{"assessments":[],"deployments":[],"fuzz":[],"identity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"interpretation":"Records acceptance and evidence. Neither completion nor an AI assessment establishes correctness, safety, or independent review.","jobId":"ff6c2a8a-bdd7-42d8-8a9f-b19dfd879145","kind":"shape:chain","nodes":[{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"6bfc5307608697446efb92092d95c083ec225fd1524262dd3e54e23ca01c1e4c","dependsOn":["refine_project"],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"foundry","requires":[],"skillHash":"6b037a7b6601e883cf8a906c1520c0624817d42d8310b65c2f43679204608af3","skillId":"adversarial-review","tools":[]},"key":"adversarial_review","kind":"code","role":"review","skillHash":"6b037a7b6601e883cf8a906c1520c0624817d42d8310b65c2f43679204608af3","skillId":"adversarial-review","state":"accepted"},{"acceptedSubmissionHash":"d16b01d16066dbf781b8c18b8e9a6eee91922abf561b52a68a782478feea83ad","dependsOn":[],"execution":{"network":false,"profile":"none","requires":[],"skillHash":"99cccc7e3e2e1b515c66d54cc6d4bd9832d528aaf0ec0ba48c87a4182db4b7ca","skillId":"refine-project","tools":[]},"key":"refine_project","kind":"code","role":"implement","skillHash":"99cccc7e3e2e1b515c66d54cc6d4bd9832d528aaf0ec0ba48c87a4182db4b7ca","skillId":"refine-project","state":"accepted"}],"objective":"Move swarm-derby-mcp to SwarmDerby v2 and close three review findings. Keep the tool names, their inputs and the existing outputs, and keep the cap and the read-only mode.\n\nSwarmDerby v2 is live on Robinhood Chain at 0x53d9aa0b925c5148bcc5f98f394872687f4c831c (IMD launch #1103). Its source: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/pepegobig/swarm-derby-contracts/da1a8647d6f33b23e6838b57fc7821ef7a6b454b/src/SwarmDerby.sol. The first SwarmDerby (0xBa58BC6b5aCf8043DAEa2Bf1BF6C1c09cF84b03C) used a target block; v2 uses a house draw instead:\n- swing(league, quality, velo, commit) emits `event SwingCommitted(uint256 indexed swingId, address indexed player, uint8 league, uint8 quality, uint8 velo, uint64 committedAt)` (no targetBlock any more). commit = keccak256(abi.encode(salt, playerOf(wallet))), as now.\n- The house signs the swing and sends draw(swingId, sig), usually within seconds. `swings(uint256)` returns (address player, uint8 league, uint8 quality, uint8 velo, uint8 status, uint64 committedAt, bytes32 commit, uint32 day, bytes32 drawHash); status 1 = committed, 2 = drawn, 3 = final, 4 = refunded. Event `SwingDrawn(uint256 indexed swingId, bytes32 drawHash)`.\n- finalize(swingId, salt) works only on a drawn swing (status 2). Revealed later than committedAt + 600 s, it counts as a foul.\n- If the swing is still status 1 after committedAt + 300 s (DRAW_WINDOW), anyone can call expire(swingId): the turn comes back (event `SwingRefunded(uint256 indexed swingId, address indexed player, uint8 league)`). Before that, expire reverts NotExpired.\n- New custom errors: DrawClosed, BadDraw, CommitUsed, NoHouseKey (swing and buyPacks revert with it while the house key is revoked; nothing is spent), KeyNotReady, KeyExpired. TooEarly no longer exists.\n\n1 src/config.ts: DEFAULT_CONTRACT = 0x53d9aa0b925c5148bcc5f98f394872687f4c831c. Replace DERBY_REVEAL_TIMEOUT_MS with DERBY_DRAW_TIMEOUT_MS (default 45000, below the 60 s request timeout of most MCP clients): how long derby_swing waits for the house draw. Keep pollIntervalMs at 250 for the fake-chain tests, but poll the real chain at most once per second.\n2 src/chain.ts: take the ABI lines from the v2 source above (swing, finalize, expire, swings, SwingCommitted, SwingDrawn, SwingRefunded, SwingResolved, TurnsBought, DaySettled and the reads already used) and update the comment that names the source commit. Give each error above a plain sentence in the error map; NoHouseKey: \"The house draw is paused (no house key). Nothing was spent; try again later.\" PendingSwing gets committedAt (unix seconds) instead of targetBlock, plus status(): Promise<number> and expire(): Promise<string> (the tx hash). Event parsing accepts only logs whose address equals the configured contract (case-insensitive).\n3 src/server.ts derby_swing: commit, then poll status() until it is 2 and call reveal(). If the status is still 1 when DERBY_DRAW_TIMEOUT_MS has passed, keep the PendingSwing in memory and return isError: \"Swing <id> is committed but not drawn yet. The next derby_swing call reveals it if the house draws it, or gives the turn back 5 minutes after the commit.\" At the start of every derby_swing call, first handle the kept swings: status 2 -> reveal() (report the result in a new output field `earlier`); status 1 and the latest block's timestamp past committedAt + 300 s -> expire() and report \"The house did not draw swing <id> within 5 minutes. The turn was given back (tx <hash>).\"; status 3 or 4 -> drop it. If a reveal happens after committedAt + 600 s, say that the swing counted as a foul. Update the tool description and README for the house draw.\n4 W-L1 (src/server.ts derby_buy_pack): the cap uses the price read before the buy, so a larger existing allowance lets a raised packPrice take more than the reservation. Approve exactly the reserved cost before every buy, even if the allowance is already high enough. After the buy, if the TurnsBought cost is above the reservation, keep the higher amount in the ledger and return isError that says the cost was above the quoted price.\n5 W-L2 (src/chain.ts send; src/server.ts derby_buy_pack): a hostile DERBY_RPC_URL can report a buy that succeeded as reverted; every \"revert\" releases the reservation, so spending has no limit. Release a reservation only after the revert is confirmed by a second read: the wallet's agent turns did not grow and its IMD balance did not fall compared with reads taken just before the buy. Otherwise keep the reservation. Together with the address check in step 2.\n6 W-L3 (src/ledger.ts): a malformed ledger (`spent` not an object) counts as 0, and a negative entry raises the cap; the README says a corrupt ledger fails closed. Validate the file strictly: a JSON object whose `spent` is an object; each key a 0x address of 40 hex digits in lower case; each value a string of decimal digits only (no sign). Anything else throws the existing \"unreadable; fix or remove it by hand\" error, so no buy is signed. A missing file still starts at 0.\n7 README.md: replace each `npx -y github:identity-md-launches/launch-937-build-swarm-derby-mcp-typescript-stdio` line with the pinned form `github:identity-md-launches/launch-937-build-swarm-derby-mcp-typescript-stdio#<commit>`, and say in one sentence that npx builds the package with DERBY_PRIVATE_KEY in its environment, so users must pin a commit they have reviewed. Say that the default contract is SwarmDerby v2 and that turns bought on the first SwarmDerby cannot be played on v2.\n8 DEMO.md: keep the recorded run and every number and hash unchanged, and add one sentence under the title: the run was recorded on the first SwarmDerby (0xBa58BC6b5aCf8043DAEa2Bf1BF6C1c09cF84b03C), before the move to SwarmDerby v2.\n9 Tests (fake chain): a swing that is drawn is revealed and scored; a swing not drawn within the timeout returns isError, and the next derby_swing call reveals it if it was drawn meanwhile, or expires it once 300 s of chain time have passed and reports the expire tx, with the turn back; NoHouseKey gives the sentence above; W-L1: with an allowance of 10 IMD and a pack price raised after the quote, the buy approves exactly the reserved cost and the ledger never shows less than the charged amount; W-L2: a buy that the RPC reports as reverted while turns grew keeps its reservation; a log from another address is ignored; W-L3: `spent` as an array, a value \"-100\", a value \"1e18\" and a key that is not an address each make the ledger throw and no buy is signed.","parentJobId":"cad710fd-e98f-4f4f-bca8-8befe90dfcdf","planHash":"bf84ccf15915c776e45641839e58ade1e4e0b148e460aa47cd569b24f7fe924f","previousHash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","projectId":"fb8ac5d7-7eee-484e-9bfc-79f42fb6b377","publication":{"commit":null,"deliveredAt":null,"repoUrl":"https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-937-build-swarm-derby-mcp-typescript-stdio"},"receiptIdentity":{"adapter":"0xde152afb7db5373f34876e1499fbd893a82dd336","chainId":1,"collection":"0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d","registry":"0x8004a169fb4a3325136eb29fa0ceb6d2e539a432"},"registry":"0xb6d0a187b050fa5bb0b87033a203f37becf4a775","research":[],"schema":"identitymd-work-v1","signals":[{"agentId":"50976","feedbackHash":"cbb83402868c4242819e1d767edb883365e47c6b1e927a57f4b4ebe8081e3a0c","nodeKey":"adversarial_review","submissionHash":"6bfc5307608697446efb92092d95c083ec225fd1524262dd3e54e23ca01c1e4c","tag1":"review:submission","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1},{"agentId":"51233","feedbackHash":"b334e9fd1c65d63eb596703bfbe65c954288841e87d88712c1d2121f772c8730","nodeKey":"refine_project","submissionHash":"d16b01d16066dbf781b8c18b8e9a6eee91922abf561b52a68a782478feea83ad","tag1":"verification:structural","tag2":"acceptance-v2","value":1}],"site":null,"snapshotHash":"ca349ea6acc3381e721c6ab75240f36ffdf8c9dca80f0f69744cdb1af540ea4b","state":"completed","submissions":[{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":null,"device":"9b06782c7559b54c","findings":[{"citation":"resolved","description":"W-L2 says a reservation may only be released after a second read confirms that turns did not grow and the balance did not fall. That rule is applied to the revert path only. The success path trusts a single RPC-reported value: it sets the ledger to the `cost` field of the TurnsBought log in the receipt, and when that value is below the reservation it lowers the ledger by the difference without any read of turns or balance. A DERBY_RPC_URL that relays the real transaction (so the chain charges the full packs x packPrice, bounded by the exact approve) but returns a receipt whose TurnsBought log, at the configured contract address, carries cost 0 (or 1 wei) makes every buy end with a ledger of 0. The next derby_buy_pack passes the cap check again, so IMD spending is unbounded, which is exactly the outcome W-L2 was meant to close. The address check from step 2 does not help because the hostile RPC fabricates the log at the configured address. Note a genuine price cut between quote and buy also yields actualCost < cost, so the fix cannot simply refuse smaller costs: either keep the ledger at max(reservation, actualCost), or lower it only when a fresh balance read shows before.balance - after.balance == actualCost.","line":239,"path":"src/server.ts","reproduction":"Fake chain (test/server.test.ts FakeChain), MemoryLedger, config maxImdWei = PRICE (0.5 IMD). Replace chain.buyPacks with: deduct PRICE from chain.imd, add 5 to chain.turnCount, return { txHash: \"0xbuy\", costWei: 0n }. Call derby_buy_pack {packs:1} twice. Expected: the second call is refused by the cap (0.5 IMD was already charged and the receipt cannot lower that). Actual: both calls return isError undefined, chain.calls is [approve, buyPacks, approve, buyPacks], ledger.spent(WALLET) is 0 after each call, and the wallet's IMD went from 10 to 9.0, i.e. 1.0 IMD spent under a 0.5 IMD cap. A third call spends again; nothing stops it.","severity":"medium","snippet":"            if (actualCost !== cost) {\n              if (ledger.adjust) ledger.adjust(wallet, actualCost - cost);\n              else ledger.add(wallet, actualCost - cost);","title":"A success receipt whose TurnsBought cost is below the reservation releases the cap with no second read (hostile-RPC cap bypass left open by W-L1/W-L2)"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The before-buy snapshot is taken only after approve succeeds, and the release path runs only for errors flagged reportedRevert or confirmedNoCharge. Any failure of chain.approve (INSUFFICIENT_FUNDS for gas on a wallet holding dust ETH, which passes the `=== 0n` precheck; nonce errors; RPC down) therefore leaves the full reservation in the ledger although no IMD moved and no buy was attempted, and no verification read is ever made. Each retry reserves again. With DERBY_MAX_IMD=1 and the default 0.5 IMD pack, two failed approves leave the ledger at 1.0 IMD with 0 IMD spent, and the next buy is refused by the cap until the user edits the ledger file by hand. The spec's rule (release after a second read confirms turns did not grow and the balance did not fall) would safely release here if the snapshot were taken before approve and the check also ran for approve failures.","line":257,"path":"src/server.ts","reproduction":"Fake chain, MemoryLedger, maxImdWei = 1 IMD, chain.eth = 1n, chain.approve = async () => { throw new Error(\"The wallet has too little ETH to pay for gas.\"); }. Call derby_buy_pack {packs:1} twice (both isError). Then restore chain.eth and chain.approve and call derby_buy_pack {packs:1} once more. Expected: the third call succeeds, since the wallet has spent 0 IMD. Actual: ledger.spent(WALLET) is 0.5 IMD after the first failure and 1.0 IMD after the second, chain.imd is still 10, and the third call returns isError 'Refused: buying 1 pack(s) costs 0.5 IMD, which would take spending to 1.5 IMD, past the DERBY_MAX_IMD cap of 1.0 IMD (1.0 already spent). Nothing was signed.'","severity":"low","snippet":"            if ((e.reportedRevert || e.confirmedNoCharge) && beforeBuy) {","title":"A failed approve (or any non-revert error) keeps the reservation permanently without the second read, so attempts that spent nothing exhaust the cap"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"reveal() deletes the pending swing from the map as soon as pending.reveal() returns, then performs three more RPC reads (currentDay, dayScore/board, turns). If any of those throws (a transient RPC error), the error propagates into the poll loop, which treats it as a failed reveal, sleeps, re-reads status (now 3) and returns isError 'Swing <id> was already finalized or refunded.' The tier, feet and finalize tx hash that this very call produced are never returned, and because the entry was already deleted the next call cannot report them either. For a kept swing (line 328) the same failure aborts the whole call. The result should be captured before the follow-up reads, and a read failure should degrade the extra fields rather than discard the resolution.","line":313,"path":"src/server.ts","reproduction":"Fake chain with turnCount 1. Wrap commitSwing so the returned PendingSwing's reveal() first calls the original reveal (which records 'finalize' and returns tier 4 / 450 ft) and then replaces chain.dayScore with a function that throws 'The Robinhood Chain RPC could not be reached; try again shortly.'. Call derby_swing. Expected: a result with tierName BOMB, feet 450 and txHashes.finalize 0xfinal (todayScore may be unavailable). Actual: isError true with text 'Swing 42 was already finalized or refunded.', chain.calls is ['swing','finalize'], and the swing is no longer in pendingSwings so no later call reports it.","severity":"low","snippet":"            const today = await agentScore(wallet, await chain.currentDay());","title":"If a read fails after finalize succeeded, the swing's result is dropped and the call reports 'already finalized or refunded'"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"SwarmDerby.finalize marks the swing a foul when the block that mines it has block.timestamp > committedAt + DRAW_WINDOW + REVEAL_WINDOW (600 s). The server computes `late` from the latest block's timestamp before it sends the finalize transaction; that transaction can only land in a later block with a timestamp at least as large. When the read returns exactly committedAt + 600 (or any value in the last seconds of the window with the slow 1 s poll and the 45 s tx wait), the contract fouls the swing but the server emits no note, contrary to step 3 ('If a reveal happens after committedAt + 600 s, say that the swing counted as a foul'). The note can instead be derived from the SwingResolved result together with the receipt's block timestamp, or from the timestamp of the block that contains the finalize tx.","line":310,"path":"src/server.ts","reproduction":"Fake chain, turnCount 1, stuck = true, drawTimeoutMs 10. Call derby_swing (times out, swing 42 kept, committedAt 1000). Set chain.timestamp = 1600, chain.pendingStatus = 2, chain.swingTier = 1 (what the contract returns for a finalize mined at >= 1601). Call derby_swing. Expected: earlier[0].note contains 'counted as a foul'. Actual: earlier[0] is {swingId:'42', tier:1, tierName:'FOUL', feet:0, ...} with no note field.","severity":"low","snippet":"            const late = (await chain.blockTimestamp()) > pending.committedAt + 600;","title":"The foul note is decided from the latest block read before finalize, so a reveal that mines after commit+600 is reported as a plain FOUL without the required sentence"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Recovery of kept swings is not isolated: any error from reveal() or expire() for an old swing propagates to the outer catch and the call ends with that error, before the turn check and before the new commit. On the real chain this happens whenever a drawn kept swing is older than commit+600 and anyone (the house bot, which can call expire on any swing) mines expire(swingId) between the server's status read (2) and its finalize: finalize reverts WrongStatus. The user gets 'That swing is not in the required state for this action.' and no swing for the turn they asked to spend; the stale entry stays in the map until the next call drops it at status 3. The same holds for a transient RPC error during an old swing's reveal. Errors for kept swings should be reported in `earlier` and the call should continue.","line":328,"path":"src/server.ts","reproduction":"Fake chain, turnCount 2, stuck = true, drawTimeoutMs 10. Call derby_swing (swing 42 kept). Set pendingStatus = 2, timestamp = 1601, stuck = false, and make the next reveal() throw new Error('That swing is not in the required state for this action.') after setting pendingStatus = 3 (the state after a third-party expire). Call derby_swing. Expected: a new swing 43 is committed and revealed (the wallet still holds 1 turn), with the failure of swing 42 reported in `earlier`. Actual: isError true with text 'That swing is not in the required state for this action.', chain.calls is ['swing 42','finalize 42'], turnCount is still 1 and no new swing was taken.","severity":"low","snippet":"            if (status === 2) earlier.push(await reveal(pending));","title":"A kept swing whose finalize reverts aborts the whole derby_swing call and no new swing is taken, although the caller still has a turn"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"When the only turn is locked in a kept swing that is still status 1 and younger than commit+300 s, the turn check fires and names derby_buy_pack. An autonomous agent following that instruction spends IMD on a new pack while a turn is about to be refunded (or while the house is still about to draw). The message should say that swing <id> is still waiting for the house draw and that the next call after commit+300 s returns the turn, and only name derby_buy_pack when no kept swing can return a turn.","line":338,"path":"src/server.ts","reproduction":"Fake chain, turnCount 1, stuck = true, drawTimeoutMs 10. Call derby_swing (isError, swing 42 kept, committedAt 1000). Set chain.timestamp = 1100 and call derby_swing again. Expected: an error that names swing 42 as pending and says the turn returns after 5 minutes. Actual: 'No agent turns left. Call derby_buy_pack to buy a pack of 5 turns first.'","severity":"low","snippet":"            return swingFail(\"No agent turns left. Call derby_buy_pack to buy a pack of 5 turns first.\");","title":"With 0 turns and an undrawn kept swing, the tool tells the agent to buy a pack although the locked turn comes back in 5 minutes"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Both pinned run lines (README.md:58 and README.md:214) use commit 0e02635, which is the previous delivery: its src/config.ts defaults DERBY_CONTRACT to 0xBa58BC6b5aCf8043DAEa2Bf1BF6C1c09cF84b03C and its swing flow uses the target-block protocol. A user who copies the documented command, as the README recommends, therefore runs a server that buys turns on the first SwarmDerby, and the same README states that those turns cannot be played on v2. The README acknowledges the pin is 'before v2', but that sentence is easy to miss next to a copy-paste command that spends IMD. Until the v2 commit hash is known the command should either not be given as runnable or should set DERBY_CONTRACT explicitly and warn that the pinned code is v1.","line":58,"path":"README.md","reproduction":"git show 0e02635:src/config.ts | grep DEFAULT_CONTRACT prints 0xBa58BC6b5aCf8043DAEa2Bf1BF6C1c09cF84b03C. Running the README command with DERBY_PRIVATE_KEY set and calling derby_buy_pack {packs:1} signs an approve and buyPacks against the first SwarmDerby; the resulting 5 turns are not playable on 0x53d9aa0b925c5148bcc5f98f394872687f4c831c.","severity":"low","snippet":"npx -y github:identity-md-launches/launch-937-build-swarm-derby-mcp-typescript-stdio#0e02635af56b614626ccb3a190eb7ff69eedaae4      # builds on install via \"prepare\"","title":"The README's pinned npx command points at the pre-v2 commit, whose default contract is the first SwarmDerby"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"The verification reads go to the same DERBY_RPC_URL that reported the revert. An endpoint that lies consistently (reports the mined buy as reverted and then replays the pre-buy turns and balance) passes the check, the reservation is released and the next buy is signed. This is the limit of the design the requester specified, not an implementation error, and the exact approve from W-L1 still bounds each individual buy to the quoted cost. It is recorded here so the trust assumption is explicit: the cap is enforced against a buggy or occasionally wrong RPC, not against a fully adversarial one. A stronger design (compare against a second, independent RPC, or never release on the revert path and rely on the exact approve plus a manual ledger edit) would be a scope decision.","line":259,"path":"src/server.ts","reproduction":"Fake chain, MemoryLedger, maxImdWei = 0.5 IMD. Make chain.turns and chain.imdBalance return the pre-buy values (0 turns, 10 IMD) throughout, and make chain.buyPacks deduct 0.5 IMD, add 5 turns and throw an error flagged reportedRevert. Call derby_buy_pack {packs:1} twice. Actual: the ledger is 0 after the first call, the second call passes the cap check and signs another buy, and the wallet's real IMD falls from 10 to 9.0 under a 0.5 IMD cap.","severity":"info","snippet":"                const [turns, balance] = await Promise.all([chain.turns(\"agent\", wallet), chain.imdBalance(wallet)]);","title":"Scope observation: the W-L2 second-read defense holds only for an RPC that misreports the outcome but reports state honestly"},{"citation":"resolved","description":"Step 3 fixes the exact text for a timed-out commit ('Swing <id> is committed but not drawn yet. The next derby_swing call reveals it if the house draws it, or gives the turn back 5 minutes after the commit.'). The only test for that path matches /Swing 42/, which any error mentioning the swing satisfies (including the reveal-failure and already-finalized messages). The implementation currently emits the right sentence; the test does not prove it and would not catch a regression that changed it.","line":290,"path":"test/server.test.ts","reproduction":"Change the string on src/server.ts:364 to 'Swing 42 failed.' and run npm test: 'times out waiting for the house draw and names the swing' still passes.","severity":"info","snippet":"    assert.match(text(r), /Swing 42/);","title":"Test weakness: the draw-timeout test does not assert the required isError sentence"}],"hash":"6bfc5307608697446efb92092d95c083ec225fd1524262dd3e54e23ca01c1e4c","nodeId":"0cb8bb32-ae4c-4292-9895-4be90ef80004","outcome":"completed","summary":"The review is complete. The findings file holds 9 entries, every snippet verified against the tree, and no repository file was changed. Scratch reproductions live under test/scratch/, which is gitignored.\n\n**What I checked and found correct**\n\n- The ABI, status values, draw window (300 s), reveal window (600 s) and expire semantics match the v2 source, and the live contract at the v2 address reports the same constants. The `expire` check uses strict greater-than, matching the contract's `NotExpired` condition.\n- W-L1 holds: approve is always the exact reserved cost, so a raised price makes `buyPacks` revert on allowance rather than overcharge, and the revert is confirmed by the second read before release.\n- W-L3 holds: every malformed shape I tried (array, negative, exponent, bad key, uppercase key, null, BOM, wrong top-level type) throws the \"unreadable\" error before any signature. A missing file still starts at 0.\n- All 51 existing tests pass and the typecheck is clean.\n\n**Findings, ranked**\n\n1. **Medium, src/server.ts:239.** The success path lowers the ledger to whatever cost the receipt's TurnsBought log reports, with no second read. An RPC that relays the real buy but returns a log with cost 0 at the configured address leaves the ledger at 0 after every buy. Reproduced: with a 0.5 IMD cap, two buys both succeed and the wallet spends 1.0 IMD. This is the same actor and outcome W-L2 was meant to close.\n2. **Low, src/server.ts:257.** An approve failure keeps the reservation forever and never runs the confirming read. Two failed approves on a dust-ETH wallet exhaust a 1 IMD cap with 0 IMD spent.\n3. **Low, src/server.ts:313.** A read failure after a successful finalize drops the result and reports \"already finalized or refunded\". The tier and finalize hash are never returned.\n4. **Low, src/server.ts:310.** The foul note is decided from a block read taken before finalize is sent. A read of exactly commit+600 gives a FOUL with no note.\n5. **Low, src/server.ts:328.** A kept swing whose finalize reverts (third-party expire mined first) aborts the whole call and no new swing is taken.\n6. **Low, src/server.ts:338.** With a turn locked in an undrawn kept swing, the tool tells the agent to buy a pack.\n7. **Low, README.md:58.** The pinned run command points at the pre-v2 commit, whose default contract is the first SwarmDerby, so a copied command buys turns that cannot be played on v2.\n8. **Info.** The W-L2 second read goes to the same RPC; a consistently lying endpoint still bypasses the cap. This is a limit of the specified design, recorded as a trust assumption.\n9. **Info, test/server.test.ts:290.** The draw-timeout test matches only \"Swing 42\" and would not catch a changed message.\n\nNo critical or high findings, so no Foundry proofs were attached. Findings are in `.imd-findings.json` at the repository root.","treeHash":null,"usage":{"cachedInputTokens":2096204,"inputTokens":610,"model":"claude-fable-5-1","outputTokens":43038,"runtime":"claude","turns":30,"wallClockMs":593955}},{"artifacts":[],"attempt":1,"bundleHash":"4293869184a30220dfbb3134acca5766d2fe56287d3e4732e4a547c765d6c237","device":"15b1d692225b9db2","findings":[],"hash":"d16b01d16066dbf781b8c18b8e9a6eee91922abf561b52a68a782478feea83ad","nodeId":"21355971-1cb3-4bd2-86bd-03ccfa5341a5","outcome":"completed","summary":"Implemented SwarmDerby v2 draw, reveal, and refund recovery, plus all three spending and ledger fixes. Tool inputs, cap, and read-only mode are preserved.\n\nValidation passed in `test/scratch/`: typecheck, all 51 tests, and build. Only the nine allowed files changed. README includes this run’s test output; DEMO’s recorded content is unchanged.\n\nThe npx examples pin the previous published commit; README explains replacing it with a reviewed v2 commit after publication.","treeHash":"7761db638c54a4bea8166f52b7f8c83d836e4a55","usage":{"cachedInputTokens":665216,"inputTokens":73548,"model":null,"outputTokens":15147,"runtime":"codex","turns":5,"wallClockMs":346965}}],"verification":[{"checks":[],"detail":"paths and tree verified; no suite was run for this kind of work","evaluation":"structural","profile":"none","status":"accepted","submissionHash":"d16b01d16066dbf781b8c18b8e9a6eee91922abf561b52a68a782478feea83ad","verifiedTreeHash":"7761db638c54a4bea8166f52b7f8c83d836e4a55","verifierVersion":"0.1.0+ad90ce4c"}]}