# Independent control check — view 5 Independent research on 2026-11-12 UTC. I did not read other views or published assessments of these contracts. This is a reading of declared powers, not an exploit review, a claim about private key custody, or an agreement summary. **Access limitation:** Ethereum Blockscout supplied source and verification metadata. Its documented read RPC returned a few successful reads, then rate-limit errors. Robinhood Blockscout returned HTTP 403 challenge pages, including on its read RPC. I therefore also used documented, unauthenticated public JSON-RPC **read methods** on public nodes for state. These RPC observations are identified below; they are not represented as successful explorer reads. The requested explorer-only transport was consequently not fully achievable. No login, private endpoint, transaction submission, or write method was used. Robinhood source-dependent conclusions remain unknown; another chain's source was not assumed to apply there. **Meaning of the comparable answers:** `mint` concerns an issuance path in the deployed code, even if capacity is currently exhausted; exhaustion is stated separately. `mint_cap` means an explicit aggregate units/IDs bound, not integer width or merely the absence of a mint function. `pause` concerns privileged restrictions on token/NFT transfers, including bridge transfers; non-token service gating is described separately. `fees` includes prices consumed from an external oracle and owner-controlled bridge options; direct transfer taxes are distinguished. `delay` concerns a mandatory elapsed-time wait in the target's owner-action code, not ownership acceptance, oracle confirmations, epochs, or transaction inclusion. External controller policies are not silently assumed. `no` in an implementation/admin field means not applicable because no proxy was found. A measured zero owner is a real returned value, never a placeholder. F = returned data; I = interpretation of source/runtime; U = unresolved. No source read or failed request has a block number invented for it. Source observations have UTC read times; state observations have pinned blocks and UTC read times. A getter without verified source establishes its returned address, but not completeness of the role list or the authorization logic. ## 1. CLAUS token — Robinhood Chain Chain id `4663`; address `0x163015276f3244bc2ccb78b4d69cc8a4069effac`. | Form | Answer | Evidence | | --- | --- | --- | | a. proxy | **yes (I)** — transparent-style eip1967 proxy: implementation `0xd68727ddd50e8ba07e4be20d37a5ecf3dd814bff`; admin `0xcbc4bbd337e62c926c995e66a231e5e2b0a722a8` (contract); admin `owner()` returns `0x979d5810d32292358639f25294472f01c95bdc46` (contract), whose `owner()` returns `0xbb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5` (plain wallet on this chain). The kind is inferred from runtime, not verified source. | R1, R3, R4, R49, R50, R7, R53 | | b. owner | **F:** token `owner()` returns `0x979d5810d32292358639f25294472f01c95bdc46`; owner chain: token → `0x979d5810d32292358639f25294472f01c95bdc46` (contract) → `0xbb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5` (plain wallet, empty code). Admin chain: token → `0xcbc4bbd337e62c926c995e66a231e5e2b0a722a8` → `0x979d5810d32292358639f25294472f01c95bdc46` → `0xbb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5` (three edges). **U:** other roles and the owner contract’s execution policy. | R2, R6, R7, R53 | | c. mint / cap | **unknown / unknown (U)** — implementation source/ABI unavailable; owner and proxy slots do not establish mint entry points, cap checks, or usable upgrade powers. | S1, S16, S17 | | d. pause | **unknown (U)** — no verified implementation source; no conclusion from an owner getter alone. | S1, S17 | | e. fees | **unknown (U)** — fee setters and current authorization could not be established. | S1, S17 | | f. delay | **unknown (U)** — proxy upgrade dispatch is visible, but the admin/owner execution policies and implementation owner actions are not established. | S1, S2, S16, S17 | | g. source | **unknown (U)** — explorer HTTP 403 is not evidence that source is unverified. This overrides the yes/no-only subquestion rather than inventing “no”. | S1, S16, S17 | ## 2. CLAUS owner contract — Robinhood Chain Chain id `4663`; address `0x979d5810d32292358639f25294472f01c95bdc46`. | Form | Answer | Evidence | | --- | --- | --- | | a. proxy | **unknown (U)** — all three eip1967 slots return zero; that alone cannot exclude other proxy schemes. Runtime is present; source was inaccessible. | R6, R9, R10, R11 | | b. owner | **F:** `owner()` returns `0xbb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5`; `pendingOwner()` is zero. `0xbb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5` has empty code on Robinhood Chain, so is classified as a plain wallet there. **U:** completeness of roles and any additional execution authority. | R7, R8, R53 | | c. mint / cap | **unknown / unknown (U)** — no source establishing whether this is an issuer, an executor, or a controller with callable mint powers. Its descriptive label is not proof. | S2 | | d. pause | **unknown (U)** — declared transfer or execution restrictions could not be established. | S2 | | e. fees | **unknown (U)** — declared price/payee powers could not be established. | S2 | | f. delay | **unknown (U)** — no verified code establishing owner execution delay. | S2 | | g. source | **unknown (U)** — HTTP 403; verification state unobserved. | S2 | ## 3. Old CLAUS token — Ethereum Chain id `1`; address `0x1b54e762aa34cf6e28e9c082f2848e28e45da6b8`. | Form | Answer | Evidence | | --- | --- | --- | | a. proxy | **yes (F/I)** — verified `TokenProxy`, inheriting `TransparentUpgradeableProxy` (eip1967 transparent). Current implementation `0x55d555bd85fed6ecf30fda9b4c76019b844218a7` (`ProtectedToken`); admin `0xfb4b9d2ba3ef17787bfe3fd90c3ea7b319807a57` (verified `ProxyAdmin`, contract); its current owner is `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000`. The immutable runtime admin matches the slot. | S3, S9, S10; R12, R15, R16, R48 | | b. owner | **F:** implementation-level `owner()` is `0xbb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5`; pending owner zero. `0xbb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5` is an EIP-7702 delegated EOA, not a plain wallet or an ordinary deployed contract: code points to `0x63c0c19a282a1b52b07dd5a65b58948a07dae32b`. The delegate verifies signatures against the account itself; it is not the account’s owner. **U:** outstanding subdelegations. Upgrade admin `0xfb4b9d2ba3ef17787bfe3fd90c3ea7b319807a57` is a contract with zero owner; its verified upgrade entry point is owner-only. | S9–S11, A2, A3; R13, R14, R51, R67, R48 | | c. mint / cap | **no / no (I)** — current `ProtectedToken` and inherited code expose no usable mint/initializer path; holder burn exists. No explicit numeric supply cap is coded. Supply cannot increase through the current implementation. Verified ProxyAdmin owner-only upgrades have no nonzero owner at the snapshot. | S3, S9, S10; R15, R48 | | d. pause | **no (I)** — inherited ordinary ERC20 transfer logic; no pause/blacklist hook. Historical restriction setters in `ProtectedToken` revert or do nothing, rather than authorize restrictions. | S9 | | e. fees | **no (I)** — no transfer levy, price, or payee setter in the token. The tax-limit getter is a constant, not a fee setter. External pool/hook economics are separate contracts and are not inferred from that getter. | S9 | | f. delay | **no (I)** — metadata and ownership actions have no elapsed-time check. Two-step ownership requires acceptance, not a timed wait. This is not a claim that all delegated-account policies were enumerated. | S9, S11 | | g. source | **yes (F)** — shell, current implementation, and admin all return `is_verified=true`, `is_fully_verified=true`. | S3, S9, S10 | ## 4. Claus NFT collection — Ethereum Chain id `1`; address `0x80396c7131159eb92e7e84839e51c9887a7a95d9`. | Form | Answer | Evidence | | --- | --- | --- | | a. proxy | **no (F/I)** — verified direct `ClausNFT` implementation and inherited source; explorer has no proxy/implementation entry. | S4 | | b. owner | **F/I:** immutable owner `0xbb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5`. Delegated EOA on Ethereum, with EIP-7702 code pointing to `0x63c0c19a282a1b52b07dd5a65b58948a07dae32b`; no separate `owner()` in that stateless delegate. The NFT owner can open minting, not replace the immutable owner. Further delegated permissions are unknown. | S4, S11, A2; R18, R51 | | c. mint / cap | **yes / yes (I)** — public `requestMint()` after owner opens minting; 50,000 CLAUS backing, once per wallet, free identity required, generally authenticated VRF fulfillment plus public `finishMints()`. The final free identity has a direct mint path. Cap is 300 outstanding identities; redeemed IDs can be reused, so not a lifetime issuance cap. **F:** open=true, supply=300, available=0, pending=0: no mint slot currently available. | S4; R19, R20, R71, R72 | | d. pause | **no (I)** — no privileged pause/blacklist of existing NFT transfers. Mint opening is one-way; it is not a transfer pause. External VRF wrapper can disable oracle requests, affecting minting, not transfers of existing NFTs. | S4, S13 | | e. fees | **yes (I)** for the consumed VRF oracle price; **no** collection-owner setter for backing, price formula, or oracle address. `mintPrice()` / `requestMint()` use wrapper `0x02aae1a04f9828517b3007f83f6181900cad910c`. Its owner can change pricing configuration and withdrawal recipients; `owner()` is Safe `0xcc4b5b07316be81ed6edb44ca61e4cab28a1950d` (contract). Safe reads: threshold 4, twelve owner wallets; see fee-controller trace. The collection’s backing amount remains fixed. | S4, S13–S15; R21, R65, R68, R69 | | f. delay | **no (I)** in collection owner actions: `openMint()` has no elapsed-time condition. VRF confirmations and daily reward epochs are different mechanisms. Safe/VRF external controller policies are not a collection timelock verdict. | S4, S13 | | g. source | **yes (F)** — `is_verified=true`, `is_fully_verified=true`, including inherited sources. | S4 | ## 5. IMD Intake — Ethereum Chain id `1`; address `0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82`. | Form | Answer | Evidence | | --- | --- | --- | | a. proxy | **no (F/I)** — verified direct `Intake`, no proxy implementation in explorer metadata or delegating shell in source. | S5 | | b. owner | **F:** owner `0x047f606fd5b2baa5f5c6c4ab8958e45cb6b054b7`, pending owner zero, writer `0x3d3c0df7c1a17d384545e9d7c8228897bd9625cb`, signer `0x169b08ea234d7819eeabb246e34d8cd81e32279f`; each has empty code on Ethereum (plain wallet). Payee `0x4e0fa57bde726079356537e2f34d671e9f41adbc` also has empty code, but receiving payments is not an admin role. **I:** owner can replace writer/signer/payee; writer completes requests; signer authorizes quotes. | S5, A1; R23, R24, R25, R26, R27 | | c. mint / cap | **no / no (I)** — payment/request intake, not a token/NFT issuer. It creates request IDs and records, not token units; no unit-supply cap applies. | S5 | | d. pause | **no (I)** for token transfers: no global transfer-pause switch or token ledger. Owner can disable an action/asset request sale by setting its price to zero; writer can withhold completion. Those are service restrictions, not an ERC20 transfer freeze. | S5 | | e. fees | **yes (I)** — owner `0x047f606fd5b2baa5f5c6c4ab8958e45cb6b054b7` can set action/asset prices and payee with `setPrice` / `setPayTo`; can replace signer. Current signer `0x169b08ea234d7819eeabb246e34d8cd81e32279f` signs individual quote terms, including amount, for `pay()`. Current payee `0x4e0fa57bde726079356537e2f34d671e9f41adbc`. | S5; R23, R26, R27 | | f. delay | **no (I)** — setters take effect in the call, with no elapsed-time gate; Ownable2Step acceptance is not a timelock. Quote expiry constrains payment, not owner updates. | S5 | | g. source | **yes (F)** — `is_verified=true`, `is_fully_verified=true`. | S5 | ## 6. IMD Intake — Robinhood Chain Chain id `4663`; address `0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82`. | Form | Answer | Evidence | | --- | --- | --- | | a. proxy | **unknown (U)** — code is present and all three eip1967 slots are zero, but verified source is inaccessible. No assumption of equivalence to the same Ethereum address. | R28, R34, R35, R36; S6 | | b. owner | **F:** getters return owner `0x047f606fd5b2baa5f5c6c4ab8958e45cb6b054b7`, pending owner zero, writer `0x3d3c0df7c1a17d384545e9d7c8228897bd9625cb`, signer `0x169b08ea234d7819eeabb246e34d8cd81e32279f`, payee `0x4e0fa57bde726079356537e2f34d671e9f41adbc`. All four nonzero addresses have empty code on Robinhood Chain (plain wallets). **U:** role enforcement, extra roles, and completeness without source. | R29, R30, R31, R32, R33; controller code reads below | | c. mint / cap | **unknown / unknown (U)** — descriptive name and identical address on another chain do not establish issuance code. | S6 | | d. pause | **unknown (U)** — no verified source establishing restrictions. | S6 | | e. fees | **unknown (U)** — payee/signer getters identify returned state, not who can change it or the pricing rules. | S6; R33, R32 | | f. delay | **unknown (U)** — cannot establish setters or mandatory delay from these getter reads. | S6 | | g. source | **unknown (U)** — HTTP 403; verification state unobserved. | S6 | ## 7. IMD token — Ethereum Chain id `1`; address `0xd34a99bc0f67ae1bbd63c660e6d0b0dd03e263b7`. | Form | Answer | Evidence | | --- | --- | --- | | a. proxy | **no (F/I)** — verified direct `BridgedFP`/OFT source and inherited code, no proxy implementation reported. | S7 | | b. owner | **F:** owner `0x047f606fd5b2baa5f5c6c4ab8958e45cb6b054b7`, plain wallet (empty code). **I:** owner controls metadata, peers, message inspector, enforced bridge options, pre-crime configuration and endpoint delegate selection. Immutable receiving endpoint `0x1a44076050125825900e736c501f859c50fe728c` is a protocol dependency, not an owner getter. Current peer senders/delegate settings and their upstream control are not enumerated here. | S7, A1; R38, R41, R54 | | c. mint / cap | **yes / no (I)** — inherited OFT receive flow credits by minting. `lzReceive` authenticates the immutable endpoint and a configured peer; owner chooses peers, but there is no owner-only arbitrary local mint method. No aggregate supply-cap check in `_credit` / `_mint`; uint64 shared-decimal message amounts are not a total-supply cap. **U:** current full peer list and remote issuance governance. | S7; R41 | | d. pause | **yes (I)** for bridge transfers: owner `0x047f606fd5b2baa5f5c6c4ab8958e45cb6b054b7` can remove/replace peers and install a reverting message inspector for outgoing sends. **no** owner pause/blacklist of ordinary same-chain ERC20 transfers. **F:** current inspector and pre-crime getters are zero. | S7; R42, R43 | | e. fees | **yes (I)** for bridge price inputs: owner `0x047f606fd5b2baa5f5c6c4ab8958e45cb6b054b7` can change enforced options consumed by `quoteSend`/`send`, affecting endpoint-quoted messaging cost. **no** direct ERC20 transfer-tax/payee setter. External endpoint/service tariff administrators are unknown in this bounded check; no fixed bridge fee is asserted. | S7 | | f. delay | **no (I)** — target owner setters use immediate authorization, no elapsed-time scheduling. Cross-chain delivery latency is not an owner timelock. | S7 | | g. source | **yes (F)** — `is_verified=true`, `is_fully_verified=true`. Source name `BridgedFP` and constructor strings “Fren Pet”/“FP” do not describe current metadata: live getters return “Identity.md”/“IMD”, and the verified code permits metadata updates. No address substitution was made. | S7; R39, R40 | ## 8. IMD seat NFT — Ethereum Chain id `1`; address `0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d`. | Form | Answer | Evidence | | --- | --- | --- | | a. proxy | **no (F/I)** — direct `IdentityMD` source and inherited ERC721, no proxy implementation reported. Verification is partial; see g. | S8 | | b. owner | **F:** owner `0x4e59b44847b379578588920ca78fbf26c0b4956c` is a contract: 69-byte runtime, not an empty-code wallet. **U:** upstream owner unknown. Explorer returns runtime without verified source; a simulated `owner()` getter fails, so it supplies no owner address. Trace stops after this one contract edge rather than guessing a person or wallet. | S8, S12; R45, R62, R63 | | c. mint / cap | **yes / yes (I)** as a code path: public `mint(id)`, IDs 0–1999, each ID once, once per wallet, free. Cap is 2,000. **F:** supply=2,000. There is no public burn/recycle path in the source, so no remaining new mint at this snapshot. This exhaustion is not an owner mint bypass. | S8; R46 | | d. pause | **no (I)** — inherited ordinary ERC721 transfer rules, no owner transfer-pause hook. Owner’s `identityAllowed` gates identity-hash updates, not transfers or minting; epoch/pool/hook settings do not modify transfer authorization. | S8 | | e. fees | **no (I)** — mint is free; no mint-price, transfer-tax, royalty/payee setter. Payable inherited ownership/transfer methods do not themselves levy a fee. | S8 | | f. delay | **no (I)** — target owner setters/transferOwnership have no elapsed-time wait. The inherited handover expiry is an acceptance window, not a mandatory delay. Upstream owner-contract policy remains unknown, and its ability to invoke these actions is not asserted. | S8, S12 | | g. source | **yes (F), partial verification** — `is_verified=true`, `is_partially_verified=true`, `is_fully_verified=false`. This answer follows explorer “verified” status, not a claim of full/exact compiler-input verification. The explorer-returned deployed runtime equals the pinned runtime. | S8 | ## Comparable JSON Outer keys identify `chain-id:address`; each contract object has exactly the thirteen requested keys. Reasons, proxy kinds, cap values, and scope qualifications are in the corresponding table and evidence below. Unknown verification remains `unknown` where the explorer could not be read. ```json { "4663:0x163015276f3244bc2ccb78b4d69cc8a4069effac": { "proxy": "yes", "implementation": "0xd68727ddd50e8ba07e4be20d37a5ecf3dd814bff", "admin": "0xcbc4bbd337e62c926c995e66a231e5e2b0a722a8", "admin_owner": "0x979d5810d32292358639f25294472f01c95bdc46", "owners": [ { "role": "owner getter", "address": "0x979d5810d32292358639f25294472f01c95bdc46", "type": "contract", "owner": "0xbb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5" }, { "role": "proxy admin", "address": "0xcbc4bbd337e62c926c995e66a231e5e2b0a722a8", "type": "contract", "owner": "0x979d5810d32292358639f25294472f01c95bdc46" }, { "role": "owner getter of controller", "address": "0xbb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5", "type": "plain wallet" } ], "mint": "unknown", "mint_cap": "unknown", "pause": "unknown", "fees": "unknown", "delay": "unknown", "source_verified": "unknown", "block": { "number": 112494184, "hex": "0x6b48668", "hash": "0x8ceca59d10a9573a1c7a2f7c02d211a87296461a93cf380f861410f8cc07793d", "timestamp_utc": "2026-11-12T11:32:27+00:00", "header_read_at_utc": "2026-11-12T11:37:13.966992+00:00" }, "evidence": [ "S1", "R1", "R2", "R3", "R4", "R5", "S2", "S16", "R6", "R7", "R8", "R9", "R10", "R11", "R49", "R50", "R53", "S17" ] }, "4663:0x979d5810d32292358639f25294472f01c95bdc46": { "proxy": "unknown", "implementation": "unknown", "admin": "unknown", "admin_owner": "unknown", "owners": [ { "role": "owner getter", "address": "0xbb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5", "type": "plain wallet" } ], "mint": "unknown", "mint_cap": "unknown", "pause": "unknown", "fees": "unknown", "delay": "unknown", "source_verified": "unknown", "block": { "number": 112494184, "hex": "0x6b48668", "hash": "0x8ceca59d10a9573a1c7a2f7c02d211a87296461a93cf380f861410f8cc07793d", "timestamp_utc": "2026-11-12T11:32:27+00:00", "header_read_at_utc": "2026-11-12T11:37:13.966992+00:00" }, "evidence": [ "S2", "R6", "R7", "R8", "R9", "R10", "R11", "R53" ] }, "1:0x1b54e762aa34cf6e28e9c082f2848e28e45da6b8": { "proxy": "yes", "implementation": "0x55d555bd85fed6ecf30fda9b4c76019b844218a7", "admin": "0xfb4b9d2ba3ef17787bfe3fd90c3ea7b319807a57", "admin_owner": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000", "owners": [ { "role": "token owner", "address": "0xbb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5", "type": "eip7702 delegated eoa" }, { "role": "proxy admin", "address": "0xfb4b9d2ba3ef17787bfe3fd90c3ea7b319807a57", "type": "contract", "owner": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" } ], "mint": "no", "mint_cap": "no", "pause": "no", "fees": "no", "delay": "no", "source_verified": "yes", "block": { "number": 26398580, "hex": "0x192cf74", "hash": "0xa4aed55bb305368bf803064782d0433b869f4b1fe046424e09dd140f1b9996fe", "timestamp_utc": "2026-11-12T11:32:11+00:00", "header_read_at_utc": "2026-11-12T11:37:13.565485+00:00" }, "evidence": [ "S3", "R12", "R13", "R14", "R15", "R16", "S11", "A2", "R51", "R52", "R66", "R67", "S9", "S10", "L1", "R47", "R48" ] }, "1:0x80396c7131159eb92e7e84839e51c9887a7a95d9": { "proxy": "no", "implementation": "no", "admin": "no", "admin_owner": "no", "owners": [ { "role": "immutable collection owner", "address": "0xbb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5", "type": "eip7702 delegated eoa" } ], "mint": "yes", "mint_cap": "yes", "pause": "no", "fees": "yes", "delay": "no", "source_verified": "yes", "block": { "number": 26398580, "hex": "0x192cf74", "hash": "0xa4aed55bb305368bf803064782d0433b869f4b1fe046424e09dd140f1b9996fe", "timestamp_utc": "2026-11-12T11:32:11+00:00", "header_read_at_utc": "2026-11-12T11:37:13.565485+00:00" }, "evidence": [ "S4", "R17", "R18", "R19", "R20", "R21", "S11", "A2", "R51", "R52", "R66", "R67", "S13", "S14", "S15", "R64", "R65", "R68", "R69", "R70", "R71", "R72", "R73", "R74", "R75", "R76", "R77", "R78", "R79", "R80", "R81", "R82", "R83", "R84" ] }, "1:0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82": { "proxy": "no", "implementation": "no", "admin": "no", "admin_owner": "no", "owners": [ { "role": "owner", "address": "0x047f606fd5b2baa5f5c6c4ab8958e45cb6b054b7", "type": "plain wallet" }, { "role": "writer", "address": "0x3d3c0df7c1a17d384545e9d7c8228897bd9625cb", "type": "plain wallet" }, { "role": "signer", "address": "0x169b08ea234d7819eeabb246e34d8cd81e32279f", "type": "plain wallet" } ], "mint": "no", "mint_cap": "no", "pause": "no", "fees": "yes", "delay": "no", "source_verified": "yes", "block": { "number": 26398580, "hex": "0x192cf74", "hash": "0xa4aed55bb305368bf803064782d0433b869f4b1fe046424e09dd140f1b9996fe", "timestamp_utc": "2026-11-12T11:32:11+00:00", "header_read_at_utc": "2026-11-12T11:37:13.565485+00:00" }, "evidence": [ "S5", "R22", "R23", "R24", "R25", "R26", "R27", "R54", "R56", "R58", "R60" ] }, "4663:0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82": { "proxy": "unknown", "implementation": "unknown", "admin": "unknown", "admin_owner": "unknown", "owners": [ { "role": "owner getter", "address": "0x047f606fd5b2baa5f5c6c4ab8958e45cb6b054b7", "type": "plain wallet" }, { "role": "writer getter", "address": "0x3d3c0df7c1a17d384545e9d7c8228897bd9625cb", "type": "plain wallet" }, { "role": "signer getter", "address": "0x169b08ea234d7819eeabb246e34d8cd81e32279f", "type": "plain wallet" } ], "mint": "unknown", "mint_cap": "unknown", "pause": "unknown", "fees": "unknown", "delay": "unknown", "source_verified": "unknown", "block": { "number": 112494184, "hex": "0x6b48668", "hash": "0x8ceca59d10a9573a1c7a2f7c02d211a87296461a93cf380f861410f8cc07793d", "timestamp_utc": "2026-11-12T11:32:27+00:00", "header_read_at_utc": "2026-11-12T11:37:13.966992+00:00" }, "evidence": [ "S6", "R28", "R29", "R30", "R31", "R32", "R33", "R34", "R35", "R36", "R55", "R57", "R59", "R61" ] }, "1:0xd34a99bc0f67ae1bbd63c660e6d0b0dd03e263b7": { "proxy": "no", "implementation": "no", "admin": "no", "admin_owner": "no", "owners": [ { "role": "owner", "address": "0x047f606fd5b2baa5f5c6c4ab8958e45cb6b054b7", "type": "plain wallet" } ], "mint": "yes", "mint_cap": "no", "pause": "yes", "fees": "yes", "delay": "no", "source_verified": "yes", "block": { "number": 26398580, "hex": "0x192cf74", "hash": "0xa4aed55bb305368bf803064782d0433b869f4b1fe046424e09dd140f1b9996fe", "timestamp_utc": "2026-11-12T11:32:11+00:00", "header_read_at_utc": "2026-11-12T11:37:13.565485+00:00" }, "evidence": [ "S7", "R37", "R38", "R39", "R40", "R41", "R42", "R43", "R54", "R56", "R58", "R60" ] }, "1:0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d": { "proxy": "no", "implementation": "no", "admin": "no", "admin_owner": "no", "owners": [ { "role": "owner", "address": "0x4e59b44847b379578588920ca78fbf26c0b4956c", "type": "contract", "owner": "unknown" } ], "mint": "yes", "mint_cap": "yes", "pause": "no", "fees": "no", "delay": "no", "source_verified": "yes", "block": { "number": 26398580, "hex": "0x192cf74", "hash": "0xa4aed55bb305368bf803064782d0433b869f4b1fe046424e09dd140f1b9996fe", "timestamp_utc": "2026-11-12T11:32:11+00:00", "header_read_at_utc": "2026-11-12T11:37:13.565485+00:00" }, "evidence": [ "S8", "R44", "R45", "R46", "S12", "R62", "R63" ] } } ``` ## Evidence: transport, blocks and calls Source endpoint documentation: [Blockscout get smart contract](https://docs.blockscout.com/api-reference/get-smart-contract). Read-method documentation: [Blockscout ETH RPC](https://docs.blockscout.com/devs/apis/rpc/eth-rpc), specifically `eth_call`, `eth_getCode`, `eth_getStorageAt`, `eth_chainId`, `eth_blockNumber`, and `eth_getBlockByNumber`. The official [Robinhood connection documentation](https://docs.robinhood.com/chain/connecting/) identifies the public node used here. Ethereum explorer RPC: `https://eth.blockscout.com/api/eth-rpc`. It returned `eth_blockNumber=[]` → `0x192cf74` at 2026-11-12T11:32:28.229590+00:00, and successful old-CLAUS owner/implementation reads in the initial batch; subsequent read requests returned “Too many requests” (`result=null`), including a final recheck at 2026-11-12T11:36:11.967770+00:00. Those failures are not treated as state values. Robinhood explorer RPC `https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/eth-rpc`, `eth_blockNumber=[]`, returned HTTP 403 at 2026-11-12T11:32:41.873433+00:00. Its source/address APIs likewise returned 403. Etherscan target/read pages returned 403; no claim depends on their unavailable content. **RPC evidence below uses these public read-only fallbacks:** Ethereum `https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com`; Robinhood `https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com/`. Requests are HTTP POST envelopes with `jsonrpc="2.0"`, `id=1`, the indicated method and parameters. No raw transaction method or signed payload was sent. - Ethereum: `eth_chainId([])` → `0x1` at `2026-11-12T11:37:13.241140+00:00`. Pinned block **26398580** (`0x192cf74`), hash `0xa4aed55bb305368bf803064782d0433b869f4b1fe046424e09dd140f1b9996fe`, block timestamp `2026-11-12T11:32:11+00:00`. Header read: `eth_getBlockByNumber(["0x192cf74",false])` at `2026-11-12T11:37:13.565485+00:00`. - Robinhood Chain: `eth_chainId([])` → `0x1237` at `2026-11-12T11:37:13.762357+00:00`. Pinned block **112494184** (`0x6b48668`), hash `0x8ceca59d10a9573a1c7a2f7c02d211a87296461a93cf380f861410f8cc07793d`, block timestamp `2026-11-12T11:32:27+00:00`. Header read: `eth_getBlockByNumber(["0x6b48668",false])` at `2026-11-12T11:37:13.966992+00:00`. For each R row, exact parameters are reconstructed without any unstated arguments: - `call`: `eth_call([{"to":TARGET,"data":INPUT},BLOCK])`; INPUT is the exact calldata shown, not a write transaction. - `storage`: `eth_getStorageAt([TARGET,INPUT,BLOCK])`; INPUT is the exact slot. - `code`: `eth_getCode([TARGET,BLOCK])`. BLOCK is `0x192cf74` for chain 1 and `0x6b48668` for chain 4663 in every R row. All R observations are on 2026-11-12; the time column is UTC. Zero-address returns are measured; empty bytecode `0x` is distinct from an owner getter returning empty bytes or reverting. Runtime SHA-256 values hash the decoded bytes, not their hex text. Full long runtimes are not reproduced, but the exact reads, byte lengths and fingerprints are. | ID / read | Chain | TARGET | Method / INPUT | Returned observation | Read time UTC | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | R1: rh-token:code | 4663 | `0x163015276f3244bc2ccb78b4d69cc8a4069effac` | code: `—` | 720 bytes; sha256 `d5cc83ab5f291a6e5d2154c167fe51f98fc6a8c19836cf4ecb5e7474f1cc60b0` | 11:32:31.541738 | | R2: rh-token:owner() | 4663 | `0x163015276f3244bc2ccb78b4d69cc8a4069effac` | call: `0x8da5cb5b` | `0x979d5810d32292358639f25294472f01c95bdc46` | 11:32:31.540679 | | R3: rh-token:implementation | 4663 | `0x163015276f3244bc2ccb78b4d69cc8a4069effac` | storage: `0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc` | `0x000000000000000000000000d68727ddd50e8ba07e4be20d37a5ecf3dd814bff` | 11:32:31.585995 | | R4: rh-token:admin | 4663 | `0x163015276f3244bc2ccb78b4d69cc8a4069effac` | storage: `0xb53127684a568b3173ae13b9f8a6016e243e63b6e8ee1178d6a717850b5d6103` | `0x000000000000000000000000cbc4bbd337e62c926c995e66a231e5e2b0a722a8` | 11:32:31.710021 | | R5: rh-token:beacon | 4663 | `0x163015276f3244bc2ccb78b4d69cc8a4069effac` | storage: `0xa3f0ad74e5423aebfd80d3ef4346578335a9a72aeaee59ff6cb3582b35133d50` | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` | 11:32:31.784162 | | R6: rh-owner:code | 4663 | `0x979d5810d32292358639f25294472f01c95bdc46` | code: `—` | 2188 bytes; sha256 `ae52cda9637a990b61cdd94c1251c001726402faa0bf38df55dd401980c8d6e6` | 11:32:31.800924 | | R7: rh-owner:owner() | 4663 | `0x979d5810d32292358639f25294472f01c95bdc46` | call: `0x8da5cb5b` | `0xbb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5` | 11:32:32.050018 | | R8: rh-owner:pendingOwner() | 4663 | `0x979d5810d32292358639f25294472f01c95bdc46` | call: `0xe30c3978` | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000` | 11:32:31.977364 | | R9: rh-owner:implementation | 4663 | `0x979d5810d32292358639f25294472f01c95bdc46` | storage: `0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc` | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` | 11:32:31.839480 | | R10: rh-owner:admin | 4663 | `0x979d5810d32292358639f25294472f01c95bdc46` | storage: `0xb53127684a568b3173ae13b9f8a6016e243e63b6e8ee1178d6a717850b5d6103` | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` | 11:32:32.081534 | | R11: rh-owner:beacon | 4663 | `0x979d5810d32292358639f25294472f01c95bdc46` | storage: `0xa3f0ad74e5423aebfd80d3ef4346578335a9a72aeaee59ff6cb3582b35133d50` | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` | 11:32:32.080197 | | R12: eth-old:code | 1 | `0x1b54e762aa34cf6e28e9c082f2848e28e45da6b8` | code: `—` | 1059 bytes; sha256 `6045d1fd8471174793c084c6191695584c3b6b6c57277b26237c0b2b5265bb56` | 11:33:32.981272 | | R13: eth-old:owner() | 1 | `0x1b54e762aa34cf6e28e9c082f2848e28e45da6b8` | call: `0x8da5cb5b` | `0xbb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5` | 11:33:35.102214 | | R14: eth-old:pendingOwner() | 1 | `0x1b54e762aa34cf6e28e9c082f2848e28e45da6b8` | call: `0xe30c3978` | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000` | 11:33:32.936160 | | R15: eth-old:implementation | 1 | `0x1b54e762aa34cf6e28e9c082f2848e28e45da6b8` | storage: `0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc` | `0x00000000000000000000000055d555bd85fed6ecf30fda9b4c76019b844218a7` | 11:33:33.412776 | | R16: eth-old:admin | 1 | `0x1b54e762aa34cf6e28e9c082f2848e28e45da6b8` | storage: `0xb53127684a568b3173ae13b9f8a6016e243e63b6e8ee1178d6a717850b5d6103` | `0x000000000000000000000000fb4b9d2ba3ef17787bfe3fd90c3ea7b319807a57` | 11:33:33.585252 | | R17: eth-nft:code | 1 | `0x80396c7131159eb92e7e84839e51c9887a7a95d9` | code: `—` | 16743 bytes; sha256 `442e33e5f19bff0202060161789637cd32a53fdcc217fe5bf821bf6315a492e1` | 11:33:33.851114 | | R18: eth-nft:owner() | 1 | `0x80396c7131159eb92e7e84839e51c9887a7a95d9` | call: `0x8da5cb5b` | `0xbb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5` | 11:33:33.858272 | | R19: eth-nft:mintOpen() | 1 | `0x80396c7131159eb92e7e84839e51c9887a7a95d9` | call: `0x24bbd049` | 1 | 11:33:34.112892 | | R20: eth-nft:totalSupply() | 1 | `0x80396c7131159eb92e7e84839e51c9887a7a95d9` | call: `0x18160ddd` | 300 | 11:33:34.112322 | | R21: eth-nft:i_vrfV2PlusWrapper() | 1 | `0x80396c7131159eb92e7e84839e51c9887a7a95d9` | call: `0x9ed0868d` | `0x02aae1a04f9828517b3007f83f6181900cad910c` | 11:33:34.379396 | | R22: eth-intake:code | 1 | `0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82` | code: `—` | 7384 bytes; sha256 `f5fff211a739f75cd4dd1f4b16b713c2d52fb9c146d378db27194ffc4a3327bb` | 11:33:34.825152 | | R23: eth-intake:owner() | 1 | `0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82` | call: `0x8da5cb5b` | `0x047f606fd5b2baa5f5c6c4ab8958e45cb6b054b7` | 11:33:34.885496 | | R24: eth-intake:pendingOwner() | 1 | `0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82` | call: `0xe30c3978` | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000` | 11:33:35.040502 | | R25: eth-intake:writer() | 1 | `0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82` | call: `0x453a2abc` | `0x3d3c0df7c1a17d384545e9d7c8228897bd9625cb` | 11:33:35.086712 | | R26: eth-intake:signer() | 1 | `0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82` | call: `0x238ac933` | `0x169b08ea234d7819eeabb246e34d8cd81e32279f` | 11:33:35.258053 | | R27: eth-intake:payTo() | 1 | `0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82` | call: `0xb837c58e` | `0x4e0fa57bde726079356537e2f34d671e9f41adbc` | 11:33:35.337317 | | R28: rh-intake:code | 4663 | `0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82` | code: `—` | 7384 bytes; sha256 `6b77479b91d15224d6fcff083374a864e25fa70604ee238b3b9801139ae42ec2` | 11:32:31.988457 | | R29: rh-intake:owner() | 4663 | `0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82` | call: `0x8da5cb5b` | `0x047f606fd5b2baa5f5c6c4ab8958e45cb6b054b7` | 11:32:32.039620 | | R30: rh-intake:pendingOwner() | 4663 | `0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82` | call: `0xe30c3978` | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000` | 11:32:32.140237 | | R31: rh-intake:writer() | 4663 | `0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82` | call: `0x453a2abc` | `0x3d3c0df7c1a17d384545e9d7c8228897bd9625cb` | 11:32:32.151292 | | R32: rh-intake:signer() | 4663 | `0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82` | call: `0x238ac933` | `0x169b08ea234d7819eeabb246e34d8cd81e32279f` | 11:32:32.145141 | | R33: rh-intake:payTo() | 4663 | `0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82` | call: `0xb837c58e` | `0x4e0fa57bde726079356537e2f34d671e9f41adbc` | 11:32:32.193249 | | R34: rh-intake:implementation | 4663 | `0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82` | storage: `0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc` | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` | 11:32:32.251113 | | R35: rh-intake:admin | 4663 | `0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82` | storage: `0xb53127684a568b3173ae13b9f8a6016e243e63b6e8ee1178d6a717850b5d6103` | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` | 11:32:32.243106 | | R36: rh-intake:beacon | 4663 | `0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82` | storage: `0xa3f0ad74e5423aebfd80d3ef4346578335a9a72aeaee59ff6cb3582b35133d50` | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` | 11:32:32.287089 | | R37: eth-imd:code | 1 | `0xd34a99bc0f67ae1bbd63c660e6d0b0dd03e263b7` | code: `—` | 22990 bytes; sha256 `755038d06a586bf545db7f205b6683064e7402668c544ef0517fd552fb781443` | 11:33:35.618095 | | R38: eth-imd:owner() | 1 | `0xd34a99bc0f67ae1bbd63c660e6d0b0dd03e263b7` | call: `0x8da5cb5b` | `0x047f606fd5b2baa5f5c6c4ab8958e45cb6b054b7` | 11:33:35.695036 | | R39: eth-imd:name() | 1 | `0xd34a99bc0f67ae1bbd63c660e6d0b0dd03e263b7` | call: `0x06fdde03` | `Identity.md` | 11:33:35.782457 | | R40: eth-imd:symbol() | 1 | `0xd34a99bc0f67ae1bbd63c660e6d0b0dd03e263b7` | call: `0x95d89b41` | `IMD` | 11:33:35.854804 | | R41: eth-imd:endpoint() | 1 | `0xd34a99bc0f67ae1bbd63c660e6d0b0dd03e263b7` | call: `0x5e280f11` | `0x1a44076050125825900e736c501f859c50fe728c` | 11:33:35.901548 | | R42: eth-imd:msgInspector() | 1 | `0xd34a99bc0f67ae1bbd63c660e6d0b0dd03e263b7` | call: `0x111ecdad` | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000` | 11:33:36.024147 | | R43: eth-imd:preCrime() | 1 | `0xd34a99bc0f67ae1bbd63c660e6d0b0dd03e263b7` | call: `0xb731ea0a` | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000` | 11:33:36.081987 | | R44: eth-seat:code | 1 | `0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d` | code: `—` | 5231 bytes; sha256 `b8366d19142014f729a217bca8d26aaad875bb29fa3e65290b8d456817c1cfba` | 11:33:36.460512 | | R45: eth-seat:owner() | 1 | `0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d` | call: `0x8da5cb5b` | `0x4e59b44847b379578588920ca78fbf26c0b4956c` | 11:33:36.546961 | | R46: eth-seat:totalSupply() | 1 | `0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d` | call: `0x18160ddd` | 2000 | 11:33:36.596411 | | R47: eth:0xfb4b9d2ba3ef17787bfe3fd90c3ea7b319807a57:eth_getCode | 1 | `0xfb4b9d2ba3ef17787bfe3fd90c3ea7b319807a57` | code: `—` | 1018 bytes; sha256 `d196e163d95fd3b1905bc409ebc43e9bd3f2d02bf329c1aa14fd1164d43045ae` | 11:34:13.881325 | | R48: eth:0xfb4b9d2ba3ef17787bfe3fd90c3ea7b319807a57:eth_call | 1 | `0xfb4b9d2ba3ef17787bfe3fd90c3ea7b319807a57` | call: `0x8da5cb5b` | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000` | 11:34:14.162641 | | R49: rh:0xcbc4bbd337e62c926c995e66a231e5e2b0a722a8:eth_getCode | 4663 | `0xcbc4bbd337e62c926c995e66a231e5e2b0a722a8` | code: `—` | 840 bytes; sha256 `7bee93a48c741f70ed1eef85fcc96bb2cdad01bb3ba94cef9798b210c5373726` | 11:34:13.876624 | | R50: rh:0xcbc4bbd337e62c926c995e66a231e5e2b0a722a8:eth_call | 4663 | `0xcbc4bbd337e62c926c995e66a231e5e2b0a722a8` | call: `0x8da5cb5b` | `0x979d5810d32292358639f25294472f01c95bdc46` | 11:34:14.135957 | | R51: eth:0xbb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5:eth_getCode | 1 | `0xbb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5` | code: `—` | 23 bytes; sha256 `7652a45dda6a3f58cf50f4b74a64b449053dba0d37db5c509169b6447b03dcd8`; code `0xef010063c0c19a282a1b52b07dd5a65b58948a07dae32b` | 11:34:13.885599 | | R52: eth:0xbb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5:eth_call | 1 | `0xbb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5` | call: `0x8da5cb5b` | error: {'code': 3, 'message': 'execution reverted', 'data': '0x'} | 11:34:14.172119 | | R53: rh:0xbb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5:eth_getCode | 4663 | `0xbb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5` | code: `—` | `0x` (empty code) | 11:34:14.362949 | | R54: eth:0x047f606fd5b2baa5f5c6c4ab8958e45cb6b054b7:eth_getCode | 1 | `0x047f606fd5b2baa5f5c6c4ab8958e45cb6b054b7` | code: `—` | `0x` (empty code) | 11:34:14.445660 | | R55: rh:0x047f606fd5b2baa5f5c6c4ab8958e45cb6b054b7:eth_getCode | 4663 | `0x047f606fd5b2baa5f5c6c4ab8958e45cb6b054b7` | code: `—` | `0x` (empty code) | 11:34:14.417558 | | R56: eth:0x3d3c0df7c1a17d384545e9d7c8228897bd9625cb:eth_getCode | 1 | `0x3d3c0df7c1a17d384545e9d7c8228897bd9625cb` | code: `—` | `0x` (empty code) | 11:34:14.785815 | | R57: rh:0x3d3c0df7c1a17d384545e9d7c8228897bd9625cb:eth_getCode | 4663 | `0x3d3c0df7c1a17d384545e9d7c8228897bd9625cb` | code: `—` | `0x` (empty code) | 11:34:14.837470 | | R58: eth:0x169b08ea234d7819eeabb246e34d8cd81e32279f:eth_getCode | 1 | `0x169b08ea234d7819eeabb246e34d8cd81e32279f` | code: `—` | `0x` (empty code) | 11:34:14.882183 | | R59: rh:0x169b08ea234d7819eeabb246e34d8cd81e32279f:eth_getCode | 4663 | `0x169b08ea234d7819eeabb246e34d8cd81e32279f` | code: `—` | `0x` (empty code) | 11:34:15.210766 | | R60: eth:0x4e0fa57bde726079356537e2f34d671e9f41adbc:eth_getCode | 1 | `0x4e0fa57bde726079356537e2f34d671e9f41adbc` | code: `—` | `0x` (empty code) | 11:34:15.278841 | | R61: rh:0x4e0fa57bde726079356537e2f34d671e9f41adbc:eth_getCode | 4663 | `0x4e0fa57bde726079356537e2f34d671e9f41adbc` | code: `—` | `0x` (empty code) | 11:34:15.343168 | | R62: eth:0x4e59b44847b379578588920ca78fbf26c0b4956c:eth_getCode | 1 | `0x4e59b44847b379578588920ca78fbf26c0b4956c` | code: `—` | 69 bytes; sha256 `e0af82ad2e5188285db8ba0b2ae054d13f0fd4fe325c48c7f2dace48454404b9`; code `0x7fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe03601600081602082378035828234f58015156039578182fd5b8082525050506014600cf3` | 11:34:15.604050 | | R63: eth:0x4e59b44847b379578588920ca78fbf26c0b4956c:eth_call | 1 | `0x4e59b44847b379578588920ca78fbf26c0b4956c` | call: `0x8da5cb5b` | error: {'code': -32003, 'message': 'out of gas: invalid operand to an opcode: 50000000'} | 11:34:15.845021 | | R64: eth-wrapper:eth_getCode | 1 | `0x02aae1a04f9828517b3007f83f6181900cad910c` | code: `—` | 14693 bytes; sha256 `4585737c18cef45ac5bb12c6b759201a8db9051b88083cb46b6b05f2b7b5cbbd` | 11:35:31.043792 | | R65: eth-wrapper:eth_call | 1 | `0x02aae1a04f9828517b3007f83f6181900cad910c` | call: `0x8da5cb5b` | `0xcc4b5b07316be81ed6edb44ca61e4cab28a1950d` | 11:35:31.264967 | | R66: eth-delegate:eth_getCode | 1 | `0x63c0c19a282a1b52b07dd5a65b58948a07dae32b` | code: `—` | 11185 bytes; sha256 `deb51590e22cdf9f70292f763d6d3aea8b078148aae082f3af1eca19bf0aa58c` | 11:35:31.210813 | | R67: eth-delegate:eth_call | 1 | `0x63c0c19a282a1b52b07dd5a65b58948a07dae32b` | call: `0x8da5cb5b` | error: {'code': 3, 'message': 'execution reverted', 'data': '0x'} | 11:35:31.410719 | | R68: safe:getOwners() | 1 | `0xcc4b5b07316be81ed6edb44ca61e4cab28a1950d` | call: `0xa0e67e2b` | 12 owner addresses; exact decoded list in fee-controller trace below | 11:38:38.448280 | | R69: safe:getThreshold() | 1 | `0xcc4b5b07316be81ed6edb44ca61e4cab28a1950d` | call: `0xe75235b8` | 4 | 11:38:38.684075 | | R70: safe-modules | 1 | `0xcc4b5b07316be81ed6edb44ca61e4cab28a1950d` | call: `0xcc2f845200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000032` | `0x000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000004000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` (empty module list; next sentinel 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000001) | 11:39:19.407175 | | R71: nft-available | 1 | `0x80396c7131159eb92e7e84839e51c9887a7a95d9` | call: `0x48a0d754` | 0 | 11:39:19.400411 | | R72: nft-pending | 1 | `0x80396c7131159eb92e7e84839e51c9887a7a95d9` | call: `0xea70b4af` | 0 | 11:39:19.412953 | | R73: safe-signer-0x1a2c8cb633c4768cae363b175b3d9bd7414f02f1 | 1 | `0x1a2c8cb633c4768cae363b175b3d9bd7414f02f1` | code: `—` | `0x` (empty code) | 11:39:19.687877 | | R74: safe-signer-0x582b97365b846f59bcaec80753d0756f66d2e12a | 1 | `0x582b97365b846f59bcaec80753d0756f66d2e12a` | code: `—` | `0x` (empty code) | 11:39:19.682746 | | R75: safe-signer-0x1a9afaea5a3d20f7a20082c6f1da655f73be96fc | 1 | `0x1a9afaea5a3d20f7a20082c6f1da655f73be96fc` | code: `—` | `0x` (empty code) | 11:39:19.689388 | | R76: safe-signer-0xb65b6d224351cd61f856c227b2d5cfc611e9b2d8 | 1 | `0xb65b6d224351cd61f856c227b2d5cfc611e9b2d8` | code: `—` | `0x` (empty code) | 11:39:19.968535 | | R77: safe-signer-0x4cd248bc8ce09ed1c0c0688c75c38902ac761967 | 1 | `0x4cd248bc8ce09ed1c0c0688c75c38902ac761967` | code: `—` | `0x` (empty code) | 11:39:19.960738 | | R78: safe-signer-0x236bff6a0239066d6586bd6f44021ae9a2d850b0 | 1 | `0x236bff6a0239066d6586bd6f44021ae9a2d850b0` | code: `—` | `0x` (empty code) | 11:39:19.953984 | | R79: safe-signer-0xab70e084de1da8289079c0acc1b40bb05cd7b8eb | 1 | `0xab70e084de1da8289079c0acc1b40bb05cd7b8eb` | code: `—` | `0x` (empty code) | 11:39:20.253512 | | R80: safe-signer-0x09afdcde1a87ad9ace7d965f580eff05ee1c7dc3 | 1 | `0x09afdcde1a87ad9ace7d965f580eff05ee1c7dc3` | code: `—` | `0x` (empty code) | 11:39:20.230045 | | R81: safe-signer-0x9ea1f784ae2c14dd39667031a4df4553d5690c80 | 1 | `0x9ea1f784ae2c14dd39667031a4df4553d5690c80` | code: `—` | `0x` (empty code) | 11:39:20.255231 | | R82: safe-signer-0x44713da18a0dd5c64ea7231651c16d177d09fbb5 | 1 | `0x44713da18a0dd5c64ea7231651c16d177d09fbb5` | code: `—` | `0x` (empty code) | 11:39:20.503983 | | R83: safe-signer-0x7c704eb7c6454d9c2cd3f460386a21adda71a8a7 | 1 | `0x7c704eb7c6454d9c2cd3f460386a21adda71a8a7` | code: `—` | `0x` (empty code) | 11:39:20.529113 | | R84: safe-signer-0x99b5c70f7cf97a44491466483439b630e875d773 | 1 | `0x99b5c70f7cf97a44491466483439b630e875d773` | code: `—` | `0x` (empty code) | 11:39:20.519500 | | R85: eth-implementation | 1 | `0x55d555bd85fed6ecf30fda9b4c76019b844218a7` | code: `—` | 5357 bytes; sha256 `2d85aeeb26d7f2cc96c27cbc40a82e504c2519b839bbd4a615a69a76c1f60622` | 11:39:20.738983 | | R86: safe-owner | 1 | `0xcc4b5b07316be81ed6edb44ca61e4cab28a1950d` | code: `—` | 171 bytes; sha256 `5b8bff324e02136edb0775bd77aa0fe773c1e23092305fe63f50a9e92f5b8faf` | 11:39:20.743391 | ### Runtime interpretation and limits For Robinhood CLAUS, the 720-byte runtime (R1) compares the caller to the hardcoded admin at byte offsets 0x05–0x34, dispatches the admin selector equal to `0x4f1ef286` (`upgradeToAndCall(address,bytes)`), and otherwise loads the eip1967 implementation slot at 0x67–0x88 and delegates at 0x9e. The admin branch writes that implementation slot and can delegate initialization. This supports the transparent-style classification; it does not establish that the controller contract will authorize any particular upgrade. Current implementation/admin slots agree with that runtime. For the other two Robinhood targets, zero standard slots are reported without treating them as proof of no proxy. For Ethereum targets, the five runtime byte strings returned by `eth_getCode` at the pinned block equal their corresponding explorer `deployed_bytecode` values byte for byte. This is an output consistency check, not independent source verification. Seat source remains partially verified. The old CLAUS proxy embeds the same immutable admin address returned by its admin slot; its verified current implementation has no implementation-slot writer or UUPS upgrade entry point. The verified ProxyAdmin upgrade entry point requires its owner; the returned zero owner is additionally corroborated by the explorer event below. EIP-7702 classification follows the [EIP-7702 specification](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7702): the prefix `0xef0100` identifies an EOA delegation indicator, not ordinary contract deployment. This distinguishes the Ethereum and Robinhood incarnations of the same owner address. The Ethereum delegate’s verified signature check recovers the delegated account itself. Its delegation-manager and entry-point mechanisms do not constitute an `owner()` hierarchy; active subordinate permissions were not enumerated. The binary “contract or plain wallet” wording is insufficient for this observed account type, so it is explicitly preserved in JSON. ### Fee-controller trace for the Claus NFT Immutable collection wrapper `0x02aae1a04f9828517b3007f83f6181900cad910c` → wrapper owner Safe `0xcc4b5b07316be81ed6edb44ca61e4cab28a1950d` → twelve signer addresses below. This is a dependency trace, not a transfer of NFT ownership. Source S13 makes wrapper configuration owner-only. S14/S15 identify a Safe proxy/current implementation. Reads R68, R69, R70 return twelve owners, threshold 4, and no enabled modules (pagination terminates at the sentinel). All twelve signer code reads return `0x`, so each is a plain wallet at the pinned Ethereum block. Guard/fallback policies and human custody were not established; the threshold is not claimed to exhaust every external policy. - `0x1a2c8cb633c4768cae363b175b3d9bd7414f02f1` (R73). - `0x582b97365b846f59bcaec80753d0756f66d2e12a` (R74). - `0x1a9afaea5a3d20f7a20082c6f1da655f73be96fc` (R75). - `0xb65b6d224351cd61f856c227b2d5cfc611e9b2d8` (R76). - `0x4cd248bc8ce09ed1c0c0688c75c38902ac761967` (R77). - `0x236bff6a0239066d6586bd6f44021ae9a2d850b0` (R78). - `0xab70e084de1da8289079c0acc1b40bb05cd7b8eb` (R79). - `0x09afdcde1a87ad9ace7d965f580eff05ee1c7dc3` (R80). - `0x9ea1f784ae2c14dd39667031a4df4553d5690c80` (R81). - `0x44713da18a0dd5c64ea7231651c16d177d09fbb5` (R82). - `0x7c704eb7c6454d9c2cd3f460386a21adda71a8a7` (R83). - `0x99b5c70f7cf97a44491466483439b630e875d773` (R84). ### Explorer source reads Every S row is an exact HTTP GET, with response time. API responses supplied both the main source and inherited/imported `additional_sources` where verified. Function references below identify the source code used for the interpretations; comments or contract names alone were not used to infer powers. | ID | Exact explorer API page | UTC read time | Observation and code used | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | S1 | [GET https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x163015276f3244bc2ccb78b4d69cc8a4069effac](https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x163015276f3244bc2ccb78b4d69cc8a4069effac) | `2026-11-12T11:31:13.930879+00:00` | HTTP 403; source and verification status unavailable. | | S2 | [GET https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x979d5810d32292358639f25294472f01c95bdc46](https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x979d5810d32292358639f25294472f01c95bdc46) | `2026-11-12T11:31:14.051490+00:00` | HTTP 403; source and verification status unavailable. | | S3 | [GET https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x1b54e762aa34cf6e28e9c082f2848e28e45da6b8](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x1b54e762aa34cf6e28e9c082f2848e28e45da6b8) | `2026-11-12T11:31:15.357774+00:00` | Verified/full: TokenProxy; TransparentUpgradeableProxy fallback/admin; ERC1967Utils; ProxyAdmin. Explorer current implementation matches pinned storage. | | S4 | [GET https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x80396c7131159eb92e7e84839e51c9887a7a95d9](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x80396c7131159eb92e7e84839e51c9887a7a95d9) | `2026-11-12T11:31:15.316786+00:00` | Verified/full: ClausNFT constructor, openMint, requestMint, finishMints, redeem, _update; inherited ERC721, NftRewards and VRF consumer. CAPACITY=300; BACKING=50,000 ether; no collection price setter. | | S5 | [GET https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82) | `2026-11-12T11:31:15.434016+00:00` | Verified/full: Intake request/_request, pay, complete, setPrice, setPayTo, setWriter, setSigner, setCallbackGas, _collect; inherited Ownable/Ownable2Step. | | S6 | [GET https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82](https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xa43e6f75ee006411f79ac1c84120606c2330de82) | `2026-11-12T11:31:14.215425+00:00` | HTTP 403; source and verification status unavailable. | | S7 | [GET https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xd34a99bc0f67ae1bbd63c660e6d0b0dd03e263b7](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xd34a99bc0f67ae1bbd63c660e6d0b0dd03e263b7) | `2026-11-12T11:31:43.777641+00:00` | Verified/full: BridgedFP metadata updates; inherited OFT _credit/_debit; OFTCore _lzReceive, _buildMsgAndOptions, quoteSend; OAppReceiver lzReceive; OAppCore setPeer/setDelegate; OAppOptionsType3 setEnforcedOptions; ERC20 transfer/_update. Initial constructor metadata is historical, not current. | | S8 | [GET https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x0000ec93127baa929e58e97dd0095a2bfb38ec1d) | `2026-11-12T11:31:15.153602+00:00` | Verified/partial, not full: IdentityMD mint, owner setters, identity hash gating; inherited Solady ERC721 and Ownable. MAX_SUPPLY=2000; owner handover is an expiry window. | | S9 | [GET https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x55d555bd85fed6ecf30fda9b4c76019b844218a7](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x55d555bd85fed6ecf30fda9b4c76019b844218a7) | `2026-11-12T11:31:43.163252+00:00` | Verified/full: ProtectedToken constructor disables initializers; burn/updateMetadata and historical restriction functions; inherited ERC20Upgradeable, Ownable2StepUpgradeable. No mint/transfer-tax/pause path or numeric cap. | | S10 | [GET https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xfb4b9d2ba3ef17787bfe3fd90c3ea7b319807a57](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xfb4b9d2ba3ef17787bfe3fd90c3ea7b319807a57) | `2026-11-12T11:34:15.333100+00:00` | Verified/full: ProxyAdmin upgradeAndCall is onlyOwner; inherited Ownable transfer/renounce emit ownership events; no arbitrary ownerless upgrade path. | | S11 | [GET https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x63c0c19a282a1b52b07dd5a65b58948a07dae32b](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x63c0c19a282a1b52b07dd5a65b58948a07dae32b) | `2026-11-12T11:35:30.980852+00:00` | Verified: EIP7702StatelessDeleGator; _isValidSignature and inherited EIP7702DeleGatorCore; no owner getter. Account itself is signature authority; delegated permissions not enumerated. | | S12 | [GET https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x4e59b44847b379578588920ca78fbf26c0b4956c](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x4e59b44847b379578588920ca78fbf26c0b4956c) | `2026-11-12T11:34:15.208184+00:00` | HTTP 200; runtime/creation bytecode returned without verified source/ABI or an owner hierarchy. No upstream owner established. | | S13 | [GET https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x02aae1a04f9828517b3007f83f6181900cad910c](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0x02aae1a04f9828517b3007f83f6181900cad910c) | `2026-11-12T11:35:30.809998+00:00` | Verified: VRFV2PlusWrapper setConfig, setFulfillmentTxSize, calculateRequestPriceNative, estimateRequestPriceNative, disable/enable, withdrawNative and inherited ownership. Config changes affect consumed oracle quote; withdrawal accepts recipient. | | S14 | [GET https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xcc4b5b07316be81ed6edb44ca61e4cab28a1950d](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xcc4b5b07316be81ed6edb44ca61e4cab28a1950d) | `2026-11-12T11:37:25.883961+00:00` | Verified: GnosisSafeProxy; explorer proxy_type=master_copy, implementation=0xd9db270c1b5e3bd161e8c8503c55ceabee709552. | | S15 | [GET https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xd9db270c1b5e3bd161e8c8503c55ceabee709552](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xd9db270c1b5e3bd161e8c8503c55ceabee709552) | `2026-11-12T11:38:38.219772+00:00` | Verified: GnosisSafe with OwnerManager getOwners/getThreshold; ModuleManager getModulesPaginated; Safe execution authorization. External guard policies not asserted absent. | | S16 | [GET https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xcbc4bbd337e62c926c995e66a231e5e2b0a722a8](https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xcbc4bbd337e62c926c995e66a231e5e2b0a722a8) | `2026-11-12T11:34:15.074080+00:00` | HTTP 403; admin source and verification status unavailable. | | S17 | [GET https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xd68727ddd50e8ba07e4be20d37a5ecf3dd814bff](https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/api/v2/smart-contracts/0xd68727ddd50e8ba07e4be20d37a5ecf3dd814bff) | `2026-11-12T11:45:40.672534+00:00` | HTTP 403 on the currently referenced Robinhood CLAUS implementation itself; source/ABI and verification status unavailable. | ### Additional explorer corroboration | ID | Exact explorer page | UTC read time | Observation | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | A1 | [GET https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/addresses/0x047f606fd5b2baa5f5c6c4ab8958e45cb6b054b7](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/addresses/0x047f606fd5b2baa5f5c6c4ab8958e45cb6b054b7) | `2026-11-12T11:36:31.493032+00:00` | is_contract=false for Ethereum Intake/IMD owner. | | A2 | [GET https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/addresses/0xbb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/addresses/0xbb145ca83272c3806d4ddc75ca1d5514789cf1c5) | `2026-11-12T11:36:31.665234+00:00` | is_contract=true, proxy_type=eip7702, implementation=0x63c0c19a282a1b52b07dd5a65b58948a07dae32b; this is why a simple nonempty-code=ordinary-contract rule is not used. | | A3 | [GET https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/addresses/0xfb4b9d2ba3ef17787bfe3fd90c3ea7b319807a57](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/addresses/0xfb4b9d2ba3ef17787bfe3fd90c3ea7b319807a57) | `2026-11-12T11:36:31.773048+00:00` | is_contract=true for old CLAUS ProxyAdmin. | | L1 | [GET https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/addresses/0xfb4b9d2ba3ef17787bfe3fd90c3ea7b319807a57/logs](https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/addresses/0xfb4b9d2ba3ef17787bfe3fd90c3ea7b319807a57/logs) | `2026-11-12T11:38:09.495110+00:00` | Complete returned log page (`next_page_params=null`): latest OwnershipTransferred event is block 26197788, previousOwner=0xbc34a5a7eacdfb4daca7e5a8ed874227c4962fff, newOwner=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000. Earlier transfer at 26197785 and constructor transfer at 26121996 are also returned. The latest event corroborates renunciation, not the constructor's historical owner. | ## Unanswered questions and timing Robinhood verification status and source-level issuance, cap, restriction, fee and delay powers remain unknown because the explorer was inaccessible. Successful address/slot reads do not fill those gaps. Other unresolved items are subordinate permissions of the Ethereum delegated owner, the seat-owner contract’s upstream control, full current LayerZero peer/remote governance and endpoint fee administration, and external Safe guard policies. These are explicit limits, not negative findings. No missing owner was replaced with a made-up address. Source reads began at 2026-11-12T11:30:53 UTC. Reads were interleaved across contracts and shared controllers; no isolated careful-check duration for one contract was measured. Per-contract elapsed time is therefore unknown. Timestamps above measure actual observations, not claimed audit effort. There is no five-view comparison in this independent assignment.