{"assessments":[],"deployments":[],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"03f2e68d-a874-4f09-bbd3-533ac4b4211f","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"645d2f3d553e598b4f64eeaf0fe4648cf318aeea028970f275606aa8732640f0","dependsOn":["scaffold_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"6b037a7b6601e883cf8a906c1520c0624817d42d8310b65c2f43679204608af3","skillId":"adversarial-review","tools":[]},"key":"adversarial_review","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"6b037a7b6601e883cf8a906c1520c0624817d42d8310b65c2f43679204608af3","skillId":"adversarial-review","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"ae3049f20a2da5c555676a5883c8f38e62b9c02ecf5a153d42be449eb000c764","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":true,"profile":"none","requires":["network"],"skillHash":"7ae2f33d07dd65f04780071437d0c74200f8f58a323bc9324fa8524f587719c6","skillId":"scaffold-project","tools":[]},"key":"scaffold_project","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"7ae2f33d07dd65f04780071437d0c74200f8f58a323bc9324fa8524f587719c6","skillId":"scaffold-project","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"Build imd-mcp: a Model Context Protocol server (stdio, @modelcontextprotocol/sdk) that lets any MCP client (Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Cursor) hire the IMD swarm. Tools: imd_capabilities, imd_check (free evaluator verdict), imd_import_repo, imd_quote (quote only, returns price and order id), imd_pay (pays a quoted order; requires confirm: true and respects the caps), imd_order_status, imd_job (GET /jobs/{id} and /jobs/{id}/report.md), imd_schedules (list one owner's schedules via GET /schedules?owner=). Tool input schemas for each paid action are derived at startup from GET /openapi.json x-imd-actions so new actions appear without a release. Configuration only through env: IMD_PRIVATE_KEY (optional; without it every tool is read-only), IMD_MAX_PER_REQUEST, IMD_MAX_PER_DAY, IMD_DRY_RUN (default true). It must be runnable straight from GitHub (`npx github:<owner>/<repo>`), so commit a prepare/build script and a bin entry. Paid-request flow on https://api.imd.fun (server-side only; browser origins get 403). 1) Make a bearer token: 32 random bytes as hex, header Authorization: Bearer <token>. 2) POST /requests/quote {requestKey: new UUID, action, input} returns {order:{id}} (422 invalid_input lists problems). 3) POST /requests/{id}/submit with no body returns 402 with a challenge: accepts[], quote{id, quoteHash, action, payment{asset, amount, payTo}, expiresAt}, resource, resourceUrl, requesterScopeHash. 4) Check accepts[0] against capabilities and the quote. 5) Sign EIP-712 Permit2 PermitWitnessTransferFrom: domain {name \"Permit2\", chainId 1, verifyingContract 0x000000000022D473030F116dDEE9F6B43aC78BA3}; types PermitWitnessTransferFrom(TokenPermissions permitted, address spender, uint256 nonce, uint256 deadline, Witness witness), TokenPermissions(address token, uint256 amount), Witness(address to, uint256 validAfter); spender = x402 exact Permit2 proxy 0x402085c248EeA27D92E8b30b2C58ed07f9E20001; random 256-bit nonce; deadline at most quote.expiresAt minus 5 s; witness {to: payTo, validAfter: 0}. The payment object is {x402Version: 2, resource, accepted: accepts[0], payload: {signature, permit2Authorization: {from, permitted{token, amount}, spender, nonce, deadline, witness{to, validAfter}}}} with numbers as decimal strings and no extra fields (extra fields fail as invalid_payment_shape). 6) Sign EIP-712 QuoteApproval: domain {name \"IdentityMD Paid Action\", version \"1\", chainId 1}; fields resource string (= resourceUrl), requesterScopeHash bytes32 (0x + value), quoteId string, quoteHash bytes32 (0x + value), paymentHash bytes32 (sha256 of the payment object serialised as key-sorted JSON), action string, asset address, amount uint256, payTo address, expiresAt uint256. 7) POST /requests/{id}/submit again with header PAYMENT-SIGNATURE: base64(JSON payment) and body {quoteSignature}: 202 pending or 200 outcome. 8) Poll GET /requests/{id} with the same bearer until the status leaves quoted, payment_pending and admission_pending. Payment is IMD 0xd34a99bc0f67ae1bbd63c660e6d0b0dd03e263b7 on Ethereum mainnet, 0.5 IMD per action (per run for schedules); the wallet needs a one-time IMD approve to Permit2; the server pays gas. Free helpers: POST /requests/check {action, input} (the evaluator's verdict, no payment; it is noisy, so retry up to 3 times), POST /requests/import {url, kind} (public GitHub repo to repoUrl + baseCommit), GET /openapi.json (actions and limits under x-imd-actions), GET /requests/capabilities (price, asset, payTo, quote lifetime, launch chains). Full reference: https://imd.fun/docs#paid Key safety is a hard requirement. The private key is read only from an environment variable, never logged, printed, written to disk or sent anywhere except as signatures. Dry run (stop before signing) is the default and real payment needs an explicit flag. A per-request and a per-day IMD spending cap are enforced before any signature. Refuse to pay when the challenge's asset, payTo or amount differ from GET /requests/capabilities or from the quote (this also blocks look-alike address poisoning). Never pay more than the quoted amount. Tests must never spend real IMD or touch mainnet: run them against a local mock server with throwaway test keys.  Label it everywhere it is presented (README top, CLI --help, site banner) as experimental: \"Experimental, commissioned as a test of the IMD swarm. It may not work as described. Read the code, start with small amounts, no warranty.\" Add one line at the end of the README: \"Commissioned through paid IMD swarm requests.\"","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"d64c7a83cadcbd4c335451e7e2b752fc5b892056516c68e38afab00beca514e1","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"03f2e68d-a874-4f09-bbd3-533ac4b4211f","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-600-build-imd-mcp-model-context"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"51046","feedbackHash":"df8a68c02d76abc1f2c24052daba3b18428c618196aee3d05b380897b2fee4ef","nodeKey":"adversarial_review","submissionHash":"aed00ccfb95d97dadf8f24ffbf7c4ec808cbc1456bd7e176211594b3be63a5e7","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51432","feedbackHash":"576d3da73b82e85d983f226614ff0d60949b802953d7a0f61c55374a53f70934","nodeKey":"adversarial_review","submissionHash":"645d2f3d553e598b4f64eeaf0fe4648cf318aeea028970f275606aa8732640f0","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51086","feedbackHash":"2844a14162af2b0af805624019c888bd6cf0dcf57572c9cb8735fae7329041e1","nodeKey":"scaffold_project","submissionHash":"5843ae50530b269514e0ebe31e774604e83ab2d6771d78b9d3fe9ccb166fb6ac","tag1":"verification:structural","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51133","feedbackHash":"7d12010ba6a5cbd6463c9d12d4dc13800ea3e85e028fbde79a704f57599668da","nodeKey":"scaffold_project","submissionHash":"ae3049f20a2da5c555676a5883c8f38e62b9c02ecf5a153d42be449eb000c764","tag1":"verification:structural","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"3b3781e12db4b70522639273b005b1928cf5224592391a9edc02eba3881619b6","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"2dbc8b056705c08db912f7eb64d1561e9023fed5c6d6d47c5273f2227c5fa503","device":"080780b6898c2241","findings":[],"hash":"5843ae50530b269514e0ebe31e774604e83ab2d6771d78b9d3fe9ccb166fb6ac","nodeId":"42337eaf-eba7-4569-bef8-9a48d95ecc07","outcome":"completed","summary":"I'll start by reading the pinned inputs to understand what's required.The inputs are read. This is a fresh repo — I need to build `imd-mcp`, a TypeScript MCP stdio server. Let me check the toolchain first.Node 22 is available (project targets Node 20+). Scaffolding the project now.Dependencies installed (SDK 1.32.0, zod peer ^3.25). Now I'll write the project. First, let me check what landed in package.json:`InMemoryTransport` is available for an end-to-end MCP test. Now I'll build the project.Now the source files — config, utilities, and the API client:Now the API client:Now the payment/signing core:Now the tool handlers and MCP registration:Fixing a wrong import in index.ts (`./runtime.js` doesn't exist):Now the mock server and tests. First let me add a poll-options parameter to `payOrder` so tests run fast:Now the mock server and tests:Let me update the mock to record challenges (so tests can verify the QuoteApproval signature), then write helpers and tests:Now the test helpers and the two test files:A few fixes needed. First, `index.ts` main-module detection fails through the npx bin symlink — use realpath. Also clean up the awkward dynamic imports in the dry-run test:Let me move those imports to the top of index.ts for cleanliness:Now build and run the tests:Two fixes: `privateKeyToAccount` lives in `viem/accounts`, and the ajv default import resolves to the namespace under NodeNext. Let me check ajv's types:Mostly passing — 15/17. Let me see the failures and fix the test script path issue:Both failures are bugs in my test assertions, not the implementation: the payment object legitimately includes `resource`, and `imd_quote`+`imd_pay` each fetch a challenge (count 2, not 1). Fixing:All 17 tests pass. Verifying the CLI entry works:The server works end-to-end on stdio. Now README and LICENSE:Verifying a clean install works (prepare script path) and reviewing the final tree:Clean install works and `prepare` builds `dist/`. Final full test run and file audit:One portability concern: `node --test` glob/directory args differ between Node 20 and 22. Let me verify the right form:On Node 22 only the glob form works; on Node 20 the shell expands it. I'll use the unquoted glob so both work via the npm-script shell:All green. Let me clean up dead code — an unused `envFlag` in config.ts and unused imports in the tests:All 17 tests pass after cleanup. Let me do a final sanity read of the entry point and the full file listing:All checks pass. Final state of the deliverable:\n\n## imd-mcp — done\n\n**Layout**\n```\npackage.json / package-lock.json / tsconfig.json / .gitignore\nREADME.md / LICENSE\nsrc/\n  config.ts    env-only config: IMD_PRIVATE_KEY, IMD_MAX_PER_REQUEST,\n               IMD_MAX_PER_DAY, IMD_DRY_RUN (default true), spend tracker\n  api.ts       thin fetch client: bearer auth, quote/submit/poll, check,\n               import, openapi x-imd-actions, capabilities, jobs, schedules\n  pay.ts       402 verification + EIP-712 PermitWitnessTransferFrom and\n               QuoteApproval signing (viem, local only — no RPC)\n  tools.ts     the 8 MCP tools, ajv validation against advertised schemas\n  index.ts     stdio entry, --help/--version, bin target\ntests/\n  mock-server.ts  local api.imd.fun mock (no mainnet, throwaway keys)\n  flow.test.ts    full quote → 402 → sign → submit → poll; verifies both\n                  EIP-712 signatures recover to the test key, payment shape,\n                  deadline = expiresAt−5s, key-sorted sha256 paymentHash;\n                  plus an end-to-end pass over a real MCP InMemoryTransport\n  safety.test.ts  dry-run stops before signing, confirm required, read-only\n                  without key, payTo/asset/amount mismatch refusals,\n                  per-request + per-day caps, evaluator retry\n  helpers.ts\n```\n\n**Verification results**\n- `npm test` — builds, then 17/17 pass against the local mock (`# pass 17, # fail 0`)\n- `npm ci` from scratch works; `prepare` compiles `dist/`, `bin: imd-mcp → dist/src/index.js` ","treeHash":"cf12ce6a77d65472450adcb68e07d91696b915d3","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":0,"inputTokens":0,"model":"swe-2-high","outputTokens":0,"runtime":"codex","turns":1,"wallClockMs":326219}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"03f15d1296244279","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"verifyChallenge only refuses an expiresAt that is already in the past (src/pay.ts line 166). The Permit2 deadline is then expiresAt - 5s with no ceiling, and capabilities.quoteLifetimeSeconds (fetched in the same call) is never consulted. A tampered or buggy 402 challenge whose quote.expiresAt is far in the future therefore yields a signed PermitWitnessTransferFrom for the verified amount and verified payTo that remains executable long after the user believes the quote expired, including after the daily ledger has rolled over. Exposure is bounded: asset, payTo and amount are still verified, the amount is reserved against today's cap, and no second authorization can be created for the order. This is a hygiene gap, not a cap bypass or double-pay, and it does not block the earlier findings' fixes. A possible fix that preserves the design is deadline = min(expiresAt - 5, now + quoteLifetimeSeconds + small slack), refusing when expiresAt exceeds the advertised lifetime by more than that slack.","line":199,"path":"src/pay.ts","reproduction":"Start tests/mock-server.ts startMock({pendingPolls:0}) behind a loopback proxy that rewrites quote.expiresAt in every 402 response to now + 10 years (everything else unchanged; capabilities still advertise quoteLifetimeSeconds: 300). Use the throwaway key 0x followed by 11 repeated 32 times, IMD_DRY_RUN=false, IMD_MAX_PER_REQUEST=0.5, IMD_MAX_PER_DAY=5. Quote swarm.launch with {repoUrl:'https://github.com/example/repo',prompt:'fix the tests'} and call payOrder/imd_pay with confirm: true. Expected: refusal, or a deadline capped near now + 300 s. Reproduced actual: paid:true, and the submitted permit2Authorization.deadline is 3649.99 days in the future (deadline - now = 315359995 s), i.e. a one-use 0.5 IMD authorization to the real payTo that stays valid for ten years. No mainnet contact; local mock and throwaway key only.","severity":"low","snippet":"  const deadline = verified.expiresAtSec - 5n; // at most expiresAt minus 5s","title":"Permit2 deadline follows a server-supplied expiresAt with no upper bound, so one quoted amount can stay authorized for years"}],"hash":"645d2f3d553e598b4f64eeaf0fe4648cf318aeea028970f275606aa8732640f0","nodeId":"ad09d16b-6581-4251-bcfa-6a6e873a4cd5","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. Nothing in the tree was modified. The author's build and suite pass (22 of 22), and findings are written to `.imd-findings.json`.\n\n**All five earlier findings are fixed.** I reran each with my own reproductions rather than only the author's regressions:\n\n- **Concurrent payments exceed the daily cap (high).** Fixed. Four concurrent `payOrder` calls against a 0.5 IMD daily cap now produce exactly one signed submission and three per-day cap refusals, with both the in-memory tracker and the per-wallet ledger. The reservation in `SpendTracker.reserve` is taken before `signPayment` runs.\n- **Lost submit response removes an accepted payment from accounting (high).** Fixed. With the mock accepting then destroying the socket, the tracker still shows 0.5 IMD reserved, a retry of the same order only polls, and the next order is cap-refused.\n- **Restart resets the daily limit (high).** Fixed. Using the exact construction in `main` (wallet address from the key, ledger under the user state directory), a second process with the same key and fresh in-memory state is refused. Two separate OS processes paying concurrently against one ledger yield one payment. The ledger file is mode 0600 and holds only day, order ids and amounts.\n- **Retrying a pending order signs a second Permit2 nonce (high).** Fixed. A retry while the server reports `admission_pending` only polls. I also tested a variant where the server reverts the order to `quoted` after the first accepted submit. That retry is refused because of the existing local reservation, so one nonce exists in every path.\n- **Out-of-range key disclosed in the error (low).** Fixed. The all-ff key, the exact curve order, and the zero key all produce only `IMD_PRIVATE_KEY is invalid`. A hand-built config bypassing `loadConfig` reaches the generic refusal in `signPayment` with no key material in the output.\n\n**One new finding, low and non-blocking.** The Permit2 deadline is `expiresAt - 5s` with no ceiling, and `quoteLifetimeSeconds` from capabilities is never consulted. A challenge whose `expiresAt` is ten years out yields a signed authorization for the verified amount and payTo that stays executable for ten years. I reproduced it locally through a rewriting proxy. The exposure is bounded to one quoted amount per order, which is already reserved against the cap, so this does not reopen the money findings. A fix that keeps the agreed design is to cap the deadline at now plus the advertised quote lifetime plus a small slack.\n\n**Checked and found sound.** The stale-lock cleanup cannot give two processes the lock at once, since a freshly created lock has a current mtime. An unreadable or malformed ledger, an unwritable state directory, and a lock wait timeout all refuse before signing. Dry run still verifies without reserving. The capped ledger file never contains the key, and no code path logs or writes it.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1104261,"inputTokens":418,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":24906,"runtime":"claude","turns":32,"wallClockMs":361771}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"acd630b1d34022961d0624d6ee7a31c2ff61ae0a76d24b9068944507c41436d2","device":"0b129ef2f81deead","findings":[],"hash":"ae3049f20a2da5c555676a5883c8f38e62b9c02ecf5a153d42be449eb000c764","nodeId":"42337eaf-eba7-4569-bef8-9a48d95ecc07","outcome":"completed","summary":"Implemented all reported fixes and recorded verdicts in [.imd-responses.json](/home/imd-worker/.identitymd/work/03f2e68d-a874-4f09-bbd3-533ac4b4211f/42337eaf-eba7-4569-bef8-9a48d95ecc07/.imd-responses.json).\n\nKey changes:\n- Atomic pre-sign spending reservations, retained on lost responses.\n- Durable per-wallet daily ledger across server restarts.\n- Pending orders only poll on retry; no second Permit2 signature.\n- Out-of-range private keys fail generically without disclosure.\n- Added local mock regression tests for all findings.\n\nVerified in an isolated lockfile-resolved copy: `npm test` passes, 22/22 tests.","treeHash":"3c060b9c6d7f40eb82f72229effb298c7f5f7796","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1367040,"inputTokens":82231,"model":null,"outputTokens":18554,"runtime":"codex","turns":7,"wallClockMs":413165}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"02ae6543274731ab","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"imd_pay calls share a SpendTracker but do not reserve budget or serialize the check/sign/submit sequence. Each call reads the same spentToday value, then yields while signing and submitting; tracker.add runs only after submitPayment resolves (lines 312-314). A client issuing concurrent confirmed calls can authorize more than IMD_MAX_PER_DAY, even with an honest API and valid quotes. The existing cap test only awaits payments sequentially.","line":289,"path":"src/pay.ts","reproduction":"Use tests/mock-server.ts startMock({pendingPolls:0}), the throwaway key 0x followed by 11 repeated 32 times, IMD_DRY_RUN=false, IMD_MAX_PER_REQUEST=0.5 and IMD_MAX_PER_DAY=0.5. In one context/client/tracker, quote swarm.launch twice with input {repoUrl:'https://github.com/example/repo',prompt:'fix the tests'}, obtaining A and B. Send imd_pay({orderId:A,confirm:true}) and imd_pay({orderId:B,confirm:true}) concurrently (Promise.all). Equivalently call both underlying payOrder functions concurrently with the same context and polling interval 1 ms. Expected: at most one 0.5 IMD signature/submission and a cap refusal for the other. Reproduced actual: both calls return paid:true, the local mock records two signed 500000000000000000-unit payments, and tracker.spentToday() becomes 1000000000000000000, twice the cap. No mainnet connection is needed.","severity":"high","snippet":"  const today = tracker.spentToday();\n  if (today + verified.amountWei > cfg.maxPerDayWei) {","title":"Concurrent payments exceed the daily cap before either spend is recorded"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Spend is counted only after the signed submission returns an HTTP 200/202 response whose body has been fully read. If the API accepts/settles the payment but the connection closes before the response arrives, payOrder throws without counting or reserving that amount. Further orders can be signed against the unchanged budget, even sequentially. This is distinct from the concurrent-call race: serializing calls alone would still leave successful-but-unacknowledged payments unaccounted for.","line":312,"path":"src/pay.ts","reproduction":"Set the throwaway key, IMD_DRY_RUN=false and both caps to 0.5 IMD. Start tests/mock-server.ts with {pendingPolls:0} behind a loopback HTTP proxy. For the first POST /requests/A/submit containing PAYMENT-SIGNATURE, let the proxy forward the request to the mock and consume its successful 202 response, then destroy the downstream socket instead of returning that response. Call imd_quote(swarm.launch,{repoUrl:'https://github.com/example/repo',prompt:'fix the tests'}) for A, then imd_pay({orderId:A,confirm:true}). Actual: the mock has accepted A and recorded its payment, imd_pay reports 'fetch failed', and spentToday() remains 0. Next quote B and call imd_pay({orderId:B,confirm:true}) normally. Expected: refuse/reserve the full daily budget while A's payment is unresolved. Reproduced actual: B returns paid:true; the mock has two signed/accepted 0.5 IMD payments (1 IMD total), while the tracker records only 0.5 IMD. Both API requests and signatures were exercised locally.","severity":"high","snippet":"  const signed = await signPayment(cfg.privateKey, challenge, verified);\n  const submit = await client.submitPayment(orderId, signed.payment, signed.quoteSignature);\n  tracker.add(verified.amountWei);","title":"A lost submit response removes an accepted payment from cap accounting"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The daily ledger exists only in a process-local Map and main() constructs a new SpendTracker on every launch. Restarting the MCP server, or running the same wallet in two MCP clients, therefore gives the wallet a fresh daily allowance. README line 143 acknowledges the reset, but that weaker process-lifetime limit does not satisfy the assignment's per-day spending cap. No compromised API or failed response is needed.","line":65,"path":"src/config.ts","reproduction":"Within one UTC day, use a local mock API, the same throwaway IMD_PRIVATE_KEY for all launches, IMD_DRY_RUN=false, IMD_MAX_PER_REQUEST=0.5 and IMD_MAX_PER_DAY=0.5. In server instance 1 call imd_quote({action:'swarm.launch',input:{repoUrl:'https://github.com/example/repo',prompt:'fix the tests'}}), then imd_pay({orderId:A,confirm:true}) and await success. Restart the MCP server with the same env (or start a second client instance), quote a new order B, and call imd_pay({orderId:B,confirm:true}). Expected: B is rejected because this wallet already spent its daily 0.5 IMD. Actual: B is signed and paid. Reproduced with the exact new ImdClient/new SpendTracker initialization performed by main(): the mock records two 0.5 IMD payments from the identical address 0x19E7E376E7C213B7E7e7e46cc70A5dD086DAff2A, each tracker reports only 0.5 IMD, and the wallet has authorized 1 IMD that day. Repeating restarts repeats the bypass.","severity":"high","snippet":"/** Tracks IMD spent per UTC day in this process. Resets on restart. */\nexport class SpendTracker {\n  private spent = new Map<string, bigint>();","title":"Restarting the server resets the daily spending limit for the same wallet"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"payment_pending is treated as eligible for a new payment instead of an already submitted payment to poll/reconcile. After an accepted submission times out during polling, retrying imd_pay fetches another challenge and calls signPayment again, which generates a fresh random nonce (line 193). There is no per-order in-flight lock or saved signed payload. The two signatures therefore authorize separate debits, rather than a replay of the same one-use authorization. This also permits the aggregate authorization for one order to exceed its quote and per-request cap. Actual double settlement depends on whether the remote API/facilitator independently deduplicates the order; the client itself sends two valid spend authorizations.","line":266,"path":"src/pay.ts","reproduction":"Use a loopback mock with the throwaway key, IMD_DRY_RUN=false, IMD_MAX_PER_REQUEST=0.5 and IMD_MAX_PER_DAY=5. Quote one swarm.launch order A for 500000000000000000 units. Call imd_pay({orderId:A,confirm:true}); accept its signed POST /requests/A/submit with HTTP 202 and keep GET /requests/A returning status:'payment_pending' until polling times out (300000 ms via the tool; reproduced via underlying payOrder with {intervalMs:1,timeoutMs:10}). Retry imd_pay({orderId:A,confirm:true}). Return the same payment terms in a valid 402 challenge to its unsigned submit, then accept the second signed submit. Expected: retry only polls/reconciles the first payment or resubmits its identical one-use payload; no new debit authorization. Reproduced actual: the local mock receives two payments for ord_1, each permitting 0.5 IMD, with two different nonces; both Permit2 signatures independently verify against the throwaway payer and the specified mainnet domain, and the tracker becomes 1 IMD for this one 0.5 IMD order. This uses a documented pending state and a concrete mock response sequence, without contacting mainnet.","severity":"high","snippet":"  const current = await client.getRequest(orderId);\n  const status = String(current.status ?? \"\");\n  if (status && ![\"quoted\", \"payment_pending\"].includes(status)) {","title":"Retrying a payment_pending order signs a second independently spendable Permit2 payment"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"loadConfig checks only the key's hex syntax and length, so it accepts 32-byte values outside the secp256k1 private-scalar range. When imd_pay reaches privateKeyToAccount, the declared viem dependency's @noble/curves validation includes the entire supplied key as a decimal integer in its exception. This unsanitized fail() helper returns that exception as MCP text, disclosing the configured key value over stdout to the client. This violates the explicit never-print/never-send-key requirement. Severity is low because the reproduced value is not a usable Ethereum private key; no disclosure of a valid signing key was demonstrated.","line":20,"path":"src/tools.ts","reproduction":"Set IMD_PRIVATE_KEY to '0x' followed by 64 lowercase f characters, IMD_DRY_RUN=false, IMD_MAX_PER_REQUEST=0.5 and IMD_MAX_PER_DAY=0.5. Against tests/mock-server.ts, quote swarm.launch with {repoUrl:'https://github.com/example/repo',prompt:'fix the tests'}, then call imd_pay({orderId:A,confirm:true}). Expected: a generic invalid-private-key error containing none of the supplied key. Actual error text: 'expected valid private key: 1 <= n < 115792089237316195423570985008687907852837564279074904382605163141518161494337, got 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913129639935'. The final decimal number is exactly BigInt(IMD_PRIVATE_KEY), allowing reconstruction of every input byte. Reproduced locally; checked that viem 2.57.2 declares @noble/curves 1.9.1 and its privateKeyToAccount implementation is identical to the preinstalled implementation used by the harness. No real key or mainnet request was used.","severity":"low","snippet":"const fail = (e: unknown): ToolResult => err(e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e));","title":"An out-of-range environment key is disclosed in the MCP error response"}],"hash":"aed00ccfb95d97dadf8f24ffbf7c4ec808cbc1456bd7e176211594b3be63a5e7","nodeId":"ad09d16b-6581-4251-bcfa-6a6e873a4cd5","outcome":"completed","summary":"Recorded five findings in [.imd-findings.json](.imd-findings.json):\n\n- **High:** concurrent cap bypass, lost-response accounting, restart resets, and duplicate payment authorizations on retry.\n- **Low:** invalid key disclosure through error messages.\n\nEach includes an exact reproduction and verified source snippet. Checks used local mocks and throwaway keys; implementation files remain unchanged.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1718400,"inputTokens":88569,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":14367,"runtime":"codex","turns":6,"wallClockMs":738512}}],"verification":[{"checks":[],"detail":"paths and tree verified; no suite was run for this kind of work","evaluation":"structural","profile":"none","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"5843ae50530b269514e0ebe31e774604e83ab2d6771d78b9d3fe9ccb166fb6ac","verifiedTreeHash":"cf12ce6a77d65472450adcb68e07d91696b915d3","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+68ddf5e4"},{"checks":[],"detail":"paths and tree verified; no suite was run for this kind of work","evaluation":"structural","profile":"none","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"ae3049f20a2da5c555676a5883c8f38e62b9c02ecf5a153d42be449eb000c764","verifiedTreeHash":"3c060b9c6d7f40eb82f72229effb298c7f5f7796","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+68ddf5e4"}]}