller-chosen recipient, and records the caller in creatorOf. If TokenFactory is deployed as an application contract in the launch (README.md:87-89 says it may be), the resulting lookalike's deployer() is an address created by the official ProjectFactory, and its creation is attributable on-chain to the launch's contracts. This is the behaviour the task asked for ('create another factory, changing the deployer of the token') and the README documents that names and symbols do not establish identity, so it is not a permission bypass and nobody's balance is at risk; the only asset exposed is provenance. It is reported here so the judge sees the single unrestricted write path in the project and its reach. If the requester wants the factory only for their own use, the minimal change that preserves the design is an immutable `creator` set in the constructor and checked in createToken (or a per-factory name/symbol so clones are distinguishable); if permissionless use is intended, no code change is needed and the canonical token address should be published alongside the factory address.","line":21,"path":"src/TokenFactory.sol","reproduction":"State: launch has deployed `real = new Token()` from address F (F holds 10^27) and `appFactory = new TokenFactory()`. Input: an unrelated account S = 0xBAD calls `appFactory.createToken(S)`. Actual (verified in a Foundry scratch test): returns `fake` with fake.name() == real.name() == '1 Million Dolar', fake.symbol() == '1MD', fake.totalSupply() == 10^27, address(fake).code.length == address(real).code.length (runtime differs only in the embedded immutable deployer word), fake.deployer() == address(appFactory), appFactory.creatorOf(address(fake)) == S, fake.balanceOf(S) == 10^27, and real's balances are untouched (real.balanceOf(F) == 10^27). Expected under a creator-restricted design: the call from S reverts; under the documented permissionless design this is intended behaviour.","severity":"info","snippet":" function createToken(address recipient) external returns (Token token) {","title":"Trust assumption: createToken is permissionless, so any third party can mint launch-attributed 1MD lookalikes through the launch's own application factory"}],"hash":"a5faa69a7cb5013a733b9d2370747627b066d56dd63cbe2e581c7bbe12d87593","nodeId":"397ad905-0843-4157-86eb-23ffd1b347f8","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and the findings file is in place. The working tree has no other changes.\n\n**Outcome:** the token and factory hold under the Access Control, Trust Gap and Asymmetry guides. No permission bypass, escalation path, inconsistent guard or asymmetric write exists in the production code. Two items were substantiated and written to `.imd-findings.json`, neither severe enough to carry a proof test.\n\n**Findings**\n- **Low, dependency integrity.** DEPENDENCIES.md says the vendored libraries were copied without changes and that the hash file verifies them. Running the documented check fails on seven forge-std files. I fetched the v1.9.7 archive and diffed: every difference is formatter line-wrapping, and the OpenZeppelin files are byte-identical. Production bytecode is unaffected, but the one integrity control the repo offers reports failure and the provenance sentence is false.\n- **Info, trust assumption.** The factory's only state-changing function is unrestricted by design. Any third party can use a launch-deployed factory to create a token with identical name, symbol, supply and creation code, attributed on-chain to the launch's own contracts. No balance is at risk and the README documents that names do not establish identity. It is recorded so the judge sees the project's single unrestricted write path and its reach, with a minimal creator-restriction option if the requester wants it.\n\n**Coverage:** all four verifier-listed entry points have rows. The three token functions hold, with OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 confirmed unmodified against upstream. The factory's row points at the info finding. Five extra rows cover the constructor, a recipient guard asymmetry that is self-harm only, launch-floor compatibility traced against the protected suite, both static-analysis leads which did not reproduce, and the dependency check.\n\n**Not reached:** the Uniswap v4 protected harness cannot run in this tree, so launch-floor compatibility is by trace of the token's transfer paths rather than by execution.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1059027,"inputTokens":354,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":20455,"runtime":"claude","turns":39,"wallClockMs":306511}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"fbcdfc017217af1f","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_flow, audit_economics and audit_math (same root cause). The guard refuses the two recipients the NatSpec on line 19 and README lines 64-68 call unrecoverable (zero and the factory), but the token the call is about to deploy belongs to the same class. The factory deploys with plain CREATE, so the next token address is keccak256(rlp(factory, nonce)) and anyone can compute it from public state before calling. Passing it as recipient makes line 29 transfer all 1e27 units to the token contract itself; Token has no code path that spends its own balance and no allowance from itself can ever exist, so every unit is permanently unspendable while totalSupply still reports 1e27 and TokenCreated reports a successful distribution. Only the caller's own freshly created token is affected (no existing holder, the launched 1MD or any launch flow loses anything), so this stays low: the guard is inconsistent with its own stated purpose rather than a loss to a third party. Minimal fix that preserves the design: after `token = new Token();` add `if (recipient == address(token)) revert InvalidRecipient(recipient);` before the transfer (or compute the CREATE address first and fold it into the existing check). The attached proof fails on the current tree and passes with that one-line change. Slither's reentrancy-events line on this function was checked and dropped: the only external call is to the freshly deployed concrete Token, whose transfer path invokes no receiver callback, so nothing can reenter before the event.","line":22,"path":"src/TokenFactory.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {Token} from \"src/Token.sol\";\nimport {TokenFactory} from \"src/TokenFactory.sol\";\n\n/// @notice The factory refuses address(0) and itself as recipient, but not the address of the\n/// token it is about to create. That address is a pure function of the factory address and its\n/// nonce, so any caller can compute it in advance and pass it as `recipient`. The whole supply is\n/// then forwarded to the token contract itself, which has no way to move it out: it is burned in\n/// everything but the totalSupply figure.\ncontract FactoryRecipientIsTokenTest is Test {\n uint256 internal constant SUPPLY = 1_000_000_000 * 1e18;\n\n function test_predictedTokenAddressAsRecipientLocksTheWholeSupply() public {\n TokenFactory factory = new TokenFactory();\n\n // Predict the CREATE address of the next token.\n address predicted = vm.computeCreateAddress(address(factory), vm.getNonce(address(factory)));\n\n // Expected: the factory rejects a recipient that is the token itself (as it rejects 0 and self).\n // Actual on current code: the call succeeds and the supply lands inside the token contract.\n vm.expectRevert(abi.encodeWithSelector(TokenFactory.InvalidRecipient.selector, predicted));\n factory.createToken(predicted);\n }\n\n function test_lockedSupplyIsUnrecoverable() public {\n TokenFactory factory = new TokenFactory();\n address predicted = vm.computeCreateAddress(address(factory), vm.getNonce(address(factory)));\n (bool ok, bytes memory ret) = address(factory).call(abi.encodeCall(TokenFactory.createToken, (predicted)));\n if (!ok) return; // fixed code: nothing to check further\n Token token = abi.decode(ret, (Token));\n assertEq(address(token), predicted, \"prediction\");\n assertEq(token.balanceOf(address(token)), SUPPLY, \"whole supply sits in the token contract\");\n assertEq(token.balanceOf(address(factory)), 0);\n // Nobody can spend it: the token has no code path that calls transfer on itself, and no\n // allowance from itself exists for anyone.\n vm.prank(address(factory));\n vm.expectRevert();\n token.transferFrom(address(token), address(this), 1);\n vm.prank(address(this));\n vm.expectRevert();\n token.transferFrom(address(token), address(this), 1);\n // The totalSupply still claims 1e27 while zero units are spendable by anyone.\n assertEq(token.totalSupply(), SUPPLY);\n }\n}","reproduction":"State: fresh TokenFactory F (nonce 1). Input: predicted = vm.computeCreateAddress(address(F), vm.getNonce(address(F))); call F.createToken(predicted) from any account. Expected by the guard's own rationale: revert InvalidRecipient(predicted), as address(0) and F are rejected. Actual (run locally, `forge test --match-path test/scratch/Proof_5b19d2000c89.t.sol`): the call succeeds, address(token) == predicted, token.balanceOf(address(token)) == 1_000_000_000e18, token.balanceOf(F) == 0, token.totalSupply() == 1_000_000_000e18, and token.transferFrom(address(token), anyone, 1) reverts with ERC20InsufficientAllowance from every caller. test_predictedTokenAddressAsRecipientLocksTheWholeSupply FAILS with 'next call did not revert as expected'; test_lockedSupplyIsUnrecoverable passes, confirming the locked state.","severity":"low","snippet":" if (recipient == address(0) || recipient == address(this)) {","title":"createToken accepts the new token's own predictable CREATE address as recipient and strands the entire 10^27 supply inside the token"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from all four specialists (same root cause). DEPENDENCIES.md states the libraries were 'copied without changes' from the v1.9.7 and v5.0.2 release archives and that `sha256sum -c dependencies.sha256` verifies every vendored file; README.md lines 121-124 repeat the claim. On the committed tree the check fails for seven files under lib/forge-std/src (StdAssertions.sol, StdJson.sol, StdToml.sol, Vm.sol, console.sol, interfaces/IERC7540.sol, interfaces/IMulticall3.sol). I re-downloaded both upstream archives: the hashes recorded in dependencies.sha256 are the upstream v1.9.7 hashes, and each of the seven committed files is identical to upstream after stripping all whitespace, i.e. `forge fmt` ran over lib/ after the hash list was written. All five OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 files, including the ERC20.sol the production token inherits, are byte-identical to upstream and verify. Production bytecode is therefore unaffected and forge-std is test-only, but the single integrity control the repository offers reports failure, and the offline verifier cannot distinguish this benign reformat from a tampered cheatcode interface without the diff I ran. Fix: restore the seven files byte-for-byte from the v1.9.7 archive (and keep lib/ out of forge fmt), or regenerate dependencies.sha256 and drop the 'without changes' wording. lib/ is outside contributor write paths, so this needs the repository owner.","line":18,"path":"DEPENDENCIES.md","reproduction":"In the repository root run `sha256sum -c dependencies.sha256 | grep -v ': OK$'`. Expected per DEPENDENCIES.md lines 11 and 18: no output, every file OK. Actual: seven lines ending in FAILED (lib/forge-std/src/StdAssertions.sol, StdJson.sol, StdToml.sol, Vm.sol, console.sol, interfaces/IERC7540.sol, interfaces/IMulticall3.sol) and 'WARNING: 7 computed checksums did NOT match'. Example: dependencies.sha256 line 18 records 9068805b59ac1d0ea03a8fa1f15ae49c094e0c6c852a2500e0dd112f264b2cb1 for lib/forge-std/src/Vm.sol, which equals sha256sum of upstream forge-std-1.9.7/src/Vm.sol, while the committed file hashes differently; `diff <(tr -d '[:space:]' < upstream) <(tr -d '[:space:]' < committed)` is empty for all seven.","severity":"low","snippet":"vendored file and can be checked with `sha256sum -c dependencies.sha256`.","title":"Documented vendored-dependency integrity check fails: seven committed forge-std files were reformatted after dependencies.sha256 was generated"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from all four specialists. This is the requested design ('create another factory, changing the deployer of the token') and the README states that repeated names and symbols do not establish identity and that creatorOf is provenance, not an access role, so it is recorded as the trust assumption the design carries rather than a defect. Consequence worth stating for the launch page: launch.json deploys TokenFactory as an application contract, so its address becomes official, attested provenance. Any caller can then obtain a token with the exact name, symbol, decimals and 1e27 supply of the launched 1MD whose immutable deployer() is the official factory and whose creatorOf entry is non-zero. Nothing on chain except the address distinguishes it from the launched token; integrators that treat deployer() or creatorOf as endorsement will be misled, and buyers of a pool seeded with such a look-alike lose what they pay. No balance in the launched token or in these contracts is at risk and no privileged role exists. No code change is required by the agreed design; if provenance is wanted, restricting createToken to a known creator or giving factory-created tokens a distinct name is a scope decision for the requester.","line":21,"path":"src/TokenFactory.sol","reproduction":"State: TokenFactory F deployed (as the launch application). Input: stranger S = 0xBAD calls F.createToken(S). Actual (confirmed by the existing test_permissionlessRepeatedDeploymentsAreIndependent in test/TokenFactory.t.sol and by the specialists' scratch tests): fake.name() == '1 Million Dolar', fake.symbol() == '1MD', fake.decimals() == 18, fake.totalSupply() == 1e27, fake.deployer() == address(F), F.creatorOf(address(fake)) == S, fake.balanceOf(S) == 1e27; the launched token's balances are untouched. Expected under the documented permissionless design: exactly this.","severity":"info","snippet":" function createToken(address recipient) external returns (Token token) {","title":"Trust assumption: the permissionless TokenFactory lets anyone create look-alike '1 Million Dolar / 1MD' tokens whose deployer() and creatorOf provenance point at the launch's official factory"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"README.md lines 97-100 say the task provides no chain, paired currency, pool settings or economics and that no launch.json is supplied. The later accepted manifest assignment (commit 5d27170 'combine accepted dependencies') added launch.json with pool.pairedCurrency, fee 3000, tickSpacing 60, initialPrice and economics. The manifest itself is consistent with the code: token.constructorArgs is empty, totalSupply 1000000000000000000000000000 equals INITIAL_SUPPLY, contracts lists TokenFactory with empty constructorArgs, and initialPrice equals floor(sqrt(initialMarketCapWei / totalSupply) * 2^96) = 129702091929298906150570304 as the notes describe. Only the README sentence is now stale; it is a documentation accuracy item and nothing else.","line":100,"path":"README.md","reproduction":"In the repository root run `test -f launch.json && sed -n 100p README.md`. Expected: the README sentence and the tree agree. Actual: launch.json exists (25 lines, committed in 5d27170) while README.md line 100 still reads 'no `launch.json` is supplied'.","severity":"info","snippet":"have been invented, and no `launch.json` is supplied.","title":"README states that no launch.json is supplied, but the merged tree now commits one"}],"hash":"ad3f24b0d6b77124e6eaf711201efebb3e91f8f37cc7d4f8f1c4873885c3b242","nodeId":"d4e8b1bb-0a53-4b26-b622-f018745f51e7","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is written and validated, the working tree is otherwise clean, and the scratch directory was removed.\n\n**Outcome.** Four findings, none above low. The specialists' reports collapsed into three merged findings, and I added one documentation item of my own. No defect threatens the launched token's supply, its launch flows, or any holder's balance.\n\n**Findings written to .imd-findings.json:**\n\n1. **Low, with proof.** The factory's recipient guard rejects the zero address and itself but not the predictable CREATE address of the token it is about to deploy. Passing that address strands that token's whole supply inside the token contract. Only the caller's own new token is harmed, so it stays low. The specialist proof fails on the current code for exactly this reason and is attached. Three specialists reported this; merged into one.\n2. **Low.** The documented integrity check fails: seven forge-std files were reformatted after the hash list was written. I re-downloaded both upstream archives and confirmed the differences are whitespace only, and that every OpenZeppelin file the production token inherits is byte-identical to upstream. All four specialists reported this; merged into one.\n3. **Info, trust assumption.** The permissionless factory lets anyone create a look-alike 1MD token whose deployer and creator provenance point at the launch's official factory. This is the requested design and the README documents it. All four specialists reported it; merged into one.\n4. **Info, mine.** The README still says no launch.json is supplied, but the merge commit added one. The manifest itself checks out: empty constructor arguments, supply equal to the constant, and an initialPrice that matches the stated formula to the digit.\n\n**Dropped leads.** The Slither reentrancy line does not hold because the only external call is to the freshly deployed concrete Token, which has no callback. The aderyn unsafe-ERC20 line does not hold because the return value is checked and OpenZeppelin reverts on failure.\n\n**Coverage.** All four entry points answered: the three Token functions hold as unmodified OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 code, and createToken carries finding 1. The protected harness is recorded as unreached because it needs Uniswap v4 and host contracts absent from this tree. The local suite of 56 tests passes apart from the attached proof.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":649707,"inputTokens":322,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":12026,"runtime":"claude","turns":11,"wallClockMs":188104}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"3987a51ff810f3b9","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Boundary gap (Boundary guide, Step 2 case 3 / sentinel-branch walk). The guard enumerates two unrecoverable recipients, the zero address and the factory, but misses a third that is just as unrecoverable and just as computable in advance: the address of the Token the call is about to create. Because the factory deploys with plain CREATE, the next token address is keccak256(rlp(factory, nonce)), which anyone can compute from public state (the factory's nonce). If a caller passes that address, the constructor mints 1e27 units to the factory and the factory then forwards all 1e27 units to the token contract itself. Token has no code path that calls transfer on its own behalf and can never grant an allowance from itself, so every unit is permanently unspendable while totalSupply still reports 1,000,000,000e18. The factory's stated contract (README: 'cannot be zero or this factory', 'Choose a recipient whose keys you control') treats unrecoverable recipients as an input error; this one slips past the check. Impact is confined to the caller's own freshly created token (no existing holder or launch supply is affected, and creation is free), so severity is low. Minimal fix that preserves the design: after `token = new Token();` add `if (recipient == address(token)) revert InvalidRecipient(recipient);` (or compute the CREATE address before deploying and fold it into the existing guard).","line":22,"path":"src/TokenFactory.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {Token} from \"src/Token.sol\";\nimport {TokenFactory} from \"src/TokenFactory.sol\";\n\n/// @notice The factory refuses address(0) and itself as recipient, but not the address of the\n/// token it is about to create. That address is a pure function of the factory address and its\n/// nonce, so any caller can compute it in advance and pass it as `recipient`. The whole supply is\n/// then forwarded to the token contract itself, which has no way to move it out: it is burned in\n/// everything but the totalSupply figure.\ncontract FactoryRecipientIsTokenTest is Test {\n uint256 internal constant SUPPLY = 1_000_000_000 * 1e18;\n\n function test_predictedTokenAddressAsRecipientLocksTheWholeSupply() public {\n TokenFactory factory = new TokenFactory();\n\n // Predict the CREATE address of the next token.\n address predicted = vm.computeCreateAddress(address(factory), vm.getNonce(address(factory)));\n\n // Expected: the factory rejects a recipient that is the token itself (as it rejects 0 and self).\n // Actual on current code: the call succeeds and the supply lands inside the token contract.\n vm.expectRevert(abi.encodeWithSelector(TokenFactory.InvalidRecipient.selector, predicted));\n factory.createToken(predicted);\n }\n\n function test_lockedSupplyIsUnrecoverable() public {\n TokenFactory factory = new TokenFactory();\n address predicted = vm.computeCreateAddress(address(factory), vm.getNonce(address(factory)));\n (bool ok, bytes memory ret) = address(factory).call(abi.encodeCall(TokenFactory.createToken, (predicted)));\n if (!ok) return; // fixed code: nothing to check further\n Token token = abi.decode(ret, (Token));\n assertEq(address(token), predicted, \"prediction\");\n assertEq(token.balanceOf(address(token)), SUPPLY, \"whole supply sits in the token contract\");\n assertEq(token.balanceOf(address(factory)), 0);\n // Nobody can spend it: the token has no code path that calls transfer on itself, and no\n // allowance from itself exists for anyone.\n vm.prank(address(factory));\n vm.expectRevert();\n token.transferFrom(address(token), address(this), 1);\n vm.prank(address(this));\n vm.expectRevert();\n token.transferFrom(address(token), address(this), 1);\n // The totalSupply still claims 1e27 while zero units are spendable by anyone.\n assertEq(token.totalSupply(), SUPPLY);\n }\n}","reproduction":"State: fresh TokenFactory F with nonce n (vm.getNonce(F)). Input: predicted = vm.computeCreateAddress(F, n); call F.createToken(predicted) from any EOA. Expected: revert InvalidRecipient(predicted), matching how address(0) and F itself are rejected. Actual: call succeeds; returned token == predicted; token.balanceOf(token) == 1_000_000_000e18; token.balanceOf(F) == 0; token.totalSupply() == 1_000_000_000e18; token.transferFrom(token, anyone, 1) reverts for every caller (ERC20InsufficientAllowance), so the full supply is irrecoverable. Run: forge test --match-path test/scratch/FactoryRecipientIsToken.t.sol -> test_predictedTokenAddressAsRecipientLocksTheWholeSupply FAILS on current code ('next call did not revert as expected'); test_lockedSupplyIsUnrecoverable passes and prints the locked state.","severity":"low","snippet":" if (recipient == address(0) || recipient == address(this)) {\n revert InvalidRecipient(recipient);\n }","title":"createToken accepts the token's own (predictable) address as recipient and locks the whole supply inside the token"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Trust assumption, documented rather than a code defect: this is the design the brief asked for ('create another factory, changing the deployer of the token') and the README states that names and symbols do not establish identity. Still worth recording for the judge and the launch page: every token created through createToken has name '1 Million Dolar', symbol '1MD', supply 1e27 and deployer() == TokenFactory. If TokenFactory is deployed as an application contract of this launch, its address is public project provenance, and a counterfeit token created by a stranger will answer deployer() with that official address and emit TokenCreated from it. Only creatorOf(token) and the token address itself distinguish the launched token from a counterfeit. No funds inside these contracts are at risk and no fix is required by the agreed design; the mitigation is to publish the launched token address and chain ID as the sole identity and to make clear that creatorOf is provenance, not endorsement.","line":21,"path":"src/TokenFactory.sol","reproduction":"State: TokenFactory F deployed. Input: stranger S calls F.createToken(S). Actual: new token X with X.name()=='1 Million Dolar', X.symbol()=='1MD', X.totalSupply()==1e27, X.deployer()==F, X.balanceOf(S)==1e27, F.creatorOf(X)==S. These values are identical to any 'official' token created through F except the creator record and the address. The existing test test_permissionlessRepeatedDeploymentsAreIndependent in test/TokenFactory.t.sol already exercises two such tokens from different callers.","severity":"info","snippet":" function createToken(address recipient) external returns (Token token) {","title":"Permissionless factory lets anyone create look-alike 1MD tokens whose deployer() is the project's own TokenFactory"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"DEPENDENCIES.md line 18 says every vendored file 'can be checked with `sha256sum -c dependencies.sha256`', but that command fails for 7 forge-std files (StdAssertions.sol, StdJson.sol, StdToml.sol, Vm.sol, console.sol, interfaces/IERC7540.sol, interfaces/IMulticall3.sol). I downloaded the upstream v1.9.7 and v5.0.2 release archives and diffed: all OpenZeppelin files (ERC20.sol, IERC20.sol, IERC20Metadata.sol, Context.sol, draft-IERC6093.sol) are byte-identical to upstream and their hashes match; the 7 forge-std files differ from upstream only in whitespace/line wrapping (identical after stripping whitespace), consistent with `forge fmt` having touched lib/ after the hash list was generated. So the production dependency is intact and this is a documentation/integrity-tooling inconsistency only: the integrity check the README offers reports failure, and DEPENDENCIES.md's 'copied without changes' is not literally true for those 7 test-only files. Fix: regenerate dependencies.sha256 from the tree (or restore the upstream bytes), and keep forge fmt out of lib/.","line":5,"path":"dependencies.sha256","reproduction":"Run `sha256sum -c dependencies.sha256` at the repository root. Expected: all OK. Actual: 'sha256sum: WARNING: 7 computed checksums did NOT match'. Example: recorded d4c89eec70d267dec6188461fbc74d3dc8c47e518d176a23417533a232ed9780 for lib/forge-std/src/StdAssertions.sol, actual 3fbf4a025b4fc94eaca4c38c1f3dacb37bee10f12ee81994cfaf365ac1ce7384. `diff -w` against upstream forge-std v1.9.7 src/StdAssertions.sol is empty.","severity":"info","snippet":"d4c89eec70d267dec6188461fbc74d3dc8c47e518d176a23417533a232ed9780 lib/forge-std/src/StdAssertions.sol","title":"dependencies.sha256 does not match seven vendored forge-std files (whitespace-only reformat; upstream content identical)"}],"hash":"c6e6f6befd84c8e89b2034705cd5b6eda3fc0d0558dd49ccb8dba8a6d2ed18d6","nodeId":"0274a4e5-cf4d-4438-bb6c-1eab99d47347","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. No tracked files were changed; the findings file and the scratch test are the only new artifacts.\n\n**Outcome.** The math and boundary audit found no arithmetic defect in the token. One low-severity boundary gap in the factory and two informational notes are recorded in `.imd-findings.json`, with a coverage row for each of the four entry points plus four invariants.\n\n**Findings**\n\n- **Low, factory recipient guard (finding 1).** `TokenFactory.createToken` rejects the zero address and itself as recipient, but not the address of the token it is about to create. That address is a plain CREATE address, computable from the factory's public nonce. Passing it forwards all 1e27 units into the token contract, where no code path or allowance can ever move them, while totalSupply still reports the full amount. The scratch test under `test/scratch/` fails on the current code and passes once the recipient is also checked against the new token's address. Impact is confined to the caller's own free token, hence low.\n- **Info, look-alike tokens.** Anyone can create a token with identical name, symbol and supply whose `deployer()` is the project's own factory. This is the requested permissionless design and is recorded as a trust assumption, not a defect to fix.\n- **Info, dependency hash file.** The documented integrity check `sha256sum -c dependencies.sha256` fails for seven forge-std files. I downloaded upstream forge-std v1.9.7 and OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 and diffed: OpenZeppelin files are byte-identical, and the seven forge-std files differ only in whitespace. The production dependency is intact; the hash list is stale.\n\n**What held.** OpenZeppelin's `approve`, `transfer` and `transferFrom` were traced through the vendored v5.0.2 source: checked arithmetic bounded by the constant supply, correct zero-address and allowance failure paths, supply conserved across the existing invariant run. The constant supply cannot overflow, there is no division anywhere, and the runtime bytecode contains no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT. The slither reentrancy lead and both aderyn leads were checked and rejected: the factory's only external call targets its freshly created token, which has no callbacks, and the transfer return value is checked.\n\n**Not covered.** No `launch.json` exists in the tree, so manifest validation and the Uniswap v4 seed and swap flows in the protected harness could not be exercised locally.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":662516,"inputTokens":290,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":16821,"runtime":"claude","turns":26,"wallClockMs":297877}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":1314,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 29 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 1.20s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":617,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 8 tests for test/TokenFactory.t.sol:TokenFactoryTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_chosenRecipientGetsExactSupply(address) (runs: 256, μ: 592503, ~: 592594)\n[PASS] test_anotherFactoryChangesDeployerForNewTokensOnly() (gas: 1157563)\n[PASS] test_factoryAndCreatorHaveNoAuthorityOverDistributedTokens() (gas: 658028)\n[PASS] test_factoryCannotBeRecipient() (gas: 30393)\n[PASS] test_factoryIsActualDeployerAndForwardsAllSupply() (gas: 625589)\n[PASS] test_nativeCurrencyIsRejected() (gas: 65714)\n[PASS] test_permissionlessRepeatedDeploymentsAreIndependent() (gas: 1195623)\n[PASS] test_zeroRecipientRevertsBeforeCreatingToken() (gas: 578613)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 5.50ms (7.42ms CPU time)\n\nRan 24 tests for test/Token.t.sol:TokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupply(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 155433, ~: 155853)\nLogs:\n Bound result 813429177804570539522753874\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFromConsumesAllowance(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 156086, ~: 157965)\nLogs:\n Bound result 413524\n Bound result 227794\n\n[PASS] test_applicationFactoryConstructorPreservesExistingLaunchSupply() (gas: 199812)\n[PASS] test_approveEmitsEventAndReplacesAllowance() (gas: 139869)\n[PASS] test_approveRejectsZeroSpender() (gas: 30407)\n[PASS] test_constructorEmitsOneMintToImmediateCaller() (gas: 26330)\n[PASS] test_create2MintsToContractCallerAndNotTransactionOrigin() (gas: 224086)\n[PASS] test_deployerCannotSpendHoldersTokensWithoutApproval() (gas: 92233)\n[PASS] test_failedTransferFromRestoresSpentAllowance() (gas: 114386)\n[PASS] test_launchDistributionAndClaimDeliverExactAmounts() (gas: 155491)\n[PASS] test_metadataAndExactSupply() (gas: 79932)\n[PASS] test_nativeCurrencyIsRejected() (gas: 36886)\n[PASS] test_noPostDeploymentMintOrAdministration() (gas: 1158946)\n[PASS] test_revokedApprovalCannotSpend() (gas: 105263)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoDelegatecallCallcodeOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 802708)\n[PASS] test_transferEmitsEventAndDeliversExactAmount() (gas: 88796)\n[PASS] test_transferFromConsumesExactAllowance() (gas: 140164)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRejectsInsufficientAllowance() (gas: 108623)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRejectsZeroRecipientAndRestoresAllowance() (gas: 101211)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRejectsZeroSender() (gas: 33031)\n[PASS] test_transferFromWithInfiniteAllowanceDoesNotDecreaseIt() (gas: 126654)\n[PASS] test_transferRejectsInsufficientBalanceWithoutChangingBalances() (gas: 60918)\n[PASS] test_transferRejectsZeroRecipientEvenForZeroAmount() (gas: 71904)\n[PASS] test_zeroAndSelfTransfersPreserveSupply() (gas: 102435)\nSuite result: ok. 24 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 8.57ms (22.86ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/Token.invariant.t.sol:TokenInvariantTest\n[PASS] invariant_supplyIsFixedAndAllBalancesAreConserved() (runs: 128, calls: 8192, reverts: 0)\n\n╭--------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+==========================================================+\n| TokenHandler | approve | 2691 | 0 | 0 |\n|--------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | transfer | 2730 | 0 | 0 |\n|--------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | transferFrom | 2771 | 0 | 0 |\n╰--------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 2\n Bound result 255\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 154832171511028620773329747\n Bound result 127\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 128\n Bound result 5000000000000000000\n Bound result 166\n Bound result 13\n Bound result 1\n Bound result 398\n Bound result 24301\n Bound result 363\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 2000000000000000000\n Bound result 37945462721\n Bound result 53992569383073113979795797\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 999999999000000001\n Bound result 53262\n Bound result 3492\n Bound result 845167829488971340281203899\n Bound result 10435083356799037360813339\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 514.02ms (511.86ms CPU time)\n\nRan 3 test suites in 516.16ms (528.10ms CPU time): 33 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (33 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":34,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"Token.approve(address,uint256)\",\"Token.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"Token.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"TokenFactory.createToken(address)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"DEPENDENCIES.md\":18,\"README.md\":140,\"dependencies.sha256\":36,\"foundry.toml\":20,\"remappings.txt\":2,\"src/Token.sol\":18,\"src/TokenFactory.sol\":34,\"test/Token.invariant.t.sol\":68,\"test/Token.t.sol\":289,\"test/TokenFactory.t.sol\":136},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":538,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/TokenFactory.sol:21: Reentrancy in TokenFactory.createToken(address) (src/TokenFactory.sol#21-33):","passed":true},{"durationMs":274,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[low] large-numeric-literal at src/Token.sol:9: Large Numeric Literal\n[low] unsafe-erc20-operation at src/TokenFactory.sol:29: Unsafe ERC20 Operation","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"18cbce3cf6d7d652353ea8d5bc005b1e3de95ffa35887ac064e8dc7b673c2afa","verifiedTreeHash":"eea94e0a6530b6165a8f0b3aa4e0eff11f48bd6f","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+a2d9a899"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":1683,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 32 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 1.59s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":25113,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 8 tests for test/TokenFactory.t.sol:TokenFactoryTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_chosenRecipientGetsExactSupply(address) (runs: 256, μ: 592504, ~: 592594)\n[PASS] test_anotherFactoryChangesDeployerForNewTokensOnly() (gas: 1157563)\n[PASS] test_factoryAndCreatorHaveNoAuthorityOverDistributedTokens() (gas: 658028)\n[PASS] test_factoryCannotBeRecipient() (gas: 30393)\n[PASS] test_factoryIsActualDeployerAndForwardsAllSupply() (gas: 625589)\n[PASS] test_nativeCurrencyIsRejected() (gas: 65714)\n[PASS] test_permissionlessRepeatedDeploymentsAreIndependent() (gas: 1195623)\n[PASS] test_zeroRecipientRevertsBeforeCreatingToken() (gas: 578613)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 18.69ms (20.06ms CPU time)\n\nRan 24 tests for test/Token.t.sol:TokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupply(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 155435, ~: 155853)\nLogs:\n Bound result 24576\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFromConsumesAllowance(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 156051, ~: 157935)\nLogs:\n Bound result 172383300227306364735128230\n Bound result 1\n\n[PASS] test_applicationFactoryConstructorPreservesExistingLaunchSupply() (gas: 199812)\n[PASS] test_approveEmitsEventAndReplacesAllowance() (gas: 139869)\n[PASS] test_approveRejectsZeroSpender() (gas: 30407)\n[PASS] test_constructorEmitsOneMintToImmediateCaller() (gas: 26330)\n[PASS] test_create2MintsToContractCallerAndNotTransactionOrigin() (gas: 224086)\n[PASS] test_deployerCannotSpendHoldersTokensWithoutApproval() (gas: 92233)\n[PASS] test_failedTransferFromRestoresSpentAllowance() (gas: 114386)\n[PASS] test_launchDistributionAndClaimDeliverExactAmounts() (gas: 155491)\n[PASS] test_metadataAndExactSupply() (gas: 79932)\n[PASS] test_nativeCurrencyIsRejected() (gas: 36886)\n[PASS] test_noPostDeploymentMintOrAdministration() (gas: 1158946)\n[PASS] test_revokedApprovalCannotSpend() (gas: 105263)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoDelegatecallCallcodeOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 802708)\n[PASS] test_transferEmitsEventAndDeliversExactAmount() (gas: 88796)\n[PASS] test_transferFromConsumesExactAllowance() (gas: 140164)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRejectsInsufficientAllowance() (gas: 108623)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRejectsZeroRecipientAndRestoresAllowance() (gas: 101211)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRejectsZeroSender() (gas: 33031)\n[PASS] test_transferFromWithInfiniteAllowanceDoesNotDecreaseIt() (gas: 126654)\n[PASS] test_transferRejectsInsufficientBalanceWithoutChangingBalances() (gas: 60918)\n[PASS] test_transferRejectsZeroRecipientEvenForZeroAmount() (gas: 71904)\n[PASS] test_zeroAndSelfTransfersPreserveSupply() (gas: 102435)\nSuite result: ok. 24 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 62.13ms (100.78ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/TokenFactory.edges.t.sol:TokenFactoryEdgeTest\n[PASS] test_contractCreatorIsRecordedInsteadOfTransactionOrigin() (gas: 810803)\n[PASS] test_contractRecipientNeedsNoCallbackAndCanTransferWholeSupply() (gas: 817847)\n[PASS] test_failedBatchRollsBackMintRegistryAndCreationNonce() (gas: 1363398)\n[PASS] test_repeatedRejectionsPreserveEarlierTokenAndNextDeployment() (gas: 1322874)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 62.32ms (924.85µs CPU time)\n\nRan 16 tests for test/Token.edges.t.sol:TokenEdgeTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_allowancesAreIsolatedByOwnerAndSpender(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 304189, ~: 306062)\nLogs:\n Bound result 604219762978560075922238490\n Bound result 7512393881026974006718\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_failedSpendRestoresFiniteAllowance(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 205761, ~: 206290)\nLogs:\n Bound result 96\n Bound result 244\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_failedTransferDoesNotChangeBalances(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 148684, ~: 149231)\nLogs:\n Bound result 999999999999999999999999999\n Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665639564039457584007913171832055\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_insufficientAllowanceIsAtomic(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 147432, ~: 147841)\nLogs:\n Bound result 95\n Bound result 13468\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_roundTripRestoresBalancesWithoutTouchingApproval(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 210313, ~: 210606)\nLogs:\n Bound result 8586\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_zeroReceiverRestoresAllowance(uint256,bool) (runs: 1000, μ: 145515, ~: 144681)\nLogs:\n Bound result 15230\n\n[PASS] test_delegatedSelfTransferConsumesAllowanceButKeepsBalance() (gas: 145074)\n[PASS] test_infiniteAllowanceCanBeReplacedAndRevoked() (gas: 223184)\n[PASS] test_maximumDelegatedTransferCannotSpendBeyondBalance() (gas: 143207)\n[PASS] test_maximumMinusOneApprovalIsFinite() (gas: 167379)\n[PASS] test_maximumTransferRevertsWithoutOverflowOrMinting() (gas: 82297)\n[PASS] test_oneWeiThenRemainingSupplyCanBeSpentExactlyOnce() (gas: 253444)\n[PASS] test_ownerCannotBypassTransferFromAllowance() (gas: 169777)\n[PASS] test_supplyPlusOneRevertsEvenOnSelfTransfer() (gas: 82165)\n[PASS] test_zeroApprovalStillRejectsZeroSpender() (gas: 90216)\n[PASS] test_zeroDelegatedTransferNeedsNeitherBalanceNorApproval() (gas: 101211)\nSuite result: ok. 16 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 63.46ms (371.83ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/Token.invariant.t.sol:TokenInvariantTest\n[PASS] invariant_supplyIsFixedAndAllBalancesAreConserved() (runs: 128, calls: 8192, reverts: 0)\n\n╭--------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+==========================================================+\n| TokenHandler | approve | 2732 | 0 | 0 |\n|--------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | transfer | 2751 | 0 | 0 |\n|--------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | transferFrom | 2709 | 0 | 0 |\n╰--------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n Bound result 12000000000000000000\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 3630\n Bound result 24576\n Bound result 526\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 12000000000000000000\n Bound result 27123\n Bound result 5880\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 7\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 1684\n Bound result 4911\n Bound result 110\n Bound result 22\n Bound result 285\n Bound result 16\n Bound result 4\n Bound result 14\n Bound result 249\n Bound result 1540\n Bound result 1474\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 180\n Bound result 4\n Bound result 1771\n Bound result 2\n Bound result 270288498787413340908270045\n Bound result 6094604378\n Bound result 13234\n Bound result 6\n Bound result 4176\n Bound result 1306\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 79478247054028358838147761\n Bound result 2\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 447.07ms (446.35ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/TokenFactory.model.invariant.t.sol:FactoryTokenModelInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nFactoryTokenModelInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_allAllowancesMatchIndependentLedger\n[PASS] invariant_balancesMatchIndependentLedgerAndSupplyIsConserved\n[PASS] invariant_factoryProvenanceAndTokenMetadataRemainIndependent\n FactoryTokenModelInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭--------------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=========================================================================+\n| FactoryTokenModelHandler | approve | 1829 | 0 | 0 |\n|--------------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FactoryTokenModelHandler | approveAndSpend | 1849 | 0 | 0 |\n|--------------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FactoryTokenModelHandler | create | 1815 | 0 | 0 |\n|--------------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FactoryTokenModelHandler | rejectApproval | 1777 | 0 | 0 |\n|--------------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FactoryTokenModelHandler | rejectCreation | 1799 | 0 | 0 |\n|--------------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FactoryTokenModelHandler | rejectSpend | 1892 | 0 | 0 |\n|--------------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FactoryTokenModelHandler | rejectTransfer | 1859 | 0 | 0 |\n|--------------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FactoryTokenModelHandler | transfer | 1790 | 0 | 0 |\n|--------------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FactoryTokenModelHandler | transferFrom | 1774 | 0 | 0 |\n╰--------------------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 18\n Bound result 1000000000\n Bound result 3000000000000000000\n Bound result 4\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 764\n Bound result 471234002260\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 112833291928270781753979928\n Bound result 1\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 999999999999999999999999999\n Bound result 8288\n Bound result 847867862359495770482639265\n Bound result 3\n Bound result 1396168377954770812690981929630918166732944645823924616153867542589638\n Bound result 1\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 22\n Bound result 1000000000000000000\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 946\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 260637061220370964814618290\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 25.03s (25.03s CPU time)\n\nRan 6 test suites in 25.04s (25.69s CPU time): 54 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (54 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":34,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"Token.approve(address,uint256)\",\"Token.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"Token.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"TokenFactory.createToken(address)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"DEPENDENCIES.md\":18,\"README.md\":140,\"dependencies.sha256\":36,\"foundry.toml\":20,\"remappings.txt\":2,\"src/Token.sol\":18,\"src/TokenFactory.sol\":34,\"test/TESTING.md\":29,\"test/Token.edges.t.sol\":224,\"test/Token.invariant.t.sol\":68,\"test/Token.t.sol\":289,\"test/TokenFactory.edges.t.sol\":108,\"test/TokenFactory.model.invariant.t.sol\":277,\"test/TokenFactory.t.sol\":136},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"293b54d0a4ca02ca5766c3e92c7d4a55a818f721dc47bf269547876af506832d","verifiedTreeHash":"97977464ea818008ac02d05e6f0f80e4318817fc","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+a2d9a899"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":1422,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 29 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 1.29s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":723,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 8 tests for test/TokenFactory.t.sol:TokenFactoryTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_chosenRecipientGetsExactSupply(address) (runs: 256, μ: 592509, ~: 592594)\n[PASS] test_anotherFactoryChangesDeployerForNewTokensOnly() (gas: 1157563)\n[PASS] test_factoryAndCreatorHaveNoAuthorityOverDistributedTokens() (gas: 658028)\n[PASS] test_factoryCannotBeRecipient() (gas: 30393)\n[PASS] test_factoryIsActualDeployerAndForwardsAllSupply() (gas: 625589)\n[PASS] test_nativeCurrencyIsRejected() (gas: 65714)\n[PASS] test_permissionlessRepeatedDeploymentsAreIndependent() (gas: 1195623)\n[PASS] test_zeroRecipientRevertsBeforeCreatingToken() (gas: 578613)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 8.31ms (10.29ms CPU time)\n\nRan 24 tests for test/Token.t.sol:TokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupply(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 155426, ~: 155853)\nLogs:\n Bound result 353503736342393546165711608\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFromConsumesAllowance(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 155742, ~: 157925)\nLogs:\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n\n[PASS] test_applicationFactoryConstructorPreservesExistingLaunchSupply() (gas: 199812)\n[PASS] test_approveEmitsEventAndReplacesAllowance() (gas: 139869)\n[PASS] test_approveRejectsZeroSpender() (gas: 30407)\n[PASS] test_constructorEmitsOneMintToImmediateCaller() (gas: 26330)\n[PASS] test_create2MintsToContractCallerAndNotTransactionOrigin() (gas: 224086)\n[PASS] test_deployerCannotSpendHoldersTokensWithoutApproval() (gas: 92233)\n[PASS] test_failedTransferFromRestoresSpentAllowance() (gas: 114386)\n[PASS] test_launchDistributionAndClaimDeliverExactAmounts() (gas: 155491)\n[PASS] test_metadataAndExactSupply() (gas: 79932)\n[PASS] test_nativeCurrencyIsRejected() (gas: 36886)\n[PASS] test_noPostDeploymentMintOrAdministration() (gas: 1158946)\n[PASS] test_revokedApprovalCannotSpend() (gas: 105263)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoDelegatecallCallcodeOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 802708)\n[PASS] test_transferEmitsEventAndDeliversExactAmount() (gas: 88796)\n[PASS] test_transferFromConsumesExactAllowance() (gas: 140164)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRejectsInsufficientAllowance() (gas: 108623)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRejectsZeroRecipientAndRestoresAllowance() (gas: 101211)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRejectsZeroSender() (gas: 33031)\n[PASS] test_transferFromWithInfiniteAllowanceDoesNotDecreaseIt() (gas: 126654)\n[PASS] test_transferRejectsInsufficientBalanceWithoutChangingBalances() (gas: 60918)\n[PASS] test_transferRejectsZeroRecipientEvenForZeroAmount() (gas: 71904)\n[PASS] test_zeroAndSelfTransfersPreserveSupply() (gas: 102435)\nSuite result: ok. 24 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 8.73ms (24.84ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/Token.invariant.t.sol:TokenInvariantTest\n[PASS] invariant_supplyIsFixedAndAllBalancesAreConserved() (runs: 128, calls: 8192, reverts: 0)\n\n╭--------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+==========================================================+\n| TokenHandler | approve | 2682 | 0 | 0 |\n|--------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | transfer | 2835 | 0 | 0 |\n|--------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| TokenHandler | transferFrom | 2675 | 0 | 0 |\n╰--------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 95\n Bound result 1\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 2827\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 22\n Bound result 255\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 95\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 155\n Bound result 127\n Bound result 2644\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 539\n Bound result 1\n Bound result 7\n Bound result 1\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 114\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 4938\n Bound result 1632\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 869\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 431699241188541216797452563\n Bound result 0\n Bound result 1626\n Bound result 905\n Bound result 62\n Bound result 8\n Bound result 3\n Bound result 7\n Bound result 4\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 600.28ms (599.13ms CPU time)\n\nRan 3 test suites in 602.03ms (617.33ms CPU time): 33 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (33 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":43,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"Token.approve(address,uint256)\",\"Token.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"Token.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"TokenFactory.createToken(address)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"DEPENDENCIES.md\":18,\"README.md\":140,\"dependencies.sha256\":36,\"foundry.toml\":20,\"launch.json\":25,\"remappings.txt\":2,\"src/Token.sol\":18,\"src/TokenFactory.sol\":34,\"test/Token.invariant.t.sol\":68,\"test/Token.t.sol\":289,\"test/TokenFactory.t.sol\":136},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"41020ad4551d393bd3d95d9b3e2b1d261b36005ff1519ef4ed85f29b0128d9ec","verifiedTreeHash":"80d70f2468703570e41654f53e2694e0c70a8aa8","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+a2d9a899"}]}