{"assessments":[],"deployments":[],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"ffb47362-cdd3-498f-8c1c-911c27666c35","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"42e0a7475026a838df8601674331de795323730c79f352a6e5cd7062b9d59dd8","dependsOn":["build_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_economics","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"e1ca305e736581240ebabe737ea59ac4ed924643e175625add0529f566a76a89","dependsOn":["build_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_flow","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"8bfe2a04d35719ff748946e8fac175dc941aa4c93ce7bab07729053a344887ca","dependsOn":["build_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest","audit_math","audit_permissions","audit_economics","audit_flow"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"af3aa01159bbf354f621cafa5c0006f6169e0938a8b015be508b7377dbf165bc","skillId":"audit-judge","tools":[]},"key":"audit_judge","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"af3aa01159bbf354f621cafa5c0006f6169e0938a8b015be508b7377dbf165bc","skillId":"audit-judge","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"fa5874e0db07e132deb9ba8a7a86ff7b588b92bf723c6ff7694d9ca69b644712","dependsOn":["build_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_math","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"d20b3c9b67f48bb9959ba20539bc1b1a5d6f5c517b053b91ed1091838cc88689","dependsOn":["build_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_permissions","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"ff950c82ea1504a17c1f616d4db00174bf1bb4c3c18a4a813fed649c08d7ef2b","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"6e3e328aa196f6965a2821b098b101e9ff09eef55cdaafaec1d6ea18007b96f6","skillId":"build-contract-project","tools":[]},"key":"build_contract_project","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"6e3e328aa196f6965a2821b098b101e9ff09eef55cdaafaec1d6ea18007b96f6","skillId":"build-contract-project","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"e3e00488b0dd9bf10cd6a77a2f054c08c792e965ecc53cf7730a9ff76d3c416a","dependsOn":["build_contract_project","write_foundry_tests"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"tools":[]},"key":"manifest","kind":"code","role":"integrate","skillHash":null,"skillId":null,"state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"906741396f7f085d59cc431278e362dd2604da29859af636856229ff658a1daa","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"73431852439ad3a343f3d2b7db1c43cd363b9f48f9bb51497374a0cf6d50b223","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","tools":[]},"key":"write_foundry_tests","kind":"code","role":"tests","skillHash":"73431852439ad3a343f3d2b7db1c43cd363b9f48f9bb51497374a0cf6d50b223","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"Build QuantumCanary: one immutable, ownerless Solidity contract that is a public on-chain alarm for a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) able to break secp256k1.\n\nIdea: a 'canary' is an Ethereum address whose secp256k1 public key is derived in a verifiable nothing-up-my-sleeve way, so that nobody on Earth knows its private key. Anyone can send ETH to that address as a bounty. The only way that balance can ever decrease is a valid ECDSA signature from a key that only a CRQC can derive from the public key. So 'the canary balance dropped' is a public, composable, cryptographic signal that a CRQC exists.\n\nRequirements:\n1. The seed phrase is chosen by YOU, the agent building this contract, not by the requester: one plain-ASCII English sentence of 60 to 160 characters that begins with 'IMD Quantum Canary #1' and says, in your own words, that if this balance ever drops a quantum computer has broken secp256k1. Write it once as a public string constant SEED_PHRASE in the contract and expose seedPhrase(); the constructor computes seedHash = keccak256(bytes(SEED_PHRASE)) itself. The only constructor argument is uint256 thresholdWei. No owner, no admin, no upgrade, no selfdestruct, no delegatecall. In the README state that the phrase was written by the building agent, and that the choice of phrase cannot weaken the key because the private key is unknown for any phrase.\n2. The constructor then derives the canary public key from seedHash by try-and-increment: for counter i = 0,1,2,... compute x = uint256(keccak256(abi.encode(seedHash, i))) mod p; compute rhs = (x^3 + 7) mod p; compute y = rhs^((p+1)/4) mod p using the modexp precompile at address 0x05 (p is the secp256k1 field prime, p mod 4 == 3); accept the first i where mulmod(y, y, p) == rhs; normalise y to the even value (if y is odd use p - y). Store seedHash, x, y, the counter i, and canaryAddress = address(uint160(uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(x, y))))) as immutables, and emit them in an event. The derivation must be fully on chain so nobody has to trust an off-chain script.\n3. isTripped() view returns true when canaryAddress.balance < thresholdWei AND the recorded high-water mark of the balance was ever >= thresholdWei. Provide a permissionless poke() that records the current balance high-water mark and, the first time a drop below threshold is observed after the mark, stores trippedAt (block.timestamp) and trippedBlock and emits CanaryTripped. isTripped() must also be computable with no poke, purely from the live balance versus the stored high-water mark, so integrators can read it as a view.\n4. Expose: seedPhrase(), seedHash(), canaryAddress(), pubKeyX(), pubKeyY(), counter(), thresholdWei(), highWaterMark(), trippedAt(), trippedBlock(), isTripped(). No payable functions; the contract itself never holds ETH; bounties go directly to canaryAddress.\n5. Tests (Foundry, solc 0.8.26): the derived point must satisfy y^2 == x^3 + 7 mod p; an independent re-derivation in test code (pure Solidity, no ffi) starting from seedPhrase() must give the same seedHash, x, y and address; fuzz thresholds; simulate a tripped canary with vm.deal on canaryAddress; prove no function can move funds or change immutables.\n6. The README must document the exact derivation algorithm step by step with the seed phrase in clear text (byte-exact, in a code block), explain why nobody can know the private key, show how to verify the address independently, and warn that forcing the balance below the threshold is impossible without a CRQC.\n\nUse thresholdWei = 1 ether. Deploy on Ethereum mainnet as contracts only.","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"0ae81c1988b7f51e015728d4d08f9c733ab0cd6e00b2120f91e99acf3b1f4ced","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"ffb47362-cdd3-498f-8c1c-911c27666c35","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-1213-src-quantumcanary-sol"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"51025","feedbackHash":"1330de411e60c393804cf73a2a3e977600d8a9c84255cb52b09a71d40c26f513","nodeKey":"audit_economics","submissionHash":"42e0a7475026a838df8601674331de795323730c79f352a6e5cd7062b9d59dd8","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"50952","feedbackHash":"64e9eeb061918be2cfb534563e1e08630f608bf1fd925fbf6572a201fe149df6","nodeKey":"audit_flow","submissionHash":"e1ca305e736581240ebabe737ea59ac4ed924643e175625add0529f566a76a89","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51032","feedbackHash":"9df11c31c991d50b6993b847a87c5be7e4bb9dc6166f606b021912e8b7c8878f","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"8bfe2a04d35719ff748946e8fac175dc941aa4c93ce7bab07729053a344887ca","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51022","feedbackHash":"7430e0f152f0ae9a2ff6ba7a17cc023762c50b17aaa79f780632075288de92fe","nodeKey":"audit_math","submissionHash":"fa5874e0db07e132deb9ba8a7a86ff7b588b92bf723c6ff7694d9ca69b644712","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51020","feedbackHash":"d8d5eb3a06387a609a15bfa1ef63f0da013b424d8ea5f109b241f48a09834d6f","nodeKey":"audit_permissions","submissionHash":"d20b3c9b67f48bb9959ba20539bc1b1a5d6f5c517b053b91ed1091838cc88689","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51756","feedbackHash":"102443ecbcda194941190f9fd97fb5d28fb1e425a5ba16afe846e25cd9872a84","nodeKey":"build_contract_project","submissionHash":"ff950c82ea1504a17c1f616d4db00174bf1bb4c3c18a4a813fed649c08d7ef2b","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51058","feedbackHash":"b75573f8e7944d2d63a9e6ad52f3f42af3394f86af84c1f6dd6ecf272e4270c8","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"e3e00488b0dd9bf10cd6a77a2f054c08c792e965ecc53cf7730a9ff76d3c416a","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52148","feedbackHash":"cd267e09fc65eaee83646b1f8f64ca76ea0e493b060d64877ae966568c0c848d","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"906741396f7f085d59cc431278e362dd2604da29859af636856229ff658a1daa","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"edf7dcf0b9f66bed0fd0b74a612e49457cf08eeda4c9722e704708abf7a51077","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"b273d407784470b4","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Area: Economic Security x Flow Gap (execution x first principles). The project's stated purpose is that 'the canary balance dropped' is a public, composable, cryptographic signal that a CRQC exists, because the balance of the canary EOA can only decrease through a secp256k1 signature. The contract, however, only signals when the live balance falls strictly below thresholdWei (1 ether at launch). Both isTripped() (line 72) and the recording branch in poke() (line 86: `if (!tripRecorded && balance < thresholdWei && mark >= thresholdWei)`) ignore any decrease that leaves at least thresholdWei behind, even though poke() already holds the information needed to detect it (balance < highWaterMark is only possible via a signature from the canary key). Economics: the only actor who can move the bounty is the key holder, and a profit-seeking key holder who wants to keep the capability secret simply leaves exactly 1 ETH behind. With a 1 ETH threshold and a bounty that donors are encouraged to grow, the attacker's payoff is (bounty - 1 ETH) per harvest, repeatable every time donors top up, at a cost of 21000 gas per harvest, with zero on-chain signal: no CanaryTripped event, trippedAt == 0, isTripped() == false, and every integrator reading the view concludes no CRQC exists. The larger the bounty, the stronger the incentive to stay silent, so the alarm is weakest exactly when it matters most. The README documents 'A decrease that stays at or above 1 ETH does not satisfy this threshold alarm' as a limitation, and the behaviour is consistent with the literal wording of requirement 3, but it contradicts the first-principles guarantee the same brief states ('The only way that balance can ever decrease is a valid ECDSA signature ... so the canary balance dropped is a ... signal'). Minimal fix that preserves the requested isTripped()/CanaryTripped semantics: in poke(), additionally compare balance against the stored high-water mark and, on the first observation of balance < highWaterMark, record e.g. firstDropAt/firstDropBlock and emit a BalanceDecreased(balance, highWaterMark) event (and optionally expose a hasEverDropped() view). Any decrease below the mark is cryptographically impossible without the key, so this stronger signal has no false positives. This changes the agreed interface only additively; the requester must decide whether the threshold-only predicate is intended.","line":72,"path":"src/QuantumCanary.sol","reproduction":"State: QuantumCanary deployed with thresholdWei = 1 ether; donors fund canaryAddress to 100 ether; anyone calls poke() so highWaterMark == 100 ether. Attack: the CRQC holder signs one plain transfer from canaryAddress with value = 99 ether - 21000*gasPrice, leaving exactly 1 ether (simulated with vm.deal(canaryAddress, 1 ether)). Then anyone calls poke(). Expected (per stated purpose): a public signal that the bounty dropped by 99 ETH. Actual: poke() emits no event, trippedAt() == 0, trippedBlock() == 0, isTripped() == false. Repeat: donors add 50 ETH (balance 51 ETH, below the stored mark of 100 ETH so poke() emits nothing); attacker again leaves exactly 1 ETH; still no event and isTripped() == false. Total stolen 150 ETH, alarm silent indefinitely. Foundry reproduction: vm.deal(canary,100 ether); observer.poke(); vm.deal(canary,1 ether); vm.recordLogs(); observer.poke(); assertEq(vm.getRecordedLogs().length,0); assertFalse(observer.isTripped()); assertEq(observer.trippedAt(),0); — all assertions pass on the current code (run locally, test/scratch/EconScenarios.t.sol, test_SilentSkimAboveThreshold).","severity":"medium","snippet":"        return canaryAddress.balance < thresholdWei && highWaterMark >= thresholdWei;","title":"Rational CRQC holder can skim every wei above thresholdWei without ever tripping the alarm (silent partial drain)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Area: Economic Security (incentives) and Invariant (the view promises 'was ever >= thresholdWei' but the mark only reflects balances somebody paid gas to observe). This is inherent to requirement 3 as written and the README documents it under operational responsibilities, so it is reported as information for the judge, not as a code defect. Two concrete consequences. (a) Race on arming: a donation transaction and the CRQC holder's drain can both be mined before any poke(); the first poke() then sees balance 0, highWaterMark stays 0, and the observer can never trip for that bounty even though a public signed transaction from the canary exists on chain. (b) Incentive gap: poke() rewards nothing, so the arming and recording of the trip depend on altruistic gas spenders; a bounty that is funded but never poked is unarmed forever. Mitigation within the agreed design, documentation only: recommend that donors fund and poke atomically (a tiny helper or a multicall that sends ETH to canaryAddress and calls poke() in the same transaction, which no attacker can interpose between), and that integrators also watch the canary account's nonce and transaction history, which the README already advises.","line":80,"path":"src/QuantumCanary.sol","reproduction":"State: fresh QuantumCanary(1 ether), highWaterMark == 0. Block N: donor sends 10 ether to canaryAddress (vm.deal(canary, 10 ether)). Block N+1, before any poke(): CRQC holder drains to 0 (vm.deal(canary, 0)). Block N+2: anyone calls poke(). Expected under the stated purpose: the 10 ETH drop is a signal. Actual: highWaterMark() == 0, isTripped() == false, trippedAt() == 0; the observer is not armed and cannot retroactively arm. Verified locally with test/scratch/EconScenarios.t.sol, test_DrainBeforeFirstPokeNeverArms (assertions pass on current code).","severity":"info","snippet":"        if (balance > mark) {\n            highWaterMark = balance;","title":"Observation-only high-water mark: a drain mined between a donation and the first poke() is never recorded, and nothing in the contract pays anyone to poke"}],"hash":"42e0a7475026a838df8601674331de795323730c79f352a6e5cd7062b9d59dd8","nodeId":"2c787426-b0bd-4d7f-b4d1-a487e83fc822","outcome":"completed","summary":"The findings file is in place (it is ignored by git via a global rule, which is expected for a review artifact), snippets match the source, and the scratch directory is removed. No project files were changed.\n\n## Review result\n\nI audited `src/QuantumCanary.sol` against the Pashov Economic Security, Invariant and Flow Gap guides. The existing 37-test suite passes. The README derivation table, the Python verifier and the pure-Solidity rederivation all agree on the published values, and launch.json has a valid shape with the 1 ether threshold.\n\n**Findings written to `.imd-findings.json`:**\n\n1. **Medium: silent partial drain.** Both `isTripped()` and the recording branch in `poke()` only signal when the balance falls strictly below the threshold. A key holder who leaves exactly 1 ETH behind can take everything above it, repeatedly as donors top up, and the contract emits nothing. Reproduced locally: fund to 100 ETH, poke, drop to 1 ETH, poke. No event, trippedAt stays zero, view returns false. This follows requirement 3 literally but defeats the stated purpose that any drop is a CRQC signal. The suggested fix is additive: have `poke()` also record and emit the first observation of balance below the high-water mark, which is impossible without a signature.\n\n2. **Info: observation-only arming.** A drain mined between a donation and the first poke is never recorded, and nothing pays anyone to poke. Inherent to the spec and documented in the README, so reported for the judge rather than as a defect, with an atomic fund-and-poke recommendation.\n\n**Coverage:** the single entry point `poke()` is marked `finding` (ref 1). Eight further rows record invariants that hold: monotonic high-water mark, no false positives, once-only trip record, view and write predicate agreement, no ETH custody or movable immutables, correct on-chain derivation, valid manifest, and safe modexp dependency.\n\nNothing in my area was left unreached.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1068907,"inputTokens":322,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":17390,"runtime":"claude","turns":26,"wallClockMs":285959}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"2a9662a76cb5f51d","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Three specialists (audit_permissions low, audit_economics medium, audit_flow info) reported the same root cause; this is the merged finding. isTripped() at line 72 and the recording branch of poke() at line 86 (`if (!tripRecorded && balance < thresholdWei && mark >= thresholdWei)`) compare the live balance only against the fixed 1 ETH threshold, never against the recorded highWaterMark. The only actor able to lower the canary balance is whoever holds the derived key, and any balance below the recorded mark is already a complete cryptographic signal that such a key exists. A rational key holder therefore withdraws highWaterMark minus 1 ETH, repeats after every top-up, and the contract records nothing: no CanaryTripped event, trippedAt and trippedBlock stay 0, isTripped() stays false. The alarm is weakest exactly when the bounty is largest. This matches requirement 3 literally and README.md line 70 documents it ('A decrease that stays at or above 1 ETH does not satisfy this threshold alarm'), so it is spec-conformant and I rate it low rather than medium: it is a limitation of the requested predicate, not a permission bypass or loss of funds the contract was asked to prevent. It is reported because the brief's stated idea ('the canary balance dropped' is the public signal) is strictly stronger than what the contract exposes, and poke() already holds the information to close the gap. A minimal, additive fix that keeps isTripped()/CanaryTripped exactly as specified: in poke(), when balance < highWaterMark is first observed, latch e.g. droppedAt/droppedBlock and emit BalanceDecreased(balance, highWaterMark); and add a view hasDropped() returning canaryAddress.balance < highWaterMark. Whether to add this is the requester's decision.","line":72,"path":"src/QuantumCanary.sol","reproduction":"Foundry, run and confirmed on the current tree (test/scratch, since deleted): c = new QuantumCanary(1 ether); canary = c.canaryAddress(); vm.deal(canary, 100 ether); c.poke(); assertEq(c.highWaterMark(), 100 ether); vm.deal(canary, 1 ether) /* key holder leaves exactly the threshold */; vm.recordLogs(); c.poke(); Expected under the brief's stated purpose: a public signal that 99 ETH left the bounty. Actual: vm.getRecordedLogs().length == 0, c.isTripped() == false, c.trippedAt() == 0, c.trippedBlock() == 0. Setting vm.deal(canary, 1 ether - 1) instead makes isTripped() == true, showing the alarm hinges on the last wei of the threshold rather than on the recorded mark.","severity":"low","snippet":"        return canaryAddress.balance < thresholdWei && highWaterMark >= thresholdWei;","title":"Threshold-only alarm stays silent while a key holder drains everything above thresholdWei (merged: permissions, economics, flow)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Reported by audit_economics (info); reproduced. highWaterMark only advances when the constructor or a poke() observes a larger balance. A donation and a key-holder spend that are both mined before anyone pokes leave the mark at its previous value; the first poke() then sees the lower balance, nothing arms, and isTripped() can never return true for that bounty even though a signed transaction from the canary is on chain. Nothing in the contract rewards poking, so arming depends on altruistic gas. This is inherent to requirement 3 ('the recorded high-water mark') and README.md lines 67 to 70 document it. No code change is required by the spec; the documented mitigation (fund and poke in one transaction, watch the account nonce) is the right operational advice. Recorded as information for the requester.","line":80,"path":"src/QuantumCanary.sol","reproduction":"Foundry, run and confirmed: c = new QuantumCanary(1 ether); canary = c.canaryAddress(); vm.deal(canary, 10 ether) /* donation, block N */; vm.deal(canary, 0) /* key-holder drain, block N+1, no poke in between */; c.poke(). Expected under the brief's stated purpose: the 10 ETH drop is a signal. Actual: c.highWaterMark() == 0, c.isTripped() == false, c.trippedAt() == 0; the observer cannot arm retroactively.","severity":"info","snippet":"        if (balance > mark) {","title":"High-water mark is observation-only: a drain mined before the first poke() after funding can never arm or trip the observer"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Reported by audit_flow (info); reproduced. The sentence was true for the build step, but the accepted manifest step added launch.json at the repository root. A reader following the handoff section could conclude no manifest exists and write a second one. The manifest itself is valid: keys kind/contracts/notes only, kind evm_contracts, one contract QuantumCanary (13 characters), one string constructorArgs entry \"1000000000000000000\" matching the single uint256 constructor parameter and the brief's 1 ether, notes well under 4,000 characters, no $owner or $token. Documentation drift only; no code impact.","line":108,"path":"README.md","reproduction":"git ls-files | grep launch.json prints launch.json. cat launch.json shows kind evm_contracts with QuantumCanary and constructorArgs [\"1000000000000000000\"]. README.md line 108 states the repository does not write launch.json. Expected: README describes the tree as it is. Actual: contradiction.","severity":"info","snippet":"The deployment service supplies the factory transaction and confirmed observer address through the launch handoff; this repository does not fabricate an address or write `launch.json`.","title":"README deployment handoff says the repository does not write launch.json, but launch.json is tracked in the tree"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Reported by audit_math (info); reproduced. For the shipped SEED_PHRASE the counter-0 candidate is already a quadratic residue, so every test runs the production loop exactly once and the `++i` path never executes. derivePoint and sqrtCandidate are private and take their input only from the constant, so no test in test/ can drive the retry path. I copied both functions verbatim into a scratch contract and ran them on a seed whose first two candidates are non-residues: the copy returned counter 2 and the same x and y as test/helpers/IndependentDerivation.sol, so the branch is correct, and the mainnet derivation never enters it. Test-coverage note only. A design-preserving option is a test that runs an exact copy of the two private functions against IndependentDerivation for seeds with counter > 0, or exposing the derivation as an internal function in a library so a test can call it with an arbitrary hash.","line":95,"path":"src/QuantumCanary.sol","reproduction":"Foundry, run and confirmed: phrase = \"IMD Quantum Canary #1 warns that if this balance ever drops, a quantum computer has broken secp256k1. v5\"; IndependentDerivation.derive(phrase).counter == 2; a verbatim copy of derivePoint(keccak256(bytes(phrase))) returns (x, y, 2) equal to the helper's x and y. forge test on the shipped suite: observer.counter() == 0 in every test, so src/QuantumCanary.sol line 95's increment is never executed by production code under test.","severity":"info","snippet":"        for (i = 0;; ++i) {","title":"Try-and-increment retry branch of derivePoint has no test coverage because the shipped phrase succeeds at counter 0 and the helper is private"}],"hash":"8bfe2a04d35719ff748946e8fac175dc941aa4c93ce7bab07729053a344887ca","nodeId":"ec3c76e1-457f-4e94-9fe5-37a221cdb71b","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is written, every snippet matches the tree, the scratch tests are removed, and the only untracked file is `.imd-findings.json`.\n\n**Outcome:** the contract is sound. No critical, high or medium defects. One low finding and three informational notes, all reproduced; no proof files were needed since nothing reached high severity.\n\n**What I verified myself**\n\n- Full suite passes (37 tests including 256-run invariants), `forge fmt --check` clean, Python verifier reproduces the README table.\n- Independent Python check: the derived point is on secp256k1, y is even, and n·P is the point at infinity.\n- Seed phrase is 101 ASCII bytes with the required prefix; creation code is 2,483 bytes and runtime 1,247 bytes, well under the deploy limits.\n- No payable, receive or fallback; no owner, initializer, CALL, CREATE, DELEGATECALL or SELFDESTRUCT in the runtime.\n- launch.json is schema-valid with the single argument of 1 ether.\n\n**Findings kept**\n\n1. **Low, merged from three specialists:** the alarm compares only against the 1 ETH threshold, so a key holder can drain everything above it with no event and `isTripped()` false. This is spec-conformant and documented, so it is a requester decision; an additive `hasDropped()` view and latched drop record in `poke()` would close the gap without changing the requested predicate.\n2. **Info:** the high-water mark is observation-only, so a drain mined before the first poke after funding never arms the observer. Inherent to requirement 3 and documented.\n3. **Info:** README line 108 says the repository does not write launch.json, but launch.json is now tracked.\n4. **Info:** the try-and-increment retry branch is never executed under test because the shipped phrase succeeds at counter 0. I confirmed the branch is correct with a verbatim copy of the private functions on a seed that needs counter 2.\n\n**Coverage:** the single ABI entry point `poke()` is answered as `finding` (ref 1), with additional rows for the constructor, `isTripped()`, derivation correctness, fund custody, the manifest and the two static-analysis leads, all holding.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":648465,"inputTokens":258,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":13713,"runtime":"claude","turns":21,"wallClockMs":191037}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"b30197a9ea24e177e0b9370a25da19fb9d64d918d4691e789b60a195e763f761","device":"94220c4a6ab72976","findings":[],"hash":"906741396f7f085d59cc431278e362dd2604da29859af636856229ff658a1daa","nodeId":"8ebc1d6c-341a-4eaf-8bab-2ca85ac43add","outcome":"completed","summary":"Added tests under `test/` covering independent derivation, threshold fuzzing, simulated theft, failure paths, and immutability.\n\nValidation passed: `forge build` and `forge test`—37 tests, including invariants across 24,576 randomized calls with zero reverts.\n\nNo reproducible implementation defects found. Only `test/` files changed.","treeHash":"cb44aa62d5daa07fa1248d4a9bd3af255e2f1b52","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":740608,"inputTokens":58180,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":13222,"runtime":"codex","turns":5,"wallClockMs":318152}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"a31e321b410aaa02","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Seam economics x asymmetry (Trust Gap guide). The only actor who can lower the balance is whoever holds the canary key. That actor collects the bounty and also decides whether the alarm fires. isTripped() and poke() fire only when the balance goes below thresholdWei (1 ETH). They do not fire when it goes below the recorded highWaterMark. So the bounty is paid out on an asymmetric rule: a key holder can withdraw highWaterMark - thresholdWei and both isTripped() and CanaryTripped stay silent. The silent payout grows with the donations (for example 99 of 100 ETH). This matches Requirement 3, which defines the predicate against the threshold, and README.md line 70 says so: 'A decrease that stays at or above 1 ETH does not satisfy this threshold alarm.' It is therefore not a violation of the spec. It does weaken the brief's stated idea that 'the canary balance dropped' is the public signal: the alarm stays silent for exactly the drop a rational CRQC holder would make. A fix that keeps the agreed design would leave isTripped() unchanged and add a second view, for example hasDropped() = canaryAddress.balance < highWaterMark, plus a matching latched record in poke(). Integrators could then detect any authenticated spend. Reported low because the behavior is documented and spec-defined.","line":72,"path":"src/QuantumCanary.sol","reproduction":"Run in Foundry: c = new QuantumCanary(1 ether); vm.deal(c.canaryAddress(), 100 ether); c.poke(); // highWaterMark == 100 ether. Then vm.deal(c.canaryAddress(), 1 ether) to simulate a CRQC spend of 99 ETH, and c.poke(). Expected under the brief's idea ('the balance dropped' is the signal): alarm on. Actual: isTripped() == false, trippedBlock() == 0, no CanaryTripped event. Setting the balance to 1 ether - 1 wei instead makes isTripped() == true. I confirmed this with a scratch test, which passed and was then deleted.","severity":"low","snippet":"        return canaryAddress.balance < thresholdWei && highWaterMark >= thresholdWei;","title":"Spec-conformant trust gap: a CRQC holder can take everything above thresholdWei with no alarm, because the predicate compares to the threshold and not to the high-water mark"}],"hash":"d20b3c9b67f48bb9959ba20539bc1b1a5d6f5c517b053b91ed1091838cc88689","nodeId":"783aeca9-d302-4434-9379-651c76781348","outcome":"completed","summary":"I found nothing in the permissions review that needs fixing before launch. The one result is a low-severity design limitation. It's written to `.imd-findings.json`, which is valid JSON, and no tracked file was changed.\n\n**Finding 1 (low): a key holder can quietly take everything above 1 ETH.** `src/QuantumCanary.sol:72`. The alarm only fires when the canary balance falls below `thresholdWei`; it does not fire on a drop below the recorded high-water mark. So someone who can sign for the canary can withdraw everything down to exactly 1 ETH without setting it off.\n- **Reproduction:** fund the canary with 100 ETH, call `poke()`, set the balance to 1 ETH, call `poke()` again. `isTripped()` stays false, `trippedBlock()` stays 0, and no `CanaryTripped` event is emitted. At 1 ETH minus 1 wei it does trip. I confirmed this with a scratch test, then deleted it.\n- **Why it's only low:** this is what Requirement 3 asks for, and README line 70 already says so. But it cuts against the brief's idea that any drop is the signal.\n- **Suggested fix:** leave `isTripped()` as it is and add a second view, `hasDropped()` (balance below the high-water mark), with a matching one-time record in `poke()`.\n\n**Coverage:**\n- **`QuantumCanary.poke()`: holds.** Anyone can call it and there's no privileged version. It only writes the observation fields: the high-water mark only goes up, and the trip record is written once. It makes no external call and handles no value. Its trip check agrees with `isTripped()`.\n- **No privileged paths: holds.** There are no owners, roles or initializers. A scan of the deployed bytecode found no call, create, delegatecall or selfdestruct opcodes. The only call is the constructor's static call to the modexp precompile at `0x05`.\n- **Constructor and launch: holds.** It's nonpayable and stores nothing about the deployer. Its only argument is the threshold, and `launch.json` passes `1000000000000000000`.\n- **Derivation: holds.** I re-derived it in Python with `cast keccak`. The seed hash, counter 0, x, y and the address `0x379c…9e7e` all match the README, and the phrase is 101 ASCII bytes. I also checked a public mainnet RPC: that address has nonce 0, balance 0 and no code.\n- **View vs. `poke()`: holds.** Both compare the same live balance, threshold and high-water mark. Documented limits: drains and refills between pokes can be missed, and a refill clears the live alarm.\n\nThe project's own 37 tests pass. I didn't run Slither, which isn't installed. Its loop-call lead is the required try-and-increment search, which accepts counter 0 for this phrase, so it isn't a defect. The literal-instead-of-constant lead is cosmetic.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":616555,"inputTokens":26,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":11356,"runtime":"claude","turns":13,"wallClockMs":146661}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"ce6eaff570c608ab","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"isTripped() and the poke() trip branch implement requirement 3 literally: a trip needs balance < thresholdWei. The only way the canary balance can decrease at all is a transaction signed with the derived key, so any decrease below the recorded highWaterMark is already a complete CRQC signal. Because the alarm compares against the fixed 1 ETH threshold instead of the recorded mark, a party holding the key can withdraw the entire bounty above 1 ETH and the contract records nothing: isTripped() stays false, poke() emits no CanaryTripped, trippedAt and trippedBlock stay 0. The README documents this ('A decrease that stays at or above 1 ETH does not satisfy this threshold alarm'), and the behaviour matches the requested predicate, so this is not a correctness defect. It is reported because the signal the brief describes ('the canary balance dropped') is strictly stronger than what the contract exposes. A minimal, spec-preserving addition would be a second pure-view indicator such as balanceDropped() == (canaryAddress.balance < highWaterMark), leaving isTripped() unchanged.","line":72,"path":"src/QuantumCanary.sol","reproduction":"deploy QuantumCanary(1 ether); vm.deal(canaryAddress, 100 ether); poke() -> highWaterMark == 100 ether. Simulate a signed spend with vm.deal(canaryAddress, 1 ether) (99 ETH removed). Expected by the brief's intent: a public signal that the balance dropped. Actual: isTripped() == false; poke() emits nothing; trippedAt() == 0; trippedBlock() == 0; only canaryAddress.balance (1 ether) < highWaterMark (100 ether) reveals the spend, and no view exposes that comparison. Verified with test/scratch/PartialDrain.t.sol (passes on current code, confirming the silent state).","severity":"info","snippet":"        return canaryAddress.balance < thresholdWei && highWaterMark >= thresholdWei;","title":"Threshold-only predicate lets a key holder spend everything above thresholdWei without ever tripping the alarm (spec-conformant design limit)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The sentence was true for the build step but is now stale: the accepted manifest step added launch.json at the repository root (kind evm_contracts, one QuantumCanary entry with constructorArgs [\"1000000000000000000\"]). A reader following the README's deployment handoff section would conclude no manifest exists and could write a second one. The manifest itself was checked and is schema-valid: only kind/contracts/notes keys, one unique 13-character contract name, one string argument matching the single uint256 constructor parameter and the brief's 1 ether, notes under 4,000 characters, no owner or token references.","line":108,"path":"README.md","reproduction":"git ls-files | grep launch.json -> launch.json (tracked). README.md line 108 says the repository does not write launch.json. Expected: README describes the tree as it is. Actual: contradiction between documentation and tree; no code impact.","severity":"info","snippet":"The deployment service supplies the factory transaction and confirmed observer address through the launch handoff; this repository does not fabricate an address or write `launch.json`. No mainnet transaction has been broadcast by this implementation task. Before funding, the launch operator should verify the source and deployment event, compare all derived fields and the 1 ETH threshold, and check that the canary has no existing code/delegation or unexpected spending history. After funding, record the armed balance with `poke()` and arrange public monitoring. There is no privileged operator required to continue monitoring.","title":"README states the repository does not write launch.json, but launch.json is tracked in the tree"}],"hash":"e1ca305e736581240ebabe737ea59ac4ed924643e175625add0529f566a76a89","nodeId":"46acd4b2-ef91-4ab9-bb6b-ce8a672803ef","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and the findings file is valid, with both cited lines matching the tree. The working tree shows no tracked-file changes; the scratch test lives under the gitignored `test/scratch/`.\n\n**Outcome: the contract holds in the assigned area.** I traced the constructor derivation, `poke()` and `isTripped()` against the Execution Trace, Periphery and First Principles guides and found no correctness or safety defect. The one state-changing entry point, `poke()`, is marked `holds`.\n\n**What was verified**\n\n- **Derivation** matches the brief step by step: counter hashing, mod p reduction, EIP-198 modexp encoding, the square check, even-y normalisation and the keccak address. The Python verifier and the pure-Solidity helper both reproduce the README table independently. The phrase is 101 ASCII bytes with the required prefix.\n- **poke()** keeps the mark monotone, records the first trip once with its timestamp, block and flag written together, and has no external call or value path. The full suite of 37 tests plus the 256-run invariant campaign passes.\n- **Custody**: the runtime has no CALL, CREATE, DELEGATECALL, STATICCALL or SELFDESTRUCT opcodes, every selector rejects value, and forge-std is vendored as 31 plain files with no submodule.\n- **Static-analysis leads** (loop call, literals) are the required try-and-increment loop in the constructor and EIP-198 length words. Neither is a defect.\n- **launch.json** is schema-valid and carries the 1 ether argument.\n\n**Two info-level notes recorded**\n\n1. The threshold predicate is spec-conformant, but a key holder can spend everything above 1 ETH without tripping anything. With a 100 ETH recorded mark and 1 ETH remaining, `isTripped()` stays false and `poke()` records nothing. A strict-drop view comparing balance against the mark would expose the stronger signal the brief describes, without changing `isTripped()`.\n2. The README's deployment section says the repository does not write a manifest, but `launch.json` is now tracked.\n\n**Not covered**: no fork run against live mainnet state, and no Slither or Mythril beyond the supplied output. Both are out of reach offline.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":794316,"inputTokens":322,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":21925,"runtime":"claude","turns":23,"wallClockMs":336202}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"f4b5d141c19e1182917bbc67c224e8d2c74bdc155fa4936b755e7cd3988140b7","device":"99fdbd4812d28337","findings":[],"hash":"e3e00488b0dd9bf10cd6a77a2f054c08c792e965ecc53cf7730a9ff76d3c416a","nodeId":"0dd0dff4-36a5-4a1f-b08b-945362076ee4","outcome":"completed","summary":"Created [launch.json](/root/.identitymd/work/ffb47362-cdd3-498f-8c1c-911c27666c35/0dd0dff4-36a5-4a1f-b08b-945362076ee4/launch.json) for `QuantumCanary` with threshold `\"1000000000000000000\"` (1 ETH).\n\nManifest structure and constructor match the compiled ABI. `forge build` succeeded; `forge test` passed all 37 tests. Only `launch.json` changed outside permitted scratch artifacts.","treeHash":"f9560c3663dbb74adf2f475f4a1fbe1741760eda","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":335616,"inputTokens":36838,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":2630,"runtime":"codex","turns":3,"wallClockMs":81325}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"c35be49d2f8f8def","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Area: Boundary (loop first-iteration vs subsequent-iteration branch). For the shipped SEED_PHRASE the counter-0 candidate x already satisfies y^2 == x^3 + 7, so the production constructor returns on the first iteration. Because derivePoint and sqrtCandidate are private, no test in test/ can reach the `++i` / re-encode-with-new-counter path of the production code; the only loop coverage is of the test-side IndependentDerivation helper, which for the same phrase also exits at counter 0. I reproduced the branch by copying the private functions verbatim into a scratch harness and running them with a seed whose first two candidates are quadratic non-residues: the copy returns counter 2 and the same x, y as IndependentDerivation, so the branch is correct. This is a test-coverage note only; it has no mainnet impact because the mainnet derivation never enters the branch. Everything else in the Math Precision, Boundary and Numerical Gap areas holds: p ≡ 3 (mod 4) so (p+1)/4 is exact and the constant does not overflow; addmod/mulmod keep every intermediate in the field; a non-residue rhs gives y^2 == -rhs != rhs (rhs == 0 is impossible since the curve has odd prime order and no 2-torsion), so the acceptance check is sound; even-y normalisation is total (p - y is even for odd y, 0 is even); modexp gas under EIP-2565 is 1360; the precompile output is exactly 32 bytes and an absent precompile (empty return) reverts with ModExpFailed; a fully independent pure-Python Keccak-256 derivation gives seedHash 0x24049af8…6655, counter 0, pubKeyX 0xae07cae0…4625, pubKeyY 0x6b5e6d8b…affa, address 0x379c0a5704c211f26eadd26e670246e242af9e7e, matching the README table, the constructor and the Solidity re-derivation, and n*P is the point at infinity; isTripped/poke are consistent at threshold == balance (armed, not tripped), threshold - 1 (tripped), threshold = 1 and threshold = 2^256-1, and a mark raised to a value below the threshold can never trip.","line":95,"path":"src/QuantumCanary.sol","reproduction":"Input: seed phrase \"IMD Quantum Canary #1 warns that if this balance ever drops, a quantum computer has broken secp256k1. v5\" (seedHash 0xa3ddbe3c5ee35b9a27d63f720a349debec4753375aac5ebef6b1687b94c7d944). Expected: a test that drives the production loop past counter 0 and asserts it accepts the first valid counter (2 for this seed). Actual: `forge test` runs every suite with the fixed SEED_PHRASE whose counter is 0, so the `++i` branch of src/QuantumCanary.sol:95 has zero execution coverage; derivePoint is private and takes the hash only from the constant, so no test can supply this input without a harness copy of the function. Possible minimal fix that preserves the design: expose the derivation as an internal function in an abstract base or library so a test contract can call it with an arbitrary seed hash, or add a test that re-runs an exact copy of the two private functions against IndependentDerivation for seeds with counter > 0.","severity":"info","snippet":"        for (i = 0;; ++i) {\n            x = uint256(keccak256(abi.encode(hash, i))) % FIELD_PRIME;","title":"Try-and-increment retry branch of derivePoint is never executed by any test"}],"hash":"fa5874e0db07e132deb9ba8a7a86ff7b588b92bf723c6ff7694d9ca69b644712","nodeId":"04ff3bbc-71c2-455e-98cf-a25f1226359e","outcome":"completed","summary":"Review complete. The findings file is written, the scratch directory is removed, and the working tree is clean apart from the untracked `.imd-findings.json` (which git status does not list because it is the deliverable and the tree otherwise shows nothing).\n\n**Result: no defects in the Math Precision, Boundary or Numerical Gap areas.** One informational test-coverage note was recorded.\n\nWhat I verified:\n- **Field arithmetic.** p ≡ 3 (mod 4), so the square-root exponent is exact and the constant cannot overflow. Every intermediate uses addmod or mulmod and stays in the field. A non-residue yields y² = −rhs, so the acceptance check is sound, and rhs = 0 is unreachable because the curve has no 2-torsion. Even-y normalisation is total.\n- **Precompile boundary.** The modexp input matches EIP-198, the 32-byte output length is enforced, and an absent precompile (empty return) reverts with ModExpFailed. I confirmed this with a scratch test.\n- **Independent derivation.** A pure-Python Keccak-256 implementation, independent of Foundry, reproduces the seed hash, counter 0, x, y and address 0x379c0a5704c211f26eadd26e670246e242af9e7e exactly as the README, the constructor and the Solidity re-derivation state. Scalar multiplication by the group order returns infinity.\n- **Threshold boundaries.** Balance equal to the threshold arms but does not trip. One wei below trips. Threshold values 1 and 2²⁵⁶−1 behave correctly. A high-water mark raised to a value below the threshold can never trip. The first trip is recorded once, including at timestamp and block zero.\n- **Static analysis leads.** The calls-loop and literal-constant lines are the specified algorithm and cosmetic style respectively, not defects.\n\nThe informational finding: the `++i` retry branch of the derivation loop is never executed by the shipped suite, because the fixed phrase accepts counter 0 and the functions are private. I verified the branch is correct with a verbatim copy run on a seed whose first valid counter is 2 (phrase suffix \"v5\"), so this is a coverage gap with no mainnet impact.\n\nCoverage rows: `poke()` holds, plus rows for the constructor math, `isTripped()`, and the retry branch (linked to the finding).","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1241449,"inputTokens":354,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":18274,"runtime":"claude","turns":25,"wallClockMs":264210}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"f17e0bc8f135c4d50eab38e0de4922678d34782cb98caf309cf82114ba24db9c","device":"83b36551000748bb","findings":[],"hash":"ff950c82ea1504a17c1f616d4db00174bf1bb4c3c18a4a813fed649c08d7ef2b","nodeId":"bc947582-5424-4039-8e3d-d5770edb17c0","outcome":"completed","summary":"Implemented QuantumCanary with vendored dependencies, independent verification, tests, and deployment documentation.\n\n`forge build`, `forge test` (25 tests, including 4,000 fuzz cases), and `forge fmt --check` pass.\n\nMainnet handoff specifies one contract with a 1 ETH threshold. No transaction was broadcast. Cryptographic assumptions and operational limitations are documented in `README.md`.","treeHash":"ef78c5c9c3a63eff1d8fd3f6b37e9cf73b7a7d78","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":447360,"inputTokens":76599,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":19024,"runtime":"codex","turns":6,"wallClockMs":458282}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":1588,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 25 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 1.49s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[calls-loop]: external call inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/QuantumCanary.sol:109:13\n    │\n109 │             address(0x05).staticcall(abi.encode(uint256(32), uint256(32), uint256(32), rhs, SQRT_EXPONENT, FIELD_PRIME));\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/calls-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/QuantumCanary.sol:110:46\n    │\n110 │         if (!success || result.length != 32) revert ModExpFailed();\n    │                                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":2541,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 25 tests for test/QuantumCanary.t.sol:QuantumCanaryTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_AnyCallerCanPokeWithoutMovingFunds(address,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 153978, ~: 154377)\n[PASS] testFuzz_ObservationSequence(uint256,uint256[16],uint16) (runs: 1000, μ: 982477, ~: 975811)\n[PASS] testFuzz_ThresholdBoundaryAndImmutableDerivation(uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 259778, ~: 259779)\n[PASS] testFuzz_UnknownSelectorCannotMoveFundsOrChangeConfiguration(bytes4,bytes) (runs: 1000, μ: 139126, ~: 138892)\n[PASS] test_AllEntryPointsRejectValueAndCannotMoveFunds() (gas: 1438545)\n[PASS] test_ConstructorEmitsCompleteDerivation() (gas: 32492)\n[PASS] test_ConstructorRecordsPrefundedCanary() (gas: 55878)\n[PASS] test_ConstructorRejectsValue() (gas: 127074)\n[PASS] test_Create2FactoryDeploymentWorksOnEmptyChain() (gas: 335539)\n[PASS] test_FirstTripRecordedOnceAcrossRefillsAndLaterDrops() (gas: 322520)\n[PASS] test_ForcedObserverBalanceIsIgnoredAndCannotBeSwept() (gas: 81261)\n[PASS] test_IndependentRederivation() (gas: 198428)\n[PASS] test_PointIsOnCurveAndCanonical() (gas: 24643)\n[PASS] test_PokeEmitsOnlyForNewHighWaterMarks() (gas: 164951)\n[PASS] test_RealDonationGoesDirectlyToCanary() (gas: 127738)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenModexpFails() (gas: 4696)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenModexpReturnsMalformedOutput() (gas: 4588)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenThresholdIsZero() (gas: 3909)\n[PASS] test_RuntimeHasNoCallsTransfersCreationOrEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 489480)\n[PASS] test_SeedPhraseIsAsciiAndHasRequiredPrefixAndLength() (gas: 214245)\n[PASS] test_ThresholdBoundaryAndLiveAlarmWithoutPoke() (gas: 114602)\n[PASS] test_TransientDropCanBeMissedIfRefilledBeforePoke() (gas: 121806)\n[PASS] test_TripAtTimestampAndBlockZeroCannotBeOverwritten() (gas: 166417)\n[PASS] test_UnfundedAndUnarmedDropsNeverTrip() (gas: 168056)\n[PASS] test_UnobservedFundingDoesNotArm() (gas: 81405)\nSuite result: ok. 25 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 100.21ms (380.17ms CPU time)\n\nRan 10 tests for test/QuantumCanaryAdversarial.t.sol:QuantumCanaryAdversarialTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_IndependentPointIgnoresDeploymentContext(uint256,address,uint64,uint64,uint64,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 228863, ~: 229812)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 18558\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_MalformedModexpReturnLengthsRevert(uint16) (runs: 1000, μ: 8643, ~: 8381)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 134\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_PrefundedThresholdEdges(uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 342526, ~: 342523)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 589\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_ValueCallsCannotRecordPendingTrip(uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 552637, ~: 552635)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 30536\n\n[PASS] test_GettersDoNotWriteStorageOrRecordPendingTrip() (gas: 206904)\n[PASS] test_ModexpReceivesEveryExactCandidateThroughFirstValidPoint() (gas: 183228)\n[PASS] test_PrefundedThresholdMaximumUint256() (gas: 339149)\n[PASS] test_PrefundedThresholdOneWei() (gas: 339125)\n[PASS] test_RuntimeWorksEvenWhenModexpIsUnavailable() (gas: 257088)\n[PASS] test_TwoObserversShareTheBountyButNotThresholdsOrHistory() (gas: 417517)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 100.31ms (393.44ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/QuantumCanaryInvariant.t.sol:QuantumCanaryInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nQuantumCanaryInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_ConfigurationAndRuntimeAreImmutable\n[PASS] invariant_ObservationsDetermineTheMarkLiveViewAndFirstTrip\n[PASS] invariant_ObserverCallsCannotMoveEitherBalance\n QuantumCanaryInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 24576, reverts: 0)\n\n╭----------------------+---------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract             | Selector            | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=========================================================================+\n| QuantumCanaryHandler | advanceClock        | 3051  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+---------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| QuantumCanaryHandler | donate              | 3053  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+---------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| QuantumCanaryHandler | forceObserverCredit | 3056  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+---------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| QuantumCanaryHandler | poke                | 3029  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+---------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| QuantumCanaryHandler | readGetter          | 3049  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+---------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| QuantumCanaryHandler | rejectedShortCall   | 3188  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+---------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| QuantumCanaryHandler | rejectedValueCall   | 3068  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+---------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| QuantumCanaryHandler | simulateBalance     | 3082  | 0       | 0        |\n╰----------------------+---------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 3328626698383732\n  Bound result 2264337573736909707\n  Bound result 2264337573736909707\n  Bound result 7213\n  Bound result 6273\n  Bound result 1906289104\n  Bound result 767034202423500329\n  Bound result 55881\n  Bound result 208\n  Bound result 1149569967697490818\n  Bound result 3561\n  Bound result 209\n  Bound result 12229\n  Bound result 280\n  Bound result 5609\n  Bound result 2264337573736909707\n  Bound result 11291\n  Bound result 2264337573736909707\n  Bound result 9184938993464514\n  Bound result 10931461806807\n  Bound result 242\n  Bound result 137\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 104\n  Bound result 2264337573736909707\n  Bound result 6618\n  Bound result 12947\n  Bound result 7961\n  Bound result 60\n  Bound result 242\n  Bound result 42\n  Bound result 8743\n  Bound result 3217761888125749843\n  Bound result 466\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 2264337573736909707\n  Bound result 8684\n  Bound result 87\n  Bound result 127\n  Bound result 39\n  Bound result 5272\n  Bound result 7464\n  Bound result 9\n  Bound result 50\n  Bound result 2264337593543950335\n  Bound result 2264337573736909707\n  Bound result 27110\n  Bound result 15\n  Bound result 579\n  Bound result 96\n  Bound result 2264337593543950335\n  Bound result 2264337573736909707\n  Bound result 9434\n  Bound result 99\n  Bound result 542759935158377582\n  Bound result 9\n  Bound result 149\n  Bound result 565\n  Bound result 10185\n  Bound result 241\n  Bound result 160\n  Bound result 12371\n  Bound result 230\n  Bound result 305829057\n  Bound result 2264337593543950335\n  Bound result 2264337573736909707\n  Bound result 5604\n  Bound result 2264337573736909707\n  Bound result 2264337593543950335\n  Bound result 9230\n\n[PASS] test_HandlerExercisesTripAtZeroRefillAndLaterTheft() (gas: 1355133)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 2000000000000000000\n  Bound result 123\n  Bound result 12\n  Bound result 2000000000000000000\n  Bound result 3000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 2.47s (2.47s CPU time)\n\nRan 3 test suites in 2.47s (2.67s CPU time): 37 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (37 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":32,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"QuantumCanary.poke()\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"LICENSE\":21,\"README.md\":110,\"REVIEW.md\":17,\"foundry.toml\":14,\"remappings.txt\":1,\"scripts/verify_canary.py\":68,\"src/QuantumCanary.sol\":113,\"test/QuantumCanary.t.sol\":405,\"test/QuantumCanaryAdversarial.t.sol\":219,\"test/QuantumCanaryInvariant.t.sol\":255,\"test/README.md\":51,\"test/helpers/CanaryTestUtils.sol\":41,\"test/helpers/IndependentDerivation.sol\":51},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"906741396f7f085d59cc431278e362dd2604da29859af636856229ff658a1daa","verifiedTreeHash":"cb44aa62d5daa07fa1248d4a9bd3af255e2f1b52","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+fdeb4d4a"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":1392,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 25 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 1.30s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[calls-loop]: external call inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/QuantumCanary.sol:109:13\n    │\n109 │             address(0x05).staticcall(abi.encode(uint256(32), uint256(32), uint256(32), rhs, SQRT_EXPONENT, FIELD_PRIME));\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/calls-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/QuantumCanary.sol:110:46\n    │\n110 │         if (!success || result.length != 32) revert ModExpFailed();\n    │                                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":2567,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 25 tests for test/QuantumCanary.t.sol:QuantumCanaryTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_AnyCallerCanPokeWithoutMovingFunds(address,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 154232, ~: 154377)\n[PASS] testFuzz_ObservationSequence(uint256,uint256[16],uint16) (runs: 1000, μ: 984512, ~: 980581)\n[PASS] testFuzz_ThresholdBoundaryAndImmutableDerivation(uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 259778, ~: 259779)\n[PASS] testFuzz_UnknownSelectorCannotMoveFundsOrChangeConfiguration(bytes4,bytes) (runs: 1000, μ: 139115, ~: 138871)\n[PASS] test_AllEntryPointsRejectValueAndCannotMoveFunds() (gas: 1438545)\n[PASS] test_ConstructorEmitsCompleteDerivation() (gas: 32492)\n[PASS] test_ConstructorRecordsPrefundedCanary() (gas: 55878)\n[PASS] test_ConstructorRejectsValue() (gas: 127074)\n[PASS] test_Create2FactoryDeploymentWorksOnEmptyChain() (gas: 335539)\n[PASS] test_FirstTripRecordedOnceAcrossRefillsAndLaterDrops() (gas: 322520)\n[PASS] test_ForcedObserverBalanceIsIgnoredAndCannotBeSwept() (gas: 81261)\n[PASS] test_IndependentRederivation() (gas: 198428)\n[PASS] test_PointIsOnCurveAndCanonical() (gas: 24643)\n[PASS] test_PokeEmitsOnlyForNewHighWaterMarks() (gas: 164951)\n[PASS] test_RealDonationGoesDirectlyToCanary() (gas: 127738)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenModexpFails() (gas: 4696)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenModexpReturnsMalformedOutput() (gas: 4588)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenThresholdIsZero() (gas: 3909)\n[PASS] test_RuntimeHasNoCallsTransfersCreationOrEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 489480)\n[PASS] test_SeedPhraseIsAsciiAndHasRequiredPrefixAndLength() (gas: 214245)\n[PASS] test_ThresholdBoundaryAndLiveAlarmWithoutPoke() (gas: 114602)\n[PASS] test_TransientDropCanBeMissedIfRefilledBeforePoke() (gas: 121806)\n[PASS] test_TripAtTimestampAndBlockZeroCannotBeOverwritten() (gas: 166417)\n[PASS] test_UnfundedAndUnarmedDropsNeverTrip() (gas: 168056)\n[PASS] test_UnobservedFundingDoesNotArm() (gas: 81405)\nSuite result: ok. 25 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 107.76ms (395.95ms CPU time)\n\nRan 10 tests for test/QuantumCanaryAdversarial.t.sol:QuantumCanaryAdversarialTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_IndependentPointIgnoresDeploymentContext(uint256,address,uint64,uint64,uint64,uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 228809, ~: 229812)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 1676617270933341405063297407949283807589390187823921331\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_MalformedModexpReturnLengthsRevert(uint16) (runs: 1000, μ: 8656, ~: 8381)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 31\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_PrefundedThresholdEdges(uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 342526, ~: 342523)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 15648\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_ValueCallsCannotRecordPendingTrip(uint96) (runs: 1000, μ: 552638, ~: 552635)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 15648\n\n[PASS] test_GettersDoNotWriteStorageOrRecordPendingTrip() (gas: 206904)\n[PASS] test_ModexpReceivesEveryExactCandidateThroughFirstValidPoint() (gas: 183228)\n[PASS] test_PrefundedThresholdMaximumUint256() (gas: 339149)\n[PASS] test_PrefundedThresholdOneWei() (gas: 339125)\n[PASS] test_RuntimeWorksEvenWhenModexpIsUnavailable() (gas: 257088)\n[PASS] test_TwoObserversShareTheBountyButNotThresholdsOrHistory() (gas: 417517)\nSuite result: ok. 10 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 107.91ms (415.23ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/QuantumCanaryInvariant.t.sol:QuantumCanaryInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nQuantumCanaryInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_ConfigurationAndRuntimeAreImmutable\n[PASS] invariant_ObservationsDetermineTheMarkLiveViewAndFirstTrip\n[PASS] invariant_ObserverCallsCannotMoveEitherBalance\n QuantumCanaryInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 24576, reverts: 0)\n\n╭----------------------+---------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract             | Selector            | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=========================================================================+\n| QuantumCanaryHandler | advanceClock        | 3143  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+---------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| QuantumCanaryHandler | donate              | 3024  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+---------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| QuantumCanaryHandler | forceObserverCredit | 3017  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+---------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| QuantumCanaryHandler | poke                | 3207  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+---------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| QuantumCanaryHandler | readGetter          | 3024  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+---------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| QuantumCanaryHandler | rejectedShortCall   | 3051  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+---------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| QuantumCanaryHandler | rejectedValueCall   | 3046  | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------------+---------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| QuantumCanaryHandler | simulateBalance     | 3064  | 0       | 0        |\n╰----------------------+---------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 229\n  Bound result 2264337573736909707\n  Bound result 2264337573736909707\n  Bound result 2264337573736909707\n  Bound result 646\n  Bound result 20\n  Bound result 2233625728\n  Bound result 246\n  Bound result 8972\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 2264337573736909707\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 3896080589848395780\n  Bound result 2264337573736909707\n  Bound result 2264337573736909707\n  Bound result 1111\n  Bound result 250\n  Bound result 2868981775557737362\n  Bound result 398\n  Bound result 1021572767129219672\n  Bound result 2264337573736909707\n  Bound result 244\n  Bound result 256\n  Bound result 20850\n  Bound result 190\n  Bound result 2264337593543950335\n  Bound result 5198\n  Bound result 127\n  Bound result 11\n  Bound result 25\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 2264337593543950335\n  Bound result 2264337573736909707\n  Bound result 6429\n  Bound result 199\n  Bound result 2651\n  Bound result 2264337573736909707\n  Bound result 2264337573736909707\n  Bound result 2264337593543950335\n  Bound result 5047\n  Bound result 2264337573736909707\n  Bound result 621867\n  Bound result 161\n  Bound result 245\n  Bound result 11\n  Bound result 2264337573736909707\n  Bound result 9188\n  Bound result 56949\n  Bound result 2264337573736909707\n  Bound result 2264337573736909707\n  Bound result 5586\n  Bound result 111\n  Bound result 2264337573736909707\n  Bound result 2264337573736909707\n  Bound result 79541\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 2264337593543950335\n  Bound result 7082\n  Bound result 8929\n  Bound result 23075\n  Bound result 120\n  Bound result 2000\n  Bound result 256\n  Bound result 5367\n  Bound result 3140582653823906053\n  Bound result 2264337573736909707\n  Bound result 2264337573736909707\n\n[PASS] test_HandlerExercisesTripAtZeroRefillAndLaterTheft() (gas: 1355133)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 2000000000000000000\n  Bound result 123\n  Bound result 12\n  Bound result 2000000000000000000\n  Bound result 3000000000000000000\n  Bound result 1000000000000000000\n\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 2.49s (2.49s CPU time)\n\nRan 3 test suites in 2.49s (2.71s CPU time): 37 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (37 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":25,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"QuantumCanary.poke()\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"LICENSE\":21,\"README.md\":110,\"REVIEW.md\":17,\"foundry.toml\":14,\"launch.json\":12,\"remappings.txt\":1,\"scripts/verify_canary.py\":68,\"src/QuantumCanary.sol\":113,\"test/QuantumCanary.t.sol\":405,\"test/QuantumCanaryAdversarial.t.sol\":219,\"test/QuantumCanaryInvariant.t.sol\":255,\"test/README.md\":51,\"test/helpers/CanaryTestUtils.sol\":41,\"test/helpers/IndependentDerivation.sol\":51},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"e3e00488b0dd9bf10cd6a77a2f054c08c792e965ecc53cf7730a9ff76d3c416a","verifiedTreeHash":"f9560c3663dbb74adf2f475f4a1fbe1741760eda","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+fdeb4d4a"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":844,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 22 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 740.83ms\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[calls-loop]: external call inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/QuantumCanary.sol:109:13\n    │\n109 │             address(0x05).staticcall(abi.encode(uint256(32), uint256(32), uint256(32), rhs, SQRT_EXPONENT, FIELD_PRIME));\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/calls-loop\n\nwarning[require-revert-in-loop]: `require` or `revert` inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/QuantumCanary.sol:110:46\n    │\n110 │         if (!success || result.length != 32) revert ModExpFailed();\n    │                                              ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/require-revert-in-loop\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":149,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 25 tests for test/QuantumCanary.t.sol:QuantumCanaryTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_AnyCallerCanPokeWithoutMovingFunds(address,uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 153850, ~: 154377)\n[PASS] testFuzz_ObservationSequence(uint256,uint256[16],uint16) (runs: 1000, μ: 973342, ~: 975582)\n[PASS] testFuzz_ThresholdBoundaryAndImmutableDerivation(uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 259778, ~: 259779)\n[PASS] testFuzz_UnknownSelectorCannotMoveFundsOrChangeConfiguration(bytes4,bytes) (runs: 1000, μ: 139115, ~: 138922)\n[PASS] test_AllEntryPointsRejectValueAndCannotMoveFunds() (gas: 1438545)\n[PASS] test_ConstructorEmitsCompleteDerivation() (gas: 32492)\n[PASS] test_ConstructorRecordsPrefundedCanary() (gas: 55878)\n[PASS] test_ConstructorRejectsValue() (gas: 127074)\n[PASS] test_Create2FactoryDeploymentWorksOnEmptyChain() (gas: 335539)\n[PASS] test_FirstTripRecordedOnceAcrossRefillsAndLaterDrops() (gas: 322520)\n[PASS] test_ForcedObserverBalanceIsIgnoredAndCannotBeSwept() (gas: 81261)\n[PASS] test_IndependentRederivation() (gas: 198428)\n[PASS] test_PointIsOnCurveAndCanonical() (gas: 24643)\n[PASS] test_PokeEmitsOnlyForNewHighWaterMarks() (gas: 164951)\n[PASS] test_RealDonationGoesDirectlyToCanary() (gas: 127738)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenModexpFails() (gas: 4696)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenModexpReturnsMalformedOutput() (gas: 4588)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhenThresholdIsZero() (gas: 3909)\n[PASS] test_RuntimeHasNoCallsTransfersCreationOrEscapeOpcodes() (gas: 489480)\n[PASS] test_SeedPhraseIsAsciiAndHasRequiredPrefixAndLength() (gas: 214245)\n[PASS] test_ThresholdBoundaryAndLiveAlarmWithoutPoke() (gas: 114602)\n[PASS] test_TransientDropCanBeMissedIfRefilledBeforePoke() (gas: 121806)\n[PASS] test_TripAtTimestampAndBlockZeroCannotBeOverwritten() (gas: 166417)\n[PASS] test_UnfundedAndUnarmedDropsNeverTrip() (gas: 168056)\n[PASS] test_UnobservedFundingDoesNotArm() (gas: 81405)\nSuite result: ok. 25 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 65.75ms (260.83ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test suite in 66.38ms (65.75ms CPU time): 25 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (25 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":32,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"QuantumCanary.poke()\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"LICENSE\":21,\"README.md\":110,\"REVIEW.md\":17,\"foundry.toml\":14,\"remappings.txt\":1,\"scripts/verify_canary.py\":68,\"src/QuantumCanary.sol\":113,\"test/QuantumCanary.t.sol\":405,\"test/helpers/IndependentDerivation.sol\":51},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":362,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[low/medium] calls-loop at src/QuantumCanary.sol:106: QuantumCanary.sqrtCandidate(uint256) (src/QuantumCanary.sol#106-112) has external calls inside a loop: (success,result) = address(0x05).staticcall(abi.encode(uint256(32),uint256(32),uint256(32),rhs,SQRT_EXPONENT,FIELD_PRIME)) (src/QuantumCanary.sol#108-109)","passed":true},{"durationMs":205,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[low] literal-instead-of-constant at src/QuantumCanary.sol:109: Literal Instead of Constant (4 places)","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"ff950c82ea1504a17c1f616d4db00174bf1bb4c3c18a4a813fed649c08d7ef2b","verifiedTreeHash":"ef78c5c9c3a63eff1d8fd3f6b37e9cf73b7a7d78","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+fdeb4d4a"}]}