{"assessments":[],"deployments":[],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent 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custom token: HAMSTER (HAMSTER).\nToken name: HAMSTER\nToken symbol: HAMSTER\nToken supply: 1,000,000,000 with 18 decimals, all minted once to the deployer in the constructor.","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"33344122cdeb219f27235e4282ee63217e04f038406fb75326c848b9e2144560","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"7be3d349-fa0a-45be-8fde-75fb7d119f1d","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-2337-hamster"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"52266","feedbackHash":"05bcbdf629dfe5aad1287b1414370a938ac292af7a97c07190138d5fce9cb900","nodeKey":"audit_economics","submissionHash":"68f2947d721d34b8587c4e1b6621cc6af65cccfde2c29a7216bbb049b45a0fb2","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"54232","feedbackHash":"f61f2f0416ae5a3b6a058249fa99d242708f09da53a2c69ed78e7f378a37df0e","nodeKey":"audit_flow","submissionHash":"b919bb4feea5f08f1b465d200c93eadf00baa25270806ee135a6352b4cd677ad","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52672","feedbackHash":"cf1102ec11b65de212d08c7d81bc83e6d8b83dcfa6b9baff8040230d48576d03","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"62778239c9be3c6de89bd4d44c6f2613e0bc704ef377ae87d2ff2489947aadba","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52617","feedbackHash":"8e5aee5168edda581cf96e65aa5a0d0765912e5f084c6901ad0da5dc6ab3126c","nodeKey":"audit_math","submissionHash":"afbb34232e8d38634c40bae4a64f2d08dc9e5d1be96fd79e55f7c9045c5cd8a0","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"54231","feedbackHash":"245e93d736ef13cab2af251ca80201416023f0fa7d8104ec55acea231213c3cb","nodeKey":"audit_permissions","submissionHash":"db4ecfc3cfcae321a746da37d16471b0b911ebeb68c5398679d30ccbf89fffeb","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51465","feedbackHash":"4439eeb11271f44ba665847af04298a904bc936e2b89f04fc57f4b79ac9b043b","nodeKey":"build_contract_project","submissionHash":"cccabd2f0e24aeb6bf4348f468d395df84b0f512cde96a606160edc2676091a8","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52479","feedbackHash":"a13a9f87525f9a799fe8e9c6b54820de6a0d7467b2c6ef1d1f33ea6df3c618c0","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"df46abf2a9ad42fa53a7ca4cc3ed51ee9e03130b7b7d3b58b64dcf3731648d04","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52222","feedbackHash":"4eaeb2055be8ecf25c7cb5880c35168de93a5a75e87001cf95ce0d4139ca0ed6","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"5373032be8d5211e662316fe849d9610aca93e1df8f8d140ecae38bb1a789f38","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"d7202ce44fb87ef05eb2d1e5316b28de6581d1e0cb871698425e4d2eb099c186","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"48bde47897cc9d0c3a7d9a270472b03241633272d90acb7cf6f532cdaf8faa55","device":"357c46e3781993d4","findings":[],"hash":"5373032be8d5211e662316fe849d9610aca93e1df8f8d140ecae38bb1a789f38","nodeId":"282ae847-cc4a-44cf-b572-097f9b290e71","outcome":"completed","summary":"I added two test files. The full suite now has 57 tests, and all of them pass with `forge test` under the verifier's fuzz seed. I found no defects, so there is no `.imd-findings.json`.\n\nThe HAMSTER token has a fixed supply of 1,000,000,000 × 10¹⁸, all of it minted to the deployer. It has no owner, no mint, no pause and no transfer tax. Transfers or approvals to the zero address revert, and an allowance set to the maximum value counts as unlimited and is never reduced. The earlier contributor's tests (`HamsterToken.t.sol`, `HamsterToken.invariant.t.sol`, `DeployHamsterToken.t.sol`) are unchanged and still pass.\n\n**`test/HamsterToken.model.t.sol`** is a stronger invariant suite set to 256 runs × 64 calls in the file itself. It makes random sequences of `transfer`, `approve` and `transferFrom` calls between six actors: the deployer, four others, and the token contract itself. About one target in eight is the zero address, and the amounts lean towards the edges: 0, exactly the balance or allowance, one more than that, and the maximum. It keeps its own record of what every balance and allowance should be, and checks that each call succeeds or reverts exactly when the token standard says it should. After every sequence it checks that:\n- every outcome matched the expected result;\n- every balance and allowance matches the record;\n- the total supply never changes, and the actors' balances add up to it;\n- the zero address never holds tokens or receives an allowance;\n- the address recorded as the first holder never changes.\n\nI also ran a throwaway check that the handler really hits both succeeding and reverting calls, so the invariants aren't passing on empty runs.\n\n**`test/HamsterToken.edges.t.sol`** pins cases the existing tests didn't cover:\n- **Largest amounts:** transfers of the maximum value or one wei over the supply revert, and moving the whole supply through an allowance works.\n- **Allowance edges:** an allowance one below the maximum is reduced normally, an unlimited one emits no Approval event when spent, and zero-amount `transferFrom` behaves correctly with no allowance or to the zero address.\n- **Ownership edges:** self-allowances, transfers back to the owner, allowances that can't be spent against a different owner, and calls made from the zero address.\n- **Launch:** deploying the token and paying out the 10% swarm share, the pool seed and the rest in a single transaction delivers exact amounts and leaves the factory empty. The distributor can pay every claim in full, and the original holder has no special power afterwards.\n- **Fuzz tests (1000 runs each):** a failed `transferFrom` changes nothing, an unlimited allowance never goes down, and transfers between holders keep the supply whole.","treeHash":"7b9e4a44d437d6ef187277b88542f4d95fea1a88","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":461620,"inputTokens":20,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":13007,"runtime":"claude","turns":12,"wallClockMs":144299}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"223fd994d1a35f81","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_flow (low), audit_math (info) and audit_permissions (low): one root cause. _transfer checks only the recipient against address(0) (line 131) and never the sender; _spendAllowance (lines 143-151) checks neither owner nor a zero amount. With from == address(0) and amount == 0, allowance 0 >= 0 and balance 0 >= 0 both pass, so transferFrom returns true and emits Approval(address(0), caller, 0) then Transfer(address(0), to, 0). IERC20.sol line 6 documents Transfer with from == address(0) as a mint, and the contract NatSpec says the supply is minted once in the constructor; explorers/indexers that classify such events as mints will show post-launch zero-value mints to arbitrary addresses. No balance, allowance or totalSupply changes and no value moves, so impact is off-chain event integrity only: low. Related, same function: transferFrom(holder, caller, 0) with no allowance emits Approval(holder, caller, 0) because _spendAllowance always emits on spend (OZ v5 does not); also harmless, fixed by not emitting Approval on spend or skipping it for a zero amount. Fix that keeps the design: add `error InvalidSender();` and `if (from == address(0)) revert InvalidSender();` at the top of _transfer (unreachable for real transfers, since address(0) holds no balance). Launch flows (factory transfer to distributor, seed via PoolManager, swaps) are unaffected.","line":131,"path":"src/HamsterToken.sol","reproduction":"Fresh HamsterToken deployed by any address. From any EOA (e.g. makeAddr(\"attacker\")) call token.transferFrom(address(0), victim, 0). Expected (OZ ERC20InvalidSender semantics; only the constructor emits Transfer from address(0)): revert. Actual: returns true, emits Approval(0x0, attacker, 0) and Transfer(0x0, victim, 0); totalSupply and balances unchanged. Control: amount 1 reverts InsufficientAllowance(0x0, attacker, 0, 1). Reproduced by running the specialist's proof (ZeroSenderProof.test_transferFromZeroSenderMustRevert, asserting the low-level call fails) with forge test: it FAILS on the current code with 'transferFrom with address(0) as sender succeeded and emitted a mint-shaped Transfer event'; it passes once _transfer rejects from == address(0). The project's own 57 tests all pass.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (to == address(0)) revert InvalidRecipient();","title":"transferFrom accepts address(0) as sender for a zero amount, letting anyone emit a mint-shaped Transfer(address(0), to, 0) after deployment"}],"hash":"62778239c9be3c6de89bd4d44c6f2613e0bc704ef377ae87d2ff2489947aadba","nodeId":"792d75c6-e96d-4cec-a737-e1e527780cfa","outcome":"completed","summary":"I've written the review to `.imd-findings.json`. It holds one low-severity finding and a coverage row for all 3 entry points; no tracked files were changed.\n\n**The finding:** the three specialist reports on the zero-address sender all describe the same cause, so I merged them into one (`src/HamsterToken.sol:131`). `_transfer` checks that the recipient isn't the zero address but never checks the sender. As a result, anyone can call `transferFrom(address(0), victim, 0)` and it succeeds instead of reverting. It emits `Approval(0x0, caller, 0)` and `Transfer(0x0, victim, 0)`, which looks like a new mint to explorers and indexers, even though the token says it mints only once, at deployment.\n- **Reproduction:** I ran the specialist's proof (`test_transferFromZeroSenderMustRevert`) and it fails on the current code for the stated reason.\n- **Severity:** low. No balance, allowance or supply changes, so the only harm is misleading event logs.\n- **Related, same function:** `transferFrom(holder, caller, 0)` with no allowance emits an `Approval` the holder never made. That's also harmless, and I noted it under the same finding.\n- **Fix:** add a check that rejects a zero-address sender at the top of `_transfer`.\n\n**Coverage:**\n- `approve` holds.\n- `transfer` holds: the exact amount moves, and the unchecked arithmetic can't overflow because the supply is fixed.\n- `transferFrom` is marked as the finding.\n- I also checked one invariant and it holds: the supply is a constant 1e27, minted to the factory by a constructor with no arguments, which matches `launch.json`.\n\n**Dismissed leads:** the aderyn \"large numeric literal\" warning on line 40 is just the supply constant, not a defect. Slither reported nothing. The token has no fees or exemptions, so the launch transfers, the pool seed and swaps all move exact amounts.\n\n**Tests:** all 57 of the project's tests pass. I couldn't run the protected launch tests because they need files (`src/LaunchLiquidity.sol`, `src/HookFlags.sol` and others) and `v4-core`, none of which are in this tree. I read them instead. I deleted my scratch test files afterwards.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":249336,"inputTokens":12,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":3853,"runtime":"claude","turns":6,"wallClockMs":70983}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"644eb561f6d70a85","findings":[],"hash":"68f2947d721d34b8587c4e1b6621cc6af65cccfde2c29a7216bbb049b45a0fb2","nodeId":"f4046eea-8fa6-40f0-bfa3-33c884a2e806","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is written with an empty findings list and seven coverage rows, and my scratch tests are removed so the tree is unchanged apart from the findings file.\n\n**Outcome: no defects found in the economics area.** HamsterToken is a self-contained fixed-supply ERC-20 with no owner, no external call, no fee, and no privileged function, so most failure modes in the Economic Security, Invariant and Flow Gap guides have no surface to attach to. What I checked against each guide:\n\n- **Economic Security.** No oracle, token or cross-contract dependency exists. The token never returns false, takes no fee, does not rebase or blacklist, and rejects ether and unknown calldata. Sentinel inputs behave sanely: zero recipient and zero spender revert, zero-value transfers succeed and emit per EIP-20.\n- **Invariant.** The conservation law \"sum of balances equals the constant supply\" holds across every writer. Self-transfers re-read storage so they conserve, the unchecked addition is bounded by the constant supply, and a failed transfer reverts the allowance spend atomically. The project's handler invariants and my scratch fuzz confirmed this.\n- **Flow Gap.** I modelled the launch flows end to end with a factory deploying through CREATE2, a distributor claim, and a PoolManager-style sync, transfer, settle and take sequence. Every leg moved exactly the stated amount and a buy and sell round trip left no shortfall.\n\n**Verification run.** The project builds, its 37 tests pass with the verifier's fuzz seed, the formatter check passes on tracked files, and my five scratch probes passed. The static analysis lead about the large numeric literal is a compile-time constant that evaluates to the manifest's supply, so it is not a defect.\n\n**Trust notes, not defects.** Tokens sent to the token contract itself or to any wrong address are unrecoverable, and the classic approve race is inherent to EIP-20. Both are documented in the README. The protected token test could not be executed locally because it imports Uniswap v4 core, which is not vendored here.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":596778,"inputTokens":226,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":13299,"runtime":"claude","turns":24,"wallClockMs":204967}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"76df9026b98e4277","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Boundary lens (sentinel-address branch): _transfer validates only the recipient against address(0), never the sender, and _spendAllowance does not check the owner either. For a zero amount every check passes (allowance 0 >= 0, balance 0 >= 0), so any caller can make the token emit Transfer(address(0), to, 0) and Approval(address(0), caller, 0). IERC20.sol documents 'A mint has from == address(0)', so the token emits a mint-shaped event even though it states it never mints after the constructor. Balances and totalSupply do not change and value is 0, so no indexer that sums values drifts. Some indexers and explorers do list such events as mint transactions, which contradicts the fixed-supply notice. OpenZeppelin's ERC20 reverts on this input (ERC20InvalidSender).","line":130,"path":"src/HamsterToken.sol","reproduction":"From any EOA, e.g. 0xBEEF, call transferFrom(address(0), 0xBEEF, 0) on a fresh HamsterToken. Expected: revert (an invalid sender, as in OZ ERC20, so only the constructor emits a Transfer from address(0)). Actual: returns true and emits Approval(0x0, 0xBEEF, 0) and Transfer(0x0, 0xBEEF, 0). Confirmed with a scratch Foundry test: vm.prank(0xBEEF); t.transferFrom(address(0), address(0xBEEF), 0) returned true and vm.getRecordedLogs().length == 2. Fix: add `if (from == address(0)) revert InvalidSender();` at the top of _transfer (unreachable for real balances, since address(0) holds 0).","severity":"info","snippet":"    function _transfer(address from, address to, uint256 amount) private {\n        if (to == address(0)) revert InvalidRecipient();","title":"transferFrom accepts from == address(0) for a zero amount and emits a mint-shaped Transfer(address(0), to, 0)"}],"hash":"afbb34232e8d38634c40bae4a64f2d08dc9e5d1be96fd79e55f7c9045c5cd8a0","nodeId":"6d05688e-961c-47ec-b312-3744b74299ac","outcome":"completed","summary":"The math audit of `src/HamsterToken.sol` found no math defects that need fixing. It found one boundary issue at info severity. The results are in `.imd-findings.json`, which parses as valid JSON with 1 finding and 4 coverage rows. No tracked files were changed: I deleted my scratch tests after running them.\n\n**Finding 1 (info), `src/HamsterToken.sol:130`:** `transferFrom` accepts `address(0)` as the sender when the amount is 0.\n- **What happens:** anyone calling `transferFrom(address(0), to, 0)` gets `true` back, and the token emits `Approval(0x0, caller, 0)` and `Transfer(0x0, to, 0)`.\n- **Why it matters:** the interface treats a Transfer from `address(0)` as a mint, so this looks like a mint even though the token says it never mints after deployment. No balance or supply changes; some explorers and indexers may list it as a mint.\n- **Reproduction:** a scratch Foundry test confirmed it.\n- **Fix:** add a check that reverts when `from == address(0)` in `_transfer`, as OpenZeppelin's ERC-20 does.\n\n**Coverage by entry point:**\n\n| Entry point | Verdict | Reason |\n|---|---|---|\n| `approve` | holds | Stores the amount exactly with no arithmetic; a zero spender reverts. |\n| `transfer` | holds | Balance is checked before subtracting; edge cases below. |\n| `transferFrom` | finding 1 | The allowance math is correct; the only issue is the zero-sender case above. |\n| Fixed supply | holds | Supply is always 1e27 and equals the sum of balances. |\n\n**What I checked against the three guides:**\n- **Precision:** there is nothing to round; the contract has no division or scaling.\n- **Supply constant:** the aderyn lead at line 40 is a false alarm. The constant evaluates to exactly 1e27.\n- **Unchecked addition:** it cannot overflow, because all balances together always add up to 1e27.\n- **Transfer edge cases:**\n  - Sending to yourself keeps your balance (fuzzed for 256 runs).\n  - Sending the full supply succeeds.\n  - Sending one unit more than the supply, or the uint256 maximum, reverts.\n  - Sending to `address(0)` reverts.\n- **Allowance edge cases:**\n  - An unlimited (maximum) allowance is never reduced, and maximum minus one is reduced correctly.\n  - Spending more than the allowance reverts.\n  - Spending exactly the allowance leaves zero, with no off-by-one.\n- **Boundary guide:** the contract makes no external calls and has no payable functions or decoded byte inputs, so most of its steps don't apply.\n\nThe project's own test suite passed (41 tests). Nothing in my area was left unchecked.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":350779,"inputTokens":16,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":5247,"runtime":"claude","turns":8,"wallClockMs":59848}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"89eed35842d609d7","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Execution-trace sentinel check: `_transfer` rejects `to == address(0)` but never rejects `from == address(0)`. `_spendAllowance(address(0), spender, 0)` passes because the zero address's allowance (0) is not below 0, and `_transfer(address(0), to, 0)` passes because the zero address's balance (0) is not below 0. The call therefore succeeds, returns true, and emits `Approval(address(0), msg.sender, 0)` and `Transfer(address(0), to, 0)`. The interface documents `Transfer` with `from == address(0)` as a mint (src/interfaces/IERC20.sol line 6) and the contract claims to mint exactly once in the constructor; any unprivileged caller can nevertheless produce an unbounded number of mint-shaped events against any recipient. No balance or supply changes (the amount is forced to zero by the balance check), so the impact is confined to off-chain consumers: explorers, indexers and alerting that classify `Transfer` from the zero address as mints will show fake mints of 0 HAMSTER to arbitrary addresses, and allowance indexers see Approval events for an owner that cannot exist. OpenZeppelin v5's `_transfer` rejects this with `ERC20InvalidSender`. Minimal fix that preserves intended behaviour: add `if (from == address(0)) revert InvalidSender();` (new error) at the top of `_transfer`, or check `from != address(0)` in `transferFrom`.","line":131,"path":"src/HamsterToken.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {HamsterToken} from \"src/HamsterToken.sol\";\n\n/// @notice Fails on the current code: `transferFrom(address(0), to, 0)` succeeds and emits\n/// `Transfer(address(0), to, 0)`, a mint-shaped event, from a token that claims to mint once.\n/// Passes once `_transfer` rejects `from == address(0)` (any revert is accepted).\ncontract ZeroSenderProof is Test {\n    HamsterToken token;\n    address deployer = makeAddr(\"deployer\");\n    address victim = makeAddr(\"victim\");\n    address attacker = makeAddr(\"attacker\");\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        vm.prank(deployer);\n        token = new HamsterToken();\n    }\n\n    function test_transferFromZeroSenderMustRevert() public {\n        vm.prank(attacker);\n        (bool ok,) = address(token).call(\n            abi.encodeWithSelector(HamsterToken.transferFrom.selector, address(0), victim, uint256(0))\n        );\n        assertFalse(ok, \"transferFrom with address(0) as sender succeeded and emitted a mint-shaped Transfer event\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"State: freshly deployed HamsterToken (any deployer). Call from any EOA `attacker`: `token.transferFrom(address(0), victim, 0)`. Expected (per the interface doc and OZ semantics): revert, since address(0) can never hold or approve tokens. Actual: returns true; emits `Approval(address(0), attacker, 0)` then `Transfer(address(0), victim, 0)`; balances and totalSupply unchanged. With amount 1 the call reverts with `InsufficientAllowance(address(0), attacker, 0, 1)`, so only the zero-amount variant goes through. Verified with test/scratch/Trace.t.sol::test_spoofedMintEventFromZeroSender (passes on current code, asserting the events) and the proof below (fails on current code).","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (to == address(0)) revert InvalidRecipient();\n        uint256 fromBalance = _balances[from];\n        if (fromBalance < amount) revert InsufficientBalance(from, fromBalance, amount);","title":"transferFrom accepts address(0) as sender: anyone can emit a mint-shaped Transfer(address(0), to, 0) event"}],"hash":"b919bb4feea5f08f1b465d200c93eadf00baa25270806ee135a6352b4cd677ad","nodeId":"90b246ce-cde7-4bc3-a12e-84dc74cec14d","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. The findings file at `.imd-findings.json` holds one low-severity finding and seven coverage rows, and the tree has no changes outside that file and `test/scratch/`.\n\n**What I checked.** The token is a self-contained ERC-20 with three state-changing entry points and no external calls, payable paths, callbacks, owner or initializer. I traced each entry point against the Execution Trace, Periphery and First Principles guides, re-ran the existing 37 tests with the verifier's fuzz seed, and added scratch tests for self-transfer via transferFrom, unlimited self-allowance, the raw-call return shape the Uniswap v4 PoolManager checks, and balance conservation. The aderyn \"large numeric literal\" lead is a compile-time constant that the tests confirm equals 1e27, so it is not a defect.\n\n**Finding 1, low.** `_transfer` rejects a zero recipient but never rejects a zero sender. Because the zero address has a balance and allowance of exactly 0, any caller can run the following and have it succeed:\n\n```\ntoken.transferFrom(address(0), victim, 0)\n```\n\nIt returns true and emits `Approval(address(0), caller, 0)` and `Transfer(address(0), victim, 0)`, a mint-shaped event from a token that documents one mint only. No balance or supply changes, so the harm is confined to explorers, indexers and alerting that treat zero-sender transfers as mints. The proof test fails on the current code and passes against a copy with a one-line `from != address(0)` check, which keeps all intended behaviour.\n\n**Coverage.** `approve` and `transfer` hold. `transferFrom` carries finding 1; its allowance-spend and transfer paths otherwise hold. Supply constancy, exact launch flows, the constructor's single mint to the factory, and the absence of any periphery surface all hold. Nothing in my area was left unreached.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":712151,"inputTokens":290,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":15519,"runtime":"claude","turns":25,"wallClockMs":316179}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"dc00fcaea1ead2131e008c35bfe7abf7517fdeb7ad21643e3c44fdd9e225a1bf","device":"f0c4ae5b8ada215c","findings":[],"hash":"cccabd2f0e24aeb6bf4348f468d395df84b0f512cde96a606160edc2676091a8","nodeId":"18fda249-4fc4-487a-b541-98e049149a07","outcome":"completed","summary":"The HAMSTER token is built, tested, documented and committed on `main` as commit 9594349.\n\n**What was delivered**\n\n- `src/HamsterToken.sol`: contract `HamsterToken`, a self-contained fixed-supply ERC-20. Name and symbol are HAMSTER, 18 decimals, and the constructor mints the full 1,000,000,000 tokens to `msg.sender` once. It takes no constructor arguments, calls no other contract, and has no owner, mint, burn, pause, blocklist, fee or exemption list. Transfers and approvals to the zero address revert, and an unlimited allowance is not decremented.\n- `src/interfaces/IERC20.sol`: the interface it implements, so no external library is vendored into the attested bytecode.\n- `script/DeployHamsterToken.s.sol`: a local deploy script whose `deploy()` function reads no environment and is called directly by a test.\n- Tests in `test/`: 37 tests across three suites. They cover metadata, the single mint, every transfer and approval success and failure path, custom error payloads, deployment through a CREATE2 factory probe, bare creation code with no arguments, the same admin and freeze selector sweeps the protected floor runs, an opcode scan for DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE and SELFDESTRUCT, EIP-170 size, fuzz tests, and handler-based invariants that the supply never changes and balances always sum to it.\n- `README.md`: assumptions, deployment parameters including the launch economics as given, the supply flow at launch, operational responsibilities, security notes and how to run the checks.\n- `foundry.toml` pins solc 0.8.26 with `bytecode_hash = \"none\"`, optimizer on, no ffi and no filesystem permissions. The runtime bytecode tail confirms only the solc version marker is appended.\n- `lib/forge-std` is forge-std v1.11.0 copied in as plain files with no git metadata, so the offline verifier can build it.\n\n**Verification results**\n\n| Check | Result |\n| --- | --- |\n| `forge build` | clean, solc 0.8.26 |\n| `forge test` with the verifier's fuzz seed | 37 passed, 0 failed |\n| `forge fmt --check` | passes |\n| git metadata under `lib/` | none |\n\nSlither and Mythril were not available on this machine and did not run. No `launch.json` was written, and nothing was deployed or signed. There are no owner settings to configure after launch, so the README's \"After launch\" section states that explicitly.","treeHash":"d5958119f52c661785482ba5ba5011bc920d7ad6","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":616285,"inputTokens":322,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":25021,"runtime":"claude","turns":27,"wallClockMs":309444}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"a0f92fec784312b7","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Asymmetry guide, Step 3 (branch-symmetry) and Step 1 (approve <-> pull pair). `_transfer` rejects `to == address(0)` but has no mirror check for `from == address(0)`, and `_spendAllowance` (lines 143-151) lets a zero amount through against a zero allowance and then emits `Approval(owner, spender, 0)`. Because `transferFrom` is the only pull path and it takes `from` from calldata, an unprivileged caller can therefore (a) call `transferFrom(address(0), attacker, 0)` and have the token emit `Approval(address(0), attacker, 0)` followed by `Transfer(address(0), attacker, 0)`, the exact shape of a mint event, after deployment, contradicting the NatSpec claim that the only mint event is the constructor's; and (b) call `transferFrom(victim, attacker, 0)` with no allowance and have the token emit `Approval(victim, attacker, 0)` and `Transfer(victim, attacker, 0)`, events the victim never authorised. No balance or supply changes, so this is event-level only: indexers, explorers and allowance-tracking UIs that key on `Transfer(address(0), ...)` or on `Approval` events can be fed rows that no holder produced. OpenZeppelin v5's `_transfer` rejects `from == address(0)` (ERC20InvalidSender) and does not emit `Approval` on spend, so the behaviour here diverges from the de-facto standard. Minimal fix that preserves the intended design: add `if (from == address(0)) revert InvalidSender();` (or reuse an existing error) at the top of `_transfer`, and optionally emit `Approval` in `_spendAllowance` only when `current != 0` or drop that emit. The arithmetic and balance guards themselves hold: with amount 1 and no allowance the call reverts with `InsufficientAllowance(victim, attacker, 0, 1)`, and no path moves funds.","line":131,"path":"src/HamsterToken.sol","reproduction":"State: fresh deployment, deployer holds 1e27; deployer transfers 1e18 to victim 0x401D; allowance(victim, attacker) == 0. Call 1 (attacker 0xBEEF): token.transferFrom(address(0), 0xBEEF, 0). Expected: revert (sender is the zero address). Actual: returns true and emits Approval(0x0, 0xBEEF, 0) then Transfer(0x0, 0xBEEF, 0); totalSupply still 1e27, balanceOf(0xBEEF) == 0. Call 2 (attacker 0xBEEF): token.transferFrom(0x401D, 0xBEEF, 0). Expected: no events attributed to 0x401D without an approval. Actual: returns true and emits Approval(0x401D, 0xBEEF, 0) and Transfer(0x401D, 0xBEEF, 0); balanceOf(0x401D) still 1e18. Control: token.transferFrom(0x401D, 0xBEEF, 1) from 0xBEEF reverts InsufficientAllowance(0x401D, 0xBEEF, 0, 1). Verified with a Foundry test using vm.expectEmit on both event sequences.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (to == address(0)) revert InvalidRecipient();\n        uint256 fromBalance = _balances[from];\n        if (fromBalance < amount) revert InsufficientBalance(from, fromBalance, amount);","title":"Asymmetric zero-address guard: transferFrom with from == address(0) and amount 0 succeeds, letting anyone emit a fake zero-value mint event and Approval/Transfer events attributed to any holder"}],"hash":"db4ecfc3cfcae321a746da37d16471b0b911ebeb68c5398679d30ccbf89fffeb","nodeId":"ebabb954-2a52-4901-a00c-eb87d9f686e7","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. The findings file is written and the tree is otherwise unchanged.\n\n**Outcome:** The HAMSTER token has no permission defects that move or freeze funds. One low-severity asymmetry was found and reproduced.\n\n**What was checked** (Access Control, Asymmetry and Trust Gap guides, plus the Senior Auditor's Mindset):\n- **Permission map.** The contract has no owner, minter, pauser, blocklist, initializer or proxy. The ABI holds only the ERC-20 functions and constants. I scanned the compiled runtime and found no CALL, DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE, SELFDESTRUCT or CREATE opcodes, and there is no receive or fallback.\n- **Constructor.** It mints exactly one billion tokens with 18 decimals to msg.sender and makes no external call. The factory holding the whole supply at launch is a trust assumption by design, not a defect.\n- **Allowance path.** The deployer cannot pull from a holder without an approval. Max allowance is not decremented, finite ones are, and the project's own 37 tests pass with the pinned fuzz seed.\n- **Launch flows.** Transfers carry no tax, burn or exemption list, so every flow delivers exactly what it says.\n\n**Finding 1 (low), src/HamsterToken.sol:131.** The transfer path rejects a zero recipient but has no mirror check for a zero sender, and a zero amount needs no allowance. Any caller can therefore run the following and get events the token should never emit after deployment:\n\n```\ntransferFrom(address(0), attacker, 0)   // emits Approval(0x0, attacker, 0) and Transfer(0x0, attacker, 0), a fake mint row\ntransferFrom(victim, attacker, 0)       // emits Approval(victim, attacker, 0) and Transfer(victim, attacker, 0) with no approval\n```\n\nNo balance or supply changes, so the impact is confined to indexers and explorers. The suggested fix is a sender zero-address check at the top of the internal transfer, matching OpenZeppelin v5.\n\n**Coverage.** All three listed entry points have rows: approve and transfer hold, transferFrom carries finding 1. Four extra invariant rows record the constructor, the access surface, the trust-gap seam and the launch flows. The protected floor tests could not be executed here because v4-core and the launch environment variables are not supplied, but each property they assert was traced in source.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":457796,"inputTokens":226,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":11431,"runtime":"claude","turns":18,"wallClockMs":210566}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"be228a93e57d49d2af7c45016ec301eba8e245b1c45cc328054477f327647bb5","device":"dfa08759ca0424de","findings":[],"hash":"df46abf2a9ad42fa53a7ca4cc3ed51ee9e03130b7b7d3b58b64dcf3731648d04","nodeId":"5fad0992-96fb-4a48-996b-78f4b690bd63","outcome":"completed","summary":"The manifest is written and verified.\n\n**What I wrote:** `launch.json` at the repository root, the only file changed.\n\n- **Token:** contract `HamsterToken`, name HAMSTER, symbol HAMSTER, 18 decimals. The accepted constructor takes no parameters, so constructorArgs is an empty list. totalSupply is the 1,000,000,000 × 10^18 the constructor mints to msg.sender, written as a decimal string in minor units.\n- **Contracts:** none. The accepted tree contains only the token and its IERC20 interface, so no application contracts are named.\n- **Pool and economics:** copied verbatim from the launch reference, with the IMD pair address, fee 12500, tick spacing 60, the one-to-one provenance price, and the requester's economics object.\n- **Notes:** a 1,306-character description of the token's behavior and the launch terms, well under the 4,000 limit.\n\n**Checks run:**\n\n- A script confirmed the manifest has exactly the schema's top-level keys, the correct kind, the exact supply and economics, a valid contract name, and lowercase addresses.\n- `forge build` succeeded with solc 0.8.26.\n- `forge test` with the verifier's fuzz seed passed all 37 tests across 3 suites.\n- `git status` shows launch.json as the only new file, with nothing else modified.","treeHash":"16b5fe498367091bf369f403dadb4740b9f9846f","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":193273,"inputTokens":130,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":2959,"runtime":"claude","turns":8,"wallClockMs":52381}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":1676,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 28 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 1.60s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":9129,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 1 test for test/DeployHamsterToken.t.sol:DeployHamsterTokenTest\n[PASS] test_deployMintsSupplyToTheCaller() (gas: 1198160)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 379.62µs (190.80µs CPU time)\n\nRan 35 tests for test/HamsterToken.t.sol:HamsterTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_approve_setsExactly(address,address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 58455, ~: 58645)\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFrom_revertsAboveAllowance(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 145131, ~: 145419)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 158698011571431669614067202\n  Bound result 271309291515069305655441722\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFrom_withinAllowanceAndBalance(uint256,uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 213626, ~: 217631)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 18\n  Bound result 1537\n  Bound result 4\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transfer_conservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 103926, ~: 104270)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 955324480476879900196165246\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transfer_revertsAboveBalance(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 99738, ~: 100081)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 999999999999999999999999998\n  Bound result 999999999999999999999999999\n\n[PASS] test_approve_doesNotRequireABalance() (gas: 62316)\n[PASS] test_approve_overwritesPreviousAllowance() (gas: 117283)\n[PASS] test_approve_revertsForZeroSpender() (gas: 32506)\n[PASS] test_approve_setsAllowanceAndEmits() (gas: 64680)\n[PASS] test_constructorEmitsMintTransfer() (gas: 11256)\n[PASS] test_constructorMintsWholeSupplyToDeployer() (gas: 32771)\n[PASS] test_creationCodeTakesNoConstructorArguments() (gas: 533889)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 47686)\n[PASS] test_noMintOrAdminFunctionExists() (gas: 776365)\n[PASS] test_noPrivilegedCallMovesOrFreezesAHolder() (gas: 481422)\n[PASS] test_rejectsEtherAndUnknownCalldata() (gas: 60695)\n[PASS] test_runtimeFitsEip170() (gas: 5104)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoDelegatecallCallcodeOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 1052637)\n[PASS] test_supplyGoesToWhoeverDeploysIncludingAContract() (gas: 198572)\n[PASS] test_supplyIsOneBillionWithEighteenDecimals() (gas: 23242)\n[PASS] test_transferFrom_exactAllowanceLeavesZero() (gas: 210023)\n[PASS] test_transferFrom_infiniteAllowanceIsNotDecremented() (gas: 184420)\n[PASS] test_transferFrom_ownerCannotPullWithoutSelfAllowance() (gas: 93046)\n[PASS] test_transferFrom_revertsAboveAllowance() (gas: 147071)\n[PASS] test_transferFrom_revertsAboveBalanceEvenWithAllowance() (gas: 154231)\n[PASS] test_transferFrom_revertsToZeroAddress() (gas: 144547)\n[PASS] test_transferFrom_revertsWithoutAllowance() (gas: 99235)\n[PASS] test_transferFrom_spendsAllowanceAndEmitsBoth() (gas: 215534)\n[PASS] test_transfer_movesBalanceAndEmits() (gas: 85177)\n[PASS] test_transfer_revertsFromEmptyAccount() (gas: 37640)\n[PASS] test_transfer_revertsOnInsufficientBalance() (gas: 106120)\n[PASS] test_transfer_revertsToZeroAddress() (gas: 36726)\n[PASS] test_transfer_toSelfKeepsBalance() (gas: 94934)\n[PASS] test_transfer_wholeBalance() (gas: 72087)\n[PASS] test_transfer_zeroAmountSucceeds() (gas: 46800)\nSuite result: ok. 35 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 51.15ms (189.41ms CPU time)\n\nRan 19 tests for test/HamsterToken.edges.t.sol:HamsterTokenEdgesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_failedTransferFromChangesNothing(uint256,uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 178898, ~: 178185)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 18146\n  Bound result 1147\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913129638947\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferBetweenThirdParties(uint256,uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 169634, ~: 185227)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 307730102631981504101943779\n  Bound result 307730102631981504101943777\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_unlimitedAllowanceNeverDecreases(uint256,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 239196, ~: 239436)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 243838684442783063854459496\n  Bound result 81959124297019852858738841\n\n[PASS] test_allowanceIsScopedToOwnerAndSpender() (gas: 223471)\n[PASS] test_approve_fromZeroAddressCallerIsHarmless() (gas: 92437)\n[PASS] test_approve_revertsForZeroSpenderEvenWithZeroAmount() (gas: 32426)\n[PASS] test_initialHolderHasNoPowerAfterDistributing() (gas: 113775)\n[PASS] test_launchFlowsArriveExactInOneTransaction() (gas: 655854)\n[PASS] test_transferFrom_allowanceJustBelowMaxIsDecremented() (gas: 182362)\n[PASS] test_transferFrom_toOwnerKeepsBalanceButSpendsAllowance() (gas: 159570)\n[PASS] test_transferFrom_uint256MaxWithUnlimitedAllowanceReverts() (gas: 149788)\n[PASS] test_transferFrom_unlimitedAllowanceEmitsNoApproval() (gas: 174001)\n[PASS] test_transferFrom_wholeSupplyThroughAllowance() (gas: 136682)\n[PASS] test_transferFrom_withSelfAllowance() (gas: 182040)\n[PASS] test_transferFrom_zeroAmountToZeroAddressReverts() (gas: 39620)\n[PASS] test_transferFrom_zeroAmountWithoutAllowanceSucceeds() (gas: 51797)\n[PASS] test_transfer_oneWeiOverSupplyReverts() (gas: 38000)\n[PASS] test_transfer_uint256MaxReverts() (gas: 42149)\n[PASS] test_transfer_zeroAmountToZeroAddressReverts() (gas: 32514)\nSuite result: ok. 19 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 51.19ms (134.70ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/HamsterToken.invariant.t.sol:HamsterTokenInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nHamsterTokenInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_balancesSumToSupply\n[PASS] invariant_totalSupplyNeverChanges\n[PASS] invariant_zeroAddressHoldsNothing\n HamsterTokenInvariantTest invariants (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 833)\n\n╭----------------+----------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract       | Selector             | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+====================================================================+\n| HamsterHandler | approve              | 406   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+----------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HamsterHandler | transfer             | 390   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+----------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HamsterHandler | transferAboveBalance | 410   | 410     | 0        |\n|----------------+----------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HamsterHandler | transferFrom         | 419   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+----------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HamsterHandler | transferToZero       | 423   | 423     | 0        |\n╰----------------+----------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 1645\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 144\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 497\n  Bound result 3923\n  Bound result 24576\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 138.38ms (136.85ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/HamsterToken.model.t.sol:HamsterTokenModelInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nHamsterTokenModelInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_allowancesMatchTheModel\n[PASS] invariant_balancesMatchTheModel\n[PASS] invariant_everyOutcomeMatchesTheModel\n[PASS] invariant_fixedSupplyIsFullyAccountedFor\n[PASS] invariant_initialHolderIsFixed\n[PASS] invariant_zeroAddressNeverHoldsOrSpends\n HamsterTokenModelInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭---------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract            | Selector     | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=================================================================+\n| HamsterModelHandler | approve      | 5515  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HamsterModelHandler | transfer     | 5445  | 0       | 0        |\n|---------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HamsterModelHandler | transferFrom | 5424  | 0       | 0        |\n╰---------------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 1025835547251232722128\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 81896206\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 734\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 134614500871640700841439946\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 0\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 9.05s (9.05s CPU time)\n\nRan 5 test suites in 9.05s (9.29s CPU time): 57 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (57 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":38,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"HamsterToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"HamsterToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"HamsterToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"README.md\":147,\"foundry.toml\":31,\"remappings.txt\":1,\"script/DeployHamsterToken.s.sol\":24,\"src/HamsterToken.sol\":152,\"src/interfaces/IERC20.sol\":29,\"test/DeployHamsterToken.t.sol\":21,\"test/HamsterToken.edges.t.sol\":283,\"test/HamsterToken.invariant.t.sol\":113,\"test/HamsterToken.model.t.sol\":210,\"test/HamsterToken.t.sol\":442},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"5373032be8d5211e662316fe849d9610aca93e1df8f8d140ecae38bb1a789f38","verifiedTreeHash":"7b9e4a44d437d6ef187277b88542f4d95fea1a88","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+a26ee00d"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":1452,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 26 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 1.36s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":217,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 1 test for test/DeployHamsterToken.t.sol:DeployHamsterTokenTest\n[PASS] test_deployMintsSupplyToTheCaller() (gas: 1198160)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 410.49µs (213.28µs CPU time)\n\nRan 35 tests for test/HamsterToken.t.sol:HamsterTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_approve_setsExactly(address,address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 58530, ~: 58639)\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFrom_revertsAboveAllowance(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 144962, ~: 145419)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 799679249440265741101784823\n  Bound result 799679249440265741101784827\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFrom_withinAllowanceAndBalance(uint256,uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 214479, ~: 217614)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 18\n  Bound result 1537\n  Bound result 4\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transfer_conservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 103977, ~: 104270)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 625142986706132341970261016\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transfer_revertsAboveBalance(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 99547, ~: 100081)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 4419\n\n[PASS] test_approve_doesNotRequireABalance() (gas: 62316)\n[PASS] test_approve_overwritesPreviousAllowance() (gas: 117283)\n[PASS] test_approve_revertsForZeroSpender() (gas: 32506)\n[PASS] test_approve_setsAllowanceAndEmits() (gas: 64680)\n[PASS] test_constructorEmitsMintTransfer() (gas: 11256)\n[PASS] test_constructorMintsWholeSupplyToDeployer() (gas: 32771)\n[PASS] test_creationCodeTakesNoConstructorArguments() (gas: 533889)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 47686)\n[PASS] test_noMintOrAdminFunctionExists() (gas: 776365)\n[PASS] test_noPrivilegedCallMovesOrFreezesAHolder() (gas: 481422)\n[PASS] test_rejectsEtherAndUnknownCalldata() (gas: 60695)\n[PASS] test_runtimeFitsEip170() (gas: 5104)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoDelegatecallCallcodeOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 1052637)\n[PASS] test_supplyGoesToWhoeverDeploysIncludingAContract() (gas: 198572)\n[PASS] test_supplyIsOneBillionWithEighteenDecimals() (gas: 23242)\n[PASS] test_transferFrom_exactAllowanceLeavesZero() (gas: 210023)\n[PASS] test_transferFrom_infiniteAllowanceIsNotDecremented() (gas: 184420)\n[PASS] test_transferFrom_ownerCannotPullWithoutSelfAllowance() (gas: 93046)\n[PASS] test_transferFrom_revertsAboveAllowance() (gas: 147071)\n[PASS] test_transferFrom_revertsAboveBalanceEvenWithAllowance() (gas: 154231)\n[PASS] test_transferFrom_revertsToZeroAddress() (gas: 144547)\n[PASS] test_transferFrom_revertsWithoutAllowance() (gas: 99235)\n[PASS] test_transferFrom_spendsAllowanceAndEmitsBoth() (gas: 215534)\n[PASS] test_transfer_movesBalanceAndEmits() (gas: 85177)\n[PASS] test_transfer_revertsFromEmptyAccount() (gas: 37640)\n[PASS] test_transfer_revertsOnInsufficientBalance() (gas: 106120)\n[PASS] test_transfer_revertsToZeroAddress() (gas: 36726)\n[PASS] test_transfer_toSelfKeepsBalance() (gas: 94934)\n[PASS] test_transfer_wholeBalance() (gas: 72087)\n[PASS] test_transfer_zeroAmountSucceeds() (gas: 46800)\nSuite result: ok. 35 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 17.82ms (64.78ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/HamsterToken.invariant.t.sol:HamsterTokenInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nHamsterTokenInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_balancesSumToSupply\n[PASS] invariant_totalSupplyNeverChanges\n[PASS] invariant_zeroAddressHoldsNothing\n HamsterTokenInvariantTest invariants (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 833)\n\n╭----------------+----------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract       | Selector             | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+====================================================================+\n| HamsterHandler | approve              | 406   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+----------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HamsterHandler | transfer             | 390   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+----------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HamsterHandler | transferAboveBalance | 410   | 410     | 0        |\n|----------------+----------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HamsterHandler | transferFrom         | 419   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+----------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HamsterHandler | transferToZero       | 423   | 423     | 0        |\n╰----------------+----------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 1646\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 243\n  Bound result 497\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 127\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 128.51ms (125.65ms CPU time)\n\nRan 3 test suites in 132.18ms (146.75ms CPU time): 37 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (37 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":40,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"HamsterToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"HamsterToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"HamsterToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"README.md\":147,\"foundry.toml\":31,\"remappings.txt\":1,\"script/DeployHamsterToken.s.sol\":24,\"src/HamsterToken.sol\":152,\"src/interfaces/IERC20.sol\":29,\"test/DeployHamsterToken.t.sol\":21,\"test/HamsterToken.invariant.t.sol\":113,\"test/HamsterToken.t.sol\":442},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":493,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"slither: no results at low impact or above","passed":true},{"durationMs":231,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[low] large-numeric-literal at src/HamsterToken.sol:40: Large Numeric Literal","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"cccabd2f0e24aeb6bf4348f468d395df84b0f512cde96a606160edc2676091a8","verifiedTreeHash":"d5958119f52c661785482ba5ba5011bc920d7ad6","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+a26ee00d"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":1198,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 26 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 1.12s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":207,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 1 test for test/DeployHamsterToken.t.sol:DeployHamsterTokenTest\n[PASS] test_deployMintsSupplyToTheCaller() (gas: 1198160)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 315.74µs (159.12µs CPU time)\n\nRan 35 tests for test/HamsterToken.t.sol:HamsterTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_approve_setsExactly(address,address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 58530, ~: 58639)\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFrom_revertsAboveAllowance(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 144962, ~: 145419)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 158698011571431669614067202\n  Bound result 271309291515069305655441722\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFrom_withinAllowanceAndBalance(uint256,uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 214479, ~: 217614)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 307909757991395986722201015\n  Bound result 409051995272941048724234782772863443241691233473\n  Bound result 31681109834405696438476872\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transfer_conservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 103977, ~: 104270)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 625142986706132341970261016\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_transfer_revertsAboveBalance(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 99547, ~: 100081)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 4419\n\n[PASS] test_approve_doesNotRequireABalance() (gas: 62316)\n[PASS] test_approve_overwritesPreviousAllowance() (gas: 117283)\n[PASS] test_approve_revertsForZeroSpender() (gas: 32506)\n[PASS] test_approve_setsAllowanceAndEmits() (gas: 64680)\n[PASS] test_constructorEmitsMintTransfer() (gas: 11256)\n[PASS] test_constructorMintsWholeSupplyToDeployer() (gas: 32771)\n[PASS] test_creationCodeTakesNoConstructorArguments() (gas: 533889)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 47686)\n[PASS] test_noMintOrAdminFunctionExists() (gas: 776365)\n[PASS] test_noPrivilegedCallMovesOrFreezesAHolder() (gas: 481422)\n[PASS] test_rejectsEtherAndUnknownCalldata() (gas: 60695)\n[PASS] test_runtimeFitsEip170() (gas: 5104)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoDelegatecallCallcodeOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 1052637)\n[PASS] test_supplyGoesToWhoeverDeploysIncludingAContract() (gas: 198572)\n[PASS] test_supplyIsOneBillionWithEighteenDecimals() (gas: 23242)\n[PASS] test_transferFrom_exactAllowanceLeavesZero() (gas: 210023)\n[PASS] test_transferFrom_infiniteAllowanceIsNotDecremented() (gas: 184420)\n[PASS] test_transferFrom_ownerCannotPullWithoutSelfAllowance() (gas: 93046)\n[PASS] test_transferFrom_revertsAboveAllowance() (gas: 147071)\n[PASS] test_transferFrom_revertsAboveBalanceEvenWithAllowance() (gas: 154231)\n[PASS] test_transferFrom_revertsToZeroAddress() (gas: 144547)\n[PASS] test_transferFrom_revertsWithoutAllowance() (gas: 99235)\n[PASS] test_transferFrom_spendsAllowanceAndEmitsBoth() (gas: 215534)\n[PASS] test_transfer_movesBalanceAndEmits() (gas: 85177)\n[PASS] test_transfer_revertsFromEmptyAccount() (gas: 37640)\n[PASS] test_transfer_revertsOnInsufficientBalance() (gas: 106120)\n[PASS] test_transfer_revertsToZeroAddress() (gas: 36726)\n[PASS] test_transfer_toSelfKeepsBalance() (gas: 94934)\n[PASS] test_transfer_wholeBalance() (gas: 72087)\n[PASS] test_transfer_zeroAmountSucceeds() (gas: 46800)\nSuite result: ok. 35 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 14.21ms (60.05ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/HamsterToken.invariant.t.sol:HamsterTokenInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nHamsterTokenInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_balancesSumToSupply\n[PASS] invariant_totalSupplyNeverChanges\n[PASS] invariant_zeroAddressHoldsNothing\n HamsterTokenInvariantTest invariants (runs: 64, calls: 2048, reverts: 833)\n\n╭----------------+----------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract       | Selector             | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+====================================================================+\n| HamsterHandler | approve              | 406   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+----------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HamsterHandler | transfer             | 390   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+----------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HamsterHandler | transferAboveBalance | 410   | 410     | 0        |\n|----------------+----------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HamsterHandler | transferFrom         | 419   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+----------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HamsterHandler | transferToZero       | 423   | 423     | 0        |\n╰----------------+----------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 1646\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 243\n  Bound result 497\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 127\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 126.68ms (124.92ms CPU time)\n\nRan 3 test suites in 128.38ms (141.21ms CPU time): 37 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (37 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":39,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"HamsterToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"HamsterToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"HamsterToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"README.md\":147,\"foundry.toml\":31,\"launch.json\":24,\"remappings.txt\":1,\"script/DeployHamsterToken.s.sol\":24,\"src/HamsterToken.sol\":152,\"src/interfaces/IERC20.sol\":29,\"test/DeployHamsterToken.t.sol\":21,\"test/HamsterToken.invariant.t.sol\":113,\"test/HamsterToken.t.sol\":442},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"df46abf2a9ad42fa53a7ca4cc3ed51ee9e03130b7b7d3b58b64dcf3731648d04","verifiedTreeHash":"16b5fe498367091bf369f403dadb4740b9f9846f","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+a26ee00d"}]}