{"assessments":[],"deployments":[],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"bdaac522-ab1b-4f34-bd43-9f358b2411e8","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"0994c29e04a36c26394049cd56c39b7620dbb71ddc30eeddcfe403aa9a480eb0","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_economics","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"0dc4d82544de91ff1f667fd39d1134b458d8d14311b5747592fd37d9e5a37eb6","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_flow","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"4686cc9c6e11ca5f971137cc77ad7d835e798ce09a64e40e77b46f46036f76b8","dependsOn":["build_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest","audit_math","audit_permissions","audit_economics","audit_flow"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"af3aa01159bbf354f621cafa5c0006f6169e0938a8b015be508b7377dbf165bc","skillId":"audit-judge","tools":[]},"key":"audit_judge","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"af3aa01159bbf354f621cafa5c0006f6169e0938a8b015be508b7377dbf165bc","skillId":"audit-judge","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"7823d3e9953548e2e6c477bb1fc1a8ce22447bcbef9e19f63af34bca966e6ecb","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_math","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"cd3a3febe61a406cdab70b9aaf3705b870c135c1c15e2e9bef89da409d032d46","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_permissions","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"8189a29b4573eb59a8ac7359ed2eded6998a7724c706fbf58daa1e6456ce9b3e","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"6b8d2c2ebd3301cff2be8edb1e1cc6ba65c858c02fe7247be81722b969842265","skillId":"build-contract-project","tools":[]},"key":"build_contract_project","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"6b8d2c2ebd3301cff2be8edb1e1cc6ba65c858c02fe7247be81722b969842265","skillId":"build-contract-project","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"da01bdebca6f27a5f5f07bba89df9efa740f152c2821d2f8fe7429a3e9edc2a2","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"tools":[]},"key":"manifest","kind":"code","role":"integrate","skillHash":null,"skillId":null,"state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"9180e7bf107bb2364784c1b32a91b906453c9e7a3c0894e3f6532c43d665e7dc","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"73431852439ad3a343f3d2b7db1c43cd363b9f48f9bb51497374a0cf6d50b223","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","tools":[]},"key":"write_foundry_tests","kind":"code","role":"tests","skillHash":"73431852439ad3a343f3d2b7db1c43cd363b9f48f9bb51497374a0cf6d50b223","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"A custom token: Kite (KITE).\nToken name: Kite\nToken symbol: KITE\nToken supply: 1,000,000,000 with 18 decimals, all minted once to the deployer in the constructor.","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"cddeafff7fb52cacb609716e064e5b39d04cb4be645a41fa69ac8c077df45a63","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"bdaac522-ab1b-4f34-bd43-9f358b2411e8","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-1392-kite"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"51316","feedbackHash":"fecd0d43b2e1e6e751d872cb86b30dfe5e9fa35a5b3c81c9f81e9c26157f804a","nodeKey":"audit_economics","submissionHash":"0994c29e04a36c26394049cd56c39b7620dbb71ddc30eeddcfe403aa9a480eb0","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52017","feedbackHash":"dfff7ed62dee5df9804632beebabdbcaaa0457af1a1ec120fea57f9fcc518a67","nodeKey":"audit_flow","submissionHash":"0dc4d82544de91ff1f667fd39d1134b458d8d14311b5747592fd37d9e5a37eb6","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52149","feedbackHash":"c8dbfc48cd0285b54bcaeb5c7ba1e670015bc8febcf3f482945e1575c318c1fa","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"4686cc9c6e11ca5f971137cc77ad7d835e798ce09a64e40e77b46f46036f76b8","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51250","feedbackHash":"6f95610ea75a4cc1e6f39b397506540774d6b7a5296605579e74a71c992c6462","nodeKey":"audit_math","submissionHash":"7823d3e9953548e2e6c477bb1fc1a8ce22447bcbef9e19f63af34bca966e6ecb","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51084","feedbackHash":"20eb3623901880fa4a90b3a5ab843b56c8fdc30e4ce5d8a631338cf586210af3","nodeKey":"audit_permissions","submissionHash":"cd3a3febe61a406cdab70b9aaf3705b870c135c1c15e2e9bef89da409d032d46","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52167","feedbackHash":"683b2cc9b346918a83068a47085da95a234a12b22e598caac21907f41fdc0d44","nodeKey":"build_contract_project","submissionHash":"8189a29b4573eb59a8ac7359ed2eded6998a7724c706fbf58daa1e6456ce9b3e","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52160","feedbackHash":"e6af1e9c1a79d4928ed55d97bab9ebc43f27132872fd6d08939137196aa13347","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"da01bdebca6f27a5f5f07bba89df9efa740f152c2821d2f8fe7429a3e9edc2a2","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52157","feedbackHash":"d9932dcbf0aca8b78eab86e271061ec6059abf6ce5b450b1f01959d6e520d418","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"9180e7bf107bb2364784c1b32a91b906453c9e7a3c0894e3f6532c43d665e7dc","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"73c5e3fb460b89a98f8ceefce8992a474b51a93db5783b9e8b530f2ab66f7cdc","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"6b0a28df3d585600","findings":[],"hash":"0994c29e04a36c26394049cd56c39b7620dbb71ddc30eeddcfe403aa9a480eb0","nodeId":"52091180-74f6-4c3a-a557-edb98c32ae9e","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. `.imd-findings.json` is written with zero findings and seven coverage rows. The tree is otherwise untouched apart from my scratch test under `test/scratch/`, which is git-ignored and is not kept.\n\n**Result: no defects found in my area.** KiteToken is a 110-line, dependency-free ERC-20 with a constant supply and no privileged functions. Each of the three guides was checked against it:\n\n- **Economic Security.** There are no external dependencies, oracles, prices or fees to manipulate. The token returns true from transfer, so a Uniswap v4 PoolManager-style low-level call with a decoded bool succeeds. Sentinel checks reject zero sender, receiver and spender. ERC-20 compliance holds. Approve overwrites rather than adds, which is the standard behaviour and is documented in the README.\n- **Invariant.** The sum of balances always equals the 1e27 constant. The only writers are the constructor and the private transfer helper. A 128,000-call invariant fuzz across random transfer, approve and transferFrom sequences produced zero reverts and no drift. Self-transfers, allowance at max minus one, and full-supply moves all behave correctly.\n- **Flow Gap.** The launch flows were reproduced end to end in a scratch test. The 10 percent swarm share, 88 percent pool share and 2 percent remainder all arrive whole, and a distributor claim leaves the distributor at zero.\n\nThe static-analysis lead about a large numeric literal was checked. The constant equals exactly 10^27 and matches the manifest supply string. The compiled ABI exposes only the three listed state-changing entry points, each marked `holds` in the coverage record with a one-line reason, plus four invariant rows.\n\nNothing in my area was left unreached.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":834092,"inputTokens":354,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":11898,"runtime":"claude","turns":24,"wallClockMs":207651}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"9df7d5d52e83c572","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Execution trace of transferFrom(from, to, 0) by a caller with allowance(from, caller) == 0: _spendAllowance reads current = 0, the sentinel branch (current == max) is skipped, the check `current < amount` is `0 < 0` and passes, the allowance is rewritten to 0 and `Approval(from, caller, 0)` is emitted; _transfer then passes the zero-address and balance checks (fromBalance >= 0 always holds) and emits `Transfer(from, to, 0)`. No balance changes, but two events naming an arbitrary `from` are logged by a stranger. This is the well-known zero-value 'address poisoning' pattern: an attacker calls transferFrom(victim, lookalikeOfVictimsUsualCounterparty, 0) so the victim's explorer/wallet history shows an outgoing transfer to the lookalike, hoping the victim later copies that address. The Transfer part is ERC-20-conformant (EIP-20 requires zero-value transfers to fire the event) and identical to OpenZeppelin; the Approval emission on every spend is OpenZeppelin v4 behaviour (v5 no longer emits it), so this contract gives a spoofer two forged events per call instead of one. Not a loss-of-funds defect in the token itself and no balance or allowance is affected; recorded so the author can decide. Minimal optional change that preserves the agreed design: stop emitting Approval from _spendAllowance (as OpenZeppelin v5 does) so only the standard-mandated Transfer event remains; do not make zero-value transfers revert, since the launch's PoolManager/distributor flows and ERC-20 integrators may legitimately send zero.","line":103,"path":"src/KiteToken.sol","reproduction":"State: token deployed; victim holds 1000e18; allowance(victim, attacker) == 0. Call: vm.prank(attacker); token.transferFrom(victim, lookalike, 0). Expected (what the author may want): revert or at least no events naming victim. Actual: returns true; emits Approval(victim, attacker, 0) then Transfer(victim, lookalike, 0); balanceOf(victim) stays 1000e18, balanceOf(lookalike) stays 0, allowance stays 0. Verified with a Foundry test (test/scratch/EdgeCases.t.sol::test_zeroValueTransferFromSpoofsEventsFromAnyHolder, expectEmit on both events, passes on current code). The sibling case transferFrom(address(0), lookalike, 0) correctly reverts with InvalidSender(0) because _transfer's zero-sender check runs after the allowance step.","severity":"info","snippet":"        if (current < amount) revert InsufficientAllowance(spender, current, amount);\n        unchecked {\n            _allowances[owner][spender] = current - amount;\n        }\n        emit Approval(owner, spender, current - amount);","title":"Zero-value transferFrom with no allowance succeeds and lets any caller emit Transfer and Approval events 'from' any holder (address-poisoning vector)"}],"hash":"0dc4d82544de91ff1f667fd39d1134b458d8d14311b5747592fd37d9e5a37eb6","nodeId":"6cf9592b-33c3-43fb-9046-8b8f529cad1c","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. Nothing further depends on another result, so here is the recap.\n\n**Outcome: no defect found in KiteToken within the Execution Trace, Periphery and First Principles guides.** The findings file at the repository root holds one informational note and a nine-row coverage record. No tracked file was changed. The scratch tests live under the gitignored scratch directory.\n\n**What I checked**\n\n- **Execution trace of all three entry points.** Allowance step runs before balance step in `transferFrom`, both revert cleanly, the whole call reverts on either failure, and no external call exists anywhere in the runtime. The max-allowance sentinel is an exact match, so max minus one decrements normally. Self-transfer and self-transferFrom preserve balance because the write order subtracts from the cached read before adding.\n- **First-principles arithmetic.** Both unchecked blocks are bounded by a preceding check. Every balance is at most the fixed supply of 10 to the 27, so the unchecked add cannot wrap. The supply conservation invariant held across 128,000 randomized handler calls with zero reverts.\n- **Launch flows.** Transfers return true and move the exact amount, so the Uniswap v4 PoolManager settle path, the distributor's claims and the remainder forward all arrive whole. An empty constructor argument list is consistent since no exemption is needed. The protected harness itself could not run here because v4-core and its environment variables are absent, so that trace is by reading.\n- **Periphery.** No libraries, helpers or encoders exist. forge-std 1.17.0 is tracked as 36 plain files with no submodule gitlink. All 29 project tests pass and their expectations match the traced behaviour. The ABI shows exactly three non-view functions and no receive or fallback. The runtime contains no CALL, DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE, CREATE or SELFDESTRUCT opcode.\n\n**The one note recorded, at info severity.** A caller with zero allowance can call `transferFrom(victim, lookalike, 0)` and it succeeds, emitting both a Transfer and an Approval event naming the victim. This is the known address-poisoning pattern. It is ERC-20 conformant and matches OpenZeppelin, so it is not a loss-of-funds defect. The Approval emission on spend is OpenZeppelin v4 behaviour that v5 dropped, so dropping it is the only change I suggest, and zero-value transfers should keep succeeding.\n\n**Trust assumptions worth stating.** The bytecode uses PUSH0 and MCOPY, so the target chain must be at Cancun or later. Ethereum mainnet and Base both qualify. The ERC-20 approve race and tokens sent to the token's own address are inherent to the standard and were checked but not reported.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":697148,"inputTokens":290,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":30156,"runtime":"claude","turns":25,"wallClockMs":511650}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"af1843f371022d4a","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Reproduced by the judge (test/scratch/Judge.t.sol::test_approveOverwriteRaceSpendsOldPlusNew, passes on this tree). _approve writes the new value unconditionally, so a holder lowering a non-zero allowance has no atomic path: the spender can consume the old value before the new approve lands and the new value after it. This is the standard EIP-20 property, OpenZeppelin v5 ships the same behaviour, and README.md documents that approve overwrites. The access model otherwise holds: only allowance[from][msg.sender] is spent, the factory/deployer has no power over other holders, and the spender can never move more than the sum of what the holder explicitly approved. Not a defect of this implementation and no change is required for the launch; recorded so the author decides knowingly. Optional, design-preserving mitigation: add increaseAllowance/decreaseAllowance helpers, or document that holders should approve(spender, 0) before setting a new non-zero value. audit_permissions (line 67) and audit_math (line 96) reported this same mechanism; kept once at info.","line":96,"path":"src/KiteToken.sol","reproduction":"State: factory deploys KiteToken and transfers 1000e18 to alice; alice calls approve(bob, 100e18). Alice then broadcasts approve(bob, 50e18) intending to lower bob's allowance. Bob front-runs it: vm.prank(bob); transferFrom(alice, bob, 100e18) succeeds (allowance 100e18 -> 0). Alice's approve(bob, 50e18) executes (allowance 0 -> 50e18). Bob calls transferFrom(alice, bob, 50e18), succeeds. Expected by alice: bob moves at most 100e18. Actual: balanceOf(bob) == 150e18, balanceOf(alice) == 850e18. All four calls return true; none reverts.","severity":"info","snippet":"        _allowances[owner][spender] = amount;","title":"approve overwrites the allowance, so a spender can front-run a reduction and move old + new (EIP-20 approve race; no increase/decreaseAllowance or permit offered). Merged from audit_permissions and au"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Reproduced by the judge (test/scratch/Judge.t.sol::test_zeroValueTransferFromWithoutAllowanceEmitsEventsFromAnyHolder, expectEmit on both events, passes on this tree). With allowance 0 and amount 0 the check `0 < 0` is false, the allowance is rewritten to 0 and Approval(owner, spender, 0) is emitted at line 107; _transfer then passes (fromBalance >= 0) and emits Transfer(from, to, 0) at line 90. No balance or allowance changes, so this is not a loss of funds and not a launch-flow defect. The Transfer event is EIP-20-mandated (zero-value transfers must emit) and matches OpenZeppelin; the extra Approval event on every finite spend is OpenZeppelin v4 behaviour (v5 dropped it), so a spoofer gets two forged events per call instead of one. The sibling call transferFrom(address(0), x, 0) reverts with InvalidSender(0) in _transfer, so nothing persists for the zero address. Optional, design-preserving change: stop emitting Approval from _spendAllowance; do not make zero-value transfers revert, since the PoolManager and integrators may legitimately move zero. Recorded for the author's decision; no change required for the launch.","line":103,"path":"src/KiteToken.sol","reproduction":"State: token deployed by factory; factory transfers 1000e18 to alice; allowance(alice, bob) == 0. Call: vm.prank(bob); token.transferFrom(alice, lookalike, 0). Expected (if the author wants no stranger-emitted events naming alice): revert or no events. Actual: returns true; emits Approval(alice, bob, 0) then Transfer(alice, lookalike, 0); balanceOf(alice) stays 1000e18, balanceOf(lookalike) stays 0, allowance(alice, bob) stays 0.","severity":"info","snippet":"        if (current < amount) revert InsufficientAllowance(spender, current, amount);","title":"transferFrom(victim, x, 0) by a caller with no allowance succeeds and emits Approval(victim, caller, 0) and Transfer(victim, x, 0): two events naming an arbitrary holder, usable for address poisoning."}],"hash":"4686cc9c6e11ca5f971137cc77ad7d835e798ce09a64e40e77b46f46036f76b8","nodeId":"df598e3c-3001-4d1a-9d88-b7eae5458ace","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and `.imd-findings.json` is written. The working tree is otherwise clean (the scratch test was removed and git shows no changes).\n\n**Outcome:** no defect in KiteToken blocks the launch. Both specialist claims reproduce but are inherent ERC-20 properties, kept at info only.\n\n**What I did**\n- Built the project and ran the existing suite. All 65 tests pass, including the 256-run invariant suite.\n- Wrote scratch Foundry tests reproducing each specialist claim and my own checks. All five passed on the current tree before I deleted them.\n- Validated launch.json: only schema keys, correct value types, lowercase addresses, notes under 4,000 characters, initial price equal to 2^96, empty constructor arguments matching the no-argument constructor, supply equal to what the constructor mints.\n- Walked the compiled runtime for DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE and SELFDESTRUCT and checked both size limits.\n\n**Findings reported**\n1. **Info, merged:** the approve overwrite race reported by both the permissions and math specialists is one root cause. A spender front-running a reduction from 100e18 to 50e18 ends with 150e18. Standard EIP-20 behaviour, documented in the README, no change required.\n2. **Info:** zero-value transferFrom with no allowance emits Approval and Transfer events naming any holder, the address-poisoning pattern reported by the flow specialist. No balance or allowance changes.\n\n**Coverage:** all three entry points answered, plus rows for the constructor and supply invariant, runtime bytecode, the manifest, and the static-analysis leads. The aderyn large-literal line is style only, and the literal equals the manifest supply exactly.\n\n**My own pass found nothing further.** Self-transfer under unchecked arithmetic is safe because the debited slot is re-read before the credit, exact-allowance spends emit Approval with zero without underflow, there are no external calls or callbacks, and the transfer path delivers exact amounts, so the factory, distributor and PoolManager flows arrive whole.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":471346,"inputTokens":226,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":12766,"runtime":"claude","turns":19,"wallClockMs":197673}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"0cf632e317dfab7a","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Not a defect of this implementation: it is the EIP-20 approve race that every overwrite-style approve has, and the README documents that approve overwrites. Reported for completeness of the allowance-arithmetic review because the contract offers no increaseAllowance/decreaseAllowance (or permit) alternative, so a holder who wants to lower an existing non-zero allowance has only approve(spender, newValue), which does not bound the spender's total to max(old, new). The author may accept this as designed (OpenZeppelin v5 also ships without increase/decrease) or add a pair of delta-based helpers; neither changes launch flows.","line":96,"path":"src/KiteToken.sol","reproduction":"State: factory sends alice 150 KITE; alice calls approve(bob, 100). Alice then broadcasts approve(bob, 50) intending bob's total spend to be at most 100. Bob sees it pending and first calls transferFrom(alice, bob, 100) (allowance 100 -> 0, balance alice 50), then alice's approve(bob, 50) lands, then bob calls transferFrom(alice, bob, 50). Expected by alice: bob can move at most 100 in total. Actual: bob holds 150 and alice 0. Verified with a Foundry test (test_approveRaceIsPossible) on this tree: all four calls succeed and balanceOf(bob) == 150.","severity":"info","snippet":"        _allowances[owner][spender] = amount;","title":"approve overwrites the allowance, so a spender can front-run a reduction and spend old + new (standard ERC-20 property, no increase/decreaseAllowance offered)"}],"hash":"7823d3e9953548e2e6c477bb1fc1a8ce22447bcbef9e19f63af34bca966e6ecb","nodeId":"f0292aba-f555-447f-a5c1-4cbf7472a4af","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is in place at the repository root, and git status is silent only because the project's .gitignore lists it, along with the scratch directory I removed.\n\n**Outcome: no math, boundary or numerical-gap defect in KiteToken.** The contract has no runtime division, multiplication, narrowing cast, scale conversion, external call, payable path or byte decoding, so most failure modes in the three assigned guides have nothing to attach to. The arithmetic that does exist was traced and tested:\n\n- **Unchecked balance moves** in the private transfer helper are guarded by the balance check, and the sum of balances is fixed at 1e27, so the addition cannot wrap. Self-transfer re-reads storage and keeps the balance.\n- **Allowance arithmetic** decrements only after the check, never touches the max-uint sentinel, treats max-minus-one as finite, and a balance revert rolls the decrement back. The zero address can never hold an allowance.\n- **The supply constant** flagged by aderyn is exactly 1e27, divides cleanly by the 10% and 88% basis-point splits, and the pool share fits Uniswap v4's int128 delta type.\n- **A conservation invariant** over random transfer, approve and transferFrom calls among eight actors ran 128,000 calls without a violation, alongside 14 edge-case unit tests covering 0, whole-balance, supply-plus-one and max-uint inputs.\n\n**What I reported:** one informational item, the standard ERC-20 approve overwrite race, with a concrete four-call reproduction. It is a known property of the specification and the README documents that approve overwrites, so it is not a defect that needs a revision. The coverage record answers all three listed entry points plus five invariant and guide rows.\n\n**Commands run:** `forge build`, the project's `forge test` suite with 29 passing tests, and my scratch suite under test/scratch, now deleted. Slither and Aderyn were not run by me; the verifier's output for both was checked as leads. No source file was changed.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":608392,"inputTokens":290,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":15356,"runtime":"claude","turns":21,"wallClockMs":240249}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"89891d8b5a9870de336ecad2676ed984814a3baffe6c1e751a208e0764de0ed2","device":"1ca477e8d9b58040","findings":[],"hash":"8189a29b4573eb59a8ac7359ed2eded6998a7724c706fbf58daa1e6456ce9b3e","nodeId":"e5ae186b-61e4-41fa-b5d5-98d19064982d","outcome":"completed","summary":"Done. The Kite token project is committed on main and all checks pass.\n\n**What was delivered**\n\n- `src/KiteToken.sol` is a dependency-free ERC-20 named Kite, symbol KITE, 18 decimals. The constructor takes no arguments, calls no contract, and mints the full 1,000,000,000 KITE to the deployer once. There is no owner, mint, burn, pause, blocklist, fee or proxy, so the supply can never change and no privileged call can touch a holder.\n- `test/KiteToken.t.sol` holds 29 unit and fuzz tests. They cover the mint to a contract deployer, metadata, exact transfers, allowance spending and the unlimited-allowance case, every typed revert, the floor test's admin and freeze selectors reverting, ETH rejection, and a runtime scan for DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE and SELFDESTRUCT.\n- `foundry.toml` pins solc 0.8.26 with the optimizer on, bytecode_hash set to none, metadata off, ffi off and no filesystem permissions. The remappings file points forge-std at the vendored copy.\n- `lib/forge-std` is forge-std 1.17.0 copied in as ordinary files. Git shows no submodule entries.\n- `README.md` documents behaviour, the manifest values, build settings, assumptions, and the fact that nobody administers the token after launch.\n\n**Verification**\n\n| Check | Result |\n| --- | --- |\n| forge build | clean |\n| forge test | 29 passed, 0 failed |\n| forge test with empty environment | 29 passed |\n| forge fmt --check | clean |\n\nThe protected floor test could not run verbatim because the LaunchLiquidity and hook sources it imports are not on this machine. I mirrored its non-pool checks in a scratch test that deploys the real creation code through CREATE2 from an etched factory address. The swarm-share, holder-freeze and size checks passed. The pool seed and swap path is untested locally, but the token has no transfer hooks or fees, so it moves exactly what the PoolManager asks for.\n\n**Open items for the launch, not this task**\n\n- The manifest step records the contract as KiteToken with empty constructor arguments and the supply in minor units shown in the README.\n- Explorer verification after deployment is the deployer's responsibility.","treeHash":"a864d09aff46c671be801c1e767109da6c5ce878","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":649554,"inputTokens":418,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":17142,"runtime":"claude","turns":19,"wallClockMs":201255}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"c483cd38789452a94d3735f704d22025c16c152faa9f1e634c94ee64ead08965","device":"37eed9f56188ea8b","findings":[],"hash":"9180e7bf107bb2364784c1b32a91b906453c9e7a3c0894e3f6532c43d665e7dc","nodeId":"fb5e331b-e546-44ce-9f13-3b1ffd0a4fe1","outcome":"completed","summary":"Done. The Kite token test suite now has invariant coverage and a dedicated edge-case suite alongside the existing unit tests, and `forge build` plus `forge test` pass with no defects found in the token.\n\n**What I added** (only under `test/`, nothing installed, no config touched):\n\n- `test/KiteToken.invariant.t.sol`. A handler drives the token from six actors, with the factory stand-in holding the supply. It covers transfer, approve, transferFrom and their failure paths, plus admin-selector and ether probes. Every call is wrapped in try/catch and checked against the exact typed error, so a wrong outcome is recorded and surfaced by an invariant instead of silently skipped. Ghost ledgers track per-actor sent and received amounts and every allowance pair. Eight invariants check fixed supply, conservation across all holders, ledger agreement, allowance agreement including the unlimited sentinel, no leaked ether, and constant metadata. Inline config sets 256 runs at depth 64 with fail-on-revert on.\n- `test/KiteToken.edge.t.sol`. Thirty-five tests for inputs the existing suite skipped: the zero sender on every entry point, exact-allowance boundaries, max-minus-one and above-supply allowances being finite, event shape for unlimited versus finite spends, self-approval, rollback on failed transferFrom, independent deployments, and fuzzed launch-shaped flows such as the ten percent swarm split, multi-hop delivery and pool-style pulls.\n\n**Verification.** The full run is 65 tests across three suites, all passing, with the invariant run completing 16,384 handler calls and zero reverts. I grounded the harness by running a deliberately broken copy in the scratch directory that mis-tracked the unlimited allowance; the allowance invariant caught it with a one-call shrunk sequence. That first mutation check initially passed because the unlimited transferFrom path was rarely reached, so I changed the handler to grant an allowance itself when the chosen pair has none.\n\n**Findings.** None. The token behaves as specified on every path I exercised, so no `.imd-findings.json` was written. One behaviour worth knowing but not a defect: tokens sent to the token contract's own address are accepted and stranded, which is standard ERC-20 and is pinned as a documented test. The new files are left uncommitted in the working tree, matching how the earlier accepted work was handed over.","treeHash":"bfa1459bbf576d7fecbeca4f86cc1faabfad2891","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1064200,"inputTokens":482,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":29712,"runtime":"claude","turns":24,"wallClockMs":449820}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"7c0191a32541eb74","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Not a permission bypass and not a deviation from the brief: this is the well-known EIP-20 approve front-running property, and README.md documents that approve overwrites rather than adds. It is recorded so the author decides knowingly. A holder who wants to LOWER a spender's allowance from A to B cannot do so atomically: the spender can spend A before the new approve lands and B after it, moving A+B. KiteToken offers no increaseAllowance/decreaseAllowance or permit helper that would let a holder adjust an allowance without passing through zero. The access model itself (msg.sender is the only authority over its own balance and its own allowances; transferFrom spends only allowance[from][msg.sender]) was traced and holds; the deployer/factory has no power over any other holder. Mitigation, if wanted, is the usual one and does not change the agreed design: holders set the allowance to 0 before setting a new non-zero value, or the author adds increaseAllowance/decreaseAllowance that read the current value and emit Approval with the new total. Severity info: ERC-20-inherent, requires the holder to have granted the allowance, and the spender gains at most the sum of what the holder explicitly approved twice.","line":67,"path":"src/KiteToken.sol","reproduction":"State: alice holds 1000 KITE. 1) alice: approve(bob, 100e18). 2) alice broadcasts approve(bob, 50e18) intending to lower it. 3) bob sees it in the mempool and front-runs: transferFrom(alice, bob, 100e18) succeeds (allowance 100e18 -> 0). 4) alice's approve(bob, 50e18) executes and sets allowance to 50e18. 5) bob: transferFrom(alice, bob, 50e18) succeeds. Actual: bob received 150e18 and alice holds 850e18. Expected by alice: bob could take at most 100e18 (old) or 50e18 (new), never both. Verified with a Foundry test under test/scratch (balance of bob == 150e18 after the sequence).","severity":"info","snippet":"    function approve(address spender, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) {\n        _approve(msg.sender, spender, amount);\n        return true;\n    }","title":"approve() overwrites the allowance, so the standard ERC-20 approve race applies (no increase/decreaseAllowance)"}],"hash":"cd3a3febe61a406cdab70b9aaf3705b870c135c1c15e2e9bef89da409d032d46","nodeId":"b7e8bd50-1f90-446a-8943-59b1f7b15712","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is valid JSON, the quoted snippet matches the tree, and the scratch tests are removed so only `.imd-findings.json` is new in the working tree.\n\n**Outcome:** no defects in the Access Control, Trust Gap or Asymmetry areas. One informational note was recorded.\n\n**What was checked**\n- **Permission model.** The ABI exposes exactly approve, transfer and transferFrom plus views. There are no roles, modifiers, initializers, receive or fallback. The constructor mints the fixed supply to msg.sender once and hands out no power. The deployer cannot pull from, freeze or alter any other holder.\n- **Entry points.** transfer and transferFrom share one internal path, so both validate and write identically, differing only in the allowance spend. Allowance of max is unlimited, max minus one is finite, and a zero-amount transferFrom from a stranger moves and sets nothing.\n- **Invariants.** A handler-based fuzz of 256 runs by 64 depth over random transfer, approve and transferFrom calls across six actors never broke sum of balances equals 1e27. The unchecked arithmetic is therefore safe.\n- **Static analysis lead.** The large-literal warning on line 34 is a compile-time constant equal to 1e27 and matches the brief. Not a defect.\n- **Launch flows.** No fee, burn or exemption logic exists, so every flow delivers whole amounts and empty constructor arguments are consistent with the protected test.\n\n**The one note (info).** approve overwrites, so the inherent ERC-20 race applies: a holder lowering an allowance from 100 to 50 can have both spent by a front-running spender. The README already documents overwrite semantics, so this is for the author's awareness, not a revision trigger.\n\n**Coverage record.** All three listed entry points are marked holds, plus seven invariant rows covering the constructor, privileged surface, supply conservation, launch flows, bytecode, the static-analysis lead and the trust-gap seams.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":432263,"inputTokens":194,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":13645,"runtime":"claude","turns":18,"wallClockMs":198253}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"5400195e45da69276f8caa330cc19ae385851f1cdba7d65c65dda040f5030ba6","device":"cd8076510aad8b8e","findings":[],"hash":"da01bdebca6f27a5f5f07bba89df9efa740f152c2821d2f8fe7429a3e9edc2a2","nodeId":"91d9f848-98d6-4daa-9b93-17fd954f74b0","outcome":"completed","summary":"Done. launch.json is written and is the only changed file.\n\n**What the manifest describes.** The accepted tree contains a single contract, KiteToken in src/KiteToken.sol, whose constructor takes no arguments and mints the full supply once to msg.sender. The compiled ABI confirms an empty constructor input list. There are no application contracts, so the contracts array is empty.\n\n**Manifest contents**\n- kind is custom_token. The token entry names KiteToken, Kite, KITE, 18 decimals, empty constructorArgs and a totalSupply of 1000000000000000000000000000 minor units, matching the TOTAL_SUPPLY constant.\n- pool and economics are copied exactly from the launch reference: native ETH, fee 12500, tick spacing 60, the one-to-one initialPrice, and the requester's verbatim economics object.\n- notes run to 1664 characters and describe only what is present in the tree.\n\n**Checks run**\n- A scratch Python check confirmed the key set, types, supply string, verbatim economics, pool values, notes length and contract name length.\n- forge build compiled cleanly and forge test passed all 29 existing tests.\n- git status shows launch.json as the only new file and no other changes.","treeHash":"22e208295a310cf6379aeae48267417f85d98a24","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":181592,"inputTokens":130,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":3216,"runtime":"claude","turns":8,"wallClockMs":46448}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":1790,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 21 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 1.57s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":190,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 29 tests for test/KiteToken.t.sol:KiteTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferAboveBalanceReverts(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 98136, ~: 98713)\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 93313, ~: 93970)\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFromRespectsAllowance(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 170347, ~: 189966)\n[PASS] test_approveOverwritesRatherThanAdds() (gas: 92312)\n[PASS] test_approveRevertsForZeroSpender() (gas: 32867)\n[PASS] test_approveSetsAllowanceAndEmits() (gas: 64748)\n[PASS] test_constructorEmitsMintTransfer() (gas: 267106)\n[PASS] test_constructorMintsWholeSupplyToDeployer() (gas: 27994)\n[PASS] test_contractNameFitsTheManifest() (gas: 392)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 23688)\n[PASS] test_noPrivilegedCallMovesOrFreezesAHolder() (gas: 432551)\n[PASS] test_noSupplyGrowingOrAdminFunctions() (gas: 484010)\n[PASS] test_rejectsPlainEtherAndUnknownCalldata() (gas: 57653)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoDelegatecallCallcodeOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 603347)\n[PASS] test_supplyIsOneBillionWithEighteenDecimals() (gas: 22076)\n[PASS] test_transferFromCannotMoveAHolderWithoutApprovalEvenForDeployer() (gas: 100036)\n[PASS] test_transferFromInfiniteAllowanceIsNotDecremented() (gas: 189372)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRevertsBeyondAllowance() (gas: 152019)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRevertsBeyondBalanceEvenWithAllowance() (gas: 154786)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRevertsToZeroAddress() (gas: 149928)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRevertsWithoutAllowance() (gas: 103945)\n[PASS] test_transferFromSpendsAllowance() (gas: 220407)\n[PASS] test_transferMovesExactAmount() (gas: 163491)\n[PASS] test_transferRevertsFromEmptyAccount() (gas: 37687)\n[PASS] test_transferRevertsOnInsufficientBalance() (gas: 97441)\n[PASS] test_transferRevertsToZeroAddress() (gas: 92527)\n[PASS] test_transferToSelfKeepsBalance() (gas: 99936)\n[PASS] test_transferWholeBalanceLeavesZero() (gas: 131466)\n[PASS] test_transferZeroAmountSucceeds() (gas: 44355)\nSuite result: ok. 29 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 17.43ms (59.64ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test suite in 18.40ms (17.43ms CPU time): 29 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (29 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":63,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"KiteToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"KiteToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"KiteToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"README.md\":93,\"foundry.toml\":19,\"remappings.txt\":1,\"src/KiteToken.sol\":109,\"test/KiteToken.t.sol\":349},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":747,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"slither: no results at low impact or above","passed":true},{"durationMs":360,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[low] large-numeric-literal at src/KiteToken.sol:34: Large Numeric Literal","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"8189a29b4573eb59a8ac7359ed2eded6998a7724c706fbf58daa1e6456ce9b3e","verifiedTreeHash":"a864d09aff46c671be801c1e767109da6c5ce878","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+fb8278c5"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":1456,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 23 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 1.35s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":9317,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 29 tests for test/KiteToken.t.sol:KiteTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferAboveBalanceReverts(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 98085, ~: 98726)\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 93374, ~: 93372)\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFromRespectsAllowance(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 170025, ~: 189972)\n[PASS] test_approveOverwritesRatherThanAdds() (gas: 92312)\n[PASS] test_approveRevertsForZeroSpender() (gas: 32867)\n[PASS] test_approveSetsAllowanceAndEmits() (gas: 64748)\n[PASS] test_constructorEmitsMintTransfer() (gas: 267106)\n[PASS] test_constructorMintsWholeSupplyToDeployer() (gas: 27994)\n[PASS] test_contractNameFitsTheManifest() (gas: 392)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 23688)\n[PASS] test_noPrivilegedCallMovesOrFreezesAHolder() (gas: 432551)\n[PASS] test_noSupplyGrowingOrAdminFunctions() (gas: 484010)\n[PASS] test_rejectsPlainEtherAndUnknownCalldata() (gas: 57653)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoDelegatecallCallcodeOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 603347)\n[PASS] test_supplyIsOneBillionWithEighteenDecimals() (gas: 22076)\n[PASS] test_transferFromCannotMoveAHolderWithoutApprovalEvenForDeployer() (gas: 100036)\n[PASS] test_transferFromInfiniteAllowanceIsNotDecremented() (gas: 189372)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRevertsBeyondAllowance() (gas: 152019)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRevertsBeyondBalanceEvenWithAllowance() (gas: 154786)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRevertsToZeroAddress() (gas: 149928)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRevertsWithoutAllowance() (gas: 103945)\n[PASS] test_transferFromSpendsAllowance() (gas: 220407)\n[PASS] test_transferMovesExactAmount() (gas: 163491)\n[PASS] test_transferRevertsFromEmptyAccount() (gas: 37687)\n[PASS] test_transferRevertsOnInsufficientBalance() (gas: 97441)\n[PASS] test_transferRevertsToZeroAddress() (gas: 92527)\n[PASS] test_transferToSelfKeepsBalance() (gas: 99936)\n[PASS] test_transferWholeBalanceLeavesZero() (gas: 131466)\n[PASS] test_transferZeroAmountSucceeds() (gas: 44355)\nSuite result: ok. 29 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 107.65ms (73.18ms CPU time)\n\nRan 35 tests for test/KiteToken.edge.t.sol:KiteTokenEdgeTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_anyNonZeroRecipientReceivesWhole(address,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 95316, ~: 95416)\n[PASS] testFuzz_approveAllowanceRoundTrip(address,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 60320, ~: 60519)\n[PASS] testFuzz_insufficientBalanceErrorIsAccurate(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 95874, ~: 96053)\n[PASS] testFuzz_launchSplitArrivesWhole(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 901776, ~: 966454)\n[PASS] testFuzz_multiHopDeliversExactAmount(uint256,uint8) (runs: 1000, μ: 473094, ~: 363068)\n[PASS] testFuzz_onlyMaxAllowanceIsUnlimited(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 187532, ~: 188659)\n[PASS] testFuzz_pullPaymentConsumesExactAllowance(uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 275615, ~: 275398)\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferIsAdditive(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 164784, ~: 165835)\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferRoundTripRestoresBalances(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 115868, ~: 116405)\n[PASS] test_allowanceAboveSupplyIsDecremented() (gas: 177655)\n[PASS] test_allowanceIsDirectionalAndPerSpender() (gas: 169889)\n[PASS] test_allowanceMaxMinusOneIsFiniteAndDecremented() (gas: 177831)\n[PASS] test_approveFromZeroOwnerRevertsInvalidSender() (gas: 33111)\n[PASS] test_approveSelfAndSpendOwnAllowance() (gas: 212065)\n[PASS] test_constructorEmitsExactlyOneEvent() (gas: 6661)\n[PASS] test_eoaDeployerReceivesWholeSupply() (gas: 11219)\n[PASS] test_failedTransferFromRollsBackAllowance() (gas: 165052)\n[PASS] test_failedTransferLeavesNoTrace() (gas: 108405)\n[PASS] test_finiteAllowanceSpendEmitsApprovalThenTransfer() (gas: 178646)\n[PASS] test_independentDeploymentsDoNotShareState() (gas: 266620)\n[PASS] test_revokeAllowanceStopsSpender() (gas: 170914)\n[PASS] test_spenderCanPullToItself() (gas: 179784)\n[PASS] test_supplyFitsNarrowDownstreamTypes() (gas: 10767)\n[PASS] test_transferDoesNotTouchAllowances() (gas: 179389)\n[PASS] test_transferFromExactAllowanceLeavesZeroAndNextWeiReverts() (gas: 272561)\n[PASS] test_transferFromToSelfKeepsBalanceButSpendsAllowance() (gas: 162378)\n[PASS] test_transferFromWithZeroOwnerAndAmountRevertsOnAllowance() (gas: 38174)\n[PASS] test_transferFromWithZeroOwnerRevertsInvalidSender() (gas: 40043)\n[PASS] test_transferFromZeroAmountWithoutAllowanceSucceeds() (gas: 56841)\n[PASS] test_transferFromZeroSenderRevertsInvalidSender() (gas: 33044)\n[PASS] test_transferMaxUintReverts() (gas: 38090)\n[PASS] test_transferOneWeiMoreThanSupplyReverts() (gas: 38110)\n[PASS] test_transferToTokenContractIsAllowedButStranded() (gas: 119475)\n[PASS] test_transferWholeSupplyAndBack() (gas: 144019)\n[PASS] test_unlimitedAllowanceSpendEmitsOnlyTransfer() (gas: 175507)\nSuite result: ok. 35 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 107.90ms (913.58ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/KiteToken.invariant.t.sol:KiteTokenInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nKiteTokenInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_allowancesMatchGhost\n[PASS] invariant_balancesMatchGhostLedger\n[PASS] invariant_handlerExpectationsHeld\n[PASS] invariant_metadataIsConstant\n[PASS] invariant_noBalanceExceedsSupply\n[PASS] invariant_sumOfBalancesEqualsSupply\n[PASS] invariant_tokenHoldsNoEther\n[PASS] invariant_totalSupplyIsConstant\n KiteTokenInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------+----------------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract    | Selector                   | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=======================================================================+\n| KiteHandler | approve                    | 1605  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| KiteHandler | approveZeroSpender         | 1648  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| KiteHandler | probeAdminSurface          | 1647  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| KiteHandler | probeEther                 | 1689  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| KiteHandler | transfer                   | 1588  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| KiteHandler | transferAboveBalance       | 1714  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| KiteHandler | transferFrom               | 1607  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| KiteHandler | transferFromAboveAllowance | 1620  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| KiteHandler | transferFromAboveBalance   | 1613  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| KiteHandler | transferToZero             | 1653  | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------+----------------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  transfer / aboveBalance / toZero 9 7 3\n  approve / unlimited / zeroSpender 5 3 5\n  transferFrom / unlimited 4 3\n  transferFrom aboveAllowance / aboveBalance 10 7\n  admin probes / ether probes 10 5\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 9.22s (9.22s CPU time)\n\nRan 3 test suites in 9.23s (9.44s CPU time): 65 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (65 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":28,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"KiteToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"KiteToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"KiteToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"README.md\":93,\"foundry.toml\":19,\"remappings.txt\":1,\"src/KiteToken.sol\":109,\"test/KiteToken.edge.t.sol\":467,\"test/KiteToken.invariant.t.sol\":431,\"test/KiteToken.t.sol\":349},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"9180e7bf107bb2364784c1b32a91b906453c9e7a3c0894e3f6532c43d665e7dc","verifiedTreeHash":"bfa1459bbf576d7fecbeca4f86cc1faabfad2891","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+fb8278c5"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":872,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 21 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 770.00ms\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":79,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 29 tests for test/KiteToken.t.sol:KiteTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferAboveBalanceReverts(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 98427, ~: 98727)\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 92993, ~: 93372)\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFromRespectsAllowance(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 172478, ~: 190008)\n[PASS] test_approveOverwritesRatherThanAdds() (gas: 92312)\n[PASS] test_approveRevertsForZeroSpender() (gas: 32867)\n[PASS] test_approveSetsAllowanceAndEmits() (gas: 64748)\n[PASS] test_constructorEmitsMintTransfer() (gas: 267106)\n[PASS] test_constructorMintsWholeSupplyToDeployer() (gas: 27994)\n[PASS] test_contractNameFitsTheManifest() (gas: 392)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 23688)\n[PASS] test_noPrivilegedCallMovesOrFreezesAHolder() (gas: 432551)\n[PASS] test_noSupplyGrowingOrAdminFunctions() (gas: 484010)\n[PASS] test_rejectsPlainEtherAndUnknownCalldata() (gas: 57653)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoDelegatecallCallcodeOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 603347)\n[PASS] test_supplyIsOneBillionWithEighteenDecimals() (gas: 22076)\n[PASS] test_transferFromCannotMoveAHolderWithoutApprovalEvenForDeployer() (gas: 100036)\n[PASS] test_transferFromInfiniteAllowanceIsNotDecremented() (gas: 189372)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRevertsBeyondAllowance() (gas: 152019)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRevertsBeyondBalanceEvenWithAllowance() (gas: 154786)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRevertsToZeroAddress() (gas: 149928)\n[PASS] test_transferFromRevertsWithoutAllowance() (gas: 103945)\n[PASS] test_transferFromSpendsAllowance() (gas: 220407)\n[PASS] test_transferMovesExactAmount() (gas: 163491)\n[PASS] test_transferRevertsFromEmptyAccount() (gas: 37687)\n[PASS] test_transferRevertsOnInsufficientBalance() (gas: 97441)\n[PASS] test_transferRevertsToZeroAddress() (gas: 92527)\n[PASS] test_transferToSelfKeepsBalance() (gas: 99936)\n[PASS] test_transferWholeBalanceLeavesZero() (gas: 131466)\n[PASS] test_transferZeroAmountSucceeds() (gas: 44355)\nSuite result: ok. 29 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 6.79ms (21.69ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test suite in 7.52ms (6.79ms CPU time): 29 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (29 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":33,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"KiteToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"KiteToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"KiteToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"README.md\":93,\"foundry.toml\":19,\"launch.json\":24,\"remappings.txt\":1,\"src/KiteToken.sol\":109,\"test/KiteToken.t.sol\":349},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"da01bdebca6f27a5f5f07bba89df9efa740f152c2821d2f8fe7429a3e9edc2a2","verifiedTreeHash":"22e208295a310cf6379aeae48267417f85d98a24","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+fb8278c5"}]}