{"assessments":[],"deployments":[],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"7b2d14d8-1923-4948-8a33-c8d85b741b2b","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"b8e58a010be92db64a353eb7d81177299f282cb475610b132733df503d3f97a6","dependsOn":["audit_imported_code"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"a2cea02e8b33e91eeb784e0e5eaeb571cd62cd69e768d335d5834e24b3aa46e5","skillId":"adapt-contract-project","tools":[]},"key":"adapt_contract_project","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"a2cea02e8b33e91eeb784e0e5eaeb571cd62cd69e768d335d5834e24b3aa46e5","skillId":"adapt-contract-project","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"60175e6b2ee1c87d54b95ef844abc0b4b41960af57979e6d3157e9bef712f274","dependsOn":["adapt_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_economics","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"c0ff5de52818328e9ab875f21563c70fd5033ac6a1d603bf49c9114c59620db5","dependsOn":["adapt_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_flow","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"fb5a293c068b4935473c0b142602af7e82238339d973b1822c478ce533d4652d","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"9897597976b0e72440db7ca402d225aea20f3d37205ba53e7df2400ff80f29cc","skillId":"audit-imported-code","tools":[]},"key":"audit_imported_code","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"9897597976b0e72440db7ca402d225aea20f3d37205ba53e7df2400ff80f29cc","skillId":"audit-imported-code","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"4c4ac13e9f0716367fb1d6812aa3de7189a668034c41a988a7a31927fbe71b33","dependsOn":["adapt_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest","audit_math","audit_permissions","audit_economics","audit_flow"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"3014f1ea5961918ca059453a484bf4c8bcbbfc2248dbe31d94ac7c5cdf8f50bd","skillId":"audit-judge","tools":[]},"key":"audit_judge","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"3014f1ea5961918ca059453a484bf4c8bcbbfc2248dbe31d94ac7c5cdf8f50bd","skillId":"audit-judge","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"ceabaeee433de165b4dc2bf44db324d411f9835a08ba33fd7c543e9344fbef49","dependsOn":["adapt_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_math","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"52c3e54a0d8dbfd98cc5a5740282cd905e5080364eccf0779e8c6b3220796f08","dependsOn":["adapt_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_permissions","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"2c7df81e7058a93be55c69376cf8819bc1a44fc891124a17ed1b13c00161e7c3","dependsOn":["adapt_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"tools":[]},"key":"manifest","kind":"code","role":"integrate","skillHash":null,"skillId":null,"state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"7dbb255fce44f4db6a9c595da68d7b8f2988fd9b22e5f076765582c80c730acd","dependsOn":["adapt_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"73431852439ad3a343f3d2b7db1c43cd363b9f48f9bb51497374a0cf6d50b223","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","tools":[]},"key":"write_foundry_tests","kind":"code","role":"tests","skillHash":"73431852439ad3a343f3d2b7db1c43cd363b9f48f9bb51497374a0cf6d50b223","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"Deploy SwarmDerby (src/SwarmDerby.sol) unchanged to Robinhood Chain. Deploy only SwarmDerby. Do not create or launch any token, distributor or pool. Constructor arguments in order: owner_ = $owner; imd_ = 0x5F7Bb59365ce557C26dbcAa4EE9d39A4b95B7127; singlePrice_ = 150000000000000000; packPrice_ = 500000000000000000. This commit already passed a full audit (job 9396db7f-19f5-40b7-aa19-46b45ab87101: 0 critical, 0 high, 0 medium) and its low findings are fixed. Keep the code as it is unless the audit finds a critical or high issue. A published site and agent bots call this exact ABI, so do not change function signatures, events, errors, constants, the split, prices or the payout math, and keep src/DerbyOdds.sol byte-identical: the browser mirrors its odds and test_parityWithBrowser checks it. Accepted by the owner, do not change: purchases have no maxCost argument (the owner will not change prices while people play); session consent signatures have no deadline; swing quality and velo are reported by the client; the arcade cap is per wallet; a grand slam pays 10% of its league's vault. The constructor deliberately has no token code check: launch #867 parked because that check failed the protected deploy rehearsal, which runs without the IMD token's code. Purchases now revert NotAContract while the token address has no code. Do not add the check back to the constructor and do not deploy a token fixture. forge test must pass (54 tests).","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"12da6e02c47fa4a5f639cd891ffd6cb64f64367ecfc54488dcf60249b8855163","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"7b2d14d8-1923-4948-8a33-c8d85b741b2b","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-871-src-swarmderby-sol"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"51614","feedbackHash":"a81afd34b55d0b87d0587271a3708480f53e2186d42f00864fa724f8e01eba9c","nodeKey":"adapt_contract_project","submissionHash":"b8e58a010be92db64a353eb7d81177299f282cb475610b132733df503d3f97a6","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51222","feedbackHash":"639f93b9a7dc9a466236dd60b979f67483f070e4c4df76c979089827069b0085","nodeKey":"audit_economics","submissionHash":"60175e6b2ee1c87d54b95ef844abc0b4b41960af57979e6d3157e9bef712f274","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51507","feedbackHash":"c282cc35b6105e760e61fa66b189b2cc819d8cfab0beff28aa7a5b98225d9010","nodeKey":"audit_flow","submissionHash":"c0ff5de52818328e9ab875f21563c70fd5033ac6a1d603bf49c9114c59620db5","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52210","feedbackHash":"d0ad1d69bc7ce3797728afeadc1a73acb591f64545dd2044a61fe701376715dc","nodeKey":"audit_imported_code","submissionHash":"fb5a293c068b4935473c0b142602af7e82238339d973b1822c478ce533d4652d","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51375","feedbackHash":"a704579aba346ca5dc0f765850e6199eb9602d58a1e7f1f0cbd4ec0996f493e8","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"4c4ac13e9f0716367fb1d6812aa3de7189a668034c41a988a7a31927fbe71b33","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51382","feedbackHash":"a252ab7dba7801d53587f86ce7ed6c8cec3b057b7faa6406ccfe090b3bbbfaf6","nodeKey":"audit_math","submissionHash":"ceabaeee433de165b4dc2bf44db324d411f9835a08ba33fd7c543e9344fbef49","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51039","feedbackHash":"d14aa9756b8182b228cffcce06568ed5f0fdb9a51e7128f46fb0326c5b7fdd2e","nodeKey":"audit_permissions","submissionHash":"52c3e54a0d8dbfd98cc5a5740282cd905e5080364eccf0779e8c6b3220796f08","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51745","feedbackHash":"c73aedd817b887ee8f7d42dc9d7b29cae9fe178668db415e228cc6e7ec692b87","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"2c7df81e7058a93be55c69376cf8819bc1a44fc891124a17ed1b13c00161e7c3","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51749","feedbackHash":"ff3f1d419623170088a0e0bfac02c088c8e172cafa09e41b013d6ea1535ab0f8","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"7dbb255fce44f4db6a9c595da68d7b8f2988fd9b22e5f076765582c80c730acd","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"d99cf0f432ea6a5e3c736338678909a8cdc703df0c43abb0df5e6f5f66e2d100","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"5ca9650cc721f76653efef733c77066eadeae6626b1b8c37b80aa73fe2a4dbd7","device":"f84fad79f165f267","findings":[],"hash":"2c7df81e7058a93be55c69376cf8819bc1a44fc891124a17ed1b13c00161e7c3","nodeId":"d969fc32-845a-4021-aa06-ecafcd4120ff","outcome":"completed","summary":"Created [launch.json](/root/.identitymd/work/7b2d14d8-1923-4948-8a33-c8d85b741b2b/d969fc32-845a-4021-aa06-ecafcd4120ff/launch.json) for SwarmDerby only, with the exact approved constructor arguments.\n\nValidation passed against the supplied schema and compiled constructor ABI. `forge build` succeeded; `forge test` passed all 57 tests (54 application + 3 launch tests).\n\nOnly `launch.json` changed. All accepted source remains unchanged.","treeHash":"f60336ad8778e3a01a898e513d4d7393ce2153cb","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":358144,"inputTokens":26944,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":2597,"runtime":"codex","turns":4,"wallClockMs":111126}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"93c37f17670e4d98","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"_buy credits turns[league][playerOf(msg.sender)] at purchase time and swing debits turns[league][playerOf(msg.sender)] at swing time. If a wallet buys turns as a standalone player and is later bound as a session key for another player, playerOf resolves to that player, so swing reverts NoTurns while the key's own balance is still non-zero. No funds are lost: the key can leaveSession, or the player can revoke it, and the turns become spendable again. Merged from audit_permissions (same root cause; the earlier imported low 60b4ab8e... in ADAPTATION.md item 1). The owner's brief accepts this limitation and asks for no code change unless a critical or high issue is found; it is recorded here because it reproduces, with severity low (recoverable, no loss).","line":197,"path":"src/SwarmDerby.sol","reproduction":"Fresh SwarmDerby with a mock IMD; key K = vm.addr(0x5E55) holds IMD and approved the derby. 1) K calls buyTurns(0, 1): turns(0, K) == 1. 2) Player P calls setSession(K, sigK) where sigK is K's EIP-712 signature over sessionDigest(P, K). 3) K calls swing(0, 50, 50, 0x0). Expected by the key: its paid turn is spent. Actual: revert NoTurns; turns(0, K) is still 1 and turns(0, P) is 0. 4) K calls leaveSession() then swing(0, 0, 50, 0x0): succeeds, turns(0, K) == 0. Reproduced in a scratch test (test_preBindingTurnsStranded) against this tree; it passes with exactly these assertions.","severity":"low","snippet":"        address player = playerOf(msg.sender);","title":"Turns a key bought for itself before binding are unreachable while it is bound as a session key"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"setPrices enforces only the floor in _checkPrices (MIN_TURN_PRICE per turn), has no ceiling, no timelock and emits no event, and the next _buy charges the new price. buyTurns/buyPacks take no maxCost, so a buyer whose allowance covers count * newPrice pays whatever price is in storage when their purchase lands. The split still applies, so the owner cannot reach pot or vault through this; the only exposed party is the buyer, and only to the owner it already trusts. The brief accepts the missing maxCost and states the owner will not change prices while people play. Recorded as the owner's documented power together with its bounds, not as a defect: withdrawOps is capped by opsBalance, ownership is two-step, and prices can never drop below the floor.","line":505,"path":"src/SwarmDerby.sol","reproduction":"Owner O, player P with 200 IMD and allowance type(uint256).max to the derby. 1) O calls setPrices(100 ether, 500 ether): succeeds (floor is 0.01 per turn). 2) P calls buyTurns(0, 1): P pays 100 IMD for one turn (40 burned, 45 to the day pot, 10 to the vault, 5 to ops). Expected under the owner's stated commitment: 0.15 IMD. Actual: 100 IMD, nothing in the contract prevents it. Also verified in the same scratch test (test_ownerRaisesPriceWithoutBound): setPrices(0.0099 ether, 0.5 ether) reverts BadPrice, withdrawOps(opsBalance + 1) reverts, and pot(0) == 45 ether, vault(0) == 10 ether remain untouched by the owner.","severity":"info","snippet":"    function setPrices(uint256 single, uint256 pack) external onlyOwner {","title":"Trust assumption: owner can raise prices with no ceiling, delay or event, and holders of standing allowances pay the new price"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The constructor argument imd_ = 0x5F7Bb59365ce557C26dbcAa4EE9d39A4b95B7127 is an owner-controlled OFT with a blocklist and a transfers switch (the permissions specialist read these live; this review did not re-read the chain). SwarmDerby already fails closed where it can: a refused burn reverts the whole purchase before any turn is credited, a refused winner or slam prize rolls back into pot or vault, and a refused ops withdrawal restores opsBalance. What the contract cannot neutralize is a third party's power: blocking DEAD stops every buyTurns/buyPacks with TransferFailed; blocking the derby address or disabling transfers stops purchases, settlement tips, slam payouts and withdrawOps until reversed, while balances stay intact. Matches ADAPTATION.md item 3; recorded as a dependency trust assumption, not a SwarmDerby defect.","line":211,"path":"src/SwarmDerby.sol","reproduction":"Mock IMD whose transfer reverts for blocked recipients. 1) P calls buyTurns(0, 1): turns(0, P) == 1. 2) Token owner blocks 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000dEaD. 3) P calls buyTurns(0, 1). Expected: a second turn for 0.15 IMD. Actual: revert TransferFailed from _send(DEAD, burned); turns(0, P) still 1 and imd.balanceOf(derby) == pot(0) + vault(0) + opsBalance. Reproduced in scratch test test_blockedDeadHaltsPurchases on this tree.","severity":"info","snippet":"        _send(DEAD, burned);","title":"External trust: the IMD token owner's blocklist and transfer switch can halt purchases, burns and payouts"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Two paths produce tier FOUL with different feet. A reveal after FINALIZE_WINDOW, an ArbSys revert, or expire() leaves feet at 0, while DerbyOdds.roll assigns a FOUL a distance of 90..170 (lo = 90, span = 81). No funds, scores or boards depend on a foul's feet (only HOMER and above reach _recordDinger), so this is a reporting inconsistency visible to indexers and the site, not a loss. Cannot be changed without touching the emitted values, which the brief freezes; recorded for the site and bot maintainers.","line":323,"path":"src/SwarmDerby.sol","reproduction":"Player has 2 arcade turns, ArbSys block 1000. 1) swing(0, 100, 100, commitFor(salt, player)) -> swingId 0, target 1005. 2) setBlock(1005 + 256); finalize(0, salt) -> emits SwingResolved(0, player, 1, 0) and returns (1, 0). 3) Rig the next target hash so swing 1 rolls a FOUL, commit, advance 6 blocks, finalize(1, salt) -> returns (1, feet) with 90 <= feet <= 170. Expected: one convention for a foul's distance; actual: 0 on the late path, 90-170 on the rolled path. Reproduced in scratch test test_foulFeetDiffer on this tree.","severity":"info","snippet":"        if (bh == bytes32(0)) {\n            tier = DerbyOdds.FOUL;","title":"SwingResolved reports feet 0 for a late or expired foul but 90-170 ft for a rolled foul"}],"hash":"4c4ac13e9f0716367fb1d6812aa3de7189a668034c41a988a7a31927fbe71b33","nodeId":"6b3bdab2-25d3-4f05-a043-1d656f401c08","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is written at the repository root and validated: all four snippets match the tree at their stated lines, and the coverage record answers all 12 entry points plus three invariants. The scratch tests were removed, so no project file changed.\n\n**Outcome: no critical, high or medium defect in SwarmDerby.** The code can ship unchanged, which is what the brief asks for.\n\n**What I kept, after reproducing each in a Foundry scratch test on this tree:**\n\n- **Low (finding 1):** turns a wallet bought for itself before being bound as a session key are unspendable while bound, because purchase and swing both resolve `playerOf(msg.sender)` but at different moments. Recoverable via leaveSession or revocation, no loss. The owner's brief already accepts this.\n- **Info (finding 2):** the owner's price power has only a floor, no ceiling, delay or event. Buyers with standing allowances pay whatever price lands first. Recorded as the trust assumption the brief states, with its bounds verified: ops withdrawal is capped by the ops balance, and pot and vault are unreachable by the owner.\n- **Info (finding 3):** the IMD token's owner-controlled blocklist and transfer switch can halt purchases, burns and payouts. The contract fails closed in every case I traced, so this is a dependency trust assumption.\n- **Info (finding 4):** a late or expired foul emits feet 0 while a rolled foul emits 90 to 170 ft. Reporting inconsistency only, nothing economic reads a foul's distance.\n\n**What I dropped:** the flow specialist's claim that a token returning more than 32 bytes passes `_pull` but fails `_trySend`, leading to double-counted refunds. The burn inside the same purchase goes through `_send`, so the purchase reverts with TransferFailed and no turns or balances are credited. The contract never holds such a token's funds, and the launch token returns exactly 32 bytes anyway.\n\n**My own pass** found nothing further. I traced the EIP-712 session binding (no chains, no self-binding, per-key nonce, malleability guards), the settlement ordering and pot accounting, the reveal window against ArbSys's 256-block hash range, board insertion and eviction, and the constructor against the launch manifest. Block-hash randomness remains a sequencer trust assumption the design already documents, and I did not re-read the live token state on Robinhood Chain in this review.\n\nThe full suite passes, 73 tests including the 54 originals.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":878060,"inputTokens":354,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":30823,"runtime":"claude","turns":18,"wallClockMs":480424}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"9ab27edcfd62be02","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Paired surface: _buy (credit) vs swing (spend). Both resolve the beneficiary with playerOf(msg.sender), but at different moments. _buy credits turns[league][playerOf(caller)] at purchase time; swing debits turns[league][playerOf(caller)] at swing time. If the caller's playerOf changes in between (it buys as a standalone wallet, then signs consent and is bound as a session key), the turns it holds under its own address are not spendable: swing resolves to the player, whose balance is checked, and reverts NoTurns while turns[league][key] stays non-zero. No funds are lost; the key can leaveSession (or the player can revoke) and spend them. This is the known low (ADAPTATION.md item 1) that the owner chose to leave; it is reported here for completeness of the asymmetry pass and needs no code change under the brief. Access control, trust gap and asymmetry passes otherwise found no defect: owner powers are limited to setPrices (floor-checked), withdrawOps (bounded by opsBalance, cannot reach pot or vault) and two-step ownership; a bound session key cannot call setSession, cannot redirect any payout (slam and board credit go to the stored player), and its purchases credit the player; consent signatures bind player, key, nonce, chainId and contract and cannot be replayed by another player or after a rebind.","line":197,"path":"src/SwarmDerby.sol","reproduction":"State: fresh SwarmDerby, mock IMD, key K = vm.addr(0x5E55) holds IMD and approved the derby. 1) K calls buyTurns(0, 1): turns(0, K) == 1. 2) Player P calls setSession(K, sigK) where sigK is K's EIP-712 signature over sessionDigest(P, K). 3) K calls swing(0, 0, 50, 0x0). Expected by a user: the turn K paid for is spent. Actual: revert NoTurns; turns(0, K) is still 1 (turns(0, P) is 0). 4) K calls leaveSession() then swing(0, 0, 50, 0x0): succeeds, turns(0, K) == 0. Verified with a Foundry scratch test (test_preBindingTurnsStranded) against this tree.","severity":"low","snippet":"        address player = playerOf(msg.sender);\n        uint256 burned = (cost * BURN_BPS) / 10_000;\n        uint256 toPot = (cost * POT_BPS) / 10_000;\n        uint256 toVault = (cost * VAULT_BPS) / 10_000;\n        uint256 day = currentDay();\n\n        turns[league][player] += count;","title":"Asymmetry: turns a key bought for itself before binding are unreachable while it is bound"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Seam access x economics, documented as an accepted trust assumption (the brief: purchases have no maxCost; the owner will not change prices while people play). setPrices only enforces a floor (MIN_TURN_PRICE per turn), has no ceiling, no timelock and no event, and takes effect for the next _buy. The site's e2e flow approves then buys, and the agent bot runs unattended with an allowance; any buyer whose allowance exceeds count*newPrice pays the new price if the owner's setPrices lands before their buyTurns. The owner cannot reach pot or vault through this (the split still applies), so the only party exposed is the buyer, and only to the owner it already trusts. Recorded as the owner's power, not a defect; no change requested.","line":505,"path":"src/SwarmDerby.sol","reproduction":"State: owner O, player P with 200 IMD and allowance type(uint256).max to the derby. 1) O calls setPrices(100 ether, 500 ether): succeeds (floor is 0.01 per turn). 2) P's pending buyTurns(0, 1) executes: P pays 100 IMD for one turn (40 burned, 45 to the arcade day pot, 10 to the vault, 5 to ops). Expected under the owner's stated commitment: price stays 0.15 IMD. Actual on-chain: nothing prevents the change; verified with scratch test test_ownerBoundsAndTokenBlocklist (before - after == 100 ether). Also verified in the same test: withdrawOps(opsBalance + 1) reverts, setPrices(0.0099 ether, 0.5 ether) reverts BadPrice, and pot + vault remain 8.25 IMD and fully backed.","severity":"info","snippet":"    function setPrices(uint256 single, uint256 pack) external onlyOwner {\n        _checkPrices(single, pack);\n        singlePrice = single;\n        packPrice = pack;\n    }","title":"Trust assumption: owner may raise prices without bound or delay, so standing max allowances pay whatever the new price is"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Live check on Robinhood Chain (chain id 4663) of the constructor argument imd_ = 0x5F7Bb59365ce557C26dbcAa4EE9d39A4b95B7127: it has code, name 'Identity.md', symbol 'IMD', 18 decimals, totalSupply 48,423.98 IMD, owner() = 0x047F606fD5b2BaA5f5C6c4aB8958E45CB6B054B7, and exposes setBlocked(address,bool), blocked(address), enableTransfers() and transfersEnabled() (a LayerZero OFT with an owner blocklist). Current state: transfersEnabled() == true, blocked(0x000000000000000000000000000000000000dEaD) == false. ArbSys at address(100) answers arbBlockNumber() (82,166,365 at check time), so the reveal path's dependency is present. SwarmDerby handles refusals correctly where it can: a refused winner or slam prize rolls back into the pot or vault, and _send on the burn path reverts the whole purchase so no unbacked turns are credited. What remains is a third-party power the contract cannot neutralize: if the token owner blocks DEAD, every buyTurns/buyPacks reverts TransferFailed; if it blocks the derby address or disables transfers, purchases, settlement tips, slam payouts and withdrawOps all stop until reversed, while balances stay intact. This matches ADAPTATION.md item 3 and is recorded as a dependency trust assumption, not a SwarmDerby defect.","line":211,"path":"src/SwarmDerby.sol","reproduction":"State: derby holding 15 IMD of purchases (pot 6.75, vault 1.5, ops 0.75 in the arcade league). The token owner calls setBlocked(0x000000000000000000000000000000000000dEaD, true). Then any player calls buyTurns(0, 1). Expected: a turn for 0.15 IMD. Actual: revert TransferFailed from _send(DEAD, burned); no state change, derby balance still equals pot + vault + ops. Reproduced with a blocklisting mock token in scratch test test_ownerBoundsAndTokenBlocklist; the live token's blocklist state was read with cast call blocked(dEaD) == 0 at review time.","severity":"info","snippet":"        _send(DEAD, burned);","title":"External trust: the Robinhood IMD token's owner holds a blocklist and transfer switch over every purchase, burn and payout"}],"hash":"52c3e54a0d8dbfd98cc5a5740282cd905e5080364eccf0779e8c6b3220796f08","nodeId":"6306e9a1-90dc-4d22-9b31-c444e4c6e2d8","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings are in `.imd-findings.json`, the tree is otherwise unchanged, and the full suite still passes with 57 tests.\n\n**Outcome: no critical, high or medium defect in the Access Control, Trust Gap or Asymmetry areas.** The code can ship unchanged under the brief.\n\nWhat I checked, against the three Pashov guides:\n\n- **Permission map.** Owner reaches only `setPrices` (floor-checked), `withdrawOps` (bounded by the ops share) and two-step ownership. The pot and vault have no owner path. A bound session key cannot call `setSession` or any owner function, its purchases credit the player, and every slam and board credit goes to the stored player. Consent signatures bind player, key, nonce, chain and contract, so another player cannot replay them.\n- **Asymmetry diffs.** Buy vs. swing, whiff vs. contact, finalize vs. expire, settle vs. its preview view, pull vs. send. Accounting is updated before every external send, and the pot invariant holds across settlement and refused transfers.\n- **Live dependencies.** The constructor's token address on Robinhood Chain has code, reports symbol IMD with 18 decimals, and ArbSys at address 100 answers. The launch arguments pass the constructor's checks with the owner taken from the explicit argument, not the factory.\n\nFindings recorded:\n\n1. **Low.** Turns a key buys for itself before binding are unreachable while bound. Recoverable by leaving the session. This is the known low the owner already chose to keep.\n2. **Info.** The owner can raise prices with no ceiling or delay, so standing allowances pay the new price. Accepted by the owner in the brief.\n3. **Info.** The IMD token's owner holds a blocklist and transfer switch. Blocking the burn address would stop every purchase. Current live state is unblocked with transfers enabled.\n\nCoverage lists all 12 entry points plus the constructor and two invariants. The scratch tests that produced the exact reproductions were run and then removed.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1204555,"inputTokens":418,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":34030,"runtime":"claude","turns":26,"wallClockMs":620652}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"47470357c74e4755","findings":[],"hash":"60175e6b2ee1c87d54b95ef844abc0b4b41960af57979e6d3157e9bef712f274","nodeId":"4b1a88b8-4b54-42ad-9f8b-04cbb9a6c027","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file is written and the tree is otherwise untouched.\n\n**Result: no defects found in the economics.** `.imd-findings.json` holds an empty findings list and 16 coverage rows: one for each of the 12 entry points, three for the invariants and assumptions I checked, and one for the live token. All 12 entry points are marked `holds`. The full suite still passes (54 original tests plus 3 launch tests).\n\n**What I checked, against the Economic Security, Invariant and Flow Gap guides:**\n\n- **Purchase split and backing.** The 40/45/10/5 split is exact at the launch prices, dust goes to ops, and state is credited before a pull that reverts on failure. A scratch fuzz of 400 random 120-step sequences (buys at random floor-respecting prices, reveals rigged to every tier, late reveals, expiries, blocked slammers and winners, settlements, ops withdrawals) never broke `balance == pot + vault + ops`, `pot == unsettled dayPots + rollover`, strictly increasing day queues, or turn conservation. The scratch test was deleted afterwards since it supports no finding.\n- **Settlement math.** `paid` never exceeds the day's amount, pot is debited before transfers, refused prizes return to both rollover and pot, and the view and write paths use identical arithmetic. A settled day cannot be re-scored because settlement needs a block past every reveal window.\n- **Reveal incentives.** A non-reveal and a foul are identical, so withholding a bad roll never pays. Slam payouts and board credit always go to the player, never the session key.\n- **Live dependencies, read from Robinhood Chain.** The IMD address has code, reports `IMD` / 18 decimals, transfers are enabled, the burn address is not blocked, and a traced `transfer` is a plain full-amount move with no fee and no external calls. ArbSys answers at `0x64`. The chain runs about 8–10 blocks per second with several transactions per block, so the 255-block window is the documented ~25–30 s and a player cannot own a target block's contents to grind its hash.\n\n**What I could not verify.** The token is a LayerZero OFT with owner-only `setBlocked` and `setV4Config`; three zero-valued views and one `(uint256)` setter could not be named because the source is not verified on Blockscout (Cloudflare-gated) or Sourcify. If one of them is a future tax or transfer limit, the split accounting would under-collect, but that is the already-documented token-owner trust assumption, not a contract defect today.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1713483,"inputTokens":418,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":53297,"runtime":"claude","turns":36,"wallClockMs":909819}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"2fd398ca925c1a882cffb76d36495ce7c932935057de05afc147679a7f2b581b","device":"f6c59a24920668f6","findings":[],"hash":"7dbb255fce44f4db6a9c595da68d7b8f2988fd9b22e5f076765582c80c730acd","nodeId":"35c764a7-8b3e-4886-ad79-fdcd0d93128e","outcome":"completed","summary":"Added failure-path tests, fuzz tests, and stateful invariants covering 16,384 randomized calls.\n\nVerification: `forge build` passed; `forge test` finished with **73 passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped**.\n\nOnly `test/` changed. Production contracts and configuration remain unchanged. Integration checks use offline mocks; live-chain behavior remains unverified.","treeHash":"719e138d928a230d25331d9b4cda3b99ee12cb04","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2571648,"inputTokens":98978,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":25557,"runtime":"codex","turns":8,"wallClockMs":746795}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"200fd1b7c2986820e0a4bc172b25874837b2c705984406f8171d3f146d57b06b","device":"eedfe508061c8582","findings":[],"hash":"b8e58a010be92db64a353eb7d81177299f282cb475610b132733df503d3f97a6","nodeId":"8ad72cae-345b-434e-b989-30e0a2b5b53d","outcome":"completed","summary":"Adaptation complete. Both source files remain byte-identical.\n\n- Fixed the ArbSys test fixture and added three launch tests.\n- `forge build` passes.\n- `forge test`: **57 passed**—54 original plus 3 new.\n- Supplied protected deployment rehearsal passes.\n\n[ADAPTATION.md](/root/.identitymd/work/7b2d14d8-1923-4948-8a33-c8d85b741b2b/8ad72cae-345b-434e-b989-30e0a2b5b53d/ADAPTATION.md) records the exact arguments, changes and retained low-severity session-key limitation.\n\nNo on-chain transaction was broadcast.","treeHash":"fff9d438efd78031c6130617e6441c8efa638a87","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":3162496,"inputTokens":112650,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":18756,"runtime":"codex","turns":8,"wallClockMs":608305}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"2dc755dfe7bd177c","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Two paths produce tier FOUL with different `feet`. A reveal after FINALIZE_WINDOW (or an ArbSys revert) leaves `feet` at 0, while DerbyOdds.roll assigns a FOUL 90..170 ft (`lo = 90; span = 81`). `expire` also emits feet 0. No funds or scores depend on a foul's feet (only HOMER+ reach `_recordDinger`), so this is a reporting inconsistency for indexers and the site, not a loss. Execution-trace area: branch asymmetry inside `finalize`.","line":323,"path":"src/SwarmDerby.sol","reproduction":"State: player has 1 arcade turn, ArbSys block 1000. (1) swing(0,100,100,commitFor(salt,player)) -> swingId 0, target 1005. (2) setBlock(1005+256); finalize(0,salt) -> emits SwingResolved(0, player, 1, 0). (3) Fresh swing whose rigged target hash rolls a FOUL; finalize within the window -> emits SwingResolved(id, player, 1, feet) with feet in [90,170]. Expected: one convention for a foul's distance; actual: 0 on the late/expired path, 90-170 on the rolled path. Verified with a scratch test (test_foulFeetDiffer) on this tree.","severity":"info","snippet":"        if (bh == bytes32(0)) {\n            tier = DerbyOdds.FOUL;\n        } else {\n            (tier, feet) = DerbyOdds.roll(swingSeed(salt, bh), swingId, s.quality, s.velo);\n        }","title":"SwingResolved reports feet=0 for a forced foul but 90-170 ft for a rolled foul"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"`_pull` (line 555) treats any non-empty return data that decodes to true as success, while `_trySend` requires exactly 0 or 32 bytes. A token whose `transfer` returns true padded beyond 32 bytes would be accepted on purchase but every payout (`_send` -> TransferFailed, or `_trySend` -> false) would be treated as failed even though the tokens left the contract; the slam/settlement refund branches (`vault[s.league] += payout`, `rollover[league] += amounts[k]`) would then double-count. Not reachable with the deployed token: `cast call` on Robinhood Chain (chain 4663) shows IMD 0x5F7Bb59365ce557C26dbcAa4EE9d39A4b95B7127 is a LayerZero-OFT-style OZ ERC20 whose transfer/transferFrom return exactly 32 bytes (0x..01), so with the launch's constructor arguments this is only a periphery asymmetry worth knowing about, not a defect in the launch.","line":565,"path":"src/SwarmDerby.sol","reproduction":"Hypothetical token input, not the real IMD: deploy SwarmDerby against a mock whose transfer() returns abi.encode(true, 0) (64 bytes) and transferFrom() returns the same. buyTurns(0,1) succeeds (`_pull` decodes the first word as true). Rig a slam and finalize: `_trySend` returns false although the mock moved the tokens, so `vault` is re-credited while the contract balance dropped; `imd.balanceOf(derby) != pot+vault+ops`. Expected: both helpers apply the same acceptance rule. With the real IMD (32-byte returns) both helpers agree and no state diverges.","severity":"info","snippet":"        return ok && (data.length == 0 || (data.length == 32 && abi.decode(data, (bool))));","title":"_trySend and _pull accept different ERC20 return-data shapes (>32 bytes passes transferFrom, fails transfer)"}],"hash":"c0ff5de52818328e9ab875f21563c70fd5033ac6a1d603bf49c9114c59620db5","nodeId":"ed09b103-e1fc-456f-a9f6-84f5cd236c67","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. `.imd-findings.json` is written at the repository root; `git status` shows no changes other than that file (scratch tests removed), and `forge test` still passes (54 + 3 launch tests).\n\n## Summary\n\n**Area: Execution Trace, Periphery, First Principles** on `src/SwarmDerby.sol` and `src/DerbyOdds.sol`, judged against the Pashov guides.\n\n**Result: no critical, high or medium defect.** The code can ship as-is under the brief's constraints. Two informational items are recorded, each with a concrete repro:\n\n1. **`finalize` foul-feet asymmetry** (`src/SwarmDerby.sol:323`) — a late/expired foul emits `feet = 0`, a rolled foul emits 90–170 ft. Reporting only; no money or board depends on a foul's distance.\n2. **`_trySend` vs `_pull` return-data rule** (`src/SwarmDerby.sol:565`) — `_pull` accepts any ≥32-byte `true`, `_trySend` requires exactly 0 or 32 bytes. Not reachable with the deployed token: I verified via `cast` on Robinhood Chain (4663) that IMD `0x5F7B…7127` is a LayerZero-OFT-style OZ ERC20 returning exactly 32-byte `true`, with transfers to `0xdead` accepted and no hooks.\n\n**What I verified** (all 12 entry points answered, plus 8 invariant/periphery/deployment rows):\n- The core safety property — a day's board cannot change after settlement — holds by construction: `finalize` scores only while `current ≤ T+255 ≤ dayLastTarget+255`, settlement requires `current > dayLastTarget+255`; confirmed at both edge blocks with scratch tests, and per-league so one league never blocks the other.\n- Conservation `balance == pot₀+pot₁+vault₀+vault₁+ops` traced through every writer including the slam and winner refund branches.\n- Session mapping bijection `sessionPlayer[K]==P ⇔ sessionOf[P]==K`, no key chains, single-use EIP-712 consent, same-key rebind needs a fresh signature.\n- Live chain facts: ArbSys at `0x64` is present; block cadence is ~10 blocks/s, so `FINALIZE_WINDOW=255` ≈ 25 s as documented.\n\n**Not reached:** sequencer-level block-hash steering and L2 liveness stalls — these are the trust assumptions DEPLOY.md already states, and I attempted no contract-level reproduction.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1966594,"inputTokens":47,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":39798,"runtime":"claude","turns":25,"wallClockMs":657407}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"85f29f4c09dba910","findings":[],"hash":"ceabaeee433de165b4dc2bf44db324d411f9835a08ba33fd7c543e9344fbef49","nodeId":"2e263b8a-1d5e-4429-ad38-aecd637c0c8f","outcome":"completed","summary":"Both files are in place at the repository root, and the harness's own exclude list keeps them out of git as intended. The review is complete.\n\n**Result: no defects found in the math area.** The findings file at `.imd-findings.json` holds an empty findings list and 17 coverage rows, one for each of the 12 entry points plus five invariant and boundary checks.\n\n**What I verified, with numbers, using a scratch Foundry file under `test/scratch/`:**\n- **Purchase split.** Fuzzed single prices from 0.01 to 1e24 IMD and counts 1 to 1000. Burned, pot, vault and ops always sum to the cost, and ops absorbs at most 3 wei of rounding dust. The ops subtraction cannot underflow because the three floored shares sum to at most 95% of cost.\n- **Settlement.** Paid amounts are floors of a 60/25/15 split of 90% minus a 0.5% tip, so paid never exceeds the day's amount. The invariant that a league's pot equals its unsettled day pots plus rollover holds through purchase, settle and the unpayable-winner re-add, so the pot subtraction cannot underflow. Fuzzed pots from 0.0045 to 4500 IMD with 0 to 4 scorers conserve to the wei.\n- **Slam payout.** A vault under 10 wei pays zero without reverting and the homer still scores.\n- **Block boundaries.** A reveal at target plus 255 scores, target plus 256 is a foul, expire opens at exactly target plus 256, and a day closes at the same block. Nitro's ArbSys serves hashes down to current minus 256, so the contract stays strictly inside the served range.\n- **Odds table.** Closed forms for all five thresholds hold for every quality 0 to 100, strictly ordered so no tier inverts. The browser's floating-point floor matches the integer result for all 101 values. Feet bands never overlap and the slam band is exactly 550 to 620.\n\n**Chain facts checked against the public RPC.** IMD at the launch address has 18 decimals and is an OpenZeppelin v5 ERC20 with LayerZero OFT functions, a blocklist view and a transfers switch, with no transfer fee. ArbSys at address 100 has code and advances about 10 blocks a second, so the 5-block delay and 255-block window match the documented half second and 25 seconds.\n\n**Not covered.** I did not re-examine randomness steerability by a party who can shape a target block's contents, EIP-712 recovery details, or token blocklist governance beyond confirming the contract's documented handling. Those belong to the other specialists' areas.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1576119,"inputTokens":482,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":41967,"runtime":"claude","turns":30,"wallClockMs":615522}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"dff6c0d3de4aa913","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"_buy credits playerOf(msg.sender) and swing spends turns[league][playerOf(msg.sender)]. Both resolve to the caller while it is unbound and to its player once bound, so turns that landed on the key's own address before setSession cannot be spent by anyone until the key leaves the session (leaveSession) or the player revokes it. No funds are lost and the state is recoverable, but a key that funded itself first (the page funds keys with gas; a user may also send it turns) silently loses access to those turns and gets NoTurns even though turns(league, key) > 0. Scope and coverage: read in full src/SwarmDerby.sol (567 lines, every external/public state-changing function traced: buyTurns, buyPacks, setSession, leaveSession, swing, finalize, expire, settleNextDay, setPrices, withdrawOps, transferOwnership, acceptOwnership) and src/DerbyOdds.sol (69 lines), test/SwarmDerby.t.sol (54 tests, all pass), web/derby-odds.js, e2e/Mocks.sol, DEPLOY.md, HANDOFF.md, the Pashov guide and the protected deploy test. Passes applied: access control, math/rounding, economic (slam vault EV, pot/rollover conservation), execution trace and reentrancy (CEI holds on every token call), invariants (pot[l] == sum of unsettled dayPot + rollover; day queue monotone; a swing can never score after its day settles because dayClosed needs arbBlockNumber > lastTarget+255 while a non-foul finalize needs current-target <= 255), boundary (token return-data shapes, ArbSys revert path, zero amounts), asymmetry (setSession/leaveSession, finalize/expire), trust gaps (session keys, commit binding). External dependencies verified live against Robinhood Chain RPC (chain id 4663): ArbSys at 0x64 has code 0xfe and arbBlockNumber() answers (82,153,340); block cadence ~103 ms; IMD 0x5F7Bb59365ce557C26dbcAa4EE9d39A4b95B7127 is 'Identity.md' (IMD, 18 decimals), a LayerZero OFT ERC20 whose transfer delivers the full amount and returns a 32-byte true (eth_call with code override at a real holder), with transfersEnabled() == true and a blocked(address) list. Blockscout (Cloudflare-gated) could not be reached, so the token's source was not read; its behaviour was established from bytecode selectors and simulated calls only. Verdict: no critical, high or medium defect found; the per-day board payout, commit-reveal, session consent, cap and split logic behave as specified. Launch-forbidden items: no mint, pause, freeze, blacklist, DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE, SELFDESTRUCT, proxy or initializer in the deployed contract; runtime 12,599 bytes.","line":197,"path":"src/SwarmDerby.sol","reproduction":"State: key K unbound. K calls buyTurns(0, 1): turns(0, K) == 1. Alice calls setSession(K, consent). K calls swing(0, 50, 50, commitFor(salt, Alice)) with Alice holding no arcade turns. Expected: either the key's own turn is spent or it followed the key's player. Actual: revert NoTurns while turns(0, K) is still 1; after K calls leaveSession the same swing succeeds. Reproduced with a scratch Foundry test (StrandedTurnsTest.test_turnsBoughtBeforeBindingAreUnusableWhileBound, passing against current code as a demonstration).","severity":"low","snippet":"        address player = playerOf(msg.sender);","title":"Turns bought by an address before it is bound as a session key are unusable while bound"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The launch reference flags anything configured after deployment rather than in the constructor. SwarmDerby's owner can change singlePrice/packPrice at any time (floored at MIN_TURN_PRICE 0.01 IMD per turn), withdraw the 5% ops share and hand ownership over in two steps. The owner cannot touch pot[], vault[] or rollover, cannot pause, freeze or blacklist, and cannot renounce. The requester explicitly accepted no maxCost on purchases and committed not to change prices while people play, and the ABI is frozen for the published site and bots, so this is recorded as a trust assumption rather than a change request. Documented here so the adapter and the final panel see the actor and preconditions.","line":505,"path":"src/SwarmDerby.sol","reproduction":"Owner calls setPrices(1 ether, 5 ether) while a player's buyTurns(0, 1) is in flight; the player's purchase lands at the new price and pays 1 IMD instead of 0.15 IMD (no revert, no maxCost). setPrices(0.009 ether, 0.05 ether) reverts BadPrice; withdrawOps(to, opsBalance()+1) reverts (underflow), so pots and vaults are unreachable by the owner.","severity":"info","snippet":"    function setPrices(uint256 single, uint256 pack) external onlyOwner {","title":"Owner runtime powers: setPrices and withdrawOps are post-deployment configuration (accepted trust assumption)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Verified live on chain 4663: IMD 0x5F7Bb59365ce557C26dbcAa4EE9d39A4b95B7127 is a LayerZero OFT with transfersEnabled()/enableTransfers() and blocked(address). No transfer fee was observed (0.01 IMD sent, 0.01 received, returns true), so the 40/45/10/5 split and all balances reconcile. If the token owner blocks 0xdEaD or this contract, or disables transfers, every purchase reverts TransferFailed at the burn, settleNextDay reverts at the settler tip (_send) and withdrawOps reverts; prizes already accounted stay in pot/vault until the block lifts (a blocked winner's or slammer's prize rolls over / stays in the vault, which the code handles). This is an inherent property of the chosen token, already listed in DEPLOY.md's known limits; no change to SwarmDerby is proposed.","line":559,"path":"src/SwarmDerby.sol","reproduction":"State: token has blocked(0x000000000000000000000000000000000000dEaD) == true (or transfersEnabled() == false). Player calls buyTurns(0, 1) with sufficient balance and allowance. Expected per the game: 1 turn credited. Actual: transferFrom succeeds, then transfer to DEAD returns false/reverts and _send reverts TransferFailed, undoing the purchase. Likewise settleNextDay(league) reverts when the token refuses the caller's tip, though any unblocked caller can settle instead.","severity":"info","snippet":"        if (!_trySend(to, amount)) revert TransferFailed();","title":"External dependency: the Robinhood IMD token can block addresses or disable transfers, which halts purchases, burns, tips and ops withdrawals"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Measured block cadence on chain 4663 is ~103 ms (36,732 blocks in 3,792 s), so FINALIZE_WINDOW = 255 blocks is about 26 s after the target block, matching the code comment. A swing whose finalize is mined later than target+255 is scored FOUL even with the correct salt, and expire can close it. For a player without a session key this means two wallet confirmations (swing, then finalize) within roughly half a minute; a slow confirmation loses that turn's 0.15 IMD of value with no refund. This is the documented design (unrevealed swings must be fouls so a bad roll cannot be hidden) and the chain produces blocks continuously, so the window cannot stall; recorded for the site operator rather than as a code defect.","line":65,"path":"src/SwarmDerby.sol","reproduction":"swing(0, 100, 100, commit) at arbBlockNumber N sets targetBlock N+5. finalize(id, salt) at arbBlockNumber N+5+255 returns the rolled tier; the same call at N+5+256 returns (FOUL, 0) and the turn is consumed. Covered by the existing tests test_revealAtWindowEdgeStillCounts and test_lateRevealIsFoul.","severity":"info","snippet":"    uint256 public constant FINALIZE_WINDOW = 255;","title":"Reveal window is ~26 s on Robinhood Chain; a finalize that lands later costs the turn"}],"hash":"fb5a293c068b4935473c0b142602af7e82238339d973b1822c478ce533d4652d","nodeId":"993d558f-59b1-46d0-8912-32746f594eed","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. `.imd-findings.json` is written at the repository root, `test/scratch/` is removed, and `git status` shows no tracked file changed.\n\n## Summary\n\n**Verdict: no critical, high or medium defect.** The code can ship as it is; nothing in the report asks for an ABI, constant, split, price or payout-math change, and `src/DerbyOdds.sol` is untouched.\n\n**What I read:** `src/SwarmDerby.sol` (every state-changing entry point traced), `src/DerbyOdds.sol`, the 54-test suite (passes), `web/derby-odds.js`, `e2e/Mocks.sol`, DEPLOY/HANDOFF, the Pashov guide and the protected deploy test. Key invariants hold: CEI on every token call; `pot[l] == Σ unsettled dayPot + rollover`; the day queue is monotone; a swing can never score into an already-settled day (settlement needs `arbBlockNumber > lastTarget+255`, a non-foul finalize needs `current−target ≤ 255`); session consent is player-bound, nonce'd, malleability-checked; the commit binds `player` so copied commits are dead. Runtime is 12,599 bytes with no forbidden opcodes, no proxy/initializer/pause/blacklist.\n\n**What I verified live on Robinhood Chain (4663):** ArbSys at `0x64` exists and answers; blocks run at ~103 ms so the 255-block window is really ~26 s and the chain never stalls; the IMD token at `0x5F7B…` is a LayerZero OFT, delivers transfers in full with a 32-byte `true` (no fee), and has `transfersEnabled()`/`blocked(address)` as the docs state. **Not reached:** Blockscout is Cloudflare-gated, so the token's verified source was not read — its behaviour is established from bytecode selectors and simulated calls only.\n\n**Findings (4):**\n1. **Low** — `src/SwarmDerby.sol:197`: turns bought by an address *before* it is bound as a session key are stuck while bound (`NoTurns` despite `turns(l,key)>0`); recoverable via `leaveSession`. Confirmed with a scratch test.\n2. **Info** — `:505`: `setPrices`/`withdrawOps` are owner runtime powers; recorded as the accepted trust assumption (floored price, pots/vaults unreachable) rather than a change request, since the brief freezes the ABI and accepts no-`maxCost`.\n3. **Info** — `:559`: the token's block list / transfer switch can halt purchases, burns, tips and ops withdrawals; already in DEPLOY.md's known limits, handled where the contract can.\n4. **Info** — `:65`: the ~26 s reveal window means a slow non-session finalize forfeits the turn; by design, covered by existing tests.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1168118,"inputTokens":424,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":37497,"runtime":"claude","turns":29,"wallClockMs":589940}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":24335,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 23 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 23.99s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[boolean-cst]: misuse of a boolean constant\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:436:48\n    │\n436 │         if (i >= _days[league].length) return (false, false, 0, 0, 0);\n    │                                                ━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/boolean-cst\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/DerbyOdds.sol:67:16\n   │\n67 │         feet = uint16(lo + (d % span));\n   │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint16' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[boolean-cst]: misuse of a boolean constant\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:436:55\n    │\n436 │         if (i >= _days[league].length) return (false, false, 0, 0, 0);\n    │                                                       ━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/boolean-cst\n\nwarning[missing-events-arithmetic]: `singlePrice` is changed without an event but is used in arithmetic\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:507:9\n    │\n507 │         singlePrice = single;\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-events-arithmetic\n\nwarning[missing-events-arithmetic]: `packPrice` is changed without an event but is used in arithmetic\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:508:9\n    │\n508 │         packPrice = pack;\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-events-arithmetic\n\nwarning[missing-events-access-control]: `owner` is changed without an event but is used for access control\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:528:9\n    │\n528 │         owner = msg.sender;\n    │         ━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-events-access-control\n\nwarning[missing-events-access-control]: `pendingOwner` is changed without an event but is used for access control\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:529:9\n    │\n529 │         pendingOwner = address(0);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-events-access-control\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:212:9\n    │\n212 │         emit TurnsBought(player, league, count, cost, burned);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:296:91\n    │\n296 │             swings[swingId] = Swing(player, league, 0, velo, Status.Final, 0, bytes32(0), uint32(day));\n    │                                                                                           ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint32' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:302:25\n    │\n302 │         uint64 target = uint64(ARB_SYS.arbBlockNumber() + REVEAL_DELAY);\n    │                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint64' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:305:98\n    │\n305 │         swings[swingId] = Swing(player, league, quality, velo, Status.Committed, target, commit, uint32(day));\n    │                                                                                                  ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint32' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `vault` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:564:40\n    │\n564 │         (bool ok, bytes memory data) = address(imd).call(abi.encodeCall(IERC20.transfer, (to, amount)));\n    │                                        ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[uninitialized-local]: local variable is read before being initialized\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:323:13\n    │\n323 │         if (bh == bytes32(0)) {\n    │             ━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/uninitialized-local\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:339:13\n    │\n339 │             emit GrandSlam(swingId, s.player, s.league, feet, payout);\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:341:9\n    │\n341 │         emit SwingResolved(swingId, s.player, tier, feet);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[divide-before-multiply]: division before multiplication may lose precision\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:441:51\n    │\n441 │         if (_board[league][day].length > 0) tip = (amount * PAYOUT_BPS / 10_000) * SETTLE_TIP_BPS / 10_000;\n    │                                                   ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/divide-before-multiply\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `rollover` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:564:40\n    │\n564 │         (bool ok, bytes memory data) = address(imd).call(abi.encodeCall(IERC20.transfer, (to, amount)));\n    │                                        ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[divide-before-multiply]: division before multiplication may lose precision\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:465:19\n    │\n465 │             tip = (distributable * SETTLE_TIP_BPS) / 10_000;\n    │                   ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/divide-before-multiply\n\nwarning[uninitialized-local]: local variable is read before being initialized\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:477:27\n    │\n477 │         _send(msg.sender, tip);\n    │                           ━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/uninitialized-local\n\nwarning[uninitialized-local]: local variable is read before being initialized\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:475:37\n    │\n475 │         rollover[league] = amount - paid;\n    │                                     ━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/uninitialized-local\n\nwarning[calls-loop]: external call inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:564:40\n    │\n564 │         (bool ok, bytes memory data) = address(imd).call(abi.encodeCall(IERC20.transfer, (to, amount)));\n    │                                        ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/calls-loop\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:485:9\n    │\n485 │         emit DaySettled(league, day, winners, amounts, msg.sender, tip, rollover[league]);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[missing-zero-check]: address parameter is used in a state write or value transfer without a zero-address check\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:519:32\n    │\n519 │     function transferOwnership(address to) external onlyOwner {\n    │                                ━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-zero-check\n\nwarning[environment-read-across-mutation]: `block.timestamp` may be reused across `vm.warp`\n    ╭▸ test/SwarmDerby.t.sol:141:18\n    │\n141 │         vm.warp((block.timestamp / 1 days + 1) * 1 days + 1);\n    │         ─────────━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━──────────────────────────── `vm.warp` changes this environment here\n    │\n    ├ help: capture it with `vm.getBlockTimestamp()` instead\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/environment-read-across-mutation\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":487,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 3 tests for test/SwarmDerbyLaunch.t.sol:SwarmDerbyLaunchTest\n[PASS] test_factoryDeploymentIsFullyConfigured() (gas: 101211)\nLogs:\n  computeCreate2Address is deprecated. Please use vm.computeCreate2Address instead.\n\n[PASS] test_missingTokenRejectsPurchasesWithoutCreditingState() (gas: 776427)\nLogs:\n  computeCreate2Address is deprecated. Please use vm.computeCreate2Address instead.\n\n[PASS] test_runtimeMeetsLaunchLimits() (gas: 2922269)\nLogs:\n  computeCreate2Address is deprecated. Please use vm.computeCreate2Address instead.\n\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 267.42ms (7.07ms CPU time)\n\nRan 54 tests for test/SwarmDerby.t.sol:SwarmDerbyTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_boardsAreTopTen(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 5055037, ~: 5051810)\n[PASS] testFuzz_settlementConserves(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 5525822, ~: 5583266)\n[PASS] test_agentLeagueHasNoCap() (gas: 2695596)\n[PASS] test_arcadeCapIsTwentyPerDay() (gas: 2523316)\n[PASS] test_arcadeKeepsLongestAgentKeepsTotal() (gas: 298076)\n[PASS] test_badLeagueRejected() (gas: 32903)\n[PASS] test_boardResetsEachDay() (gas: 216345)\n[PASS] test_buyPackSplitsPerLeague() (gas: 518853)\n[PASS] test_capCountsSessionSwingsForThePlayer() (gas: 2274997)\n[PASS] test_commitBoundToPlayer() (gas: 588030)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroAddressesAndFreeTurns() (gas: 1145480)\n[PASS] test_contactNeedsCommit() (gas: 334529)\n[PASS] test_eachDaySettlesOnceInOrder() (gas: 1443294)\n[PASS] test_emptyDayRollsOverWithoutTip() (gas: 1103462)\n[PASS] test_expireUnrevealed() (gas: 613957)\n[PASS] test_finalizeTooEarly() (gas: 503290)\n[PASS] test_finalizeUpdatesArcadeBoard() (gas: 629262)\n[PASS] test_fullSwingMatchesOdds() (gas: 522204)\n[PASS] test_lateFinalizeScoresOnCommitDay() (gas: 664441)\n[PASS] test_lateRevealIsFoul() (gas: 516676)\n[PASS] test_leagueTurnsAreSeparate() (gas: 295691)\n[PASS] test_leaveSessionFreesTheKey() (gas: 205604)\n[PASS] test_nextSettlementBeforeAnything() (gas: 11875)\n[PASS] test_oddsMonotoneInQuality() (gas: 316953)\n[PASS] test_ownerIsConstructorArg() (gas: 2913055)\n[PASS] test_ownerOnlyReachesOps() (gas: 418230)\n[PASS] test_ownershipIsTwoStep() (gas: 169425)\n[PASS] test_ownershipMoveCanBeCancelled() (gas: 113732)\n[PASS] test_parityWithBrowser() (gas: 63207)\n[PASS] test_priceFloor() (gas: 100369)\n[PASS] test_qualityAndVeloBounded() (gas: 317033)\n[PASS] test_revealAtWindowEdgeStillCounts() (gas: 615293)\n[PASS] test_sessionBuysForThePlayer() (gas: 483847)\n[PASS] test_sessionCannotBeClaimedTwice() (gas: 179047)\n[PASS] test_sessionChainsRejected() (gas: 376408)\n[PASS] test_sessionConsentIsSingleUse() (gas: 313939)\n[PASS] test_sessionNeedsTheKeysConsent() (gas: 161377)\n[PASS] test_sessionRevokeAndRotate() (gas: 300545)\n[PASS] test_sessionSwingsForPlayer() (gas: 671328)\n[PASS] test_settleAgentLeague() (gas: 633377)\n[PASS] test_settlePaysOnlyThatDaysPot() (gas: 1162747)\n[PASS] test_settlePaysTheDaysTopThree() (gas: 1224388)\n[PASS] test_settleWaitsForTheDayToEnd() (gas: 927961)\n[PASS] test_settleWaitsForTheLastReveal() (gas: 687692)\n[PASS] test_singleTurnPrice() (gas: 285720)\n[PASS] test_slamPaysTenPercentOfItsLeagueVault() (gas: 4962671)\n[PASS] test_swingStoresVelo() (gas: 449101)\n[PASS] test_tokenWithoutCodeRefusesPurchases() (gas: 3276413)\n[PASS] test_underPowerLineNoBombOrSlam() (gas: 29184887)\n[PASS] test_unpayableSlamKeepsPrizeAndHomer() (gas: 4747473)\n[PASS] test_unpayableWinnerRollsOver() (gas: 997522)\n[PASS] test_whiffCostsTurnNoRoll() (gas: 404595)\n[PASS] test_wrongSaltRejected() (gas: 498546)\n[PASS] test_zeroCountPurchaseReverts() (gas: 77131)\nSuite result: ok. 54 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 314.14ms (792.79ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 test suites in 317.80ms (581.56ms CPU time): 57 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (57 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":86,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"SwarmDerby.acceptOwnership()\",\"SwarmDerby.buyPacks(uint8,uint256)\",\"SwarmDerby.buyTurns(uint8,uint256)\",\"SwarmDerby.expire(uint256)\",\"SwarmDerby.finalize(uint256,bytes32)\",\"SwarmDerby.leaveSession()\",\"SwarmDerby.setPrices(uint256,uint256)\",\"SwarmDerby.setSession(address,bytes)\",\"SwarmDerby.settleNextDay(uint8)\",\"SwarmDerby.swing(uint8,uint8,uint8,bytes32)\",\"SwarmDerby.transferOwnership(address)\",\"SwarmDerby.withdrawOps(address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":5,\"ADAPTATION.md\":140,\"DEPLOY.md\":144,\"HANDOFF.md\":132,\"LICENSE\":21,\"README.md\":15,\"e2e/Mocks.sol\":27,\"e2e/README.md\":22,\"e2e/board.py\":47,\"e2e/leagues.py\":35,\"e2e/play.py\":63,\"e2e/recover.py\":23,\"e2e/settle.py\":55,\"e2e/setup.py\":30,\"foundry.toml\":9,\"imd-check.mjs\":40,\"launch.json\":15,\"src/DerbyOdds.sol\":69,\"src/SwarmDerby.sol\":567,\"test/SwarmDerby.t.sol\":923,\"test/SwarmDerbyLaunch.t.sol\":95,\"web/derby-odds.js\":48},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"2c7df81e7058a93be55c69376cf8819bc1a44fc891124a17ed1b13c00161e7c3","verifiedTreeHash":"f60336ad8778e3a01a898e513d4d7393ce2153cb","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+7471272e"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":43136,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 27 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 42.89s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[boolean-cst]: misuse of a boolean constant\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:436:48\n    │\n436 │         if (i >= _days[league].length) return (false, false, 0, 0, 0);\n    │                                                ━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/boolean-cst\n\nwarning[boolean-cst]: misuse of a boolean constant\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:436:55\n    │\n436 │         if (i >= _days[league].length) return (false, false, 0, 0, 0);\n    │                                                       ━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/boolean-cst\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/DerbyOdds.sol:67:16\n   │\n67 │         feet = uint16(lo + (d % span));\n   │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint16' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[missing-events-arithmetic]: `singlePrice` is changed without an event but is used in arithmetic\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:507:9\n    │\n507 │         singlePrice = single;\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-events-arithmetic\n\nwarning[missing-events-arithmetic]: `packPrice` is changed without an event but is used in arithmetic\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:508:9\n    │\n508 │         packPrice = pack;\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-events-arithmetic\n\nwarning[missing-events-access-control]: `owner` is changed without an event but is used for access control\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:528:9\n    │\n528 │         owner = msg.sender;\n    │         ━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-events-access-control\n\nwarning[missing-events-access-control]: `pendingOwner` is changed without an event but is used for access control\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:529:9\n    │\n529 │         pendingOwner = address(0);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-events-access-control\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:212:9\n    │\n212 │         emit TurnsBought(player, league, count, cost, burned);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:296:91\n    │\n296 │             swings[swingId] = Swing(player, league, 0, velo, Status.Final, 0, bytes32(0), uint32(day));\n    │                                                                                           ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint32' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:302:25\n    │\n302 │         uint64 target = uint64(ARB_SYS.arbBlockNumber() + REVEAL_DELAY);\n    │                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint64' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:305:98\n    │\n305 │         swings[swingId] = Swing(player, league, quality, velo, Status.Committed, target, commit, uint32(day));\n    │                                                                                                  ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint32' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `vault` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:564:40\n    │\n564 │         (bool ok, bytes memory data) = address(imd).call(abi.encodeCall(IERC20.transfer, (to, amount)));\n    │                                        ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[uninitialized-local]: local variable is read before being initialized\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:323:13\n    │\n323 │         if (bh == bytes32(0)) {\n    │             ━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/uninitialized-local\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:339:13\n    │\n339 │             emit GrandSlam(swingId, s.player, s.league, feet, payout);\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:341:9\n    │\n341 │         emit SwingResolved(swingId, s.player, tier, feet);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[divide-before-multiply]: division before multiplication may lose precision\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:441:51\n    │\n441 │         if (_board[league][day].length > 0) tip = (amount * PAYOUT_BPS / 10_000) * SETTLE_TIP_BPS / 10_000;\n    │                                                   ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/divide-before-multiply\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `rollover` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:564:40\n    │\n564 │         (bool ok, bytes memory data) = address(imd).call(abi.encodeCall(IERC20.transfer, (to, amount)));\n    │                                        ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[divide-before-multiply]: division before multiplication may lose precision\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:465:19\n    │\n465 │             tip = (distributable * SETTLE_TIP_BPS) / 10_000;\n    │                   ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/divide-before-multiply\n\nwarning[uninitialized-local]: local variable is read before being initialized\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:475:37\n    │\n475 │         rollover[league] = amount - paid;\n    │                                     ━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/uninitialized-local\n\nwarning[uninitialized-local]: local variable is read before being initialized\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:477:27\n    │\n477 │         _send(msg.sender, tip);\n    │                           ━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/uninitialized-local\n\nwarning[calls-loop]: external call inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:564:40\n    │\n564 │         (bool ok, bytes memory data) = address(imd).call(abi.encodeCall(IERC20.transfer, (to, amount)));\n    │                                        ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/calls-loop\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:485:9\n    │\n485 │         emit DaySettled(league, day, winners, amounts, msg.sender, tip, rollover[league]);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[missing-zero-check]: address parameter is used in a state write or value transfer without a zero-address check\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:519:32\n    │\n519 │     function transferOwnership(address to) external onlyOwner {\n    │                                ━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-zero-check\n\nwarning[environment-read-across-mutation]: `block.timestamp` may be reused across `vm.warp`\n    ╭▸ test/SwarmDerby.t.sol:141:18\n    │\n141 │         vm.warp((block.timestamp / 1 days + 1) * 1 days + 1);\n    │         ─────────━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━──────────────────────────── `vm.warp` changes this environment here\n    │\n    ├ help: capture it with `vm.getBlockTimestamp()` instead\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/environment-read-across-mutation\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":16660,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 3 tests for test/SwarmDerbyLaunch.t.sol:SwarmDerbyLaunchTest\n[PASS] test_factoryDeploymentIsFullyConfigured() (gas: 101211)\nLogs:\n  computeCreate2Address is deprecated. Please use vm.computeCreate2Address instead.\n\n[PASS] test_missingTokenRejectsPurchasesWithoutCreditingState() (gas: 776427)\nLogs:\n  computeCreate2Address is deprecated. Please use vm.computeCreate2Address instead.\n\n[PASS] test_runtimeMeetsLaunchLimits() (gas: 2922269)\nLogs:\n  computeCreate2Address is deprecated. Please use vm.computeCreate2Address instead.\n\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 126.27ms (8.68ms CPU time)\n\nRan 13 tests for test/SwarmDerbyFailures.t.sol:SwarmDerbyFailuresTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_invalidLeagueCannotSpendOrCreateActivity(uint8) (runs: 1000, μ: 452485, ~: 452470)\n[PASS] testFuzz_refusedPurchaseIsAtomic(uint8,uint8,uint96,bool) (runs: 1000, μ: 455533, ~: 455349)\n[PASS] test_allRefusedWinnersRollOverAndDoNotStallQueue() (gas: 1232442)\n[PASS] test_emptyTokenReturnDataIsSupported() (gas: 229345)\n[PASS] test_failedOpsWithdrawalRestoresBalanceAndCannotReachPrizes() (gas: 540245)\n[PASS] test_failedSessionRotationKeepsOldBindingAndNonce() (gas: 211060)\n[PASS] test_hashFailureOrZeroHashFinalizesAsFoulExactlyOnce() (gas: 715852)\n[PASS] test_maximumPurchaseCountsRevertWithoutCredit() (gas: 179201)\n[PASS] test_refusedSettlerTipRollsBackAndAnotherCallerCanSettle() (gas: 904516)\n[PASS] test_rejectedSwingDoesNotSpendTurnCapOrIdentifier() (gas: 550016)\n[PASS] test_revealAndExpiryHaveComplementaryWindowBoundaries() (gas: 675311)\n[PASS] test_sessionConsentRejectsMalformedMalleableAndWrongDomainSignatures() (gas: 341880)\n[PASS] test_unauthorizedAdminCallsCannotChangeFundedState() (gas: 467400)\nSuite result: ok. 13 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 130.30ms (299.28ms CPU time)\n\nRan 54 tests for test/SwarmDerby.t.sol:SwarmDerbyTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_boardsAreTopTen(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 5050773, ~: 5052667)\n[PASS] testFuzz_settlementConserves(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 5541404, ~: 5589414)\n[PASS] test_agentLeagueHasNoCap() (gas: 2695596)\n[PASS] test_arcadeCapIsTwentyPerDay() (gas: 2523316)\n[PASS] test_arcadeKeepsLongestAgentKeepsTotal() (gas: 298076)\n[PASS] test_badLeagueRejected() (gas: 32903)\n[PASS] test_boardResetsEachDay() (gas: 216345)\n[PASS] test_buyPackSplitsPerLeague() (gas: 518853)\n[PASS] test_capCountsSessionSwingsForThePlayer() (gas: 2274997)\n[PASS] test_commitBoundToPlayer() (gas: 588030)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroAddressesAndFreeTurns() (gas: 1145480)\n[PASS] test_contactNeedsCommit() (gas: 334529)\n[PASS] test_eachDaySettlesOnceInOrder() (gas: 1443294)\n[PASS] test_emptyDayRollsOverWithoutTip() (gas: 1103462)\n[PASS] test_expireUnrevealed() (gas: 613957)\n[PASS] test_finalizeTooEarly() (gas: 503290)\n[PASS] test_finalizeUpdatesArcadeBoard() (gas: 629262)\n[PASS] test_fullSwingMatchesOdds() (gas: 522204)\n[PASS] test_lateFinalizeScoresOnCommitDay() (gas: 664441)\n[PASS] test_lateRevealIsFoul() (gas: 516676)\n[PASS] test_leagueTurnsAreSeparate() (gas: 295691)\n[PASS] test_leaveSessionFreesTheKey() (gas: 205604)\n[PASS] test_nextSettlementBeforeAnything() (gas: 11875)\n[PASS] test_oddsMonotoneInQuality() (gas: 316953)\n[PASS] test_ownerIsConstructorArg() (gas: 2913055)\n[PASS] test_ownerOnlyReachesOps() (gas: 418230)\n[PASS] test_ownershipIsTwoStep() (gas: 169425)\n[PASS] test_ownershipMoveCanBeCancelled() (gas: 113732)\n[PASS] test_parityWithBrowser() (gas: 63207)\n[PASS] test_priceFloor() (gas: 100369)\n[PASS] test_qualityAndVeloBounded() (gas: 317033)\n[PASS] test_revealAtWindowEdgeStillCounts() (gas: 615293)\n[PASS] test_sessionBuysForThePlayer() (gas: 483847)\n[PASS] test_sessionCannotBeClaimedTwice() (gas: 179047)\n[PASS] test_sessionChainsRejected() (gas: 376408)\n[PASS] test_sessionConsentIsSingleUse() (gas: 313939)\n[PASS] test_sessionNeedsTheKeysConsent() (gas: 161377)\n[PASS] test_sessionRevokeAndRotate() (gas: 300545)\n[PASS] test_sessionSwingsForPlayer() (gas: 671328)\n[PASS] test_settleAgentLeague() (gas: 633377)\n[PASS] test_settlePaysOnlyThatDaysPot() (gas: 1162747)\n[PASS] test_settlePaysTheDaysTopThree() (gas: 1224388)\n[PASS] test_settleWaitsForTheDayToEnd() (gas: 927961)\n[PASS] test_settleWaitsForTheLastReveal() (gas: 687692)\n[PASS] test_singleTurnPrice() (gas: 285720)\n[PASS] test_slamPaysTenPercentOfItsLeagueVault() (gas: 4962671)\n[PASS] test_swingStoresVelo() (gas: 449101)\n[PASS] test_tokenWithoutCodeRefusesPurchases() (gas: 3276413)\n[PASS] test_underPowerLineNoBombOrSlam() (gas: 29184887)\n[PASS] test_unpayableSlamKeepsPrizeAndHomer() (gas: 4747473)\n[PASS] test_unpayableWinnerRollsOver() (gas: 997522)\n[PASS] test_whiffCostsTurnNoRoll() (gas: 404595)\n[PASS] test_wrongSaltRejected() (gas: 498546)\n[PASS] test_zeroCountPurchaseReverts() (gas: 77131)\nSuite result: ok. 54 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 278.40ms (659.96ms CPU time)\n\nRan 3 tests for test/SwarmDerbyInvariant.t.sol:SwarmDerbyInvariantTest\n[PASS]\nSwarmDerbyInvariantTest invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_turnsSessionsAndFinalityMatchPublicActions\n[PASS] invariant_valueIsConservedAcrossBothLeagues\n SwarmDerbyInvariantTest invariants (runs: 256, calls: 16384, reverts: 0)\n\n╭--------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract     | Selector       | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+============================================================+\n| DerbyHandler | advance        | 2023  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| DerbyHandler | buy            | 2106  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| DerbyHandler | failedPurchase | 2073  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| DerbyHandler | resolve        | 2041  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| DerbyHandler | session        | 2099  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| DerbyHandler | settle         | 2039  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| DerbyHandler | swing          | 1975  | 0       | 0        |\n|--------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| DerbyHandler | withdraw       | 2028  | 0       | 0        |\n╰--------------+----------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\n[PASS] test_handlerExercisesPayoutFailureSessionAndClosurePaths() (gas: 2433445)\n[PASS] test_publicSwingsExerciseTopTenEviction() (gas: 10010878)\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 16.52s (16.50s CPU time)\n\nRan 4 test suites in 16.52s (17.05s CPU time): 73 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (73 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":93,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"SwarmDerby.acceptOwnership()\",\"SwarmDerby.buyPacks(uint8,uint256)\",\"SwarmDerby.buyTurns(uint8,uint256)\",\"SwarmDerby.expire(uint256)\",\"SwarmDerby.finalize(uint256,bytes32)\",\"SwarmDerby.leaveSession()\",\"SwarmDerby.setPrices(uint256,uint256)\",\"SwarmDerby.setSession(address,bytes)\",\"SwarmDerby.settleNextDay(uint8)\",\"SwarmDerby.swing(uint8,uint8,uint8,bytes32)\",\"SwarmDerby.transferOwnership(address)\",\"SwarmDerby.withdrawOps(address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":5,\"ADAPTATION.md\":140,\"DEPLOY.md\":144,\"HANDOFF.md\":132,\"LICENSE\":21,\"README.md\":15,\"e2e/Mocks.sol\":27,\"e2e/README.md\":22,\"e2e/board.py\":47,\"e2e/leagues.py\":35,\"e2e/play.py\":63,\"e2e/recover.py\":23,\"e2e/settle.py\":55,\"e2e/setup.py\":30,\"foundry.toml\":9,\"imd-check.mjs\":40,\"src/DerbyOdds.sol\":69,\"src/SwarmDerby.sol\":567,\"test/SwarmDerby.t.sol\":923,\"test/SwarmDerbyFailures.t.sol\":258,\"test/SwarmDerbyInvariant.t.sol\":95,\"test/SwarmDerbyLaunch.t.sol\":95,\"test/TESTING.md\":51,\"test/helpers/DerbyCallTest.sol\":98,\"test/helpers/DerbyHandler.sol\":445,\"web/derby-odds.js\":48},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"7dbb255fce44f4db6a9c595da68d7b8f2988fd9b22e5f076765582c80c730acd","verifiedTreeHash":"719e138d928a230d25331d9b4cda3b99ee12cb04","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+7471272e"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":22976,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 23 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 22.75s\nCompiler run successful!\nwarning[boolean-cst]: misuse of a boolean constant\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:436:48\n    │\n436 │         if (i >= _days[league].length) return (false, false, 0, 0, 0);\n    │                                                ━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/boolean-cst\n\nwarning[boolean-cst]: misuse of a boolean constant\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:436:55\n    │\n436 │         if (i >= _days[league].length) return (false, false, 0, 0, 0);\n    │                                                       ━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/boolean-cst\n\nwarning[missing-events-arithmetic]: `singlePrice` is changed without an event but is used in arithmetic\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:507:9\n    │\n507 │         singlePrice = single;\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-events-arithmetic\n\nwarning[missing-events-arithmetic]: `packPrice` is changed without an event but is used in arithmetic\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:508:9\n    │\n508 │         packPrice = pack;\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-events-arithmetic\n\nwarning[missing-events-access-control]: `owner` is changed without an event but is used for access control\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:528:9\n    │\n528 │         owner = msg.sender;\n    │         ━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-events-access-control\n\nwarning[missing-events-access-control]: `pendingOwner` is changed without an event but is used for access control\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:529:9\n    │\n529 │         pendingOwner = address(0);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-events-access-control\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n   ╭▸ src/DerbyOdds.sol:67:16\n   │\n67 │         feet = uint16(lo + (d % span));\n   │                ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n   │\n   ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n   │       \n   │       // casting to 'uint16' is safe because [explain why]\n   │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n   │       \n   │       \n   ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:212:9\n    │\n212 │         emit TurnsBought(player, league, count, cost, burned);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:296:91\n    │\n296 │             swings[swingId] = Swing(player, league, 0, velo, Status.Final, 0, bytes32(0), uint32(day));\n    │                                                                                           ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint32' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:302:25\n    │\n302 │         uint64 target = uint64(ARB_SYS.arbBlockNumber() + REVEAL_DELAY);\n    │                         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint64' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[unsafe-typecast]: typecast can truncate values\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:305:98\n    │\n305 │         swings[swingId] = Swing(player, league, quality, velo, Status.Committed, target, commit, uint32(day));\n    │                                                                                                  ━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ├ note: consider disabling this lint if you're certain the cast is safe\n    │       \n    │       // casting to 'uint32' is safe because [explain why]\n    │       // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)\n    │       \n    │       \n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/unsafe-typecast\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `vault` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:564:40\n    │\n564 │         (bool ok, bytes memory data) = address(imd).call(abi.encodeCall(IERC20.transfer, (to, amount)));\n    │                                        ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[uninitialized-local]: local variable is read before being initialized\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:323:13\n    │\n323 │         if (bh == bytes32(0)) {\n    │             ━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/uninitialized-local\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:339:13\n    │\n339 │             emit GrandSlam(swingId, s.player, s.league, feet, payout);\n    │             ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:341:9\n    │\n341 │         emit SwingResolved(swingId, s.player, tier, feet);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[divide-before-multiply]: division before multiplication may lose precision\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:441:51\n    │\n441 │         if (_board[league][day].length > 0) tip = (amount * PAYOUT_BPS / 10_000) * SETTLE_TIP_BPS / 10_000;\n    │                                                   ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/divide-before-multiply\n\nwarning[reentrancy-no-eth]: external call can be reentered before `rollover` is updated\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:564:40\n    │\n564 │         (bool ok, bytes memory data) = address(imd).call(abi.encodeCall(IERC20.transfer, (to, amount)));\n    │                                        ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-no-eth\n\nwarning[divide-before-multiply]: division before multiplication may lose precision\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:465:19\n    │\n465 │             tip = (distributable * SETTLE_TIP_BPS) / 10_000;\n    │                   ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/divide-before-multiply\n\nwarning[uninitialized-local]: local variable is read before being initialized\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:475:37\n    │\n475 │         rollover[league] = amount - paid;\n    │                                     ━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/uninitialized-local\n\nwarning[uninitialized-local]: local variable is read before being initialized\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:477:27\n    │\n477 │         _send(msg.sender, tip);\n    │                           ━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/uninitialized-local\n\nwarning[calls-loop]: external call inside a loop\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:564:40\n    │\n564 │         (bool ok, bytes memory data) = address(imd).call(abi.encodeCall(IERC20.transfer, (to, amount)));\n    │                                        ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/calls-loop\n\nwarning[reentrancy-events]: event emitted after an external call; reentrancy can reorder or fabricate logs that off-chain consumers rely on\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:485:9\n    │\n485 │         emit DaySettled(league, day, winners, amounts, msg.sender, tip, rollover[league]);\n    │         ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/reentrancy-events\n\nwarning[missing-zero-check]: address parameter is used in a state write or value transfer without a zero-address check\n    ╭▸ src/SwarmDerby.sol:519:32\n    │\n519 │     function transferOwnership(address to) external onlyOwner {\n    │                                ━━━━━━━━━━\n    │\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/missing-zero-check\n\nwarning[environment-read-across-mutation]: `block.timestamp` may be reused across `vm.warp`\n    ╭▸ test/SwarmDerby.t.sol:141:18\n    │\n141 │         vm.warp((block.timestamp / 1 days + 1) * 1 days + 1);\n    │         ─────────━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━──────────────────────────── `vm.warp` changes this environment here\n    │\n    ├ help: capture it with `vm.getBlockTimestamp()` instead\n    ╰ help: https://getfoundry.sh/forge/linting/environment-read-across-mutation\n\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":415,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 3 tests for test/SwarmDerbyLaunch.t.sol:SwarmDerbyLaunchTest\n[PASS] test_factoryDeploymentIsFullyConfigured() (gas: 101211)\nLogs:\n  computeCreate2Address is deprecated. Please use vm.computeCreate2Address instead.\n\n[PASS] test_missingTokenRejectsPurchasesWithoutCreditingState() (gas: 776427)\nLogs:\n  computeCreate2Address is deprecated. Please use vm.computeCreate2Address instead.\n\n[PASS] test_runtimeMeetsLaunchLimits() (gas: 2922269)\nLogs:\n  computeCreate2Address is deprecated. Please use vm.computeCreate2Address instead.\n\nSuite result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 27.11ms (8.57ms CPU time)\n\nRan 54 tests for test/SwarmDerby.t.sol:SwarmDerbyTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_boardsAreTopTen(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 5054103, ~: 5058479)\n[PASS] testFuzz_settlementConserves(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 5591177, ~: 5590743)\n[PASS] test_agentLeagueHasNoCap() (gas: 2695596)\n[PASS] test_arcadeCapIsTwentyPerDay() (gas: 2523316)\n[PASS] test_arcadeKeepsLongestAgentKeepsTotal() (gas: 298076)\n[PASS] test_badLeagueRejected() (gas: 32903)\n[PASS] test_boardResetsEachDay() (gas: 216345)\n[PASS] test_buyPackSplitsPerLeague() (gas: 518853)\n[PASS] test_capCountsSessionSwingsForThePlayer() (gas: 2274997)\n[PASS] test_commitBoundToPlayer() (gas: 588030)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroAddressesAndFreeTurns() (gas: 1145480)\n[PASS] test_contactNeedsCommit() (gas: 334529)\n[PASS] test_eachDaySettlesOnceInOrder() (gas: 1443294)\n[PASS] test_emptyDayRollsOverWithoutTip() (gas: 1103462)\n[PASS] test_expireUnrevealed() (gas: 613957)\n[PASS] test_finalizeTooEarly() (gas: 503290)\n[PASS] test_finalizeUpdatesArcadeBoard() (gas: 629262)\n[PASS] test_fullSwingMatchesOdds() (gas: 522204)\n[PASS] test_lateFinalizeScoresOnCommitDay() (gas: 664441)\n[PASS] test_lateRevealIsFoul() (gas: 516676)\n[PASS] test_leagueTurnsAreSeparate() (gas: 295691)\n[PASS] test_leaveSessionFreesTheKey() (gas: 205604)\n[PASS] test_nextSettlementBeforeAnything() (gas: 11875)\n[PASS] test_oddsMonotoneInQuality() (gas: 316953)\n[PASS] test_ownerIsConstructorArg() (gas: 2913055)\n[PASS] test_ownerOnlyReachesOps() (gas: 418230)\n[PASS] test_ownershipIsTwoStep() (gas: 169425)\n[PASS] test_ownershipMoveCanBeCancelled() (gas: 113732)\n[PASS] test_parityWithBrowser() (gas: 63207)\n[PASS] test_priceFloor() (gas: 100369)\n[PASS] test_qualityAndVeloBounded() (gas: 317033)\n[PASS] test_revealAtWindowEdgeStillCounts() (gas: 615293)\n[PASS] test_sessionBuysForThePlayer() (gas: 483847)\n[PASS] test_sessionCannotBeClaimedTwice() (gas: 179047)\n[PASS] test_sessionChainsRejected() (gas: 376408)\n[PASS] test_sessionConsentIsSingleUse() (gas: 313939)\n[PASS] test_sessionNeedsTheKeysConsent() (gas: 161377)\n[PASS] test_sessionRevokeAndRotate() (gas: 300545)\n[PASS] test_sessionSwingsForPlayer() (gas: 671328)\n[PASS] test_settleAgentLeague() (gas: 633377)\n[PASS] test_settlePaysOnlyThatDaysPot() (gas: 1162747)\n[PASS] test_settlePaysTheDaysTopThree() (gas: 1224388)\n[PASS] test_settleWaitsForTheDayToEnd() (gas: 927961)\n[PASS] test_settleWaitsForTheLastReveal() (gas: 687692)\n[PASS] test_singleTurnPrice() (gas: 285720)\n[PASS] test_slamPaysTenPercentOfItsLeagueVault() (gas: 4962671)\n[PASS] test_swingStoresVelo() (gas: 449101)\n[PASS] test_tokenWithoutCodeRefusesPurchases() (gas: 3276413)\n[PASS] test_underPowerLineNoBombOrSlam() (gas: 29184887)\n[PASS] test_unpayableSlamKeepsPrizeAndHomer() (gas: 4747473)\n[PASS] test_unpayableWinnerRollsOver() (gas: 997522)\n[PASS] test_whiffCostsTurnNoRoll() (gas: 404595)\n[PASS] test_wrongSaltRejected() (gas: 498546)\n[PASS] test_zeroCountPurchaseReverts() (gas: 77131)\nSuite result: ok. 54 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 276.38ms (744.40ms CPU time)\n\nRan 2 test suites in 278.77ms (303.50ms CPU time): 57 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (57 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":68,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"SwarmDerby.acceptOwnership()\",\"SwarmDerby.buyPacks(uint8,uint256)\",\"SwarmDerby.buyTurns(uint8,uint256)\",\"SwarmDerby.expire(uint256)\",\"SwarmDerby.finalize(uint256,bytes32)\",\"SwarmDerby.leaveSession()\",\"SwarmDerby.setPrices(uint256,uint256)\",\"SwarmDerby.setSession(address,bytes)\",\"SwarmDerby.settleNextDay(uint8)\",\"SwarmDerby.swing(uint8,uint8,uint8,bytes32)\",\"SwarmDerby.transferOwnership(address)\",\"SwarmDerby.withdrawOps(address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":5,\"ADAPTATION.md\":140,\"DEPLOY.md\":144,\"HANDOFF.md\":132,\"LICENSE\":21,\"README.md\":15,\"e2e/Mocks.sol\":27,\"e2e/README.md\":22,\"e2e/board.py\":47,\"e2e/leagues.py\":35,\"e2e/play.py\":63,\"e2e/recover.py\":23,\"e2e/settle.py\":55,\"e2e/setup.py\":30,\"foundry.toml\":9,\"imd-check.mjs\":40,\"src/DerbyOdds.sol\":69,\"src/SwarmDerby.sol\":567,\"test/SwarmDerby.t.sol\":923,\"test/SwarmDerbyLaunch.t.sol\":95,\"web/derby-odds.js\":48},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"b8e58a010be92db64a353eb7d81177299f282cb475610b132733df503d3f97a6","verifiedTreeHash":"fff9d438efd78031c6130617e6441c8efa638a87","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+7471272e"}]}