{"assessments":[],"deployments":[],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"fa6b5618-3053-4770-a581-63cff25b59c3","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"510508734beeb77113639c648b8f567902a7f45c490164226ccf88ce9895d8f8","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_economics","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"04f7897a491a3ed1502ce9bd5974da9a0925dd141315b20959b84f6834be9a01","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_flow","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"e92debbe59cf08fcd7ea343231d8aed2ef70cb1c6fcb3a2e77405df7eb0a45b2","dependsOn":["build_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest","audit_math","audit_permissions","audit_economics","audit_flow"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"3014f1ea5961918ca059453a484bf4c8bcbbfc2248dbe31d94ac7c5cdf8f50bd","skillId":"audit-judge","tools":[]},"key":"audit_judge","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"3014f1ea5961918ca059453a484bf4c8bcbbfc2248dbe31d94ac7c5cdf8f50bd","skillId":"audit-judge","state":"failed"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"0a7ed0d4de8b1ba0072e835217b3916c18f4596179acfe610f1e98f699a81447","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_math","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"c4b465d6e3f2f4dd92a0400ea6cd67476a6cbc757c4f8736591b1ea4e42c7845","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_permissions","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"651dcc0f41d7b64106cdd9e0e6f3ce39fd0261a6e6406a6e2d0f056c32731101","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"47381b166d1f406a34f0ebdc740ee21bc0383e56e7ad9084b26abf1bf7570904","skillId":"build-contract-project","tools":[]},"key":"build_contract_project","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"47381b166d1f406a34f0ebdc740ee21bc0383e56e7ad9084b26abf1bf7570904","skillId":"build-contract-project","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"3f2903056fa1d4cf33a4017f7f4f7f914c8da903ed2c2dac94ae3a14e11e51a4","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"tools":[]},"key":"manifest","kind":"code","role":"integrate","skillHash":null,"skillId":null,"state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"6099f3c3601b1f9758e5171c92b55beb5b17d85dd7810acbffdbd310b4f50da3","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"73431852439ad3a343f3d2b7db1c43cd363b9f48f9bb51497374a0cf6d50b223","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","tools":[]},"key":"write_foundry_tests","kind":"code","role":"tests","skillHash":"73431852439ad3a343f3d2b7db1c43cd363b9f48f9bb51497374a0cf6d50b223","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"An anti-snipe hook: the pool's LP fee is 1% for the first hour after the pool is initialized and 0.3% afterwards, set through the dynamic fee in beforeSwap. No owner and no other state changes.","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"ed5bb22b1432cf8608c51456ca174f4fde5854cb3d40a05cc12ea5fcfbca4a17","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"fa6b5618-3053-4770-a581-63cff25b59c3","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-540-anti-snipe-hook-pool-s-lp"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"51342","feedbackHash":"366bcd3e46c6848f7be65b791038f30b40ff76ec2a91f41d38925e23deef7103","nodeKey":"audit_economics","submissionHash":"510508734beeb77113639c648b8f567902a7f45c490164226ccf88ce9895d8f8","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51343","feedbackHash":"ce1723acf7c7257b7fb997707bef07969f0e2869dc715162441c4073ad2a5036","nodeKey":"audit_flow","submissionHash":"04f7897a491a3ed1502ce9bd5974da9a0925dd141315b20959b84f6834be9a01","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51018","feedbackHash":"1145db14f2426b66b398e3ab6f1b7c3f7ea4cfe17822af00209fb9bd9af13139","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"a885ec2c5007f38887ae03b1c30ba3cf870080747de3d6d48e473d1e1ce93f40","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"50955","feedbackHash":"07f5846a05d75d136bb605fab549c820ade507682cd2395c77a33e3dd96c6854","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"e92debbe59cf08fcd7ea343231d8aed2ef70cb1c6fcb3a2e77405df7eb0a45b2","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51337","feedbackHash":"57e25bbd93d0a03d351a1a931ebac7160f58af192755fa15ca5da808ddbecdd5","nodeKey":"audit_math","submissionHash":"0a7ed0d4de8b1ba0072e835217b3916c18f4596179acfe610f1e98f699a81447","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51188","feedbackHash":"e9221ef463dfdf64ba165f425c5be64950a1ba2b10b32f7c32b31d02bcea3106","nodeKey":"audit_permissions","submissionHash":"c4b465d6e3f2f4dd92a0400ea6cd67476a6cbc757c4f8736591b1ea4e42c7845","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51046","feedbackHash":"3806cc808e6531049c34685e490dc75c5ee1020932e9ea4a3f06fc0b2bda7c87","nodeKey":"build_contract_project","submissionHash":"651dcc0f41d7b64106cdd9e0e6f3ce39fd0261a6e6406a6e2d0f056c32731101","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51046","feedbackHash":"e5955929532059ef4b71ae60a3322bc41bda716ef5fcc54acf987e7cb40899c2","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"802cd05fbdca3f342d9550c34dbc6162e3267943255e00968bd9ed183745dab4","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"50971","feedbackHash":"613312b928b9415fd5b307fa32a72e24d8962e277eeac109ae3e6bd5f4c697c8","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"3f2903056fa1d4cf33a4017f7f4f7f914c8da903ed2c2dac94ae3a14e11e51a4","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51030","feedbackHash":"077b5130fc929bd52e618d9be9dc6a16db3a6261d4842c300644aae3fc7d9d9e","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"6099f3c3601b1f9758e5171c92b55beb5b17d85dd7810acbffdbd310b4f50da3","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"b100bba2c89a3762ee9c272570875ddc8951d41f8e6b72a2b931ec1b9c61f61a","state":"blocked","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"feba2a869621cab2","findings":[],"hash":"04f7897a491a3ed1502ce9bd5974da9a0925dd141315b20959b84f6834be9a01","nodeId":"0346c785-b901-4853-a27c-4b2f329fa8f2","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. The findings file at `.imd-findings.json` holds an empty findings list and a coverage record of 11 rows, all `holds`. No source files were changed, and my scratch copy of the verifier floor test was removed.\n\n**What I checked, in my area (Execution Trace, Periphery, First Principles)**\n\n- **Initialize path.** PoolManager runs Pool.initialize before calling afterInitialize, so a duplicate deadline write is unreachable, and any hook revert rolls the whole initialization back. The caller check runs before the key checks, so a direct call from anyone else fails first.\n- **Swap path.** The manager reads the third return word as the fee only because the key carries the dynamic-fee sentinel, strips the override bit, and validates it against the one-million ceiling. Both 1% and 0.3% pass and neither blocks exact-output swaps. The returned delta is ignored because no return-delta flag is set.\n- **Bypass search.** The only way to skip beforeSwap in the pinned Hooks library is for the hook itself to be the swap caller. The hook has no fallback and never calls the manager, so that branch is dead. Nothing can call updateDynamicLPFee for this hook either.\n- **Trap search.** The only revert in beforeSwap for a live pool would need a zero deadline, which cannot exist once the manager has initialized the pool. Liquidity removal never calls this hook, so LPs can always exit.\n- **Periphery.** The flag library matches the Hooks bit layout, and the mining script hashes exactly the payload a CREATE2 deployer would use. I ran it offline and the predicted address carries the right low bits.\n- **Verifier floor.** I ran the pinned protected hook test against the real creation code with a placeholder manager address. All three tests passed.\n- **Vendored libraries.** A spot scan of the ERC20, Hooks, fee, parse, Pool and PoolManager sources found no origin checks, hardcoded addresses, or escape opcodes.\n\n**Static-analysis leads.** The timestamp comparison is the specified mechanism, with drift bounded to seconds against a one-hour window and no profit path, so I did not report it. The three aderyn items are style and missing-event notes with no failing input.\n\n**Not reached.** Nothing in my assigned area was left untraced. I did not attempt a mainnet fork rehearsal, since the task permits no fork and the floor file itself defers that to the deployer's rehearsal step.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":689015,"inputTokens":226,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":22512,"runtime":"claude","turns":31,"wallClockMs":470049}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"6ef494db85781eec","findings":[],"hash":"0a7ed0d4de8b1ba0072e835217b3916c18f4596179acfe610f1e98f699a81447","nodeId":"74f19ec1-e625-4cc0-8702-27528ed3c0e3","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. The findings file at `.imd-findings.json` reports no defects in my area, with a coverage record of 11 rows (the 4 listed entry points plus 7 invariants I checked). The working tree has no other changes; scratch tests were removed.\n\n**What I covered**\n\nThe hook's math is a single checked addition in afterInitialize and a single comparison in beforeSwap. I worked through every failure mode in the Math Precision, Boundary and Numerical Gap guides against it:\n\n- **Precision.** Fee constants are exact pips (1% and 0.3%), the override flag OR fits in uint24, and PoolManager strips and validates the fee. No division, cast, decimal or scale conversion exists in the hook.\n- **Boundary.** Real swaps across every second from 10 seconds before to 10 seconds after the one-hour mark emit the expected fee. The window is [init, init+3600) at 1%, matching the README. The zero-deadline sentinel cannot collide with an initialized pool: timestamp 0 stores 3600, and the only overflowing timestamp reverts atomically.\n- **Numerical gap.** Stacking a protocol fee on the override gives the composed fee PoolManager's formula predicts. Swap params and hookData are ignored entirely, so no bytes decoding or amount-dependent path exists. A 1-wei swap is consumed as fee by v4-core's own math, not the hook's.\n- **Outside my area.** The LaunchToken entry points are unmodified OpenZeppelin v5 ERC-20. I ran the protected hook and token floor suites against the actual creation code and all 9 tests pass, alongside the project's 31 tests.\n\n**Leads examined and dropped**\n\n- Timestamp overflow on deadline write: reverts under checked arithmetic, only reachable at a timestamp above 2^256 minus 3601. Not a defect.\n- Hooks.noSelfCall would skip afterInitialize if the hook itself called initialize, leaving a pool permanently unswappable. The hook has no call path to PoolManager, no fallback and no delegatecall, so this is unreachable.\n- Slither's timestamp lead is the intended time-based schedule, not a comparison defect.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":766110,"inputTokens":258,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":18615,"runtime":"claude","turns":26,"wallClockMs":506691}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"35c52a5b502e847c","findings":[],"hash":"2e7bd9d07059dcb483ef807302473240ae1695b4e81da026f627f514758aeb55","nodeId":"18ca5a19-b9b7-40d2-91c3-a84d1fabc9a0","outcome":"no_change","summary":"Recorded both findings in [.imd-responses.json](/home/identitymd5/.identitymd/work/fa6b5618-3053-4770-a581-63cff25b59c3/18ca5a19-b9b7-40d2-91c3-a84d1fabc9a0/.imd-responses.json).\n\nManifest unchanged: required fee `8388608` exceeds the schema maximum `1000000`. Deployment remains blocked on schema/deployer support and chain verification.\n\n`forge build` succeeded; all 43 tests passed, including protected checks and reproductions.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":515456,"inputTokens":41334,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":7697,"runtime":"codex","turns":5,"wallClockMs":286934}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"2005a0832c87ba62d083cab08dadff9f43c1a59384b4b0ac8abcd16b05a3a83f","device":"35c52a5b502e847c","findings":[],"hash":"3f2903056fa1d4cf33a4017f7f4f7f914c8da903ed2c2dac94ae3a14e11e51a4","nodeId":"18ca5a19-b9b7-40d2-91c3-a84d1fabc9a0","outcome":"completed","summary":"Updated `launch.json` to use `$poolManager` and answered both findings in `.imd-responses.json`.\n\nSchema validation, `forge build`, and all 44 tests passed.\n\nDeployment remains blocked: the hook requires fee `8388608`, but the schema caps it at `1000000`. This reproduced and cannot be fixed within the manifest-only scope.","treeHash":"9db7d531902c83e7b49d7aa16b606ce282652507","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":372352,"inputTokens":52211,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":7391,"runtime":"codex","turns":4,"wallClockMs":266760}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"cbc83f8151b8340d","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Invariant guide, 'Interface guarantees' / 'Diverge view from write'. The hook never calls PoolManager.updateDynamicLPFee, so the pool's Slot0.lpFee (read by StateLibrary.getSlot0 / StateView and by any off-chain pathfinder or indexer that reads slot0 instead of simulating the swap) is 0 from initialization onward, while beforeSwap overrides every swap to 10_000 or 3_000 pips. v4-core's own LPFeeLibrary.getInitialLPFee NatSpec says a dynamic-fee pool that wants a non-zero initial fee 'should call updateDynamicLPFee in the afterInitialize hook'. Integrators that quote from slot0 will quote a fee-free pool and users will receive up to 1% less than quoted; with tight slippage their swaps revert, with loose slippage the shortfall is silently accepted. No funds can be stolen and the hook's Swap events carry the real fee, so this is a quoting/representation defect only. The README documents the behaviour, but the Uniswap-recommended mitigation is a single trusted external call. Minimal fix that keeps the design: in afterInitialize, after recording the deadline, call poolManager.updateDynamicLPFee(key, INITIAL_LP_FEE) so the stored fee matches the opening fee. Keeping the stored fee exact after the hour would additionally require a one-time updateDynamicLPFee(key, NORMAL_LP_FEE) from the first post-deadline beforeSwap, which would make beforeSwap non-view and add a second write; that is a scope decision for the author, since the brief says 'no other state changes'.","line":54,"path":"src/AntiSnipeHook.sol","reproduction":"State: fresh PoolManager, hook mined at flags 0x1080, pool key {fee: 0x800000, tickSpacing: 60, hooks: hook}. Calls: manager.initialize(key, 2^96); add liquidity; read IPoolManager(manager).getSlot0(key.toId()) -> lpFee == 0. Then swapRouter.swap(key, SwapParams(true, -1 ether, 2^96/2)) and decode the manager's Swap event -> fee == 10000. Expected (per LPFeeLibrary guidance): stored lpFee reflects the opening fee (10000). Actual: stored lpFee 0, swap charged 10000. Reproduced in test/scratch/Econ.t.sol::test_storedFeeZeroWhileSwapCharges1pct (logs 'stored lpFee: 0', 'charged fee: 10000').","severity":"low","snippet":"        initialFeeEndsAt[id] = block.timestamp + INITIAL_FEE_DURATION;","title":"Stored pool LP fee stays 0 forever while every swap is charged 1% / 0.3% (view/write divergence for integrators)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Flow Gap seam 3 (execution x first principles). The code matches the brief literally ('1% for the first hour after the pool is initialized'), so this is reported as a design trust assumption, not a code bug. The clock starts in afterInitialize and nothing in the hook observes liquidity. If the launch factory initializes the pool in one transaction but the first liquidity (the frozen allocation copied by launch/deploy.ts) lands in a later transaction, or the pool is initialized ahead of a public announcement, the surcharge is consumed while there is nothing to snipe and the first real trades pay 0.3%. The hook cannot tell these cases apart. The IMD factory is described as deploying the hook and initializing the pool atomically, but nothing in this repository or the manifest schema shows that liquidity is seeded in that same transaction; that evidence should come from the factory/deploy flow before admission. Changing the anchor to the first liquidity add would need the afterAddLiquidity permission and a different address bit pattern, i.e. a design change outside the brief.","line":69,"path":"src/AntiSnipeHook.sol","reproduction":"State: pool initialized at timestamp T = 1_000_000 with no liquidity. Calls: vm.warp(T + 3600); liquidityRouter.modifyLiquidity(key, {-60000, 60000, +1_000_000 ether}); swapRouter.swap(key, SwapParams(true, -1 ether, 2^96/2)). Expected by the anti-snipe intent: the first trade against freshly seeded liquidity pays 1%. Actual: Swap event fee == 3000. Reproduced in test/scratch/Econ.t.sol::test_windowElapsesBeforeLiquidityArrives (log 'first swap fee after late seeding: 3000').","severity":"info","snippet":"        uint24 fee = block.timestamp < deadline ? INITIAL_LP_FEE : NORMAL_LP_FEE;","title":"Anti-snipe window is anchored to pool initialization, not to liquidity; late seeding or a pre-announced launch shortens or voids the 1% period"}],"hash":"510508734beeb77113639c648b8f567902a7f45c490164226ccf88ce9895d8f8","nodeId":"3c962d23-cc58-4a2a-99bd-c03f9c289701","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. The findings file is written at `.imd-findings.json`, both snippets match the tree, and no tracked file was changed. The scratch test lives under the git-ignored `test/scratch/` directory.\n\n**Outcome:** the hook's economics are sound. No critical, high, or medium defect was found in the Economic Security, Invariant, or Flow Gap areas. Two lower-tier observations are reported with reproductions.\n\n**Findings:**\n- **Low, stored LP fee stays zero.** The hook never calls `updateDynamicLPFee`, so the pool's slot0 fee reads 0 while every swap is actually charged 1% or 0.3%. Integrators that quote from slot0 instead of simulating the swap will misquote by up to 1%. The v4 fee library's own guidance says a dynamic pool wanting a non-zero opening fee should set it in afterInitialize. Fix is one trusted call in afterInitialize; keeping the stored value exact after the hour would need a write in beforeSwap, which is a scope decision given the brief's \"no other state changes\".\n- **Info, window anchored to initialization.** The hour starts at pool initialization and ignores liquidity. If the factory seeds liquidity in a later transaction, or initializes ahead of announcement, the surcharge is spent on an empty pool. This matches the brief literally and is recorded as a trust assumption on the factory flow, with the evidence the admission step should obtain.\n\n**Checked and holding:** the override flag path through `Hooks.beforeSwap` and `Pool.swap`, write-once deadline across re-initialization and other pools, zero hook custody and zero return deltas, exact boundary behaviour, JIT self-liquidity by a sniper (net fee per token taken from the launch LP remains 1%), the Slither timestamp lead (no unprivileged trigger, bounded gain), and the hook-as-caller skip in the Hooks library (unreachable). All four listed entry points have coverage rows, plus six invariant and economics rows.\n\n**Not reached:** nothing within the assigned area. Access-control, math-precision and other specialties were only touched where they intersected the economic path.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":867871,"inputTokens":290,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":23616,"runtime":"claude","turns":30,"wallClockMs":544258}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"f92fd66fc9abbfc772a90cc1c67a5c5ff7630f3ccd79c9e5f3fd4ff9de86262b","device":"06486f6fefb50394","findings":[],"hash":"6099f3c3601b1f9758e5171c92b55beb5b17d85dd7810acbffdbd310b4f50da3","nodeId":"ef0471c2-96b2-45e2-b5a0-357340b77f71","outcome":"completed","summary":"Added tests only under `test/`, covering failure paths, fee boundaries, dust swaps, partial fills, and token/pool invariants.\n\nClean offline `forge build` and `forge test` pass: **47 passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped**. Invariant suites exercised **32,768 random calls**.\n\nNo implementation defects found.","treeHash":"8043b10294bba1e81562f2e848c92f269b10111b","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2309632,"inputTokens":106926,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":20117,"runtime":"codex","turns":8,"wallClockMs":728455}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"5b731783dc9815bd6c78f4079881f70f3a03e2adff5f98569692a3861bfc97b3","device":"02ae6543274731ab","findings":[],"hash":"651dcc0f41d7b64106cdd9e0e6f3ce39fd0261a6e6406a6e2d0f056c32731101","nodeId":"688f8cb7-1ba2-403f-afd6-6c156fd24758","outcome":"completed","summary":"Implemented the 1% LP fee for the first hour, then 0.3%, through `beforeSwap`. No owner; only a one-time deadline write per pool.\n\nIncluded the launch token, vendored dependencies, salt finder, and [deployment documentation](/home/imd-worker/.identitymd/work/fa6b5618-3053-4770-a581-63cff25b59c3/688f8cb7-1ba2-403f-afd6-6c156fd24758/README.md).\n\nVerified with Solidity 0.8.26: clean offline build, all 31 tests, and `forge fmt --check` pass.","treeHash":"e1889bed09974f5df72a2b3705e77018260def01","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":996352,"inputTokens":78858,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":21744,"runtime":"codex","turns":6,"wallClockMs":731221}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"e99f2549716e560a395a43e6ec52ae3f7baaf03624257e37559ff87be8b0dca0","device":"02ae6543274731ab","findings":[],"hash":"802cd05fbdca3f342d9550c34dbc6162e3267943255e00968bd9ed183745dab4","nodeId":"18ca5a19-b9b7-40d2-91c3-a84d1fabc9a0","outcome":"completed","summary":"Created [launch.json](/home/imd-worker/.identitymd/work/fa6b5618-3053-4770-a581-63cff25b59c3/18ca5a19-b9b7-40d2-91c3-a84d1fabc9a0/launch.json). Schema validation, `forge build`, and all 40 tests passed. Only the manifest is deliverable.\n\nDocumented blocker: the schema cannot encode required dynamic fee flag `8388608`. The manifest’s `3000` describes the normal fee but cannot initialize this hook; deployment compatibility remains unresolved.","treeHash":"73ef13a60ded270dc2fe91c9feee61d3f7615341","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":461312,"inputTokens":47927,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":5671,"runtime":"codex","turns":5,"wallClockMs":205466}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"30a6c1a419ef4f9c","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"The hook requires PoolKey.fee == LPFeeLibrary.DYNAMIC_FEE_FLAG (0x800000 = 8388608): src/AntiSnipeHook.sol:75 `if (key.fee != LPFeeLibrary.DYNAMIC_FEE_FLAG) revert DynamicFeeRequired();` runs inside afterInitialize, and v4-core only honours a beforeSwap fee override on dynamic-fee pools (lib/v4-core/src/libraries/Hooks.sol:264 `if (key.fee.isDynamicFee()) lpFeeOverride = result.parseFee();`). The manifest, which the deployer's plan.ts uses for the pool fields of the launch transaction, says pool.fee = 3000. A factory that builds the key from the manifest therefore calls PoolManager.initialize with fee 3000; the manager calls afterInitialize, the hook reverts DynamicFeeRequired, callHook wraps it in HookCallFailed and the whole deploy-and-initialize transaction reverts. No funds are at risk (atomic revert), but the launch cannot happen with this manifest. The notes field admits this as a 'compatibility blocker' but notes are explanatory text, not deployment authority. Root gap: the LaunchManifest schema caps pool.fee at 1000000, so the dynamic-fee sentinel 8388608 is not schema-expressible; no edit to launch.json alone can fix it. Needed before admission: either schema/deployer support for dynamic-fee keys (a representation of 0x800000 that plan.ts and the factory pass through to PoolKey.fee), with evidence from the deploy plan, or a change of the agreed design away from dynamic fees. Removing the hook's check is not a fix: a static 3000 key would silently never apply the 1% window (v4 ignores the override), which breaks the brief instead of reverting.","line":21,"path":"launch.json","reproduction":"State: fresh PoolManager; AntiSnipeHook deployed at an address with flags 0x1080; two tokens. Call: manager.initialize(PoolKey{currency0, currency1, fee: 3000 /* launch.json pool.fee */, tickSpacing: 60, hooks: hook}, 2^96). Expected (if the manifest were deployable): pool initialized, initialFeeEndsAt[id] == block.timestamp + 3600. Actual: reverts (Hooks.HookCallFailed wrapping AntiSnipeHook.DynamicFeeRequired); initialFeeEndsAt[id] stays 0. Reproduced in test/scratch/Review.t.sol::test_manifestFeeKeyCannotInitialize (passes with vm.expectRevert) and by the repository's own test/AntiSnipeHook.t.sol::test_staticFeePoolInitializationRevertsAtomically. The same key with fee 8388608 initializes and records the deadline.","severity":"medium","snippet":"    \"fee\": 3000,","title":"launch.json pool.fee = 3000 describes a pool key this hook rejects; initializing with the manifest's key reverts, so the launch cannot deploy as described"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_economics (low); reproduced. afterInitialize records the deadline but never calls poolManager.updateDynamicLPFee, so Slot0.lpFee for a dynamic-fee pool remains its initial 0 (lib/v4-core/src/libraries/LPFeeLibrary.sol getInitialLPFee: 'if a dynamic fee pool wants a non-0 initial fee, it should call updateDynamicLPFee in the afterInitialize hook'). beforeSwap overrides every swap to 10_000 or 3_000 pips, so the pool behaves correctly and the Swap event carries the real fee, but any integrator, indexer or pathfinder that reads lpFee from slot0 (StateLibrary.getSlot0 / StateView) instead of simulating the swap sees 0 and quotes up to 1% better than the user receives; tight-slippage swaps built from such quotes revert, loose ones silently accept the shortfall. No funds can be stolen. README documents the behaviour. Minimal fix that keeps the design: in afterInitialize call poolManager.updateDynamicLPFee(key, INITIAL_LP_FEE) after recording the deadline (one trusted call to the immutable manager; hook storage is still written once). Making the stored fee exact after the hour would need a one-time write from beforeSwap, which conflicts with the brief's 'no other state changes' and is a scope decision for the author.","line":54,"path":"src/AntiSnipeHook.sol","reproduction":"State: fresh PoolManager, hook at flags 0x1080, pool key {fee: 0x800000, tickSpacing: 60, hooks: hook}, manager.initialize(key, 2^96), liquidity 1_000_000e18 in [-60000, 60000]. Calls: IPoolManager(manager).getSlot0(key.toId()) -> lpFee == 0; swapRouter.swap(key, SwapParams(true, -1 ether, 2^96/2)) and decode the manager's Swap event fee -> 10000. After vm.warp(+3600): slot0 lpFee still 0, Swap event fee 3000. Expected per v4-core guidance: stored lpFee reflects the fee being charged. Actual: stored 0 throughout. Reproduced in test/scratch/Review.t.sol::test_storedFeeZeroWhileSwapCharges (logs 'stored lpFee: 0', 'charged fee: 10000').","severity":"low","snippet":"        initialFeeEndsAt[id] = block.timestamp + INITIAL_FEE_DURATION;","title":"Stored pool LP fee stays 0 forever while every swap is charged 1% / 0.3% (slot0 readers quote a fee-free pool)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_economics (info); reproduced. The code matches the brief literally ('1% for the first hour after the pool is initialized'), so this is not a code bug. The clock starts in afterInitialize and the hook never observes liquidity. If the factory initializes the pool in one transaction and the frozen allocation lands as liquidity in a later one, or the pool is initialized before the public announcement, the surcharge is consumed while there is nothing to snipe and the first real trades pay 0.3%. Evidence needed from the deploy flow before admission: that liquidity is seeded in the same transaction as (or within minutes of) initialization. Changing the anchor to the first liquidity add would need afterAddLiquidity and a different address bit pattern, which is a design change outside the brief.","line":69,"path":"src/AntiSnipeHook.sol","reproduction":"State: pool initialized at timestamp T = 1_000_000 with no liquidity. Calls: vm.warp(T + 3600); liquidityRouter.modifyLiquidity(key, {-60000, 60000, +1_000_000 ether}); swapRouter.swap(key, SwapParams(true, -1 ether, 2^96/2)). Expected by the anti-snipe intent: the first trade against freshly seeded liquidity pays 1%. Actual: Swap event fee == 3000. Reproduced in test/scratch/Review.t.sol::test_windowElapsesBeforeLiquidity (log 'first swap fee after late seeding: 3000').","severity":"info","snippet":"        uint24 fee = block.timestamp < deadline ? INITIAL_LP_FEE : NORMAL_LP_FEE;","title":"Anti-snipe window is anchored to pool initialization, not to first liquidity; late seeding shortens or voids the 1% period (design trust assumption)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The single constructor argument is Ethereum mainnet's canonical PoolManager. The constructor requires code at that address (src/AntiSnipeHook.sol:34 `if (address(manager).code.length == 0) revert InvalidPoolManager();`) and binds it immutably. launch.chainId, which selects the deployer queue, is not a manifest field and no .imd/reads/network.json was supplied, so nothing in this tree ties the argument to a chain. Uniswap v4's PoolManager lives at a different address on every other chain (e.g. Base, Arbitrum), where this address has no code: the factory transaction reverts atomically (safe, no funds moved) and nothing is launched. Not a code defect; the needed evidence is that the launch's chainId is 1, or the argument is replaced with the verified PoolManager of the selected chain (README step 1). Verified locally that with the manager's code present at this address the protected hook floor passes (3/3) and the hook binds to it.","line":6,"path":"launch.json","reproduction":"State: an EVM where 0x000000000004444c5dc75cb358380d2e3de08a90 has no code (any chain other than Ethereum mainnet, or a local VM). Call: new AntiSnipeHook{salt}(IPoolManager(0x000000000004444c5dc75cb358380d2e3de08a90)). Expected on the intended chain: deployment succeeds. Actual elsewhere: reverts InvalidPoolManager (the repository's test/AntiSnipeHook.t.sol::test_constructorRejectsManagerWithoutCode shows the same revert for a code-less manager). With the manager's runtime code etched at that address, deployment succeeds and the protected floor passes (run locally with IMD_POOL_MANAGER set to this address).","severity":"info","snippet":"      \"0x000000000004444c5dc75cb358380d2e3de08a90\"","title":"constructorArgs pins the Ethereum mainnet PoolManager; on any other deployer queue the hook constructor reverts and the launch cannot deploy"}],"hash":"a885ec2c5007f38887ae03b1c30ba3cf870080747de3d6d48e473d1e1ce93f40","nodeId":"a5194c6a-5548-442f-8097-108169970ae4","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. The findings file is written and validated, the scratch tests are removed, and no repository file was changed.\n\n**Outcome:** the hook code itself is sound. The one blocking item is in the manifest, not the Solidity.\n\n**Findings written to .imd-findings.json**\n\n1. **Medium, launch.json line 21.** The manifest says pool fee 3000, but the hook only accepts the dynamic-fee sentinel 8388608. Initializing with the manifest's key reverts inside afterInitialize, so the deploy transaction fails atomically. The schema caps fee at 1000000, so no manifest edit alone can express the sentinel. Needed before admission: schema or deployer support for dynamic-fee keys, or a design change. Removing the hook's check would be wrong, since v4 silently ignores the fee override on static-fee pools.\n2. **Low, AntiSnipeHook.sol line 54.** Merged from the economics specialist and reproduced. The stored pool fee stays 0 because afterInitialize never calls the manager's fee updater, while swaps are charged 1% then 0.3%. Only slot0 readers are misled. A one-line fix exists if the author accepts one trusted call to the manager.\n3. **Info, AntiSnipeHook.sol line 69.** Merged from the economics specialist and reproduced. The hour starts at initialization, not first liquidity. This matches the brief. Evidence is needed that the factory seeds liquidity in the same transaction.\n4. **Info, launch.json line 6.** The constructor argument is the Ethereum mainnet PoolManager. On any other deployer queue the constructor reverts for lack of code there, so the chain selection must be confirmed as mainnet or the argument replaced.\n\n**What I verified**\n\n- Full suite passes: 47 tests including fuzz and invariant runs.\n- The protected hook and token floors pass locally against the real creation code with the manifest's manager argument etched into place.\n- Every reproduction above was run in a scratch test before being recorded.\n- The permissions, flow and math specialists reported nothing, and my own pass over caller checks, selector returns, hook address bits, the pre-deployment initialization guard, and the token's ERC20 paths found no further defects.\n\n**Coverage:** all four listed entry points are answered, plus rows for beforeSwap, the constructor, and two invariants. No finding is critical or high, so no proof test was attached.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":860563,"inputTokens":290,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":25304,"runtime":"claude","turns":31,"wallClockMs":429206}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"0b0761c9b10fe0bb","findings":[],"hash":"c4b465d6e3f2f4dd92a0400ea6cd67476a6cbc757c4f8736591b1ea4e42c7845","nodeId":"256a5804-dde3-4f52-a072-ffce10fae76b","outcome":"completed","summary":"Wrote [.imd-findings.json](/root/.identitymd/work/fa6b5618-3053-4770-a581-63cff25b59c3/256a5804-dde3-4f52-a072-ffce10fae76b/.imd-findings.json).\n\nNo substantiated defects found. All four required entry points covered; 31 Foundry tests passed. Production deployment evidence remains unverified. Source files unchanged.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":736384,"inputTokens":106903,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":6414,"runtime":"codex","turns":5,"wallClockMs":269746}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"3c7630b22a73c1fb","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Settlement of finding 81a25355: NOT FIXED, and the author's dispute is upheld on one point only: no edit inside this assignment's write scope can fix it. The code is unchanged since round 1 (src/AntiSnipeHook.sol:75 `if (key.fee != LPFeeLibrary.DYNAMIC_FEE_FLAG) revert DynamicFeeRequired();` runs inside afterInitialize) and v4-core only honours the beforeSwap fee override on dynamic-fee pools (lib/v4-core/src/libraries/Hooks.sol:264 `if (key.fee.isDynamicFee()) lpFeeOverride = result.parseFee();`). launch.json still says pool.fee = 3000, which the deployer's plan.ts passes into the PoolKey of the launch transaction; PoolManager.initialize then calls afterInitialize, the hook reverts DynamicFeeRequired, callHook wraps it in HookCallFailed and the deploy-and-initialize transaction reverts atomically. No funds are at risk, but the launch cannot happen with this manifest. I re-ran the author's schema claim: the supplied LaunchManifest schema (pool.fee maximum 1000000) accepts the current manifest and rejects a copy with pool.fee = 8388608 ('8388608 is greater than the maximum of 1000000'), so no schema-valid fee value both validates and initializes. The notes field describes this as a compatibility blocker, but notes are explanatory text, not deployment authority. This remains the outstanding admission blocker. What settles it is outside this repository: (a) schema and deployer/factory support for a dynamic-fee PoolKey (a representation of 0x800000 that plan.ts and the factory pass through to PoolKey.fee), with deploy-plan evidence, or (b) a scope decision to change the agreed design away from dynamic fees. Removing the hook's check is not a fix: with a static 3000 key v4 ignores the override, so the 1% window would silently never apply, breaking the brief instead of reverting.","line":21,"path":"launch.json","reproduction":"State: fresh PoolManager; AntiSnipeHook mined at an address with flags 0x1080 and constructed with that manager; LaunchToken deployed. Key built from launch.json: currency0 = address(0) (pairedCurrency, native ETH), currency1 = LaunchToken, fee = 3000, tickSpacing = 60, hooks = hook; sqrtPriceX96 = 79228162514264337593543950336 (initialPrice). Call: manager.initialize(key, sqrtPriceX96). Expected (if the manifest were deployable): pool initialized, hook.initialFeeEndsAt(key.toId()) == block.timestamp + 3600. Actual: reverts CustomRevert.WrappedError(hook, IHooks.afterInitialize.selector, DynamicFeeRequired(), HookCallFailed()); initialFeeEndsAt stays 0 and slot0 sqrtPriceX96 stays 0. Changing only fee to 8388608 initializes and records START + 3600. Reproduced this round in test/scratch/Settle.t.sol::test_manifestFeeKeyCannotInitialize (passes with vm.expectRevert on the exact wrapped error). Schema check (python jsonschema Draft202012Validator against the supplied LaunchManifest schema): current launch.json -> no errors; same manifest with pool.fee = 8388608 -> '8388608 is greater than the maximum of 1000000'.","severity":"medium","snippet":"    \"fee\": 3000,","title":"Unresolved from round 1: launch.json pool.fee = 3000 describes a pool key this hook rejects; the launch cannot initialize as described (schema cannot express the dynamic-fee sentinel)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Settlement of finding 17d0aad8 (merged with audit_economics cf5908d0, same root cause): NOT FIXED; the author gave no answer and the hook source is byte-for-byte what it was in round 1. afterInitialize records the deadline but never calls poolManager.updateDynamicLPFee, so Slot0.lpFee for the dynamic-fee pool stays at its initial 0 (lib/v4-core/src/libraries/LPFeeLibrary.sol getInitialLPFee: 'the initial fee for a dynamic fee pool is 0'; its NatSpec says a pool wanting a non-zero initial fee should call updateDynamicLPFee in afterInitialize). beforeSwap overrides every swap to 10_000 or 3_000 pips, so the pool charges correctly and the Swap event carries the real fee, but any integrator, indexer or pathfinder that reads lpFee via StateLibrary.getSlot0 / StateView instead of simulating the swap sees 0 and quotes up to 1% better than the user receives; tight-slippage swaps built from such quotes revert, loose ones silently accept the shortfall. No funds can be stolen. README documents the behaviour. Minimal fix that keeps the design: after recording the deadline in afterInitialize, call poolManager.updateDynamicLPFee(key, INITIAL_LP_FEE) (one call to the immutable, trusted manager; PoolManager.updateDynamicLPFee at lib/v4-core/src/PoolManager.sol:338 accepts it because msg.sender == key.hooks and the key is dynamic). Making the stored fee exact after the hour would need a one-time write from beforeSwap, which conflicts with the brief's 'no other state changes' and is a scope decision for the author. Advisory; does not block on its own.","line":54,"path":"src/AntiSnipeHook.sol","reproduction":"State: fresh PoolManager, hook at flags 0x1080, key {currency0: native ETH, currency1: LaunchToken, fee: 0x800000, tickSpacing: 60, hooks: hook}, manager.initialize(key, 2^96), PoolModifyLiquidityTest adds 1_000_000e18 liquidity in [-60000, 60000]. Calls: IPoolManager(manager).getSlot0(key.toId()) -> lpFee == 0; PoolSwapTest.swap(key, SwapParams(true, -1 ether, 2^96/2)) and decode the manager's Swap event fee -> 10000. vm.warp(START + 3600): getSlot0 lpFee still 0; Swap event fee 3000. Expected per v4-core guidance: stored lpFee reflects the fee being charged (10000 during the window). Actual: stored 0 throughout. Reproduced this round in test/scratch/Settle.t.sol::test_storedFeeZeroWhileSwapCharges (asserts stored == 0 and charged == 10_000, then stored == 0 and charged == 3_000).","severity":"low","snippet":"        initialFeeEndsAt[id] = block.timestamp + INITIAL_FEE_DURATION;","title":"Unresolved from round 1: stored pool LP fee stays 0 forever while every swap is charged 1% / 0.3% (slot0 readers quote a fee-free pool)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Settlement of finding a7ce3921 (merged with audit_economics 94e1c63a): unchanged, still reproduces, still not a code bug. The code matches the brief literally ('1% for the first hour after the pool is initialized'). The clock starts in afterInitialize and the hook never observes liquidity. If the factory initializes the pool in one transaction and the frozen allocation lands as liquidity in a later one, or the pool is initialized before the public announcement, the surcharge is consumed while there is nothing to snipe and the first real trades pay 0.3%. Evidence needed from the deploy flow before admission: that liquidity is seeded in the same transaction as, or within minutes of, initialization. Changing the anchor to the first liquidity add would need afterAddLiquidity and a different address bit pattern, a design change outside the brief. Not blocking.","line":69,"path":"src/AntiSnipeHook.sol","reproduction":"State: pool (dynamic key, native ETH / LaunchToken, spacing 60) initialized at timestamp T = 1_000_000 with no liquidity. Calls: vm.warp(T + 3600); PoolModifyLiquidityTest.modifyLiquidity(key, {-60000, 60000, +1_000_000 ether}); PoolSwapTest.swap(key, SwapParams(true, -1 ether, 2^96/2)). Expected by the anti-snipe intent: the first trade against freshly seeded liquidity pays 1%. Actual: Swap event fee == 3000. Reproduced this round in test/scratch/Settle.t.sol::test_windowElapsesBeforeLiquidity.","severity":"info","snippet":"        uint24 fee = block.timestamp < deadline ? INITIAL_LP_FEE : NORMAL_LP_FEE;","title":"Unresolved from round 1 (design trust assumption): anti-snipe window is anchored to pool initialization, not to first liquidity; late seeding shortens or voids the 1% period"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Settlement of finding 0f9160a5: the author's dispute is accepted as far as it goes. The conditional failure still reproduces (constructor at src/AntiSnipeHook.sol:34 `if (address(manager).code.length == 0) revert InvalidPoolManager();`), the argument is Ethereum mainnet's canonical PoolManager, and nothing in this tree (no .imd/reads/network.json, launch.chainId is not a manifest field) ties the argument to a chain. The author correctly notes there is equally no evidence that the selected queue is a different chain, and that retaining the mainnet reference is better than inventing another target. This is therefore not a code defect and does not block on its own; it is the open evidence item for admission: the launch service must show launch.chainId == 1 with this address as that chain's verified PoolManager, or supply the selected chain's verified manager for an authorized manifest revision. The protected hook floor passes with this address when the manager's code is etched there (author and round 1 both verified).","line":6,"path":"launch.json","reproduction":"State: an EVM where 0x000000000004444c5dc75cb358380d2e3de08a90 has no code (any chain other than Ethereum mainnet, or a fresh local VM). Call: new AntiSnipeHook(IPoolManager(0x000000000004444c5dc75cb358380d2e3de08a90)). Expected on the intended chain: deployment succeeds. Actual elsewhere: reverts InvalidPoolManager. Reproduced this round in test/scratch/Ctor.t.sol::test_manifestManagerWithoutCodeReverts (asserts code.length == 0 at that address, then vm.expectRevert(AntiSnipeHook.InvalidPoolManager.selector)).","severity":"info","snippet":"      \"0x000000000004444c5dc75cb358380d2e3de08a90\"","title":"Unresolved from round 1 (evidence needed): constructorArgs pins the Ethereum mainnet PoolManager; on any other deployer queue the hook constructor reverts and the launch cannot deploy"}],"hash":"e92debbe59cf08fcd7ea343231d8aed2ef70cb1c6fcb3a2e77405df7eb0a45b2","nodeId":"a5194c6a-5548-442f-8097-108169970ae4","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is settled and written to `.imd-findings.json`. The hook and token sources are byte-for-byte unchanged since round 1, and launch.json still carries fee 3000, so I re-ran every reproduction against this tree rather than carrying answers forward.\n\n**Outcome for each prior finding**\n\n- **Medium, manifest pool.fee = 3000 (still open).** Reproduced again with the manifest's own fields: native ETH paired with LaunchToken, tick spacing 60, price 2^96. Initializing with fee 3000 reverts with the wrapped DynamicFeeRequired error and leaves the deadline and price at zero. The same key with 8388608 initializes. I also re-ran the author's schema claim with jsonschema. The current manifest validates, and a copy with fee 8388608 fails the 1000000 maximum. The author is right that no edit inside this assignment can fix it, so I kept the finding as the outstanding admission blocker and named the service gap: schema and deployer support for a dynamic-fee pool key, or a design decision away from dynamic fees.\n- **Low, stored LP fee stays 0 (still open).** Not addressed and unanswered. A swap during the window emits fee 10000 while slot0 reports 0, and the same after the hour with 3000. Kept as advisory with the one-call fix in afterInitialize.\n- **Info, window anchored to initialization (unchanged).** Liquidity seeded exactly one hour after initialization trades at 0.3%. Kept as a design trust assumption needing deploy-flow evidence.\n- **Info, mainnet PoolManager in constructorArgs (unchanged).** The constructor reverts where that address has no code. The author's dispute is accepted: there is no evidence either way about the chain, so this stays an evidence item, not a code defect.\n\n**Fresh pass.** I re-read the hook, token, and vendored ERC20 paths and checked the slither and aderyn leads. The timestamp comparison is the intended design, the missing event is covered by PoolManager's Initialize event, and nothing new reproduced. All 47 repository tests pass. No findings carry proofs since none are critical or high.\n\n**Coverage.** All four listed entry points are answered: afterInitialize points to finding 1, the three LaunchToken functions hold. Three extra rows cover beforeSwap, the constructor, and the no-admin invariant. Scratch tests live only under test/scratch, which is gitignored, and no tracked file changed.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1026433,"inputTokens":386,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":20241,"runtime":"claude","turns":26,"wallClockMs":341405}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":14193,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 84 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 14.06s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n   ╭▸ src/AntiSnipeHook.sol:69:22\n   │\n69 │         uint24 fee = block.timestamp < deadline ? INITIAL_LP_FEE : NORMAL_LP_FEE;\n   │                      ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":147,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 7 tests for test/LaunchToken.t.sol:LaunchTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 87926, ~: 88549)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1\n\n[PASS] test_approveAndTransferFromSpendAllowance() (gas: 189341)\n[PASS] test_fixedSupplyMetadataAndDeployerBalance() (gas: 44026)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceReverts() (gas: 39176)\n[PASS] test_neitherDeployerNorOutsiderCanMintOrAdminister() (gas: 492068)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 606340)\n[PASS] test_zeroRecipientReverts() (gas: 36261)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 3.85ms (6.08ms CPU time)\n\nRan 20 tests for test/AntiSnipeHook.t.sol:AntiSnipeHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_callbacksRejectUnauthorizedCaller(address) (runs: 256, μ: 161868, ~: 161868)\n[PASS] testFuzz_callbacksRequireExactDynamicFeeFlag(uint24) (runs: 256, μ: 48633, ~: 48640)\n[PASS] testFuzz_feeScheduleIgnoresSwapInputsAndNeverWrites(uint64,bool,int128,address,bytes) (runs: 256, μ: 125237, ~: 125242)\n[PASS] test_afterInitializeReturnsSelector() (gas: 64527)\n[PASS] test_callbacksRejectWrongHookInKey() (gas: 43080)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsIncorrectPermissionBits() (gas: 8400)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsManagerWithoutCode() (gas: 4700)\n[PASS] test_feeAtInitializationAndExactBoundary() (gas: 196769)\n[PASS] test_initializationRecordsOnlyPoolDeadline() (gas: 123417)\n[PASS] test_multiplePoolsHaveIndependentWindows() (gas: 244034)\n[PASS] test_noAdministrationAndDisabledCallbacksRevert() (gas: 129464)\n[PASS] test_permissionsAndMinedAddressAgree() (gas: 21679)\n[PASS] test_poolCannotInitializeBeforeHookCodeExists() (gas: 83432)\n[PASS] test_reinitializationCannotRestartWindow() (gas: 181967)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 555544)\n[PASS] test_saltSearchExhaustionReverts() (gas: 624918)\n[PASS] test_staticFeePoolInitializationRevertsAtomically() (gas: 101151)\n[PASS] test_timestampZeroIsAValidInitialization() (gas: 147526)\n[PASS] test_uninitializedPoolCannotGetFee() (gas: 21421)\n[PASS] test_windowStartsAtInitializationNotDeploymentOrFirstSwap() (gas: 125573)\nSuite result: ok. 20 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 23.66ms (25.17ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/AntiSnipeIntegration.t.sol:AntiSnipeIntegrationTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_realSwapsMatchStaticFeePool(uint32,bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 791077, ~: 786823)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1403\n  Bound result 99999999999000023449\n\n[PASS] test_failedSettlementRollsBackSwapAndKeepsDeadline() (gas: 550270)\n[PASS] test_fullLifecycleBothDirectionsAcrossBoundary() (gas: 1361145)\n[PASS] test_zeroSwapRejectedByManager() (gas: 80802)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 58.04ms (45.65ms CPU time)\n\nRan 3 test suites in 58.55ms (85.55ms CPU time): 31 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (31 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":46,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"AntiSnipeHook.afterInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160,int24)\",\"LaunchToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"LaunchToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"LaunchToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"DEPENDENCIES.md\":13,\"LICENSE\":23,\"README.md\":95,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"launch.json\":26,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/MineHook.s.sol\":27,\"src/AntiSnipeHook.sol\":77,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":32,\"src/LaunchToken.sol\":11,\"test/AntiSnipeHook.t.sol\":239,\"test/AntiSnipeIntegration.t.sol\":164,\"test/HookTestBase.sol\":55,\"test/LaunchToken.t.sol\":106,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":10},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"3f2903056fa1d4cf33a4017f7f4f7f914c8da903ed2c2dac94ae3a14e11e51a4","verifiedTreeHash":"9db7d531902c83e7b49d7aa16b606ce282652507","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+da6bdbe5"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":26833,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 88 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 26.69s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n   ╭▸ src/AntiSnipeHook.sol:69:22\n   │\n69 │         uint24 fee = block.timestamp < deadline ? INITIAL_LP_FEE : NORMAL_LP_FEE;\n   │                      ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":6950,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 7 tests for test/LaunchToken.t.sol:LaunchTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 88108, ~: 88549)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 60\n\n[PASS] test_approveAndTransferFromSpendAllowance() (gas: 189341)\n[PASS] test_fixedSupplyMetadataAndDeployerBalance() (gas: 44026)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceReverts() (gas: 39176)\n[PASS] test_neitherDeployerNorOutsiderCanMintOrAdminister() (gas: 492068)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 606340)\n[PASS] test_zeroRecipientReverts() (gas: 36261)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 3.09ms (4.83ms CPU time)\n\nRan 20 tests for test/AntiSnipeHook.t.sol:AntiSnipeHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_callbacksRejectUnauthorizedCaller(address) (runs: 256, μ: 161868, ~: 161868)\n[PASS] testFuzz_callbacksRequireExactDynamicFeeFlag(uint24) (runs: 256, μ: 48634, ~: 48640)\n[PASS] testFuzz_feeScheduleIgnoresSwapInputsAndNeverWrites(uint64,bool,int128,address,bytes) (runs: 256, μ: 125237, ~: 125242)\n[PASS] test_afterInitializeReturnsSelector() (gas: 64527)\n[PASS] test_callbacksRejectWrongHookInKey() (gas: 43080)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsIncorrectPermissionBits() (gas: 8400)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsManagerWithoutCode() (gas: 4700)\n[PASS] test_feeAtInitializationAndExactBoundary() (gas: 196769)\n[PASS] test_initializationRecordsOnlyPoolDeadline() (gas: 123417)\n[PASS] test_multiplePoolsHaveIndependentWindows() (gas: 244034)\n[PASS] test_noAdministrationAndDisabledCallbacksRevert() (gas: 129464)\n[PASS] test_permissionsAndMinedAddressAgree() (gas: 21679)\n[PASS] test_poolCannotInitializeBeforeHookCodeExists() (gas: 83432)\n[PASS] test_reinitializationCannotRestartWindow() (gas: 181967)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 555544)\n[PASS] test_saltSearchExhaustionReverts() (gas: 624918)\n[PASS] test_staticFeePoolInitializationRevertsAtomically() (gas: 101151)\n[PASS] test_timestampZeroIsAValidInitialization() (gas: 147526)\n[PASS] test_uninitializedPoolCannotGetFee() (gas: 21421)\n[PASS] test_windowStartsAtInitializationNotDeploymentOrFirstSwap() (gas: 125573)\nSuite result: ok. 20 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 130.46ms (275.63ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/AntiSnipeCallbackSurface.t.sol:AntiSnipeCallbackSurfaceTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_hourWindowIndependentOfTimestampEpoch(uint64,uint16) (runs: 1000, μ: 126573, ~: 126515)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 494\n\n[PASS] test_allDisabledCallbacksRevertEvenForManager() (gas: 452126)\n[PASS] test_hourWindowCrossesUint32TimestampBoundary() (gas: 128892)\n[PASS] test_noOwnerOrFeeAdministrationFromDeployerManagerOrTrader() (gas: 638026)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 130.52ms (114.74ms CPU time)\n\nRan 10 tests for test/AntiSnipeIntegration.t.sol:AntiSnipeIntegrationTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_dustSwapsMatchStaticFeePool(uint16,bool,bool,bool) (runs: 1000, μ: 785070, ~: 783185)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 693\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_priceLimitedSwapMatchesStaticFee(bool,bool,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 749782, ~: 753597)\n[PASS] testFuzz_realSwapsMatchStaticFeePool(uint32,bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 790818, ~: 786912)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 3943\n  Bound result 99999999999016773120\n\n[PASS] test_emptyingAndRefillingPoolDoesNotRestartFeeWindow() (gas: 890328)\n[PASS] test_failedSettlementRollsBackSwapAndKeepsDeadline() (gas: 550358)\n[PASS] test_fullLifecycleBothDirectionsAcrossBoundary() (gas: 1361583)\n[PASS] test_invalidPriceLimitRevertsWithoutChangingPoolOrHook() (gas: 209739)\n[PASS] test_oneWeiSwapsBothDirectionsAndFeeWindows() (gas: 6127139)\n[PASS] test_uninitializedPoolSwapRejectedThroughRouter() (gas: 180098)\n[PASS] test_zeroSwapRejectedByManager() (gas: 80815)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 130.79ms (315.36ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/LaunchTokenInvariant.t.sol:LaunchTokenInvariantTest\n[PASS] invariant_supplyBalancesAndAllowancesMatchModel() (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭--------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract           | Selector                    | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+===============================================================================+\n| LaunchTokenHandler | approve                     | 2749  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| LaunchTokenHandler | rejectInsufficientAllowance | 2693  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| LaunchTokenHandler | rejectInsufficientBalance   | 2675  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| LaunchTokenHandler | rejectZeroRecipient         | 2797  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| LaunchTokenHandler | transfer                    | 2699  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| LaunchTokenHandler | transferFrom                | 2771  | 0       | 0        |\n╰--------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 26984491837278670531635558\n  Bound result 638212885\n  Bound result 2348\n  Bound result 41000000000000000000\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 2950\n  Bound result 41000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 9334\n  Bound result 10360\n  Bound result 1800\n  Bound result 4294967195\n  Bound result 403946701618047262273317988\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 244\n  Bound result 1597\n  Bound result 550927964052573969342854095\n  Bound result 575\n  Bound result 600\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 60\n  Bound result 5342\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 21192568202738169554476725\n  Bound result 1038\n  Bound result 1567\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 9415\n  Bound result 4194304\n  Bound result 22\n  Bound result 242\n  Bound result 60000\n  Bound result 3126\n  Bound result 57796\n  Bound result 134330226869211667521746113\n  Bound result 5400\n  Bound result 5269\n  Bound result 35370\n  Bound result 1000\n  Bound result 5703\n  Bound result 600\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 27897\n  Bound result 225\n\n[PASS] test_failedTransferFromRestoresSpentAllowance() (gas: 131084)\n[PASS] test_handlerExercisesBoundaryTransfersAndReverts() (gas: 1186107)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 250000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 249999999999999999999999999\n  Bound result 500000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 750000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 750000000000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 1\n\n[PASS] test_zeroSpenderApprovalReverts() (gas: 37162)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 3.53s (3.53s CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/AntiSnipeInvariant.t.sol:AntiSnipeInvariantTest\n[PASS] invariant_scheduleAccountingAndSettlement() (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract         | Selector                    | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=============================================================================+\n| AntiSnipeHandler | addLiquidity                | 2311  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AntiSnipeHandler | advanceTime                 | 2304  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AntiSnipeHandler | reachBoundary               | 2342  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AntiSnipeHandler | rejectReinitialization      | 2346  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AntiSnipeHandler | rejectUnauthorizedCallbacks | 2376  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AntiSnipeHandler | removeLiquidity             | 2313  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| AntiSnipeHandler | swap                        | 2392  | 0       | 0        |\n╰------------------+-----------------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 8754613718838517006429\n  Bound result 468\n  Bound result 9999000000000000000061\n  Bound result 8670\n  Bound result 10990\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 60000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 536\n  Bound result 9998000000000000012367\n  Bound result 9999000000000000659919\n  Bound result 9998000000000000668484\n  Bound result 600\n  Bound result 598\n  Bound result 501\n  Bound result 9999000000000000000101\n  Bound result 10418328441464787828805\n  Bound result 27\n  Bound result 95\n  Bound result 9999000000000000005401\n  Bound result 127\n  Bound result 141\n  Bound result 4191\n  Bound result 15519\n  Bound result 18\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 95\n  Bound result 9187\n  Bound result 269\n  Bound result 4528\n  Bound result 2917340575791912132001\n\n[PASS] test_handlerReachesBothFeeWindowsAndEveryAction() (gas: 3798715)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 6.86s (6.85s CPU time)\n\nRan 6 test suites in 6.86s (10.78s CPU time): 47 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (47 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":41,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"AntiSnipeHook.afterInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160,int24)\",\"LaunchToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"LaunchToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"LaunchToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"DEPENDENCIES.md\":13,\"LICENSE\":23,\"README.md\":95,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/MineHook.s.sol\":27,\"src/AntiSnipeHook.sol\":77,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":32,\"src/LaunchToken.sol\":11,\"test/AntiSnipeCallbackSurface.t.sol\":75,\"test/AntiSnipeHook.t.sol\":239,\"test/AntiSnipeIntegration.t.sol\":258,\"test/AntiSnipeInvariant.t.sol\":119,\"test/HookTestBase.sol\":55,\"test/LaunchToken.t.sol\":106,\"test/LaunchTokenInvariant.t.sol\":175,\"test/README.md\":21,\"test/handlers/AntiSnipeHandler.sol\":233,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":10},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"6099f3c3601b1f9758e5171c92b55beb5b17d85dd7810acbffdbd310b4f50da3","verifiedTreeHash":"8043b10294bba1e81562f2e848c92f269b10111b","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+9f8ef295"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":24195,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 84 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 23.99s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n   ╭▸ src/AntiSnipeHook.sol:69:22\n   │\n69 │         uint24 fee = block.timestamp < deadline ? INITIAL_LP_FEE : NORMAL_LP_FEE;\n   │                      ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":253,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 7 tests for test/LaunchToken.t.sol:LaunchTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 88505, ~: 88549)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 43712958974193401326264414\n\n[PASS] test_approveAndTransferFromSpendAllowance() (gas: 189341)\n[PASS] test_fixedSupplyMetadataAndDeployerBalance() (gas: 44026)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceReverts() (gas: 39176)\n[PASS] test_neitherDeployerNorOutsiderCanMintOrAdminister() (gas: 492068)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 606340)\n[PASS] test_zeroRecipientReverts() (gas: 36261)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 5.02ms (7.65ms CPU time)\n\nRan 20 tests for test/AntiSnipeHook.t.sol:AntiSnipeHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_callbacksRejectUnauthorizedCaller(address) (runs: 256, μ: 161868, ~: 161868)\n[PASS] testFuzz_callbacksRequireExactDynamicFeeFlag(uint24) (runs: 256, μ: 48635, ~: 48640)\n[PASS] testFuzz_feeScheduleIgnoresSwapInputsAndNeverWrites(uint64,bool,int128,address,bytes) (runs: 256, μ: 125236, ~: 125242)\n[PASS] test_afterInitializeReturnsSelector() (gas: 64527)\n[PASS] test_callbacksRejectWrongHookInKey() (gas: 43080)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsIncorrectPermissionBits() (gas: 8400)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsManagerWithoutCode() (gas: 4700)\n[PASS] test_feeAtInitializationAndExactBoundary() (gas: 196769)\n[PASS] test_initializationRecordsOnlyPoolDeadline() (gas: 123417)\n[PASS] test_multiplePoolsHaveIndependentWindows() (gas: 244034)\n[PASS] test_noAdministrationAndDisabledCallbacksRevert() (gas: 129464)\n[PASS] test_permissionsAndMinedAddressAgree() (gas: 21679)\n[PASS] test_poolCannotInitializeBeforeHookCodeExists() (gas: 83432)\n[PASS] test_reinitializationCannotRestartWindow() (gas: 181967)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 555544)\n[PASS] test_saltSearchExhaustionReverts() (gas: 624918)\n[PASS] test_staticFeePoolInitializationRevertsAtomically() (gas: 101151)\n[PASS] test_timestampZeroIsAValidInitialization() (gas: 147526)\n[PASS] test_uninitializedPoolCannotGetFee() (gas: 21421)\n[PASS] test_windowStartsAtInitializationNotDeploymentOrFirstSwap() (gas: 125573)\nSuite result: ok. 20 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 87.19ms (98.56ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/AntiSnipeIntegration.t.sol:AntiSnipeIntegrationTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_realSwapsMatchStaticFeePool(uint32,bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 791325, ~: 794212)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 3650\n  Bound result 99999999999000021653\n\n[PASS] test_failedSettlementRollsBackSwapAndKeepsDeadline() (gas: 550270)\n[PASS] test_fullLifecycleBothDirectionsAcrossBoundary() (gas: 1361145)\n[PASS] test_zeroSwapRejectedByManager() (gas: 80802)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 93.37ms (70.71ms CPU time)\n\nRan 3 test suites in 95.25ms (185.58ms CPU time): 31 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (31 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":74,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"AntiSnipeHook.afterInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160,int24)\",\"LaunchToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"LaunchToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"LaunchToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"DEPENDENCIES.md\":13,\"LICENSE\":23,\"README.md\":95,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/MineHook.s.sol\":27,\"src/AntiSnipeHook.sol\":77,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":32,\"src/LaunchToken.sol\":11,\"test/AntiSnipeHook.t.sol\":239,\"test/AntiSnipeIntegration.t.sol\":164,\"test/HookTestBase.sol\":55,\"test/LaunchToken.t.sol\":106,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":10},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":1619,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[low/medium] timestamp at src/AntiSnipeHook.sol:60: AntiSnipeHook.beforeSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,bytes) (src/AntiSnipeHook.sol#60-71) uses timestamp for comparisons","passed":true},{"durationMs":419,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[low] internal-function-used-once at src/HookFlags.sol:25: Internal Function Used Only Once\n[low] large-numeric-literal at src/AntiSnipeHook.sol:23: Large Numeric Literal (2 places)\n[low] state-change-without-event at src/AntiSnipeHook.sol:50: State Change Without Event","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"651dcc0f41d7b64106cdd9e0e6f3ce39fd0261a6e6406a6e2d0f056c32731101","verifiedTreeHash":"e1889bed09974f5df72a2b3705e77018260def01","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+9f8ef295"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":20795,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 84 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 20.62s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[block-timestamp]: usage of `block.timestamp` in a comparison may be manipulated by validators\n   ╭▸ src/AntiSnipeHook.sol:69:22\n   │\n69 │         uint24 fee = block.timestamp < deadline ? INITIAL_LP_FEE : NORMAL_LP_FEE;\n   │                      ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/block-timestamp\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":214,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 7 tests for test/LaunchToken.t.sol:LaunchTokenTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferConservesSupply(address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 88142, ~: 88513)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 7200\n\n[PASS] test_approveAndTransferFromSpendAllowance() (gas: 189341)\n[PASS] test_fixedSupplyMetadataAndDeployerBalance() (gas: 44026)\n[PASS] test_insufficientBalanceReverts() (gas: 39176)\n[PASS] test_neitherDeployerNorOutsiderCanMintOrAdminister() (gas: 492068)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 606340)\n[PASS] test_zeroRecipientReverts() (gas: 36261)\nSuite result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 3.76ms (6.47ms CPU time)\n\nRan 20 tests for test/AntiSnipeHook.t.sol:AntiSnipeHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_callbacksRejectUnauthorizedCaller(address) (runs: 256, μ: 161868, ~: 161868)\n[PASS] testFuzz_callbacksRequireExactDynamicFeeFlag(uint24) (runs: 256, μ: 48633, ~: 48640)\n[PASS] testFuzz_feeScheduleIgnoresSwapInputsAndNeverWrites(uint64,bool,int128,address,bytes) (runs: 256, μ: 125235, ~: 125242)\n[PASS] test_afterInitializeReturnsSelector() (gas: 64527)\n[PASS] test_callbacksRejectWrongHookInKey() (gas: 43080)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsIncorrectPermissionBits() (gas: 8400)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsManagerWithoutCode() (gas: 4700)\n[PASS] test_feeAtInitializationAndExactBoundary() (gas: 196769)\n[PASS] test_initializationRecordsOnlyPoolDeadline() (gas: 123417)\n[PASS] test_multiplePoolsHaveIndependentWindows() (gas: 244034)\n[PASS] test_noAdministrationAndDisabledCallbacksRevert() (gas: 129464)\n[PASS] test_permissionsAndMinedAddressAgree() (gas: 21679)\n[PASS] test_poolCannotInitializeBeforeHookCodeExists() (gas: 83432)\n[PASS] test_reinitializationCannotRestartWindow() (gas: 181967)\n[PASS] test_runtimeHasNoEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 555544)\n[PASS] test_saltSearchExhaustionReverts() (gas: 624918)\n[PASS] test_staticFeePoolInitializationRevertsAtomically() (gas: 101151)\n[PASS] test_timestampZeroIsAValidInitialization() (gas: 147526)\n[PASS] test_uninitializedPoolCannotGetFee() (gas: 21421)\n[PASS] test_windowStartsAtInitializationNotDeploymentOrFirstSwap() (gas: 125573)\nSuite result: ok. 20 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 34.84ms (33.71ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/AntiSnipeIntegration.t.sol:AntiSnipeIntegrationTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_realSwapsMatchStaticFeePool(uint32,bool,bool,uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 790825, ~: 786823)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 5095\n  Bound result 99999999999000017952\n\n[PASS] test_failedSettlementRollsBackSwapAndKeepsDeadline() (gas: 550270)\n[PASS] test_fullLifecycleBothDirectionsAcrossBoundary() (gas: 1361145)\n[PASS] test_zeroSwapRejectedByManager() (gas: 80802)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 88.28ms (68.18ms CPU time)\n\nRan 3 test suites in 88.99ms (126.88ms CPU time): 31 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (31 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":68,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"AntiSnipeHook.afterInitialize(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),uint160,int24)\",\"LaunchToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"LaunchToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"LaunchToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"DEPENDENCIES.md\":13,\"LICENSE\":23,\"README.md\":95,\"foundry.toml\":21,\"launch.json\":26,\"remappings.txt\":4,\"script/MineHook.s.sol\":27,\"src/AntiSnipeHook.sol\":77,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":32,\"src/LaunchToken.sol\":11,\"test/AntiSnipeHook.t.sol\":239,\"test/AntiSnipeIntegration.t.sol\":164,\"test/HookTestBase.sol\":55,\"test/LaunchToken.t.sol\":106,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":10},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"802cd05fbdca3f342d9550c34dbc6162e3267943255e00968bd9ed183745dab4","verifiedTreeHash":"73ef13a60ded270dc2fe91c9feee61d3f7615341","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+9f8ef295"}]}