{"assessments":[],"deployments":[],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"96d94ee9-b42a-4324-8dba-b952d6cafc29","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"4e3f600399ba1a0b6578aba9a6780ebb7d9069292815af44c9f8b660c733f5e9","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_economics","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"e0ba4e17739f3996e28092873b11bd56173e1e9e26c418da474a3c8fc06a022b","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_flow","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"a78af4f1d90356814186d5557cc820eaa4a33a1f575f887e09da007eca41b768","dependsOn":["build_contract_project","write_foundry_tests","manifest","audit_math","audit_permissions","audit_economics","audit_flow"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"af3aa01159bbf354f621cafa5c0006f6169e0938a8b015be508b7377dbf165bc","skillId":"audit-judge","tools":[]},"key":"audit_judge","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"af3aa01159bbf354f621cafa5c0006f6169e0938a8b015be508b7377dbf165bc","skillId":"audit-judge","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"443ff8ca00921b3408af651409e4a6ebe06a8ad73b1372a200d2e4eaac24b933","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_math","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"30f3adefc7daa2655a19b8494c0de74b16d54acf2e41450c30aa88e0ddd757d5","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","tools":[]},"key":"audit_permissions","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"e5ac2cb1fd91a56aa40b16487fc230c48de0d317c8266140331dd3219bb40a85","skillId":"audit-specialist","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"f89a82eb08f77358e35c628cd2f8e368b3f2bad3fbe4575094b07fdc265901a8","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"6b8d2c2ebd3301cff2be8edb1e1cc6ba65c858c02fe7247be81722b969842265","skillId":"build-contract-project","tools":[]},"key":"build_contract_project","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"6b8d2c2ebd3301cff2be8edb1e1cc6ba65c858c02fe7247be81722b969842265","skillId":"build-contract-project","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"602b9e8f8da98a066004ac9d05ed3810bd1cf8bc93ddec1ad83e1f4f8e92faec","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"tools":[]},"key":"manifest","kind":"code","role":"integrate","skillHash":null,"skillId":null,"state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"4fc1176e3d6259983719e7b4259b9b13c28b677d06f012472140a70661947ac0","dependsOn":["build_contract_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"73431852439ad3a343f3d2b7db1c43cd363b9f48f9bb51497374a0cf6d50b223","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","tools":[]},"key":"write_foundry_tests","kind":"code","role":"tests","skillHash":"73431852439ad3a343f3d2b7db1c43cd363b9f48f9bb51497374a0cf6d50b223","skillId":"write-foundry-tests","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"Launch the rnnn.io community token RNNN (symbol RNNN) on Robinhood Chain, paired with IMD on Uniswap v4, with a hook that has exactly one rule: on every swap, take 1% of the swap amount in IMD (the pool's IMD side) and transfer it, as IMD, to the fixed address 0x45c89d0cf0b8a05218506236fcfcb18da1d3ebe4. Do NOT swap or sell the fee for ETH or any other token; the recipient must receive IMD. The fee recipient is a constructor argument and can never change. The hook has no owner, no pause, no mint, no other fees, and does not block or alter swaps in any other way. Include Foundry tests: a buy and a sell each send exactly 1% of the IMD side to 0x45c89d0cf0b8a05218506236fcfcb18da1d3ebe4; the hook has no privileged functions.","parentJobId":null,"planHash":"fba3f11893f56e4012971f83b1d248aa0d5384c902132c4d301bfae580a9e561","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"96d94ee9-b42a-4324-8dba-b952d6cafc29","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-1327-launch-rnnn-io-community-token"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"51064","feedbackHash":"54b0efb76583dc96e57dc4407724bed4943f5842aeebafdb3644f7fbd6497edf","nodeKey":"audit_economics","submissionHash":"4e3f600399ba1a0b6578aba9a6780ebb7d9069292815af44c9f8b660c733f5e9","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51891","feedbackHash":"dff4c47fa0bbb54aff94e122d52e3cc1311340eeda4745042054f5754e40eb24","nodeKey":"audit_flow","submissionHash":"e0ba4e17739f3996e28092873b11bd56173e1e9e26c418da474a3c8fc06a022b","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52613","feedbackHash":"e6f36c32ff22a4ff6e052f6b206cb4ba4b8ad89d22ee489561c17119d23074b0","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"a78af4f1d90356814186d5557cc820eaa4a33a1f575f887e09da007eca41b768","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"50986","feedbackHash":"b7c61504e7ad5fe59b62b310e932e24a52aec70a84248c623eccd2d025b1ddf1","nodeKey":"audit_judge","submissionHash":"3d504691b3b3e7132d477e23e1793cd586d95d49a1ba0420f0616be39be9757f","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51251","feedbackHash":"a108750e2114386a3f4d6aebcd8b0de5ac559e9f3d0fb8deb04725f94fb19216","nodeKey":"audit_math","submissionHash":"443ff8ca00921b3408af651409e4a6ebe06a8ad73b1372a200d2e4eaac24b933","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51509","feedbackHash":"cc73b5eaa51670347c0519a9c1eea6c5a1fe1c715ddd7f2434885ddaa52be531","nodeKey":"audit_permissions","submissionHash":"30f3adefc7daa2655a19b8494c0de74b16d54acf2e41450c30aa88e0ddd757d5","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52251","feedbackHash":"c49a988f2235f9df5eab6bf7445044a6aeccfaa9e62a8a2931eadbdceb4f7233","nodeKey":"build_contract_project","submissionHash":"f89a82eb08f77358e35c628cd2f8e368b3f2bad3fbe4575094b07fdc265901a8","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52257","feedbackHash":"161133abda7e045e84ebc14e7b2d2ac16dc5625a5dae4b684f965ffad6a72e90","nodeKey":"build_contract_project","submissionHash":"df813aafd25675fade601d08077a954c5f7bf8d93cc0665bca68e04fcdaf99b6","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52130","feedbackHash":"e3c175fe335d198a1ea2a22ef2c7b0bda82b5441eaef8ec08f6649a66c6192ca","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"602b9e8f8da98a066004ac9d05ed3810bd1cf8bc93ddec1ad83e1f4f8e92faec","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51455","feedbackHash":"030256ec5a485647761ff3ad270f2bbc3698b4ef9c4eb5d1a44c25c5250585f2","nodeKey":"manifest","submissionHash":"9eaa8dc740e3ac6cc048fd424dbbac47da75655925dfff91146dcf1266bc8b5e","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51130","feedbackHash":"f31875c5366df8aa96ccc04766a0c47f744ce80957203a3473987398b2b467e6","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"4fc1176e3d6259983719e7b4259b9b13c28b677d06f012472140a70661947ac0","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"52597","feedbackHash":"97bed1890c83d7061f9bd06437129d72e85ba114eff34cc7ff1d47ffb655afe7","nodeKey":"write_foundry_tests","submissionHash":"01ede4f00e08ae81f1bd770847d4be27975b00e838509ea748e77de4c9460372","tag1":"verification:checks","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"19de4eac1610c89903f08375cedc2a9b98900158bf5f950144f1cf7da2e231b7","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":2,"bundleHash":"8d6bb5d71917c6bcf84185c0fa02973ceb4c190f09c640e8d1b3eefb6b6a6efb","device":"9f3c23750c16c22c","findings":[{"description":"When IMD is the swap's specified currency (exact-input buy, exact-output sell) the hook fixes the fee in beforeSwap as |params.amountSpecified| / 100 and returns it as a beforeSwapReturnDelta (line 158-159), then settles the same amount in afterSwap (line 174). The pool may fill only part of the specified amount: when the swap reaches its sqrtPriceLimitX96, or when it runs out of liquidity in that direction (the price then slides to the limit with nothing more traded). The hook never re-reads the executed amount, so the swapper pays 1% of what they asked for rather than 1% of the IMD side of the swap that happened. The brief defines the fee as 1% of the swap amount; for every swap that is not completely filled the hook takes more than that, up to the whole 1% of the request on a swap that moved almost nothing. On the launch pool itself (RNNN-only liquidity, no IMD in the manager) an exact-output sell asking for IMD delivers zero IMD and zero RNNN moves, yet the swapper is debited 1% of the requested IMD, which the hook holds as a claim and later pays to the recipient. The two afterSwap paths (IMD unspecified) are not affected: they measure the pool's actual IMD delta. Suggested fix: compute the fee from the executed IMD amount. One way: keep beforeSwap at zero delta and in afterSwap, when IMD is specified, charge the fee on the executed IMD amount via an unspecified-side-free mechanism is not available in v4, so instead either (a) in afterSwap compare |delta.amount(imd)| with |amountSpecified| and, when the fill is partial, refund the excess fee to the router (`sender`) by taking it to that address rather than to the recipient, or (b) revert the swap when the executed IMD amount differs from the specified one, so a partial fill cannot be overcharged. Either makes the attached proof pass.","line":158,"path":"src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol","reproduction":"Funded pool, full-range liquidity 1e6 ether at price 1:1. Exact-input buy of 1,000 IMD with sqrtPriceLimitX96 one millionth away from the current price: the swapper pays 11.0127 IMD in total, of which 10 IMD is the hook fee (expected fee <= 0.1101 IMD = 1% of the 11.01 IMD that moved; actual 10 IMD, ~91% of the IMD side). Pool with liquidity 1,000 ether only in [-60, 60]: exact-input buy of 1,000,000 IMD with the extreme price limit completes with 10,003.04 IMD paid, of which 10,000 IMD is fee (expected <= 100.03 IMD). Launch pool, RNNN-only liquidity, manager holds 0 IMD: exact-output sell asking for 1,000 IMD: 0 RNNN spent, 0 IMD received, and the swapper's IMD balance drops by 10 IMD (expected: no IMD debited, or the swap refused). Run: forge test --match-path test/scratch/PartialFillOvercharge.t.sol -vv (3 failing tests on the current hook).","severity":"medium","title":"Partially filled swaps are charged 1% of the requested IMD, not of the IMD actually traded; an exact-output sell on the IMD-empty launch pool pays the fee for nothing"}],"hash":"01ede4f00e08ae81f1bd770847d4be27975b00e838509ea748e77de4c9460372","nodeId":"9d9fe02d-d066-4df6-a83c-4b7a7749f19a","outcome":"completed","summary":"Done. The suite builds and passes, and one defect is reported with a runnable proof.\n\n**Result**\n\n| Check | Outcome |\n| --- | --- |\n| `forge build` | clean |\n| `forge test` (delivered tree, scratch excluded) | 82 passed, 0 failed |\n| Proof in `test/scratch/PartialFillOvercharge.t.sol` | 3 of 3 fail on the current hook, as intended |\n\n**What I added under `test/`** (the existing 37 tests are untouched):\n\n- `RNNNImdFeeHookInvariants.t.sol`: a handler that drives three actors through all four swap shapes, liquidity in and out, donations, gifted ERC-6909 claims and `collectPending`, with per-call assertions. Eight invariants run against a funded pool with IMD as currency0 and against the launch-state pool (RNNN-only liquidity, IMD as currency1): fees are exactly floor(1%) of each fully filled swap's IMD side, every fee is with the recipient or pending, the hook holds no tokens, the recipient never receives RNNN, claims are always backed, configuration never changes. 128 runs at depth 50 with fail-on-revert, zero reverts.\n- `RNNNImdFeeHookOrdering.t.sol`: the same behaviour with IMD on either side of the pool key, plus failure paths: rounding at 99/100/199 wei, zero-amount swaps, deferral on the afterSwap path, strangers unable to burn or move the hook's claims, gifted claims going to the recipient and not back to the gifter, the `sender` argument carrying no authority, `afterSwap` unable to move funds outside an unlock, the beforeSwap delta always below the swap amount, and a recipient contract that rejects ETH still receiving IMD.\n- `RNNNTokenInvariants.t.sol`: a handler and four invariants over the fixed-supply ledger, plus stateless edge tests.\n- `utils/RNNNImdFixture.sol`: shared scaffolding that mines the hook address and places the mock IMD on a chosen side.\n\n**Finding reported in `.imd-findings.json`** (medium, with proof). When IMD is the specified currency, the hook fixes the fee in `beforeSwap` from the requested amount and never re-reads the executed amount. On a partial fill the swapper is charged 1% of the request, not of the IMD that moved. Reproduced three ways: a buy stopped by a price limit paid 11.01 IMD of which 10 IMD was fee; a buy that exhausted a thin range paid 10,003 IMD of which 10,000 was fee; an exact-output sell on the IMD-empty launch pool debited 10 IMD for a swap that delivered nothing. The handler excludes partial fills from its exact-1% check and counts them separately rather than blessing that behaviour.\n\n**Notes for the reviewer**\n\n- The invariant handler uses v4-core's `PoolModifyLiquidityTestNoChecks` router. The checked router asserts that adding liquidity never yields a positive delta, which is false once a position has accrued swap fees, so it panicked under fuzzing. That was a harness issue, not a hook one.\n- The findings file sits at the repo root and is listed in `.git/info/exclude`, which the harness set up, so it does not appear in `git status`. Nothing outside `test/**` was changed.\n- No fork tests exist here. The real IMD token's behaviour on Robinhood Chain remains to be rehearsed against live state.","treeHash":"37cce9deb98301f43636a3706885540ce16f548e","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":4627270,"inputTokens":994,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":89023,"runtime":"claude","turns":63,"wallClockMs":1302227}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"74a99f640688d37b","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Branch asymmetry (Asymmetry guide, step 3) between the two fee paths. When IMD is the unspecified currency, afterSwap computes the fee from the executed BalanceDelta (line 178-179), so it is always 1% of the IMD the pool actually moved. When IMD is the specified currency, beforeSwap returns a specified-currency delta of |amountSpecified|/100 (line 158-159) and afterSwap re-derives the same number from params.amountSpecified (line 174) to settle it. v4-core's Hooks.afterSwap then does `swapDelta = swapDelta - hookDelta` with that beforeSwap delta regardless of how much of amountSpecified the pool filled. So on an exact-input buy or exact-output sell that stops early (a sqrtPriceLimitX96 reached, or no liquidity in that direction) the swapper is debited the full 1% of the requested amount on top of the small amount actually traded. In the limit the pool fills nothing and the swapper still pays the fee: this is the launch pool's own state, since it opens seeded with RNNN only, so the very first exact-output sell anyone submits is debited 1% of the IMD they asked for and receives nothing. The brief's rule is 1% of the swap's IMD side; here the fee is unbounded relative to the IMD side (988% in the repro, infinite in the zero-fill case). Who loses: the swapper, in IMD, to the fee recipient. Who can trigger: any swapper, unprivileged, through any router that settles both deltas (v4-core's PoolSwapTest, custom routers); routers that TAKE_ALL the output currency revert instead, which blocks the swap rather than overcharging. Fix direction: in afterSwap, for the IMD-specified branch, derive the executed IMD amount from `delta` and limit the settled fee to 1% of it, returning or crediting the excess (for example refund the unfilled part via the unspecified-side delta valued at the swap price, or refuse IMD-specified swaps whose fill is short of amountSpecified so the swapper is never charged on IMD that did not move), and document that the fee base is the executed amount.","line":158,"path":"src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol","reproduction":"State: PoolManager; RNNN/IMD pool with this hook, LP fee 12500, spacing 60, price 1:1.\n(A) Launch state. Seed the pool with RNNN-only liquidity (1e24 L in the range entirely on the RNNN side of the price), so imd.balanceOf(manager) == 0. Swap through PoolSwapTest: zeroForOne = (RNNN is currency0), amountSpecified = +1000e18 (exact-output 1,000 IMD), price limit MIN/MAX. The pool has no IMD and fills nothing: swapper's RNNN balance unchanged, IMD received 0. Expected: fee 0 (the IMD side of the swap is 0), swapper's IMD unchanged. Actual: swapper's IMD balance drops by 10e18; hook.pendingFees() == 10e18 held for 0x45c89d...; event FeeDeferred(10e18).\n(B) Funded pool, full-range L = 1e24. Exact-input buy: amountSpecified = -1000e18 IMD, sqrtPriceLimitX96 one part in a million from the current price. Pool consumes 1.0127e18 IMD. Expected: fee about 0.0101e18 (1% of the IMD moved). Actual: fee 10e18 to the recipient; swapper pays 11.0127e18 for a 1.0127e18 trade.\nRun: forge test --match-path test/scratch/FeeOnUnfilledAmount.t.sol (both tests fail on the current code).","severity":"medium","snippet":"        if (_imdIsSpecified(key, params)) {\n            // IMD is the specified amount: shave the fee off what the pool trades. The swapper's total\n            // in IMD stays exactly what they specified.\n            uint256 fee = _feeOf(_abs(params.amountSpecified));\n            if (fee > 0) delta = toBeforeSwapDelta(fee.toInt128(), 0);","title":"IMD-specified swaps are charged 1% of the amount asked for, not of the IMD that actually moved: partial and zero fills overpay the recipient, up to a fee for a trade of nothing"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Trust-gap (external dependency x asymmetry between the two _settleFee branches). _settleFee falls back to an ERC-6909 claim only when the manager's IMD balance is short (line 253-256); when the balance suffices it calls poolManager.take, which does an ERC-20 transfer of IMD to the fixed recipient, and any revert there propagates out of afterSwap and reverts the whole swap. The hook therefore depends on IMD always accepting a transfer to 0x45c89d0cf0b8a05218506236fcfcb18da1d3ebe4. The live IMD on Robinhood Chain (0x5f7bb59365ce557c26dbcaa4ee9d39a4b95b7127, checked over its public RPC) is a LayerZero OFT with an owner (0x047f606fd5b2baa5f5c6c4ab8958e45cb6b054b7, an EOA), a per-address blocked(address) view, a transfersEnabled() flag with enableTransfers(), and setV4Config(address,address,bool)/poolManager(). Today transfersEnabled() is true, blocked(recipient) is false and poolManager() is unset, so the path works now; but a single owner action on IMD (blocking the recipient, or a future v4 config that gates transfers out of the PoolManager) makes every swap on the launch pool whose fee is at least 1 wei revert, buys and sells alike, until it is reversed. The recipient itself is a contract (1406 bytes of runtime code holding the IMD address as an immutable, with imd()/feed()/adapter() views and SafeERC20 approve calls), so it can receive plain ERC-20 transfers; the exposure is only the token-side gate. The README records this as an assumption, so this is a documented trust risk rather than a code error, but the fix is small and keeps the design: wrap the take in a try/catch (or check IMD's blocked/transfersEnabled views first) and mint the claim instead when the transfer fails, exactly as the balance-short branch already does, so a swap never fails because the fee could not be delivered. The claim can then be collected later with collectPending once the block is lifted.","line":268,"path":"src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol","reproduction":"State: funded RNNN/IMD pool on this hook, full-range liquidity 1e24, price 1:1, where IMD is an ERC-20 whose transfer reverts when the recipient is on its blocklist (modelled by a mock with setBlocked; the live IMD exposes blocked(address) under its owner). Call imd.setBlocked(0x45C89d0CF0B8a05218506236FcfcB18DA1D3ebE4, true). Then swap exact-input buy of 1000e18 IMD through PoolSwapTest: expected (by the README's own guarantee, 'No swap ever fails because the fee could not be delivered') a successful swap with the 10e18 fee held as a claim; actual: the swap reverts (take -> IMD.transfer reverts -> afterSwap reverts -> unlock reverts). Sell exact-input 1000e18 RNNN: same revert. Only a swap whose IMD side is below 100 wei (fee rounds to 0) still succeeds. Scratch test test/scratch/BlockedRecipient.t.sol demonstrates both reverts and the dust exception (it passes because it asserts the reverts).","severity":"low","snippet":"        poolManager.take(imd, feeRecipient, payout);\n        emit FeePaid(payout);","title":"Direct-pay path has no fallback when the IMD transfer to the recipient reverts: an IMD blocklist entry for 0x45c8... halts every fee-bearing swap on the launch pool"}],"hash":"30f3adefc7daa2655a19b8494c0de74b16d54acf2e41450c30aa88e0ddd757d5","nodeId":"b715b530-b964-4a03-ad44-1d0e89e3a36a","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete and `.imd-findings.json` holds two findings and eleven coverage rows. Both quoted snippets match the source lines exactly.\n\n**Finding 1, medium, with proof.** `src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol:158`. When IMD is the specified currency, the hook charges 1% of the amount asked for, not of the IMD the pool actually moved. v4-core subtracts the beforeSwap delta from the swapper regardless of fill, so a price-limited exact-input buy of 1,000 IMD that fills 1.01 IMD still pays a 10 IMD fee. On the launch pool's own opening state, seeded with RNNN only, the first exact-output sell fills nothing and the seller is still debited 10 IMD. The proof file in test/scratch fails both scenarios on the current code.\n\n**Finding 2, low, no proof.** `src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol:268`. The direct-pay branch has no fallback when the IMD transfer to the recipient reverts, unlike the balance-short branch that mints a claim. I checked the live IMD on Robinhood Chain over its public RPC. It is an owner-controlled LayerZero OFT with a per-address blocklist and a transfers-enabled switch. Both are currently permissive and the recipient is a contract that can hold IMD, so this is a documented trust risk, but one owner action on IMD would revert every fee-bearing swap. A scratch test demonstrates the reverts.\n\n**Coverage.** All six verifier entry points have rows: afterSwap carries the findings, collectPending, unlockCallback and the three token functions hold. Extra rows record the beforeSwap delta bound, beforeInitialize access, the absent privileged surface, claim backing, and the manifest as unreached since no launch.json exists in the tree. Access control itself is clean: every callback is PoolManager-only, configuration is immutable, and there is no owner, setter, pause, mint or ETH entry point.\n\nSources used for the IMD check: [Blockscout Robinhood API docs](https://docs.blockscout.com/robinhood-api.md), [Alchemy Robinhood Chain RPC details](https://www.alchemy.com/rpc/robinhood.md).","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2153408,"inputTokens":514,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":50386,"runtime":"claude","turns":37,"wallClockMs":690957}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"ef5038c1bdac3372","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_math, audit_permissions, audit_economics, audit_flow and write_foundry_tests (same root cause). When IMD is the specified currency (exact-input buy, exact-output sell) beforeSwap fixes the fee as floor(|params.amountSpecified|/100) and returns it as the specified-currency delta (lines 158-159); afterSwap recomputes the identical number from params.amountSpecified (line 174: `fee = _feeOf(_abs(params.amountSpecified));`) and settles it with take or mint. Nothing reads the BalanceDelta the pool actually produced on this path. v4-core's Pool.swap stops without reverting when the price reaches params.sqrtPriceLimitX96 or the liquidity in that direction is exhausted (`while (!(amountSpecifiedRemaining == 0 || result.sqrtPriceX96 == params.sqrtPriceLimitX96))`), and Hooks.afterSwap then applies the beforeSwap delta in full (`swapDelta = swapDelta - hookDelta`) however little was filled. So on any partially filled IMD-specified swap the swapper is debited the fee of the whole order on top of the amount traded, and the recipient receives IMD that is not 1% of any swap's IMD side. In the zero-fill limit a seller pays IMD and receives none: that is the launch pool's own opening state (RNNN-only liquidity, no IMD in the manager), so the first exact-output sell anyone submits is debited 1% of the IMD asked for and gets nothing, with the amount booked as a claim for the recipient. Partial fills are ordinary: every slippage-protected swap sets a price limit, and a front-runner can push the price to a victim's limit so the victim fills almost nothing yet pays 1% of all of it. Routers that TAKE_ALL the output (Universal Router) turn the exact-output case into a reverted swap instead, which contradicts the brief's 'does not block swaps'. The two unspecified-IMD paths (exact-output buy, exact-input sell, lines 178-180) are correct because they read the executed delta. This breaks the brief's single rule ('take 1% of the swap amount in IMD, the pool's IMD side') and the README's table, which assume a full fill. Fix direction, keeping one rule and no owner: in afterSwap on the IMD-specified path derive the executed IMD amount from `delta` (|delta.amount(imd)| minus or plus the declared fee), compute actualFee = 1% of it, pay only actualFee to the recipient and return fee - actualFee to the swapper's router inside the same unlock (take the excess to the hook, sync, transfer to the manager, settleFor(sender)), or, as a scope decision against 'never blocks', revert with a dedicated error when the fill is short so a partial fill is refused rather than mischarged. Add tests for a price-limited exact-input buy and for an exact-output sell on the RNNN-only launch pool.","line":158,"path":"src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol","reproduction":"State: fresh PoolManager, RNNN/IMD pool with this hook, LP fee 12500, tick spacing 60, price 1:1, IMD a plain 18-decimal ERC-20, recipient balance 0. Case A (funded pool, full-range liquidity 1e6 ether): PoolSwapTest.swap with zeroForOne = (IMD is currency0), amountSpecified = -100_000e18 (exact-input buy of 100,000 IMD), sqrtPriceLimitX96 = TickMath.getSqrtPriceAtTick(one tick spacing from the current price, -60 or +60 in the swap direction). Expected: fee <= 1% of the IMD side that traded (pool took 3,042.38 IMD, so about 30.4 IMD; the swapper should pay about 3,072.8 IMD). Actual (measured): swapper pays 4,042.383861004481674916 IMD, the manager's IMD grows by 3,042.383861004481674916, the recipient receives 1,000 IMD = 32.9% of the pool's IMD side and 24.7% of the swapper's. Case B (launch opening state: liquidity 1e6 ether placed only on the RNNN side of the price, manager holds 0 IMD): PoolSwapTest.swap with zeroForOne = (RNNN is currency0), amountSpecified = +1_000e18 (exact-output sell for 1,000 IMD), extreme price limit. Expected: the pool has no IMD, nothing trades, no fee is due and the seller's IMD is unchanged. Actual (measured): 0 RNNN spent, 0 IMD received, the seller's IMD balance falls by 10e18, FeeDeferred(10e18) and hook.pendingFees() == 10e18 for the recipient. Run: forge test --match-path test/scratch/PartialFillOvercharge.t.sol -vv; both tests fail on this tree ('fee exceeds 1% of the swapper's IMD side: 1000000000000000000000 > 40423838610044816750' and 'a seller must never end a sell with less IMD'). The proof accepts either fix: a fee bounded by the IMD that moved, or a refused swap on which the recipient receives nothing.","severity":"high","snippet":"            uint256 fee = _feeOf(_abs(params.amountSpecified));\n            if (fee > 0) delta = toBeforeSwapDelta(fee.toInt128(), 0);","title":"IMD-specified swaps are charged 1% of amountSpecified, not of the IMD the pool traded: partial and zero fills overcharge the swapper and pay the recipient IMD it is not owed"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from audit_math, audit_economics and audit_flow. On the two IMD-unspecified paths afterSwap charges 1% of the IMD the pool actually moved (lines 178-179), which is the brief's 'pool's IMD side'. On the two IMD-specified paths the fee is 1% of the swapper's specified amount: an exact-input buy of X IMD pays X/100 while the pool trades 0.99X, so the fee is 1.0101% of the pool's side; an exact-output sell for Y IMD pays Y/100 while the pool pays out 1.01Y, so the fee is 0.9901% of the pool's side. Measured against the swapper's side the mismatch is mirrored (0.99% on an exact-output buy, 1.0101% on an exact-input sell). The same economic trade therefore pays about 1% more or less fee depending on which shape a router chooses, and the README's single definition ('1% of the IMD amount the pool quotes') is not what the specified paths compute. Impact is 0.01% of notional per swap, non-compounding. Fix: pick one base and apply it on all four paths (for 'pool's IMD side': exact-input buy fee = X*100/10_100 and exact-output sell fee = Y*100/9_900 in beforeSwap, the unspecified paths already comply), then align the README table and the acceptance tests, which currently encode both definitions (fee == amountIn/100 in test_buyExactInput..., fee == pooled/100 in test_buyExactOutput...).","line":174,"path":"src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol","reproduction":"Funded pool at 1:1, LP fee 12500, full-range liquidity 1e6 ether, PoolSwapTest router (measured in test/scratch/Probe.t.sol::test_feeBaseDiffersBySwapShape). (1) Exact-input buy amountSpecified = -1_000e18 IMD: recipient receives 10e18, the manager's IMD grows by 990e18: fee = 1.0101% of the pool's IMD side. (2) Exact-output sell amountSpecified = +1_000e18 IMD: recipient receives 10e18, the manager's IMD falls by 1_010e18: fee = 0.9901% of the pool's IMD side. (3) Exact-input sell of 1_000e18 RNNN: pool pays out 986.461960761284253887e18 IMD, recipient receives 9.864619607612842538e18: fee = 0.9999% (floor of 1%) of the pool's IMD side. Expected: one ratio between fee and the pool's IMD leg for every shape; actual: 1.0101%, 0.9901%, 1.0000%.","severity":"low","snippet":"            fee = _feeOf(_abs(params.amountSpecified));","title":"The fee base differs by swap shape: IMD-specified swaps charge 1% of the swapper's gross IMD, IMD-unspecified swaps 1% of the pool's IMD, so 'exactly 1%' holds under a different definition for each pa"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"From audit_math. v4 accepts an exact-input amountSpecified far larger than any balance as 'swap until the price limit': Pool.swap only requires the consumed amount to fit int128, and a plain pool fills such a swap to its limit. The hook derives fee = |amountSpecified|/100 from the raw requested amount and casts it with fee.toInt128(), which reverts once |amountSpecified| > 100 * 170141183460469231731687303715884105727 (about 1.7e40), so the swap fails with the hook-call wrapper around SafeCastOverflow although the trade itself was fine. _abs(type(int256).min) also reverts on the checked negation, but there the plain pool reverts too, so the hook-specific band is roughly 1.7e40 to 1e75. No funds are lost; the hook blocks a class of swaps the brief says it must not block. Same root cause as finding 1 (fee derived from the requested amount instead of the amount the pool can trade); fixing that finding by bounding the fee to the executed amount resolves this one, or clamp the requested amount to the int128 domain before the fee math and document the bound.","line":159,"path":"src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol","reproduction":"Two pools on one fresh PoolManager, both RNNN/IMD at 1:1 with full-range liquidity 1e6 ether: one with this hook, one with hooks = address(0). PoolSwapTest.swap exact-input buy with amountSpecified = -(100 * 170141183460469231731687303715884105727 + 100) = -17014118346046923173168730371588410572800 and sqrtPriceLimitX96 one tick spacing from the current price. Plain pool: succeeds and consumes 3,042.383861004481674916 IMD up to the limit. Hook pool: reverts with CustomRevert.WrappedError(hook, IHooks.beforeSwap.selector, SafeCastOverflow(), HookCallFailed()). Expected per the brief: the hook alters the swap only by the 1% fee and never blocks it. Measured in test/scratch/Probe.t.sol::test_hugeAmountSpecified_hookRevertsWherePlainPoolFills (passes because it asserts the revert).","severity":"low","snippet":"            if (fee > 0) delta = toBeforeSwapDelta(fee.toInt128(), 0);","title":"beforeSwap reverts with SafeCastOverflow on fill-to-limit swaps whose |amountSpecified| exceeds 100 * type(int128).max, which a plain pool executes"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"From audit_permissions. _settleFee falls back to an ERC-6909 claim only when the manager's IMD balance is short (lines 253-256); when the balance suffices it calls poolManager.take, which does an ERC-20 transfer of IMD to the fixed recipient, and any revert there propagates out of afterSwap and reverts the whole swap, buys and sells alike. The README's own guarantee ('No swap ever fails because the fee could not be delivered') therefore holds only for the balance-short case. The live IMD on Robinhood Chain is an owner-controlled OFT with a per-address blocklist and a transfers-enabled flag, so a single owner action on IMD against 0x45c89d0cf0b8a05218506236fcfcb18da1d3ebe4 would freeze the launch pool until reversed. The README records this as an assumption, so it is a documented trust risk rather than a code error, and no funds are lost. The fix is small and keeps the design: wrap the take in a try/catch and mint the claim instead when the transfer fails, exactly as the balance-short branch already does, so the swap completes and the claim can be collected later with collectPending once IMD accepts the transfer again.","line":268,"path":"src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol","reproduction":"Funded RNNN/IMD pool on this hook, full-range liquidity 1e6 ether, price 1:1, IMD modelled by an ERC-20 whose transfer reverts when the recipient is blocked (setBlocked). Call imd.setBlocked(0x45C89d0CF0B8a05218506236FcfcB18DA1D3ebE4, true). Exact-input buy of 1_000e18 IMD through PoolSwapTest: expected (README guarantee) a successful swap with the 10e18 fee held as a claim; actual: the whole swap reverts (take -> IMD.transfer reverts -> afterSwap reverts -> unlock reverts). Exact-input sell of 1_000e18 RNNN: same revert. A buy of 50 wei (fee rounds to 0) still trades. Measured in test/scratch/Probe.t.sol::test_blockedRecipient_haltsFeeBearingSwaps (passes because it asserts the reverts).","severity":"low","snippet":"        poolManager.take(imd, feeRecipient, payout);","title":"Direct-pay path has no fallback when IMD refuses the transfer to the recipient: a blocklist entry or transfer gate on IMD halts every fee-bearing swap on the launch pool"}],"hash":"3d504691b3b3e7132d477e23e1793cd586d95d49a1ba0420f0616be39be9757f","nodeId":"b1f0ca94-0ed4-470f-bf79-d69a5d50369e","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. No tracked file was changed. Only the findings file and my scratch tests exist outside the tree, both ignored by git.\n\n**Outcome.** One high finding, three low, all reproduced against the code with Foundry. Nine specialist reports collapsed into these four. The economics specialist's info note about unhooked RNNN/IMD pools was dropped as a consequence of the brief rather than a defect.\n\n**Findings written to `.imd-findings.json`:**\n\n1. **High, with proof.** When IMD is the specified currency, the hook charges 1% of the requested amount, never re-reading what the pool filled. A price-limited exact-input buy of 100,000 IMD paid a 1,000 IMD fee on a 3,042 IMD trade. On the IMD-empty launch pool, an exact-output sell traded nothing yet debited the seller 10 IMD, booked for the recipient. Five specialists reported this; merged into one finding at high because a swapper loses funds to the recipient under ordinary slippage limits. The proof test fails on this tree and passes under either fix shape, a bounded fee or a refused swap.\n2. **Low.** Fee base differs by swap shape. Measured 1.0101%, 0.9901% and 1.0000% of the pool's IMD side across three shapes. Three specialists, merged.\n3. **Low.** Huge exact-input amounts that a plain pool fills to its limit revert in the hook on the int128 cast of the fee.\n4. **Low.** A refused IMD transfer to the recipient reverts every fee-bearing swap, contradicting the README's own guarantee. Documented as an assumption, kept as a trust risk with a mock reproduction.\n\n**Coverage.** All six listed entry points answered. The three token functions, collectPending and unlockCallback hold. afterSwap carries finding 1. I added rows for beforeSwap, beforeInitialize, constructor and deployability, undeclared callbacks, delta accounting and privileged functions. My own pass found nothing beyond the specialists: the manifest matches the constructor and permissions, the hook deploys under the factory model, claims can only be burned by the hook, and the full 82-test suite passes.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1530973,"inputTokens":386,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":29528,"runtime":"claude","turns":28,"wallClockMs":433389}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"723b11f958c65250","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"When IMD is the specified currency (exact-input buy, exact-output sell) the fee is fixed in beforeSwap as floor(|amountSpecified|/100) and credited to the hook through beforeSwapReturnDelta, before the pool has traded anything. v4's swap loop (Pool.sol:344) stops when the price reaches sqrtPriceLimitX96 or the in-range liquidity is exhausted, so the pool may consume only part of amountToSwap; the hook's credit does not shrink. afterSwap (line 174) recomputes the same amount from amountSpecified and settles it with take/mint, so the recipient is paid 1% of the amount the swapper *asked* to trade, however little was traded. Math: exact-input buy of X with pool fill C < 0.99X gives swapper delta = -(C + X/100), fee/IMD-side = (X/100)/(C + X/100), which approaches 100% as C -> 0. Exact-output sell of Y with pool output D < 1.01Y gives swapper IMD delta = D - Y/100, which is negative when D < Y/100: the seller pays IMD and receives none. On the launch pool this is the fresh-pool state (RNNN-only liquidity, no IMD on the sell side), and on any pool it is reachable with a user price limit or a bounded liquidity range. The brief's one rule, 'take 1% of the swap amount in IMD', and the README table ('fee = X/100, the pool trades 0.99X') assume a full fill. The two unspecified-IMD paths (exact-output buy, exact-input sell) are unaffected because they read the realized delta in afterSwap. Fix: in afterSwap, for the IMD-specified case, compare |delta.amountImd| with |amountSpecified| - fee (exact input) or |amountSpecified| + fee (exact output). If the pool traded less, the fair fee is 1% of the realized IMD side and the hook has been over-credited by the difference; because afterSwapReturnDelta cannot touch the specified currency, either revert that swap with a dedicated error (never overcharges; blocks only swaps that would be mischarged, a scope decision against 'never blocks') or return the excess to `sender` with poolManager.take(imd, sender, excess) and document that routers must sweep it. The attached test accepts either.","line":158,"path":"src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol","reproduction":"All numbers from test/scratch/PartialFillOvercharge.t.sol on this tree (fresh PoolManager, RNNN/IMD pool at 1:1, LP fee 12500, spacing 60, hook mined to 0x20CC; IMD is a second plain fixed-supply ERC-20).\n(a) Price limit: full-range liquidity 1e6 ether. buy exact-input amountSpecified = -100_000e18 IMD with sqrtPriceLimitX96 = SQRT_PRICE_1_1 -/+ SQRT_PRICE_1_1/2000 (0.05%). Actual: pool consumes 506.33 IMD, swapper pays 1,506.33 IMD, recipient receives 1,000 IMD (66% of the swapper's IMD side, 197% of the IMD traded). Expected: fee <= 15.06 IMD (1% of what the swapper paid).\n(b) Liquidity exhaustion with the router's default unbounded limit: RNNN-only liquidity 1e6 ether in ticks [60,600] (mirrored when IMD is currency1); manager holds 0 IMD. buy exact-input -10_000_000e18 IMD. Actual: swapper pays 127,796.09 IMD and receives 26,557.66 RNNN; pool traded 27,796 IMD; hook books a 100,000 IMD claim for the recipient (78% of the IMD the swapper paid, 3.6x the IMD traded). Expected: fee <= 1,277.96 IMD.\n(c) Fresh launch pool (RNNN-only liquidity, no IMD). sell exact-output amountSpecified = +1_000e18 IMD. Actual: pool delivers 0 IMD, seller spends 0 RNNN, seller's IMD balance falls by 10 IMD, hook mints a 10 IMD claim for the recipient. Expected: a seller never ends a sell with less IMD; fee 0 on a swap that traded nothing. (Through the Universal Router the TAKE of IMD would hit a negative delta and revert the whole transaction, turning the same defect into a blocked swap.)\nRun: forge test --match-path test/scratch/PartialFillOvercharge.t.sol -vv  -> 3 failing tests on this code.","severity":"high","snippet":"            uint256 fee = _feeOf(_abs(params.amountSpecified));\n            if (fee > 0) delta = toBeforeSwapDelta(fee.toInt128(), 0);","title":"Fee on IMD-specified swaps is 1% of amountSpecified, not of the IMD actually swapped: partial fills overcharge the swapper (up to paying IMD for nothing)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"v4 accepts an exact-input amountSpecified far larger than any balance as 'swap until the price limit': Pool.swap only requires the *consumed* amount to fit int128 (Pool.sol:455), and a plain pool fills such a swap to its limit. The hook computes fee = |amountSpecified|/100 from the raw specified amount and casts it with fee.toInt128(), which reverts once |amountSpecified| > 100 * 170141183460469231731687303715884105727, i.e. 1.7e40, and the swap fails with Wrap__FailedHookCall(SafeCastOverflow 0x93dafdf1). _abs(type(int256).min) reverts on the checked negation for the same class of input (there the plain pool also reverts, so only the 1.7e40 .. ~1e75 band is hook-specific). No funds are lost; the hook blocks a class of swaps the brief says it must not block. The same root cause as the partial-fill finding: the fee is derived from the requested amount rather than the amount the pool can trade. Fix with that finding, or clamp the requested amount to the int128 domain before the fee math and document the bound.","line":159,"path":"src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol","reproduction":"Two pools on one fresh PoolManager, both RNNN/IMD at 1:1 with full-range liquidity 1e6 ether: one with this hook, one with hooks = address(0). Swap exact-input buy, amountSpecified = -(100 * 170141183460469231731687303715884105727 + 100) = -17014118346046923173168730371588410572800, sqrtPriceLimitX96 = SQRT_PRICE_1_1 -/+ SQRT_PRICE_1_1/2000. Plain pool: succeeds, consumes ~506 IMD up to the limit. Hook pool: reverts, error data 0x90bfb865 (Wrap__FailedHookCall) wrapping 0x93dafdf1 (SafeCastOverflow) from fee.toInt128(). Expected per the brief: the hook alters the swap only by the 1% fee and never blocks it. Observed in test/scratch/Probe.t.sol::test_hugeAmountSpecified_hookRevertsWherePlainPoolFills (scratch, not kept).","severity":"low","snippet":"            if (fee > 0) delta = toBeforeSwapDelta(fee.toInt128(), 0);","title":"beforeSwap reverts (SafeCastOverflow) on fill-to-limit swaps with |amountSpecified| > 100*type(int128).max that the plain pool executes"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The brief defines the fee as 1% of 'the pool's IMD side'. In the two unspecified-IMD forms the hook takes 1% of the IMD the pool actually traded (delta), which matches. In the two specified-IMD forms it takes 1% of the swapper's specified amount instead, which is a different base: exact-input buy of X -> the pool trades 0.99X and the fee X/100 is 1.0101% of the pool's side; exact-output sell of Y -> the pool pays 1.01Y and the fee Y/100 is 0.9901% of the pool's side. Measured against the swapper's side the mismatch is mirrored (0.99% on an exact-output buy, 1.0101% on an exact-input sell). The deviation is 1% of the fee (0.01% of notional) per swap, so impact is small, but the 'exactly 1%' guarantee holds only for whichever base each form happens to use, and the README's single definition ('1% of the IMD amount the pool quotes') is not what the specified-IMD paths compute. Fix: pick one base and apply it in all four forms. For 'pool's IMD side': exact-input buy fee = X*100/10100 (pool then trades 100X/101 and the fee is 1% of it), exact-output sell fee = Y*100/9900; the unspecified paths already comply. For 'swapper's IMD side' adjust the two afterSwap formulas instead (fee = Q*100/9900 for exact-output buy, Q*100/10100 for exact-input sell).","line":174,"path":"src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol","reproduction":"Full-range pool, 1e6 ether liquidity, 1:1 price, LP fee 12500 (numbers from test/scratch/Probe.t.sol::test_feeBaseDiffersBetweenExactInAndExactOut, scratch). Exact-output buy of 500 RNNN: swapper pays 511.648229 IMD, recipient receives 5.065824 IMD = 0.9900% of the swapper's IMD side (= 1.0000% of the 506.58 IMD the pool traded). Exact-input sell of 1000 RNNN: swapper receives 977.637459 IMD, recipient receives 9.875126 IMD = 1.0101% of the swapper's IMD side (= 1.0000% of the 987.51 IMD the pool paid). Exact-input buy of 1000 IMD (existing test_buyExactInput): fee 10 IMD = 1.0000% of the swapper's side but 1.0101% of the 990 IMD the pool traded. Exact-output sell of 1000 IMD (existing test_sellExactOutput): fee 10 IMD = 0.9901% of the 1010 IMD the pool paid. Expected: one base, the same percentage in all four rows.","severity":"low","snippet":"            fee = _feeOf(_abs(params.amountSpecified));","title":"Fee base is inconsistent across the four swap forms: specified-IMD swaps charge 1% of the swapper's amount, unspecified-IMD swaps 1% of the pool's, so the same trade pays a different fee depending on "}],"hash":"443ff8ca00921b3408af651409e4a6ebe06a8ad73b1372a200d2e4eaac24b933","nodeId":"b2896bd0-8dc5-4d86-bc9e-897eda74dc73","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. Findings and coverage are in `.imd-findings.json`; no tracked file was changed. The only working-tree additions are the findings file and the proof test under test/scratch, which the verifier runs.\n\n**Result: one high, two low, across the three guides assigned to me.**\n\n1. **High. Fee on IMD-specified swaps is 1% of the requested amount, not of the IMD actually swapped.** For an exact-input buy or exact-output sell the hook fixes the fee in `beforeSwap` from `amountSpecified` and settles that same number in `afterSwap`. v4 stops a swap at the price limit or when in-range liquidity runs out, so the pool can trade far less than requested while the hook's credit stays the same. Reproduced three ways on this tree: a buy with a 0.05% price limit paid 1,506 IMD of which 1,000 was fee. A buy against a bounded RNNN-only range paid 127,796 IMD with a 100,000 IMD fee for 27,796 IMD of trade. An exact-output sell on the fresh launch pool traded nothing and still took 10 IMD from the seller. The proof test fails three of three on the current code and passes on a scratch copy with a revert-on-partial-fill fix. The fix is a scope call for the author: either refuse the mischarged swap or refund the excess to `sender`, since the afterSwap return delta cannot touch the specified currency.\n\n2. **Low. The hook refuses fill-to-limit swaps the plain pool executes.** `fee.toInt128()` overflows once the requested amount exceeds 100 times the int128 maximum. A plain pool with the same price limit fills the swap. No funds at risk, but it contradicts \"never blocks\".\n\n3. **Low. Fee base differs by swap form.** Unspecified-IMD forms charge 1% of the pool's IMD; specified-IMD forms charge 1% of the swapper's IMD. The same trade pays a fee that differs by 1% of the fee depending on exact-in versus exact-out. Concrete percentages for all four forms are in the file.\n\n**Coverage.** All six listed entry points have rows. `afterSwap` is a finding. `collectPending`, `unlockCallback` and the three token functions hold after tracing their checks and arithmetic. I added rows for `beforeSwap`, `beforeInitialize`, the constructor, `_settleFee`, the HookFlags constants and three invariants. Within my area I did not find anything in the deferred-claim arithmetic, the delta netting, the floor rounding, or the token's unchecked block. The Slither reentrancy-events leads and the Aderyn style leads did not reproduce as defects.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1528724,"inputTokens":386,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":49912,"runtime":"claude","turns":35,"wallClockMs":758632}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"63274cc86a9400de","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"When IMD is the specified currency (exact-input buy, exact-output sell) the hook commits the fee in beforeSwap as FEE_BPS of |params.amountSpecified| (src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol:158-159) and settles exactly that amount in afterSwap (line 174: fee = _feeOf(_abs(params.amountSpecified))), never looking at the BalanceDelta the pool actually produced. A v4 swap stops without reverting when it reaches params.sqrtPriceLimitX96 or runs out of liquidity in its direction (Pool.swap loop: while (!(amountSpecifiedRemaining == 0 || sqrtPriceX96 == sqrtPriceLimitX96))). On such a partial fill the hook's delta of +fee still lands on the swapper (Hooks.afterSwap: swapDelta = swapDelta - hookDelta), so: (a) exact-input buy: the swapper pays executed + 1% of the whole order, which can be several times the IMD the pool took; (b) exact-output sell: the swapper receives executed - 1% of the whole order, which goes negative when the pool delivers less than 1% of the ask, so a seller of RNNN ends the swap owing IMD and a router that settles negative deltas (v4-core PoolSwapTest does) pulls IMD from them on top of the RNNN they sold; the Universal Router's TAKE_ALL reverts the trade instead. Both outcomes violate the launch's single rule ('exactly 1% of the IMD side of the swap', README line 41: '1% of the IMD amount the pool quotes for the swap') and pay the recipient IMD it is not entitled to. The two unspecified-IMD paths (lines 178-180) are correct because they read the executed delta. Partial fills are ordinary on this pool: any slippage-protected swap sets a price limit, the launch pool opens with one-sided RNNN liquidity so a large buy exhausts the range and stops, and an exact-output sell for more IMD than the pool holds fills only what exists; a front-runner can also push the price to a victim's limit so the victim's order fills almost nothing yet pays 1% of all of it. Fix sketch (keeps the one rule and no owner): in afterSwap for the IMD-specified case compute actualFee from the executed IMD delta and, when fee > actualFee, return the difference to the swapper's delta, e.g. take(imd, address(this), refund); sync(imd); imd.transfer(poolManager, refund); settleFor(sender) so the router's net IMD delta equals swapDelta - actualFee; pay only actualFee to the recipient. Alternatively bound the beforeSwap commitment with a quote of the executable amount.","line":158,"path":"src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol","reproduction":"State: PoolManager, RNNN/IMD pool with this hook, fee 12500, spacing 60, price 1:1, full-range liquidity 1e6 ether, recipient balance 0. Swap A (exact-input buy): SwapParams{zeroForOne: imdIsCurrency0, amountSpecified: -1_000_000e18, sqrtPriceLimitX96: TickMath.getSqrtPriceAtTick(imdIsCurrency0 ? -60 : 60)} via PoolSwapTest.swap. Expected: fee = 1% of the IMD side that traded (~30.4e18 of the 3_042.38e18 IMD the pool took). Actual: pool took 3_042.38e18 IMD, swapper paid 13_042.38e18 IMD, recipient received 10_000e18 IMD (329% of the IMD the pool traded; 76.7% of what the swapper paid). Swap B (exact-output sell): SwapParams{zeroForOne: !imdIsCurrency0, amountSpecified: +1_000_000e18, same one-tick limit}. Expected: seller receives the IMD the pool delivered minus 1% of it (~2_965e18), pays RNNN only. Actual: pool paid out 2_995.35e18 IMD, recipient received 10_000e18 IMD, seller spent 3_042.38e18 RNNN AND paid 7_004.6e18 IMD net (balance 999_000_000e18 -> 998_992_995.35e18). Run: forge test --match-path test/scratch/PartialFillFee.t.sol -vv; both tests fail on the current code with these numbers and pass once the fee is derived from the executed IMD delta.","severity":"high","snippet":"            uint256 fee = _feeOf(_abs(params.amountSpecified));\n            if (fee > 0) delta = toBeforeSwapDelta(fee.toInt128(), 0);","title":"Fee on the IMD-specified path is 1% of amountSpecified, not of the IMD that traded: partial fills overcharge the swapper and can make a seller pay IMD"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"For an exact-output sell the hook charges fee = Y/100 where Y is what the swapper receives, while the pool pays out Y + Y/100, so the fee is 1/101 = 0.990% of the IMD leaving the pool. For an exact-input sell the fee is Q/100 of the pool's output Q, i.e. 1.000% of the IMD leaving the pool. Symmetrically, an exact-input buy pays X/100 of the swapper's gross X (1.0101% of the 0.99X the pool receives) while an exact-output buy pays Q/100 of the pool's quote Q (the swapper pays 1.01Q). The brief's 'exactly 1% of the IMD side' therefore holds for two of the four swap shapes under one reading and for the other two under the other; traders who route the same economic trade as exact-output rather than exact-input pay about 1% less fee (1/101 of it). The amount is small and non-compounding, but it is a broken 'exactly 1%' guarantee and an invariant (fee/IMD-side ratio) that depends on the path chosen. Fix: pick one base and apply it on all four paths, e.g. in beforeSwap commit fee = amount * 100 / 9_900 (so the fee is 1% of the pool-side amount for exact-input buys) or amount / 99 for exact-output sells, or document the chosen base per path in the README and the acceptance test.","line":172,"path":"src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol","reproduction":"Pool at 1:1, LP fee 12500, full-range liquidity 1e6 ether. (1) sell exact-output: SwapParams{zeroForOne: !imdIsCurrency0, amountSpecified: +100_000e18, limit MAX-1}: pool pays out 101_000e18 IMD, recipient gets 1_000e18 (0.990% of the IMD side). (2) sell exact-input: SwapParams{zeroForOne: !imdIsCurrency0, amountSpecified: -113_000e18 RNNN}: pool pays out 100_385.71e18 IMD, recipient gets 1_003.857e18 (1.000%). (3) buy exact-input -101_000e18 IMD: swapper pays 101_000e18, pool receives 99_990e18, recipient gets 1_010e18 (1.0101% of what the pool received). Expected under one consistent rule: the same ratio in all three; actual: 0.990%, 1.000%, 1.0101%. Measured with the project's PoolSwapTest router.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (_imdIsSpecified(key, params)) {\n            // Already declared in beforeSwap; only settle it here.\n            fee = _feeOf(_abs(params.amountSpecified));\n        } else {\n            // IMD is the unspecified side: charge the fee on top of (buy) or out of (sell) what the\n            // pool quoted.\n            int256 imdAmount = key.currency0 == imd ? delta.amount0() : delta.amount1();\n            fee = _feeOf(_abs(imdAmount));\n            if (fee > 0) hookDeltaUnspecified = fee.toInt128();\n        }","title":"Fee base differs by swap type: IMD-specified swaps pay 1% of the swapper's gross IMD, IMD-unspecified swaps pay 1% of the pool's IMD, so the same trade pays two different fees"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The fee lives only in the hook, and the hook only sees swaps on pools whose key names it. RNNNToken has no transfer restriction and PoolManager.initialize is permissionless, so anyone can open RNNN/IMD with hooks = address(0) (or with this hook at another fee/spacing, which beforeInitialize accepts) and LPs and routers can migrate there; the Universal Router and aggregators pick the best-priced pool. Over time the recipient's 1% applies only to the share of volume that still goes through the launch pool. This is a consequence of the brief (plain token, one-rule hook, no owner) rather than a code defect, and is recorded here as an economic trust assumption so the requester decides knowingly; no change is proposed that would add restrictions the brief forbids.","line":142,"path":"src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol","reproduction":"State: launch pool live. Anyone calls PoolManager.initialize(PoolKey{currency0/1: RNNN,IMD sorted, fee: 3000, tickSpacing: 60, hooks: IHooks(address(0))}, sqrtPrice) and adds liquidity; a swap on that key pays no hook fee and the recipient receives nothing. Expected by the brief's spirit: every RNNN/IMD swap pays 1%; actual: only swaps on the hooked key.","severity":"info","snippet":"    function beforeInitialize(address, PoolKey calldata key, uint160) external view onlyPoolManager returns (bytes4) {\n        if (!(key.currency0 == imd) && !(key.currency1 == imd)) revert PoolHasNoImdSide();\n        return IHooks.beforeInitialize.selector;\n    }","title":"Nothing routes RNNN/IMD trading through the hooked pool: any RNNN/IMD pool without the hook (or with a different fee tier) avoids the 1% entirely"}],"hash":"4e3f600399ba1a0b6578aba9a6780ebb7d9069292815af44c9f8b660c733f5e9","nodeId":"bb5e8bac-2243-4636-b96c-a11a7fb43f1a","outcome":"completed","summary":"The findings file and the scratch proof are on disk. They are ignored by a global git exclude, which is the expected handling for review output, so nothing in the reviewed tree changed. The review is complete.\n\n## Outcome\n\nThe economics audit of the RNNN/IMD fee hook found one substantive defect, one minor inconsistency, and one design-level trust assumption. All are written to `.imd-findings.json` with a coverage row for every listed entry point.\n\n**Finding 1, high: the fee is computed from the requested amount, not the executed amount.** When IMD is the specified currency, `beforeSwap` commits 1% of `amountSpecified` and `afterSwap` settles exactly that. A Uniswap v4 swap that reaches its price limit or exhausts liquidity stops without reverting, so on a partial fill the swapper pays 1% of the whole order for a fraction of it. The proof test under `test/scratch/PartialFillFee.t.sol` fails on the current code with these numbers:\n\n| Case | IMD the pool traded | Fee paid to recipient | Swapper outcome |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| Exact-input buy, limit one tick away | 3,042 IMD | 10,000 IMD | pays 13,042 IMD total |\n| Exact-output sell, limit one tick away | 2,995 IMD | 10,000 IMD | pays 7,005 IMD net on top of the RNNN sold |\n\nThis breaks the launch's single rule and pays the recipient IMD it is not entitled to. The report includes a fix sketch that keeps the no-owner design: derive the fee from the executed delta and return any over-commitment to the swapper's delta.\n\n**Finding 2, low:** the two IMD-specified paths charge 1% of the swapper's gross while the two unspecified paths charge 1% of the pool's amount. The same trade pays 0.990%, 1.000% or 1.0101% depending on how it is routed.\n\n**Finding 3, info:** nothing forces RNNN/IMD trading through the hooked pool, so a hookless pool avoids the fee entirely. This follows from the brief, so it is recorded as a trust assumption, not a defect.\n\n**What holds:** delta accounting nets to zero on every path, deferred claims are always backed, the recipient only ever receives IMD, `collectPending` and `unlockCallback` are safe, and the token is a plain fixed-supply ERC-20 with no admin surface. I did not cover the Universal Router's exact settlement behaviour on partial fills beyond reading its action semantics.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1768122,"inputTokens":482,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":41695,"runtime":"claude","turns":27,"wallClockMs":588924}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"26fddadbb60b75fea4ebb9d458fefb94add2e5a8da3155d2d678bfd8eb792f4f","device":"232b62e021f6f394","findings":[{"description":"When IMD is the specified currency (exact-input buy, exact-output sell) beforeSwap declares the full-fill fee (X/101 or Y/99) and afterSwap returns the unowed part through _refund, which first takes that amount out of the PoolManager. If the manager's IMD balance is below it the swap reverts with ShortFillNotRefundable. A hookless pool would fill the same order up to its price limit. This is reachable in three ways: (1) on the launch pool before the first full-range buy has settled, every slippage-limited buy that stops short is refused; (2) after someone sells the pool's IMD out (price at the tick where IMD liquidity ends), slippage-limited buys that fill short are refused until a full-range buy settles; (3) any exact-input order larger than roughly 101 times the manager's IMD holdings is refused instead of filling to the limit, because the unowed declaration exceeds what the manager holds. The README documents cases (1) and (3). The brief says the hook 'does not block or alter swaps in any other way'; this is a documented, bounded deviation. The alternative v4 offers (charging the specified currency only in beforeSwap) leaves no way to true a short fill up without the refund, so this is reported for the record rather than as a fix request. Tests pin the behaviour and its precondition: test/RNNNImdFeeHookOrdering.t.sol test_shortFillIsRefusedWhileTheManagerHoldsNoImdAndTruedUpAfterwards and test_exactOutputSellThatFillsNothingIsRefused; the invariant handler in test/RNNNImdFeeHookInvariants.t.sol asserts a refusal only ever happens when the manager held less IMD than the declaration and that a refused swap moves nothing.","line":310,"path":"src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol","reproduction":"Fresh PoolManager, pool initialized at 1:1, 1e6 ether RNNN-only liquidity, no IMD in the manager. Exact-input buy of 100,000 IMD with sqrtPriceLimitX96 one tick spacing from the current price through a router that settles recorded deltas. Expected (hookless): fills to the limit, swapper pays the fill. Actual: reverts with WrappedError(hook, afterSwap.selector, ShortFillNotRefundable, HookCallFailed); nothing moves. After one full-range buy of 1,000 IMD settles, the same order fills short and pays 1% of its fill.","severity":"low","title":"IMD-specified short fills are refused, not filled, whenever the PoolManager holds less IMD than the unowed part of the declared fee"},{"description":"beforeSwap declares floor(X/101); the pool trades E = X - floor(X/101); afterSwap computes floor(E/100) and caps it at the declaration. When X = 101k + 100, E = 100k + 100 and floor(E/100) = k + 1 > k = declared, so the fee is k, one wei under 1% of the leg. The smallest case is X = 100 wei: the pool trades all 100 wei and no fee is taken, although 1% of 100 wei is 1 wei. The hook never charges more than 1% and the shortfall is at most one wei per swap, so this is not exploitable (gas exceeds the gain by many orders of magnitude). The README already records it. Pinned in test/RNNNImdFeeHookOrdering.t.sol test_feeRoundsDownAtTheBoundary and by the one-wei bound in testFuzz_everySwapShapePaysFloorOnePercentOfItsImdSide.","line":210,"path":"src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol","reproduction":"Funded pool. Exact-input buy of 100 wei IMD: expected fee 1 wei (1% of the 100-wei leg); actual fee 0. Exact-input buy of 101 wei: pool trades 100 wei, fee 1 wei, as expected.","severity":"info","title":"An exact-input buy of X with X mod 101 == 100 pays one wei less than 1% of the pool's IMD leg"}],"hash":"4fc1176e3d6259983719e7b4259b9b13c28b677d06f012472140a70661947ac0","nodeId":"9d9fe02d-d066-4df6-a83c-4b7a7749f19a","outcome":"completed","summary":"Done. The full suite is green again and the revision stays inside my three accepted test files.\n\n**What was wrong.** The hook was revised after my tests were accepted. The fee base moved from 1% of the amount the swapper specified to 1% of the IMD the pool actually trades, with a refund path for short fills. That made 22 of my tests fail on arithmetic the implementation no longer has. The rejected attempt's work did not survive, so this is the first revision that lands.\n\n**What I changed.** Only `test/RNNNImdFeeHookOrdering.t.sol`, `test/RNNNImdFeeHookInvariants.t.sol` and `test/utils/RNNNImdFixture.sol`. The other contributor's tests, the source and the README are untouched.\n\n- **Fee oracle rebuilt from balances.** Both suites now compute the pool's IMD leg from the manager's balance and the claim books alone, then assert the fee is floor(1%) of that leg, capped at the declaration when IMD is the specified currency. The swapper's IMD must move by the leg plus or minus that fee. This is independent of the hook's arithmetic, so it can check it.\n- **Short fills now exercised in both token orderings.** Price-limited buys and exact-output sells go through the actual-delta router, with a fuzz over sizes and limits. The refund amount is checked against the emitted event, and the router and hook must end holding nothing.\n- **Failure paths added.** A v4-core router that settles the returned delta cannot complete a short fill. The launch pool refuses a short fill until the first buy settles, then trues it up. An exact-output sell that fills nothing is refused. IMD blocking the hook stops short fills but not full fills. Oversized orders clamp instead of reverting.\n- **Invariant handler reworked.** The IMD-specified shapes take a random price limit, so short fills and refusals occur under random sequences. A refusal is accepted only when the manager held less IMD than the declaration and nothing moved. Fees must sum to exactly floor(1%) of all traded volume, and the funded pool must never refuse or defer anything. I verified by probe that short fills, refunds and refusals are actually hit, not vacuous.\n\n**Results.**\n\n| Check | Outcome |\n| --- | --- |\n| `forge build` | clean |\n| `forge test` | 112 passed, 0 failed, 13 suites |\n| Invariant runs | 128 runs × 50 depth per suite, 0 reverts |\n\n**Findings reported** in `.imd-findings.json`, both without proof since neither is high severity:\n\n- **Low.** IMD-specified short fills are refused whenever the manager holds less IMD than the unowed part of the declaration. That blocks slippage-limited buys on the launch pool before the first settled buy, after IMD is sold out of the pool, and for orders over roughly 101 times the manager's IMD. The README documents two of the three cases.\n- **Info.** An exact-input buy of X with X mod 101 equal to 100 pays one wei under 1% of the leg. Never over, not exploitable.\n\nI drafted a third finding about the refund's `sync` breaking routers that sync before swapping, then reproduced it and found those routers already fail on every fee-bearing swap because of the `take` in afterSwap, which the README states. The refund adds no new exposure, so I dropped it.","treeHash":"5a0b5ccb4da0f78de49c1a704e305c21200d6628","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":6516070,"inputTokens":1250,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":77889,"runtime":"claude","turns":50,"wallClockMs":1186629}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"161d6fb54f66cfa0ec4dfe60832daaf36bf4e35d587356680ae4d7ee1e680248","device":"1c29c7c6e4cf57eb","findings":[],"hash":"602b9e8f8da98a066004ac9d05ed3810bd1cf8bc93ddec1ad83e1f4f8e92faec","nodeId":"e4e2720b-1f65-4f7a-a4b5-af36254136b1","outcome":"completed","summary":"I updated the `notes` in `launch.json` and changed nothing else. `forge build` succeeds and `forge test` passes all 51 tests.\n\n**Why the notes changed:** another contributor revised `RNNNImdFeeHook` after my manifest was accepted, so the old notes described behaviour the hook no longer has. They claimed the fee is based on the amount the swapper asked for, with no adjustment for partial fills. The hook now:\n- takes 1% of the IMD the pool actually traded, on every kind of swap;\n- refunds any overcharge on a partly filled swap where IMD is the specified side;\n- turns the fee into an IMD claim if it can't be delivered yet, including when the recipient refuses the transfer.\n\n**One problem with the brief:** the notes now open with a limitation that conflicts with \"does not block or alter swaps in any other way.\" A partly filled swap where IMD is the specified side reverts with `ShortFillNotRefundable` if the PoolManager holds too little IMD to make the refund. That can happen on the launch pool before its first buy settles. The hook refuses the swap rather than overcharging it. Full fills are never affected. Reviewers should decide whether that is acceptable.\n\n**Fields I checked and left unchanged:**\n- **Hook:** `RNNNImdFeeHook`, with constructor arguments in declaration order: `\"$poolManager\"`, then the IMD address `0x5f7b…7127`, then the fee recipient `0x45c8…be4`. Both addresses come from the brief. The hook takes no token or owner argument, so `\"$token\"` and `\"$owner\"` don't appear.\n- **Permissions:** `beforeInitialize`, `beforeSwap`, `afterSwap`, `beforeSwapReturnDelta`, `afterSwapReturnDelta`. This matches `getHookPermissions` and the address bits `0x20cc`.\n- **Token:** `RNNNToken`, named RNNN, symbol RNNN, 18 decimals, no constructor arguments.\n- **Pool:** paired with IMD at fee 12500, tickSpacing 60 and initialPrice `79228162514264337593543950336`. `beforeInitialize` accepts that fee and spacing.\n\nThe notes are 2,630 characters, under the 4,000 limit.","treeHash":"c190daa12a79d89eecf9ef0c4c6398e37ae83368","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":260927,"inputTokens":12,"model":"claude-opus-5-5","outputTokens":3724,"runtime":"claude","turns":6,"wallClockMs":44695}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"d8a55896631c1bb4ac3805f1c422c1e2c7e3d32fa42ddfe124528c7ebf5fcfc2","device":"7989aa5d838d11d9","findings":[],"hash":"9eaa8dc740e3ac6cc048fd424dbbac47da75655925dfff91146dcf1266bc8b5e","nodeId":"e4e2720b-1f65-4f7a-a4b5-af36254136b1","outcome":"completed","summary":"Created [launch.json](/root/.identitymd/work/96d94ee9-b42a-4324-8dba-b952d6cafc29/e4e2720b-1f65-4f7a-a4b5-af36254136b1/launch.json) with matching contracts, constructor arguments, permissions, and required pool values.\n\n`forge build` succeeded; all 37 tests passed. Only the manifest changed.\n\nNotes disclose the existing hook’s deferred-payment and partial-fill fee limitations.","treeHash":"73192f7625771e6cbb56bdeb065be69265d91bb7","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":317824,"inputTokens":59422,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":3971,"runtime":"codex","turns":3,"wallClockMs":116850}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"7eaf1cd0fb3df712","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged with write_foundry_tests finding c1f31c99 (same root cause). This is the deviation from 'does not block swaps' that my round-1 finding 789cc455 explicitly allowed as the alternative to mischarging, so it is advisory, not blocking. The fix returns the unowed part of the beforeSwap declaration (X/101 on an exact-input buy, Y/99 on an exact-output sell) by taking it out of the PoolManager, and refuses the swap when the manager's IMD balance is below that amount. The condition is therefore manager IMD < declared - E/100, where E is the IMD the pool filled: it holds on the launch pool until enough buys have settled (not only before the first one), and on any pool for an IMD-specified order larger than about 101 x (exact input) or 99 x (exact output) the manager's IMD holding that stops at a price limit. Because the check reads the manager's whole IMD balance, IMD held for every other IMD pool on the same manager also backs the refund, which narrows the window on Robinhood Chain. The README (lines 189-192) and launch.json notes describe only 'the launch pool before its first buy settles' and 'an order larger than all the IMD in existence'; the accurate statement is the balance condition above. No funds move on a refused swap and nothing is booked for the recipient. The only ways to remove the window entirely are to drop the beforeSwap declaration (charge the unspecified side, which the brief forbids) or to pre-fund the hook with IMD, so no code change is requested; the README and notes should state the real condition.","line":310,"path":"src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol","reproduction":"Case 1 (launch pool after a small first buy): fresh PoolManager, RNNN/IMD pool with this hook, LP fee 12500, spacing 60, price 1:1, RNNN-only liquidity 1e6 ether; one unlimited exact-input buy of 100e18 IMD through PoolSwapTest settles, so imd.balanceOf(manager) == 100e18. Then ActualDeltaRouter.swap with zeroForOne = (IMD is currency0), amountSpecified = -100_000e18, sqrtPriceLimitX96 = TickMath.getSqrtPriceAtTick(current tick -/+ 60). Expected (hookless twin pool on a separate manager, same liquidity and first buy): fills to the limit, 3,053.399472914553301317 IMD in. Actual: reverts with WrappedError(hook, IHooks.afterSwap.selector, ShortFillNotRefundable(), HookCallFailed()); swapper balances unchanged, pendingFees() == 0. Case 2 (funded pool): full-range liquidity 1e6 ether, manager holds 999,999.99 IMD. ActualDeltaRouter.swap exact-output sell with amountSpecified = +500_000_000e18 IMD and the same one-spacing limit: a hookless pool on the same manager fills 2,995.354955910780937674 IMD out; the hooked pool reverts with the same wrapped ShortFillNotRefundable (declared 5,050,505 IMD exceeds the manager's balance). Measured in test/scratch/Settle.t.sol (test_refusalWindowAfterSmallFirstBuy, test_exactOutputSellBeyondManagerImd), both pass because they assert the refusal.","severity":"low","snippet":"        if (imd.balanceOf(address(poolManager)) < amount) revert ShortFillNotRefundable();","title":"IMD-specified short fills are refused whenever the PoolManager's IMD is below the unowed declaration (X/101 - E/100), a wider window than the README's 'before the first buy settles'"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Merged from write_foundry_tests finding 1317320f. beforeSwap declares floor(X/101); the pool trades E = X - floor(X/101); afterSwap computes floor(E/100) and caps it at the declaration. When X = 101k + 100, E = 100k + 100 and floor(E/100) = k + 1 > k, so the fee is k, one wei under 1% of the leg. The hook never charges more than 1%, the shortfall is at most one wei per swap, and the README records it. Not exploitable (gas exceeds the gain by many orders of magnitude); recorded so the 'exactly 1%' statement is read as floor with this one-wei boundary.","line":210,"path":"src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol","reproduction":"Funded pool (full-range liquidity 1e6 ether, 1:1). PoolSwapTest exact-input buy with amountSpecified = -100 wei IMD: expected fee 1 wei (1% of the 100-wei leg), actual 0. amountSpecified = -101 wei: pool trades 100 wei, fee 1 wei. Measured in test/scratch/Settle.t.sol::test_oneWeiRounding.","severity":"info","snippet":"            if (fee > declared) fee = declared;","title":"An exact-input buy of X IMD with X mod 101 == 100 pays one wei less than 1% of the pool's IMD leg"}],"hash":"a78af4f1d90356814186d5557cc820eaa4a33a1f575f887e09da007eca41b768","nodeId":"b1f0ca94-0ed4-470f-bf79-d69a5d50369e","outcome":"completed","summary":"The findings file is in place and the repository is otherwise untouched (the file is excluded by the harness, and my scratch tests are removed).\n\n**Outcome: all four round-1 findings are fixed. No new blocking defect. The file carries one low advisory and one info note.**\n\n**Round-1 findings, settled by my own reproduction** (fresh PoolManager, same inputs as before):\n\n- **789cc455 (high, fee on partial fills): fixed.** A price-limited 100,000 IMD buy on the funded pool now pays 30.42 IMD, which is 1% of the 3,042.38 IMD leg, and the swapper pays leg plus fee. The exact-output sell on the RNNN-only launch pool is refused with the dedicated error, the seller's IMD is unchanged and nothing is booked for the recipient. The refund path nets the hook to zero and credits the router inside the same unlock. I traced this against v4-core's Hooks.afterSwap and settleFor.\n- **80701ca0 (low, fee base by shape): fixed.** All four shapes charge floor(pool IMD leg / 100).\n- **72cf4725 (low, SafeCastOverflow): fixed.** The oversized order no longer overflows. It is refused with the hook's own error, which falls under the short-fill rule I accepted.\n- **f766513a (low, blocked recipient): fixed.** With the recipient blocked, a buy and a sell both trade and defer the fee as a claim, delivered by collectPending once unblocked.\n\n**Kept, advisory only:**\n\n- **Low:** the short-fill refusal window is wider than the README says. The swap is refused whenever the manager's IMD is below the unowed declaration, not only before the first buy. I reproduced it on the launch pool after a 100 IMD first buy, where a hookless twin fills 3,053 IMD. This is the deviation my round-1 finding explicitly allowed, so it asks for a documentation correction, not a code change. Merged with the testing specialist's low.\n- **Info:** the one-wei rounding at X mod 101 == 100, already in the README. Merged from the testing specialist.\n\n**Dropped:** the economics specialist's note that other RNNN/IMD pools avoid the fee. That follows from the brief's plain token and one-rule hook, not from a code defect.\n\nCoverage answers all six entry points, with afterSwap pointing at the advisory finding and the rest holding. Slither's unused-return on settleFor and aderyn's unsafe-erc20 lead did not reproduce: the settled amount is the measured balance difference and the transfer helper reverts on failure.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1370495,"inputTokens":354,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":38875,"runtime":"claude","turns":24,"wallClockMs":529376}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"bbbb7cd8f2f85f979d22f35c2bebe95e363e0cdf6a45472a6beed58538b52c09","device":"22c9b760d0a15149","findings":[],"hash":"df813aafd25675fade601d08077a954c5f7bf8d93cc0665bca68e04fcdaf99b6","nodeId":"7e895bfc-53cf-4b90-ba7e-7b832230ba35","outcome":"completed","summary":"Done. The RNNN launch is implemented, tested, documented and committed at `c80e1a3`. A fresh clone builds, passes all tests and passes `forge fmt --check` with no network.\n\n**What was delivered**\n\n- `src/RNNNToken.sol`: plain fixed-supply ERC-20, name and symbol `RNNN`, 18 decimals, 1,000,000,000 tokens minted once to the deployer. No owner, mint, pause, blocklist, fee or upgrade path.\n- `src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol`: the one-rule hook. On every swap it takes 1% of the swap's IMD side, in IMD, and sends it to the fixed recipient given as an immutable constructor argument. When IMD is the specified currency the fee is declared in `beforeSwap`, otherwise in `afterSwap`, so all four swap shapes pay exactly 1%. The fee is delivered at once with `take` when the PoolManager holds enough IMD. On a freshly seeded pool, which holds no IMD until the first buyer's input settles, the fee is held as an ERC-6909 claim instead, so no swap ever reverts. Later swaps deliver pending claims automatically, and anyone may call `collectPending` to deliver them to the fixed recipient. `beforeInitialize` accepts any initializer and any LP fee tier and only requires the pool to have an IMD side. No owner, no setters, no ETH entry point.\n- `src/HookFlags.sol` and `test/mocks/MockERC20.sol` at the paths the pinned protected tests import.\n- `script/Deploy.s.sol`: rehearsal deployment whose `deploy` function mines the salt and is called directly from a test.\n- Vendored forge-std, Uniswap v4-core `src/`, and solmate's `Owned.sol` as ordinary files, no submodules.\n- `README.md` documents the fee semantics per swap shape, the claim fallback, constructor arguments with their manifest values, launch parameters, assumptions, operational responsibilities, and the hook configuration record.\n\n**Verification**\n\n| Check | Result |\n| --- | --- |\n| `forge build` with solc 0.8.26 | passes, no warnings |\n| `forge test` | 37 passed, 0 failed |\n| `forge fmt --check` | passes |\n| Pinned `Hook.protected.t.sol` against built bytecode | 4 passed |\n| Pinned `Token.protected.t.sol` against built bytecode | 7 passed |\n\nThe tests cover exact-input and exact-output buys and sells each sending exactly 1% of the IMD side to the recipient, fuzzed IMD conservation, the fresh tokens-only pool deferring and later delivering the fee, callback access control, a privileged-selector sweep from several callers, pool initialization acceptance and rejection, and the token's supply and transfer behaviour.\n\n**Decisions worth knowing**\n\n- The brief's instruction that the recipient receives IMD overrides the generic launch guidance about selling hook fees for ETH, so nothing is sold and no price limit or ETH market exists.\n- The IMD address is a constructor argument because the brief gives its value for the launch chain. The manifest step should write the PoolManager as `$poolManager` and the other two arguments as the literal addresses listed in the README.\n- No `launch.json` was written, as instructed.","treeHash":"aaf5fbc067d573f4e12597ca581604dafcbf04b7","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2564027,"inputTokens":770,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":63178,"runtime":"claude","turns":36,"wallClockMs":944946}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"934ef01306a3cc89","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"Execution trace of the two cases where IMD is the specified currency (exact-input buy, exact-output sell). beforeSwap (line 158) computes fee = |params.amountSpecified| / 100 and returns it as the specified-currency delta; PoolManager (Hooks.beforeSwap) subtracts it from amountToSwap, runs the pool swap, and in Hooks.afterSwap debits the swapper and credits the hook that same fee regardless of how much the pool actually filled. afterSwap (line 174) then recomputes the identical fee from params.amountSpecified and _settleFee takes or mints exactly that. Nothing ever compares the declared fee with the IMD amount in the swap's BalanceDelta. When the fill is partial (sqrtPriceLimitX96 reached, or no liquidity on the IMD side of the price) the pool trades far less IMD than requested but the fee stays 1% of the request. The brief fixes the fee at 1% of 'the swap amount in IMD (the pool's IMD side)' and says the hook 'does not block or alter swaps in any other way'; here the fee can exceed 100% of the pool's IMD side. The launch pool's own opening state reproduces it: the factory seeds RNNN only, so until the first buy any exact-output sell (ask for Y IMD) trades nothing and still costs the swapper Y/100 IMD, which the hook books as a claim for the recipient. The unspecified-IMD paths (exact-output buy, exact-input sell) are not affected: they read the pool's actual delta (line 178). Routers that enforce a minimum output (Universal Router TAKE_ALL) turn the exact-output case into a revert rather than a loss, which still contradicts 'does not block swaps'; the exact-input buy case passes through such routers unchanged, because SETTLE_ALL(maxAmount = amountIn) covers consumed + fee. Who loses: the swapper, to the fee recipient. Fix options, in order of fidelity to the brief: (a) in afterSwap for the specified case, derive the IMD actually traded from delta, cap the fee at 1% of it, and return the excess to the swap's sender inside the same unlock (take the excess to the hook, sync + transfer + settleFor(sender), which credits the router's delta), so the swapper pays pool side + 1%; or (b) if returning value is judged too complex, revert in afterSwap when the declared fee exceeds 1% of the traded IMD (plus rounding), so a partial fill is refused instead of overcharged, and document that specified-IMD swaps need a full fill. Either way add a test for a price-limited exact-input buy and for an exact-output sell on the RNNN-only launch pool.","line":158,"path":"src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol","reproduction":"State: PoolManager, RNNN/IMD pool with this hook, LP fee 12500, spacing 60, price 1:1. Case A (launch opening state): liquidity 1,000,000 added on the RNNN side only (ticks [60, MAX] or [MIN, -60] depending on sort order); manager holds 0 IMD. Call PoolSwapTest.swap with zeroForOne = RNNN->IMD, amountSpecified = +1000e18 (exact-output 1,000 IMD), limit MIN+1/MAX-1. Expected: the pool has no IMD to sell, the swap trades 0 and no fee is due. Actual: the pool trades 0 RNNN and 0 IMD, the swapper's IMD balance drops by 10e18, the swap router's IMD delta is -10e18, FeeDeferred(10e18) is emitted and hook.pendingFees() == 10e18 (collectPending later pays it to 0x45c8...ebe4). Case B (funded pool): full-range liquidity 1,000,000. Call swap with zeroForOne = IMD->RNNN, amountSpecified = -100_000e18, sqrtPriceLimitX96 = TickMath.getSqrtPriceAtTick(-10) (or +10). The pool stops at the limit after consuming 506.43e18 IMD. Expected fee: about 5.06e18 (1% of the pool's IMD side). Actual: FeePaid(1000e18); the swapper pays 1506.43e18 IMD for a trade whose pool side was 506.43e18, a fee of about 197% of the IMD side. Proof file test/scratch/PartialFillFee.t.sol fails both cases on this tree: 'fee exceeds 1% of the pool's IMD side: 1000000000000000000000 > 5064303898739240608' and 'fee charged on IMD the pool never traded: 10000000000000000000 != 0'.","severity":"medium","snippet":"            uint256 fee = _feeOf(_abs(params.amountSpecified));\n            if (fee > 0) delta = toBeforeSwapDelta(fee.toInt128(), 0);","title":"Specified-IMD swaps are charged 1% of the requested amount, not of the IMD the pool traded: partial fills overcharge, and a swap that trades nothing still pays"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The four swap shapes do not share a definition of 'the IMD side'. Exact-input buy: the swapper pays X, the pool trades 0.99X, fee = X/100, which is 1.0101% of the IMD the pool traded. Exact-input sell: the pool pays out Q, fee = Q/100, the swapper receives 0.99Q, so the fee is 1% of the pool leg and 1.0101% of the swapper's leg. Exact-output buy: the pool quotes Q, the swapper pays 1.01Q, fee = Q/100, 1% of the pool leg. Exact-output sell: the swapper asks for Y, the pool pays out 1.01Y, fee = Y/100, which is only 0.99% of the IMD the pool traded. So exact-input swaps are charged 1% of the larger (gross) leg while exact-output swaps are charged 1% of the smaller (net) leg, and two swaps with the same pool-side IMD amount pay fees that differ by about 1% of the fee. The repository's own tests encode both definitions (fee == amountIn/100 in test_buyExactInput..., fee == pooled/100 in test_buyExactOutput...). The brief's wording 'the pool's IMD side' points at the amount the pool trades. Impact is a 0.01% of notional difference, so low. Fix: pick one base and apply it to all four shapes; for the specified cases that means fee = amount * 100 / 10_100 (exact output: the pool pays Y + fee, so fee = 1% of Y + fee) or fee = amount / 100 with the pool trading amount - fee documented as the base; then align the README table and tests.","line":174,"path":"src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol","reproduction":"Funded pool at 1:1, full-range liquidity 1,000,000e18. (1) Exact-input buy amountSpecified = -1000e18: FeePaid(10e18); the manager's IMD grows by 990e18, so the fee is 10/990 = 1.0101% of the IMD the pool traded. (2) Exact-output sell amountSpecified = +1000e18: FeePaid(10e18); the manager's IMD falls by 1010e18, so the fee is 10/1010 = 0.9901% of the IMD the pool traded. (3) Exact-input sell of RNNN producing a pool output Q: fee = Q/100 exactly 1% of the pool leg. Expected: one fixed ratio between fee and the pool's IMD leg for every swap shape. Actual: 1.0101%, 0.9901% and 1%.","severity":"low","snippet":"            fee = _feeOf(_abs(params.amountSpecified));","title":"The fee base differs between exact-input and exact-output swaps: 1% of the gross IMD leg in one, 1% of the net leg in the other"}],"hash":"e0ba4e17739f3996e28092873b11bd56173e1e9e26c418da474a3c8fc06a022b","nodeId":"b21c1274-6462-4f62-9547-cf32a011ef74","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. `.imd-findings.json` holds two findings and a 13-row coverage record; no source files were changed, and the only working-tree additions are the findings file and my scratch proof under `test/scratch/`.\n\n**Findings**\n\n1. **Medium, `src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol:158`.** When IMD is the specified currency (exact-input buy, exact-output sell), the fee is fixed in `beforeSwap` as 1% of the requested amount and settled unchanged in `afterSwap`, never reconciled with what the pool actually traded. On a partial fill the swapper is overcharged. Two reproductions, both failing in the attached proof test:\n   - Funded pool, exact-input buy of 100,000 IMD with a price limit ten ticks away: the pool consumed 506 IMD, the recipient received 1,000 IMD, about 197% of the pool's IMD side.\n   - The launch pool's opening state (RNNN-only liquidity), exact-output sell asking for 1,000 IMD: the pool trades nothing, the swapper still loses 10 IMD, booked as a claim for the recipient.\n   The unspecified-IMD paths read the real delta and are correct. I suggested two fixes: cap the fee at 1% of the traded IMD and return the excess to the sender inside the unlock, or refuse partial fills with a clear revert.\n\n2. **Low, `src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol:174`.** The fee base is inconsistent across swap shapes: exact-input swaps pay 1% of the gross IMD leg, exact-output swaps pay 1% of the net leg. Concretely, a 1,000 IMD exact-input buy pays 1.0101% of the pool's leg, a 1,000 IMD exact-output sell pays 0.9901% of it. The repo's own tests encode both definitions.\n\n**Coverage.** All six ABI entry points have rows: `afterSwap` is a finding, `collectPending`, `unlockCallback` and the three token functions hold. Additional rows cover `beforeSwap`, `beforeInitialize`, the constructor and permission bits, the hook-holds-nothing invariant, the HookFlags and deploy periphery, the sync-before-swap router caveat, and the slither reentrancy-events leads, which are benign because the only external calls are to the immutable PoolManager.\n\n**Not reported.** Delta accounting nets to zero in every branch including the deferred-claim path, access control on every callback is correct, the ERC-6909 claims can only reach the fixed recipient, and the token has no privileged path. One thing to carry forward to the manifest step: the hook's `imd_` constructor argument must equal `pool.pairedCurrency`, or `beforeInitialize` refuses the launch pool. There is no `launch.json` in the tree to check it against yet.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":1655158,"inputTokens":386,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":56725,"runtime":"claude","turns":30,"wallClockMs":758293}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"6cb536c319a09fdcb138502ca696b65564a022d8e48424a6c74952db0054602c","device":"1731fbfe0c4574fb","findings":[],"hash":"f89a82eb08f77358e35c628cd2f8e368b3f2bad3fbe4575094b07fdc265901a8","nodeId":"7e895bfc-53cf-4b90-ba7e-7b832230ba35","outcome":"completed","summary":"The responses file is excluded by the harness's own `.git/info/exclude`, so it is collected from the working tree by design, not committed. I'm leaving `.git/` alone as the rules require. The work is complete.\n\n## Summary\n\nAll four findings reproduced and were fixed. The hook keeps its design, no owner, one rule, with the IMD-specified path corrected and the fee base unified.\n\n**High finding, short fills overcharged.** `afterSwap` now reads the IMD the pool actually traded from its own `BalanceDelta` on every path and charges 1% of that. On the IMD-specified path `beforeSwap` still declares the full-fill fee, and `afterSwap` returns any unowed excess to the swapper's router inside the same unlock through `take`, `sync`, transfer and `settleFor`. When the PoolManager holds too little IMD to fund that refund, which is the launch pool's state before its first buy settles, the swap is refused with a dedicated `ShortFillNotRefundable` error instead of being mischarged. A zero-fill exact-output sell on the RNNN-only pool is now refused with the seller's IMD untouched.\n\n**Advisory findings.**\n- **Fee base.** All four swap shapes now charge 1% of the pool's IMD leg. The declared fee is X/101 on exact input and Y/99 on exact output, so a full fill needs no refund.\n- **SafeCast overflow.** The declared fee is computed by division and clamped to the `int128` range. Oversized orders fail with the hook's own short-fill error rather than an overflow, which the response explains honestly.\n- **Blocked recipient.** The `take` to the recipient is in `try`/`catch` and falls back to an ERC-6909 claim, so an IMD blocklist entry defers fees rather than halting swaps.\n\n**Verification.** `forge build`, `forge test` (51 tests, 14 new) and `forge fmt --check` all pass. The verifier's protected hook and token tests were rehearsed against the new bytecode in a scratch directory and passed. Short-fill tests use a new `test/mocks/ActualDeltaRouter.sol` that settles recorded deltas like the Universal Router, since v4-core's `PoolSwapTest` cannot drive a refund.\n\n**Documented in the README.** The new fee table, the short-fill and refund rule, the refusal window at launch, which routers receive refunds, the blocklist fallback, and the one-wei rounding edge on exact-input buys.","treeHash":"65d756db091c427b6dd180fbc8bb30d5f54927e9","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2790314,"inputTokens":674,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":71347,"runtime":"claude","turns":62,"wallClockMs":889750}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"129decb3e5ee9f5f","findings":[],"hash":"fb4697ec8931f7bb201d3f0739cd894a7861ac2747018fa5fd7ba3afff80e7bb","nodeId":"9d9fe02d-d066-4df6-a83c-4b7a7749f19a","outcome":"failed","summary":"This content was flagged for possible cybersecurity risk. If this seems wrong, try rephrasing your request. If you’re doing authorized security work that requires more cyber permissive safeguards, apply for Daybreak access via https://platform.openai.com/settings/organization/status-and-access before retrying.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":0,"inputTokens":0,"model":"gpt-6-astra","outputTokens":0,"runtime":"codex","turns":8,"wallClockMs":1091073}}],"verification":[{"checks":[{"durationMs":4445,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 86 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 4.30s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":1974,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 9 tests for test/RNNNToken.t.sol:RNNNTokenTest\n[PASS] test_approveAndTransferFrom() (gas: 163427)\n[PASS] test_infiniteAllowanceIsNotDecremented() (gas: 111960)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 23650)\n[PASS] test_mintsTheWholeSupplyToTheDeployerOnce() (gas: 18316)\n[PASS] test_noMintOwnerPauseOrUpgradePath() (gas: 280280)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoDelegatecallOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 484171)\n[PASS] test_transferMovesExactlyWhatItWasAsked() (gas: 72344)\n[PASS] test_transferRevertsOnInsufficientBalance() (gas: 32990)\n[PASS] test_transferToZeroAddressReverts() (gas: 29831)\nSuite result: ok. 9 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 9.70ms (3.33ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/RNNNImdFeeHook.t.sol:RNNNImdFeeHookInitializeTest\n[PASS] test_anyoneMayInitializeAnImdPoolAtAnyListedFeeOrSpacing() (gas: 74243)\n[PASS] test_factoryInitializesTheLaunchPool() (gas: 75085)\n[PASS] test_rejectsAPoolWithoutAnImdSide() (gas: 673213)\n[PASS] test_rejectsBeforeInitializeFromANonManager() (gas: 15463)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 10.01ms (278.34µs CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/Deploy.t.sol:DeployTest\n[PASS] test_deployPlacesTheHookOnAFlaggedAddressWithTheGivenArguments() (gas: 26571115)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 16.80ms (16.37ms CPU time)\n\nRan 5 tests for test/RNNNImdFeeHook.t.sol:RNNNImdFeeHookFreshPoolTest\n[PASS] test_anyoneCanCollectThePendingFeeForTheRecipient() (gas: 365174)\n[PASS] test_firstBuyDefersTheFeeAsAClaimInsteadOfReverting() (gas: 394226)\n[PASS] test_nextSwapDeliversTheDeferredFeeAlongWithItsOwn() (gas: 450781)\n[PASS] test_recipientNeverReceivesRnnn() (gas: 631840)\n[PASS] test_sellOnAFreshPoolAfterABuyPaysAtOnce() (gas: 585728)\nSuite result: ok. 5 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 20.19ms (3.56ms CPU time)\n\nRan 8 tests for test/RNNNTokenInvariants.t.sol:RNNNTokenEdgeTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFromSpendsExactlyTheAllowance(uint256,uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 123258, ~: 125279)\n[PASS] test_allowanceCanBeLoweredAndRaised() (gas: 120467)\n[PASS] test_selfTransferKeepsTheBalance() (gas: 34915)\n[PASS] test_transferFromToZeroAddressReverts() (gas: 84088)\n[PASS] test_transferFromWithoutAnyAllowanceReverts() (gas: 34803)\n[PASS] test_transferOfOneWeiMoreThanTheBalanceReverts() (gas: 34302)\n[PASS] test_transferOfTheWholeBalanceLeavesZero() (gas: 66156)\n[PASS] test_zeroValueTransferSucceedsAndEmits() (gas: 39906)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 37.01ms (38.02ms CPU time)\n\nRan 18 tests for test/RNNNImdFeeHook.t.sol:RNNNImdFeeHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_buyExactInput_feeIsAlwaysOnePercentFloor(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 336784, ~: 340950)\n[PASS] testFuzz_sellExactInput_imdIsConserved(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 332502, ~: 337108)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput_sendsOnePercentOfImdInToRecipient() (gas: 348652)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput_chargesOnePercentOfImdOnTop() (gas: 342350)\n[PASS] test_callbacksRefuseCallersOtherThanThePoolManager() (gas: 217821)\n[PASS] test_collectPendingWithNothingPendingIsANoOp() (gas: 59270)\n[PASS] test_constructorPinsConfiguration() (gas: 25769)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsAnAddressWithoutTheFlags() (gas: 8089)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroAddresses() (gas: 6011)\n[PASS] test_feeKeepsFlowingAcrossManySwaps() (gas: 1587540)\n[PASS] test_hasNoPrivilegedFunctions() (gas: 1017844)\n[PASS] test_hookDataIsIgnored() (gas: 331164)\n[PASS] test_liquidityCanBeAddedAndRemovedWithoutAnyFee() (gas: 436545)\n[PASS] test_permissionsMatchTheMinedAddress() (gas: 11648)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoEscapeHatch() (gas: 2272935)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput_sendsOnePercentOfImdOutToRecipient() (gas: 348076)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput_swapperGetsExactlyWhatTheyAskedAndRecipientOnePercent() (gas: 342498)\n[PASS] test_tinySwapBelowOneHundredWeiPaysNoFeeAndStillTrades() (gas: 296069)\nSuite result: ok. 18 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 41.49ms (64.37ms CPU time)\n\nRan 17 tests for test/RNNNImdFeeHookOrdering.t.sol:RNNNImdFeeHookImdIsCurrency0Test\n[PASS] testFuzz_everySwapShapePaysFloorOnePercentOfItsImdSide(uint256,uint8) (runs: 256, μ: 580834, ~: 584432)\n[PASS] test_aRecipientThatRejectsEthStillReceivesTheImdFee() (gas: 2132412)\n[PASS] test_afterSwapOutsideASwapCannotMoveFunds() (gas: 371107)\n[PASS] test_beforeSwapDeclaresNothingWhenRnnnIsTheSpecifiedCurrency() (gas: 43553)\n[PASS] test_beforeSwapDeltaCanNeverExceedTheSwapAmount() (gas: 259404)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput_recipientGetsExactlyOnePercentOfTheImdSpent() (gas: 526175)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput_recipientGetsExactlyOnePercentOfTheImdQuoted() (gas: 535706)\n[PASS] test_collectPendingDeliversNoMoreThanTheManagerHolds() (gas: 733738)\n[PASS] test_collectPendingIsPartialWhenTheManagerIsShortAndFinishesLater() (gas: 766638)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputBuyOnTheFreshPoolDefersItsFeeAndStillDeliversTheRnnn() (gas: 521413)\n[PASS] test_feeRoundsDownAtTheBoundary() (gas: 1023789)\n[PASS] test_hookNeverGrantsAnOperatorOrAllowanceOnItsClaims() (gas: 48524)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput_recipientGetsExactlyOnePercentOfTheImdOut() (gas: 530506)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput_recipientGetsExactlyOnePercentOnTopOfTheImdDelivered() (gas: 530906)\n[PASS] test_senderArgumentCarriesNoAuthority() (gas: 43905)\n[PASS] test_strangerCannotBurnOrMoveTheHooksClaims() (gas: 606331)\n[PASS] test_zeroAmountSwapIsRejectedByTheManagerNotTheHook() (gas: 362685)\nSuite result: ok. 17 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 41.30ms (42.41ms CPU time)\n\nRan 17 tests for test/RNNNImdFeeHookOrdering.t.sol:RNNNImdFeeHookImdIsCurrency1Test\n[PASS] testFuzz_everySwapShapePaysFloorOnePercentOfItsImdSide(uint256,uint8) (runs: 256, μ: 579815, ~: 583166)\n[PASS] test_aRecipientThatRejectsEthStillReceivesTheImdFee() (gas: 21653178)\n[PASS] test_afterSwapOutsideASwapCannotMoveFunds() (gas: 370963)\n[PASS] test_beforeSwapDeclaresNothingWhenRnnnIsTheSpecifiedCurrency() (gas: 43553)\n[PASS] test_beforeSwapDeltaCanNeverExceedTheSwapAmount() (gas: 259525)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput_recipientGetsExactlyOnePercentOfTheImdSpent() (gas: 520173)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput_recipientGetsExactlyOnePercentOfTheImdQuoted() (gas: 530992)\n[PASS] test_collectPendingDeliversNoMoreThanTheManagerHolds() (gas: 722026)\n[PASS] test_collectPendingIsPartialWhenTheManagerIsShortAndFinishesLater() (gas: 754926)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputBuyOnTheFreshPoolDefersItsFeeAndStillDeliversTheRnnn() (gas: 510985)\n[PASS] test_feeRoundsDownAtTheBoundary() (gas: 1015159)\n[PASS] test_hookNeverGrantsAnOperatorOrAllowanceOnItsClaims() (gas: 48524)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput_recipientGetsExactlyOnePercentOfTheImdOut() (gas: 536613)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput_recipientGetsExactlyOnePercentOnTopOfTheImdDelivered() (gas: 535725)\n[PASS] test_senderArgumentCarriesNoAuthority() (gas: 43916)\n[PASS] test_strangerCannotBurnOrMoveTheHooksClaims() (gas: 594619)\n[PASS] test_zeroAmountSwapIsRejectedByTheManagerNotTheHook() (gas: 362900)\nSuite result: ok. 17 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 98.38ms (61.90ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/RNNNTokenInvariants.t.sol:RNNNTokenInvariants\n[PASS]\nRNNNTokenInvariants invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_balancesSumToTheSupply\n[PASS] invariant_noHolderExceedsTheSupply\n[PASS] invariant_nothingAtTheZeroAddress\n[PASS] invariant_supplyIsFixed\n RNNNTokenInvariants invariants (runs: 128, calls: 6400, reverts: 0)\n\n╭------------------+----------------------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract         | Selector                         | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+==================================================================================+\n| RNNNTokenHandler | approve                          | 1091  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+----------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RNNNTokenHandler | transfer                         | 1074  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+----------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RNNNTokenHandler | transferFrom                     | 1028  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+----------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RNNNTokenHandler | transferFromOverAllowanceReverts | 1065  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+----------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RNNNTokenHandler | transferOverBalanceReverts       | 1086  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+----------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RNNNTokenHandler | transferToZeroReverts            | 1056  | 0       | 0        |\n╰------------------+----------------------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 525.53ms (522.34ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/RNNNImdFeeHookInvariants.t.sol:RNNNImdFeeHookFreshPoolInvariants\n[PASS]\nRNNNImdFeeHookFreshPoolInvariants invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_configurationNeverChanges\n[PASS] invariant_everyFeeIsWithTheRecipientOrPending\n[PASS] invariant_feesAreExactlyOnePercentOfFullyFilledVolume\n[PASS] invariant_hookHoldsNoTokens\n[PASS] invariant_pendingClaimsAreBackedByTheManager\n[PASS] invariant_poolStillQuotesAPrice\n[PASS] invariant_recipientNeverReceivesRnnn\n RNNNImdFeeHookFreshPoolInvariants invariants (runs: 128, calls: 6400, reverts: 0)\n\n╭----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract       | Selector        | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+===============================================================+\n| FeeHookHandler | addLiquidity    | 726   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FeeHookHandler | buyExactIn      | 742   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FeeHookHandler | buyExactOut     | 661   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FeeHookHandler | collectPending  | 684   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FeeHookHandler | donate          | 693   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FeeHookHandler | giftClaim       | 703   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FeeHookHandler | removeLiquidity | 748   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FeeHookHandler | sellExactIn     | 679   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FeeHookHandler | sellExactOut    | 764   | 0       | 0        |\n╰----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.79s (1.78s CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/RNNNImdFeeHookInvariants.t.sol:RNNNImdFeeHookFundedPoolInvariants\n[PASS]\nRNNNImdFeeHookFundedPoolInvariants invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_configurationNeverChanges\n[PASS] invariant_everyFeeIsWithTheRecipientOrPending\n[PASS] invariant_feesAreExactlyOnePercentOfFullyFilledVolume\n[PASS] invariant_fundedPoolNeverSeesAPartialFill\n[PASS] invariant_hookHoldsNoTokens\n[PASS] invariant_pendingClaimsAreBackedByTheManager\n[PASS] invariant_poolStillQuotesAPrice\n[PASS] invariant_recipientNeverReceivesRnnn\n RNNNImdFeeHookFundedPoolInvariants invariants (runs: 128, calls: 6400, reverts: 0)\n\n╭----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract       | Selector        | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+===============================================================+\n| FeeHookHandler | addLiquidity    | 726   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FeeHookHandler | buyExactIn      | 742   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FeeHookHandler | buyExactOut     | 661   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FeeHookHandler | collectPending  | 684   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FeeHookHandler | donate          | 693   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FeeHookHandler | giftClaim       | 703   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FeeHookHandler | removeLiquidity | 748   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FeeHookHandler | sellExactIn     | 679   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FeeHookHandler | sellExactOut    | 764   | 0       | 0        |\n╰----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.87s (1.81s CPU time)\n\nRan 11 test suites in 1.88s (4.46s CPU time): 82 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (82 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":56,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"RNNNImdFeeHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"RNNNImdFeeHook.collectPending()\",\"RNNNImdFeeHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\",\"RNNNToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"RNNNToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"RNNNToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":5,\"README.md\":228,\"foundry.toml\":27,\"remappings.txt\":3,\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":73,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":37,\"src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol\":290,\"src/RNNNToken.sol\":67,\"test/Deploy.t.sol\":32,\"test/RNNNImdFeeHook.t.sol\":564,\"test/RNNNImdFeeHookInvariants.t.sol\":499,\"test/RNNNImdFeeHookOrdering.t.sol\":368,\"test/RNNNToken.t.sol\":105,\"test/RNNNTokenInvariants.t.sol\":239,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":61,\"test/utils/RNNNImdFixture.sol\":141},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"01ede4f00e08ae81f1bd770847d4be27975b00e838509ea748e77de4c9460372","verifiedTreeHash":"37cce9deb98301f43636a3706885540ce16f548e","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+fb8278c5"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":5464,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 87 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 5.32s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":2200,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 9 tests for test/RNNNToken.t.sol:RNNNTokenTest\n[PASS] test_approveAndTransferFrom() (gas: 163427)\n[PASS] test_infiniteAllowanceIsNotDecremented() (gas: 111960)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 23650)\n[PASS] test_mintsTheWholeSupplyToTheDeployerOnce() (gas: 18316)\n[PASS] test_noMintOwnerPauseOrUpgradePath() (gas: 280280)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoDelegatecallOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 484171)\n[PASS] test_transferMovesExactlyWhatItWasAsked() (gas: 72344)\n[PASS] test_transferRevertsOnInsufficientBalance() (gas: 32990)\n[PASS] test_transferToZeroAddressReverts() (gas: 29831)\nSuite result: ok. 9 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 3.13ms (2.29ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/Deploy.t.sol:DeployTest\n[PASS] test_deployPlacesTheHookOnAFlaggedAddressWithTheGivenArguments() (gas: 13064860)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 3.39ms (3.05ms CPU time)\n\nRan 8 tests for test/RNNNTokenInvariants.t.sol:RNNNTokenEdgeTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_transferFromSpendsExactlyTheAllowance(uint256,uint256) (runs: 512, μ: 123487, ~: 125279)\n[PASS] test_allowanceCanBeLoweredAndRaised() (gas: 120467)\n[PASS] test_selfTransferKeepsTheBalance() (gas: 34915)\n[PASS] test_transferFromToZeroAddressReverts() (gas: 84088)\n[PASS] test_transferFromWithoutAnyAllowanceReverts() (gas: 34803)\n[PASS] test_transferOfOneWeiMoreThanTheBalanceReverts() (gas: 34302)\n[PASS] test_transferOfTheWholeBalanceLeavesZero() (gas: 66156)\n[PASS] test_zeroValueTransferSucceedsAndEmits() (gas: 39906)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 7.72ms (9.17ms CPU time)\n\nRan 6 tests for test/RNNNImdFeeHook.t.sol:RNNNImdFeeHookShortFillTest\n[PASS] test_fullFillThroughTheActualDeltaRouterNeedsNoRefund() (gas: 332582)\n[PASS] test_largeOrderWithinTheManagersImdIsTruedUp() (gas: 372467)\n[PASS] test_oversizedOrderFailsWithTheShortFillErrorNotAnOverflow() (gas: 171427)\n[PASS] test_priceLimitedExactInputBuy_emitsTheRefund() (gas: 275387)\n[PASS] test_priceLimitedExactInputBuy_paysOnePercentOfTheImdThatTraded() (gas: 393533)\n[PASS] test_priceLimitedExactOutputSell_paysOnePercentOfTheImdThatTraded() (gas: 394949)\nSuite result: ok. 6 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 15.55ms (1.93ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/RNNNImdFeeHook.t.sol:RNNNImdFeeHookInitializeTest\n[PASS] test_anyoneMayInitializeAnImdPoolAtAnyListedFeeOrSpacing() (gas: 74243)\n[PASS] test_factoryInitializesTheLaunchPool() (gas: 75085)\n[PASS] test_rejectsAPoolWithoutAnImdSide() (gas: 760083)\n[PASS] test_rejectsBeforeInitializeFromANonManager() (gas: 15463)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 19.93ms (295.49µs CPU time)\n\nRan 8 tests for test/RNNNImdFeeHook.t.sol:RNNNImdFeeHookFreshPoolTest\n[PASS] test_anyoneCanCollectThePendingFeeForTheRecipient() (gas: 375248)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputSellThatCannotFillIsRefusedNotCharged() (gas: 581780)\n[PASS] test_firstBuyDefersTheFeeAsAClaimInsteadOfReverting() (gas: 400035)\n[PASS] test_nextSwapDeliversTheDeferredFeeAlongWithItsOwn() (gas: 464245)\n[PASS] test_priceLimitedBuyAfterTheFirstBuyIsTruedUpToTheFill() (gas: 1658068)\n[PASS] test_priceLimitedBuyBeforeAnyImdIsInTheManagerIsRefused() (gas: 1363788)\n[PASS] test_recipientNeverReceivesRnnn() (gas: 651988)\n[PASS] test_sellOnAFreshPoolAfterABuyPaysAtOnce() (gas: 597936)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 20.15ms (5.10ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/RNNNImdFeeHook.t.sol:RNNNImdFeeHookBlockedRecipientTest\n[PASS] test_buyStillTradesAndDefersTheFeeWhenTheRecipientIsBlocked() (gas: 357916)\n[PASS] test_claimsAreDeliveredOnceTheRecipientIsUnblocked() (gas: 565308)\n[PASS] test_nextSwapAfterUnblockingDeliversEverything() (gas: 439177)\n[PASS] test_sellStillTradesAndDefersTheFeeWhenTheRecipientIsBlocked() (gas: 367327)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 25.07ms (1.81ms CPU time)\n\nRan 19 tests for test/RNNNImdFeeHook.t.sol:RNNNImdFeeHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_buyExactInput_feeIsAlwaysOnePercentFloor(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 347951, ~: 352417)\n[PASS] testFuzz_sellExactInput_imdIsConserved(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 339437, ~: 344155)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput_sendsOnePercentOfImdInToRecipient() (gas: 356908)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput_chargesOnePercentOfImdOnTop() (gas: 349419)\n[PASS] test_callbacksRefuseCallersOtherThanThePoolManager() (gas: 217799)\n[PASS] test_collectPendingWithNothingPendingIsANoOp() (gas: 59270)\n[PASS] test_constructorPinsConfiguration() (gas: 25835)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsAnAddressWithoutTheFlags() (gas: 8089)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroAddresses() (gas: 6011)\n[PASS] test_feeBaseIsThePoolsImdSideOnEveryShape() (gas: 1273745)\n[PASS] test_feeKeepsFlowingAcrossManySwaps() (gas: 1667686)\n[PASS] test_hasNoPrivilegedFunctions() (gas: 1017822)\n[PASS] test_hookDataIsIgnored() (gas: 339227)\n[PASS] test_liquidityCanBeAddedAndRemovedWithoutAnyFee() (gas: 445317)\n[PASS] test_permissionsMatchTheMinedAddress() (gas: 11715)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoEscapeHatch() (gas: 2717827)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput_sendsOnePercentOfImdOutToRecipient() (gas: 355190)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput_swapperGetsExactlyWhatTheyAskedAndRecipientOnePercent() (gas: 350705)\n[PASS] test_tinySwapBelowOneHundredWeiPaysNoFeeAndStillTrades() (gas: 301413)\nSuite result: ok. 19 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 53.03ms (65.17ms CPU time)\n\nRan 25 tests for test/RNNNImdFeeHookOrdering.t.sol:RNNNImdFeeHookImdIsCurrency0Test\n[PASS] testFuzz_everySwapShapePaysFloorOnePercentOfItsImdSide(uint256,uint8) (runs: 256, μ: 628013, ~: 632208)\n[PASS] testFuzz_shortFillsPayOnePercentOfWhatTradedOnly(uint256,uint8,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 665914, ~: 666559)\n[PASS] test_aRecipientThatRejectsEthStillReceivesTheImdFee() (gas: 3521371)\n[PASS] test_aRouterThatSettlesTheReturnedDeltaCannotCompleteAShortFill() (gas: 849393)\n[PASS] test_afterSwapOutsideASwapCannotMoveFunds() (gas: 376722)\n[PASS] test_beforeSwapClampsAnOversizedDeclarationInsteadOfReverting() (gas: 47753)\n[PASS] test_beforeSwapDeclaresNothingWhenRnnnIsTheSpecifiedCurrency() (gas: 43553)\n[PASS] test_beforeSwapDeltaCanNeverExceedTheSwapAmount() (gas: 521853)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput_recipientGetsExactlyOnePercentOfTheImdSpent() (gas: 619264)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput_recipientGetsExactlyOnePercentOfTheImdQuoted() (gas: 547148)\n[PASS] test_collectPendingDeliversGiftedClaimsToTheRecipientToo() (gas: 748294)\n[PASS] test_collectPendingIsNeverPartialBecauseClaimsAreAlwaysBacked() (gas: 1063785)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputBuyOnTheFreshPoolDefersItsFeeAndStillDeliversTheRnnn() (gas: 525851)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputSellThatFillsNothingIsRefused() (gas: 786116)\n[PASS] test_feeRoundsDownAtTheBoundary() (gas: 1906431)\n[PASS] test_hookNeverGrantsAnOperatorOrAllowanceOnItsClaims() (gas: 48589)\n[PASS] test_imdBlockingTheHookStopsShortFillsButNotFullFills() (gas: 728032)\n[PASS] test_priceLimitedBuy_paysOnePercentOfTheFillAndRefundsTheRest() (gas: 680684)\n[PASS] test_priceLimitedExactOutputSell_paysOnePercentOfTheFillAndRefundsTheRest() (gas: 680404)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput_recipientGetsExactlyOnePercentOfTheImdOut() (gas: 541930)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput_recipientGetsExactlyOnePercentOnTopOfTheImdDelivered() (gas: 602818)\n[PASS] test_senderArgumentCarriesNoAuthority() (gas: 44087)\n[PASS] test_shortFillIsRefusedWhileTheManagerHoldsNoImdAndTruedUpAfterwards() (gas: 1086444)\n[PASS] test_strangerCannotBurnOrMoveTheHooksClaims() (gas: 612088)\n[PASS] test_zeroAmountSwapIsRejectedByTheManagerNotTheHook() (gas: 367184)\nSuite result: ok. 25 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 56.23ms (115.05ms CPU time)\n\nRan 25 tests for test/RNNNImdFeeHookOrdering.t.sol:RNNNImdFeeHookImdIsCurrency1Test\n[PASS] testFuzz_everySwapShapePaysFloorOnePercentOfItsImdSide(uint256,uint8) (runs: 256, μ: 627689, ~: 631798)\n[PASS] testFuzz_shortFillsPayOnePercentOfWhatTradedOnly(uint256,uint8,bool) (runs: 256, μ: 665749, ~: 660825)\n[PASS] test_aRecipientThatRejectsEthStillReceivesTheImdFee() (gas: 4122544)\n[PASS] test_aRouterThatSettlesTheReturnedDeltaCannotCompleteAShortFill() (gas: 837597)\n[PASS] test_afterSwapOutsideASwapCannotMoveFunds() (gas: 376530)\n[PASS] test_beforeSwapClampsAnOversizedDeclarationInsteadOfReverting() (gas: 47753)\n[PASS] test_beforeSwapDeclaresNothingWhenRnnnIsTheSpecifiedCurrency() (gas: 43553)\n[PASS] test_beforeSwapDeltaCanNeverExceedTheSwapAmount() (gas: 521853)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput_recipientGetsExactlyOnePercentOfTheImdSpent() (gas: 613227)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput_recipientGetsExactlyOnePercentOfTheImdQuoted() (gas: 542386)\n[PASS] test_collectPendingDeliversGiftedClaimsToTheRecipientToo() (gas: 736511)\n[PASS] test_collectPendingIsNeverPartialBecauseClaimsAreAlwaysBacked() (gas: 1064503)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputBuyOnTheFreshPoolDefersItsFeeAndStillDeliversTheRnnn() (gas: 515375)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputSellThatFillsNothingIsRefused() (gas: 786625)\n[PASS] test_feeRoundsDownAtTheBoundary() (gas: 1893081)\n[PASS] test_hookNeverGrantsAnOperatorOrAllowanceOnItsClaims() (gas: 48589)\n[PASS] test_imdBlockingTheHookStopsShortFillsButNotFullFills() (gas: 722052)\n[PASS] test_priceLimitedBuy_paysOnePercentOfTheFillAndRefundsTheRest() (gas: 674938)\n[PASS] test_priceLimitedExactOutputSell_paysOnePercentOfTheFillAndRefundsTheRest() (gas: 686004)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput_recipientGetsExactlyOnePercentOfTheImdOut() (gas: 547989)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput_recipientGetsExactlyOnePercentOnTopOfTheImdDelivered() (gas: 607602)\n[PASS] test_senderArgumentCarriesNoAuthority() (gas: 44098)\n[PASS] test_shortFillIsRefusedWhileTheManagerHoldsNoImdAndTruedUpAfterwards() (gas: 1068955)\n[PASS] test_strangerCannotBurnOrMoveTheHooksClaims() (gas: 600293)\n[PASS] test_zeroAmountSwapIsRejectedByTheManagerNotTheHook() (gas: 367351)\nSuite result: ok. 25 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 56.06ms (99.25ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/RNNNTokenInvariants.t.sol:RNNNTokenInvariants\n[PASS]\nRNNNTokenInvariants invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_balancesSumToTheSupply\n[PASS] invariant_noHolderExceedsTheSupply\n[PASS] invariant_nothingAtTheZeroAddress\n[PASS] invariant_supplyIsFixed\n RNNNTokenInvariants invariants (runs: 128, calls: 6400, reverts: 0)\n\n╭------------------+----------------------------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract         | Selector                         | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+==================================================================================+\n| RNNNTokenHandler | approve                          | 1068  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+----------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RNNNTokenHandler | transfer                         | 1046  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+----------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RNNNTokenHandler | transferFrom                     | 1057  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+----------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RNNNTokenHandler | transferFromOverAllowanceReverts | 1052  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+----------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RNNNTokenHandler | transferOverBalanceReverts       | 1094  | 0       | 0        |\n|------------------+----------------------------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| RNNNTokenHandler | transferToZeroReverts            | 1083  | 0       | 0        |\n╰------------------+----------------------------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 548.37ms (546.71ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/RNNNImdFeeHookInvariants.t.sol:RNNNImdFeeHookFreshPoolInvariants\n[PASS]\nRNNNImdFeeHookFreshPoolInvariants invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_configurationNeverChanges\n[PASS] invariant_everyFeeIsWithTheRecipientOrPending\n[PASS] invariant_feesAreExactlyOnePercentOfTradedVolume\n[PASS] invariant_hookHoldsNoTokens\n[PASS] invariant_pendingClaimsAreBackedByTheManager\n[PASS] invariant_poolStillQuotesAPrice\n[PASS] invariant_recipientNeverReceivesRnnn\n[PASS] invariant_refundsNeverReachTheRecipientOrStayWithTheHook\n RNNNImdFeeHookFreshPoolInvariants invariants (runs: 128, calls: 6400, reverts: 0)\n\n╭----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract       | Selector        | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+===============================================================+\n| FeeHookHandler | addLiquidity    | 691   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FeeHookHandler | buyExactIn      | 710   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FeeHookHandler | buyExactOut     | 687   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FeeHookHandler | collectPending  | 714   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FeeHookHandler | donate          | 745   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FeeHookHandler | giftClaim       | 694   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FeeHookHandler | removeLiquidity | 717   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FeeHookHandler | sellExactIn     | 699   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FeeHookHandler | sellExactOut    | 743   | 0       | 0        |\n╰----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 2.00s (1.99s CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/RNNNImdFeeHookInvariants.t.sol:RNNNImdFeeHookFundedPoolInvariants\n[PASS]\nRNNNImdFeeHookFundedPoolInvariants invariants:\n[PASS] invariant_configurationNeverChanges\n[PASS] invariant_everyFeeIsWithTheRecipientOrPending\n[PASS] invariant_feesAreExactlyOnePercentOfTradedVolume\n[PASS] invariant_fundedPoolDefersNoFee\n[PASS] invariant_fundedPoolNeverRefusesASwap\n[PASS] invariant_hookHoldsNoTokens\n[PASS] invariant_pendingClaimsAreBackedByTheManager\n[PASS] invariant_poolStillQuotesAPrice\n[PASS] invariant_recipientNeverReceivesRnnn\n[PASS] invariant_refundsNeverReachTheRecipientOrStayWithTheHook\n RNNNImdFeeHookFundedPoolInvariants invariants (runs: 128, calls: 6400, reverts: 0)\n\n╭----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------╮\n| Contract       | Selector        | Calls | Reverts | Discards |\n+===============================================================+\n| FeeHookHandler | addLiquidity    | 691   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FeeHookHandler | buyExactIn      | 710   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FeeHookHandler | buyExactOut     | 687   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FeeHookHandler | collectPending  | 714   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FeeHookHandler | donate          | 745   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FeeHookHandler | giftClaim       | 694   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FeeHookHandler | removeLiquidity | 717   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FeeHookHandler | sellExactIn     | 699   | 0       | 0        |\n|----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------|\n| FeeHookHandler | sellExactOut    | 743   | 0       | 0        |\n╰----------------+-----------------+-------+---------+----------╯\n\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 2.08s (2.07s CPU time)\n\nRan 13 test suites in 2.09s (4.90s CPU time): 112 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (112 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":54,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"RNNNImdFeeHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"RNNNImdFeeHook.collectPending()\",\"RNNNImdFeeHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\",\"RNNNToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"RNNNToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"RNNNToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":5,\"README.md\":284,\"foundry.toml\":27,\"remappings.txt\":3,\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":73,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":37,\"src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol\":346,\"src/RNNNToken.sol\":67,\"test/Deploy.t.sol\":32,\"test/RNNNImdFeeHook.t.sol\":865,\"test/RNNNImdFeeHookInvariants.t.sol\":623,\"test/RNNNImdFeeHookOrdering.t.sol\":648,\"test/RNNNToken.t.sol\":105,\"test/RNNNTokenInvariants.t.sol\":239,\"test/mocks/ActualDeltaRouter.sol\":64,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":68,\"test/utils/RNNNImdFixture.sol\":202},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"4fc1176e3d6259983719e7b4259b9b13c28b677d06f012472140a70661947ac0","verifiedTreeHash":"5a0b5ccb4da0f78de49c1a704e305c21200d6628","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+fb8278c5"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":2865,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 80 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 2.74s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":130,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 9 tests for test/RNNNToken.t.sol:RNNNTokenTest\n[PASS] test_approveAndTransferFrom() (gas: 163427)\n[PASS] test_infiniteAllowanceIsNotDecremented() (gas: 111960)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 23650)\n[PASS] test_mintsTheWholeSupplyToTheDeployerOnce() (gas: 18316)\n[PASS] test_noMintOwnerPauseOrUpgradePath() (gas: 280280)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoDelegatecallOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 484171)\n[PASS] test_transferMovesExactlyWhatItWasAsked() (gas: 72344)\n[PASS] test_transferRevertsOnInsufficientBalance() (gas: 32990)\n[PASS] test_transferToZeroAddressReverts() (gas: 29831)\nSuite result: ok. 9 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 2.13ms (3.15ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/Deploy.t.sol:DeployTest\n[PASS] test_deployPlacesTheHookOnAFlaggedAddressWithTheGivenArguments() (gas: 13064860)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 7.81ms (7.22ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/RNNNImdFeeHook.t.sol:RNNNImdFeeHookInitializeTest\n[PASS] test_anyoneMayInitializeAnImdPoolAtAnyListedFeeOrSpacing() (gas: 74243)\n[PASS] test_factoryInitializesTheLaunchPool() (gas: 75085)\n[PASS] test_rejectsAPoolWithoutAnImdSide() (gas: 760083)\n[PASS] test_rejectsBeforeInitializeFromANonManager() (gas: 15463)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 16.72ms (419.53µs CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/RNNNImdFeeHook.t.sol:RNNNImdFeeHookBlockedRecipientTest\n[PASS] test_buyStillTradesAndDefersTheFeeWhenTheRecipientIsBlocked() (gas: 357916)\n[PASS] test_claimsAreDeliveredOnceTheRecipientIsUnblocked() (gas: 565308)\n[PASS] test_nextSwapAfterUnblockingDeliversEverything() (gas: 439177)\n[PASS] test_sellStillTradesAndDefersTheFeeWhenTheRecipientIsBlocked() (gas: 367327)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 19.02ms (2.04ms CPU time)\n\nRan 6 tests for test/RNNNImdFeeHook.t.sol:RNNNImdFeeHookShortFillTest\n[PASS] test_fullFillThroughTheActualDeltaRouterNeedsNoRefund() (gas: 332582)\n[PASS] test_largeOrderWithinTheManagersImdIsTruedUp() (gas: 372467)\n[PASS] test_oversizedOrderFailsWithTheShortFillErrorNotAnOverflow() (gas: 171427)\n[PASS] test_priceLimitedExactInputBuy_emitsTheRefund() (gas: 275387)\n[PASS] test_priceLimitedExactInputBuy_paysOnePercentOfTheImdThatTraded() (gas: 393533)\n[PASS] test_priceLimitedExactOutputSell_paysOnePercentOfTheImdThatTraded() (gas: 394949)\nSuite result: ok. 6 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 20.02ms (1.90ms CPU time)\n\nRan 8 tests for test/RNNNImdFeeHook.t.sol:RNNNImdFeeHookFreshPoolTest\n[PASS] test_anyoneCanCollectThePendingFeeForTheRecipient() (gas: 375248)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputSellThatCannotFillIsRefusedNotCharged() (gas: 581780)\n[PASS] test_firstBuyDefersTheFeeAsAClaimInsteadOfReverting() (gas: 400035)\n[PASS] test_nextSwapDeliversTheDeferredFeeAlongWithItsOwn() (gas: 464245)\n[PASS] test_priceLimitedBuyAfterTheFirstBuyIsTruedUpToTheFill() (gas: 1658068)\n[PASS] test_priceLimitedBuyBeforeAnyImdIsInTheManagerIsRefused() (gas: 1363788)\n[PASS] test_recipientNeverReceivesRnnn() (gas: 651988)\n[PASS] test_sellOnAFreshPoolAfterABuyPaysAtOnce() (gas: 597936)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 21.10ms (5.26ms CPU time)\n\nRan 19 tests for test/RNNNImdFeeHook.t.sol:RNNNImdFeeHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_buyExactInput_feeIsAlwaysOnePercentFloor(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 347730, ~: 352417)\n[PASS] testFuzz_sellExactInput_imdIsConserved(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 339271, ~: 344155)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput_sendsOnePercentOfImdInToRecipient() (gas: 356908)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput_chargesOnePercentOfImdOnTop() (gas: 349419)\n[PASS] test_callbacksRefuseCallersOtherThanThePoolManager() (gas: 217799)\n[PASS] test_collectPendingWithNothingPendingIsANoOp() (gas: 59270)\n[PASS] test_constructorPinsConfiguration() (gas: 25835)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsAnAddressWithoutTheFlags() (gas: 8089)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroAddresses() (gas: 6011)\n[PASS] test_feeBaseIsThePoolsImdSideOnEveryShape() (gas: 1273745)\n[PASS] test_feeKeepsFlowingAcrossManySwaps() (gas: 1667686)\n[PASS] test_hasNoPrivilegedFunctions() (gas: 1017822)\n[PASS] test_hookDataIsIgnored() (gas: 339227)\n[PASS] test_liquidityCanBeAddedAndRemovedWithoutAnyFee() (gas: 445317)\n[PASS] test_permissionsMatchTheMinedAddress() (gas: 11715)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoEscapeHatch() (gas: 2717827)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput_sendsOnePercentOfImdOutToRecipient() (gas: 355190)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput_swapperGetsExactlyWhatTheyAskedAndRecipientOnePercent() (gas: 350705)\n[PASS] test_tinySwapBelowOneHundredWeiPaysNoFeeAndStillTrades() (gas: 301413)\nSuite result: ok. 19 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 47.05ms (63.65ms CPU time)\n\nRan 7 test suites in 48.21ms (133.85ms CPU time): 51 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (51 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":50,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"RNNNImdFeeHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"RNNNImdFeeHook.collectPending()\",\"RNNNImdFeeHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\",\"RNNNToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"RNNNToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"RNNNToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":5,\"README.md\":284,\"foundry.toml\":27,\"launch.json\":31,\"remappings.txt\":3,\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":73,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":37,\"src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol\":346,\"src/RNNNToken.sol\":67,\"test/Deploy.t.sol\":32,\"test/RNNNImdFeeHook.t.sol\":865,\"test/RNNNToken.t.sol\":105,\"test/mocks/ActualDeltaRouter.sol\":64,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":68},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"602b9e8f8da98a066004ac9d05ed3810bd1cf8bc93ddec1ad83e1f4f8e92faec","verifiedTreeHash":"c190daa12a79d89eecf9ef0c4c6398e37ae83368","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+fb8278c5"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":2221,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 79 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 2.11s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":117,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 9 tests for test/RNNNToken.t.sol:RNNNTokenTest\n[PASS] test_approveAndTransferFrom() (gas: 163427)\n[PASS] test_infiniteAllowanceIsNotDecremented() (gas: 111960)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 23650)\n[PASS] test_mintsTheWholeSupplyToTheDeployerOnce() (gas: 18316)\n[PASS] test_noMintOwnerPauseOrUpgradePath() (gas: 280280)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoDelegatecallOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 484171)\n[PASS] test_transferMovesExactlyWhatItWasAsked() (gas: 72344)\n[PASS] test_transferRevertsOnInsufficientBalance() (gas: 32990)\n[PASS] test_transferToZeroAddressReverts() (gas: 29831)\nSuite result: ok. 9 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.36ms (2.13ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/RNNNImdFeeHook.t.sol:RNNNImdFeeHookInitializeTest\n[PASS] test_anyoneMayInitializeAnImdPoolAtAnyListedFeeOrSpacing() (gas: 74243)\n[PASS] test_factoryInitializesTheLaunchPool() (gas: 75085)\n[PASS] test_rejectsAPoolWithoutAnImdSide() (gas: 673213)\n[PASS] test_rejectsBeforeInitializeFromANonManager() (gas: 15463)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 8.06ms (355.17µs CPU time)\n\nRan 5 tests for test/RNNNImdFeeHook.t.sol:RNNNImdFeeHookFreshPoolTest\n[PASS] test_anyoneCanCollectThePendingFeeForTheRecipient() (gas: 365174)\n[PASS] test_firstBuyDefersTheFeeAsAClaimInsteadOfReverting() (gas: 394226)\n[PASS] test_nextSwapDeliversTheDeferredFeeAlongWithItsOwn() (gas: 450781)\n[PASS] test_recipientNeverReceivesRnnn() (gas: 631840)\n[PASS] test_sellOnAFreshPoolAfterABuyPaysAtOnce() (gas: 585728)\nSuite result: ok. 5 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 10.98ms (3.01ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/Deploy.t.sol:DeployTest\n[PASS] test_deployPlacesTheHookOnAFlaggedAddressWithTheGivenArguments() (gas: 26571115)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 16.92ms (16.52ms CPU time)\n\nRan 18 tests for test/RNNNImdFeeHook.t.sol:RNNNImdFeeHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_buyExactInput_feeIsAlwaysOnePercentFloor(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 336932, ~: 340950)\n[PASS] testFuzz_sellExactInput_imdIsConserved(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 332870, ~: 337108)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput_sendsOnePercentOfImdInToRecipient() (gas: 348652)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput_chargesOnePercentOfImdOnTop() (gas: 342350)\n[PASS] test_callbacksRefuseCallersOtherThanThePoolManager() (gas: 217821)\n[PASS] test_collectPendingWithNothingPendingIsANoOp() (gas: 59270)\n[PASS] test_constructorPinsConfiguration() (gas: 25769)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsAnAddressWithoutTheFlags() (gas: 8089)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroAddresses() (gas: 6011)\n[PASS] test_feeKeepsFlowingAcrossManySwaps() (gas: 1587540)\n[PASS] test_hasNoPrivilegedFunctions() (gas: 1017844)\n[PASS] test_hookDataIsIgnored() (gas: 331164)\n[PASS] test_liquidityCanBeAddedAndRemovedWithoutAnyFee() (gas: 436545)\n[PASS] test_permissionsMatchTheMinedAddress() (gas: 11648)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoEscapeHatch() (gas: 2272935)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput_sendsOnePercentOfImdOutToRecipient() (gas: 348076)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput_swapperGetsExactlyWhatTheyAskedAndRecipientOnePercent() (gas: 342498)\n[PASS] test_tinySwapBelowOneHundredWeiPaysNoFeeAndStillTrades() (gas: 296069)\nSuite result: ok. 18 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 31.32ms (51.72ms CPU time)\n\nRan 5 test suites in 32.02ms (68.64ms CPU time): 37 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (37 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":50,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"RNNNImdFeeHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"RNNNImdFeeHook.collectPending()\",\"RNNNImdFeeHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\",\"RNNNToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"RNNNToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"RNNNToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":5,\"README.md\":228,\"foundry.toml\":27,\"launch.json\":31,\"remappings.txt\":3,\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":73,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":37,\"src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol\":290,\"src/RNNNToken.sol\":67,\"test/Deploy.t.sol\":32,\"test/RNNNImdFeeHook.t.sol\":564,\"test/RNNNToken.t.sol\":105,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":61},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"9eaa8dc740e3ac6cc048fd424dbbac47da75655925dfff91146dcf1266bc8b5e","verifiedTreeHash":"73192f7625771e6cbb56bdeb065be69265d91bb7","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+fb8278c5"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":2356,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 79 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 2.23s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":143,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 9 tests for test/RNNNToken.t.sol:RNNNTokenTest\n[PASS] test_approveAndTransferFrom() (gas: 163427)\n[PASS] test_infiniteAllowanceIsNotDecremented() (gas: 111960)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 23650)\n[PASS] test_mintsTheWholeSupplyToTheDeployerOnce() (gas: 18316)\n[PASS] test_noMintOwnerPauseOrUpgradePath() (gas: 280280)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoDelegatecallOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 484171)\n[PASS] test_transferMovesExactlyWhatItWasAsked() (gas: 72344)\n[PASS] test_transferRevertsOnInsufficientBalance() (gas: 32990)\n[PASS] test_transferToZeroAddressReverts() (gas: 29831)\nSuite result: ok. 9 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.20ms (1.95ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/RNNNImdFeeHook.t.sol:RNNNImdFeeHookInitializeTest\n[PASS] test_anyoneMayInitializeAnImdPoolAtAnyListedFeeOrSpacing() (gas: 74243)\n[PASS] test_factoryInitializesTheLaunchPool() (gas: 75085)\n[PASS] test_rejectsAPoolWithoutAnImdSide() (gas: 673213)\n[PASS] test_rejectsBeforeInitializeFromANonManager() (gas: 15463)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 7.45ms (294.14µs CPU time)\n\nRan 5 tests for test/RNNNImdFeeHook.t.sol:RNNNImdFeeHookFreshPoolTest\n[PASS] test_anyoneCanCollectThePendingFeeForTheRecipient() (gas: 365174)\n[PASS] test_firstBuyDefersTheFeeAsAClaimInsteadOfReverting() (gas: 394226)\n[PASS] test_nextSwapDeliversTheDeferredFeeAlongWithItsOwn() (gas: 450781)\n[PASS] test_recipientNeverReceivesRnnn() (gas: 631840)\n[PASS] test_sellOnAFreshPoolAfterABuyPaysAtOnce() (gas: 585728)\nSuite result: ok. 5 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 11.38ms (2.44ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/Deploy.t.sol:DeployTest\n[PASS] test_deployPlacesTheHookOnAFlaggedAddressWithTheGivenArguments() (gas: 26571115)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 18.40ms (16.22ms CPU time)\n\nRan 18 tests for test/RNNNImdFeeHook.t.sol:RNNNImdFeeHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_buyExactInput_feeIsAlwaysOnePercentFloor(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 336997, ~: 340950)\n[PASS] testFuzz_sellExactInput_imdIsConserved(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 333069, ~: 337108)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput_sendsOnePercentOfImdInToRecipient() (gas: 348652)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput_chargesOnePercentOfImdOnTop() (gas: 342350)\n[PASS] test_callbacksRefuseCallersOtherThanThePoolManager() (gas: 217821)\n[PASS] test_collectPendingWithNothingPendingIsANoOp() (gas: 59270)\n[PASS] test_constructorPinsConfiguration() (gas: 25769)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsAnAddressWithoutTheFlags() (gas: 8089)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroAddresses() (gas: 6011)\n[PASS] test_feeKeepsFlowingAcrossManySwaps() (gas: 1587540)\n[PASS] test_hasNoPrivilegedFunctions() (gas: 1017844)\n[PASS] test_hookDataIsIgnored() (gas: 331164)\n[PASS] test_liquidityCanBeAddedAndRemovedWithoutAnyFee() (gas: 436545)\n[PASS] test_permissionsMatchTheMinedAddress() (gas: 11648)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoEscapeHatch() (gas: 2272935)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput_sendsOnePercentOfImdOutToRecipient() (gas: 348076)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput_swapperGetsExactlyWhatTheyAskedAndRecipientOnePercent() (gas: 342498)\n[PASS] test_tinySwapBelowOneHundredWeiPaysNoFeeAndStillTrades() (gas: 296069)\nSuite result: ok. 18 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 30.99ms (52.14ms CPU time)\n\nRan 5 test suites in 31.83ms (69.42ms CPU time): 37 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (37 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":45,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"RNNNImdFeeHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"RNNNImdFeeHook.collectPending()\",\"RNNNImdFeeHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\",\"RNNNToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"RNNNToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"RNNNToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":5,\"README.md\":228,\"foundry.toml\":27,\"remappings.txt\":3,\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":73,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":37,\"src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol\":290,\"src/RNNNToken.sol\":67,\"test/Deploy.t.sol\":32,\"test/RNNNImdFeeHook.t.sol\":564,\"test/RNNNToken.t.sol\":105,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":61},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":760,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol:123: Reentrancy in RNNNImdFeeHook.unlockCallback(bytes) (src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol#123-133):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol:251: Reentrancy in RNNNImdFeeHook._settleFee(uint256) (src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol#251-270):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol:251: Reentrancy in RNNNImdFeeHook._settleFee(uint256) (src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol#251-270):","passed":true},{"durationMs":325,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[low] internal-function-used-once at src/HookFlags.sol:29: Internal Function Used Only Once\n[low] large-numeric-literal at src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol:45: Large Numeric Literal (2 places)\n[low] missing-inheritance at src/RNNNToken.sol:9: Missing Inheritance","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"df813aafd25675fade601d08077a954c5f7bf8d93cc0665bca68e04fcdaf99b6","verifiedTreeHash":"aaf5fbc067d573f4e12597ca581604dafcbf04b7","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+fb8278c5"},{"checks":[{"durationMs":2883,"exitCode":0,"name":"build","output":"Compiling 80 files with Solc 0.8.26\nSolc 0.8.26 finished in 2.77s\nCompiler run successful!\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":129,"exitCode":0,"name":"test","output":"No files changed, compilation skipped\n\nRan 9 tests for test/RNNNToken.t.sol:RNNNTokenTest\n[PASS] test_approveAndTransferFrom() (gas: 163427)\n[PASS] test_infiniteAllowanceIsNotDecremented() (gas: 111960)\n[PASS] test_metadata() (gas: 23650)\n[PASS] test_mintsTheWholeSupplyToTheDeployerOnce() (gas: 18316)\n[PASS] test_noMintOwnerPauseOrUpgradePath() (gas: 280280)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoDelegatecallOrSelfdestruct() (gas: 484171)\n[PASS] test_transferMovesExactlyWhatItWasAsked() (gas: 72344)\n[PASS] test_transferRevertsOnInsufficientBalance() (gas: 32990)\n[PASS] test_transferToZeroAddressReverts() (gas: 29831)\nSuite result: ok. 9 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.29ms (1.81ms CPU time)\n\nRan 1 test for test/Deploy.t.sol:DeployTest\n[PASS] test_deployPlacesTheHookOnAFlaggedAddressWithTheGivenArguments() (gas: 13064860)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 3.10ms (2.78ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/RNNNImdFeeHook.t.sol:RNNNImdFeeHookInitializeTest\n[PASS] test_anyoneMayInitializeAnImdPoolAtAnyListedFeeOrSpacing() (gas: 74243)\n[PASS] test_factoryInitializesTheLaunchPool() (gas: 75085)\n[PASS] test_rejectsAPoolWithoutAnImdSide() (gas: 760083)\n[PASS] test_rejectsBeforeInitializeFromANonManager() (gas: 15463)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 15.37ms (342.22µs CPU time)\n\nRan 8 tests for test/RNNNImdFeeHook.t.sol:RNNNImdFeeHookFreshPoolTest\n[PASS] test_anyoneCanCollectThePendingFeeForTheRecipient() (gas: 375248)\n[PASS] test_exactOutputSellThatCannotFillIsRefusedNotCharged() (gas: 581780)\n[PASS] test_firstBuyDefersTheFeeAsAClaimInsteadOfReverting() (gas: 400035)\n[PASS] test_nextSwapDeliversTheDeferredFeeAlongWithItsOwn() (gas: 464245)\n[PASS] test_priceLimitedBuyAfterTheFirstBuyIsTruedUpToTheFill() (gas: 1658068)\n[PASS] test_priceLimitedBuyBeforeAnyImdIsInTheManagerIsRefused() (gas: 1363788)\n[PASS] test_recipientNeverReceivesRnnn() (gas: 651988)\n[PASS] test_sellOnAFreshPoolAfterABuyPaysAtOnce() (gas: 597936)\nSuite result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 15.69ms (4.60ms CPU time)\n\nRan 4 tests for test/RNNNImdFeeHook.t.sol:RNNNImdFeeHookBlockedRecipientTest\n[PASS] test_buyStillTradesAndDefersTheFeeWhenTheRecipientIsBlocked() (gas: 357916)\n[PASS] test_claimsAreDeliveredOnceTheRecipientIsUnblocked() (gas: 565308)\n[PASS] test_nextSwapAfterUnblockingDeliversEverything() (gas: 439177)\n[PASS] test_sellStillTradesAndDefersTheFeeWhenTheRecipientIsBlocked() (gas: 367327)\nSuite result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 15.82ms (1.88ms CPU time)\n\nRan 6 tests for test/RNNNImdFeeHook.t.sol:RNNNImdFeeHookShortFillTest\n[PASS] test_fullFillThroughTheActualDeltaRouterNeedsNoRefund() (gas: 332582)\n[PASS] test_largeOrderWithinTheManagersImdIsTruedUp() (gas: 372467)\n[PASS] test_oversizedOrderFailsWithTheShortFillErrorNotAnOverflow() (gas: 171427)\n[PASS] test_priceLimitedExactInputBuy_emitsTheRefund() (gas: 275387)\n[PASS] test_priceLimitedExactInputBuy_paysOnePercentOfTheImdThatTraded() (gas: 393533)\n[PASS] test_priceLimitedExactOutputSell_paysOnePercentOfTheImdThatTraded() (gas: 394949)\nSuite result: ok. 6 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 16.27ms (1.94ms CPU time)\n\nRan 19 tests for test/RNNNImdFeeHook.t.sol:RNNNImdFeeHookTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_buyExactInput_feeIsAlwaysOnePercentFloor(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 346588, ~: 352417)\n[PASS] testFuzz_sellExactInput_imdIsConserved(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 337987, ~: 344155)\n[PASS] test_buyExactInput_sendsOnePercentOfImdInToRecipient() (gas: 356908)\n[PASS] test_buyExactOutput_chargesOnePercentOfImdOnTop() (gas: 349419)\n[PASS] test_callbacksRefuseCallersOtherThanThePoolManager() (gas: 217799)\n[PASS] test_collectPendingWithNothingPendingIsANoOp() (gas: 59270)\n[PASS] test_constructorPinsConfiguration() (gas: 25835)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsAnAddressWithoutTheFlags() (gas: 8089)\n[PASS] test_constructorRejectsZeroAddresses() (gas: 6011)\n[PASS] test_feeBaseIsThePoolsImdSideOnEveryShape() (gas: 1273745)\n[PASS] test_feeKeepsFlowingAcrossManySwaps() (gas: 1667686)\n[PASS] test_hasNoPrivilegedFunctions() (gas: 1017822)\n[PASS] test_hookDataIsIgnored() (gas: 339227)\n[PASS] test_liquidityCanBeAddedAndRemovedWithoutAnyFee() (gas: 445317)\n[PASS] test_permissionsMatchTheMinedAddress() (gas: 11715)\n[PASS] test_runtimeCodeHasNoEscapeHatch() (gas: 2717827)\n[PASS] test_sellExactInput_sendsOnePercentOfImdOutToRecipient() (gas: 355190)\n[PASS] test_sellExactOutput_swapperGetsExactlyWhatTheyAskedAndRecipientOnePercent() (gas: 350705)\n[PASS] test_tinySwapBelowOneHundredWeiPaysNoFeeAndStillTrades() (gas: 301413)\nSuite result: ok. 19 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 38.10ms (50.80ms CPU time)\n\nRan 7 test suites in 38.67ms (105.65ms CPU time): 51 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (51 total tests)\n","passed":true},{"durationMs":52,"exitCode":0,"name":"source-index","output":"{\"v\":1,\"entryPoints\":[\"RNNNImdFeeHook.afterSwap(address,(address,address,uint24,int24,address),(bool,int256,uint160),int256,bytes)\",\"RNNNImdFeeHook.collectPending()\",\"RNNNImdFeeHook.unlockCallback(bytes)\",\"RNNNToken.approve(address,uint256)\",\"RNNNToken.transfer(address,uint256)\",\"RNNNToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256)\"],\"files\":{\".gitignore\":5,\"README.md\":284,\"foundry.toml\":27,\"remappings.txt\":3,\"script/Deploy.s.sol\":73,\"src/HookFlags.sol\":37,\"src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol\":346,\"src/RNNNToken.sol\":67,\"test/Deploy.t.sol\":32,\"test/RNNNImdFeeHook.t.sol\":865,\"test/RNNNToken.t.sol\":105,\"test/mocks/ActualDeltaRouter.sol\":64,\"test/mocks/MockERC20.sol\":68},\"excluded\":[\"lib/\",\"node_modules/\"],\"truncated\":false}","passed":true},{"durationMs":815,"exitCode":0,"name":"slither","output":"[medium/medium] unused-return at src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol:309: RNNNImdFeeHook._refund(address,uint256) (src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol#309-318) ignores return value by poolManager.settleFor(router) (src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol#316)\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol:152: Reentrancy in RNNNImdFeeHook.unlockCallback(bytes) (src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol#152-162):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol:288: Reentrancy in RNNNImdFeeHook._settleFee(uint256) (src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol#288-302):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol:288: Reentrancy in RNNNImdFeeHook._settleFee(uint256) (src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol#288-302):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol:196: Reentrancy in RNNNImdFeeHook.afterSwap(address,PoolKey,SwapParams,BalanceDelta,bytes) (src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol#196-220):\n[low/medium] reentrancy-events at src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol:309: Reentrancy in RNNNImdFeeHook._refund(address,uint256) (src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol#309-318):","passed":true},{"durationMs":284,"exitCode":0,"name":"aderyn","output":"[low] internal-function-used-once at src/HookFlags.sol:29: Internal Function Used Only Once\n[low] large-numeric-literal at src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol:55: Large Numeric Literal (2 places)\n[low] missing-inheritance at src/RNNNToken.sol:9: Missing Inheritance\n[low] unchecked-return at src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol:316: Unchecked Return\n[low] unsafe-erc20-operation at src/RNNNImdFeeHook.sol:313: Unsafe ERC20 Operation","passed":true}],"detail":"all checks passed","evaluation":"checks","profile":"foundry","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"f89a82eb08f77358e35c628cd2f8e368b3f2bad3fbe4575094b07fdc265901a8","verifiedTreeHash":"65d756db091c427b6dd180fbc8bb30d5f54927e9","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+fb8278c5"}]}