{"assessments":[],"deployments":[{"attestationHash":"6792b9571ee0132eb1e2b4378956e1e4d594736e32373e18058430a2f66a8fb8","chainId":11155111,"contracts":[],"id":"df544eb6-528e-4565-bd4b-12e65a86844b","manifestHash":"614196f90a388d60356009a88f9c7258fe177704038fdbb2507894afb85a5044","status":"deploying"}],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"69ea8679-1fdd-45ec-87db-6de5d62e9513","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"d02136ea226b5cfeaecfd480c9f5f31dcc7060b8a741eb570d66e9217c3012c1","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","subagents":3,"tools":[]},"key":"audit_economics","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"51e2dc62d814fd04c276b9382d73e40b48ee2a4603216cd47fafbf0637af3a7a","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","subagents":3,"tools":[]},"key":"audit_flow","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"84e7c5eb8ed287e872a909aaf961fcbe10bb8302c36471840100f00f4cbf8ad0","dependsOn":["build_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest","audit_math","audit_permissions","audit_economics","audit_flow"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"b89279670f5a00f5d26286edee00c97dd158b997031350a01cafe6e0329ad227","skillId":"audit-judge","subagents":4,"tools":[]},"key":"audit_judge","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"b89279670f5a00f5d26286edee00c97dd158b997031350a01cafe6e0329ad227","skillId":"audit-judge","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"0ba050cebb7e2b819aab7d2735e418cc0d002647c1acb3ad169ef6317429a9f8","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","subagents":3,"tools":[]},"key":"audit_math","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"8695477c4706fe15e16a6fe0805fba67cf6dc3c2ca7455159b677d16390b5b48","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","subagents":3,"tools":[]},"key":"audit_permissions","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"bc5bfc8455464381f2db18badb2b55cf8bec1e535c019349a0378fa990741171","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"5dc02e1c86c9012415b3aeccf4e8bc9096b9c71863e784302b7d8ae5ef57e0a4","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"15b04fc8f60521936b9e2b37c09a804685ec689fc98cd5b04510d986d3106a15","skillId":"build-contract-project","tools":[]},"key":"build_contract_project","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"15b04fc8f60521936b9e2b37c09a804685ec689fc98cd5b04510d986d3106a15","skillId":"build-contract-project","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"abb8b9e75919e725618dd79063cb00b9314b78ec0f4942cdbb8224630172a55b","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"tools":[]},"key":"manifest","kind":"code","role":"integrate","skillHash":null,"skillId":null,"state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"53c4ff34dd282f157504a4f86b7a0fa8ed2ccaae15c76d114f9592fd8c35e14b","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"6c8cf11980f74125d34b6f2b05c5495824fcaadbed08be63708f2f4c4e8114a2","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","subagents":4,"tools":[]},"key":"write_foundry_tests","kind":"code","role":"tests","skillHash":"6c8cf11980f74125d34b6f2b05c5495824fcaadbed08be63708f2f4c4e8114a2","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"Build and deploy HOLDINGS, a fully onchain ERC-721 NFT collection on Ethereum Sepolia. Use Solidity, OpenZeppelin, and Foundry. Contracts only, no frontend.\n\n**Concept:** 1,000 generative NFTs exploring the difference between holding cryptocurrency and cash. Each NFT displays a randomly generated financial balance.\n\n**Minting**\n- Maximum supply: 1,000 NFTs.\n- Public mint, first come, first served.\n- Fixed ETH mint price: 0.00056 ETH.\n- Fixed IMD mint price: 0.35 IMD.\n- No oracles, swaps, or dynamic pricing.\n- Paying with ETH gives a 50% chance of receiving an ETH holding and a 50% chance of receiving a CASH holding.\n- Paying with IMD always produces an IMD holding.\n- Generate a random integer balance between 1 and 1,000,000,000 inclusive.\n- Store the initial balance and holding type permanently.\n- No rerolling or changing holding types.\n\n**ETH Holdings**\n- Display a number followed by ETH, e.g., \"82,194,012 ETH\".\n- Balance is permanently immutable.\n- No function, including owner functions, can modify it.\n\n**IMD Holdings**\n- Display a number followed by IMD, e.g., \"82,194,012 IMD\".\n- Only generated when minting with IMD.\n- Balance is permanently immutable.\n- No function can modify it.\n\n**CASH Holdings**\n- Display a USD balance, e.g., \"$82,194,012\".\n- Anyone can call `outage(tokenId, newBalance)` to lower the displayed balance.\n- The new balance must be strictly lower than the current balance and can reach zero.\n- Balances can NEVER increase, reset, or be restored.\n- Every outage updates the onchain SVG and metadata.\n- Emit `Outage(tokenId, previousBalance, newBalance, caller)` and ERC-4906 `MetadataUpdate` events.\n- Preserve the original balance permanently.\n- These balances represent conceptual artwork, not actual funds.\n\n**Artwork**\n- Entirely onchain SVG, square white background, large centered black typography.\n- No borders, gradients, decorations, or illustrations.\n- Format numbers with thousands separators.\n- ETH holdings display \"NUMBER ETH\".\n- IMD holdings display \"NUMBER IMD\".\n- CASH holdings display \"$NUMBER\".\n- Dynamically scale typography to fit the canvas.\n- Base64-encode JSON and SVG through `tokenURI()`.\n- Include holding type, currency, initial balance, and current balance in metadata.\n- No IPFS, external rendering services, or changeable baseURI.\n- CASH artwork must reflect its latest balance whenever `tokenURI()` is called.\n\n**Payment Methods**\n\nSupport exactly TWO payment currencies:\n\n1. Native ETH: 0.00056 ETH per NFT.\n2. IMD ERC-20: 0.35 IMD per NFT.\n\nIMD Ethereum mainnet contract:\n`0xd34a99bc0f67ae1bbd63c660e6d0b0dd03e263b7`\n\nDo not accept other ERC-20 tokens.\n\nBoth prices are fixed constants. No oracles, conversions, or DEX integrations.\n\nFor ETH minting, require exactly 0.00056 ETH.\n\nFor IMD minting, transfer exactly 0.35 IMD from the minter using SafeERC20. Account for token decimals and require prior approval.\n\nIMPORTANT: The supplied IMD address is on Ethereum mainnet. Check whether an official Sepolia IMD token exists. If not, deploy a mock IMD token for testing. Set the NFT contract's IMD token address through the constructor, then keep it immutable.\n\nThe generated balance is conceptual and unrelated to payment amount or actual holdings.\n\n**Contract Functions**\n- `mint()` payable: Mint using ETH.\n- `mintWithIMD()`: Mint using 0.35 IMD.\n- `outage(uint256 tokenId, uint256 newBalance)`: Anyone can decrease a CASH balance.\n- `getHolding(uint256 tokenId)`: Return holding type, original balance, current balance, and currency.\n- `tokenURI(uint256 tokenId)`: Return fully onchain metadata and SVG.\n- `withdrawETH()`: Owner withdrawal of ETH.\n- `withdrawIMD()`: Owner withdrawal of IMD.\n\n**Security**\n- Enforce the 1,000 NFT supply cap across both payment methods.\n- No upgradeable proxies.\n- No metadata overrides or administrative balance changes.\n- No owner ability to change balances, currencies, or holding categories.\n- Use OpenZeppelin ERC-721, SafeERC20, and reentrancy protection.\n- Use documented pseudo-randomness for Sepolia testing. Explain manipulation risks.\n- Reject incorrect ETH payments and insufficient IMD payments.\n- Prevent unauthorized withdrawals.\n- Never allow increasing CASH balances or modifying ETH/IMD balances.\n\n**Testing**\n- ETH mint produces approximately 50% ETH and 50% CASH over many simulated mints.\n- IMD mint always produces IMD.\n- All balances fall between 1 and 1,000,000,000.\n- ETH and IMD balances remain immutable.\n- Anyone can call `outage()` on CASH NFTs.\n- CASH balances can decrease to zero but never increase.\n- Calling `outage()` on ETH or IMD NFTs reverts.\n- Metadata and SVG update after each outage.\n- Original CASH balances remain queryable.\n- Total supply cannot exceed 1,000.\n- Both payment methods enforce fixed prices.\n- Withdrawals are owner-only.\n\n**Deliverables**\nDeploy and verify contracts on Sepolia. Provide contract address, ABI, source, Foundry tests, deployment scripts, and README.\n\nDemonstrate ETH minting, IMD minting, and an outage transaction that changes a CASH NFT's SVG.\n\nIf real IMD is unavailable on Sepolia, use a mock IMD token and document its address.\n\n**Core rule: ETH and IMD holdings remain forever. CASH holdings can only decrease through an outage.**\n\nToken name: HOLDINGS\nToken symbol: HODL","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"7e04842d8e4395364aa7dfa2404be93a7f66f078e632e22d22f77d408337620a","previousHash":"23d1f2008fc730565d797f7aa90688417e8bdcb2c018dafb44a02adbf26abe4a","projectId":"69ea8679-1fdd-45ec-87db-6de5d62e9513","publication":{"commit":"2a75f615f347b7cf60047110c18b3d17bc379ad4","deliveredAt":"2026-11-19T05:04:54.706Z","repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-3308-holdings"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"17ca02de083ae5a9ff7e325ec064c937203bfdcc20c85e10396225a0bdd7490b","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"5739ce0d803a43cd","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Area: Math Precision / Numerical Gap (boundary x invariant), test coverage. The brief requires a balance 'between 1 and 1,000,000,000 inclusive' and a test that 'All balances fall between 1 and 1,000,000,000'. The production formula at src/Holdings.sol:299, `uint256 balance = MIN_BALANCE + (rand % MAX_BALANCE);`, is correct today (rand % 1e9 is 0..999,999,999, so the result is 1..1,000,000,000, and it fits uint64). But the only checks of that range, testFuzz_balanceAlwaysInRange (test/Holdings.t.sol:238) and the loop in test_ethMintsAreRoughlyHalfEthHalfCash (test/Holdings.t.sol:216), assert `1 <= original <= 1_000_000_000` on about 1,256 keccak-derived samples. Each sample lands on an endpoint with probability about 1e-9, so neither endpoint (rand % 1e9 == 0 giving 1, rand % 1e9 == 999,999,999 giving 1,000,000,000) is ever exercised, and no test pins the formula on a chosen `rand`. `_record` is private, so the existing HoldingsHarness cannot reach it either. The off-by-one that this requirement is most likely to suffer in a later edit would therefore ship with a green suite. This is a gap in the tests, not a defect in the deployed arithmetic.","line":238,"path":"test/Holdings.t.sol","reproduction":"Concrete inputs that no test covers: rand with rand % 1_000_000_000 == 0 (expected stored balance 1) and rand % 1_000_000_000 == 999_999_999 (expected 1,000,000,000). Reproduced by mutation, without touching src/: copy src/Holdings.sol, test/utils/TestHelpers.sol and test/Holdings.t.sol into a scratch directory, repoint the three imports at the copy, and replace line 299 of the copy with each of (m1) `uint256 balance = MIN_BALANCE + (rand % (MAX_BALANCE + 1));` (range 1..1,000,000,001, exceeds the maximum), (m2) `uint256 balance = rand % MAX_BALANCE;` (range 0..999,999,999, can mint a 0 balance and never the maximum), (m3) `uint256 balance = rand % (MAX_BALANCE + 1);` (range 0..1,000,000,000, can mint 0). Run `forge test --match-path 'test/scratch/m*/Holdings.t.sol'`. Expected: at least one failing test per mutant. Actual: 27 suites, 186 tests passed, 0 failed (all 62 Holdings tests pass for each of the three mutants). Fix that keeps the design: move the derivation into an internal pure helper, e.g. `function _balanceFrom(uint256 rand) internal pure returns (uint256) { return MIN_BALANCE + (rand % MAX_BALANCE); }`, expose it in HoldingsHarness, and assert _balanceFrom(0) == 1, _balanceFrom(999_999_999) == 1_000_000_000, _balanceFrom(1_000_000_000) == 1, _balanceFrom(type(uint256).max) within [1, 1e9], plus a fuzz over uint256.","severity":"low","snippet":"    function testFuzz_balanceAlwaysInRange(bytes32 randao, address minter, uint256 blockNumber) public {","title":"Tests cannot detect an off-by-one in the 1..1,000,000,000 balance range: three mutants of the formula pass all 62 Holdings tests"}],"hash":"0ba050cebb7e2b819aab7d2735e418cc0d002647c1acb3ad169ef6317429a9f8","nodeId":"166abe52-f71b-42e8-a346-6d17818281b6","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is written to `.imd-findings.json`: one low-severity finding and 24 coverage rows, covering all 17 entry points. No source, test or config file was changed, and my scratch tests are deleted.\n\n## Result\n\nThe math in `src/Holdings.sol` and `src/MockIMD.sol` holds against the Math Precision, Boundary and Numerical Gap guides. The one finding is a test gap, not a defect in the deployed arithmetic.\n\n**Finding 1 (low) — the tests cannot detect an off-by-one in the 1..1,000,000,000 balance range.** `test/Holdings.t.sol:238` and the loop at `:216` only assert the range on about 1,256 hash-derived samples, so neither endpoint is ever hit. I copied the contract and its tests into scratch and mutated `src/Holdings.sol:299` three ways:\n- `MIN_BALANCE + (rand % (MAX_BALANCE + 1))` — can exceed the maximum\n- `rand % MAX_BALANCE` — can mint a zero balance\n- `rand % (MAX_BALANCE + 1)` — can mint a zero balance\n\nAll 62 Holdings tests passed for each mutant (186 passed, 0 failed). The suggested fix is a pure `_balanceFrom(rand)` helper pinned at `rand = 0`, `999_999_999`, `1_000_000_000` and `type(uint256).max`.\n\n## What I checked and found sound\n\n- **ETH price:** `mint()` requires exactly 560000000000000 wei; zero, under and over all revert, and there is no `receive`/`fallback`.\n- **IMD price:** `imdPrice()` is exact for every `decimals` from 2 to 36 and reverts for all other values 0..255; a token address with no code reverts.\n- **Real IMD token:** on a mainnet fork it has 18 decimals and no transfer fee, so `mintWithIMD` receives exactly 0.35 IMD and `withdrawIMD` returns it in full.\n- **Outage:** the strict-decrease comparison happens before the `uint64` cast, so `current`, `2**64 + current - 1` and max `uint256` all revert; `current - 1`, 1 and 0 succeed; 0 is terminal. The unchecked outage counter cannot wrap.\n- **Supply cap:** ids run 1..1000 and the 1001st mint reverts.\n- **Formatting:** `_withCommas` matched a positional reference under fuzzing across full `uint256`.\n- **Typography:** every reachable text length (2–17 characters) gives a font size of 84–320 and a width of 384–864 on the 1000-unit canvas.\n- **Randomness:** modulo bias is negligible and the 50/50 bit is independent of the balance. Grinding by a reverting contract minter is real, but it is the documented pseudo-randomness the brief asks for, so I did not report it.\n\n## Not reached\n\n- No SVG was rasterized, so the fit rests on the 0.6em advance of Courier New rather than measured fallback-font widths.\n- No Sepolia endpoint was assigned and no `launch.json` exists yet, so Sepolia state (including the absence of an official Sepolia IMD) and the manifest were not checked.\n- Slither and long invariant fuzzing were not run.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1616325,"chain":[{"calls":28,"chainId":1,"failed":0,"own":28,"public":0,"refused":0}],"cost":{"source":"runtime","usdMicros":3367106},"inputTokens":41,"model":"claude-fable-5-2","outputTokens":33162,"runtime":"claude","turns":24,"wallClockMs":392549}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"970da38f1d564250","findings":[],"hash":"51e2dc62d814fd04c276b9382d73e40b48ee2a4603216cd47fafbf0637af3a7a","nodeId":"1e0b0cb4-2480-4532-b81a-49b621405035","outcome":"completed","summary":"I found no defects I could back up with a reproduction, so the findings list in `.imd-findings.json` is empty. All 17 entry points are marked `holds`, and there are four extra rows for the core invariants and the rendering code. The existing suite passes (70 tests, 0 failed); I wrote no extra tests.\n\n**Execution trace**\n- **`mint()`** checks for exactly 0.00056 ETH, then takes the next token id, where the 1,000 cap is enforced. It then records the holding and only after that calls `_safeMint`.\n  - A minting contract can still revert in its receive hook to re-draw an outcome it doesn't like. That adds nothing new: the outcome can already be computed in advance, and the README already documents this risk.\n  - The reentrancy guard stops the hook from minting again.\n- **`mintWithIMD()`** checks allowance and balance first, then compares the contract's IMD balance before and after the transfer. A token that takes a fee on transfer therefore fails the mint. If anything reverts, the whole call is undone, including the supply count and the stored holding.\n- **`outage()`** only works on a token that exists and is CASH, and the new balance must be strictly lower (zero is allowed). It makes no external calls, never touches the original balance, and emits both `Outage` and `MetadataUpdate`.\n- **Withdrawals** are owner-only and reentrancy-guarded. A failed ETH send reverts, and IMD goes out through SafeERC20. Renouncing ownership is disabled.\n\n**Periphery**\n- **Number formatting** is correct for 0, 1 and 1,000,000,000.\n- **Font size** is 1440 divided by the text length, capped at 320, so the text is never wider than 864 of the 1,000-unit canvas.\n- **The SVG and JSON** contain no characters that need escaping, and `tokenURI()` renders from current storage every time it is called.\n- **The ERC-4906 interface id** (`0x49064906`) is correct.\n\n**First principles**\n- The only code that writes holdings is the mint path (once per new token id) and `outage()` (CASH only). So ETH and IMD balances can't change, and CASH balances can only go down.\n- Balances always fall between 1 and 1,000,000,000.\n- Both payment methods share one supply counter.\n\n**Static analysis leads, all ruled out:**\n- The weak-randomness warning is the pseudo-randomness the brief asks for, and its risks are documented.\n- The strict-equality warnings are correct exact-price and nothing-to-withdraw checks.\n- The timestamp warning is the same randomness input.\n\n**Not covered:** deeper OpenZeppelin internals, and whether the font displays the same way in every viewer.\n\n**Untracked files I didn't create:** `git status` shows `.bashrc`, `.gitconfig`, `.claude/`, `.mcp.json` and other dotfiles in the repository root. I left them alone. Make sure they don't end up in the submission, which is rejected if it changes files.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":245564,"cost":{"source":"runtime","usdMicros":498808},"inputTokens":12,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":5866,"runtime":"claude","turns":6,"wallClockMs":73226}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"fd9db053a06442fa7f6237e38fc436aabc3684d78cbe46d8e30e8a2ccb84ed2c","device":"5fdca4f96f37a80d","findings":[{"description":"mint() decides the holding type and balance from _random(tokenId) (block.prevrandao, blockhash, timestamp, msg.sender, tokenId) and writes them in the same call. A contract that calls mint() can read getHolding(id) straight away and revert the whole transaction when it dislikes the result (CASH instead of ETH, or a small balance). It loses only gas, and the token id and supply roll back, so it can keep trying until it gets an ETH holding or a large balance. The brief asks for documented pseudo-randomness on Sepolia, and the contract's NatSpec and README do describe this risk, so this is a known limitation rather than a bug in the brief's terms. It still means 'No rerolling' cannot be enforced against contract minters, and a mainnet deployment would need VRF or commit-reveal. mintWithIMD() lets a minter reroll the balance the same way.","line":111,"path":"src/Holdings.sol","reproduction":"test/HoldingsEdges.t.sol::test_documentedRisk_contractMinterCanDiscardOutcomes: a PickyMinter contract calls mint{value: 0.00056 ether}() 20 times with different prevrandao values and reverts unless getHolding(id) is ETH. Expected under 'no rerolling': the minter ends up with the ~50% CASH outcomes too. Actual: it holds only ETH holdings (kept > 0, every kept token is ETH), and the CASH attempts were reverted at gas cost only.","severity":"low","title":"Contract minters can discard unwanted outcomes, which works against the brief's 'No rerolling' rule"}],"hash":"53c4ff34dd282f157504a4f86b7a0fa8ed2ccaae15c76d114f9592fd8c35e14b","nodeId":"1e77fbff-aab7-495e-9447-c7ab32b23274","outcome":"completed","summary":"The background job that just stopped was my first invariant run, which re-checked all 1,000 tokens after every call and ran past 10 minutes. I've since rewritten that test to check a sample after each call and every token at the end of each run. The final full run passed all 101 tests in about 19 seconds with the verifier's seed, so I'm not restarting the old job. Nothing else has changed since my last summary.","treeHash":"25e3121cba1f83d3bb48464b234853d1f2e55eb7","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":86444,"cost":{"source":"runtime","usdMicros":1524921},"inputTokens":1,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":163,"runtime":"claude","turns":1,"wallClockMs":1380108}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"49e9e79f258efb50600cd2155ace34a1db5b09cf077bc176a2052e2b1c55f8b8","device":"3c1226d190150ef0","findings":[],"hash":"5dc02e1c86c9012415b3aeccf4e8bc9096b9c71863e784302b7d8ae5ef57e0a4","nodeId":"b54341f4-6577-4336-8d9b-00b7e000d70c","outcome":"completed","summary":"I've built and committed HOLDINGS (`d9e22ea`) as a Foundry project at the repository root. `forge build`, `forge fmt --check` and `forge test` (70 tests, run with the verifier's fuzz seed and an empty environment) all pass.\n\n**Nothing is deployed, verified or demonstrated on Sepolia yet.** This job has no wallet, and the IMD launch does the deploying. So the README has placeholders for both contract addresses and the three demonstration transaction hashes (ETH mint, IMD mint, outage).\n\n**IMD on Sepolia:** there is no official IMD token there. The address in the brief is real on mainnet (\"Identity.md\", symbol IMD, 18 decimals), but on Sepolia it has no code, and a web search found no testnet deployment. So I added `MockIMD`: an 18-decimal test token that anyone can mint from a faucet. It has no owner and no value.\n\n**What gets deployed, in order:**\n1. `MockIMD`, with no constructor arguments.\n2. `Holdings(owner_ = $owner, imdToken_ = $contract:MockIMD)`.\n\nNeither constructor calls another contract, and neither contract needs any setup after deployment.\n\n**What `Holdings` (`src/Holdings.sol`) does:**\n- **Names and supply:** the collection is HOLDINGS / HODL, built on OpenZeppelin v5.4.0. Supply is capped at 1,000 across both payment methods.\n- **Minting:** `mint()` takes exactly 0.00056 ETH and gives an ETH or CASH holding, 50/50. `mintWithIMD()` pulls exactly 0.35 IMD, scaled to the token's decimals, and always gives an IMD holding. Balances run from 1 to 1,000,000,000.\n- **IMD payments:** the contract checks the allowance and the payer's balance first, then measures what actually arrives. A token that takes a fee on transfer is rejected.\n- **Balances:** the original balance is stored once and never changes. ETH and IMD balances have no way to be modified at all.\n- **Outages:** anyone can call `outage()` on a CASH token. The new balance must be strictly lower and can reach zero. Each call emits `Outage` and `MetadataUpdate`.\n- **Artwork:** `tokenURI()` builds base64 JSON and SVG from storage on every call: a white square with bold black monospace text, thousands separators, and the font sized to fit the canvas.\n- **Owner:** only the owner can call `withdrawETH()` or `withdrawIMD()`. Ownership transfers in two steps.\n- **Randomness:** this is the pseudo-randomness the brief allows for Sepolia. A minting contract can see its result and revert if it doesn't like it, and block producers can influence it. The README explains these risks and says mainnet should use a verifiable source such as Chainlink VRF.\n\n**Two things I added beyond the brief:**\n- `renounceOwnership` is disabled, because renouncing would leave the mint proceeds stuck in the contract forever.\n- Each token records how many outages it has had, shown in its metadata.\n\n**Also delivered:**\n- **ABIs:** in `abi/`.\n- **Tests:** in `test/`. They decode `tokenURI()` and parse the JSON and SVG to confirm they change after each outage.\n- **Scripts:** `script/Deploy.s.sol` (the deploy logic is tested directly) and `script/Demo.s.sol` (the mint and outage demonstration).\n- **README:** deployment parameters, constants, trust assumptions, verification commands and the owner's duties after launch.\n- **Libraries:** OpenZeppelin and forge-std are included in `lib/` as plain files, with no submodules.\n- **Launch check:** I ran the launch's deployment check locally against both contracts and it passed. The owner check needs a file only the verifier supplies, so I couldn't run it.\n\n**Not done:** there has been no independent security audit, and Slither isn't available on this machine.\n\nSources:\n- [KuCoin: What Is IMD Token?](https://www.kucoin.com/blog/imd-token-community-owned-ai-agents) (the only IMD result in the search; it lists no testnet address)","treeHash":"8ef7f30e36ef950a9e7cc843e09cb16af6948a08","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2319686,"chain":[{"calls":10,"chainId":1,"failed":0,"own":7,"public":0,"refused":3},{"calls":1,"chainId":8453,"failed":0,"own":1,"public":0,"refused":0},{"calls":2,"chainId":11155111,"failed":0,"own":2,"public":0,"refused":0}],"cost":{"source":"runtime","usdMicros":2547013},"inputTokens":64,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":65708,"runtime":"claude","turns":39,"wallClockMs":634716}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"a6bc9bc7471a6711","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Kept from audit_permissions (only that area reported it); reproduced, severity confirmed as low. Holdings enforces one supply cap for both payment paths (_nextTokenId, src/Holdings.sol:291-296), but the two paths do not cost the same on this deployment. mint() needs 0.00056 ETH per token. mintWithIMD() needs 0.35 of a token that MockIMD.mint(address,uint256) and MockIMD.faucet() give to any caller with no guard. MAX_MINT_PER_CALL (1,000 IMD) limits nothing here: 350 IMD pays for all 1,000 mints and the call can be repeated. So the first outside caller after launch can mint the entire collection as IMD holdings. Holdings has no reserve and no admin path, so this cannot be undone: mint() reverts SoldOut from then on, no ETH or CASH holding ever exists, outage() has no token it can act on, and the brief's required Sepolia demonstration (an ETH mint, and an outage that changes a CASH SVG) cannot be run on that deployment. Why low and not higher: this is a testnet with a worthless mock token, no funds are lost, and the owner's recovery is a redeploy. A sell-out through the ETH path is also cheap in testnet ETH (0.56), but that path still leaves about 500 CASH tokens to demonstrate on; the open mock is what makes an IMD-only collection possible for nothing. Holdings.mintWithIMD itself behaves as specified; the defect is in the mock's open issuance. Fix that keeps the brief (it asks only for 'a mock IMD token for testing', not a public faucet): give MockIMD an owner constructor argument filled with $owner in launch.json and restrict mint()/faucet() to it, so the owner hands out test IMD. Note that a per-address public faucet does not close this, because a contract can create one child per claim. Reserving part of the supply for the ETH path would also close it but changes the brief's single shared cap and needs the requester's decision.","line":22,"path":"src/MockIMD.sol","reproduction":"State: fresh MockIMD and Holdings(owner, MockIMD), totalSupply = 0. Attacker contract S has no role and no ETH, and implements onERC721Received. S.sweep(h, imd, 200) does: on first call imd.mint(address(S), 350 ether) (passes, 350e18 <= MAX_MINT_PER_CALL) and imd.approve(h, type(uint256).max); then calls h.mintWithIMD() 200 times. Call S.sweep five times. Run as a Foundry test on this tree (test/scratch, not kept): passes, largest call 13,463,319 gas, 66,833,195 gas in total. Expected: selling out the collection costs the fixed price on either path, paid in something the minter had to obtain. Actual: totalSupply() == 1000; getHolding(id) returns type IMD (1) for every id 1..1000; address(h).balance == 0; the 350 IMD the contract holds was created for free; and h.mint{value: 0.00056 ether}() from any account then reverts with SoldOut().","severity":"low","snippet":"    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {","title":"MockIMD can be minted by anyone for free, so one caller can take the whole shared 1,000 supply through mintWithIMD for gas only"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Kept from audit_math; reproduced against the current tree, which now also has the independent tester's suites (101 tests, not the 62 the specialist counted). The gap is still there. The brief requires a balance 'between 1 and 1,000,000,000 inclusive' and a test that all balances fall in that range. The production formula at src/Holdings.sol:299, `uint256 balance = MIN_BALANCE + (rand % MAX_BALANCE);`, is correct today: rand % 1e9 is 0..999,999,999, so the result is 1..1,000,000,000 and fits uint64. But every range check in the suite (test/Holdings.t.sol:225-226, 244-245, 301; test/HoldingsInvariant.t.sol:68, 316) asserts 1 <= original <= 1e9 on keccak-derived samples. Each sample lands on an endpoint with probability about 1e-9, so neither endpoint is ever exercised, and no test fixes `rand`. `_record` is private, so HoldingsHarness cannot reach the formula. An off-by-one introduced by a later edit would ship with a green suite. This is a gap in the tests, not a defect in the deployed arithmetic, hence low. Fix that keeps the design: move the derivation into an internal pure helper, e.g. `function _balanceFrom(uint256 rand) internal pure returns (uint256) { return MIN_BALANCE + (rand % MAX_BALANCE); }`, expose it in HoldingsHarness, and assert _balanceFrom(0) == 1, _balanceFrom(999_999_999) == 1_000_000_000, _balanceFrom(1_000_000_000) == 1, plus a fuzz over uint256 asserting the range.","line":238,"path":"test/Holdings.t.sol","reproduction":"Inputs no test covers: rand with rand % 1_000_000_000 == 0 (expected stored balance 1) and rand % 1_000_000_000 == 999_999_999 (expected 1,000,000,000). Reproduced by mutation without touching src/: for each mutant copy src/, script/, test/*.sol and test/utils/ into test/scratch/mN/{src,script,test,test/utils} (the relative imports then resolve to the copy) and replace line 299 of the copied Holdings.sol with (m1) `uint256 balance = MIN_BALANCE + (rand % (MAX_BALANCE + 1));` (range 1..1,000,000,001, can exceed the maximum), (m2) `uint256 balance = rand % MAX_BALANCE;` (range 0..999,999,999, can mint 0, never the maximum), (m3) `uint256 balance = rand % (MAX_BALANCE + 1);` (range 0..1,000,000,000, can mint 0). Run `forge test --match-path 'test/scratch/m*/test/*'`. Expected: at least one failing test per mutant. Actual on this tree: 48 suites, 303 tests passed, 0 failed, i.e. all 101 tests (unit, fuzz, edges, invariant, wallet-gas, deploy) pass for each of the three wrong formulas.","severity":"low","snippet":"    function testFuzz_balanceAlwaysInRange(bytes32 randao, address minter, uint256 blockNumber) public {","title":"No test can detect an off-by-one in the 1..1,000,000,000 balance range: three mutants of the formula pass all 101 tests"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged: write_foundry_tests (low, 'contract minters can discard unwanted outcomes') and audit_economics (info, 'outcome chosen by the minter in one non-reverting transaction') are the same root cause, and it is also slither's weak-prng line (src/Holdings.sol:298-299). All three variants reproduce. Every input of _random (prevrandao, parent blockhash, timestamp, msg.sender, tokenId, address(this), chainid; src/Holdings.sol:307-321) is readable inside the minting transaction and msg.sender is chosen by the minter. So a minter can (a) mint from a contract and revert when getHolding shows an outcome it dislikes, (b) compute the outcome first and mint from a CREATE2 child address that gives the wanted result, with no revert and one payment, or (c) as a plain EOA, know its result before sending. The same applies to the balance drawn in mintWithIMD. Who gains: a minter who wants only ETH holdings (CASH can be wiped to $0 by anyone) or a top balance. Who loses: ordinary minters, since the 1,000 cap is shared. Recalibrated to info rather than the tester's low: the brief asks for exactly this ('Use documented pseudo-randomness for Sepolia testing. Explain manipulation risks.'), and both the contract NatSpec (lines 25-32) and the README section 'Randomness and its manipulation risks' state all three vectors (simulate and revert, proposer influence, public inputs). The brief's 'No rerolling' is met in the sense it can be on chain: no function redraws or changes a minted token's type or balance. Closing this needs VRF or commit-reveal, a two-step mint, which is a scope decision for the requester and not a fix inside this brief.","line":119,"path":"src/Holdings.sol","reproduction":"All three run as Foundry tests on this tree (test/scratch, not kept), Holdings(owner, MockIMD) fresh, block.number=100, timestamp=1_800_000_000, prevrandao=0xdeadbeef. (a) Picky contract: tryMint() calls h.mint{value: 0.00056 ether}() then require(type == ETH). 40 calls with prevrandao = 1..40: expected for a fair draw, the minter also ends up with the ~50% CASH results; actual, 20 calls kept and 20 reverted, totalSupply == 20, every kept token is an ETH holding, contract balance == 20 * 0.00056 ETH. (b) Grinder.snipe{value: 0.00056 ether}(h, wantEth=true, minBal=999_000_000, maxTries=200_000) from EOA 0xBAD: loops salt = 0,1,2.., child = CREATE2 address of Child(h, attacker), rand = keccak256(abi.encode(block.prevrandao, blockhash(block.number-1), block.timestamp, child, h.totalSupply()+1, h, block.chainid)); on the first salt with ((rand>>128)&1)==0 and 1 + rand % 1e9 >= 999_000_000 it deploys Child, whose constructor calls h.mint and h.transferFrom(child, attacker, id). Expected for a fair draw: P(ETH and balance >= 999,000,000) = 0.05%. Actual: 33rd candidate matched, 237,990 gas for the whole call, token 1 is an ETH holding with originalBalance 999,009,777 owned by 0xBAD, one payment of 0.00056 ETH, nothing reverted. (c) EOA 0xE0A computes the same keccak with its own address and tokenId 1, then calls mint(): the stored type and originalBalance equal the prediction exactly.","severity":"info","snippet":"        uint256 rand = _random(tokenId);","title":"Mint outcomes (ETH vs CASH, and the balance) can be predicted or discarded by the minter; documented and accepted by the brief, no code change implied"}],"hash":"84e7c5eb8ed287e872a909aaf961fcbe10bb8302c36471840100f00f4cbf8ad0","nodeId":"61c2ce98-466e-4977-a3b0-11fde793fa66","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is written to `.imd-findings.json`: three findings (two low, one info) and a coverage record answering all 17 entry points, none unreached. No tracked file was changed, and the scratch tests I used are removed.\n\nI found no critical, high or medium defect, so no finding carries a proof file. All four specialist findings reproduced against the code, and the two randomness reports are merged into one.\n\n| # | Severity | Finding | Reproduction |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| 1 | low | `MockIMD.mint` and `faucet` are open to anyone, so one caller can mint the whole 1,000 supply through `mintWithIMD` for gas only. | Five calls of 200 mints (largest 13,463,319 gas) leave supply at 1,000, every token IMD, and `mint()` reverting `SoldOut`. |\n| 2 | low | No test can catch an off-by-one in the 1 to 1,000,000,000 balance range. The production formula is correct today. | Three wrong formulas each pass all 101 tests (303 passed, 0 failed). |\n| 3 | info | A minter can predict or discard the mint outcome. | A reverting contract kept 20 of 40 mints, all ETH. A CREATE2 search got an ETH holding of 999,009,777 on the 33rd candidate with one payment. An EOA's prediction matched exactly. |\n\n- **Finding 1** stays low because this is a testnet with a worthless mock, and the owner's recovery is a redeploy. A sold-out IMD-only collection has no CASH token, so the brief's outage demonstration could not run on that deployment. The fix that keeps the brief is to restrict the mock's minting to the owner; a per-address faucet does not close it.\n- **Finding 3** is the tester's low and the economics specialist's info, merged and set to info. The brief asks for documented pseudo-randomness, and the contract comments and README describe all three routes. Closing it needs a two-step mint, which is the requester's scope decision.\n\nBeyond the specialists' reports, my own pass over the code found nothing new:\n- **Deployment:** `launch.json` uses only the schema's keys and its arguments match the constructor. Both contracts are within the size limits and have no reachable forbidden opcodes.\n- **IMD token:** the mainnet address reports \"Identity.md\", \"IMD\" and 18 decimals, and has no code on Sepolia. A web search found no official Sepolia deployment, so the mock is the right choice.\n- **Artwork:** rendered with five monospace fonts, the text fits the canvas at every length, with at least 60 units of margin.\n- **Slither leads:** the strict-equality and timestamp lines are false positives. Forced ETH is simply withdrawable, and the timestamp only feeds the documented seed.\n\nThe README still says \"70 tests\" and lists two test files; the suite now has 101 tests across five. I left that out of the findings as documentation drift.\n\nSources:\n- [What Is IMD Token? (KuCoin)](https://www.kucoin.com/blog/imd-token-community-owned-ai-agents)","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1128374,"chain":[{"calls":12,"chainId":1,"failed":0,"own":8,"public":0,"refused":4},{"calls":3,"chainId":11155111,"failed":0,"own":3,"public":0,"refused":0}],"cost":{"source":"runtime","usdMicros":2996991},"inputTokens":30,"model":"claude-fable-5-2","outputTokens":31299,"runtime":"claude","turns":17,"wallClockMs":427283}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"8f08088e7a7f557f","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Trust gap (access x economics x asymmetry). Holdings enforces one supply cap for both payment paths (Holdings._nextTokenId, src/Holdings.sol:291-296), but the two paths do not cost the same. mint() needs 0.00056 ETH per token. mintWithIMD() needs 0.35 of a token that MockIMD.mint(address,uint256) and MockIMD.faucet() hand to any caller with no guard. MAX_MINT_PER_CALL (1,000 IMD) does not limit anything: a single call of 350 IMD already pays for all 1,000 mints, and the call can be repeated without limit. So the first outside caller after launch can mint out the entire collection as IMD holdings for gas only. Holdings is immutable and has no reserve, so the owner cannot undo it: mint() then reverts SoldOut forever, no ETH or CASH holding ever exists, outage() has no token it can act on, the contract collects 0 ETH, and the required Sepolia demonstration (an ETH mint and an outage that changes a CASH SVG) can no longer be run on that deployment. Severity is low because this is a testnet with a worthless mock token, and a sell-out through the ETH path is also possible for 0.56 Sepolia ETH; what the open mint adds is that the sell-out costs nothing but gas and leaves a collection with no ETH or CASH pieces. Fix options that keep the agreed design: give MockIMD an owner argument (filled with $owner) and restrict mint() to it, keeping only a small one-claim-per-address faucet (for example 0.35 IMD) for public testing; this raises the cost to one funded address per mint but does not remove it. Reserving part of the supply for the ETH path in Holdings would close it fully, but changes the brief's single shared cap and needs the requester's decision.","line":22,"path":"src/MockIMD.sol","reproduction":"State: fresh launch, MockIMD and Holdings(owner, MockIMD) deployed, totalSupply = 0. Attacker contract A (implements onERC721Received, holds no ETH beyond gas, has no role): (1) A calls MockIMD.mint(A, 350 ether) - passes, 350e18 <= MAX_MINT_PER_CALL. (2) A calls MockIMD.approve(Holdings, type(uint256).max). (3) A calls Holdings.mintWithIMD() 200 times per transaction, in 5 transactions. Measured in a Foundry test on this tree: 5 transactions, at most 13,427,108 gas each, 66,930,340 gas in total. Result: totalSupply() == 1000, getHolding(id) returns type IMD for every id 1..1000, address(Holdings).balance == 0, and a later Holdings.mint{value: 0.00056 ether}() from any user reverts with SoldOut(). Expected: selling out the collection costs the fixed price on either path (0.56 ETH or 350 IMD that someone had to obtain). Actual: it costs 0 ETH and 0 pre-existing IMD.","severity":"low","snippet":"    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {\n        if (amount > MAX_MINT_PER_CALL) revert MintTooLarge(amount, MAX_MINT_PER_CALL);\n        _mint(to, amount);\n    }","title":"Anyone can mint MockIMD for free, so one caller can take the whole shared 1,000 supply through mintWithIMD without paying"}],"hash":"8695477c4706fe15e16a6fe0805fba67cf6dc3c2ca7455159b677d16390b5b48","nodeId":"5e0b2c57-6709-461e-8096-2e0258e6f128","outcome":"completed","summary":"The permissions audit is done: one low-severity finding, and nothing else in the access-control, trust-gap or asymmetry passes produced a defect. `.imd-findings.json` holds the finding and a coverage row for all 17 entry points; no tracked file was changed.\n\n**Finding (low): the mock IMD token is free to mint, so the IMD mint path costs nothing.** `MockIMD.mint` at `src/MockIMD.sol:22` has no caller check, and its 1,000-IMD per-call cap is repeatable, so it limits nothing. Because both payment paths share one 1,000 supply cap, the first outside caller can mint out the whole collection as IMD holdings for gas only:\n\n- **Reproduction:** one `MockIMD.mint(attacker, 350 ether)` call, an approval, then 1,000 `mintWithIMD()` calls. A scratch test did this in 5 transactions of 200 mints, about 67M gas in total.\n- **Result:** `mint()` reverts `SoldOut` from then on, no ETH or CASH holding ever exists, and `outage()` has no token to act on. The ETH-mint and outage demonstrations can no longer be run on that deployment.\n- **Why only low:** it is a testnet with a worthless token, and a sell-out through the ETH path is also possible for 0.56 Sepolia ETH.\n- **Fix options:** restrict `MockIMD.mint` to an owner and keep a small one-claim-per-address faucet, which raises the cost but does not remove it. Reserving part of the supply for the ETH path closes it fully but changes the brief's single shared cap, so that is the requester's decision.\n\n**What held:**\n- **Withdrawals:** `withdrawETH` and `withdrawIMD` are owner-only and pay only the owner; strangers and former owners are rejected, and a pending owner only gains access after accepting.\n- **Ownership:** the two-step handover rejects strangers and replaced or cancelled pending owners, and renounce is disabled.\n- **Owner powers:** the owner has no route to balances, holding types, metadata or the IMD address.\n- **Holdings record:** type and original balance are written once at mint, and `outage` writes only the current balance and the outage count, on CASH tokens only.\n- **IMD approvals:** `mintWithIMD` pulls only from the caller, so nobody can spend another user's approval.\n\nA contract minter can still reroll its outcome through the receiver hook (kept only ETH holdings in 18 of 40 attempts). I did not report it, because the brief asked for documented pseudo-randomness and the README and contract comments describe exactly this.\n\n**Not reached:** behaviour against the real mainnet IMD token. It reports 18 decimals and is not an EIP-1967 proxy, but the fork test could not run because the RPC relay refuses `eth_gasPrice`, so any transfer fee or limit on it is unverified. That only matters for a future mainnet deployment.\n\n**Test gap, not filed as a finding:** the existing suite does not exercise the negative ownership-handover paths (stranger calling `transferOwnership` or `acceptOwnership`, replacing or cancelling a pending owner). They hold; I checked them in a scratch test that is now deleted.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":780883,"chain":[{"calls":22,"chainId":1,"failed":1,"own":13,"public":0,"refused":8}],"cost":{"source":"runtime","usdMicros":2637304},"inputTokens":21,"model":"claude-fable-5-2","outputTokens":27215,"runtime":"claude","turns":14,"wallClockMs":315071}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"c60720e7cc40f1ae6dcc11de1b85f5e7d5ba05f6deeb7692c341a79aa507359b","device":"1c29c7c6e4cf57eb","findings":[],"hash":"abb8b9e75919e725618dd79063cb00b9314b78ec0f4942cdbb8224630172a55b","nodeId":"6b37b199-21c4-45e7-997e-778dd7ef6f9b","outcome":"completed","summary":"I've written `launch.json`, and it's the only file I changed. `forge build` and `forge test` pass with the verifier's fuzz seed: 70 of 70 tests. Nothing else checks the manifest locally, so I checked it by reading: it uses only the allowed keys, has one argument per constructor parameter, and the notes are 1,162 characters, under the 4,000 limit.\n\nIt deploys two contracts, in this order:\n\n1. **`MockIMD`**, with no constructor arguments. It stands in for IMD because there is no official IMD token on Sepolia. The README from earlier work says the mainnet IMD address has no code on Sepolia; I took that from the README and didn't re-check it on chain. The mock is a worthless 18-decimal test token with an open faucet and no owner or admin.\n2. **`Holdings`**, with `[\"$owner\", \"$contract:MockIMD\"]`. These fill its constructor `(address owner_, address imdToken_)`:\n   - `owner_` is `$owner`, which resolves to the launch owner. That wallet is the only one that can call `withdrawETH` and `withdrawIMD`.\n   - `imdToken_` points to the mock token deployed in step 1 and is fixed for good once set.\n\nNeither constructor calls another contract, so both will deploy on the empty test chain. The deployment sends no ETH.\n\nThe notes summarise how the contract behaves:\n- **Prices:** exactly 0.00056 ETH, or 0.35 IMD scaled to the token's decimals.\n- **Odds:** ETH mints give an ETH or CASH holding 50/50; IMD mints always give an IMD holding.\n- **CASH balances:** anyone can lower one with `outage()`, but it can never go up.\n- **Randomness:** it is built from `prevrandao` and other block data, which block builders can manipulate. That's acceptable for Sepolia testing only.\n\n`git status` also shows other untracked dotfiles (`.bashrc`, `.claude/`, `.vscode` and others). They were already in the working directory, and I didn't touch them.","treeHash":"c1c6b31d2477ec5c3b27f86e1ee52825510e03c0","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":156818,"cost":{"source":"runtime","usdMicros":249284},"inputTokens":12,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":2635,"runtime":"claude","turns":6,"wallClockMs":38560}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"62491201fe455e89","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Economic Security pass on the only value-bearing randomness in the system. The brief asks for a 50% ETH / 50% CASH split and a uniform balance in [1, 1e9], and it also asks for documented pseudo-randomness on Sepolia, which the README section 'Randomness and its manipulation risks' provides. This entry records the measured cost of that accepted risk so the judge has numbers rather than a slither line (weak-prng at Holdings.sol:298). Every seed input (prevrandao, parent blockhash, timestamp, msg.sender, tokenId, address(this), chainid) is readable inside the minting transaction, and msg.sender is attacker-chosen. A contract therefore does not need the 'mint, read getHolding, revert' loop the README describes: it enumerates CREATE2 child addresses, evaluates the same keccak for tokenId = totalSupply()+1, and deploys only the child whose outcome it wants; that child mints from its constructor (no receiver hook runs, code length is 0) and forwards the token. Nothing reverts, exactly one 0.00056 ETH payment is made, and a filter on msg.sender.code.length or on reverts would not stop it. The same computation done off chain lets a plain EOA know its result one slot ahead, because block N's prevrandao and parent hash are fixed once block N-1 is published. Who gains: any minter who wants a specific holding type (for example never CASH, which anyone can wipe to $0) or a top-ranked balance; who loses: ordinary minters, whose share of ETH holdings and large balances shrinks, since the 1,000 cap is shared. On Sepolia the stakes are nil, as the README says. This is consistent with the brief and needs a scope decision (VRF or commit-reveal, i.e. a two-step mint) rather than a fix; reported as info only.","line":119,"path":"src/Holdings.sol","reproduction":"State: fresh Holdings(owner, MockIMD), block.number=100, block.timestamp=1_800_000_000, prevrandao=0xdeadbeef, totalSupply=0. Attacker EOA 0xBAD calls Grinder.snipe{value: 0.00056 ether}(holdings, wantEth=true, minBal=999_000_000, maxTries=200_000). Grinder loops salt=0,1,2..., child = CREATE2 address(0xff, grinder, salt, keccak(Child initcode ++ abi.encode(holdings, attacker))), rand = keccak256(abi.encode(block.prevrandao, blockhash(block.number-1), block.timestamp, child, totalSupply()+1, holdings, block.chainid)); on the first salt with ((rand>>128)&1)==0 and 1+rand%1e9 >= 999_000_000 it runs new Child{salt, value: msg.value}(holdings, attacker), whose constructor calls holdings.mint{value: msg.value}() and holdings.transferFrom(address(this), attacker, id). Expected for a fair draw: 50% ETH, and P(balance >= 999,000,000) = 0.1%, so about 1 in 2,000 mints. Actual in my run: the 33rd candidate matched, 237,531 gas for the whole call including the child deployment, token 1 is an ETH holding with originalBalance 999,009,777 owned by the attacker, who paid exactly 0.00056 ETH once and had no reverted transaction. Calling snipe(holdings, false, 1, 1000) next returned a CASH holding on demand. Separately, an EOA 0xE0A that evaluates the same keccak with its own address and tokenId=1 before sending mint() gets exactly the predicted type and balance (asserted equal).","severity":"info","snippet":"        uint256 rand = _random(tokenId);\n        HoldingType holdingType = ((rand >> 128) & 1) == 0 ? HoldingType.ETH : HoldingType.CASH;","title":"ETH-mint outcome (ETH vs CASH, and the balance) is chosen by the minter in one non-reverting transaction for the price of one mint; documented and accepted by the brief, no code change implied"}],"hash":"d02136ea226b5cfeaecfd480c9f5f31dcc7060b8a741eb570d66e9217c3012c1","nodeId":"6b3f4d03-352f-4163-a862-40eee08f0b8b","outcome":"completed","summary":"The economics review found no defect the author needs to fix: `.imd-findings.json` holds one info-level finding and a coverage row for all 17 entry points. No tracked file was changed, and my scratch tests are removed.\n\n**The one finding (info, `src/Holdings.sol:119`)** — a minter can choose the ETH-mint outcome in a single transaction that never reverts, for the price of one mint. A contract tries candidate minter addresses against the same seed and deploys only the one whose result it wants. In my run it got an ETH holding with balance 999,009,777 on the 33rd candidate for 237,531 gas, against a fair expectation of about 1 in 2,000. The README already documents this class of risk and the brief accepts pseudo-randomness on Sepolia, so the fix is a scope decision (VRF or commit-reveal), not a repair.\n\n**What holds, and how I checked it:**\n- **Supply cap:** `totalSupply` never exceeds 1,000 across both payment paths; a 1,001st mint reverts `SoldOut` on either.\n- **Balance rules:** ETH and IMD balances never change, CASH only decreases, and type and original balance are fixed. This held across a 3,600-call stateful run mixing mints, outages, transfers and withdrawals, and on boundary inputs (equal value, 2^64, max uint, zero after zero).\n- **Fund conservation:** ETH and IMD held equal mints times price minus withdrawals, exactly, with owner and stranger withdrawals interleaved. Forced ETH and donated IMD are simply swept to the owner.\n- **Token misbehaviour:** an IMD token with a transfer hook cannot re-enter a mint, and a mid-transfer donation reverts the mint.\n- **Real IMD:** the mainnet token reads Identity.md / IMD / 18 decimals and has no code on Sepolia, as the README says. It transfers without a fee, and `mintWithIMD` and `withdrawIMD` succeeded against it on a mainnet fork.\n- **Existing suite:** all 70 tests pass, and the `abi/` files match the compiled ABIs.\n\n**Not reached:** whether the `$owner` wallet named in the README can receive ETH on Sepolia. I did not query that address on a public RPC because it identifies the requester; if it is a plain wallet there is nothing to do.\n\nI worked the three guides as my own passes, without helpers. Slither's three `incorrect-equality` lines and the `timestamp` line are false positives here: the equalities are the exact-price check and the nothing-to-withdraw guards, and no comparison depends on the timestamp.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1028020,"cost":{"source":"runtime","usdMicros":3375108},"inputTokens":27,"model":"claude-fable-5-2","outputTokens":37047,"runtime":"claude","turns":16,"wallClockMs":409933}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":7086,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 58 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 6.92s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":11217,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 3 tests for test/Deploy.t.sol:MockIMDTest\n[PASS] test_faucet() (gas: 78920)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 24835)\n[PASS] test_mintCapped() (gas: 106748)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 641.28µs (230.79µs CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/Deploy.t.sol:DemoScenarioTest\n[PASS] test_demoScenario() (gas: 4030783)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.20ms (964.58µs CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/Deploy.t.sol:DeployScriptTest\n[PASS] test_deployRejectsZeroOwner() (gas: 587679)\n[PASS] test_deployWithExistingToken() (gas: 3318011)\n[PASS] test_deployWithMockIMD() (gas: 3267289)\n[PASS] test_deployWithoutTokenReverts() (gas: 30770)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 2.58ms (886.77µs CPU time)\n\nRan 3 tests for test/Holdings.t.sol:HoldingsImmutabilityTest\n[PASS] test_cashHoldingTypeSurvivesTransferAndZero() (gas: 718918)\n[PASS] test_ethAndImdBalancesNeverChange() (gas: 1811361)\n[PASS] test_getHoldingRevertsForNonexistentToken() (gas: 26085)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 4.93ms (4.30ms CPU time)\n\nRan 10 tests for test/Holdings.t.sol:HoldingsWithdrawTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_nonOwnerCannotWithdraw(address) (runs: 256, μ: 165083, ~: 165083)\n[PASS] test_fundsConservation() (gas: 4583220)\n[PASS] test_nonOwnerCannotWithdraw() (gas: 560808)\n[PASS] test_ownerWithdrawsETH() (gas: 282801)\n[PASS] test_ownerWithdrawsIMD() (gas: 571972)\n[PASS] test_pendingOwnerCannotWithdrawUntilAccepted() (gas: 317679)\n[PASS] test_reentrantWithdrawBlocked() (gas: 788374)\n[PASS] test_renounceDisabled() (gas: 29476)\n[PASS] test_withdrawNothingReverts() (gas: 72330)\n[PASS] test_withdrawToRejectingOwnerReverts() (gas: 609768)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 17.10ms (25.17ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/Holdings.t.sol:HoldingsMetadataTest\n[PASS] test_cashMetadataAndSvgUpdateAfterOutage() (gas: 4495424)\n[PASS] test_ethMetadata() (gas: 1897071)\n[PASS] test_imdMetadata() (gas: 2019343)\n[PASS] test_svgIsPlainWhiteSquareWithBlackText() (gas: 448886)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 23.11ms (35.91ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/Holdings.t.sol:HoldingsRenderingTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_formattingRoundTrips(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 22824, ~: 26157)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 6192\n\n[PASS] test_displayFormats() (gas: 58312)\n[PASS] test_thousandsSeparators() (gas: 118433)\n[PASS] test_typographyScalesToFit() (gas: 497567)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 35.47ms (37.16ms CPU time)\n\nRan 9 tests for test/Holdings.t.sol:HoldingsOutageTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_outageSequenceNeverIncreases(uint256,uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 760350, ~: 760130)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 644971958\n  Bound result 1435621845\n  Bound result 950687617\n\n[PASS] test_anyoneCanCauseOutage() (gas: 688932)\n[PASS] test_manySuccessiveOutages() (gas: 1536632)\n[PASS] test_outageCanReachZeroAndThenNothingMore() (gas: 742247)\n[PASS] test_outageCannotIncreaseOrKeepBalance() (gas: 709871)\n[PASS] test_outageOnEthHoldingReverts() (gas: 212010)\n[PASS] test_outageOnImdHoldingReverts() (gas: 338223)\n[PASS] test_outageOnNonexistentTokenReverts() (gas: 32322)\n[PASS] test_ownerCannotRestoreCashBalance() (gas: 715900)\nSuite result: ok. 9 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 48.28ms (52.23ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/HoldingsInvariant.t.sol:HoldingsHandlerSanityTest\n[PASS] test_handlerReachesCapAndStaysClean() (gas: 142337500)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 31\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 62\n  Bound result 14\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 93\n  Bound result 21\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 124\n  Bound result 28\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 155\n  Bound result 35\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 186\n  Bound result 42\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 217\n  Bound result 49\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 248\n  Bound result 56\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 279\n  Bound result 63\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 310\n  Bound result 70\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 341\n  Bound result 77\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 372\n  Bound result 84\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 403\n  Bound result 91\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 434\n  Bound result 98\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 465\n  Bound result 105\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 496\n  Bound result 112\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 527\n  Bound result 119\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 558\n  Bound result 126\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 589\n  Bound result 133\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 620\n  Bound result 140\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 651\n  Bound result 147\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 682\n  Bound result 154\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 713\n  Bound result 161\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 744\n  Bound result 168\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 775\n  Bound result 175\n  Bound result 1\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 128.59ms (128.25ms CPU time)\n\nRan 6 tests for test/Holdings.t.sol:HoldingsDeploymentTest\n[PASS] test_constructorDoesNotCallTheToken() (gas: 3025014)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroIMD() (gas: 400747)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroOwner() (gas: 355355)\n[PASS] test_constructorSetsConfiguration() (gas: 66105)\n[PASS] test_ownerIsNotDeployer() (gas: 7724)\n[PASS] test_supportsInterfaces() (gas: 28726)\nSuite result: ok. 6 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 180.88ms (3.30ms CPU time)\n\nRan 12 tests for test/Holdings.t.sol:HoldingsImdMintTest\n[PASS] test_contractCanMintWithIMD() (gas: 535134)\n[PASS] test_falseReturningTokenRejectedBySafeERC20() (gas: 3696663)\n[PASS] test_feeOnTransferPaymentRejected() (gas: 3800332)\n[PASS] test_imdMintsAlwaysProduceIMD() (gas: 71696521)\n[PASS] test_mintWithIMDIsNotPayable() (gas: 160226)\n[PASS] test_mintWithIMDRejectsInsufficientAllowance() (gas: 163232)\n[PASS] test_mintWithIMDRejectsInsufficientBalance() (gas: 169931)\n[PASS] test_mintWithIMDRequiresApproval() (gas: 115557)\n[PASS] test_mintWithIMDTransfersExactlyPrice() (gas: 324714)\n[PASS] test_onlyConfiguredTokenIsAccepted() (gas: 702432)\n[PASS] test_priceScalesWithDecimals() (gas: 7351373)\n[PASS] test_tooFewDecimalsRejected() (gas: 3570750)\nSuite result: ok. 12 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 180.89ms (182.51ms CPU time)\n\nRan 20 tests for test/HoldingsEdges.t.sol:HoldingsEdgesTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_outageByOwnerOrHolderCannotRaise(uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 243745, ~: 243881)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 340602363\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007912789096428\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_outageOnNonCashAlwaysReverts(uint256,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 374344, ~: 324994)\n[PASS] test_documentedRisk_contractMinterCanDiscardOutcomes() (gas: 2619849)\n[PASS] test_ethCashSplitAcrossManyMinters() (gas: 75720414)\n[PASS] test_ethMintSendsNoIMDAndImdMintTakesNoETH() (gas: 407530)\n[PASS] test_imdAllowanceOneWeiShortReverts() (gas: 164094)\n[PASS] test_imdBalanceOneWeiShortReverts() (gas: 167068)\n[PASS] test_imdMintTakesOnlyPriceFromLargerAllowance() (gas: 411173)\n[PASS] test_metadataAfterTransferAndOutage() (gas: 1582320)\n[PASS] test_newOwnerWithdrawsOldOwnerCannot() (gas: 621950)\n[PASS] test_outageAtZeroCannotRepeat() (gas: 233788)\n[PASS] test_outageExactlyOneBelowSucceedsEqualFails() (gas: 235696)\n[PASS] test_outageIsNotPayable() (gas: 185981)\n[PASS] test_outageOnTokenZeroAndPastSupplyReverts() (gas: 184692)\n[PASS] test_outageWithMaxUintReverts() (gas: 195456)\n[PASS] test_ownerHasNoPathToBalancesOrMetadata() (gas: 27401)\n[PASS] test_tokenURIAndViewsRevertForMissingToken() (gas: 51810)\n[PASS] test_withdrawIncludesForcedAndDonatedFunds() (gas: 177588)\n[PASS] test_withdrawTwiceSecondReverts() (gas: 199428)\n[PASS] test_wrongEthAtSoldOutStillReverts() (gas: 92779777)\nSuite result: ok. 20 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 209.08ms (371.91ms CPU time)\n\nRan 9 tests for test/HoldingsWalletGas.t.sol:HoldingsWalletGasTest\n[PASS] test_walletGas_mintEthFromContractWallet() (gas: 4365713)\n[PASS] test_walletGas_mintEthFromEOA() (gas: 3180167)\n[PASS] test_walletGas_mintEthLastToken() (gas: 94800804)\n[PASS] test_walletGas_mintWithIMDFromContractWallet() (gas: 5083073)\n[PASS] test_walletGas_mintWithIMDFromEOA() (gas: 4151249)\n[PASS] test_walletGas_outage() (gas: 1617475)\n[PASS] test_walletGas_withdrawETHToContractOwner() (gas: 1405551)\n[PASS] test_walletGas_withdrawETHToEOA() (gas: 944732)\n[PASS] test_walletGas_withdrawIMD() (gas: 1642788)\nSuite result: ok. 9 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 209.09ms (198.72ms CPU time)\n\nRan 12 tests for test/Holdings.t.sol:HoldingsEthMintTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_balanceAlwaysInRange(bytes32,address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 151724, ~: 151920)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 8707729568247616762\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_mintRejectsAnyWrongAmount(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 50001, ~: 49912)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 13448\n\n[PASS] test_ethMintsAreRoughlyHalfEthHalfCash() (gas: 136906185)\n[PASS] test_mintEmitsHoldingMinted() (gas: 149307)\n[PASS] test_mintRejectsTooLittleEth() (gas: 42512)\n[PASS] test_mintRejectsTooMuchEth() (gas: 42448)\n[PASS] test_mintRejectsZeroEth() (gas: 35158)\n[PASS] test_mintToContractReceiver() (gas: 385362)\n[PASS] test_mintToNonReceiverContractReverts() (gas: 144698)\n[PASS] test_mintWithExactEth() (gas: 168337)\n[PASS] test_plainEthTransferRejected() (gas: 36183)\n[PASS] test_reentrantMintFromReceiverReverts() (gas: 451935)\nSuite result: ok. 12 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 415.18ms (656.63ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/Holdings.t.sol:HoldingsSupplyTest\n[PASS] test_supplyCapAcrossBothPaymentMethods() (gas: 154155692)\n[PASS] test_supplyCapWithImdOnly() (gas: 219665478)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.04s (1.72s CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/HoldingsInvariant.t.sol:HoldingsInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nHoldingsInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_ethConserved\n[PASS] invariant_holdingsPermanentSample\n[PASS] invariant_imdConserved\n[PASS] invariant_noUnexpectedOutcome\n[PASS] invariant_ownerUnchanged\n[PASS] invariant_supplyCappedAndCounted\n HoldingsInvariantTest invariants (runs: 16, calls: 8000, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-----------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract        | Selector     | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=============================================================+\n| HoldingsHandler | donate       | 891   | 0       | 0        |\n|-----------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HoldingsHandler | hijack       | 860   | 0       | 0        |\n|-----------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HoldingsHandler | mintEth      | 894   | 0       | 0        |\n|-----------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HoldingsHandler | mintEthBatch | 871   | 0       | 0        |\n|-----------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HoldingsHandler | mintImd      | 906   | 0       | 0        |\n|-----------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HoldingsHandler | outage       | 885   | 0       | 0        |\n|-----------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HoldingsHandler | transfer     | 867   | 0       | 0        |\n|-----------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HoldingsHandler | withdrawETH  | 926   | 0       | 0        |\n|-----------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| HoldingsHandler | withdrawIMD  | 900   | 0       | 0        |\n╰-----------------+--------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 100\n  Bound result 32\n  Bound result 2092\n  Bound result 122\n  Bound result 393216\n  Bound result 35\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 999999999999999994\n  Bound result 2376452956\n  Bound result 20613801648122117\n  Bound result 90\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 164\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2827\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 300\n  Bound result 27\n  Bound result 22\n  Bound result 28\n  Bound result 36\n  Bound result 73\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007912529148525\n  Bound result 57\n  Bound result 12345\n  Bound result 57830831479860656\n  Bound result 39415093\n  Bound result 600\n  Bound result 11\n  Bound result 14924744780444395822005926593888580028086831236\n  Bound result 1225148678\n  Bound result 70\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913070510447\n  Bound result 78\n  Bound result 13\n  Bound result 61\n  Bound result 552323042286392\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 28\n  Bound result 459685449\n  Bound result 48879\n  Bound result 27\n  Bound result 34\n  Bound result 1225148678\n  Bound result 143\n  Bound result 48\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007912839678916\n  Bound result 196608\n  Bound result 84\n  Bound result 13\n  Bound result 23\n  Bound result 32\n  Bound result 171\n  Bound result 71\n  Bound result 1191934207005473515349178009789835290376731510885145486\n  Bound result 143\n  Bound result 123\n  Bound result 137\n  Bound result 142\n  Bound result 121\n  Bound result 600\n  Bound result 126895104789452\n  Bound result 189\n  Bound result 216\n  Bound result 243\n  Bound result 73\n  Bound result 2158778573\n  Bound result 36\n  Bound result 220\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 32\n  Bound result 373\n  Bound result 95\n  Bound result 218\n  Bound result 35\n  Bound result 71\n  Bound result 256\n  Bound result 35\n  Bound result 18\n  Bound result 999999999999999998\n  Bound result 5000000000000000000\n  Bound result 215\n  Bound result 31\n  Bound result 210\n  Bound result 48\n  Bound result 269273189\n  Bound result 12345\n  Bound result 6333\n  Bound result 43\n  Bound result 248\n  Bound result 185347293\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007912302681371\n  Bound result 196\n  Bound result 55158579253159748881140026366034777175525174870547616395121389475585796621683\n  Bound result 22359\n  Bound result 320\n  Bound result 8585\n  Bound result 75\n  Bound result 62\n  Bound result 560000000000000\n  Bound result 122\n  Bound result 18\n  Bound result 12345\n  Bound result 209347332825652855\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 100\n  Bound result 999999999999999998\n  Bound result 98364814\n  Bound result 31\n  Bound result 153461152786784730\n  Bound result 12\n  Bound result 164\n  Bound result 119\n  Bound result 5847\n  Bound result 10077\n  Bound result 120\n  Bound result 160\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007912727770027\n  Bound result 30\n  Bound result 32\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 289\n  Bound result 8998\n  Bound result 393789686\n  Bound result 320\n  Bound result 1120000000000000\n  Bound result 113145388063778850\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 11\n  Bound result 11769\n  Bound result 999999999999999999\n  Bound result 7329018282356230180\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 16\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 525804858\n  Bound result 203\n  Bound result 104101588005642655990041909996696391433105743388002639497052156215\n  Bound result 28\n  Bound result 308\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007912551668468\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 7257742\n  Bound result 262144\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 404\n  Bound result 659918\n  Bound result 10705\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 84\n  Bound result 62\n  Bound result 30\n  Bound result 789069482844136940\n  Bound result 74\n  Bound result 523610936\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 91\n  Bound result 48879\n  Bound result 392426383756025\n  Bound result 184\n  Bound result 677753247\n  Bound result 200\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007912644159651\n  Bound result 577971630\n  Bound result 900\n  Bound result 100\n  Bound result 54523999\n  Bound result 171\n  Bound result 3735879681\n  Bound result 900\n  Bound result 344\n  Bound result 52\n  Bound result 28521617\n  Bound result 48\n  Bound result 10558693\n  Bound result 68\n  Bound result 14854121\n  Bound result 2642547756594534327\n  Bound result 97\n  Bound result 3000000000000000000\n  Bound result 32\n  Bound result 302\n  Bound result 288\n  Bound result 39\n  Bound result 478\n  Bound result 263\n  Bound result 13\n  Bound result 84\n  Bound result 7167709\n  Bound result 535\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 97\n  Bound result 36\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 314781543057341448\n  Bound result 18\n  Bound result 399\n  Bound result 243\n  Bound result 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913017921472\n  Bound result 36\n  Bound result 310\n  Bound result 4294967295\n  Bound result 48\n  Bound result 103662393913485483\n  Bound result 185\n  Bound result 2536548642505727\n  Bound result 7116\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 16\n  Bound result 174\n  Bound result 135\n  Bound result 18\n  Bound result 9483\n  Bound result 12\n  Bound result 31064062024729093\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 5486\n  Bound result 999\n  Bound result 564\n  Bound result 47\n  Bound result 128\n  Bound result 345968013\n  Bound result 37\n  Bound result 769797822\n  Bound result 35\n  Bound result 308\n  Bound result 219\n  Bound result 262144\n  Bound result 8285\n  Bound result 17511867246580\n  Bound result 499\n  Bound result 55906856\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 264547899\n  Bound result 205378979510501\n  Bound result 146\n  Bound result 62\n  Bound result 388\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 22\n  Bound result 604397520\n  Bound result 122\n  Bound result 123456\n  Bound result 384\n  Bound result 4294967295\n  Bound result 174\n  Bound result 912111074\n  Bound result 195\n  Bound result 6457392261605394673947063116617\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 2198799214\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 235056883145765646\n  Bound result 141\n  Bound result 652\n  Bound result 327680\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 51\n  Bound result 26\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 353073665\n  Bound result 28\n  Bound result 123456\n  Bound result 16\n  Bound result 62\n  Bound result 62\n  Bound result 592\n  Bound result 4117976826411212900502702823427\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 72249352589621773\n  Bound result 336\n  Bound result 196608\n  Bound result 171\n  Bound result 634\n  Bound result 5000000000000000000\n  Bound result 449\n  Bound result 90\n  Bound result 320\n  Bound result 3357914360106519143\n  Bound result 229\n  Bound result 334428214\n  Bound result 262144\n  Bound result 84\n  Bound result 118104889032875244\n  Bound result 12681\n  Bound result 414\n  Bound result 71\n  Bound result 48\n  Bound result 162\n  Bound result 327\n  Bound result 1586886421415557\n  Bound result 21\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 47663573033755595\n  Bound result 481\n  Bound result 741\n  Bound result 14\n  Bound result 91497087667650185\n  Bound result 82194012\n  Bound result 507\n  Bound result 74\n  Bound result 8253300553015040\n  Bound result 231956274946337457\n  Bound result 113998396686705711\n  Bound result 545116759\n  Bound result 18126980\n  Bound result 298037726382336\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 2827\n  Bound result 108\n  Bound result 26\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 557561861715178656\n  Bound result 320\n  Bound result 16\n  Bound result 27\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 13\n  Bound result 32\n  Bound result 327680\n  Bound result 9738\n  Bound result 9\n  Bound result 549\n  Bound result 40\n  Bound result 30\n  Bound result 35\n  Bound result 304\n  Bound result 4294967295\n  Bound result 9868189549335248345\n  Bound result 36\n  Bound result 13598795601322497\n  Bound result 137875222969813762\n  Bound result 123456\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 18\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 8607\n  Bound result 458\n  Bound result 262543\n  Bound result 123456\n  Bound result 990\n  Bound result 18192896171457658081769511540018506022084432606199821170920303406975435026\n  Bound result 756819679537919294\n  Bound result 1838378692775901302\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 5333211\n  Bound result 916380168565839600\n  Bound result 7919\n  Bound result 22\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 106\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n  Bound result 967721275927573\n  Bound result 1314875138\n  Bound result 164\n  Bound result 30\n  Bound result 219091591568936778\n  Bound result 213\n  Bound result 900\n  Bound result 225431331\n  Bound result 349999999999999998\n  Bound result 18297697584583394\n  Bound result 535\n  Bound result 82194012\n  Bound result 26\n  Bound result 961\n  Bound result 386290415\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 274\n  Bound result 339\n  Bound result 964\n  Bound result 399\n  Bound result 389\n  Bound result 100\n  Bound result 54523998\n  Bound result 4335\n  Bound result 294599741493795461\n  Bound result 84540711311696095\n  Bound result 7201284608777487023\n  Bound result 405\n  Bound result 455084410\n  Bound result 821580588500424369\n  Bound result 5178698838616033107\n  Bound result 417760000000000001\n  Bound result 600\n  Bound result 550\n  Bound result 313\n  Bound result 7915\n  Bound result 227\n  Bound result 872\n  Bound result 22359\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 867887894653136253\n  Bound result 332767025\n  Bound result 1440\n  Bound result 256\n  Bound result 1001\n  Bound result 1532892063\n  Bound result 9\n  Bound result 57198598942272373\n  Bound result 25483212\n  Bound result 204462193950038419\n  Bound result 82194012\n  Bound result 612\n  Bound result 535\n  Bound result 3024824\n  Bound result 829\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 32\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 11.05s (11.04s CPU time)\n\nRan 16 test suites in 11.05s (13.55s CPU time): 101 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (101 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":81,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"Holdings.acceptOwnership()\",\"Holdings.approve(address,uint256)\",\"Holdings.mint()\",\"Holdings.mintWithIMD()\",\"Holdings.outage(uint256,uint256)\",\"Holdings.safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"Holdings.safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256,bytes)\",\"Holdings.setApprovalForAll(address,bool)\",\"Holdings.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"Holdings.transferOwnership(address)\",\"Holdings.withdrawETH()\",\"Holdings.withdrawIMD()\",\"MockIMD.approve(address,uint256)\",\"MockIMD.faucet()\",\"MockIMD.mint(address,uint256)\",\"MockIMD.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"MockIMD.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":5,\"README.md\":213,\"abi/Holdings.json\":1119,\"abi/MockIMD.json\":382,\"foundry.toml\":17,\"remappings.txt\":2,\"script/Demo.s.sol\":45,\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":45,\"src/Holdings.sol\":392,\"src/MockIMD.sol\":31,\"test/Deploy.t.sol\":110,\"test/Holdings.t.sol\":957,\"test/HoldingsEdges.t.sol\":331,\"test/HoldingsInvariant.t.sol\":375,\"test/HoldingsWalletGas.t.sol\":127,\"test/utils/TestHelpers.sol\":185,\"test/utils/WalletGas.sol\":76},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"53c4ff34dd282f157504a4f86b7a0fa8ed2ccaae15c76d114f9592fd8c35e14b","verifiedTreeHash":"25e3121cba1f83d3bb48464b234853d1f2e55eb7","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+2bde77dd"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":5307,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 54 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 5.15s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":1204,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 1 test for test/Deploy.t.sol:DemoScenarioTest\n[PASS] test_demoScenario() (gas: 4030783)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 3.88ms (3.61ms CPU time)\n\nRan 3 tests for test/Holdings.t.sol:HoldingsImmutabilityTest\n[PASS] test_cashHoldingTypeSurvivesTransferAndZero() (gas: 718918)\n[PASS] test_ethAndImdBalancesNeverChange() (gas: 1811361)\n[PASS] test_getHoldingRevertsForNonexistentToken() (gas: 26085)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 10.24ms (9.66ms CPU time)\n\nRan 3 tests for test/Deploy.t.sol:MockIMDTest\n[PASS] test_faucet() (gas: 78920)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 24835)\n[PASS] test_mintCapped() (gas: 106748)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 10.80ms (595.22µs CPU time)\n\nRan 6 tests for test/Holdings.t.sol:HoldingsDeploymentTest\n[PASS] test_constructorDoesNotCallTheToken() (gas: 3025014)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroIMD() (gas: 400747)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroOwner() (gas: 355355)\n[PASS] test_constructorSetsConfiguration() (gas: 66105)\n[PASS] test_ownerIsNotDeployer() (gas: 7724)\n[PASS] test_supportsInterfaces() (gas: 28726)\nSuite result: ok. 6 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 10.89ms (5.19ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/Deploy.t.sol:DeployScriptTest\n[PASS] test_deployRejectsZeroOwner() (gas: 587679)\n[PASS] test_deployWithExistingToken() (gas: 3318011)\n[PASS] test_deployWithMockIMD() (gas: 3267289)\n[PASS] test_deployWithoutTokenReverts() (gas: 30770)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 15.53ms (1.23ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/Holdings.t.sol:HoldingsRenderingTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_formattingRoundTrips(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 22757, ~: 25757)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 6192\n\n[PASS] test_displayFormats() (gas: 58312)\n[PASS] test_thousandsSeparators() (gas: 118433)\n[PASS] test_typographyScalesToFit() (gas: 497567)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 18.07ms (21.10ms CPU time)\n\nRan 10 tests for test/Holdings.t.sol:HoldingsWithdrawTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_nonOwnerCannotWithdraw(address) (runs: 256, μ: 165083, ~: 165083)\n[PASS] test_fundsConservation() (gas: 4583220)\n[PASS] test_nonOwnerCannotWithdraw() (gas: 560808)\n[PASS] test_ownerWithdrawsETH() (gas: 282801)\n[PASS] test_ownerWithdrawsIMD() (gas: 571972)\n[PASS] test_pendingOwnerCannotWithdrawUntilAccepted() (gas: 317679)\n[PASS] test_reentrantWithdrawBlocked() (gas: 788374)\n[PASS] test_renounceDisabled() (gas: 29476)\n[PASS] test_withdrawNothingReverts() (gas: 72330)\n[PASS] test_withdrawToRejectingOwnerReverts() (gas: 609768)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 17.82ms (34.85ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/Holdings.t.sol:HoldingsMetadataTest\n[PASS] test_cashMetadataAndSvgUpdateAfterOutage() (gas: 4495424)\n[PASS] test_ethMetadata() (gas: 1897071)\n[PASS] test_imdMetadata() (gas: 2019343)\n[PASS] test_svgIsPlainWhiteSquareWithBlackText() (gas: 448886)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 23.08ms (55.84ms CPU time)\n\nRan 9 tests for test/Holdings.t.sol:HoldingsOutageTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_outageSequenceNeverIncreases(uint256,uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 760521, ~: 760130)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 644971958\n  Bound result 1435621845\n  Bound result 950687617\n\n[PASS] test_anyoneCanCauseOutage() (gas: 688932)\n[PASS] test_manySuccessiveOutages() (gas: 1536632)\n[PASS] test_outageCanReachZeroAndThenNothingMore() (gas: 742247)\n[PASS] test_outageCannotIncreaseOrKeepBalance() (gas: 709871)\n[PASS] test_outageOnEthHoldingReverts() (gas: 212010)\n[PASS] test_outageOnImdHoldingReverts() (gas: 338223)\n[PASS] test_outageOnNonexistentTokenReverts() (gas: 32322)\n[PASS] test_ownerCannotRestoreCashBalance() (gas: 715900)\nSuite result: ok. 9 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 61.32ms (81.06ms CPU time)\n\nRan 12 tests for test/Holdings.t.sol:HoldingsImdMintTest\n[PASS] test_contractCanMintWithIMD() (gas: 535134)\n[PASS] test_falseReturningTokenRejectedBySafeERC20() (gas: 3696663)\n[PASS] test_feeOnTransferPaymentRejected() (gas: 3800332)\n[PASS] test_imdMintsAlwaysProduceIMD() (gas: 71696521)\n[PASS] test_mintWithIMDIsNotPayable() (gas: 160226)\n[PASS] test_mintWithIMDRejectsInsufficientAllowance() (gas: 163232)\n[PASS] test_mintWithIMDRejectsInsufficientBalance() (gas: 169931)\n[PASS] test_mintWithIMDRequiresApproval() (gas: 115557)\n[PASS] test_mintWithIMDTransfersExactlyPrice() (gas: 324714)\n[PASS] test_onlyConfiguredTokenIsAccepted() (gas: 702432)\n[PASS] test_priceScalesWithDecimals() (gas: 7351373)\n[PASS] test_tooFewDecimalsRejected() (gas: 3570750)\nSuite result: ok. 12 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 166.42ms (167.78ms CPU time)\n\nRan 12 tests for test/Holdings.t.sol:HoldingsEthMintTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_balanceAlwaysInRange(bytes32,address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 151713, ~: 151890)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 56391929002\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_mintRejectsAnyWrongAmount(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 50008, ~: 49912)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 10402\n\n[PASS] test_ethMintsAreRoughlyHalfEthHalfCash() (gas: 136906185)\n[PASS] test_mintEmitsHoldingMinted() (gas: 149307)\n[PASS] test_mintRejectsTooLittleEth() (gas: 42512)\n[PASS] test_mintRejectsTooMuchEth() (gas: 42448)\n[PASS] test_mintRejectsZeroEth() (gas: 35158)\n[PASS] test_mintToContractReceiver() (gas: 385362)\n[PASS] test_mintToNonReceiverContractReverts() (gas: 144698)\n[PASS] test_mintWithExactEth() (gas: 168337)\n[PASS] test_plainEthTransferRejected() (gas: 36183)\n[PASS] test_reentrantMintFromReceiverReverts() (gas: 451935)\nSuite result: ok. 12 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 401.70ms (440.49ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/Holdings.t.sol:HoldingsSupplyTest\n[PASS] test_supplyCapAcrossBothPaymentMethods() (gas: 154155692)\n[PASS] test_supplyCapWithImdOnly() (gas: 219665478)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.04s (1.71s CPU time)\n\nRan 12 test suites in 1.05s (1.78s CPU time): 70 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (70 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":73,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"Holdings.acceptOwnership()\",\"Holdings.approve(address,uint256)\",\"Holdings.mint()\",\"Holdings.mintWithIMD()\",\"Holdings.outage(uint256,uint256)\",\"Holdings.safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"Holdings.safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256,bytes)\",\"Holdings.setApprovalForAll(address,bool)\",\"Holdings.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"Holdings.transferOwnership(address)\",\"Holdings.withdrawETH()\",\"Holdings.withdrawIMD()\",\"MockIMD.approve(address,uint256)\",\"MockIMD.faucet()\",\"MockIMD.mint(address,uint256)\",\"MockIMD.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"MockIMD.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":5,\"README.md\":213,\"abi/Holdings.json\":1119,\"abi/MockIMD.json\":382,\"foundry.toml\":17,\"remappings.txt\":2,\"script/Demo.s.sol\":45,\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":45,\"src/Holdings.sol\":392,\"src/MockIMD.sol\":31,\"test/Deploy.t.sol\":110,\"test/Holdings.t.sol\":957,\"test/utils/TestHelpers.sol\":185},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":2452,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[high/medium] weak-prng at src/Holdings.sol:298: Holdings._record(uint256,Holdings.HoldingType,uint256,bool) (src/Holdings.sol#298-304) uses a weak PRNG: \"balance = MIN_BALANCE + (rand % MAX_BALANCE) (src/Holdings.sol#299)\"\n[medium/high] incorrect-equality at src/Holdings.sol:274: Holdings.withdrawIMD() (src/Holdings.sol#274-280) uses a dangerous strict equality:\n[medium/high] incorrect-equality at src/Holdings.sol:264: Holdings.withdrawETH() (src/Holdings.sol#264-271) uses a dangerous strict equality:\n[medium/high] incorrect-equality at src/Holdings.sol:116: Holdings.mint() (src/Holdings.sol#116-123) uses a dangerous strict equality:\n[low/medium] timestamp at src/Holdings.sol:116: Holdings.mint() (src/Holdings.sol#116-123) uses timestamp for comparisons","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"5dc02e1c86c9012415b3aeccf4e8bc9096b9c71863e784302b7d8ae5ef57e0a4","verifiedTreeHash":"8ef7f30e36ef950a9e7cc843e09cb16af6948a08","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+2bde77dd"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":5190,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 54 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 5.04s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":1207,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 3 tests for test/Deploy.t.sol:MockIMDTest\n[PASS] test_faucet() (gas: 78920)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 24835)\n[PASS] test_mintCapped() (gas: 106748)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 659.30µs (257.88µs CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/Deploy.t.sol:DemoScenarioTest\n[PASS] test_demoScenario() (gas: 4030783)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.15ms (951.51µs CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/Deploy.t.sol:DeployScriptTest\n[PASS] test_deployRejectsZeroOwner() (gas: 587679)\n[PASS] test_deployWithExistingToken() (gas: 3318011)\n[PASS] test_deployWithMockIMD() (gas: 3267289)\n[PASS] test_deployWithoutTokenReverts() (gas: 30770)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 2.13ms (1.60ms CPU time)\n\nRan 3 tests for test/Holdings.t.sol:HoldingsImmutabilityTest\n[PASS] test_cashHoldingTypeSurvivesTransferAndZero() (gas: 718918)\n[PASS] test_ethAndImdBalancesNeverChange() (gas: 1811361)\n[PASS] test_getHoldingRevertsForNonexistentToken() (gas: 26085)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 6.58ms (4.66ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/Holdings.t.sol:HoldingsRenderingTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_formattingRoundTrips(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 22757, ~: 25757)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 475804289\n\n[PASS] test_displayFormats() (gas: 58312)\n[PASS] test_thousandsSeparators() (gas: 118433)\n[PASS] test_typographyScalesToFit() (gas: 497567)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 9.21ms (13.51ms CPU time)\n\nRan 10 tests for test/Holdings.t.sol:HoldingsWithdrawTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_nonOwnerCannotWithdraw(address) (runs: 256, μ: 165083, ~: 165083)\n[PASS] test_fundsConservation() (gas: 4583220)\n[PASS] test_nonOwnerCannotWithdraw() (gas: 560808)\n[PASS] test_ownerWithdrawsETH() (gas: 282801)\n[PASS] test_ownerWithdrawsIMD() (gas: 571972)\n[PASS] test_pendingOwnerCannotWithdrawUntilAccepted() (gas: 317679)\n[PASS] test_reentrantWithdrawBlocked() (gas: 788374)\n[PASS] test_renounceDisabled() (gas: 29476)\n[PASS] test_withdrawNothingReverts() (gas: 72330)\n[PASS] test_withdrawToRejectingOwnerReverts() (gas: 609768)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 17.50ms (23.23ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/Holdings.t.sol:HoldingsMetadataTest\n[PASS] test_cashMetadataAndSvgUpdateAfterOutage() (gas: 4495424)\n[PASS] test_ethMetadata() (gas: 1897071)\n[PASS] test_imdMetadata() (gas: 2019343)\n[PASS] test_svgIsPlainWhiteSquareWithBlackText() (gas: 448886)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 18.39ms (33.88ms CPU time)\n\nRan 9 tests for test/Holdings.t.sol:HoldingsOutageTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_outageSequenceNeverIncreases(uint256,uint256,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 760521, ~: 760130)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 62\n  Bound result 250745484\n  Bound result 61\n\n[PASS] test_anyoneCanCauseOutage() (gas: 688932)\n[PASS] test_manySuccessiveOutages() (gas: 1536632)\n[PASS] test_outageCanReachZeroAndThenNothingMore() (gas: 742247)\n[PASS] test_outageCannotIncreaseOrKeepBalance() (gas: 709871)\n[PASS] test_outageOnEthHoldingReverts() (gas: 212010)\n[PASS] test_outageOnImdHoldingReverts() (gas: 338223)\n[PASS] test_outageOnNonexistentTokenReverts() (gas: 32322)\n[PASS] test_ownerCannotRestoreCashBalance() (gas: 715900)\nSuite result: ok. 9 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 53.08ms (58.21ms CPU time)\n\nRan 12 tests for test/Holdings.t.sol:HoldingsImdMintTest\n[PASS] test_contractCanMintWithIMD() (gas: 535134)\n[PASS] test_falseReturningTokenRejectedBySafeERC20() (gas: 3696663)\n[PASS] test_feeOnTransferPaymentRejected() (gas: 3800332)\n[PASS] test_imdMintsAlwaysProduceIMD() (gas: 71696521)\n[PASS] test_mintWithIMDIsNotPayable() (gas: 160226)\n[PASS] test_mintWithIMDRejectsInsufficientAllowance() (gas: 163232)\n[PASS] test_mintWithIMDRejectsInsufficientBalance() (gas: 169931)\n[PASS] test_mintWithIMDRequiresApproval() (gas: 115557)\n[PASS] test_mintWithIMDTransfersExactlyPrice() (gas: 324714)\n[PASS] test_onlyConfiguredTokenIsAccepted() (gas: 702432)\n[PASS] test_priceScalesWithDecimals() (gas: 7351373)\n[PASS] test_tooFewDecimalsRejected() (gas: 3570750)\nSuite result: ok. 12 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 148.09ms (152.46ms CPU time)\n\nRan 12 tests for test/Holdings.t.sol:HoldingsEthMintTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_balanceAlwaysInRange(bytes32,address,uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 151713, ~: 151890)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 716\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_mintRejectsAnyWrongAmount(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 50008, ~: 49912)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 74967819195568590734\n\n[PASS] test_ethMintsAreRoughlyHalfEthHalfCash() (gas: 136906185)\n[PASS] test_mintEmitsHoldingMinted() (gas: 149307)\n[PASS] test_mintRejectsTooLittleEth() (gas: 42512)\n[PASS] test_mintRejectsTooMuchEth() (gas: 42448)\n[PASS] test_mintRejectsZeroEth() (gas: 35158)\n[PASS] test_mintToContractReceiver() (gas: 385362)\n[PASS] test_mintToNonReceiverContractReverts() (gas: 144698)\n[PASS] test_mintWithExactEth() (gas: 168337)\n[PASS] test_plainEthTransferRejected() (gas: 36183)\n[PASS] test_reentrantMintFromReceiverReverts() (gas: 451935)\nSuite result: ok. 12 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 358.36ms (377.08ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/Holdings.t.sol:HoldingsSupplyTest\n[PASS] test_supplyCapAcrossBothPaymentMethods() (gas: 154155692)\n[PASS] test_supplyCapWithImdOnly() (gas: 219665478)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.05s (1.70s CPU time)\n\nRan 6 tests for test/Holdings.t.sol:HoldingsDeploymentTest\n[PASS] test_constructorDoesNotCallTheToken() (gas: 3025014)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroIMD() (gas: 400747)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroOwner() (gas: 355355)\n[PASS] test_constructorSetsConfiguration() (gas: 66105)\n[PASS] test_ownerIsNotDeployer() (gas: 7724)\n[PASS] test_supportsInterfaces() (gas: 28726)\nSuite result: ok. 6 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.05s (1.90ms CPU time)\n\nRan 12 test suites in 1.05s (2.72s CPU time): 70 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (70 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":71,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"Holdings.acceptOwnership()\",\"Holdings.approve(address,uint256)\",\"Holdings.mint()\",\"Holdings.mintWithIMD()\",\"Holdings.outage(uint256,uint256)\",\"Holdings.safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"Holdings.safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256,bytes)\",\"Holdings.setApprovalForAll(address,bool)\",\"Holdings.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"Holdings.transferOwnership(address)\",\"Holdings.withdrawETH()\",\"Holdings.withdrawIMD()\",\"MockIMD.approve(address,uint256)\",\"MockIMD.faucet()\",\"MockIMD.mint(address,uint256)\",\"MockIMD.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"MockIMD.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":5,\"README.md\":213,\"abi/Holdings.json\":1119,\"abi/MockIMD.json\":382,\"foundry.toml\":17,\"launch.json\":17,\"remappings.txt\":2,\"script/Demo.s.sol\":45,\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":45,\"src/Holdings.sol\":392,\"src/MockIMD.sol\":31,\"test/Deploy.t.sol\":110,\"test/Holdings.t.sol\":957,\"test/utils/TestHelpers.sol\":185},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"abb8b9e75919e725618dd79063cb00b9314b78ec0f4942cdbb8224630172a55b","verifiedTreeHash":"c1c6b31d2477ec5c3b27f86e1ee52825510e03c0","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+2bde77dd"}]}