{"assessments":[],"deployments":[],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"ca4a248e-80ba-46c1-9238-70a72e6130e3","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"7dad23b8c1301d173d496419d205f02e516fd195ec486fedcd7f2553473668f6","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_economics","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"83b77c990908ea2891208a9210c92fc56bc3b54223a15f4cf80fd7dd49e24f5c","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_flow","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"6d248f7b00fa983d2a04fbc3f26d9113cb94788cfc52b6f51f2fa702e127c5ea","dependsOn":["build_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest","audit_math","audit_permissions","audit_economics","audit_flow"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"3014f1ea5961918ca059453a484bf4c8bcbbfc2248dbe31d94ac7c5cdf8f50bd","skillId":"audit-judge","tools":[]},"key":"audit_judge","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"3014f1ea5961918ca059453a484bf4c8bcbbfc2248dbe31d94ac7c5cdf8f50bd","skillId":"audit-judge","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"05878115ba8c90c3b98262b684970411766de6cdf5bb44cded0de584f813fe36","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_math","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"2ab0d528e599485a63dd3d26f97fc0246503ca4c42ace9283b2ef92af26946c2","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_permissions","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"1d7a3d1d5640fb706c3c485106307443f24cab1220be3c51fefde3831e7dab52","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"b6503de65ad02f845827887c23da4c3b56ccc5df7a459db263bae6e549d92f7f","skillId":"build-contract-project","tools":[]},"key":"build_contract_project","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"b6503de65ad02f845827887c23da4c3b56ccc5df7a459db263bae6e549d92f7f","skillId":"build-contract-project","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"1505b3f43e43862c9004d99a3bbae2b3cbb60c967fc24546e1fd3ff61bbb084c","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"tools":[]},"key":"manifest","kind":"code","role":"integrate","skillHash":null,"skillId":null,"state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"52483cda03db68da49143db5d0aec2d92726d296dca979eb3990ec9d0ff1f19d","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"73431852439ad3a343f3d2b7db1c43cd363b9f48f9bb51497374a0cf6d50b223","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","tools":[]},"key":"write_foundry_tests","kind":"code","role":"tests","skillHash":"73431852439ad3a343f3d2b7db1c43cd363b9f48f9bb51497374a0cf6d50b223","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"A contract for an NFT collection called IMDRocks: 100 rocks, numbered 0 to 99, sold one at a time in order at a rising price, with all art and metadata fully on-chain. Just the contract: no launch token, no pool.\n\nToken name: IMDRocks\nToken symbol: IMDROCK\nTotal supply: 100 (fixed; nothing can ever mint more)\n\nContract: an ERC-721 whose contract is named exactly IMDRocks, with name \"IMDRocks\" and symbol \"IMDROCK\" as source constants. It also exposes totalSupply(), MAX_SUPPLY() = 100, nextRock() (the number now for sale, 100 when sold out) and priceOf(uint256).\n\nReserve: rocks 0 to 9 are minted to 0xE89eB4D7153958F9436E2c3fe30D6F2024404cB0 in the constructor, each with a Transfer event. That address is a constructor argument (an address; do not use msg.sender, the deployer is a factory) and is also the payout address. nextRock() starts at 10.\n\nSale: only the next rock in order can be bought. priceOf(n) = 10000000000000 wei * (1 + n * n), which is 0.00001 ETH + n squared times 0.00001 ETH: rock 10 costs 0.00101 ETH and rock 99 costs 0.09802 ETH. buy() is payable, requires msg.value to equal priceOf(nextRock()) exactly, mints that rock to the caller, moves nextRock() up by one, and forwards the whole payment to the payout address in the same transaction (state is updated before the payment is sent; if the payment fails the purchase reverts). When all 100 exist, buy() reverts. No ETH ever rests in the contract: it has no receive or fallback function and no withdraw function. One rock per call; there is no per-wallet limit.\n\nThere is no owner, no admin, no pause, no upgrade, no price change, no royalties.\n\nArt: every rock is the same hand-drawn rock, an original drawing, as an SVG produced by the contract: a chunky faceted boulder with a few shaded planes and a ground shadow on a flat background, square viewBox. Rocks differ only in tint: the rock's colour is set by its number, 100 different tints spread around the colour wheel with number 0 a plain stone grey. Do not copy the image of any existing collection.\n\nMetadata: tokenURI(n) returns a data:application/json;base64 document with name \"IMDRock #<n>\", a one-line description, image as a data:image/svg+xml;base64 SVG, and attributes: Number, Tint (a colour name or hex), and Price (the rock's priceOf in ETH as a decimal string). tokenURI reverts for a rock that does not exist yet; add imageOf(uint256) that returns the SVG for any number 0 to 99.\n\nUpgrades and pausing: none. Transfer rules: plain ERC-721, no fee, no limit. Owner: none. Constructor arguments are addresses and numbers only.\n\nTests that must exist: rocks 0 to 9 are owned by the reserve at deployment; priceOf for every n from 0 to 99 against the formula; buying rocks 10 to 99 in order with the payout address's balance rising by exactly each price and the contract's balance staying 0; a payment one wei over or under reverts; buy() after rock 99 reverts; a payout address that rejects ETH makes buy() revert and leaves nextRock() unchanged; tokenURI and imageOf well-formed for all 100; all 100 tints differ.\n\nThe review must try: buying out of order or twice, paying less than the price, reentering buy() from the payout address or from onERC721Received, stranding ETH in the contract, and minting a 101st rock.","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"0eff3ad74261aa9b0268e17489a9773b5f4a900049157ba7819f5c40e1419028","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"ca4a248e-80ba-46c1-9238-70a72e6130e3","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-753-imdrocks"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"51343","feedbackHash":"436f1c0e1866608730551d4e767f33c99550b318c3e4b5824e58c1ce20e59a1c","nodeKey":"audit_economics","submissionHash":"7dad23b8c1301d173d496419d205f02e516fd195ec486fedcd7f2553473668f6","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51338","feedbackHash":"dcfd2bed8c4461f9f4b94ecaac967acc5835da795765c1e6b94d70ec344c19b9","nodeKey":"audit_flow","submissionHash":"83b77c990908ea2891208a9210c92fc56bc3b54223a15f4cf80fd7dd49e24f5c","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51481","feedbackHash":"ccb4a27d8a40b2cf2079bc4ea5cdf9e9ea30208ccd9895f9fc17561e8118fc8e","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"6d248f7b00fa983d2a04fbc3f26d9113cb94788cfc52b6f51f2fa702e127c5ea","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51337","feedbackHash":"f9a069025139fa3d3e5c90cef58fd10cae5772e0209bf1938878f7cceb3e9720","nodeKey":"audit_math","submissionHash":"05878115ba8c90c3b98262b684970411766de6cdf5bb44cded0de584f813fe36","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51342","feedbackHash":"e41ae197d7c0a9dbf6dd1e7146f265ea117d1da981f1e8e33507bfea2f4869b9","nodeKey":"audit_permissions","submissionHash":"2ab0d528e599485a63dd3d26f97fc0246503ca4c42ace9283b2ef92af26946c2","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51129","feedbackHash":"590a97026e59431048d9a490259178936917e14caa7afa7b617fd8435c88d0b7","nodeKey":"build_contract_project","submissionHash":"1d7a3d1d5640fb706c3c485106307443f24cab1220be3c51fefde3831e7dab52","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52122","feedbackHash":"ceb7db1893bcfb7f11cc7de33ab04a501c8ff8f98004bd9ed2923eef62c95839","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"1505b3f43e43862c9004d99a3bbae2b3cbb60c967fc24546e1fd3ff61bbb084c","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"50950","feedbackHash":"a32b792752e8b9de6cbbb94d93ab6575e1525f063eef5e633e09857281646035","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"52483cda03db68da49143db5d0aec2d92726d296dca979eb3990ec9d0ff1f19d","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"e6c8f1cbd3ab340e46dc0886cdf71eadc5b39e4b255decabeb2d4a3a74a4a00e","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"6ef494db85781eec","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"buy() forwards exactly msg.value, never address(this).balance, and the contract has no receive, fallback or withdraw. That satisfies the brief for every normal path (verified: after buying 10..99 the contract balance is 0 and the payout address rose by exactly each price). However ETH pushed in by a selfdestruct(target) or as a pre-funded CREATE2 address cannot be refused by any EVM contract, and once there it is unrecoverable by anyone. The brief states the invariant 'No ETH ever rests in the contract' as absolute; the accepted implementation and launch.json notes already acknowledge forced ETH is unrecoverable, and the existing test test_ForcedEtherCannotBePreventedAndDoesNotChangeSale documents it. This is recorded for the judge as a bounded deviation from the literal wording, not as a code defect: the only remedy (a sweep that forwards address(this).balance, or a withdraw) is explicitly excluded by the brief. The sale itself is unaffected: a forced balance does not change prices, nextRock, or the amount forwarded to payout.","line":67,"path":"src/IMDRocks.sol","reproduction":"State: fresh IMDRocks(RESERVE). Call: new ForcedEther{value: 1 ether}(payable(address(rocks))) where ForcedEther's constructor does selfdestruct(target). Expected per brief wording: contract balance 0. Actual: address(rocks).balance == 1 ether permanently; subsequent buy{value: priceOf(10)}() still forwards exactly priceOf(10) to RESERVE and leaves the 1 ether in place; any withdraw()/receive attempt reverts. Reproduced by the repository test test/IMDRocks.t.sol:test_ForcedEtherCannotBePreventedAndDoesNotChangeSale (passes on current code).","severity":"info","snippet":"        (bool paid,) = payout.call{value: msg.value}(\"\");\n        if (!paid) revert PayoutFailed();","title":"Brief's 'no ETH ever rests in the contract' cannot hold against SELFDESTRUCT-forced ETH; forced wei is stranded forever (by design, no fix without a withdraw function the brief forbids)"}],"hash":"05878115ba8c90c3b98262b684970411766de6cdf5bb44cded0de584f813fe36","nodeId":"a1328d55-6e03-465e-bd7e-0137d4e62738","outcome":"completed","summary":"The findings file is valid, the quoted snippet matches lines 67 to 68 of the source exactly, and the working tree is clean apart from the ignored scratch directory and the findings file itself.\n\n**Result: the math area is clean.** I found no defect in pricing, decimal formatting, tint generation, or supply boundaries. The findings file holds one info-level note and eleven coverage rows, with all six listed entry points marked `holds`.\n\n**What I verified independently**, beyond re-running the author's 27 passing tests:\n\n- **Price formula.** All 100 values match `10000000000000 * (1 + n*n)`; the bound check runs before the multiplication, so no overflow path exists. Rock 10 is 0.00101 ETH, rock 99 is 0.09802 ETH, and the full sale totals 3.28155 ETH.\n- **Price string.** The ETH decimal is built by right-aligning `1 + n*n` into a five-digit template. The largest value has four digits, so the index arithmetic can never underflow. I recomputed the string for every token and compared.\n- **Tints.** I dumped all 100 RGB triples. Number 0 is `#929292`; every other rock has one channel at 191 and one at 112, channels stay inside a byte, hues step monotonically around the wheel, and no two tints repeat.\n- **Boundaries.** Zero value, one wei under and over, wrong-rock prices, buying at `nextRock == 100`, `priceOf(100)`, a payout that burns most of the forwarded gas, and a precompile payout all behave as the brief specifies or revert cleanly.\n- **Transfer entry points.** OpenZeppelin 5.0.2's unchecked balance updates are safe here: the decrement only runs after the ownership check and the total is capped at 100.\n\n**The one note** is informational: the brief's sentence \"no ETH ever rests in the contract\" cannot hold against ETH forced in by `selfdestruct`, which no contract can refuse. The author already tests and documents this, and the only remedy is a withdraw or sweep the brief forbids, so I recorded it for the judge rather than as a defect to fix.\n\nNothing in my area was left unreached. I did not attempt the three areas assigned to other specialists beyond what overlapped with the entry-point rows.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1090711,"inputTokens":418,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":17003,"runtime":"claude","turns":25,"wallClockMs":292543}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"879d30bdc0e413d328fb6e90833c93ec92c6bbfd67fec2853eaa07eabf7b0901","device":"3592a9be44170f18","findings":[],"hash":"1505b3f43e43862c9004d99a3bbae2b3cbb60c967fc24546e1fd3ff61bbb084c","nodeId":"18b4a9a8-4840-457b-8811-7193df970c76","outcome":"completed","summary":"Updated `launch.json` for `IMDRocks`, preserving the specified reserve/payout address and clarifying deployment notes.\n\nSchema and constructor ABI checks passed. `forge build` succeeded; all 28 tests passed, including the pinned harness with local fixture inputs.\n\nOnly `launch.json` changed for submission. The notes retain the forced-ETH limitation.","treeHash":"025245965de94c5695d8875255dff4d4d5e946b2","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":213504,"inputTokens":54691,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":3381,"runtime":"codex","turns":4,"wallClockMs":109315}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"63078901dd4d59fec658a209cf215a6967ea1e20842aa7b4904c60b5419106d7","device":"0fce87924985c9ba","findings":[],"hash":"1d7a3d1d5640fb706c3c485106307443f24cab1220be3c51fefde3831e7dab52","nodeId":"4d7f73c1-1a06-426d-aff5-c4c6cbf8fd18","outcome":"completed","summary":"Implemented [IMDRocks](/root/.identitymd/work/ca4a248e-80ba-46c1-9238-70a72e6130e3/4d7f73c1-1a06-426d-aff5-c4c6cbf8fd18/src/IMDRocks.sol) with on-chain art and metadata, vendored dependencies, deployment configuration, and documentation.\n\nAll checks pass: `forge build`, `forge fmt --check`, and 27 tests, including reentrancy, metadata, and randomized invariants.\n\nDocumented limitation: the EVM permits forcibly sent ETH; it remains unrecoverable without a withdrawal function. Ordinary purchases forward every wei.","treeHash":"7e2a21878fe1dc65a228889be836fc9bcece4600","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":555776,"inputTokens":70761,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":25167,"runtime":"codex","turns":6,"wallClockMs":611066}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"cbc83f8151b8340d","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Access x economics seam (Trust Gap guide). The contract has no owner or admin, so the only party with an implicit power is the payout/reserve address fixed in the constructor (launch.json: 0xE89eB4D7153958F9436E2c3fe30D6F2024404cB0). Because buy() forwards the full payment in the same transaction and reverts on failure (required by the brief), a payout that is a contract, or an EOA that later delegates code via EIP-7702, can revert inside receive() and thereby stop every sale, or revert conditionally (it can read tx.origin and nextRock() during the callback) to censor particular buyers or particular rock numbers. It cannot take a buyer's ETH, mint, or change price: a rejected payment rolls the whole purchase back (nextRock, ownership, buyer balance all unchanged). There is no replacement path for the payout address. This is inherent to the requested design ('if the payment fails the purchase reverts', 'no owner, no admin') and is already stated in README.md and docs/SECURITY_REVIEW.md; it is recorded here so the judge sees it was evaluated. No target chain file was supplied, so whether 0xE89e... holds code was not verified. Only the deployment operator can confirm the beneficiary is an EOA or an ETH-accepting contract.","line":67,"path":"src/IMDRocks.sol","reproduction":"Deploy IMDRocks(payout) where payout is a contract whose receive() reverts. Alice calls buy{value: priceOf(10) = 0.00101 ether}(). Expected under the brief: revert PayoutFailed with nextRock() still 10, Alice refunded, contract balance 0. Actual: exactly that (verified with a scratch test and by the existing test_PayoutRejectionRollsBackAndCanRecover). The consequence is that no rock 10..99 can ever be sold while the payout keeps rejecting; nothing in the contract can change the payout. Not a code defect; a deployment-time trust assumption on the beneficiary address.","severity":"info","snippet":"        (bool paid,) = payout.call{value: msg.value}(\"\");\n        if (!paid) revert PayoutFailed();","title":"Trust assumption (not a defect): the immutable payout address can halt or selectively block all future sales by rejecting ETH"}],"hash":"2ab0d528e599485a63dd3d26f97fc0246503ca4c42ace9283b2ef92af26946c2","nodeId":"a3201177-da7b-4efd-b993-80f0a54f1ae5","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is written and validated, and the scratch directory is removed so the tree is unchanged apart from `.imd-findings.json`.\n\n**Result: no defects found in the Access Control, Trust Gap and Asymmetry areas.** The file holds one info-level trust assumption and eleven coverage rows, all `holds`.\n\nWhat I checked in `src/IMDRocks.sol`:\n\n- **Permission model.** There is no owner, role, initializer, proxy or delegatecall. The only state-writing sale path is `buy()`, and the only other writers are the unmodified OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 ERC-721 functions, whose authorization I traced in the vendored source. Invented selectors such as mint, burn, withdraw, pause and setPrice revert.\n- **Constructor and deployment.** The beneficiary is an explicit argument, never the factory. Zero and self are rejected. Rocks 0 to 9 are minted with ten Transfer events, and the payout is immutable.\n- **Reentrancy from both callbacks.** I ran scratch probes in which the payout contract and a buyer's `onERC721Received` each tried `buy()`, `transferFrom`, `approve`, `setApprovalForAll` and `safeTransferFrom` mid-purchase. Re-entering `buy()` fails on the guard. Moving one's own rocks succeeds, which is plain ERC-721 behavior and harms nobody. The sale counter and ownership were already final before either callback.\n- **Asymmetry pairs.** The price formula is identical in `buy()`, `priceOf` and the metadata price string. The reserve mint without a callback versus the safe sale mint, and `tokenURI` requiring ownership versus `imageOf` serving all 100, are both intentional and match the brief. Transfers to the zero address are rejected, so nothing can burn and totalSupply stays equal to nextRock.\n- **Attack list from the brief.** Out-of-order or repeated purchases, underpayment, overpayment, a rejecting payout, a 101st rock and stranded ETH all behave as specified. The existing 27 tests cover these and pass.\n\nThe one recorded item is a trust assumption, not a code defect. The payout address fixed in the constructor can stop or selectively censor every future sale if it is, or becomes, a contract that rejects ETH. Nothing in the contract can replace it. The author already documents this in the README and security notes. No chain file was supplied, so I could not verify whether that address holds code on the target chain. The deployment operator should confirm it is an EOA or an ETH-accepting wallet before launch.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":541327,"inputTokens":226,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":15933,"runtime":"claude","turns":23,"wallClockMs":250118}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"fd1bfbf513762455dd374d810c40de13804f86d039034140fc7204b7759b6be5","device":"f5dec78d5893d9dc","findings":[{"description":"The assignment says no ETH ever rests in the collection. An external contract can force ETH into IMDRocks without invoking receive or fallback. buy() subsequently forwards only msg.value, leaving the unsolicited balance behind; there is no recovery entry point, including after sellout. This is an EVM/specification limitation, not theft of ordinary sale proceeds: rejecting ordinary transfers cannot enforce an absolute zero-balance guarantee. Resolving it requires clarifying that the guarantee covers sale proceeds, or explicitly authorizing a recovery design; a sweep alone still cannot prevent future forced donations. The existing test that asserted permanent retention as correct was removed rather than blessing the discrepancy.","line":67,"path":"src/IMDRocks.sol","proof":"// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity 0.8.26;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {IMDRocks} from \"src/IMDRocks.sol\";\n\ncontract ForceOneWei {\n    constructor(address payable recipient) payable {\n        selfdestruct(recipient);\n    }\n}\n\ncontract ForcedEtherFindingTest is Test {\n    function test_NoEtherIsRetainedAfterForcedDonationAndSale() public {\n        address reserve = 0xE89eB4D7153958F9436E2c3fe30D6F2024404cB0;\n        address buyer = address(0xA11CE);\n        IMDRocks rocks = new IMDRocks(reserve);\n        vm.deal(address(this), 1 wei);\n        new ForceOneWei{value: 1 wei}(payable(address(rocks)));\n        vm.deal(buyer, 0.00101 ether);\n        vm.prank(buyer);\n        rocks.buy{value: 0.00101 ether}();\n        assertEq(rocks.ownerOf(10), buyer);\n        assertEq(address(rocks).balance, 0, \"No ETH may remain after a completed sale\");\n    }\n}","reproduction":"Deploy IMDRocks with reserve 0xE89eB4D7153958F9436E2c3fe30D6F2024404cB0. Create ForceOneWei with value 1 wei and the collection as its SELFDESTRUCT beneficiary. Then have 0xA11CE buy rock 10 for exactly 0.00101 ether. Expected under the stated zero-balance requirement: collection balance 0 after buy. Actual: rock 10 is minted and collection balance is still 1 wei. Verified locally with forge test --match-path test/scratch/ForcedEtherFinding.t.sol -vv, which fails with \"No ETH may remain after a completed sale: 1 != 0\". The proof can be restored to that path from the proof field; it is excluded from the delivered passing suite.","severity":"low","title":"Forced ETH remains stranded after purchases, contradicting the literal zero-balance requirement"}],"hash":"52483cda03db68da49143db5d0aec2d92726d296dca979eb3990ec9d0ff1f19d","nodeId":"5a9ced83-ad4c-46fd-aafa-42a021bd58f4","outcome":"completed","summary":"Expanded boundary, callback rollback, and stateful invariant coverage.\n\n`forge build` and `forge test` pass: **33 tests**, including **16,384 invariant calls**.\n\nReported one low-severity forced-ETH limitation with a reproduced failing proof in [.imd-findings.json](/home/seat/.identitymd/work/ca4a248e-80ba-46c1-9238-70a72e6130e3/5a9ced83-ad4c-46fd-aafa-42a021bd58f4/.imd-findings.json).","treeHash":"fb04e3facffb2926be2f35b60f42e1c8ad4c552e","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1496064,"inputTokens":100338,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":16279,"runtime":"codex","turns":6,"wallClockMs":481213}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"3f91b58cf7cd2d45","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Reproduced. The brief states 'No ETH ever rests in the contract' and defines the mechanism as 'no receive or fallback function and no withdraw function'. The contract satisfies that mechanism exactly (verified: plain CALL with value, unknown selector with value, and a payable transferFrom attempt all revert; after buying 10..99 address(rocks).balance is 0 and the payout rose by exactly each price). But the EVM lets anyone credit a contract's balance without a call: a SELFDESTRUCT beneficiary (still sends value on Cancun when creation and destruction share a transaction) or pre-funding the predicted CREATE2 address before the factory deploys. Such wei is never swept because buy() forwards msg.value rather than address(this).balance, and there is no other path out. Nobody loses funds except the party who chose to force them in; prices, nextRock, mint order and the amount forwarded to the payout are unaffected. This is a specification limitation, not a code defect: every remedy (withdraw, or forwarding address(this).balance on the next buy) is excluded or altered by the brief, so the fix is a requester decision. Options: (a) clarify that the guarantee covers sale proceeds and ordinary transfers, which the code already meets; or (b) authorize `payout.call{value: address(this).balance}` in buy(), which equals msg.value in every normal case and would push forced dust to the payout on the next sale, at the cost that in that one transaction the payout receives slightly more than 'the whole payment'. Three specialists and the independent tester reported this same root cause; it is one finding. The tester's proof .imd/reads/proofs/Proof_e2c625c3f9b1.t.sol was run and fails on this code as described, which confirms the reproduction; no proof is attached because this is not a defect the author can fix within the brief and proofs are reserved for critical/high.","line":67,"path":"src/IMDRocks.sol","reproduction":"State: IMDRocks rocks = new IMDRocks(0xE89eB4D7153958F9436E2c3fe30D6F2024404cB0). Step 1: deploy `contract F { constructor(address payable t) payable { selfdestruct(t); } }` as new F{value: 1 wei}(payable(address(rocks))). Observed: address(rocks).balance == 1 wei. Step 2: vm.deal(buyer, 0.00101 ether); vm.prank(buyer); rocks.buy{value: 0.00101 ether}(). Observed: ownerOf(10) == buyer, payout received exactly 0.00101 ether, address(rocks).balance is still 1 wei; no function exists to move it (withdraw()/receive/fallback all revert). Expected under the literal wording 'No ETH ever rests in the contract': balance 0 after the sale. Verified: `forge test --match-path test/scratch/Proof_e2c625c3f9b1.t.sol` (copy of the tester's proof) fails with 'No ETH may remain after a completed sale: 1 != 0'.","severity":"info","snippet":"        (bool paid,) = payout.call{value: msg.value}(\"\");","title":"Forced ETH (SELFDESTRUCT beneficiary / pre-funded CREATE2 address) rests in the contract permanently; buy() forwards only msg.value and the brief forbids any withdraw path (merged: audit_math, write_f"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Reproduced. The brief requires that a rejected payout reverts the purchase and that there is no owner or admin, so the behaviour is as specified; recorded so the judge and the deployment operator see it was evaluated. If the launch argument 0xE89eB4D7153958F9436E2c3fe30D6F2024404cB0 is, or later becomes (EIP-7702 delegation, or a smart-contract wallet without a payable receive on the launch chain), an account whose receive reverts, every buy() reverts with PayoutFailed forever and the collection is stuck at totalSupply()==10. A contract payout can also revert conditionally during the callback (it can read tx.origin, nextRock() and ownerOf(nextRock()-1)) to censor specific buyers or rock numbers. It cannot take a buyer's ETH, mint, or change price: a rejected payment rolls everything back (verified: nextRock, totalSupply, ownership, buyer balance and contract balance unchanged; contract balance 0). The constructor cannot detect a non-payable payout because deployment sends no ETH. No `.imd/reads/network.json` or chain id was supplied, so whether 0xE89e...4cB0 holds code on the launch chain was not verified here; the deployer/verifier should confirm it is an EOA or an ETH-accepting contract before the launch transaction. No code change is proposed: any replacement path would add the owner/admin role the brief excludes.","line":19,"path":"src/IMDRocks.sol","reproduction":"State: PayoutProbe p = new PayoutProbe(); IMDRocks sale = new IMDRocks(address(p)); p.configure(sale, true, false, false) (receive() reverts). Call: vm.prank(ALICE); sale.buy{value: sale.priceOf(10) = 0.00101 ether}(). Observed: revert PayoutFailed(); sale.nextRock()==10, totalSupply()==10, balanceOf(ALICE)==0, ALICE.balance unchanged, address(sale).balance==0, address(p).balance==0. Every subsequent buy() from any caller reverts identically while p keeps rejecting; payout is immutable and there is no setter. Covered by the repository tests test_PayoutRejectionRollsBackAndCanRecover and testFuzz_PayoutFailureAtAnySalePositionCanRetry (both pass; their recovery step works only because the test fixture is reconfigurable, which a real address is not).","severity":"info","snippet":"    address payable public immutable payout;","title":"Trust assumption, not a defect: the immutable payout/reserve address can halt or selectively censor all remaining sales by rejecting ETH, and nothing in the contract can replace it (merged: audit_perm"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Reproduced. DEPENDENCIES.json claims per-file SHA-256 for OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 and forge-std v1.9.7. Hashing the committed files shows 10 mismatches: openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol, token/ERC721/IERC721Receiver.sol, utils/Base64.sol, and forge-std src/StdAssertions.sol, StdJson.sol, StdToml.sol, Vm.sol, console.sol, interfaces/IERC7540.sol, interfaces/IMulticall3.sol. I downloaded both upstream tarballs (archive SHA-256 matched the recorded 18c7b7e9... and 45157353... values) and diffed: every difference is a `forge fmt`-style line reflow; after stripping all whitespace each pair hashes identically, so the ERC-721 implementation behind approve/setApprovalForAll/transferFrom/safeTransferFrom and the ReentrancyGuard are the unmodified upstream logic. Impact is limited to provenance: a reviewer or the offline verifier checking the vendored tree against the recorded hashes gets a false mismatch, and the record cannot distinguish this benign reflow from a real edit. The fix (re-record the hashes of the committed files, or restore the byte-exact upstream files) lives under lib/, which this task's rules mark read-only, so it needs a scope decision rather than an author revision.","line":10,"path":"lib/DEPENDENCIES.json","reproduction":"From the repository root run: python3 -c \"import json,hashlib; d=json.load(open('lib/DEPENDENCIES.json')); [print(p) for dep in d for f,h in dep['files_sha256'].items() for p in ['lib/'+dep['repository'].rstrip('/').split('/')[-1]+'/'+f] if hashlib.sha256(open(p,'rb').read()).hexdigest()!=h]\". Expected: no output (all recorded hashes match). Actual: 10 paths printed, including lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol (recorded 94f07f84..., committed file differs). Whitespace-insensitive check: `tr -d ' \\t\\r\\n' < <upstream v5.0.2 ERC721.sol> | sha256sum` equals the same over lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol.","severity":"info","snippet":"      \"contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol\": \"94f07f843e2f541a5a000a6375a41345412c6d6da9316c547f39e0fe1f2447f7\",","title":"lib/DEPENDENCIES.json records SHA-256 values that do not match 10 of the committed vendored files (whitespace-only reformatting); provenance by hash fails although the code is semantically upstream"}],"hash":"6d248f7b00fa983d2a04fbc3f26d9113cb94788cfc52b6f51f2fa702e127c5ea","nodeId":"b68d306c-5017-4b05-8c01-4f8d6c62514d","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. `.imd-findings.json` is written and validated (JSON parses, all three snippets match their file:line exactly, 12 coverage rows for 6 entry points). Scratch tests are removed; the tree is otherwise untouched.\n\n## Verdict: no code defects — three informational findings\n\n**What I checked against the code**\n- Full suite: 33 tests pass, including 128×128 invariant runs (16,384 handler calls, 0 unexpected reverts) covering ordered sale, exact payout, reentrancy from both the payout `receive()` and `onERC721Received` (blocked by `nonReentrant`, state already updated), one-wei over/under, sellout at 100, payout rejection rollback, all-100 metadata/SVG decoding, and tint distinctness.\n- `buy()` at `src/IMDRocks.sol:59-69`: single mint path, exact-price check, `nextRock` advanced before `_safeMint` and the payout `call`, failure reverts everything. Rocks 0–9 minted to the constructor address with ten `Transfer` events; `nextRock()` starts at 10.\n- The four ERC-721 entry points are the unmodified OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 implementation — I confirmed that by downloading the upstream tarball and diffing.\n\n**Findings kept (all `info`)**\n1. **Forced ETH strands permanently** (`IMDRocks.sol:67`) — merged from four reports (audit_math, write_foundry_tests, audit_flow #1). Reproduced with the tester's proof, which fails as stated. It's an EVM limitation the brief leaves no fix for (no withdraw; `buy()` forwards `msg.value`). Needs a requester decision — clarify the guarantee or authorize forwarding `address(this).balance` — not an author revision.\n2. **Immutable payout can halt/censor sales by rejecting ETH** (`IMDRocks.sol:19`) — merged from audit_permissions and audit_flow #2. Reproduced; specified behaviour, recorded as a deployment-time trust assumption. Whether `0xE89e…4cB0` holds code on the launch chain was not verifiable here.\n3. **`lib/DEPENDENCIES.json` hashes don't match 10 committed vendored files** (`DEPENDENCIES.json:10`) — my own finding. Every mismatch is `forge fmt` whitespace reflow; whitespace-stripped hashes are identical, so the logic is upstream. Provenance-only impact, and the fix lives under read-only `lib/`.\n\n**Dropped:** audit_flow #3 (claim that `vm.prank` doesn't debit the pranked account). My scratch test on forge 1.8.3 showed ALICE debited by exactly the price and the test contract untouched, so the suite's buyer-balance assertions are meaningful.\n\n**Limits:** no SVG renderer on this worker, so the \"original hand-drawn boulder\" requirement was checked structurally (geometry, facets, shadow, square viewBox, single tint occurrence), not visually.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":739858,"inputTokens":296,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":20016,"runtime":"claude","turns":20,"wallClockMs":393141}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"feba2a869621cab2","findings":[],"hash":"7dad23b8c1301d173d496419d205f02e516fd195ec486fedcd7f2553473668f6","nodeId":"a3ea03a6-1858-4760-8143-9f59603b4c42","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file holds an empty list and a full coverage record. Nothing else in the tree changed, and the scratch harness is removed.\n\n**Result:** no substantiated defects in the Economic Security, Invariant or Flow Gap areas. Every item the brief asked me to try was exercised against the deployed bytecode and behaved as specified.\n\n**What I checked, concretely**\n\n- **Out-of-order, duplicate and stale purchases.** There is no number argument, and the exact-value check at `src/IMDRocks.sol:63` uses a strictly increasing, unique price. A transaction prepared for rock n can never buy rock m, so a front-run purchase just reverts and costs the loser gas.\n- **Under and over payment.** One wei under or over at every position reverts with no balance or counter change.\n- **Reentrancy from the payout's receive hook and from onERC721Received.** Reentering buy returns the reentrancy-guard error in both. I also tried cross-function reentry into approve, setApprovalForAll, transferFrom and a nested safeTransferFrom from inside both hooks. Those calls succeed but cannot reach sale state. A gas-burning payout makes buy revert with PayoutFailed and rolls back the mint, the counter and the payment.\n- **Stranding ETH.** Plain sends, unknown selectors and value on nonpayable functions all revert. Forced ETH via selfdestruct lands and stays. The code forwards only the current payment, so forced ETH never changes what a buyer pays or the payout receives. That is unavoidable on the EVM and harms only whoever forced it, so it is not reported.\n- **101st rock.** Sold-out state rejects every value including zero and the last price. No other path writes the mint counter and the vendored OpenZeppelin v5.0.2 ERC-721 has no public burn.\n- **Conservation.** Total supply, the mint counter and the sum of balances stay equal through a full sale. The payout receives exactly 3.28155 ETH and the contract balance stays zero.\n- **Deployment input.** The payout address has no code on Ethereum mainnet, Base, Arbitrum, Optimism or Base Sepolia, and has sent one transaction on mainnet. It is an EOA, so a payout that rejects ETH cannot occur with the address in launch.json.\n\n**Noted but not defects**\n\n- The payout address can buy the remaining rocks at net-zero cost, since the payment returns to it. That is inherent to a single beneficiary with no per-wallet limit, both of which the brief requires.\n- Calling priceOf with the sold-out sentinel reverts. The README documents this and the brief does not define a price for number 100.\n- All five aderyn low-severity lines are style or intentional choices.\n\n**Coverage.** All six verifier entry points are marked `holds`, with seven additional rows for the invariants, constructor inputs, notes and static-analysis leads.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":715322,"inputTokens":290,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":19233,"runtime":"claude","turns":24,"wallClockMs":309226}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"789312fc56d3f446","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"The brief states \"No ETH ever rests in the contract\" and the design realises this by having no receive, fallback or withdraw function. That stops ordinary transfers, but the EVM lets anyone credit a contract's balance without a call (SELFDESTRUCT beneficiary, or pre-funding the CREATE2 address before deployment). Because buy() forwards exactly msg.value rather than address(this).balance, any such balance is never swept to the payout address and there is no other path out. The author already documents this in docs/SECURITY_REVIEW.md and tests it in test_ForcedEtherCannotBePreventedAndDoesNotChangeSale, so this is recorded for completeness, not as a bug the sale logic has. Nobody loses funds except the party who chose to force them in. If the stated invariant is meant literally, the minimal change is to forward address(this).balance in buy() (which equals msg.value in every normal case) so forced dust reaches the payout address on the next sale; the trade-off is that the payout then receives slightly more than \"the payment\" in that one transaction.","line":67,"path":"src/IMDRocks.sol","reproduction":"State: fresh IMDRocks(payout). Step 1: deploy `contract F { constructor(address payable t) payable { selfdestruct(t); } }` with 1 ether and t = address(rocks). Observed: address(rocks).balance == 1 ether. Step 2: any buyer calls buy{value: priceOf(10)}(). Observed: payout receives exactly priceOf(10); address(rocks).balance is still 1 ether; no function (withdraw(), receive, fallback) exists to move it. Expected under the literal invariant \"No ETH ever rests in the contract\": the balance should be 0 after a sale. Verified locally with the existing test test_ForcedEtherCannotBePreventedAndDoesNotChangeSale (passes, asserting the 1 ether stays).","severity":"info","snippet":"        (bool paid,) = payout.call{value: msg.value}(\"\");","title":"buy() forwards only msg.value, so ETH forced into the contract via SELFDESTRUCT rests there permanently"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The payout address is immutable and there is no owner, so the brief's required behaviour (buy() reverts when the payout rejects ETH) becomes permanent and unrecoverable if the launch argument 0xE89eB4D7153958F9436E2c3fe30D6F2024404cB0 turns out to be a contract (for example a smart-contract wallet) that cannot accept a plain CALL with value on the deployment chain. The constructor cannot detect this because deployment sends no ETH and the factory makes a nonpayable deployment. The code behaves exactly as specified; this is a deployment-time trust assumption that the verifier and deployer should confirm before the launch transaction (cast code at that address on the launch chain is empty, or is a known wallet with a payable receive). No `.imd/reads/network.json` was supplied, so this review could not check the address on any chain.","line":31,"path":"src/IMDRocks.sol","reproduction":"State: deploy IMDRocks(p) where p is a contract with no receive/fallback (e.g. `contract NoReceive {}`), or the PayoutProbe from test/helpers/SaleActors.sol configured with reject=true. Call buy{value: priceOf(10)}() from any EOA. Observed: revert PayoutFailed(), nextRock() stays 10, and because payout is immutable and there is no admin, every subsequent buy() also reverts; rocks 10..99 can never be sold and the collection is stuck at totalSupply()==10. Expected per the brief: this is the specified behaviour for a rejecting payout, so the only defence is verifying the launch argument before deployment. The existing test test_PayoutRejectionRollsBackAndCanRecover demonstrates the revert (its recovery step only works because the test fixture can be reconfigured, which a real address cannot).","severity":"info","snippet":"        payout = payable(reserveAndPayout);","title":"Immutable payout address cannot be changed: if 0xE89e...4cB0 has code without a payable receive on the target chain, every buy() reverts forever"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Under Foundry 1.8.3 a value call made after vm.prank(ALICE) spends the test contract's ETH, not ALICE's. A scratch test confirmed this: after vm.deal(RESERVE, 1 ether); vm.prank(RESERVE); rocks.buy{value: priceOf(10)}(), RESERVE.balance was 1 ether + priceOf(10) and the test contract's balance fell by priceOf(10). Consequently assertions such as `assertEq(ALICE.balance, buyerBefore)` in _expectWrongPayment and `assertEq(ALICE.balance, buyerBalance)` in test_PayoutRejectionRollsBackAndCanRecover hold even if the contract kept the buyer's ETH on revert, so the brief's required check that the buyer is made whole is not actually exercised by those lines. The contract itself is correct (a revert refunds msg.value by EVM rule, and the payout-balance and contract-balance assertions do hold). This is a test-coverage note only; it does not change any contract behaviour. A stronger assertion is on the test contract's own balance (the actual value source) or on address(rocks).balance == 0 plus RESERVE.balance unchanged, which the tests already include.","line":424,"path":"test/IMDRocks.t.sol","reproduction":"In test/IMDRocks.t.sol replace the body of _expectWrongPayment's vm.expectRevert with a successful call: vm.deal(ALICE, 1 ether); uint256 b = ALICE.balance; vm.prank(ALICE); rocks.buy{value: rocks.priceOf(10)}(); assertEq(ALICE.balance, b). Observed: the assertion passes (ALICE's balance did not move even though a purchase succeeded), proving the balance check cannot detect a failure to refund. Expected for a meaningful check: the buyer's balance should drop by the price on success and be unchanged on revert.","severity":"info","snippet":"        assertEq(ALICE.balance, buyerBefore);","title":"Test assertions on the buyer's ETH balance are vacuous: vm.prank does not debit the pranked account in this Foundry version"}],"hash":"83b77c990908ea2891208a9210c92fc56bc3b54223a15f4cf80fd7dd49e24f5c","nodeId":"4a5b4302-7437-4fd3-b2d5-b202b70e6c13","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is at `.imd-findings.json` and nothing else in the tree changed. My scratch tests were deleted.\n\n**Verdict: the control flow holds.** I found no defect in the sale, mint, payment or transfer paths. Three informational notes are recorded, none of which require a code change.\n\nWhat I checked, in my area:\n\n- **Execution trace of buy().** Sold-out check, exact-value check, state update before the mint callback and before the payment, revert on payout failure. Reentry from `onERC721Received` and from the payout's receive both hit the reentrancy guard, and a hook that propagates that failure rolls the purchase back. A payout that return-bombs or burns gas cannot block a sale. Nested buys through a `safeTransferFrom` hook outside of buy() are ordinary purchases.\n- **Periphery.** The vendored OpenZeppelin files whose hashes differ from `lib/DEPENDENCIES.json` were diffed against upstream v5.0.2: formatting only, no semantic change. No git submodules. Base64, Strings and the ERC721 base are unmodified in behaviour.\n- **First principles.** Only the constructor and buy() mint, so a 101st rock is unreachable. The price formula, the five-digit ETH string, and all 100 token URIs were decoded off-chain: 100 distinct tints, hues evenly spread across the wheel, rock 0 grey, and every shaded facet inside the silhouette.\n- **Static-analysis leads.** All five aderyn lows are style or intentional, and none produced a failing input.\n\nThe three informational findings:\n\n1. Forced ETH via SELFDESTRUCT stays in the contract because buy() forwards msg.value, not the balance. Already documented by the author.\n2. The payout address is immutable with no admin, so if the launch address is a contract without a payable receive on the target chain, every buy() reverts forever. The code behaves as specified. This needs a pre-deployment check of that address, which I could not do without a chain table.\n3. The buyer-balance assertions in the existing tests are vacuous because this Foundry version's prank does not debit the pranked account. A test-coverage note only.\n\nCoverage has 13 rows: all six listed entry points plus the constructor hold, and six invariant rows are answered, one pointing to finding 1.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1034853,"inputTokens":386,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":30647,"runtime":"claude","turns":30,"wallClockMs":511981}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":1597,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 37 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 1.47s\nCompiler run successful with warnings:\nWarning (5159): \"selfdestruct\" has been deprecated. Note that, starting from the Cancun hard fork, the underlying opcode no longer deletes the code and data associated with an account and only transfers its Ether to the beneficiary, unless executed in the same transaction in which the contract was created (see EIP-6780). Any use in newly deployed contracts is strongly discouraged even if the new behavior is taken into account. Future changes to the EVM might further reduce the functionality of the opcode.\n   --> test/helpers/SaleActors.sol:106:9:\n    |\n106 |         selfdestruct(target);\n    |         ^^^^^^^^^^^^\n\nwarning[unsafe-oz-erc721-mint]: `ERC721._mint` does not check that the recipient can receive the token; use `_safeMint`\n   ╭▸ src/IMDRocks.sol:34:13\n   │\n34 │             _mint(reserveAndPayout, i);\n   │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-oz-erc721-mint\n\nwarning[reentrancy-eth]: uncapped ETH transfer can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n   ╭▸ src/IMDRocks.sol:67:24\n   │\n67 │         (bool paid,) = payout.call{value: msg.value}(\"\");\n   │                        ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-eth\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":1248,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 23 tests for test/IMDRocks.t.sol:IMDRocksTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_InexactPaymentReverts(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 72838, ~: 72943)\n[PASS] testFuzz_InvalidNumbersRevertBeforeArithmetic(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 38197, ~: 38113)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 100000000000000000000\n\n[PASS] test_ApprovalsTransfersRevocationAndNoFee() (gas: 437869)\n[PASS] test_ConstructorEmitsTenIndividualTransfers() (gas: 284755)\n[PASS] test_ConstructorReservesAndConstants() (gas: 217351)\n[PASS] test_DeploymentBoundsAndForbiddenRuntimeOpcodes() (gas: 4120155)\n[PASS] test_DirectEtherUnknownSelectorAndPayableTransferRejected() (gas: 124104)\n[PASS] test_ERC165InterfacesAndNoRoyalties() (gas: 51225)\n[PASS] test_EntireSaleInOrderExactPayoutAndNoWalletLimit() (gas: 12159018)\n[PASS] test_ForcedEtherCannotBePreventedAndDoesNotChangeSale() (gas: 279111)\n[PASS] test_InvalidPayoutRejected() (gas: 3987)\n[PASS] test_NoAlternateMintOrControlEntryPoints() (gas: 228834)\n[PASS] test_NonReceiverCannotBuy() (gas: 260339)\n[PASS] test_OneWeiUnderAndOverAtEverySalePosition() (gas: 22769065)\n[PASS] test_OutOfOrderDuplicateAndStaleTransactionsFail() (gas: 484673)\n[PASS] test_PayoutReentryBlockedWithStateAlreadyUpdated() (gas: 1098134)\n[PASS] test_PayoutRejectionRollsBackAndCanRecover() (gas: 1029988)\n[PASS] test_PricesForEveryRock() (gas: 907406)\n[PASS] test_ReceiverMayTransferNewRockWithoutAffectingSale() (gas: 1129793)\n[PASS] test_ReceiverReentryBlockedWithStateAlreadyUpdated() (gas: 1221299)\n[PASS] test_ReceiverRejectionAndPropagatedReentryRollBack() (gas: 1620856)\n[PASS] test_SafeTransferChecksReceiverAndRollsBackOnRejection() (gas: 1298591)\n[PASS] test_UnauthorizedTransfersApprovalsWrongOwnerAndZeroRecipientFail() (gas: 200298)\nSuite result: ok. 23 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 10.27ms (36.94ms CPU time)\n\nRan 3 tests for test/Metadata.t.sol:MetadataTest\n[PASS] test_AllMetadataDecodesAndMatchesImagePriceAndDistinctTint() (gas: 737025936)\n[PASS] test_MetadataRemainsTheSameAfterTransfer() (gas: 666174)\n[PASS] test_UnmintedMetadataRevertsButEveryImageCanBePreviewed() (gas: 96745112)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.13s (1.27s CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/IMDRocks.invariant.t.sol:IMDRocksInvariantTest\n[PASS] invariant_SequentialBoundedSupplyOwnershipAndPayments() (runs: 64, calls: 4096, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract    | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=====================================================+\n| RockHandler | purchase | 2047  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RockHandler | transfer | 2049  | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.14s (1.14s CPU time)\n\nRan 3 test suites in 1.14s (2.28s CPU time): 27 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (27 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":49,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"IMDRocks.approve(address,uint256)\",\"IMDRocks.buy()\",\"IMDRocks.safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"IMDRocks.safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256,bytes)\",\"IMDRocks.setApprovalForAll(address,bool)\",\"IMDRocks.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"README.md\":68,\"docs/SECURITY_REVIEW.md\":45,\"foundry.toml\":24,\"launch.json\":10,\"src/IMDRocks.sol\":157,\"test/IMDRocks.invariant.t.sol\":80,\"test/IMDRocks.t.sol\":427,\"test/Metadata.t.sol\":243,\"test/helpers/SaleActors.sol\":108},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"1505b3f43e43862c9004d99a3bbae2b3cbb60c967fc24546e1fd3ff61bbb084c","verifiedTreeHash":"025245965de94c5695d8875255dff4d4d5e946b2","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+f8d984f2"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":2429,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 37 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 2.24s\nCompiler run successful with warnings:\nWarning (5159): \"selfdestruct\" has been deprecated. Note that, starting from the Cancun hard fork, the underlying opcode no longer deletes the code and data associated with an account and only transfers its Ether to the beneficiary, unless executed in the same transaction in which the contract was created (see EIP-6780). Any use in newly deployed contracts is strongly discouraged even if the new behavior is taken into account. Future changes to the EVM might further reduce the functionality of the opcode.\n   --> test/helpers/SaleActors.sol:106:9:\n    |\n106 |         selfdestruct(target);\n    |         ^^^^^^^^^^^^\n\nwarning[unsafe-oz-erc721-mint]: `ERC721._mint` does not check that the recipient can receive the token; use `_safeMint`\n   ╭▸ src/IMDRocks.sol:34:13\n   │\n34 │             _mint(reserveAndPayout, i);\n   │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-oz-erc721-mint\n\nwarning[reentrancy-eth]: uncapped ETH transfer can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n   ╭▸ src/IMDRocks.sol:67:24\n   │\n67 │         (bool paid,) = payout.call{value: msg.value}(\"\");\n   │                        ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-eth\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":1547,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 23 tests for test/IMDRocks.t.sol:IMDRocksTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_InexactPaymentReverts(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 72864, ~: 72943)\n[PASS] testFuzz_InvalidNumbersRevertBeforeArithmetic(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 38175, ~: 38113)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 4148506502924658716368122654\n\n[PASS] test_ApprovalsTransfersRevocationAndNoFee() (gas: 437869)\n[PASS] test_ConstructorEmitsTenIndividualTransfers() (gas: 284755)\n[PASS] test_ConstructorReservesAndConstants() (gas: 217351)\n[PASS] test_DeploymentBoundsAndForbiddenRuntimeOpcodes() (gas: 4120155)\n[PASS] test_DirectEtherUnknownSelectorAndPayableTransferRejected() (gas: 124104)\n[PASS] test_ERC165InterfacesAndNoRoyalties() (gas: 51225)\n[PASS] test_EntireSaleInOrderExactPayoutAndNoWalletLimit() (gas: 12159018)\n[PASS] test_ForcedEtherCannotBePreventedAndDoesNotChangeSale() (gas: 279111)\n[PASS] test_InvalidPayoutRejected() (gas: 3987)\n[PASS] test_NoAlternateMintOrControlEntryPoints() (gas: 228834)\n[PASS] test_NonReceiverCannotBuy() (gas: 260339)\n[PASS] test_OneWeiUnderAndOverAtEverySalePosition() (gas: 22769065)\n[PASS] test_OutOfOrderDuplicateAndStaleTransactionsFail() (gas: 484673)\n[PASS] test_PayoutReentryBlockedWithStateAlreadyUpdated() (gas: 1098134)\n[PASS] test_PayoutRejectionRollsBackAndCanRecover() (gas: 1029988)\n[PASS] test_PricesForEveryRock() (gas: 907406)\n[PASS] test_ReceiverMayTransferNewRockWithoutAffectingSale() (gas: 1129793)\n[PASS] test_ReceiverReentryBlockedWithStateAlreadyUpdated() (gas: 1221299)\n[PASS] test_ReceiverRejectionAndPropagatedReentryRollBack() (gas: 1620856)\n[PASS] test_SafeTransferChecksReceiverAndRollsBackOnRejection() (gas: 1298591)\n[PASS] test_UnauthorizedTransfersApprovalsWrongOwnerAndZeroRecipientFail() (gas: 200298)\nSuite result: ok. 23 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 16.32ms (67.58ms CPU time)\n\nRan 3 tests for test/Metadata.t.sol:MetadataTest\n[PASS] test_AllMetadataDecodesAndMatchesImagePriceAndDistinctTint() (gas: 737025936)\n[PASS] test_MetadataRemainsTheSameAfterTransfer() (gas: 666174)\n[PASS] test_UnmintedMetadataRevertsButEveryImageCanBePreviewed() (gas: 96745112)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.31s (1.52s CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/IMDRocks.invariant.t.sol:IMDRocksInvariantTest\n[PASS] invariant_SequentialBoundedSupplyOwnershipAndPayments() (runs: 64, calls: 4096, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract    | Selector | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+=====================================================+\n| RockHandler | purchase | 2058  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+----------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RockHandler | transfer | 2038  | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------+----------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.41s (1.41s CPU time)\n\nRan 3 test suites in 1.42s (2.74s CPU time): 27 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (27 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":76,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"IMDRocks.approve(address,uint256)\",\"IMDRocks.buy()\",\"IMDRocks.safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"IMDRocks.safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256,bytes)\",\"IMDRocks.setApprovalForAll(address,bool)\",\"IMDRocks.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"README.md\":68,\"docs/SECURITY_REVIEW.md\":45,\"foundry.toml\":24,\"launch.json\":10,\"src/IMDRocks.sol\":157,\"test/IMDRocks.invariant.t.sol\":80,\"test/IMDRocks.t.sol\":427,\"test/Metadata.t.sol\":243,\"test/helpers/SaleActors.sol\":108},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":2108,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"slither: no results at low impact or above","passed":true},{"durationMs":855,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[low] large-numeric-literal at src/IMDRocks.sol:17: Large Numeric Literal\n[low] literal-instead-of-constant at src/IMDRocks.sol:138: Literal Instead of Constant (37 places)\n[low] unchecked-return at src/IMDRocks.sol:100: Unchecked Return\n[low] uninitialized-local-variable at src/IMDRocks.sol:33: Uninitialized Local Variable\n[low] unsafe-oz-erc721-mint at src/IMDRocks.sol:34: Unsafe `ERC721::_mint()`","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"1d7a3d1d5640fb706c3c485106307443f24cab1220be3c51fefde3831e7dab52","verifiedTreeHash":"7e2a21878fe1dc65a228889be836fc9bcece4600","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+f8d984f2"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":2968,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 38 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 2.77s\nCompiler run successful with warnings:\nWarning (5159): \"selfdestruct\" has been deprecated. Note that, starting from the Cancun hard fork, the underlying opcode no longer deletes the code and data associated with an account and only transfers its Ether to the beneficiary, unless executed in the same transaction in which the contract was created (see EIP-6780). Any use in newly deployed contracts is strongly discouraged even if the new behavior is taken into account. Future changes to the EVM might further reduce the functionality of the opcode.\n   --> test/helpers/SaleActors.sol:106:9:\n    |\n106 |         selfdestruct(target);\n    |         ^^^^^^^^^^^^\n\nwarning[unsafe-oz-erc721-mint]: `ERC721._mint` does not check that the recipient can receive the token; use `_safeMint`\n   ╭▸ src/IMDRocks.sol:34:13\n   │\n34 │             _mint(reserveAndPayout, i);\n   │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-oz-erc721-mint\n\nwarning[reentrancy-eth]: uncapped ETH transfer can be reentered before `_status` is updated\n   ╭▸ src/IMDRocks.sol:67:24\n   │\n67 │         (bool paid,) = payout.call{value: msg.value}(\"\");\n   │                        ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-eth\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":28937,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 24 tests for test/IMDRocks.t.sol:IMDRocksTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_InexactPaymentReverts(uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 75916, ~: 76050)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 2458\n\n[PASS] testFuzz_InvalidNumbersRevertBeforeArithmetic(uint256) (runs: 1000, μ: 38149, ~: 38068)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 3526\n\n[PASS] test_ApprovalsTransfersRevocationAndNoFee() (gas: 437999)\n[PASS] test_ConstructorEmitsTenIndividualTransfers() (gas: 284766)\n[PASS] test_ConstructorReservesAndConstants() (gas: 217395)\n[PASS] test_DeploymentBoundsAndForbiddenRuntimeOpcodes() (gas: 4120133)\n[PASS] test_DirectEtherUnknownSelectorAndPayableTransferRejected() (gas: 124211)\n[PASS] test_ERC165InterfacesAndNoRoyalties() (gas: 51247)\n[PASS] test_EntireSaleInOrderExactPayoutAndNoWalletLimit() (gas: 12158953)\n[PASS] test_InvalidNumberBoundaries() (gas: 43120)\n[PASS] test_InvalidPayoutRejected() (gas: 4031)\n[PASS] test_NoAlternateMintOrControlEntryPoints() (gas: 228834)\n[PASS] test_NonReceiverCannotBuy() (gas: 260361)\n[PASS] test_OneWeiUnderAndOverAtEverySalePosition() (gas: 22769087)\n[PASS] test_OutOfOrderDuplicateAndStaleTransactionsFail() (gas: 484695)\n[PASS] test_PayoutReentryBlockedWithStateAlreadyUpdated() (gas: 1098201)\n[PASS] test_PayoutRejectionRollsBackAndCanRecover() (gas: 1030032)\n[PASS] test_PricesForEveryRock() (gas: 907406)\n[PASS] test_ReceiverMayTransferNewRockWithoutAffectingSale() (gas: 1129793)\n[PASS] test_ReceiverReentryBlockedWithStateAlreadyUpdated() (gas: 1221279)\n[PASS] test_ReceiverRejectionAndPropagatedReentryRollBack() (gas: 1620945)\n[PASS] test_SafeTransferChecksReceiverAndRollsBackOnRejection() (gas: 1298635)\n[PASS] test_UnauthorizedTransfersApprovalsWrongOwnerAndZeroRecipientFail() (gas: 200339)\n[PASS] test_ZeroAndMaximumPaymentLeaveSaleUnchanged() (gas: 119413)\nSuite result: ok. 24 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 28.80ms (118.58ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/IMDRocks.callbacks.t.sol:IMDRocksCallbackTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_PayoutFailureAtAnySalePositionCanRetry(uint8) (runs: 128, μ: 3079442, ~: 1637523)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 75\n\n[PASS] test_BothCallbacksAttemptReentryAtLastRockAndNo101stMint() (gas: 9824736)\n[PASS] test_LastRockFailuresDoNotLatchSoldOutOrReentrancyGuard() (gas: 10243028)\n[PASS] test_PayoutFailureUnwindsCallbackTransfersApprovalsAndExternalState() (gas: 1096059)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 82.24ms (99.26ms CPU time)\n\nRan 3 tests for test/Metadata.t.sol:MetadataTest\n[PASS] test_AllMetadataDecodesAndMatchesImagePriceAndDistinctTint() (gas: 737025936)\n[PASS] test_MetadataRemainsTheSameAfterTransfer() (gas: 666174)\n[PASS] test_UnmintedMetadataRevertsButEveryImageCanBePreviewed() (gas: 96745112)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.41s (1.60s CPU time)\n\nRan 2 tests for test/IMDRocks.invariant.t.sol:IMDRocksInvariantTest\n[PASS] invariant_SequentialBoundedSupplyOwnershipAndPayments() (runs: 128, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭-------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract    | Selector           | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+===============================================================+\n| RockHandler | approve            | 2349  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RockHandler | directEther        | 2288  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RockHandler | purchase           | 2269  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RockHandler | purchaseBatch      | 2306  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RockHandler | receiverPurchase   | 2327  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RockHandler | transfer           | 2448  | 0       | 0        |\n|-------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RockHandler | transferAsOperator | 2397  | 0       | 0        |\n╰-------------+--------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nLogs:\n  Bound result 931\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 531471961135293015\n  Bound result 11\n  Bound result 5507\n  Bound result 7720\n  Bound result 12\n  Bound result 23\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 9042\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 2094\n  Bound result 6543\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 18\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 11\n  Bound result 7074\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 6658\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 26\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 32\n  Bound result 33\n  Bound result 32\n  Bound result 2474\n  Bound result 12\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 5\n  Bound result 1169\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 1250\n  Bound result 303\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 41\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 11\n  Bound result 17\n  Bound result 7\n  Bound result 21\n  Bound result 10\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 56\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 7719\n  Bound result 9\n  Bound result 4659\n  Bound result 32\n  Bound result 9011\n  Bound result 1044\n  Bound result 18\n  Bound result 3675\n  Bound result 6877\n  Bound result 3\n  Bound result 32\n  Bound result 5291\n  Bound result 65\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 3339\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 17\n  Bound result 16\n  Bound result 65281\n  Bound result 6\n  Bound result 56\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 4\n  Bound result 95\n  Bound result 51\n  Bound result 10323\n  Bound result 25\n  Bound result 79\n  Bound result 264337514315787820\n  Bound result 99\n  Bound result 36\n  Bound result 1\n  Bound result 12\n  Bound result 29\n  Bound result 7644\n  Bound result 568014342\n  Bound result 24\n  Bound result 2\n  Bound result 1892122\n  Bound result 2503\n  Bound result 3557\n  Bound result 8\n  Bound result 1863\n  Bound result 7444\n\n[PASS] test_HandlerSequenceReachesSelloutAndPreservesApprovals() (gas: 13514473)\nLogs:\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 0\n  Bound result 12\n  Bound result 12\n  Bound result 12\n  Bound result 12\n  Bound result 12\n  Bound result 12\n  Bound result 12\n  Bound result 12\n  Bound result 99\n  Bound result 1\n\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 28.80s (28.80s CPU time)\n\nRan 4 test suites in 28.80s (30.32s CPU time): 33 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (33 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":79,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"IMDRocks.approve(address,uint256)\",\"IMDRocks.buy()\",\"IMDRocks.safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256)\",\"IMDRocks.safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256,bytes)\",\"IMDRocks.setApprovalForAll(address,bool)\",\"IMDRocks.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":4,\"README.md\":68,\"docs/SECURITY_REVIEW.md\":45,\"foundry.toml\":24,\"launch.json\":10,\"src/IMDRocks.sol\":157,\"test/IMDRocks.callbacks.t.sol\":186,\"test/IMDRocks.invariant.t.sol\":247,\"test/IMDRocks.t.sol\":439,\"test/Metadata.t.sol\":243,\"test/REVIEW.md\":43,\"test/helpers/SaleActors.sol\":108},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"52483cda03db68da49143db5d0aec2d92726d296dca979eb3990ec9d0ff1f19d","verifiedTreeHash":"fb04e3facffb2926be2f35b60f42e1c8ad4c552e","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+f8d984f2"}]}