# Independent control check — view 2

Research performed independently on 2026-11-12. No other views or published control summaries were read. Only public explorer source/metadata and read-only chain methods were used. This is a declared-powers reading, not an exploit review. No transactions were sent.

## Reading conventions

The JSON flags describe mechanisms in the currently installed code. A proxy’s ability to replace that code is reported explicitly; `pause=no` or `fees=no` for Robinhood CLAUS does **not** exclude adding those powers by upgrade. `mint=yes` means an issuance mechanism exists, even when its capacity is currently exhausted; the table gives current availability. `mint_cap=yes` means an explicit application-level supply/ID bound, not integer overflow limits. For non-token contracts, issuance/cap are `no` (not applicable); Intake’s `pause=yes` specifically denotes service payment acceptance, not freezing an external token. Bridge-only restrictions and external oracle prices are included and labeled. `delay=no` means no mandatory elapsed-time wait for the stated owner actions, not that every operation is immediate.

`implementation`, `admin`, or `admin_owner` = `no` means no such applicable live authority, not an omitted address. A zero address is shown only when actually returned by a read. Wallet classifications are block-specific: `eth_getCode=0x` is a code-free wallet; EIP-7702 delegation is separately labeled. Human/legal identities and key custody cannot be established by these reads. Ownership tracing stops after three control edges; external signers at that boundary are listed without following their controllers further.

All RPC calls used the assignment-authorized read relay. Its local address is intentionally omitted. Public references are [Ethereum Blockscout](https://eth.blockscout.com/) and Robinhood’s [network documentation](https://docs.robinhood.com/chain/connecting/) / public RPC `https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com`. No alternate Ethereum RPC URL was supplied in the brief. Explorer source GET requests used `Accept: application/json`, `User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0`, and the explorer root as `Referer`; initial bot challenges were resolved without login.

## Fixed state snapshots

| Chain | chainId result | Block (decimal / hex) | Block hash | Block UTC |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | `0x1` | 26398577 / `0x192cf71` | `0x12ee2ba7652700029032923d830c2865429fdee673bdec5c1aa2798f21008b99` | 2026-11-12T11:31:35+00:00 |
| 4663 | `0x1237` | 112493703 / `0x6b48487` | `0x2e1ec13180e43941aef35f3422e5a29aab9330b18aacc75d9665a1e5d60ba07a` | 2026-11-12T11:31:38+00:00 |

Snapshots came from `eth_chainId([])` and `eth_getBlockByNumber(["latest",false])`; every subsequent state read explicitly used the block hex above, including owner/dependency classification. Blocks were not claimed finalized. Explorer source metadata was read separately at the times below. Source and runtime checks are evidence of correspondence, not an independent compiler reproducibility audit.

## 1. CLAUS token — Robinhood Chain

Address: `0x163015276f3244bc2ccb78b4d69cc8a4069effac`; chain ID 4663; state block 112493703.

| Form | Answer and attributable evidence |
|---|---|
| a. proxy | yes — transparent ERC-1967; implementation `0xd68727ddd50e8ba07e4be20d37a5ecf3dd814bff`; admin `0xcbc4bbd337e62c926c995e66a231e5e2b0a722a8`, owned by `0x979d5810d32292358639f25294472f01c95bdc46`. R1, R-A1; [S1](https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x163015276f3244bc2ccb78b4d69cc8a4069effac) `_fallback`, constructor. |
| b. owner/admin | Token owner and ProxyAdmin owner are `0x979d5810d32292358639f25294472f01c95bdc46` (contract). That contract owner is `0xbb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5` (plain wallet on this chain), operator `0x8aca8890d34086d7a30b9c06fae25e0c3cda4cfa` (plain wallet); both can execute calls on token and ProxyAdmin, both targets enabled. At most three control edges followed. Receipt signer `0xdbeae9444c38375a75d78ff3992cc5058a352d05` is a plain wallet, authorizing reserve releases, not new supply. R1, R2, R-A1, R-S1, R-X; [S2](https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x979d5810d32292358639f25294472f01c95bdc46) `execute`, `setOperator`; [I1](https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xd68727ddd50e8ba07e4be20d37a5ecf3dd814bff) `mintFromBurn`. |
| c. mint/cap | yes — `mint(address,uint256)` is onlyOwner, through the administrator owner/operator. no supply cap in that path; Solidity integer bounds are not a token cap. Initial reserve and migration allocations are bounded, but `mintFromBurn`, rollover and snapshot distribution release existing reserve. `adminMintedSupply()` is 0 at this block. R-S1; [I1](https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xd68727ddd50e8ba07e4be20d37a5ecf3dd814bff) `mint`, `initialize`, `mintFromBurn`, `distributeSnapshot`. |
| d. pause/restrict | no direct transfer pause/blocklist in the installed code. `migrationPaused()` = yes restricts receipt releases only; `_transfer` of ordinary balances is inherited ERC20. **Upgrade authority can replace this behavior**, including adding restrictions; it is not a permanence claim. R-S1; [I1](https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xd68727ddd50e8ba07e4be20d37a5ecf3dd814bff) `setMigrationPaused`, inherited `ERC20Upgradeable._update`; [S1](https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x163015276f3244bc2ccb78b4d69cc8a4069effac) upgrade dispatch. |
| e. fees | no token transfer fee, mint-price or payee setter in installed MigrationToken. Preferred pool descriptions are not enforcement or a fee charged by this ERC20. **Upgrade authority can introduce fee logic.** [I1](https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xd68727ddd50e8ba07e4be20d37a5ecf3dd814bff) full source/ABI, `setCanonicalPools`, `venueAllowed`, inherited ERC20 transfers; [S1](https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x163015276f3244bc2ccb78b4d69cc8a4069effac). |
| f. delay | no mandatory delay before owner minting, metadata changes or administrator `execute`. Two-step ownership acceptance is not a timed wait. [I1](https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xd68727ddd50e8ba07e4be20d37a5ecf3dd814bff) `mint`, `updateMetadata`; [S2](https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x979d5810d32292358639f25294472f01c95bdc46) `execute`, inherited Ownable2Step. |
| g. source | yes, explorer `is_verified=true`; proxy and implementation are partially verified, not full matches. ProxyAdmin endpoint separately reports `is_verified=false` and supplies a verified-twin template; do not mistake that for verification of this admin address. [S1](https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x163015276f3244bc2ccb78b4d69cc8a4069effac), [I1](https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xd68727ddd50e8ba07e4be20d37a5ecf3dd814bff), [A1](https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xcbc4bbd337e62c926c995e66a231e5e2b0a722a8). |

```json
{
  "proxy": "yes",
  "implementation": "0xd68727ddd50e8ba07e4be20d37a5ecf3dd814bff",
  "admin": "0xcbc4bbd337e62c926c995e66a231e5e2b0a722a8",
  "admin_owner": "0x979d5810d32292358639f25294472f01c95bdc46",
  "owners": [
    {
      "role": "token owner",
      "address": "0x979d5810d32292358639f25294472f01c95bdc46",
      "kind": "contract",
      "controller": "0xbb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5"
    },
    {
      "role": "proxy admin",
      "address": "0xcbc4bbd337e62c926c995e66a231e5e2b0a722a8",
      "kind": "contract",
      "controller": "0x979d5810d32292358639f25294472f01c95bdc46"
    },
    {
      "role": "administrator owner",
      "address": "0xbb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5",
      "kind": "wallet",
      "controller": "unknown"
    },
    {
      "role": "administrator operator",
      "address": "0x8aca8890d34086d7a30b9c06fae25e0c3cda4cfa",
      "kind": "wallet",
      "controller": "unknown"
    },
    {
      "role": "reserve receipt signer",
      "address": "0xdbeae9444c38375a75d78ff3992cc5058a352d05",
      "kind": "wallet",
      "controller": "unknown"
    }
  ],
  "mint": "yes",
  "mint_cap": "no",
  "pause": "no",
  "fees": "no",
  "delay": "no",
  "source_verified": "yes",
  "block": 112493703,
  "evidence": [
    "S1",
    "R1",
    "I1",
    "A1",
    "S2",
    "R2",
    "R-A1",
    "R-S1",
    "R-S2",
    "R-X",
    "R-W"
  ]
}
```

## 2. CLAUS owner contract — Robinhood Chain

Address: `0x979d5810d32292358639f25294472f01c95bdc46`; chain ID 4663; state block 112493703.

| Form | Answer and attributable evidence |
|---|---|
| a. proxy | no — direct ClausAdministrator, CALL-based execution, not DELEGATECALL. Standard proxy slots are zero (supporting evidence, not sufficient alone). R2; [S2](https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x979d5810d32292358639f25294472f01c95bdc46) full source and `execute`. |
| b. owner/admin | Owner `0xbb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5`, operator `0x8aca8890d34086d7a30b9c06fae25e0c3cda4cfa`: both plain wallets (`eth_getCode=0x`) on Robinhood Chain. Owner changes operator/managed targets; operator may execute managed calls but cannot use the `transferOwnership` selector; renunciation selector is refused for everyone. Pending owner is absent. R2, R-S2, R-X, R-W; [S2](https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x979d5810d32292358639f25294472f01c95bdc46) `execute`, `setOperator`, `setTarget`. |
| c. mint/cap | no own token or NFT units; no own issuance cap (no). It can call managed CLAUS `mint` as owner; that downstream power is recorded in contract 1. [S2](https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x979d5810d32292358639f25294472f01c95bdc46) full source/ABI; R-S2 verifies managed token. |
| d. pause/restrict | no own unit-transfer ledger or pause mechanism. Owner can remove a managed target or revoke operator; owner/operator can exercise managed proxy upgrades, which could later impose downstream transfer restrictions. [S2](https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x979d5810d32292358639f25294472f01c95bdc46) `setTarget`, `setOperator`, `execute`; R-S2. |
| e. fees | no local fee/price/payee schedule. `recoverNative` lets owner choose a recovery recipient, and `execute` forwards caller-selected value to managed contracts; these are discretionary execution/recovery powers, not a local fee setter. Downstream upgrades can change downstream policies. [S2](https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x979d5810d32292358639f25294472f01c95bdc46) `recoverNative`, `execute`. |
| f. delay | no — authorized `execute`, `setOperator`, `setTarget`, `recoverNative` have no scheduling/time check. Two-step ownership is acceptance only. [S2](https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x979d5810d32292358639f25294472f01c95bdc46) these functions and inherited Ownable2Step. |
| g. source | yes — explorer `is_verified=true`, partial verification. [S2](https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x979d5810d32292358639f25294472f01c95bdc46). |

```json
{
  "proxy": "no",
  "implementation": "no",
  "admin": "no",
  "admin_owner": "no",
  "owners": [
    {
      "role": "owner",
      "address": "0xbb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5",
      "kind": "wallet",
      "controller": "unknown"
    },
    {
      "role": "operator",
      "address": "0x8aca8890d34086d7a30b9c06fae25e0c3cda4cfa",
      "kind": "wallet",
      "controller": "unknown"
    }
  ],
  "mint": "no",
  "mint_cap": "no",
  "pause": "no",
  "fees": "no",
  "delay": "no",
  "source_verified": "yes",
  "block": 112493703,
  "evidence": [
    "S2",
    "R2",
    "R-S2",
    "R-X",
    "R-W"
  ]
}
```

## 3. Old CLAUS token — Ethereum

Address: `0x1b54e762aa34cf6e28e9c082f2848e28e45da6b8`; chain ID 1; state block 26398577.

| Form | Answer and attributable evidence |
|---|---|
| a. proxy | yes — TokenProxy extends transparent ERC-1967 proxy. Implementation `0x55d555bd85fed6ecf30fda9b4c76019b844218a7`; admin `0xfb4b9d2ba3ef17787bfe3fd90c3ea7b319807a57` (contract). Admin `owner()` returns the actual zero address: no owner, renounced/disabled under this ProxyAdmin code. It is not an unknown placeholder. R3, R-A3; [S3](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x1b54e762aa34cf6e28e9c082f2848e28e45da6b8), [A3](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xfb4b9d2ba3ef17787bfe3fd90c3ea7b319807a57) `upgradeAndCall`/Ownable. |
| b. owner/admin | Implementation-level owner `0xbb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5` is an EIP-7702 wallet with delegation code `0xef010063c0c19a282a1b52b07dd5a65b58948a07dae32b`, not a plain code-free wallet. Delegate is `0x63c0c19a282a1b52b07dd5a65b58948a07dae32b` (contract); its source authenticates the delegated EOA itself, not a separate Ownable owner. Real-world key holder unknown. ProxyAdmin has no owner. R3, R-W, R-A3; [D3](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x63c0c19a282a1b52b07dd5a65b58948a07dae32b) EIP7702StatelessDeleGator; [I3](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x55d555bd85fed6ecf30fda9b4c76019b844218a7) `updateMetadata`. |
| c. mint/cap | no new issuance path in ProtectedToken; burns only. no explicit supply-cap constant/check. Existing supply is an upper bound under current immutable-in-practice code, but is not a separately declared mint cap. No initializer or UUPS upgrade entrypoint. [I3](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x55d555bd85fed6ecf30fda9b4c76019b844218a7) full source and inherited ERC20/Ownable2Step; [A3](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xfb4b9d2ba3ef17787bfe3fd90c3ea7b319807a57) and R-A3 establish disabled upgrade authority. |
| d. pause/restrict | no — ordinary inherited ERC20 transfers; historical `setDistributor` and `activateFwaTransfers` revert, and legacy allowance getters do not gate transfers. [I3](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x55d555bd85fed6ecf30fda9b4c76019b844218a7) these methods, inherited `_update`. |
| e. fees | no — no ERC20 transfer fee/price/payee setter. `maximumTotalTaxPips()` is a pure historical/policy getter, not fee-charging code. Pool/hook economics are separate contracts and not assessed as this ERC20 transfer policy. [I3](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x55d555bd85fed6ecf30fda9b4c76019b844218a7) full source/ABI and inherited ERC20. |
| f. delay | no mandatory wait for surviving owner metadata action; proxy upgrade action is disabled, not timelocked. [I3](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x55d555bd85fed6ecf30fda9b4c76019b844218a7) `updateMetadata`; [A3](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xfb4b9d2ba3ef17787bfe3fd90c3ea7b319807a57) `upgradeAndCall` and R-A3. |
| g. source | yes — proxy, current implementation and ProxyAdmin report full verification. [S3](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x1b54e762aa34cf6e28e9c082f2848e28e45da6b8), [I3](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x55d555bd85fed6ecf30fda9b4c76019b844218a7), [A3](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xfb4b9d2ba3ef17787bfe3fd90c3ea7b319807a57). |

```json
{
  "proxy": "yes",
  "implementation": "0x55d555bd85fed6ecf30fda9b4c76019b844218a7",
  "admin": "0xfb4b9d2ba3ef17787bfe3fd90c3ea7b319807a57",
  "admin_owner": "no",
  "owners": [
    {
      "role": "token owner",
      "address": "0xbb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5",
      "kind": "wallet with eip-7702 delegation",
      "controller": "unknown"
    },
    {
      "role": "proxy admin",
      "address": "0xfb4b9d2ba3ef17787bfe3fd90c3ea7b319807a57",
      "kind": "contract",
      "controller": "no"
    }
  ],
  "mint": "no",
  "mint_cap": "no",
  "pause": "no",
  "fees": "no",
  "delay": "no",
  "source_verified": "yes",
  "block": 26398577,
  "evidence": [
    "S3",
    "R3",
    "I3",
    "A3",
    "D3",
    "R-A3",
    "R-W"
  ]
}
```

## 4. Claus NFT collection — Ethereum

Address: `0x80396c7131159eb92e7e84839e51c9887a7a95d9`; chain ID 1; state block 26398577.

| Form | Answer and attributable evidence |
|---|---|
| a. proxy | no — ClausNFT has direct ERC721 logic with immutable dependencies; standard slots zero. R4; [S4](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x80396c7131159eb92e7e84839e51c9887a7a95d9) full source. |
| b. owner/admin | Immutable owner `0xbb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5` is the same EIP-7702 delegated wallet described in contract 3 (Ethereum read, not Robinhood classification). No ownership-transfer setter exists in ClausNFT. Owner can open mint once. Oracle wrapper `0x02aae1a04f9828517b3007f83f6181900cad910c` is a contract; fee authority chain and 4-of-12 Safe signers appear in external-controls appendix (three edges). R4, R-W, R-S4, R-X, R-E; [S4](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x80396c7131159eb92e7e84839e51c9887a7a95d9) `openMint`; [W4](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x02aae1a04f9828517b3007f83f6181900cad910c). |
| c. mint/cap | yes mint mechanism — any unused minter can request, deposit 50,000 CLAUS and pay oracle charge after owner opens mint; wrapper supplies randomness, anyone can finish ready requests. yes cap: 300 concurrent identities from bounded ID pool, including pending reservations; redeemed IDs can recycle. At read: supply 300, pending 0, available 0, mintOpen yes; no immediate free capacity, but redemption may reopen capacity. R4, R-S4; [S4](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x80396c7131159eb92e7e84839e51c9887a7a95d9) constructor, `available`, `requestMint`, `finishMints`, `redeem`. |
| d. pause/restrict | no administrative pause/blocklist on existing NFT transfers. One-way `openMint` controls mint opening only; wrapper can disable new oracle requests but cannot pause transfers. [S4](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x80396c7131159eb92e7e84839e51c9887a7a95d9) `_update`, inherited ERC721; [W4](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x02aae1a04f9828517b3007f83f6181900cad910c) `disable`. |
| e. fees | yes for the external oracle component of mint price: wrapper owner `0xcc4b5b07316be81ed6edb44ca61e4cab28a1950d` (Safe, 4-of-12) can `setConfig`; wrapper owner can select withdrawal recipients. NFT owner has no price/payee setter; BACKING is fixed 50,000 CLAUS, oracle wrapper immutable; sole remaining free ID bypasses oracle. R-S4, R-X, R-E; [S4](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x80396c7131159eb92e7e84839e51c9887a7a95d9) `mintPrice`, `requestMint`; [W4](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x02aae1a04f9828517b3007f83f6181900cad910c) `setConfig`, `withdrawNative`; [W4O](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xcc4b5b07316be81ed6edb44ca61e4cab28a1950d). |
| f. delay | no mandatory wait before owner `openMint`. Oracle confirmation count (10) and daily reward epochs are operational timing, not owner-action timelocks. Wrapper `setConfig` is onlyOwner without a mandatory wait in wrapper code. [S4](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x80396c7131159eb92e7e84839e51c9887a7a95d9) `openMint`, CONFIRMATIONS, inherited NftRewards; [W4](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x02aae1a04f9828517b3007f83f6181900cad910c) `setConfig`. |
| g. source | yes — full verification for NFT; external wrapper and Safe proxy source also available. [S4](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x80396c7131159eb92e7e84839e51c9887a7a95d9), [W4](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x02aae1a04f9828517b3007f83f6181900cad910c), [W4O](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xcc4b5b07316be81ed6edb44ca61e4cab28a1950d). |

```json
{
  "proxy": "no",
  "implementation": "no",
  "admin": "no",
  "admin_owner": "no",
  "owners": [
    {
      "role": "immutable nft owner",
      "address": "0xbb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5",
      "kind": "wallet with eip-7702 delegation",
      "controller": "unknown"
    },
    {
      "role": "oracle wrapper",
      "address": "0x02aae1a04f9828517b3007f83f6181900cad910c",
      "kind": "contract",
      "controller": "0xcc4b5b07316be81ed6edb44ca61e4cab28a1950d"
    },
    {
      "role": "oracle fee administrator",
      "address": "0xcc4b5b07316be81ed6edb44ca61e4cab28a1950d",
      "kind": "contract",
      "controller": "4-of-12 signers in R-E"
    }
  ],
  "mint": "yes",
  "mint_cap": "yes",
  "pause": "no",
  "fees": "yes",
  "delay": "no",
  "source_verified": "yes",
  "block": 26398577,
  "evidence": [
    "S4",
    "R4",
    "D3",
    "W4",
    "W4O",
    "R-S4",
    "R-X",
    "R-E",
    "R-W"
  ]
}
```

## 5. IMD Intake — Ethereum

Address: `0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82`; chain ID 1; state block 26398577.

| Form | Answer and attributable evidence |
|---|---|
| a. proxy | no — direct Intake (Ownable2Step + EIP712), no delegatecall/proxy path; standard slots zero. R5; [S5](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82) full source. |
| b. owner/admin | Owner `0x047f606fd5b2baa5f5c6c4ab8958e45cb6b054b7`; writer `0x3d3c0df7c1a17d384545e9d7c8228897bd9625cb`; quote signer `0x169b08ea234d7819eeabb246e34d8cd81e32279f`: all plain wallets on this chain. Payee `0x4e0fa57bde726079356537e2f34d671e9f41adbc` receives payments but is not an admin role. Pending owner absent. Owner can replace writer/signer/payee. R5, R-W; [S5](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82) `setWriter`, `setSigner`, `setPayTo`, `complete`, `pay`. |
| c. mint/cap | no asset units minted; requests/results are records, not token issuance. no token-supply cap (not applicable). [S5](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82) full source/ABI, `_request`, `complete`. |
| d. pause/restrict | yes for service payment acceptance: owner can set an action/asset price to zero and `_request` reverts ActionNotSold; owner can replace quote signer. no ability to pause the external ERC20 ledger or freeze arbitrary holders. This is a service restriction, not an ERC20-wide pause. [S5](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82) `setPrice`, `_request`, `setSigner`, `pay`, `_collect`. |
| e. fees | yes — owner immediately changes action/asset prices with `setPrice` and treasury with `setPayTo`. Quote signer authorizes amount/asset/expiry for `pay`, owner replaces signer. Whole amount forwards to payee. R5; [S5](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82) `setPrice`, `setPayTo`, `setSigner`, `pay`, `_collect`. |
| f. delay | no — price/payee/writer/signer/callback-gas setters act immediately. Ownable2Step transfer needs acceptance but enforces no elapsed-time delay; quote expiry is not a timelock. [S5](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82) setters and inherited Ownable2Step. |
| g. source | yes — explorer `is_verified=true`, partial verification. [S5](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82). |

```json
{
  "proxy": "no",
  "implementation": "no",
  "admin": "no",
  "admin_owner": "no",
  "owners": [
    {
      "role": "owner",
      "address": "0x047f606fd5b2baa5f5c6c4ab8958e45cb6b054b7",
      "kind": "wallet",
      "controller": "unknown"
    },
    {
      "role": "completion writer",
      "address": "0x3d3c0df7c1a17d384545e9d7c8228897bd9625cb",
      "kind": "wallet",
      "controller": "unknown"
    },
    {
      "role": "quote signer",
      "address": "0x169b08ea234d7819eeabb246e34d8cd81e32279f",
      "kind": "wallet",
      "controller": "unknown"
    }
  ],
  "mint": "no",
  "mint_cap": "no",
  "pause": "yes",
  "fees": "yes",
  "delay": "no",
  "source_verified": "yes",
  "block": 26398577,
  "evidence": [
    "S5",
    "R5",
    "R-W"
  ]
}
```

## 6. IMD Intake — Robinhood Chain

Address: `0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82`; chain ID 4663; state block 112493703.

| Form | Answer and attributable evidence |
|---|---|
| a. proxy | no — direct Intake (Ownable2Step + EIP712), no delegatecall/proxy path; standard slots zero. R6; [S6](https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82) full source. |
| b. owner/admin | Owner `0x047f606fd5b2baa5f5c6c4ab8958e45cb6b054b7`; writer `0x3d3c0df7c1a17d384545e9d7c8228897bd9625cb`; quote signer `0x169b08ea234d7819eeabb246e34d8cd81e32279f`: all plain wallets on this chain. Payee `0x4e0fa57bde726079356537e2f34d671e9f41adbc` receives payments but is not an admin role. Pending owner absent. Owner can replace writer/signer/payee. R6, R-W; [S6](https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82) `setWriter`, `setSigner`, `setPayTo`, `complete`, `pay`. |
| c. mint/cap | no asset units minted; requests/results are records, not token issuance. no token-supply cap (not applicable). [S6](https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82) full source/ABI, `_request`, `complete`. |
| d. pause/restrict | yes for service payment acceptance: owner can set an action/asset price to zero and `_request` reverts ActionNotSold; owner can replace quote signer. no ability to pause the external ERC20 ledger or freeze arbitrary holders. This is a service restriction, not an ERC20-wide pause. [S6](https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82) `setPrice`, `_request`, `setSigner`, `pay`, `_collect`. |
| e. fees | yes — owner immediately changes action/asset prices with `setPrice` and treasury with `setPayTo`. Quote signer authorizes amount/asset/expiry for `pay`, owner replaces signer. Whole amount forwards to payee. R6; [S6](https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82) `setPrice`, `setPayTo`, `setSigner`, `pay`, `_collect`. |
| f. delay | no — price/payee/writer/signer/callback-gas setters act immediately. Ownable2Step transfer needs acceptance but enforces no elapsed-time delay; quote expiry is not a timelock. [S6](https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82) setters and inherited Ownable2Step. |
| g. source | yes — explorer `is_verified=true`, partial verification. [S6](https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82). |

```json
{
  "proxy": "no",
  "implementation": "no",
  "admin": "no",
  "admin_owner": "no",
  "owners": [
    {
      "role": "owner",
      "address": "0x047f606fd5b2baa5f5c6c4ab8958e45cb6b054b7",
      "kind": "wallet",
      "controller": "unknown"
    },
    {
      "role": "completion writer",
      "address": "0x3d3c0df7c1a17d384545e9d7c8228897bd9625cb",
      "kind": "wallet",
      "controller": "unknown"
    },
    {
      "role": "quote signer",
      "address": "0x169b08ea234d7819eeabb246e34d8cd81e32279f",
      "kind": "wallet",
      "controller": "unknown"
    }
  ],
  "mint": "no",
  "mint_cap": "no",
  "pause": "yes",
  "fees": "yes",
  "delay": "no",
  "source_verified": "yes",
  "block": 112493703,
  "evidence": [
    "S6",
    "R6",
    "R-W"
  ]
}
```

## 7. IMD token — Ethereum

Address: `0xd34a99bc0f67ae1bbd63c660e6d0b0dd03e263b7`; chain ID 1; state block 26398577.

| Form | Answer and attributable evidence |
|---|---|
| a. proxy | no — direct BridgedFP/OFT ERC20; standard slots zero, no proxy delegation path in source. R7; [S7](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xd34a99bc0f67ae1bbd63c660e6d0b0dd03e263b7) full source. |
| b. owner/admin | Owner `0x047f606fd5b2baa5f5c6c4ab8958e45cb6b054b7` is a plain wallet. Same address is the endpoint delegate for this OApp. Endpoint `0x1a44076050125825900e736c501f859c50fe728c` is a contract, owned by OneSig `0xbe010a7e3686fdf65e93344ab664d065a0b02478` (contract), 5-of-8 signers; see three-edge external-controls trace. R7, R-W, R-X, R-E, R-F; [S7](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xd34a99bc0f67ae1bbd63c660e6d0b0dd03e263b7) OAppCore `setPeer`/`setDelegate`; [L7](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x1a44076050125825900e736c501f859c50fe728c), [L7O](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xbe010a7e3686fdf65e93344ab664d065a0b02478). |
| c. mint/cap | yes — authenticated endpoint `lzReceive` plus configured source peer reaches OFT `_credit` and `_mint`; no direct owner mint method, but owner sets trusted peers. Current peers: EID 30184 `0xab152db8aac047b6757ffcf495ffe88d7712690a`; 30110 `0x374080d830b66a3e4c8ecbca846e922a2039a024`; 30416 `0x5f7bb59365ce557c26dbcaa4ee9d39a4b95b7127`. Remote peer controllers unknown: not traced on those chains. no aggregate supply cap in `_credit`; message uint64 encoding is not a cumulative cap. R-P; [S7](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xd34a99bc0f67ae1bbd63c660e6d0b0dd03e263b7) OAppReceiver `lzReceive`, OFTCore `_lzReceive`, OFT `_credit`. |
| d. pause/restrict | yes for bridging: owner can unset peers or impose a reverting message inspector/enforced options; owner/delegate controls endpoint configuration. no pause/blocklist in local ERC20 `transfer`/`transferFrom`. At read msgInspector and preCrime absent. R-S7; [S7](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xd34a99bc0f67ae1bbd63c660e6d0b0dd03e263b7) OAppCore `setPeer`, OFTCore `setMsgInspector`/`_buildMsgAndOptions`, inherited ERC20. |
| e. fees | yes for bridge price/configuration: owner sets enforced message options, which feed `quoteSend`; owner/delegate changes messaging library/configuration at endpoint. no local ERC20 transfer tax or token-owner fee-payee setter. Exact numerical bridge prices and all third-party fee-provider controllers unknown (route/amount/options not specified; libraries/providers not exhaustively traced). R-X; [S7](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xd34a99bc0f67ae1bbd63c660e6d0b0dd03e263b7) `setEnforcedOptions`, `quoteSend`, OAppSender `_quote`; [L7](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x1a44076050125825900e736c501f859c50fe728c) `quote`, inherited MessageLibManager setters. |
| f. delay | no mandatory wait on owner `setPeer`, metadata or options updates. Endpoint configuration can have grace/timeout parameters, and delivery has latency; neither establishes a general mandatory wait for token-owner actions. OneSig expiry is a latest valid time, not a minimum wait. [S7](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xd34a99bc0f67ae1bbd63c660e6d0b0dd03e263b7) setters; [L7O](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xbe010a7e3686fdf65e93344ab664d065a0b02478) `executeTransaction`, `verifyMerkleRoot`. |
| g. source | yes — full verification for BridgedFP. Constructor name/symbol were Fren Pet/FP; live `name()`/`symbol()` are Identity.md/IMD. This is the exact supplied address, not a similarly named substitute. R7; [S7](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xd34a99bc0f67ae1bbd63c660e6d0b0dd03e263b7) constructor and mutable metadata methods. |

```json
{
  "proxy": "no",
  "implementation": "no",
  "admin": "no",
  "admin_owner": "no",
  "owners": [
    {
      "role": "owner and endpoint delegate",
      "address": "0x047f606fd5b2baa5f5c6c4ab8958e45cb6b054b7",
      "kind": "wallet",
      "controller": "unknown"
    },
    {
      "role": "endpoint",
      "address": "0x1a44076050125825900e736c501f859c50fe728c",
      "kind": "contract",
      "controller": "0xbe010a7e3686fdf65e93344ab664d065a0b02478"
    },
    {
      "role": "endpoint governance",
      "address": "0xbe010a7e3686fdf65e93344ab664d065a0b02478",
      "kind": "contract",
      "controller": "5-of-8 signers in R-F"
    }
  ],
  "mint": "yes",
  "mint_cap": "no",
  "pause": "yes",
  "fees": "yes",
  "delay": "no",
  "source_verified": "yes",
  "block": 26398577,
  "evidence": [
    "S7",
    "R7",
    "L7",
    "L7O",
    "R-S7",
    "R-X",
    "R-E",
    "R-F",
    "R-P",
    "R-W"
  ]
}
```

## 8. IMD seat NFT — Ethereum

Address: `0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d`; chain ID 1; state block 26398577.

| Form | Answer and attributable evidence |
|---|---|
| a. proxy | no — direct IdentityMD/ERC721 logic; standard slots zero and no proxy path in verified source. R8; [S8](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d). |
| b. owner/admin | Nominal owner `0x4e59b44847b379578588920ca78fbf26c0b4956c` is a contract (69-byte CREATE2 deployer runtime), not a wallet. `owner()`, `getOwners()`, `getThreshold()` reads on that address fail; explorer provides bytecode but no verified source/ownership ABI. Who owns/controls that contract: unknown; do not assign the transaction sender or its deployer as this NFT’s owner. The observed factory runtime has no general arbitrary-call forwarding path; effective exercise of NFT onlyOwner powers was not established. R8, R-W; [F8](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x4e59b44847b379578588920ca78fbf26c0b4956c). |
| c. mint/cap | yes mint function — public `mint(id)` to caller, one mint per wallet; yes code cap, IDs 0–1999 with duplicate rejection and no burn/remint route in this ABI. At block supply = 2,000, so all IDs exhausted and no additional mint can currently succeed. No privileged mint bypass. R8; [S8](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d) `mint`, MAX_SUPPLY and inherited ERC721. |
| d. pause/restrict | no administrative NFT-transfer pause/blocklist. `setIdentityAllowed` gates identity-hash edits, not minting or transfers; hook/pool addresses are not consulted by transfer logic. [S8](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d) `setIdentityHash`, setters, inherited ERC721 transfer hooks. |
| e. fees | no — mint is nonpayable/free, no price/fee/payee setters in NFT. No claim about markets or unrelated pool contracts. [S8](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d) `mint`, complete ABI/source. |
| f. delay | no mandatory timed delay in NFT owner setters. Solady’s 48-hour ownership-handover validity is an expiry window, not a waiting period; direct `transferOwnership` also exists. Whether the nominal owner contract can invoke those actions is unknown as above. [S8](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d) setters and included Solady Ownable. |
| g. source | yes — `is_verified=true` for NFT, partial verification. Its nominal owner contract is separately unverified; do not conflate these. [S8](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d), [F8](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x4e59b44847b379578588920ca78fbf26c0b4956c). |

```json
{
  "proxy": "no",
  "implementation": "no",
  "admin": "no",
  "admin_owner": "no",
  "owners": [
    {
      "role": "nominal nft owner",
      "address": "0x4e59b44847b379578588920ca78fbf26c0b4956c",
      "kind": "contract",
      "controller": "unknown"
    }
  ],
  "mint": "yes",
  "mint_cap": "yes",
  "pause": "no",
  "fees": "no",
  "delay": "no",
  "source_verified": "yes",
  "block": 26398577,
  "evidence": [
    "S8",
    "R8",
    "F8",
    "R-W"
  ]
}
```

## Explorer evidence catalogue

Each source reference is the exact public GET URL returning source, included dependencies, ABI and verification metadata. Function names cited above identify the relevant code within that response. Read times are retrieval UTC, not deployment dates.

| ID | Exact explorer read | Read UTC | Explorer verification |
|---|---|---|---|
| S2 | [ClausAdministrator](https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x979d5810d32292358639f25294472f01c95bdc46) | 2026-11-12T11:37:54Z | yes; partial |
| S1 | [TransparentUpgradeableProxy](https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x163015276f3244bc2ccb78b4d69cc8a4069effac) | 2026-11-12T11:37:54Z | yes; partial |
| S7 | [BridgedFP](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xd34a99bc0f67ae1bbd63c660e6d0b0dd03e263b7) | 2026-11-12T11:37:54Z | yes; full |
| S4 | [ClausNFT](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x80396c7131159eb92e7e84839e51c9887a7a95d9) | 2026-11-12T11:37:54Z | yes; full |
| S8 | [IdentityMD](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d) | 2026-11-12T11:37:54Z | yes; partial |
| I3 | [ProtectedToken](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x55d555bd85fed6ecf30fda9b4c76019b844218a7) | 2026-11-12T11:37:54Z | yes; full |
| S3 | [TokenProxy](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x1b54e762aa34cf6e28e9c082f2848e28e45da6b8) | 2026-11-12T11:37:54Z | yes; full |
| S5 | [Intake](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82) | 2026-11-12T11:37:54Z | yes; partial |
| S6 | [Intake](https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82) | 2026-11-12T11:37:54Z | yes; partial |
| A3 | [ProxyAdmin](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xfb4b9d2ba3ef17787bfe3fd90c3ea7b319807a57) | 2026-11-12T11:37:54Z | yes; full |
| W4O | [GnosisSafeProxy](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xcc4b5b07316be81ed6edb44ca61e4cab28a1950d) | 2026-11-12T11:37:55Z | yes; full |
| A1 | [ProxyAdmin](https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xcbc4bbd337e62c926c995e66a231e5e2b0a722a8) | 2026-11-12T11:37:55Z | no / source verification not established |
| L7O | [OneSig](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xbe010a7e3686fdf65e93344ab664d065a0b02478) | 2026-11-12T11:37:55Z | yes; full |
| W4 | [VRFV2PlusWrapper](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x02aae1a04f9828517b3007f83f6181900cad910c) | 2026-11-12T11:37:55Z | yes; partial |
| D3 | [EIP7702StatelessDeleGator](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x63c0c19a282a1b52b07dd5a65b58948a07dae32b) | 2026-11-12T11:37:55Z | yes; full |
| I1 | [MigrationToken](https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xd68727ddd50e8ba07e4be20d37a5ecf3dd814bff) | 2026-11-12T11:37:55Z | yes; partial |
| F8 | [unknown](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x4e59b44847b379578588920ca78fbf26c0b4956c) | 2026-11-12T11:37:55Z | no / source verification not established |
| L7 | [EndpointV2](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x1a44076050125825900e736c501f859c50fe728c) | 2026-11-12T11:37:55Z | yes; partial |

A1 includes a source template with a different verified-twin address; A1 itself is unverified. No assertion that the twin runtime equals A1 is made. F8 returns bytecode only; that does not establish its owner. All eight target endpoints return `is_verified=true`; partial versus full verification is preserved above.

## Exact read-call catalogue

For any catalogue entry, `CALL(address,data,B)` means exactly `eth_call([{"to":address,"data":data},B])`, with no supplied `from` or value. `CODE(address,B)` means `eth_getCode([address,B])`. `SLOT(address,slot,B)` means `eth_getStorageAt([address,slot,B])`. B is the explicit chain snapshot above. Hex return words are ABI-decoded as unsigned integers or the last 20 bytes for addresses. Results below are successful raw returns unless marked error. Reads on EOAs returning empty bytes do not prove an Ownable interface.

Standard slots: implementation `0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc`; admin `0xb53127684a568b3173ae13b9f8a6016e243e63b6e8ee1178d6a717850b5d6103`; beacon `0xa3f0ad74e5423aebfd80d3ef4346578335a9a72aeaee59ff6cb3582b35133d50`. Zero slots alone do not establish non-proxy status: full source/runtime was also considered.

### R1: 0x163015276f3244bc2ccb78b4d69cc8a4069effac, chain 4663, B=0x6b48487

| Exact method/data | Raw result or code observation |
|---|---|
| SLOT(target, implementation slot, B) | `0x000000000000000000000000d68727ddd50e8ba07e4be20d37a5ecf3dd814bff` |
| SLOT(target, admin slot, B) | `0x000000000000000000000000cbc4bbd337e62c926c995e66a231e5e2b0a722a8` |
| SLOT(target, beacon slot, B) | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |
| CODE(target,B) | 720 bytes; SHA-256 of decoded bytecode `d5cc83ab5f291a6e5d2154c167fe51f98fc6a8c19836cf4ecb5e7474f1cc60b0` |
| CALL(target, `0x8da5cb5b`, B) — owner() | `0x000000000000000000000000979d5810d32292358639f25294472f01c95bdc46` |
| CALL(target, `0xe30c3978`, B) — pendingOwner() | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |
| CALL(target, `0x06fdde03`, B) — name() | `0x00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000005436c617573000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |
| CALL(target, `0x95d89b41`, B) — symbol() | `0x00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000005434c415553000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |
| CALL(target, `0x18160ddd`, B) — totalSupply() | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000032dd723f494c9b0d6ac4bab` |

### R2: 0x979d5810d32292358639f25294472f01c95bdc46, chain 4663, B=0x6b48487

| Exact method/data | Raw result or code observation |
|---|---|
| SLOT(target, implementation slot, B) | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |
| SLOT(target, admin slot, B) | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |
| SLOT(target, beacon slot, B) | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |
| CODE(target,B) | 2188 bytes; SHA-256 of decoded bytecode `ae52cda9637a990b61cdd94c1251c001726402faa0bf38df55dd401980c8d6e6` |
| CALL(target, `0x8da5cb5b`, B) — owner() | `0x000000000000000000000000bb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5` |
| CALL(target, `0xe30c3978`, B) — pendingOwner() | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |

### R3: 0x1b54e762aa34cf6e28e9c082f2848e28e45da6b8, chain 1, B=0x192cf71

| Exact method/data | Raw result or code observation |
|---|---|
| SLOT(target, implementation slot, B) | `0x00000000000000000000000055d555bd85fed6ecf30fda9b4c76019b844218a7` |
| SLOT(target, admin slot, B) | `0x000000000000000000000000fb4b9d2ba3ef17787bfe3fd90c3ea7b319807a57` |
| SLOT(target, beacon slot, B) | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |
| CODE(target,B) | 1059 bytes; SHA-256 of decoded bytecode `6045d1fd8471174793c084c6191695584c3b6b6c57277b26237c0b2b5265bb56` |
| CALL(target, `0x8da5cb5b`, B) — owner() | `0x000000000000000000000000bb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5` |
| CALL(target, `0xe30c3978`, B) — pendingOwner() | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |
| CALL(target, `0x06fdde03`, B) — name() | `0x00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000005436c617573000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |
| CALL(target, `0x95d89b41`, B) — symbol() | `0x00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000005434c415553000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |
| CALL(target, `0x18160ddd`, B) — totalSupply() | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000024a81af33bb6001c34b2ae2` |

### R4: 0x80396c7131159eb92e7e84839e51c9887a7a95d9, chain 1, B=0x192cf71

| Exact method/data | Raw result or code observation |
|---|---|
| SLOT(target, implementation slot, B) | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |
| SLOT(target, admin slot, B) | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |
| SLOT(target, beacon slot, B) | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |
| CODE(target,B) | 16743 bytes; SHA-256 of decoded bytecode `442e33e5f19bff0202060161789637cd32a53fdcc217fe5bf821bf6315a492e1` |
| CALL(target, `0x8da5cb5b`, B) — owner() | `0x000000000000000000000000bb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5` |
| CALL(target, `0x06fdde03`, B) — name() | `0x00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000005436c617573000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |
| CALL(target, `0x95d89b41`, B) — symbol() | `0x00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000009434c4155532d4e46540000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |
| CALL(target, `0x18160ddd`, B) — totalSupply() | `0x000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000012c` |
| CALL(target, `0x24bbd049`, B) — mintOpen() | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001` |
| CALL(target, `0x427fbf5a`, B) — CAPACITY() | `0x000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000012c` |
| CALL(target, `0xfc0c546a`, B) — token() | `0x0000000000000000000000001b54e762aa34cf6e28e9c082f2848e28e45da6b8` |

### R5: 0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82, chain 1, B=0x192cf71

| Exact method/data | Raw result or code observation |
|---|---|
| SLOT(target, implementation slot, B) | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |
| SLOT(target, admin slot, B) | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |
| SLOT(target, beacon slot, B) | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |
| CODE(target,B) | 7384 bytes; SHA-256 of decoded bytecode `f5fff211a739f75cd4dd1f4b16b713c2d52fb9c146d378db27194ffc4a3327bb` |
| CALL(target, `0x8da5cb5b`, B) — owner() | `0x000000000000000000000000047f606fd5b2baa5f5c6c4ab8958e45cb6b054b7` |
| CALL(target, `0xe30c3978`, B) — pendingOwner() | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |
| CALL(target, `0xb837c58e`, B) — payTo() | `0x0000000000000000000000004e0fa57bde726079356537e2f34d671e9f41adbc` |
| CALL(target, `0x453a2abc`, B) — writer() | `0x0000000000000000000000003d3c0df7c1a17d384545e9d7c8228897bd9625cb` |
| CALL(target, `0x238ac933`, B) — signer() | `0x000000000000000000000000169b08ea234d7819eeabb246e34d8cd81e32279f` |

### R6: 0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82, chain 4663, B=0x6b48487

| Exact method/data | Raw result or code observation |
|---|---|
| SLOT(target, implementation slot, B) | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |
| SLOT(target, admin slot, B) | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |
| SLOT(target, beacon slot, B) | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |
| CODE(target,B) | 7384 bytes; SHA-256 of decoded bytecode `6b77479b91d15224d6fcff083374a864e25fa70604ee238b3b9801139ae42ec2` |
| CALL(target, `0x8da5cb5b`, B) — owner() | `0x000000000000000000000000047f606fd5b2baa5f5c6c4ab8958e45cb6b054b7` |
| CALL(target, `0xe30c3978`, B) — pendingOwner() | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |
| CALL(target, `0xb837c58e`, B) — payTo() | `0x0000000000000000000000004e0fa57bde726079356537e2f34d671e9f41adbc` |
| CALL(target, `0x453a2abc`, B) — writer() | `0x0000000000000000000000003d3c0df7c1a17d384545e9d7c8228897bd9625cb` |
| CALL(target, `0x238ac933`, B) — signer() | `0x000000000000000000000000169b08ea234d7819eeabb246e34d8cd81e32279f` |

### R7: 0xd34a99bc0f67ae1bbd63c660e6d0b0dd03e263b7, chain 1, B=0x192cf71

| Exact method/data | Raw result or code observation |
|---|---|
| SLOT(target, implementation slot, B) | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |
| SLOT(target, admin slot, B) | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |
| SLOT(target, beacon slot, B) | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |
| CODE(target,B) | 22990 bytes; SHA-256 of decoded bytecode `755038d06a586bf545db7f205b6683064e7402668c544ef0517fd552fb781443` |
| CALL(target, `0x8da5cb5b`, B) — owner() | `0x000000000000000000000000047f606fd5b2baa5f5c6c4ab8958e45cb6b054b7` |
| CALL(target, `0x06fdde03`, B) — name() | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000b4964656e746974792e6d64000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |
| CALL(target, `0x95d89b41`, B) — symbol() | `0x00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003494d440000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |
| CALL(target, `0x18160ddd`, B) — totalSupply() | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000382b3e5b7f663f4890000` |
| CALL(target, `0x5e280f11`, B) — endpoint() | `0x0000000000000000000000001a44076050125825900e736c501f859c50fe728c` |
| CALL(target, `0xfc0c546a`, B) — token() | `0x000000000000000000000000d34a99bc0f67ae1bbd63c660e6d0b0dd03e263b7` |

### R8: 0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d, chain 1, B=0x192cf71

| Exact method/data | Raw result or code observation |
|---|---|
| SLOT(target, implementation slot, B) | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |
| SLOT(target, admin slot, B) | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |
| SLOT(target, beacon slot, B) | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |
| CODE(target,B) | 5231 bytes; SHA-256 of decoded bytecode `b8366d19142014f729a217bca8d26aaad875bb29fa3e65290b8d456817c1cfba` |
| CALL(target, `0x8da5cb5b`, B) — owner() | `0x0000000000000000000000004e59b44847b379578588920ca78fbf26c0b4956c` |
| CALL(target, `0x06fdde03`, B) — name() | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000b6964656e746974792e6d64000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |
| CALL(target, `0x95d89b41`, B) — symbol() | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000449444d4400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |
| CALL(target, `0x18160ddd`, B) — totalSupply() | `0x00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000007d0` |
| CALL(target, `0x32cb6b0c`, B) — MAX_SUPPLY() | `0x00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000007d0` |

All eight target `eth_getCode` results matched the explorer API’s `deployed_bytecode` byte-for-byte at these blocks. Both proxy runtimes contain the corresponding admin address as an immutable, consistent with the storage slot; current implementation runtime was independently read and matched I1/I3 API bytecode. This avoids relying only on a proxy slot or a constructor’s original implementation address.

### R-S1: additional target calls (same chain/B as R1)

| Getter | Exact calldata | Raw result |
|---|---|---|
| receiptSigner() | `0x9e43c343` | `0x000000000000000000000000dbeae9444c38375a75d78ff3992cc5058a352d05` |
| migrationPaused() | `0x2a641114` | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001` |
| initialReserveSupply() | `0x30db9d05` | `0x000000000000000000000000000000000000000003346061c20606cc47564435` |
| adminMintedSupply() | `0x2c41812b` | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |
| sourceMigrationLimit() | `0xa37ce950` | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000031ac94f5e417460c66d7e92` |
| venueEnforcement() | `0x66727283` | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |

### R-S2: additional target calls (same chain/B as R2)

| Getter | Exact calldata | Raw result |
|---|---|---|
| operator() | `0x570ca735` | `0x0000000000000000000000008aca8890d34086d7a30b9c06fae25e0c3cda4cfa` |
| managedTarget(0x163015276f3244bc2ccb78b4d69cc8a4069effac) | `0xbe2ae686000000000000000000000000163015276f3244bc2ccb78b4d69cc8a4069effac` | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001` |
| managedTarget(0xcbc4bbd337e62c926c995e66a231e5e2b0a722a8) | `0xbe2ae686000000000000000000000000cbc4bbd337e62c926c995e66a231e5e2b0a722a8` | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001` |

### R-S4: additional target calls (same chain/B as R4)

| Getter | Exact calldata | Raw result |
|---|---|---|
| i_vrfV2PlusWrapper() | `0x9ed0868d` | `0x00000000000000000000000002aae1a04f9828517b3007f83f6181900cad910c` |
| BACKING() | `0x29a9736a` | `0x000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a968163f0a57b400000` |
| available() | `0x48a0d754` | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |
| pendingCount() | `0xea70b4af` | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |

### R-S7: additional target calls (same chain/B as R7)

| Getter | Exact calldata | Raw result |
|---|---|---|
| msgInspector() | `0x111ecdad` | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |
| preCrime() | `0xb731ea0a` | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |
| sharedDecimals() | `0x857749b0` | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000006` |

### R-W: owner and role code classification

Each row is exact `CODE(address,B)` on the named chain’s pinned block. For contract-role owner calls, calldata `0x8da5cb5b` is `owner()`.

| Chain | Address | Code observation | owner() / interpretation |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | `0x047f606fd5b2baa5f5c6c4ab8958e45cb6b054b7` | `0x` (code-free wallet) | `0x` |
| 1 | `0x169b08ea234d7819eeabb246e34d8cd81e32279f` | `0x` (code-free wallet) | `0x` |
| 1 | `0x3d3c0df7c1a17d384545e9d7c8228897bd9625cb` | `0x` (code-free wallet) | `0x` |
| 1 | `0x4e59b44847b379578588920ca78fbf26c0b4956c` | `0x7fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe03601600081602082378035828234f58015156039578182fd5b8082525050506014600cf3` | `error: {'code': -32003, 'message': 'out of gas: invalid operand to an opcode: 550000000'}` |
| 1 | `0xbb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5` | `0xef010063c0c19a282a1b52b07dd5a65b58948a07dae32b` | `error: {'code': 3, 'message': 'execution reverted', 'data': '0x'}` |
| 4663 | `0x047f606fd5b2baa5f5c6c4ab8958e45cb6b054b7` | `0x` (code-free wallet) | `0x` |
| 4663 | `0x169b08ea234d7819eeabb246e34d8cd81e32279f` | `0x` (code-free wallet) | `0x` |
| 4663 | `0x3d3c0df7c1a17d384545e9d7c8228897bd9625cb` | `0x` (code-free wallet) | `0x` |
| 4663 | `0xbb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5` | `0x` (code-free wallet) | `0x` |

For Ethereum `0xbb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5`, EIP-7702’s delegation marker is positively observed; D3 verifies EIP7702StatelessDeleGator. On Robinhood Chain the same address returns empty code. The factory owner() error is not interpreted as an owner address. Its entire 69-byte runtime is reproduced above, so the CREATE2-only/no general CALL-forwarder characterization is independently inspectable.

### R-A1: ProxyAdmin

Chain 4663, B=0x6b48487, address `0xcbc4bbd337e62c926c995e66a231e5e2b0a722a8`. `CALL(address,0x8da5cb5b,B)` returned `0x000000000000000000000000979d5810d32292358639f25294472f01c95bdc46`. `CODE(address,B)` returned 840 bytes, equal to the corresponding explorer deployed bytecode.

### R-A3: ProxyAdmin

Chain 1, B=0x192cf71, address `0xfb4b9d2ba3ef17787bfe3fd90c3ea7b319807a57`. `CALL(address,0x8da5cb5b,B)` returned `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000`. `CODE(address,B)` returned 1018 bytes, equal to the corresponding explorer deployed bytecode.

### R-X: additional role/dependency reads

| Label / chain / address | Exact read | Raw result or code observation |
|---|---|---|
| operator2 / 4663 / `0x8aca8890d34086d7a30b9c06fae25e0c3cda4cfa` | CODE(address, B) | `0x` |
| receipt1 / 4663 / `0xdbeae9444c38375a75d78ff3992cc5058a352d05` | CODE(address, B) | `0x` |
| wrapper4 / 1 / `0x02aae1a04f9828517b3007f83f6181900cad910c` | CODE(address, B) | 14693 bytes |
| wrapper4 / 1 / `0x02aae1a04f9828517b3007f83f6181900cad910c` | CALL(address, `0x8da5cb5b`, B) — owner() | `0x000000000000000000000000cc4b5b07316be81ed6edb44ca61e4cab28a1950d` |
| endpoint7 / 1 / `0x1a44076050125825900e736c501f859c50fe728c` | CODE(address, B) | 24005 bytes |
| endpoint7 / 1 / `0x1a44076050125825900e736c501f859c50fe728c` | CALL(address, `0x8da5cb5b`, B) — owner() | `0x000000000000000000000000be010a7e3686fdf65e93344ab664d065a0b02478` |
| endpoint7 / 1 / `0x1a44076050125825900e736c501f859c50fe728c` | CALL(address, `0x587cde1e000000000000000000000000d34a99bc0f67ae1bbd63c660e6d0b0dd03e263b7`, B) — delegates(address) | `0x000000000000000000000000047f606fd5b2baa5f5c6c4ab8958e45cb6b054b7` |

### R-E: external authority owners

| Label / chain 1 address | Exact read at Ethereum B | Raw result |
|---|---|---|
| wrapper_owner `0xcc4b5b07316be81ed6edb44ca61e4cab28a1950d` | CODE(address,B) | 171 bytes (contract) |
| wrapper_owner | CALL(address, `0x8da5cb5b`, B) — owner() | `{'code': 3, 'message': 'execution reverted', 'data': '0x'}` |
| wrapper_owner | CALL(address, `0xa0e67e2b`, B) — getOwners() | `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` |
| wrapper_owner | CALL(address, `0xe75235b8`, B) — getThreshold() | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000004` |
| endpoint_owner `0xbe010a7e3686fdf65e93344ab664d065a0b02478` | CODE(address,B) | 7197 bytes (contract) |
| endpoint_owner | CALL(address, `0x8da5cb5b`, B) — owner() | `{'code': 3, 'message': 'execution reverted', 'data': '0x'}` |
| endpoint_owner | CALL(address, `0xa0e67e2b`, B) — getOwners() | `{'code': 3, 'message': 'execution reverted', 'data': '0x'}` |
| endpoint_owner | CALL(address, `0xe75235b8`, B) — getThreshold() | `{'code': 3, 'message': 'execution reverted', 'data': '0x'}` |

Wrapper authority: NFT → wrapper → Safe → signers. Safe threshold 4 of 12; the `getOwners()` ABI array above gives all twelve addresses. Their CODE reads at B were all `0x` (plain wallets). No further controller step was taken. Safe modules/guards were not enumerated: signer threshold is not a claim that no alternate module path exists.

### R-F: external controller details

| Label / address | Exact read at Ethereum B | Raw result |
|---|---|---|
| onesig `0xbe010a7e3686fdf65e93344ab664d065a0b02478` | CALL(address, `0x94cf795e`, B) — getSigners() | `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` |
| onesig `0xbe010a7e3686fdf65e93344ab664d065a0b02478` | CALL(address, `0x42cde4e8`, B) — threshold() | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000005` |
| onesig `0xbe010a7e3686fdf65e93344ab664d065a0b02478` | CALL(address, `0xef09e78f`, B) — getExecutors() | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000000000000039f86ecef62c5bce23428d6b7c7050d9ecb0e346` |
| onesig `0xbe010a7e3686fdf65e93344ab664d065a0b02478` | CALL(address, `0x606c22e0`, B) — executorRequired() | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001` |
| safe `0xcc4b5b07316be81ed6edb44ca61e4cab28a1950d` | CALL(address, `0xa619486e`, B) — masterCopy() | `0x000000000000000000000000d9db270c1b5e3bd161e8c8503c55ceabee709552` |
| wrapper `0x02aae1a04f9828517b3007f83f6181900cad910c` | CALL(address, `0xa608a1e1`, B) — s_disabled() | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` |

Endpoint authority: token → endpoint → OneSig → signers (5 of 8). All eight `getSigners()` addresses had CODE=`0x` at B. `executorRequired()`=yes; executor `0x39f86ecef62c5bce23428d6b7c7050d9ecb0e346` is permitted to submit signed executions, not an independent replacement for threshold signatures; its ownership was not followed beyond the three-edge bound. OneSig source shows signature checks and expiry, with no mandatory minimum scheduling delay. This does not inventory every LayerZero message-library, verifier or fee-provider authority.

### R-P: current IMD trusted peers

Exact explorer log GET: [https://eth.blockscout.com/api?module=logs&action=getLogs&fromBlock=23501863&toBlock=26398577&address=0xd34a99bc0f67ae1bbd63c660e6d0b0dd03e263b7&topic0=0x238399d427b947898edb290f5ff0f9109849b1c3ba196a42e35f00c50a54b98b](https://eth.blockscout.com/api?module=logs&action=getLogs&fromBlock=23501863&toBlock=26398577&address=0xd34a99bc0f67ae1bbd63c660e6d0b0dd03e263b7&topic0=0x238399d427b947898edb290f5ff0f9109849b1c3ba196a42e35f00c50a54b98b); read during 2026-11-12 11:36–11:37 UTC. Result status `1`, message `OK`, three events (well below result cap). Filter exact emitter and topic `0x238399d427b947898edb290f5ff0f9109849b1c3ba196a42e35f00c50a54b98b` = `PeerSet(uint32,bytes32)`, both arguments non-indexed, decoded from two data words. Inclusive range 23,501,863 (creation receipt) through pinned 26,398,577. A direct RPC large-range attempt failed with a 10-block limit; it was not used as empty-log evidence. Explorer discoveries were re-read with the mapping getter at B, so historical events are not assumed to describe current state.

| EID | Exact calldata for CALL(token,data,B) | Current bytes32 peer |
|---|---|---|
| 30184 | `0xbb0b6a5300000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000075e8` | `0x000000000000000000000000ab152db8aac047b6757ffcf495ffe88d7712690a` |
| 30110 | `0xbb0b6a53000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000759e` | `0x000000000000000000000000374080d830b66a3e4c8ecbca846e922a2039a024` |
| 30416 | `0xbb0b6a5300000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000076d0` | `0x0000000000000000000000005f7bb59365ce557c26dbcaa4ee9d39a4b95b7127` |

EIDs are LayerZero endpoint IDs, not EVM chain IDs. Remote peer control/verification settings were not established; that part of mint authorization remains unknown. No global token-cap guarantee is inferred from a bridge burn/mint convention.

## Limits and local checks

Facts are the returned state, code and explorer flags recorded above. Negative capability conclusions are source-reading inferences over the installed implementations and their included dependencies; upgrade capability and external control are stated separately. Partial explorer verification, the unverified ProxyAdmin template, unverified factory ownership, untraced remote peer authorities and third-party fee providers limit certainty. None is replaced with a guessed controller.

Wall-clock research/report work began around 11:28 UTC; source reread completed 11:37:55 UTC. Work was batched across contracts, so no defensible per-contract careful-check duration was recorded. Do not divide the batch elapsed time by eight and treat it as a measured individual duration. No five-view comparison was attempted.

Local validation checks JSON parseability, exactly the thirteen requested keys in each of eight contract blocks, allowed categorical values, address casing, and output scope. It does not independently certify the substantive conclusions.